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INTRODUCTION
Baseball and Antitrust:
The Legislative History of the Curt Flood Act of 1998
In 1998, the 105th Congress passed legislation to address the
exemption enjoyed by Major League Baseball from the nation's antitrust laws
which were created in 1922 by the United States Supreme Court in Federal
Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball
Clubs. The Curt Flood Act of 1998 (Public Law Number 105-297) was named
for former Major League outfielder Curtis Charles Flood. The Supreme Court's
decision in 1972 in Flood's case against Commissioner Bowie Kuhn solidified
the exemption and served as the backdrop for a turbulent period in labor
relations between players and owners that resulted in the establishment of free
agency for certain players, the escalation of salaries, and the substantial
movement of players to different Major League teams.
The action by Congress was predicated upon Article XXVIII of the
Basic Agreement between the American League of Professional Baseball Clubs
and Major League Baseball Players Association that became effective on
January 1, 1997. Ownership and the Players Association were united in
petitioning Congress to allow players the same rights as other professional
athletes to use antitrust laws as potential leverage against owners in the
collective bargaining process. The passage of the act was the end result of over
forty years of consideration of Major League Baseball's special antitrust status.
The legislative history contained in this set covers the activities of four
Congresses during the 1990s that considered this long established peculiarity.
The set features an article by Ed Edmonds detailing the components of
the act, the history of Major League Baseball's antitrust exemption, the
development of the nonstatutory labor exemption by the Supreme Court in the
overall context of labor-antitrust relations and within the specific context of the
sports arena. The article concludes that the legislation will have a limited impact
upon the labor relations between the two parties because Supreme Court
jurisprudence leaves little use for antitrust leverage whenever a collective
bargaining relationship exists.
The set contains all of the relevant Congressional debate, the major
hearing and report from 1997, the presidential statement, various versions of the
legislation considered throughout the 1990s, and related hearings from 1992 to
1995. These documents will provide the reader with the final chapter in the long
struggle by Congress to address the antitrust status of Major League Baseball.
xiii
These volumes are the first in a series of legislative histories on sports
topics that will present not only the remaining chapters of this story but also the
documentary history of Congressional activity concerning boxing in the United
States, franchise relocation, the broadcasting of professional sports, and other
selected topics.
Edmund P. Edmonds
Director of the Law Library and Professor of Law
University of St. Thomas School of Law
May 2001
xiv
LEGISLATIVE CHRONOLOGY
January 21, 1997 - Introduced by Sen. Hatch
October 29, 1997 - Reported to Senate from the Committee on the
Judiciary with amendment
July 30, 1998 - Passed Senate, as amended
July 30, 1998 - Considered in Senate
July 31, 1998 - Referred to House Committee on the Judiciary
October 7, 1998 - Measure considered and passed in House
October 14, 1998 - Enrolled Measure signed in House
October 15, 1998 - Enrolled Measure signed in Senate; presented
to President
October 27, 1998 - Signed by President (Public Law 105-297)
xv

PART I
The Curt Flood Act of 1998:
A Congressional Response to
Baseball's Antitrust Exemption

THE CURT FLOOD.ACT OF 1998:
A CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO
BASEBALL'S ANTITRUST EXEMPTION
Edmund P. Edmonds'
In 1998, Congress passed legislation ostensibly designed to provide major
league baseball players with narrowly fashioned relief from three United States
Supreme Court decisions3 that gave Major League Baseball an exemption from
antitrust laws. The act was named in honor of Curtis Charles Flood,4 a courageous5
IDirector of the Law Library and Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas School of
Law, B.A., 1973, University of Notre Dame, M.L.S., 1974, University of Maryland, J.D., 1978,
University of Toledo. A version of this article was first published as The Curt FloodAct of 1998:
A Hollow Gesture AfterAll These Years? at 9 MARQ. SPORTs L.J. 315 (1999). The article was part
of a symposium that Included numerous discussions of the Act and the history of labor
relations In Major League Baseball. Permission to create a revision of that article to serve as
an introduction to this legislative history of the Curt Flood Act of 1998 was granted by Paul M.
Anderson, Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law and Assistant Director of the National Sports Law
Institute at Marquette University School of Law. The author wishes to express his appreciation
to Paul Anderson, Associate Professor J. Gordon Hylton and Matthew Mitten, Professor of Law
and Director of the National Sports Law Institute of the Marquette University School of Law for
their encouragement throughout this project. I also wish to thank Nancy L. Strohmeyer,
Associate Law Librarian for Public Services, Loyola University New Orleans School of Law, for her
expert editorial assistance, and William Manz, Executive Law Librarian, St. John's University Law
School Library, for his steadfast loyalty towards the completion of this project.
2Curt Flood Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-297, 112 Stat. 2824. The passage of the
Curt Flood Act of 1998 came after nearly fifty years of Congressional consideration of
baseballs antitrust exemption. For more details, see, e.g., Edmund P. Edmonds, Over Forty
Years In the On-Deck Circle: Congress and the BaseballAntitrust Exemption, 1994 T. Marshall
L. Rev. 627; Stephen R. Lowe, THE ID ON THE SANDLOT: CONGRESS AND PROFESSIONAL SPORTs, 1910-
1992, 15-60 (1995).
3See Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional
Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922); Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953); Flood
v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
4Curt Flood died on January 20, 1997, at the UCLA Medical Center after a
prolonged fight against throat cancer. See, e.g., Murray Chass, On Baseball: Flood Was a
Mon for Every Season, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1997; Baseball Pioneer Dies at 59: Flood Led Fight
for Player Free Agency, SEATRTE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 21, 1997, at DI; Baseball: Outfielders
Unsuccessful Challenge of Reserve System In 1970s Led to Free Agency, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 21,
1997, at Cl; 1. J. Rosenberg, Baseball Notebook: Players Owe a Tip of the Cop, and Much
More, to Flood, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSmUrLON, Jan. 26, 1997, at F02; Ross Newhan, Player
Champion Flood Dead at 59; Baseball: Outfielder's Unsuccessful Challenge of Reserve
System In 1970s Led to Free Agency, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1997, at Cl; Bob Broeg, Flood Fell a
1
baseball player who filed suit in 1969 against Major League Baseball's reserve
clause after being traded from the St. Louis Cardinals to the Philadelphia Phillies.
Flood was so incensed at the treatment accorded to him by his employers that he
wrote to Commissioner Bowie Kuhn demanding:
After twelve years in the major leagues, I do not feel that I am a piece of
property to be bought and sold irrespective of my wishes. I believe that
any system which produces that result violates my basic rights as a citizen
and is inconsistent with the laws of the United States and of the several
States.
It is my desire to play baseball in 1970, and I am capable of playing. I
have received a contract offer from the Philadelphia club, but I believe I
have the right to consider offers from others clubs before making any
decisions. I, therefore, request that you make known to all Major League
clubs my feelings in this matter, and advise them of my availability for the
1970 season.
Flood would ultimately lose his case before the Supreme Court. However, less than
five years later, arbitrator Peter Seitz would award free agency status to pitchers
Andy Messersmith and Dave McNally.7  The availability of free agency in
professional baseball has resulted in over two decades of phenomenal salary
growth.8 In addition to the escalation of salaries, the Major League Baseball
Few Singles Short of Fame and Riches, ST. Louis PoST-DISPATCH, Jan. 27, 1997, at CI; Richard
Reeves, Editorial, The Inglorious Undoing of a Proud, AngryMon, SEATrLE TIMES, Jan. 29, 1997, at
B4. For an interesting website highlighting Flood's life and legal legacy see
http://xroads.virginia.edu/-CLASS/am483_97/projects/brady/flood.html (visited on Feb. 10,
2001)
5Rep. John Conyers, Jr. (D-Mich.) Identified Flood as a courageous and beautiful
athlete during the Congressional discussion of the Curt Flood Act of 1998. 144 Cong. Rec.
H9942-03, H9944 (Oct. 7, 1998).
6CuRT FLOOD, THE WAY IT Is 194-195 (1971). See also BOWIE KUHN, HARDBALL: THE
EDUCATION OF A BASEBALL COMMISSIONER 83 (1987); MARVIN MILLER, AWHOLE DIFFERENT BALL GAME: THE
SPORT AND BUSINESS OF BASEBALL 190-191 (1991); LEE LOWENFISH, THE IMPERFECT DIAMOND: A HISTORY OF
BASEBALL's LABOR WARS 207 (Revised Edition 1991).
7National and American League Professional Baseball Clubs v. Major League
Baseball Players Ass'n, 66 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 101 (1976). See also Kansas City Royals
Baseball Corp. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 532 F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1976).
8See, e.g., MARTIN J. GREENBERG & JAMEST. GRAY, SPORTS LAW PRACTICE 437-442 (2nd Ed.
1998); ANDREW ZMBAUST, BASEBALL AND BILLIONS: A PROBING LOOK INSIDE THE BIG BUSINESS OF OUR
NATIONAL PASTIME 112-113 (1992).
2
Players Association has become a formidable force in negotiating collective
bargaining agreements with the owners.
The passage of the Curt Flood Act of 1998 by the 105th Congress came
over seventy-five years after the Supreme Court ruled in Federal Baseball Club of
Baltimore, Inc. v. National League ofProfessional Baseball Clubs9 that baseball
was not involved in interstate commerce or trade as customarily defined within the
context of sections one and two of the Sherman Antitrust Act.10 In taking this
action, Congress finally responded to the Supreme Court's plea in Toolson v. New
York Yankees" and Floodv. Kuhn'2 to seek a legislative solution to the exemption
created in Federal Baseball. The legislation further reacted to ajoint agreement
between Major League Baseball and the Major League Baseball Players
Association embodied in their most recent collective bargaining agreement to
appeal to Congress for a legislative change to the "anomaly" and "aberration"
recognized and reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Flood.13  Although the
legislation was hailed as significant by numerous Congressmen,14 one must ask
9259 U.S. 200 (1922).
1015 U.S.C. " 1-2 (1994).
11346 U.S. 356 (1953).
12407 U.S. 258 (1972).
"See Id. of 282. Rep. Henry Hyde (R-III.) noted In his Congressional testimony that
"(g]iven the agreement of the parties, Congress has now decided to legislate In this area, but
we do so only In an extremely narrow manner." 144 Cong. Rec. H9942-03 (1998 WL 694709
(Cong. Rec.)). Article X(VIll of the Basic Agreement Between the American League of
Professional Baseball Clubs and the National League of Professional Baseball Clubs and Major
League Baseball Players Association (effective Jan. 1, 1997), reprinted in GARY A. UBERS11NE,
editor, LAw OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS 5-149 (1988), provided that Major League
Baseball and the Major League Baseball Players Association would both lobby Congress for
legislation to "clarify that Major League Baseball Players are covered under the antitrust laws"
with the same rights as football and basketball players. Article )OXVII also stressed that the act
should not change antitrust laws in any other ways concerning the parties to the collective
bargaining agreement. Id. Furthermore, if legislation was not passed by December 31,
1998, the collective bargaining agreement would be terminated cn December 31, 2000,
rather than on October 31, 2000, or one day after the last game of the World Series in 2000,
as provided In Article XXVIl of the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 5-148. The Major
League Baseball Players Association was granted the right to exercise an extension option
under Articles XVii and XXVIll to push the agreement through the 2001 season. Id. at 5-148-
5-149.
14Rep. Mike Billrakis (R-Fla.), Rep. Jim Bunning (R-Ky), Rep. John Conyers, Jr. (D-
Mich.), Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), Rep. Henry Hyde (R-lit), Sen. Pat Leahy (D-Vt.).
3
whether this act is anything more than a hollow gesture to the memory of Curt
Flood. Although baseball players nowjoin basketball and football players in their
ability potentially to wage antitrust war against management, a series of cases 5
culminating in the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.16
insures that the nonstatutory labor law exemption will nearly always trump a
complaint predicated upon antitrust grounds.
This introduction to the legislative history of the Curt Flood Act of 1998
will first outline the provisions of the Act and recent decisions discussing the reach
of baseball's antitrust exemption. Second, Congressional commentary will be
discussed. Third, the development of the nonstatutory labor exemption by the
Supreme Court will be outlined followed by a discussion of its application to sports.
The article will conclude with an expression of the likely impact of the act on the
rights of players or management to use antitrust laws effectively against the other
party.
The Curt Flood Act of 1998
The purpose of the act as outlined in section two is "to state that major
league baseball players are covered under the antitrust laws."' 7 Section two further
notes that major league baseball players are granted the same antitrust rights as
basketball and football players.' The United States Supreme Court held in
Radovich v. National FootballLeague9 that the National Football League did not
enjoy the same antitrust exemption that the Court had granted to baseball in
Federal Baseball and Toolson.20 Fourteen years later, the Court held that
i'See Mackeyv. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976); McCourtv.
California Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp.
738 (D.D.C. 1976), affdin part, reVdin part, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Wood v. National
Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987); Bridgeman v. National Basketball Ass'n, 675 F.
Supp. 960 (D.N.J. 1987); Powell v. National Football League, 678 F. Supp. 777 (D. Minn. 1988);
Powell v. National Football League, 690 F. Supp. 812 (D. Minn. 1988); Powell v. National
Football League, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989); Powell v. National Football League, 764 F.
Supp. 1351 (D. Minn. 1991); McNeil v. National Football League, 790 F. Supp. 871 (D. Minn.
1982); Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996).
16518 U.S. 231 (1996).
"Curt Flood Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-297, ' 2, 112 Stat. 2824.
18See id.
19352 U.S. 445 (1957).
201d. at 447-448.
4
professional basketball was similarly not exempt from antitrust assault in Haywood
i National Basketball Association.2 1 The final clause of section two declares that
the act "does not change the application ofthe antitrust laws in any other context or
with respect to any other person or entity."22 The clause appears to assure the
owners and commissioner of Major League Baseball that all other aspects of the
business of baseball will remain free from antitrust challenge.
Section three declares that the legislation involves "the business of
organized professional major league baseball directly relating to or affecting
employment of major league baseball players."2 Furthermore, subsection (b)
reiterates that the act only relates to employment of players.24 The drafters of the
act have taken great pains to reinforce in numerous ways the extremely narrow
grant accorded in section two.
Subsection (b) then lists six instances in which the act does not change the
existing jurisprudence concerning baseball's antitrust exemption.2 First, the act
does not grant any rights to minor league players, including "any reserve clause as
applied to minor league players."2 Fearful that minor league players might employ
the act to rid themselves of the burden of the minor league reserve system, minor
league baseball owners petitioned their Congressmen to refrain from changing the
delicate balance that exists between major league and minor league baseball.
Minor league baseball has seen a significant resurgence in the past twenty-five
years in fan interest resulting in an increased financial value for franchise owners
and a greater rationale for cities to try to attract and keep minor league teams.27
Many cities with minor league teams have responded by investing millions of
dollars in new state-of-the-art facilities. A change in the employment conditions of
minor league players wouldjeopardize these expenditures. The second enumerated
item under subsection (b) underscores the act's grant of antitrust rights only to
21401 U.S. 1204, 1205 (1971). See also, Flood, 407 U.S. at 280; Denver Rockets v.
All- Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1060 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
22Pub. L. No. 105-297, '2.
231d. at '3(a)(emphasis added).
24See Id. at ' 3(b).
25See Id.
261d. at '3(b)(1).
27See, e.g., Zimbalst, supra note 8, at 112-113; NEIL J. SULUVAN, THE MINORS: THE
STRUGGLESAND THE TRIUMPH OF BASEBALL'S POOR RELATION FROM 1876 TO THE PRESENT 256-273 (1990).
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major league players by disallowing any claim based upon the Professional
Baseball Agreement between Major League Baseball and the National Association
of Professional Baseball Leagues, the governing body of minor league baseball.28
Franchise Relocation
The third feature of baseball specifically identified by the act as continuing
to enjoy protection from any antitrust action concerns "franchise expansion,
location or relocation, franchise ownership issues," and "the relationship between
the Office of the Commissioner and franchise owners." 29  Furtlermore, the
marketing or sales of baseball or the licensing of intellectual property rights cannot
be challenged.30 The Commissioner and the owners in baseball have not been
subjected to antitrust liability regarding franchise relocation as the National
Football League was in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National
Football League. In fact, in Wisconsin v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc.,32 the
Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the viability ofthe baseball exemption respecting
franchise relocation of the Braves from Milwaukee to Atlanta. The decision was
rendered in a suit claiming a violation of state antitrust law. Because the structure
of league was at issue, the court ruled against the state. However, the court stated
(w)e venture to guess that this exemption does not cover every type of
business activity to which a baseball club or league might be a party and
does not protect clubs or leagues from application of the federal acts to
activities which are not incidental to the maintenance of the league
structure ....
Furthermore, the drafters of the legislation appear to establish that the decisions in
Piazza v. Major League Baseball3 4 and Butterworth v. National League,35 should
"Pub. L. No. 105-297, '3(b)(2).
29ld. at '3(b)(3).
3 See id.
31726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984) (antitrust liability Issue) & 791 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir.
1986) (damages issue).
32144 N.W.2d 1 (Wis. 1966).
3 Id at 15.
34831 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
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not be relied upon. Rather, the drafters prefer the analysis found in New Orleans
Pelicans Baseball, Inc. v. National Association ofProfessional Baseball Leagues,
Inc.36 and Minnesota Twins Partnership v. State" determining that the entire
business of baseball is covered by the antitrust exemption.
In Piazza, the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
considered claims by Vincent M. Piazza, Vincent N. Tirendi and PT Baseball, Inc.
that Major League Baseball had interfered illegally in their efforts to purchase the
San Francisco Giants and relocate the team to Tampa Bay, Florida." Plaintiffs
asserted numerous claims under the United States Constitution, federal antitrust
laws, and certain state laws. Judge John Padova's thorough and analytical
decision40 discussed the standard of review, 41 federal Constitutional claims, 42 a civil
rights claim, the relevant market for antitrust analysis," and standing 45 before
turning to a consideration of baseball's antitrust exemption claim. Judge Padova
noted that each of the three cases involved the reserve clause.46 Major League
35644 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 1994).
'1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21468 (E.D. La. 1994).
31592 N.W.2d 847 (Minn. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1013 (1999).
38Plazza, 831 F. Supp. at 421.
3 See Id.
40Gary Roberts In The Curt FloodAct: A Brief Appralsal of the Curt Flood Act of 1998
from the Minor League Perspective, 9 MARQ. SPORTs L.J. 413 (1999) noted the "extraordinary
efforts" employed by Judge Padova. Professor Roberts also stated that "[t]his decision might
be dismissed as the bizarre and aberrational effort of one Italian-Arnerican judge to give
redress to two fellow Italian-American plaintiffs whom some National League owners had
allegedly defamed In connection with their purported efforts to buy a part interest in the San
Francisco Giants." Id. at 422.
41See Id. at 424-425.
42See Id. at 425-426.
43See Id. at 426-429.
"See Piazza, 831 F. Supp. at 429-431.
45See Id. at 431-433.
'
6See Id. at 435.
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Baseball argued that the exemption extended to the "business of baseball"
generally, while the plaintiffs asserted that the exemption was limited to the reserve
clause. Judge Padova asserted that "the Court in Flood v. Kuhn stripped from
Federal Baseball and Toolson any precedential value that those cases may have had
beyond the particular facts there involved, i.e., the reserve clause."48 Judge Padova
concluded that the exemption was properly limited to the reserve system, a non-
issue in the case, and "rejected Baseball's argument that it is exempt from antitrust
liability in this case." 49 In finding a narrow application for baseball's exemption,
Judge Padova distinguished Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn,5 0 a case involving
the power of the Commissioner to disapprove the sale for three baseball players
from the Oakland As to other teams.51 Judge Padova cited the finding of the court
in Henderson Broadcasting Corp. v. Houston Sports Association 5 2 which stated
that the exemption did not cover the broadcasting of games.
Butterworth5 3 involved the same factual context as Piazza. Florida
Attorney General Robert Butterworth issued antitrust civil investigative demands
against the National League and its president, Bill White, involving the Giants-
Tampa Bay situation.5 4 The Circuit Court of Florida's Ninth Judicial Circuit issued
an order quashing the Attorney General's investigation and civil investigative
demands and determined that the antitrust exemption applied.ss The Florida Fifth
District Court of Appeal affirmed the decision,s6 and certified a question to the
Florida Supreme Court requesting its determination as to the applicability of
baseball's exemption to the sale and relocation of franchises under federal and state
41See id.
48Piazza, 831 F. Supp. at 436.
49Id. at 438.
50569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978).
51831 F. Supp. 436-437.
52541 F. Supp. 263 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
5644 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 1994).
"See Id. at 1022.
"See Id.
5622 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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antitrust laws. The court ruled against Major League Baseball citing favorably the
decision in Piazza because of its thorough analysis of the issues and the case law.s7
Like Piazza, the Butterworth Court refused to extend the antitrust exemption
beyond the reserve clause.58
Despite the imaginative attempts to narrow the scope ofbaseball's historic
exemption by the courts in Piazza and Butterworth, a federal court in Louisiana and
the Minnesota Supreme Court found the arguments unpersuasive. In New Orleans
Pelicans Baseball, Inc. v. NationalAssociation ofProfessional Baseball Leagues,
Inc.,59 Judge Martin Feldman found that the exemption did indeed extend to the
entire business of baseball. The Pelicans case involved a dispute between two
rivals attempting to relocate minor league teams to the New Orleans market.
Groups representing both the AAA Denver Zephyrs franchise and the AA Charlotte
Knights were looking for a new home location after Major League expansion added
the Colorado Rockies and the Florida Marlins to the National League displacing
both minor league teams from their markets.60 According to the rules of the
National Association of Professional Baseball Leagues, the governing body of
Minor League Baseball, a league in a higher classification can control the territory
by submitting a notice in response to the request by a team from a lower
classification to relocate into that market.61 In turning aside plaintiffs arguments
that Piazza should control on a summary judgment motion, Judge Feldman noted
that "[a]lthough Piazza presents an impressive dissent from precedent, this Court
associates itself with the weight of authority."62
The Minnesota Supreme Court also refused to accept the rationale of
Piazza and Butterworth in Minnesota Twins Partnership v. State.63 The Minnesota
Attorney General's Office had requested compliance with civil investigative
demands concerning the possible sale and relocation of the Minnesota Twins
51644 So. 2d at 1025.
saSee id.
591994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21468 (E.D. La. 1994).
601d. at *3.
61ld. at *14-16.
621d. at *25.
6592 N.W.2d 847 (Minn. 1999), cert. denIed, 528 U.S. 1013 (1999).
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franchise." Major League Baseball argued that its antitrust exemption protected it
from compliance with the request. In reversing the decision of a Minnesota district
court ordering compliance, the Minnesota Supreme Court considered the historic
trilogy of United States Supreme Court cases as well asJudge Padova's analysis in
Piazza." The court decided:
"to follow the lead of those courts that conclude the business of
professional baseball is exempt from federal antitrust laws. Further, we
conclude that the sale and relocation of a baseball franchise, like the
reserve clause discussed in Flood is an integral part of the business of
professional baseball and falls within the exemption."67
The decisions in Pelicans and Twins undercut any attempts to rely upon
Piazza, Butterworth and Postema v. National League of Professional Baseball
Clubs.8 Congress has tried to foreclose any reliance on these three decisions
attempting to narrow the scope of the exemption and to reinforce the analysis
presented in Pelicans and Twins. However, the nature of the language of the Act
provides a slight crack in the otherwise air-tight nature of the legislation for an
imaginative judge like John Padova to argue that the language of the statute most
conform with the reality that the exemption has already been reduced to covering
only the reserve clause. Major League Baseball and its supporters will certainly
argue that such a reading goes against the meaning and intent of the legislators
passing this statute. Furthermore, such a reading would defeat the meaning ofall of
the language in section three of the act. However, the language allows for an
argument over the meaning of these cases within the context of the Act.
The fourth listed aspect of the business of baseball maintaining protection
under subsection 3(b)69 is the right to pool the league's transfer of broadcast rights
in "sponsored telecasts" under the Sports Broadcasting Act of 196 1.70 The great
4592 N.W.2d at 849.
65d. at 852-854.
6Id. at 855.
671d.
6799 F. Supp. 1475 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), reVdIn porton other grounds, 998 F.2d 60 (2d
Cir. 1993). See Infra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
69Pub. L. No. 105-297, § 3 (b)(4).
70See 5 U.S.C. §9 1291-1295 (1994).
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disparity between the broadcast rights of teams in large markets versus small
markets is probably the greatest challenge to the financial viability ofMajor League
Baseball because of the impact on salaries. In 1999, the New York Yankees
averaged over $3.6 million in salaries. 1 Los Angeles, Atlanta, and the New York
Mets all exceeded $3 million.72 By contrast, the Minnesota Twins took the honors
of the lowest average at slightly over $601,000 while Montreal and Kansas City
averaged below $800,000.73 This trend will only increase after the record-
shattering ten-year, $252 million deal between the Texas Rangers and Alex
Rodriquez.74
The fifth item listed under subsection (b) is the relationship between
organized professional baseball and umpires or other employees of organized
professional baseball. The most likely reason for this statutory language involves
litigation between umpires and Major League Baseball.
In Salerno v. American League of Professional Baseball Clubs,5 the
plaintiffs, umpires fired by the president ofthe American League, filed an antitrust
claim against the league. The umpires claimed that they were not discharged for
incompetence as claimed by the American League, but, rather, because of their
attempts to organize the umpires for collective bargaining with the league. The
case was decided two years prior to Flood. Judge Friendly of the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals declined to rule for the umpires feeling that serious doubt existed
as to whether or not a claim for breach of contract or tort would provide a basis for
an antitrust claim even if the exemption did not exempt Major League Baseball.
Judge Friendly deferred to the Supreme Court's rulings in Federal Baseball and
Toolson while offering his view about the vitality of the exemption.
71Ronald Blum, Average Baseball Solary up 18 Percent, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL,
Dec. 21, 2000 at 4B.
721d.
731d.
741d
75429 F.2d 1003 (2d Cir. 1970).
76See Id. at 1004.
771n one of the more eloquent statements regarding baseball's exemption prior to
Flood, Judge Friendly asserted:
[Wie continue to believe that the Supreme Court should retain the exclusive
privilege of overruling its own decisions, save perhaps when opinions already
11
Nine years ago, the National League defended an employment
discrimination and a common law restraint of trade case in Postema v. National
League ofProfessionalBaseball Clubs. Pam Postema, the first female to umpire
above the Class A level,79 argued that her termination by AAA Baseball on
November 6, 1989, was the result of gender-based discrimination.80 In refusing to
dismiss the common law restraint of trade claim, the court noted that "the
exemption does not provide baseball with blanket immunity for anti-competitive
behavior in every context in which it operates."8 1 In another blow to Major League
Baseball's desire to extend its exemption to the entire business ofbaseball, the court
concluded
that Defendants have not shown any reason why the baseball exemption
should apply to baseball's employment relations with its umpires. Unlike
the league structure or the reserve system, baseball's relations with non-
players are not a unique characteristic or need of the game. Anti-
competitive conduct toward umpires is not an essential part of baseball
and in no way enhances its vitality or viability. 82
Certainly, the drafters of the legislation are insisting that, notwithstanding the
language of Postema, the relationship between Major League Baseball and its
umpires should not be subjected to antitrust liability after the passage of act. Major
League Baseball's contentious relationship with the players was no less
delivered have created a near certainty that only the occasion is needed for
pronouncement of the doom. While we should not fall out of our chairs with surprise
at the news that Federal Baseball and Toolson had been overruled, we are not at
all certain the Court is ready to give them a happy despatch (sic).
Id. at 1005.
78799 F. Supp. 1475 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), reVdin parton other grounds, 998 F.2d 60 (2d
Cir. 1993).
79799 F. Supp. at 1478.
"For a discussion of Postema's career as a minor league umpire, see PAM POSTEMA &
GENE WOJCIECHOWSKI, YouVE GOT To HAVE B*LLs TO MAKE IT IN THIS LEAGUE: My LIFE As AN UMPIRE (1992).
For an analysis of Postema's lawsuit, see, e.g., Sharene A. McEvoy, The Umpire Strikes Out:
Posternav. National League: Major League GenderDiscriminalion, 11 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS
L. REv. 1 (1993).
81799 F. Supp. at 1489.
82Id.
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acrimonious than its relationship with the Major League Umpires Association, the
union headed by chief legal counsel Richie Phillips.83 In July 1999, Phillips badly
miscalculated appropriate strategy in negotiations with Major League Baseball
when union membership all offered resignations to force the hand of Major League
Baseball and the two leagues.84
The final listing under subsection (b) is an additional statement to ensure
that courts will not use the act to change preexisting antitrust laws beyond the scope
of the employment relationship of major league baseball players. The act
specifically excludes "any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons not in
the business of organized professional major league baseball"8 5 from coverage
under the statute.
Subsection (c) provides that only "a major league baseball player has
standing to sue."86 Four definitions are provided for what constitutes a "major
league baseball player" for the purposes of this subsection. The first definition is
any "party to a major league player's contract" or one who "is playing baseball at
the major league level."88 The second listed definition is one "who was aparty to a
major league player's contract or playing baseball at the major league level at the
time of the injury that is the subject of the complaint."89 The third definition allows
a claim for a former major league player or a former party to a major league
contract who alleges an antitrust violation for one "injured in his efforts to secure a
MSee Sean McAdam, The Day is Coming When Umps Won't Be Above the Law:
After Years of Increasing Power and Decreasing Performance By Umpires, Baseball Officials
are Tackling the Problem, PROVIDENCE SUNDAY JOURNAL, Oct. 18, 1998, at D1; Ross Newhan,
Budding Leader Bud Selig, Who Used to Soy He Didn't Want to be Commissioner, is Epected
to be Near-Unanimous Choice Today Because He's aKnown Quanfi, L.A. TIMES, July 9, 1998,
at C1.
84LiMn, Blumberg, Matusow and Young Files Lawsuit Against Commissioner Of
Baseball Bud Selg, Major League Baseball, and National American Leagues On Behalf of
Richle Philips, PR NEWSWIRE, Jan 3. 2001.
"Pub L. No. 105-297, § 3(b)(6).
861d. at § 3(c). This section created some concern for the Department of Justice
because It deprives them of standing.
71d. at § 3(c)(1)-3(c)(4).
88Id. at § 3(c)(1).
891d. at § 3(c)(2).
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subsequent major league player's contract."90 There is a provision within the
subsection, however, asserting that no claim can relate to employment "at the minor
league level, including any organized professional baseball amateur or first-year
player draft, or any reserve clause as applied to minor league players."9' The final
definition provides relief for:
a person who was a party to a major league player's contract or who was
playing baseball at the major league level at the conclusion of the last full
championship season immediately preceding the expiration of the last
collective bargaining agreement between persons in the business of
organized professional major league baseball and the exclusive collective
bargaining representative of major league baseball players.92
Three particular provisions under subsection (d) bear mentioning. The first is
contained within subsection (d)(2) reiterating that only employment issues within
Major League Baseball are subject to subsection (a).93 This provision presumably
limits the impact of decisions like Piazza and Butterworth that tried to alter the
long-standing position that the exemption applied to all aspects of the business of
baseball.
The second important provision within subsection (d), (d)(4), presents
perhaps the most significant limitation on the reach ofthe new act: "Nothing in this
section shall be construed to affect the application to organized professional
baseball of the nonstatutory labor exemption from the antitrust laws."94 This
subsection, the focus of the majority of the rest of this article, effectively precludes
the use of the antitrust leverage provided by the act within the context of a labor
relationship.
Finally, subsection (d)(5) states that "(t)he scope of the conduct, acts,
practices, or agreements covered by subsection (b) shall not be strictly or narrowly
construed."95 This pro-management component ofthe act was written so that major
lId. at § 3(c)(3).
91ld.
9Id.
93See id, at § 3(d)(2).
9ld. at § 3(d)(4).
95Pub. L. No. 105-297, § 3(d)(5).
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league ownership could assert to a court any additional set of factors necessary to
insure the strict construction of subsection (a) limiting the antitrust implications of
the act solely to employment issues. This subsection seems to assure by
redundancy the unequivocal desire of the drafters not to allow a court any opening
to assert that antitrust law can be used in a non-labor area.
Congressional Commentary
Congressional concern over baseball's special treatment under the nations
antitrust law spanned five decades,96 including numerous hearings and the
introduction of a significant number of bills that never reached the floor of
Congress. However, the 1994 strike by players, highlighted by the cancellation of
the World Series, increased Congressional interest. Furthermore, the inclusion of
Article XXVII7 in the collective bargaining agreement that ended the labor
discord pushed both ownership and the MLBPA towards a real Congressional
consideration ofthe antitrust exemption. Senators Orrin Hatch (R-UT) and Patrick
Leahy (D-VT) responded by the introduction of the Curt Flood Act of 1997, S.
53. The legislation simply declared that "the antitrust laws shall apply to the
business of professional major league baseball"99 while listing that the act would
not affect the existing applicability or nonapplicability of antitrust laws to certain
aspects of minor league baseball, franchise relocation, and the Sports Broadcasting
Act.'" Despite the listed assurances to minor league baseball, the National
Association of Professional Baseball Leagues, the governing body of minor leagues
was not satisfied. The NAPBL quickly marshaled its significant political clout
based upon the great number of Congressional members with minor league baseball
in their district.
Hearings were held by the Senate Judiciary Committee on June 17, 1997.
Donald Fehr, Executive Director ofthe Major League Baseball Players Association,
and Dan Peltier, a former player at nearly every level of minor and major league
baseball testified.o'0 Although Stanley Brand had been invited to testify on behalf
96See Edmonds, supra note 2 and Lowe, supra note 2.
97See supra note 13.
98S. 53, 105th Cong., Ist Sess. (1997).
"l9d.
100ld.
i"iMajor League Baseball Antitrust Reform: Hearings on S. 53 Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997).
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of the NAPBL, he did not appear after requesting a delay in the hearing. Further,
Allan H. "Bud" Selig, chairman of the Major League Executive Council, declined
to appear.
On October 29, 1997, Senate Report 105-118,102 was issued
recommending the passage of a significantly amended S. 53. In revising the
language relating to the minor league, the Report noted that "[t]he Committee has
consistently sought not to adversely affect the legal status of the minor leagues or
minor league players." 0 3 The final vote of the Judiciary Committee was eleven
yeas to six nays with one recusal. 0 4
In the discussion on the floor of Congress, Representative Henry Hyde (R-
IL) urged passage of the bill noting: "(a)fter years of disagreement, the baseball
players, the baseball owners, and the minor leagues have reached an historic
agreement on the application of the antitrust laws to labor relations in baseball." 05
After listing the trilogy of Supreme Court cases establishing baseball's exemption,
Representative Hyde stated "(g)iven the agreement ofthe parties, Congress has now
decided to legislate in this area, but we do so only in an extremely narrow
manner." 06 After discussing the collective bargaining agreement clause requiring
Major League Baseball and the Major League Baseball Players Association to
petition Congress for legislative action, Representative Hyde stressed the
importance of the nonstatutory labor exemption:
I want to note that nothing in this bill will affect in any way the
protections afforded to the major league clubs by the nonstatutory labor
exemption .... (B)oth the players and the owners were willing to support
the repeal of the specific and narrow portion of the baseball exemption
covering labor relations between major league players and major league
clubs. The bill was carefully drafted, however, to leave the remainder of
the exemption intact. 07
1 S. Rep. 105-118, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997).
1031d. at 4.
1
"Id. at 5.
105144 Cong. Rec. H9943 (Oct. 7, 1998).
10 6Id.
10 7Id.
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Representative Hyde next turned his attention to issues raised by minor league
owners by asserting that the act would not provide any relief to one trying to attack
any aspect of minor league employment.'08 Before turning over the discussion to
Representative John Conyers, Jr. (D-Mich.), Representative Hyde supported the
narrow construction of the legislation by noting that "this bill does not affect the
application of the antitrust laws to anyone outside the business of baseball."'
Representative Conyers opened by asserting that "professional baseball is
the only industry in the United States exempt from the antitrust laws without being
subject to regulatory supervision.'o Representative Conyers stressed that
baseball's numerous work stoppages begged for a Congressional response in order
to bring baseball within the same antitrust purview as other professional sports."
The commentary offered by Jim Bunning (R-KY) was particularly
interesting because he is a member of the Baseball Hall of Fame and a former
member of the Executive Board ofthe Major League Baseball Players Association.
He threw his "strong support" behind the legislation,"l 2 while stating that
"personally, I think this exemption should be repealed altogether."" 3
Representative Sherwood L. Boehlert (R-NY), the chairman of the Minor League
Baseball Caucus," 4 after naming some baseball luminaries, pointed out the
importance of the legislation's maintenance of the antitrust exemption for minor
league baseball and its 35 million fans." 5
10OSee Id.
'eld.
noCong. Rec. H49942-03, H9943 (1998).
nISee Id.
12 Id.
" 144 Cong. Rec. at H9945.
"
1 For a discussion of Representative Boehlert and the Minor League Baseball
Caucus, see, e.g., Robert Gavin, Boehlerts Hardball Politics May Be His Calling, But Baseball is
a Passion for Rep. Sherwood Boehlert, SYRACUSE POST-STANDARD, Aug. 11, 1997, at Al; Paul
White, Will Antitrust Fight Wreck the Minors, BASEBALL WEEK Y, Mar. 5, 1997, at 2; Jonathan D.
Salant, Minor Leagues Find Backing In Congress, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Aug. 22, 1993, at
1 0A; Penny Bender, New Caucus Enters Froy Over Baseball Exemption, Gannett News Service,
Aug.20, 1993.
"
5See 144 Cong. Rec, at H9945.
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The Congressional commentary on the Curt Flood Act of 1998
underscored the narrow scope ofthe legislation. Although heralded as an important
step forward in providing major league baseball players with similar antitrust rights
as basketball and football players, the nonstatutory labor exemption far
overshadows the value of antitrust rights in the professional sports context.
The Nonstatutory Labor Exemption
To gauge the value of the Curt Flood Act of 1998 for major league
baseball players, one must discuss the development of the nonstatutory labor
exemption alluded to in section 3(d)(4) of the act."' 6 The development of this
exemption during the past three decades has left most professional team sports'
athletes in a position where collective bargaining and the policy of federal labor
laws will nearly always trump antitrust claims.
Prior to addressing the nonstatutory labor exemption in the sports context,
it is important to consider the development of the relationship between antitrust
laws and labor laws in Supreme Court jurisprudence throughout the past century.
The early relationship between antitrust laws and labor laws tilted strongly towards
the preeminance of antitrust laws. In 1908 the Supreme Court in Loewe v. Lawlor
17 decided that union collective activity violated the Sherman Act."'8 The lawsuit
focused on the actions of United Hatters of North America, a member of the
American Federation of Labor, against the co-partners, owners of Loewe &
Company, a Danbury, Connecticut hat-making factory. Congress ultimately
responded by creating a statutory exemption"'9 for labor law which provided that
labor unions were not illegal combinations in restraint of trade and limited federal
courts in their injunctive powers in the area of labor law.
In 1940 the Supreme Court in Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader 20 considered
the antitrust liability of a union, the American Federation of Full Fashioned Hosiery
16Pub. L. No. 105-297, § 3(d)(4).
i"208 U.S. 274 (1908).
"
8See id. at 292-297.
119The statutory exemption is based on sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 17 and 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1994) and the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115
(1994).
120310 U.S. 469 (1940).
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Workers, involved in a sit-down strike against the Apex Hosiery Company. 121 The
purpose of the strike was to force Apex to recognize the union.'22 The Court held
that the strike was not a restraint directed at the product market of Apex's business
' and did not produce effects which the Sherman Act proscribed.124 The statutory
exemption was determined to insulate legitimate collective bargaining activity.125
The following year in United States v. Hutcheson,1 2 6 the Supreme Court
considered a charge of a Sherman Act violation against a carpenter's union, the
United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, and its officials.' 27 This
was based upon the union's nationwide picketing and boycotting of Anheuser-
Busch.128 The union was involved in a jurisdictional dispute between itself and a
machinists' union, the International Association of Machinists, working for
Busch. 29 The court determined that the statutory exemption immunized union
activity "(s)o long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine with non-
labor groups." 30
In 1945 the Supreme Court in Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union 13,
IBEWas rendered its first decision expanding the statutory exemption to include
agreements between management and labor.132 The focus of the Court's inquiry
"'See Id. at 480-481.
"See Id. at 481-482.
"'See Id. at 501.
124See Id at 502-503.
i,'See Apex Hoslery, 310 U.S. at 503.
126312 U.S. 219 (1941).
1"See Id. at 228.
'"See Id.
'"See Id.
'"ld. at 232.
'3i325 U.S. 797 (1945).
'"See Id. at 798.
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was the activity of Local No. 3 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers towards electrical equipment manufacturers and contractors trying to enter
the New York City market.133 Under the agreement, contractors were required to
purchase equipment only from manufacturers employing union members, and
manufacturers could sell equipment only to contractors using union employees. 34
The effects were to increase profits for participating companies, force union wages
higher, and shorten hours.135 Justice Black's opinion established a balancing of
Congressional antitrust policy with the goal of preserving the right of labor to
organize and gain better working conditions.'36 Justice Black determined that the
exemption would not protect this activity because the labor group participated with
management in activities that the Court characterized as a conspiracy to
monopolize. 1
The next major Supreme Court decision involving the nonstatutory
exemption was UnitedMine Workers v. Pennington.13 8 The labor exemption claim
arose from a cross-claim filed by Phillips Brothers Coal Company against the
United Mine Workers alleging a Sherman Act violation. 39 The company claimed
that the union had conspired with larger coal companies to eliminate small
producers.140 This was effectuated by imposing a prior wage agreement on all
operators.' 4 1 The small operators were caught between the union's demand for a
higher wages package and the ability of the larger companies to cut prices. 42 The
action was held not to be immune from application of the antitrust law solely
i33See id. at 798-799.
i34See id. at 799-800.
i35See id. at 799.
136See Allen Bradley, 325 U.S. at 806.
137See id. at 811.
i'381 U.S. 657 (1965).
'
39See id. at 659.
40See Id. at 660.
i41See id.
142See id. at 660-661.
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because of union involvement. 43 A critical factor was the presence of the union-
employer conspiracy to control conditions beyond their immediate bargaining
concerns. 44
On the same day, in Local Union 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel
Tea Co., 45 the Court considered a collective bargaining agreement between a
butchers' union and food stores forbidding the sale of meat before 9:00 a.m. and
after 6:00 p.m. in both service and self-service markets.1 46 The Court established a
balancing test regarding the antitrust and labor law policies.147 This policy
established that the union's activities were exempt from antitrust liability because
the marketing-hours restriction was the product of ann's-length bargaining and was
not at the behest of a nonlabor group. 48
Ten years later in Connell Construction Co., Inc. v. Plumbers &
Steamfitters Local 100,149 the Supreme Court was concerned with an attempt by a
union to force a general contractor to agree to sub-contract mechanical work only to
fimns which were parties to the union's current collective bargaining agreement.'
The Court concluded that the agreement involved was not within the exemption
because it restrained the business market to a much greater extent than necessary in
the pursuit of better wages and working conditions.' 5 The Court determined that
the agreement
which is outside the context of a collective-bargaining relationship and not
restricted to a particular jobsite ... may be the basis of a federal antitrust
suit because it has a potential for restraining competition in the business
141See United Mine Workers, 381 U.S. at 662-663.
144See Id. at 665-666.
'4381 U.S. 676 (1965).
i'See Id. at 680.
147See Id. at 688-689.
'14 See Id. at 689-690.
149421 U.S. 616 (1975).
'"See Id. at 618-619.
i5iSee Id. at 625-626.
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market in ways that would not follow naturally from elimination of
competition over wages and working conditions. 152
The Nonstatutory Labor Exemption in the Sports Context
Three years prior to Connell, the importance of the nonstatutory labor
exemption in the sports area was noted by Justice Thurgood Marshall in his dissent
in Flood.153 Justice Marshall noted that "It is apparent that none of the prior cases
is precisely in point. They involve union-management agreements that work to the
detriment of management's competitors. In this case, petitioner [Flood] urges that
the reserve system works to the detriment of labor."154 Justice Marshall noted that
the Court had "rejected a claim that federal labor statutes governed the relationship
between a professional athlete and the professional sport"'ss in Radovich v.
National FootballLeague.1' Justice Marshall pointed out, however, "that the issue
was not squarely faced"157 in Radovich nor in Flood Justice Marshall wished to
remand the case to the district court "for consideration of whether petitioner can
state a claim under the antitrust laws despite the collective-bargaining agreement,
and, if so, for a determination of whether there has been an antitrust violation in this
case."s58
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals squarely addressed the nonstatutory
exemption four years later in Mackey v. National Football League.'59 The court
affirmed the decision of the District Court of Minnesota160 holding that the "Rozelle
Rule"'6 ' violated section one of the Sherman Act. In reaching this decision, the
1521d.
"'See 407 U.S. 258, 293-294 (1972).
'-'id. at 295.
1551d.
156352 U.S. 445 (1957).
157407 U.S. at 296.
1581d.
159543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
16 See 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Minn. 1975).
i61The "Rozelle Rule," named for the Commissioner of the NFL, allowed the
22
Eighth Circuit established a three-prong test for determining the application of the
nonstatutory labor exemption:
We find the proper accommodation to be: First, the labor policy favoring
collective bargaining may potentially be given pre-eminence over the
antitrust laws where the restraint on trade primarily affects only the parties
to the collective bargaining relationship.... Second, federal labor policy is
implicated sufficiently to prevail only where the agreement sought to be
exempted concerns a mandatory subject of collective bargaining....
Finally, the policy favoring collective bargaining is furthered to the degree
necessary to override the antitrust laws only where the agreement sought
to be exempted is the product of bona fide arm's-length bargaining. 62
After determining that the Rozelle Rule only affected the parties to the
agreement and that the restraint involved mandatory subjects of collective
bargaining,163 the court found that the National Football League had imposed the
rule upon a union "in a relatively weak bargaining position."'1 The court
concluded, therefore, that the NFL's Rozelle Rule was not protected by the labor
exemption.1
In Smith v. Pro Football, Inc.," the Circuit Court for the District of
Columbia concluded that the NFL's draft violated the Sherman Act. 67 The action
was brought by James "Yazoo" Smith, the first round draft choice of the
Washington Redskins in 1968.168 Smith's initial NFL season ended with him
Commissioner to award "one or more players, from the Active, Reserve, or Selection List
(including future selection choices)" of a team who signed a free agent formerly under
contract to another NFL team If the two teams could not arrive at an agreement over the
appropriate compensation to the team losing its free agent. 543 F.2d at 611.
12543 F.22d at 614.
'6See Id. at 615.
164Id. at 615-616.
16See Id. at 616.
i6593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
'
67See Id. at 1175.
"'See Id. at 1176.
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suffering a serious neck injury in the Redskins' final game.169 The District Court
for the District of Columbia decided that the nonstatutory labor exemption was
inapplicable to the draft and Pro Football did not appeal that ruling. 170 The court
went on to consider the facts under both a per se17 1 and a rule of reason'72 analysis
before concluding that the restraint was unreasonable and a violation of the
Sherman Act. The court felt that the appropriate standard was the rule of reason
and pointed out that this decision was in line with other courts and commentators
considering player restraints in professional sports. 73
Nine years later, in Wood v. National Basketball Association, '7 Judge
Ralph Winter ofthe Second Circuit Court ofAppeals strongly advanced his opinion
that player/management issues should be decided by labor law policies and not
antitrust law. 75 Leon Wood,' 76 the first round draft choice of the Philadelphia
76ers, brought an action against the National Basketball Association asserting that
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement, including the salary cap, the
college draft, and prohibitions against player corporations, violated section one of
the Sherman Act. '" Wood further contended that the nonstatutory exemption did
not cover these league practices. Wood was initially offered a one-year contract for
$75,000.00 because the 76ers' payroll exceeded the salary cap. Judge Winter
decided that Wood's claim that provisions of the agreement constituted a per se
violation ofthe Sherman Act was a "wholesale subversion" of national labor policy
169See Id.
170See id. at 1177, n. 11.
171See Smith, 593 F.2d at 1177-1182.
"
21d at 1183-1189.
173See Id. at 1182.
174890 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987).
175Judge Winter was the coauthor with Michael S. Jacobs of an Influential article In
the 1971 Yale Law Journal, Michael S. Jacobs & Ralph Winter, Antitrust Principles and
Collective Bargaining by Athletes: Of Superstars in Peonage, 81 YALE L.J. 1 (1971).
76Wood is currently a referee in the National Basketball Association. See, e.g., Ed
Sherman, Michael Jordan: He Was No Bowie (Ihankfully), CHI. TRIB., Jan. 24, 1999, at 4, Janis
Carr, County Takes Time to Honor its Own Hall of Fame: Seven Who Made Their Name In
Sports Are Honored at Induction Ceremony, ORANGE CouNTY REG., May 1, 1998, at D2.
17 See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
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which "must be rejected out of hand."s78 Judge Winter also rejected Wood's
arguments that the agreements prevented him from achieving his full-market
potential' 79 and that future employees should not be subject to the exemption
because they were outside of the bargaining unit. 80
The Effect of the Nonstatutory Labor Exemption Upon the National
Football League Players Association's 1987 Strike and Its Aftermath
On August 31, 1987, the Collective Bargaining Agreement executed on
December 11, 1982, between the National Football League and the National
Football League Players Association expired.18' The 1982 Agreement came after a
57-day strike by the players.'8 A point of significant conflict between the players
and owners was the Right of First Refusal/Compensation system established in
March 1, 1977, after the demise of the Rozelle Rule. During the five years that the
1982 Agreement was in effect, not a single veteran NFL player switched teams. 83
When negotiations failed to produce an agreement after the beginning of the 1987
season, the players went on strike on September 22, 1987.184 The NFL responded
by using substitute players in regularly scheduled games. The union concluded the
strike on October 15, 1987.1s
On the same day that the strike ended, a group of players led by named
plaintiff Marvin Powell' 8 filed suit in the United States District Court ofMinnesota
alleging that the compensation system violated the Sherman Act. The case was
178890 F.2d at 959.
'
9 See Id. at 960.
'"See Id. at 960-961.
is'See Powell, 678 F. Supp. 781.
1
'
2See Id. at 780.
'8See Id. at 781.
'
84See Id.
'
85See Id.
86 Other named plaintiffs were Brian Holloway, Michael Kenn, Michael Davis, James
Lofton, Michael Luckhurst, Dan Marino, George Martin, Steve Jordan and the National Football
League Players Association.
assigned to Judge David S. Doty. The NFL argued that the nonstatutory labor
exemption protected the Right of First Refusal/Compensation system under two
theories, the absolute immunity theory187 and the labor law "survival" doctrine. 88
Judge Doty dismissed the absolute immunity doctrine'89 deciding that the NFL
relied too heavily upon Justice Arthur Goldberg's' 90 concurring and dissenting
opinions in Jewel Tea'9' and Pennington.12 Judge Doty pointed out that "granting
a labor practice complete insulation from antitrust scrutiny merely because the
activity concerns a subject of mandatory bargaining does not strike the proper
accommodation between labor and antitrust laws."'93 Turning next to consideration
of the NFL's survival doctrine theory, Judge Doty concluded that the Mackey three-
prong test had been satisfied. In finding that the nonstatutory labor exemption
survived the expiration ofthe collective bargaining agreement, Judge Doty decided
that "parties to an expired agreement have an obligation to maintain the status quo
as to these provisions until a new agreement is concluded or until the parties reach
'impasse'."l94
Judge Doty then turned his attention to a discussion ofthe duration during
which the exemption remains in effect. The court rejected the players' contention
that protections dissolve once the employees make it "unequivocally clear" that
they no longer assent to terms or practices because such an application would
subject employers to "instant" antitrust liability and treble damages.' 9s Judge Doty
also pointed out that the players' position would not foster the national labor policy
favoring good faith bargaining. 6
"'See 678 F. Supp. at 783.
'
88See Id. at 783-784.
ta9See id. at 783.
i'9 Former Justice Arthur Goldberg argued on behalf of Curt Flood before the
Supreme Court in Flood, 407 U.S. 258.
191381 U.S. 676 (1965).
192381 U.S. 657 (1965).
193678 F. Supp. at 783.
194Id. at 784.
195See id. at 786.
196See id. at 787.
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The court also rejected the position reached in Bridgeman v. National
Basketball Association,9 7 a parallel case involving the breakdown of the collective
bargaining process between the National Basketball Association and National
Basketball Players Association. Judge Doty quoted the standard created in
Bridgenan:
I find that the exemption for a particular practice survives only as long as
the employer continues to impose that restriction unchanged, and
reasonably believes that the practice or a close variant of it will be
incorporated in the next collective bargaining agreement. When the
employer no longer has such a reasonable belief, it is then unilaterally
imposing the restriction on its employees, and the restraint can no longer
be deemed the product of arm's length negotiation between the union and
the employer.
Judge Doty rejected this test deciding that "the standard does not give
proper regard to the strong labor policy promoting the collective bargaining
process."'99 Judge Doty also rejected the owners' position that the exemption
survived indefinitely concerning mandatory subjects of collective bargaining or,
alternatively, for the duration ofthe bargaining relationship. The court rejected this
position because the "proposed standards would lead to the anomalous result that
illegal provisions exempted from antitrust scrutiny would continue in force longer
than lawful terms and conditions."2 Judge Doty concluded that the
proper accommodation of labor and antitrust interests requires that a labor
exemption relating to a mandatory bargaining subject survive expiration
of the collective bargaining agreement until the parties reach impasse as to
that issue; thereafter, the term or condition is no longer immune from
scrutiny under the antitrust laws, and the employer runs the risk that
continued imposition of the condition will subject the employer to
liability.20
'19675 F. Supp. 960 (D.N.J. 1987).
'
98Powell, 678 F. Supp. at 787 (quoting Bridgeman, 675 F. Supp. at 967).
1'678 F. Supp. at 787.
200d. at 788.
20 Id. at 788.
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Judge Doty also defined the court's test for impasse as "whether, following intense,
good faith negotiations, the parties have exhausted the prospects of concluding an
agreement." 202 Judge Doty concluded that the exemption would trump any
challenged restraint until impasse was reached on that issue, and he stayed certain
motions until the issue of impasse could be determined.203
Judge Doty subsequently granted summary judgment to the players on
June 17, 1988, finding that impasse had been reached as to the free agency issue.
Turning to an analysis of jurisdiction to grant an injunction under the Norris-
LaGuardia Act,205 Judge Doty declared that granting the injunction would "subvert
the collective bargaining process and ... offend a central purpose of the ... Act."206
On appeal to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge John R. Gibson
reversed Judge Doty207 and sided with the NFL. Judge Gibson recounted the
analysis of the Eighth Circuit's prior decision in Mackey.208 Finding that the
decision was not controlling because the restraint in question here was the result of
collective bargaining, the court decided, however, that the analytical structure for
the nonstatutory labor exemption fashioned in Mackey must be used.209 The court
considered the impasse test adopted by the district court and analyzed the
Bridgeman decision.210 The court decided that the parties "have not reached the
point in negotiations where it would be appropriate to permit an action under the
Sherman Act.' 21  Noting that the labor laws permit numerous remedies to both
2021d. (citing Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 475, 478 (1967)).
2mSee Id. at 789.
204See 690 F. Supp. at 812.
205See 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1994).
206690 F. Supp. at 817.
2
"See 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989).
208See id. at 1297.
2mSee Id. at 1298.
21oSee Id. at 1299-1300.
2111d. at 1302.
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management and labor after impasse,m the court pushed the application of the
nonstatutory labor exemption beyond impasse.213
As a result of the Eighth Circuit's decision, the Executive Committee of
the NFLPA met on November 3, 1989,214 and considered withdrawing as the
collective bargaining agent for all NFL players. Three days later the Executive
Committee notified the NFL Management Council that it would abandon its rights
to bargain on behalf of the players. The decision of the NFLPA Executive
Committee was supported by over sixty percent of the players.216 The NFLPA
asserted that its status had changed from a labor union to a voluntary professional
association and that this decertification reestablished the right to assert antitrust
claims because the nonstatutory exemption certainly could not insulate the NFL's
newly imposed Plan B.217 Judge Doty found that
because no 'ongoing collective bargaining relationship' exists, the court
determines that nonstatutory labor exemption has ended.... In the absence
of continued union representation, the Eighth Circuit's rationale for the
exemption no longer applies because the parties may not invoke any
remedy under the labor laws, whether it be collective bargaining,
instituting an NLRB proceeding for failure to bargain in good faith or
resorting to a strike.218
The judge offered four orders to conclude his decision in McNeil, including striking
the NFL's labor exemption defenses.219
In September 1992, a jury finally received an opportunity to consider
whether or not the NFL's Plan B violated antitrust laws.22 0 The jury found in favor
2nSee 930 F.2d at 1302.
2131d. at 1304.
2'4McNell, 764 F. Supp. 1351, 1354.
21 See Id.
2n6See Id.
21 See Id.
2n1 id, at 1359.
219See 764 F. Supp. at 1360.
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of the players, paving the way for more litigation2' and the ultimate resolution of
the litigation with the signing of a new collective bargaining agreement.22
However, the last chapter of this volume between the NFL and the NFLPA over the
nonstatutory labor exemption was just beginning to unfold in the District of
Columbia.22
Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.
The culmination of the twenty year judicial consideration of the
nonstatutory labor exemption in the sports area was the decision in Brown v. Pro
Football, Inc.224 At issue was the imposition by the NFL of Resolution G-2. 22 In
1989 the NFL created a new Developmental Squad of up to six rookie or first year
players.226 The crux of the concern to the NFLPA was the NFL's decision to create
a fixed salary.227 On May 17, 1989, the NFL's management committee proposed a
uniform salary of $1,000.00 per week for all Developmental Squad players.
Prior to the suggestion of a new Developmental Squad salary cap, such players had
been able to negotiate their own salary and benefits.229 Although the NFLPA
disputed the fixed salary aspect of the proposal, the NFL unilaterally imposed the
plan.230
220See Jackson v. National Football League, 802 F. Supp. 226, 229 (D. Minn. 1992).
221See White v. National Football League, 822 F. Supp. 1389 (D. Minn. 1993).
222See id. at 1395.
223 During the ongoing litigation surrounding the fractured relationship between the
NFL and the NFLPA, Judge Winter had another opportunity to comment upon the relationship
between labor laws and antitrust laws in Williams v. National Basketball Ass'n, 45 F.3d 684 (2d
Cir. 1995). Judge Winter again determined that the nonstatutory labor exemption triumphed
over an attempt to bring antitrust laws back to the forefront.
224821 F. Supp. 20, rev'd, 50 F.3d 1041, offd, 518 U.S. 231 (1996).
225See 50 F.3d at 1046.
226See id.
221See id.
228See id.
229See Id.
2
.
3 See id. at 1046-1047.
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In May 1990, 235 Developmental Squad players, led by named plaintiff
Antony Brown, filed suit claiming that the agreement to fix salaries at $1,000.00
per week violated the Sherman Act.231 The district court ruled that the actions of
the NFL were not insulated by the nonstatutory labor exemption, and the case went
to trial.Y The jury award after treble damages exceeded $30 million.Y
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
reversed the lower court decision in a split two to one vote.2 Judge Harry T.
Edwards, writing for the majority, ruled
(a)fter reviewing relevant Supreme Court precedent and the policies
underlying both the NLRA and the Sherman Act, we conclude that the
nonstatutory labor exemption shields from antitrust challenge alleged
restraints on competition imposed through the collective bargaining
process, so long as the challenged actions are lawful under the labor laws
and primarily affect only a labor market organized around a collective
bargaining relationship. Because the fixed salary for Developmental
Squad players is such an action, we hold that the exemption shields the
clubs and the NFL from liability in this case.Y
In her dissenting opinion, Judge Patricia Wald argued that the majority opinion
granted the NFL total immunity from antitrust liability as long as the league and the
employee players had engaged in a collective bargaining relationship regarding the
Developmental Squad issues. 6 Judge Wald also asserted that
the majority insists its ruling does no more than maintain a level playing
field in employer-employee relations and carry out the congressional
mandate favoring collective bargaining as the primary means ofresolving
labor disputes. I do not think so. The reality is that today's decision
131See Id. at 1047.
23See Id.
2 See Id.
234See Id. at 1044.
13sSee id. at 1046.
2See Id. at 1058.
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sharply tilts the playing field in employers' favor, and because of that, will
erode the vitality of collective bargaining itself. 237
The players appealed to the United States Supreme Court. Justice Stephen
Breyer wrote the opinion affirming the circuit court's ruling. After carefully
considering prior precedent, Justice Breyer queried "If the antitrust laws apply,
what are employers to do once impasse is reached?" 8  Justice Breyer's
consideration of a number of alternatives led him to conclude that potential antitrust
liability could create an unstable collective bargaining process.2 9 Justice Breyer
determined that the appropriate deference to the collective bargaining process
required the disallowance of the use of antitrust laws.240 Justice Breyer next
discounted "several suggestions for drawing the exemption boundary line short of
this case," 241 before finally holding
that the implicit ("nonstatutory") antitrust exemption applies to the
employer conduct at issue here.... Our holding is not intended to insulate
from antitrust review everyjoint imposition of terms by employers, for an
agreement among employers could be sufficiently distant in time and in
circumstances from the collective-bargaining process that a rule
permitting antitrust intervention would not significantly interfere with that
process.... We need not decide in this case whether, or where, within
these extreme outer boundaries to draw that line.242
Conclusion
In analyzing Justice Breyer's decision in Brown, Michael J. Cozzillio and
Mark S. Levinstein243 argued that:
237d. at 1058-1059.
238518 U.S. 231, 241 (1996).
239See id. at 242.
240See id.
241 See Id. at 243.
242See id. at 250.
2 See MICHAEL J. COZZILUO & MARK S. LEVINSTEIN, SPORTS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 415
(1997).
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It is now inevitable that unionized professional athletes who seek to
challenge restraints upon player mobility (or similar restraints) through
antitrust will have no alternative but to decertify their bargaining
representative and terminate the collective bargaining relationship.244
This position is certainly correct. Justice Breyer's decision plainly reduces the
potential value of the antitrust weapon from a treble damage bomb to a child's pop
gun that will necessarily remain predominantly at the bottom of the toy chest.
Justice Breyer has solidified Judge Winter's argument from Wood that any
disagreement between a union and management must be decided at the bargaining
table devoid of any antitrust leverage. This leaves all unions in the undesirable
position of committing organizational suicide in order to bring their strongest legal
weapon to the fore. Does the specter of decertification and a protracted and
expensive trial strike fear in the hearts of management? It would hardly seem so.
Although management needs the insulation from possible antitrust liability that the
nonstatutory labor exemption supplies, the odds that a union will resort to this
strategy seem increasingly remote.
The National Basketball Association's recent player lockout provided
management with the tactical advantage of placing the issues squarely in the labor
realm. Any thought of decertification had to be considered within the context of
the Brown decision. What amount of time would satisfy Judge Breyer's position?
Union decertification creates the possibility of stripping away all benefits contained
in the collective bargaining agreement. How many players would be willing to risk
the loss of significant wages and benefits for the uncertainty of reentering the
judicial system to ascertain if they have been without a collective bargaining
representative for the necessary time to satisfy a court construing the Brown
decision? In each case where a players association has successfully orchestrated
and financed antitrust litigation since the advent of the collective bargaining era, the
result has been a monetary settlement and/or a quick return to the bargaining table
to hammer out a new agreement. Union self-preservation has mandated this result.
The only alternative would be the chaos of individual negotiation. Cozzillio and
Levinstein's additional observation and metaphor would also appear to be accurate:
If Brown functionally forecloses player restraint issues from antitrust
review, then the removal of the baseball exemption in this area may be a
toothless advance for the players. In essence, they have left the frying pan
244Id.
33
of the baseball exemption to the fire of Brown and its 'decertify or forget
the Sherman Act' mandate.245
Over twenty-five years after the Supreme Court's decision in Flood, Congress
finally enacted legislation named to honor the memory of the former Cardinals
player who refused to accept a trade and, instead, attempted to use the power
created by Congress in 1890 when it passed the Sherman Antitrust Act to free
himself from the impact of the reserve clause. Baseball players would have to wait
for an arbitrator's decision growing out of a collective bargaining agreement to rid
themselves of the reserve clause. Despite Congressional action in 1998, baseball
players will assuredly need to continue to resort to collective bargaining rather than
antitrust laws to establish their employment relationship with the owners of major
league baseball clubs. The language of the Curt Flood Act of 1998 and the
legislative intent argue strongly for the narrowest use of antitrust laws in
furtherance of the goals of major league baseball players. With the widening gap
between large market and small market teams in baseball, the prospect of labor
peace in Major League Baseball has not been significantly advanced by the passage
of the Curt Flood Act of 1998.
245/d.
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MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL ANTITRUST
REFORM
TUESDAY, JUNE 17, 1997
U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in room
SD-226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Orrin G. Hatch
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Also present: Senators Specter, DeWine, and Leahy.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ORRIN G. HATCH,
A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF UTAH
The CHAIRMAN. We will call this hearing to order.
Clarifying that antitrust laws apply to Major League Baseball is
something that will benefit sports fans across the country, young
and old, rich and poor, Democrat and Republican. As evidenced by
the interleague play, agreements being reached on long-term player
and minor league contracts, and the continuing on-field heroics of
players like Cal Ripken and Ken Griffey, Jr., we are witnessing a
historical period for Major League Baseball. I have only mentioned
a few of them, as you know, of the great heroes.
Senator Leahy and I believe that we should take advantage of
this opportunity' to ensure that the coming years will indeed be
among baseball's finest by doing all we can to minimize the poten-
tial for more of the bitter labor disputes which have plagued Major
League Baseball.
Baseball has witnessed more work stoppages than all other pro-
fessional sports combined, capped by the devastating 1995 strike
which led to the cancellation of the World Series and dealt a blow
to the hearts and loyalty of baseball fans from which the sport is
only now beginning to recover.
While there are, of course, different factors contributing to base-
ball's recently tumultuous labor relations, there is one root cause
about which we in Congress can do something. With their current
antitrust status, Major League Baseball owners can, unlike the
owners in any other professional sport, conspire and collude with-
out restraint-the precise practices the antitrust laws were de-
signed to prohibit. They can take advantage of this unique legal po-
sition to gain leverage in their negotiations with the players and
their representatives.
Making it clear to the players, owners, and courts that the anti-
trust laws apply to Major League Baseball therefore will not only
put baseball on a level playing field with the other professional
(1)
2sports, but will also put the owners on a more level playing field
with the players, and will thereby bring stability to labor relations
in this area. Players, fans, investors, municipalities, and ultimately
the owners themselves will benefit.
Thus, on the first day of this Congress, I, along with Senators
Leahy, Thurmond, and Moynihan, introduced S. 53, the Curt Flood
Act of 1997, which, like its predecessor, S. 627, simply makes clear
that Major League Baseball, like all other professional sports, is
subject to our Nation's antitrust laws, except with regard to team
relocation, the minor leagues, and sports broadcasting. It overturns
the Court's mistaken premise that baseball is not a business in-
volved in interstate commerce, and it eliminates the unjustifiable
legal precedent that individuals who play professional baseball
should be treated differently from those who participate in other
professional sports. Perhaps most importantly, it helps ensure that
the 1995 labor dispute and the consequent cancellation of the 1995
World Series will never happen again.
[A copy of S. 53 follows:]
3n
105TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION S.53
To require the general application of the antitrust laws to major league
baseball, and for other purposes.
IN THE SENATE OF TEE UNITED STATES
JANUARY 21, 1997
Mr. HATCH (for himself, Mr. LEARY, Mr. THMusoND, and Mr. MoYNmAN)
introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the
Committee on the Judiciary
A BILL
To require the general application of the antitrust laws to
major league baseball, and for other purposes.
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 tives of the United States ofAmerica in Congress assembled,
3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
4 This Act may be cited as the "Curt Flood Act of
5 1997".
6 SEC. 2. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO PRO-
7 FESSIONAL MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL.
8 The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) is amended
9 by adding at the end the following new section:
42-
1 "SEc. 27. (a) Subject to subsection (b), the antitrust
2 laws shall apply to the business of professional major
3 league baseball.
4 "(b) Nothing in this section shall be construed to af-
5 feet-
6 "(1) the applicability or nonapplicability of the
7 antitrust laws to the amateur draft of professional
8 baseball, the minor league reserve clause, the agree-
9 ment between professional major league baseball
10 teams and teams of the National Association of
11 Baseball, commonly known as the 'Professional
12 Baseball Agreement', or any other matter relating to
13 the minor leagues;
14 "(2) the applicability or nonapplicability of the
15 antitrust laws to any restraint by professional base-
16 ball on franchise relocation; or
17 "(3) the application of Public Law 87-331 (15
18 T.S.C. 1291 et seq.) (commonly known as the
19 'Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961').".
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5When I first sponsored similar legislation in the 103d Congress,
Congress was told that baseball owners would never support it.
Today, for the first time, I am pleased to report that the owners
have not only pledged in the new collective bargaining agreement
to work with the players to pass legislation clarifying that profes-
sional baseball is subject to the antitrust laws with regard to labor
relations, but just last week reached agreement with the players on
specific language that would accomplish this objective.
While I and the members of this committee would like to exam-
ine this proposed alternative to S. 53, I think it is safe to say that
the most important impediment to passage of baseball antitrust re-
form has been eliminated, and that it is truly a momentous occa-
sion when Major League Baseball owners have aligned in support
of such reform.
Given this recent positive development, I must say that I am sur-
prised that the owners were unable to send a representative to tes-
tify at this hearing. We invited them and we expected them to be
here. I should note that on the basis of repeated assurances that
such an agreement between the players and owners was imminent,
I have, since the beginning of this Congress, repeatedly agreed at
the owners' request to postpone this hearing and committee consid-
eration of S. 53.
I will not repeat the numerous such requests for more time to
which I have agreed, but I will insert for the record a chronology
of the relevant requests and delays at the owners' behest.
[The chronology follows:]
CHRONOLOGY OF EvENTs
December 7, 1996-The owners and the players sign a memorandum of under-
standing, which deals with time-sensitive provisions to be included in the collective
bargaining agreement. A section of the memorandum calls for both the players and
the owners to work together to pass legislation that would give players the same
antitrust rights as other professional athletes at the major league level but that
would not change the application of the antitrust laws in any other context.
January 21, 1997-Senators Hatch, Leahy, Thurmond and Moynihan introduce
S. 53, the Curt Flood Act of 1997.
February 6, 1997-Representatives from the owners and the players meet with
Senator Hatch's staff to discuss the ongoing negotiations and the legislation. Sen-
ator Hatch's staff indicates that the Senator would like to place the bill on the cal-
endar for the mark-up scheduled for February 13, 1997, recognizing that it will be
held over. The owners make clear that a final agreement is near completion, that
both sides are moving "expeditiously," and that legislative language reflecting the
memorandum of understanding would be drafted if the mark-up is scheduled. They
also indicate that agreement on language should be relatively easy. They ask that
Senator Hatch postpone mark-up until after the collective bargaining agreement is
finalized. The players' representatives indicate that they will be sending draft lan-
guage to the owners and were ready to share these drafts with Committee staff.
February 7, 1997-The players' first draft is sent to the owners through their
Washington lobbyists and their negotiating team.
A Few Days Later in February, 1997-The owners indicate that there will be no
work on legislative language until the rest of the contract is completed and signed,
but completion will occur before the end of February.
Middle of February, 1997-Senator Hatch agrees to the owner request to delay
mark-up and a hearing for a few weeks, until the collective bargaining agreement
is completed.
February 20, 1997-Senator Hatch's staff meets with Stanley Brand, representa-
tive for Minor League Baseball, requesting that he communicate any proposed
changes to S. 53 either at the meeting or subsequent to it. Brand refuses to offer
any suggestions at that time or thereafter, and refuses to return staff phone calls
for over 3 months.
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February 28, 1997-Senators Hatch and Leahy send out a Dear Colleague letter
announcing their intention to move the legislation quickly.
March 11, 1997-A second meeting between representatives from the players and
the owners is held with Senator Hatch's staff. The owners' representative indicates
that pressure from Senator Hatch has helped to move the negotiating process along,
that neither side wants Congress to act on the legislation until the contract is com-
pleted and signed. The players state that since they have no idea when the contract
will be finalized, they will defer to Senator Hatch on timing, even if that means
moving the legislation before the contract is signed. They also offer two new ver-
sions of the legislation for the owners' review.
March 13, 1997-The Senate Judiciary Committee mark-up, with S. 53 on the
agenda, is postponed due to lack of a quorum.
March 14, 1997-The collective bargaining agreement is completed and signed.
March 20, 1997-The Senate Judiciary Committee holds a mark-up, at which time
both Senators Hatch and Leahy make it clear that they are tired of waiting and
want the promised language from the parties. Senator Hatch announces that the
Committee would mark-up the baseball bill after the Easter recess, and that he has
circulated a draft substitute amendment taken directly from the language of the col-
lective bargaining agreement. He stated that the players support the amendment,
but the owners would not take a position on his draft.
March 28, 1997-Notwithstanding his refusal to work with Senator Hatch's staff,
Stanley Brand writes letter to Senator Biden, requesting his help in defeating S. 53,
and stating that he was "surprised to be asked to cure the bil's defects before Con-
gress has conducted any study or review on its impact on grassroots baseball."
April 14, 1997-The owners and the players meet with Senator Hatch. The own-
ers' chief negotiator asks for more time to resolve this issue and asks Senator Hatch
to delay Committee consideration at this time. When pressed on how long he needs,
he subsequently indicates four weeks. As a result, Senator Hatch announces that
he will move the bill to mark-up on May 14, 1997.
May 8, 1997-Owners agree to meet with the players in New York. Drafts are
exchanged.
May 14, 1997-This latest deadline is missed.
May 16, 1997-The players agree to language offered by the owners' representa-
tives. After the players' acceptance, the owners negotiators indicate that this lan-
guage will have to be taken to the owners to see if they can accept it.
Early June, 1997-Senator Hatch's staff repeatedly requests hearing dates from
owners, players, and minor league representatives. Stanley Brand agrees to testify
at June 17, 1997 hearing.
June 10, 1997-Senator Hatch announces that a hearing on S. 53 will be held on
June 17, 1997.
June 12, 1997-Owners sign new 10 year agreement with minor leagues and rat-
ify agreement with players regarding legislative language on antitrust reform.
June 13, 1997-Senator Hatch sends formal invitation letters for June 17 hearing.
Stanley Brand fails to appear at scheduled meeting with Senator Hatch's staff. The
owners indicate that they will refuse to attend the hearing or any subsequent hear-
ing until George Steinbrenner's suit against the owners for antitrust violations is
resolved.
June 16, 1997-Bud Selig and Stanley Brand write Senator Hatch. Selig indicates
he will not attend June 17 hearing. Brand requests that the hearing be postponed
so that he can have an opportunity to draft proposed amendments. At 6 p.m., Brand
meets with Senator Hatch's staff indicating that, contrary to his position 1 week
earlier, he will not testify at June 17 hearing.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Selig has written me indicating that because
of a conflict, he is unable to attend today. I understand and appre-
ciate his conflict, but one would expect that the owners could have
sent another representative in his stead, as we had requested.
Mr. Stanley Brand, representing the minor leagues, has also
written me requesting that this hearing be delayed, although as-
suring me that he would be prepared to provide specific legislative
suggestions later this week. I had intended to meet with him yes-
terday, but he was unable to meet with me. I had hoped that by
meeting with him, we might even have avoided this hearing, but
for some reason I couldn't get with him.
7Now, while I look forward to finally receiving Mr. Brand's com-
ments, I must say that I fail to see why he cannot present them
today, especially given the fact that we asked for his views in Feb-
ruary and that Mr. Brand specifically told the committee just last
week that he would attend today's hearing.
Moreover, given Mr. Brand's statement in a March 28, 1997, let-
ter to Senator Biden that he was "surprised" to be asked for legis-
lative input before the committee had conducted any study or re-
view on its impact on the minor leagues, it now seems odd that he
is asking the committee to postpone a hearing until he has had an
opportunity to draft legislation.
That being said, it is, as I have indicated from the outset, my
sincere intent that any legislation we enact have no negative im-
pact on the current law governing the minor leagues, and I truly
do look forward to hearing from Mr. Brand within the next week.
I would note that this legislation has always been aimed at
Major League Baseball labor relations, not at addressing any issue
regarding the minor leagues, and that S. 53 even states in express
terms that it shall have no effect whatsoever on the minor leagues.
To the extent that minor leagues believe this language unintention-
ally changes the law as it applies to the minor leagues, I will cer-
tainly consider their views. This is perhaps a subject on which we
will hear more from our witnesses.
Present with us today are Don Fehr, executive director and gen-
eral counsel of the Major League Players Association, and Dan
Pelter, a former minor league player. I would like to take this op-
portunity to thank them for making the effort to be with us here
today. I would also like to thank Senator Leahy, our cosponsors
Senator Thurmond and Moynihan, and Senator DeWine and other
members of this committee for their continued assistance in this
important issue.
This is an important hearing. This will be the one time we will
listen, and I have to say that we will listen to input from both the
owners and the minor leagues, hopefully, by the end of this week
one way or the other. But if not, we are going to proceed as best
we can, and so we will just see what happens from here.
There is nobody from the minority here, so I think what we will
do is begin with you, Mr. Fehr, and then turn to you, Mr.-am I
pronouncing it right, Peltier.
Mr. PELTIER. Peltier.
The CHAIRMAN. You bet. I appreciate having both of you here
and we will look forward to your testimony at this time.
PANEL CONSISTING OF DONALD A. FEIR, EXECUTIVE DIREC-
TOR, MAJOR LEAGUE PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, NEW YORK,
NY; AND DAN PELTIER, FORMER MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL
PLAYER, HASTINGS, MN
STATEMENT OF DONALD A. FEHR
Mr. FEHR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Senator DeWine. My
name, as you know, is Donald Fehr, and for more than a decade
now I have been privileged to serve as the executive director of the
Major League Baseball Players Association. The Players Associa-
tion, of course, is the labor organization that represents all major
8league players with respect to terms and conditions of employment,
and also, interestingly enough, managers, coaches, and trainers
with respect to some.
Before making my brief comments here this morning, I do want
to take a moment to thank and express the appreciation of all
major league players to the chairman and to the ranking member
for the interest that they have shown in this issue, the steadfast-
ness with which they have pursued it during the tumultuous years
which have preceded 1997, the careful attention they have given
the various matters which have come into play, and perhaps most
of all to the chairman for his patience, especially over the last 6
months or so.
In November 1996, after just about 4 years of very difficult nego-
tiations, including a very long strike, to which the chairman has
alluded, and a long period of negotiations after that strike ended
following an injunction issued pursuant to section 10(j) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act against the owners, we were finally able
to reach a collective bargaining agreement. It is comprehensive. It
is long-term. It will expire most likely at the end of the 2001 sea-
son, and it has built into it a number of provisions, the object and
purpose of which is to cause the players and the owners to work
together on a day-by-day basis to operate the game, to rebuild the
game, to reach out to the fans, one result of which, we hope, will
be that the next time we negotiate, the relationship between the
two parties will be fundamentally different than it has been at any
time in the past.
That is the hope, and we certainly have a large task in front of
us. There have been in Major League Baseball eight work stop-
pages in the last eight negotiations, dating back to 1972, a fair
amount of strikes and a fair amount of lockouts. There has not
been a settlement without a work stoppage since 1970. Our task
for the next go-around is to make sure that that record is broken,
and broken with as loud a thump as we can manage.
In this new agreement, we have, to which the chairman referred,
also reached, in principle, an agreement on the antitrust laws. As
I think everyone knows, the major league owners have believed
that, at least with respect to player relations issues, they have had
a total exemption to the antitrust laws. And we have believed, and
I have testified on many occasions here, that that has been a prin-
cipal cause of our ongoing disputes.
Simply put, what it does is give the owners an incentive not
present in the other professional team sports to attempt to effec-
tively break the union. The reason that they could do that is that
if they would accomplish that, they then could set the terms and
conditions free of any restraint that would otherwise be imposed by
the antitrust laws. That is not the case and has not been the case
in the other professional team sports, and whatever else we can say
about those sports, they have had far fewer disruptions on the field
and the difficulty that such disruptions cause the fans have been
more often avoided than it has been in baseball.
I will not make an attempt to read my statement that has been
prepared for the record, nor to otherwise indicate my views on anti-
trust and sports, and baseball in particular. I think those views are
9well-known from my prior testimony. I will, of course, be pleased
to answer any questions about it.
Let me then turn briefly to the nature of the legislation at hand,
and in particular to the agreement that was reached between the
players and the owners. Last November when we were concluding
the agreement, the players made it clear that they wished, at last,
to be treated under the antitrust laws as other professional ath-
letes similarly situated, basketball and football players in the NFL
and the NBA being the most obvious examples.
The owners wanted some things, too, and eventually we reached
a compromise which is reflected in article XXVIII of the collective
bargaining agreement. It is a very carefully drawn provision and
it says that the players and the owners will jointly request and co-
operate in lobbying the Congress to pass a law that will clarify that
major league players are covered under the antitrust laws to the
same extent as other professional athletes similarly situated, along
with a second provision and that second provision being one which
hopefully will obviate any concerns that third parties have, and
that is that whatever the application of the antitrust laws is in any
other context or circumstance or with respect to any other third
party or parties that the passage of such legislation would not
change the application of the antitrust laws. It has the benefit of
not attempting to specifically define how the antitrust laws would
apply in any particular circumstance, that being left to such legis-
lation that becomes law to interpretation in the event that there
is a dispute.
We then had a second round of negotiations which was conducted
sporadically, essentially, between March and late May, and the
purpose of that round of negotiations conducted principally be-
tween myself on behalf of the players and Randy Levine, who is the
owners' chief negotiator, on behalf of the major league owners, was
to see if we could agree on specific language that we could suggest
to the Congress be considered in order to effectuate the collective
bargaining provision to which we had agreed.
We were able to reach agreement. The players have adopted it,
and as the chairman indicated, we have been advised by Mr. Selig
that the owners have also agreed to the negotiated provision, and
I believe a copy of it has already been submitted to the committee.
I think if you review it, you will find that it is a very carefully
drafted provision.
The "Purpose" section simply replicates the language of the col-
lective bargaining agreement. The substantive sections provide that
the antitrust laws will apply to the business of organized profes-
sional major league baseball acts, practices, or agreements relating
to or affecting employment to play baseball at the major league
level, or, in other words, as the chairman summarized, labor rela-
tions at the major league level.
The remainder of the suggested language makes it clear that
whatever the law otherwise is in any context is not affected one
way or another by the passage of this legislation. We borrowed lib-
erally, I think it is fair to say, from the provisions of S. 53 and
some of the other bills that were submitted by the chairman and
other Senators in the prior Congress to make certain as best we
could that we were accomplishing that goal.
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I do believe that a fair reading of this suggested language should
reassure any third party, be they the minor leagues or otherwise,
that the passage of this legislation would have no effect one way
or another on their rights under law as existed otherwise with re-
spect to this legislation. It does carry a specific provision that says
that more specifically, but not by way of limitation, this section
shall not be deemed to change the application of the antitrust laws
to the amateur draft, the reserve clause as applied to minor league
players, or the various agreements between the major leagues and
the minor leagues, as well as other exceptions relating to franchise
location, relocation, the Sports Broadcasting Act, and so on.
With that, I think I am prepared to conclude the remarks I
would like to give this morning, other than to say that the Players
Association and the major league players supported S. 53 and the
similar bills offered in prior Congresses, and still do. We have seen
a copy of at least one narrow amendment that was being circulated
to S. 53 which we also think is sound public policy and we support.
But what we are asking the Congress to do now, and all that we
are asking the Congress to do now is to enact legislation that will
effectively give major league players the equal protection of the
antitrust laws, and to do so in a way which will avoid, if the Con-
gress so chooses, any of the other issues that swirl around antitrust
in sports and antitrust in baseball that can and have been the sub-ject of so much contention.
I, of course, will be pleased to answer any questions that any of
the members have. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Fehr.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Fehr follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF DONALD A. FEHR
Mr. Chairman, Senator Leahy and members of the Committee, my name is
Donald Fehr, and I serve as the Executive Director of the Major League Baseball
Players Association. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the Committee
today.
This Committee has spent considerable time in the last four years studying anti-
trust issues as they relate to baseball. On behalf of all major league players, I want
to thank Chairman Hatch and Senator Leahy for their interest in and attention to
these issues. My views on these matters are well known from my previous testimony
before this and other committees, and need no repetition here.
As has been often noted, over the last 25 years, there have been eight consecutive
work stoppages (strikes and lockouts) in major league baseball, more than in the
other three major team sports (football, basketball and hockey) combined. We be-
lieve that this results, in significant part, from the belief of the major league owners
that major league players, unlike their counterparts in basketball, football and
hockey, have no rights under the antitrust laws. Major league players have sought,
and continue to seek, the same rights under the antitrust laws as other professional
athletes similarly situated, no more but no less.
The importance of the antitrust laws to the collective bargaining process inprofes-
sional sports is often misunderstood. It is not necessarily the use the reedy that
is important; rather, it is the opportunity to resort to the remedy that matters. It
has been the desire to have an alternative course of action available to them, an
alternative course which would have a moderating influence on the bargaining proc-
ess, that has been at the heart of the players' efforts in the antitrust area. As we
learned too well in 1994, the players effectively had only one choice: accept the own-
ers unilaterally imposed terms and conditions of employment, or strike.' Unlike
"It is, of course, possible that the Courts would now hold, as we would argue, that in the
current circumstances, major leaue players do have the protection of the antitrust laws to the
same extent as other professiona atletes. However, it is extremely unlikely that players would
forego their right to strike against the possibility of such a ruling.
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other similarly situated athletes, baseball players have no other alternative. And
unlike other professional sports team owners, who know that their players are pro-
tected by the antitrust laws, baseball owners have believed that major league play-
ers do not have such protection, and therefore believe that if they can break the
union, the players have no recourse, and the owners can im ose whatever conditions
they choose. That does not foster labor peace. Accordingly, major league playershave petitioned Congress to ensure that they have the same rights and protections
under law as do other similarly situated athletes. We are prepared to continue that
effort in order to avoid in the future what has been the seemingly inevitable disrup-
tion in the game every time we negotiate.
THE NEW COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT
Many people were surprised to learn that there was any mention of antitrust leg-
islation n the new collective bargaining agreement. With both sides knowing that
this effort would continue until either a bil was passed or the next work stoppage
was upon us, the parties chose to address this issue in the recently signed collective
bargamnig agreement. Let me explain how Article XXVIII came to be.
The collective bargaining agreements in professional football, basketball and hock-
ey typically expire at the end of the month of the championship season, which
means that bargaining may typically commence some weeks prior thereto. In base-
ball, however, the collective bargaining agreements have expired on December 31
of the final year of the contract. As a practical matter, this means that individual
player contract negotiations for the next season begin before the contract. Thus, not-
withstanding the fact that negotiations have not yet resulted in a new collective bar-
gaining agreement, new individual baseball contracts for the following season are
signed under the terms of the expired contract.
This time around, the baseball owners sought the players' agreement to change
the expiration date of our collective bargaining agreement to October 31 of the last
year of the agreement, just after the end of the World Series. They believe that by
doing'so, their negotiating position may be enhanced. Owners believe that an earlier
expiration date would give them time to commence negotiations and, if necessary,
declare an impasse and impose new terms and conditions of employment for new
individual contracts for the following season. In the end, the players were prepared
to accommodate the owners' request, but only on the condition that they have the
same rights under the antitrust laws as do the athletes in the other sports.
As a result, Article XXVIII of the new Basic Agreement was drafted. Article
XXVIII provides that the expiration date of the contract will move to October 31,
if legislation clarifying that baseball players have the same rights under the anti-
trust laws as do basketball and football players is enacted by the end of the 105th
Congess. If legislation providing that clarification is not enacted by the end of the
105th Congress, the expiration date reverts to December 31 of the final year of the
agreement. The players and owners were very careful to make certain that the bill
they would jointly support would deal only with major league player issues; the
scope and effect of the antitrust laws is not changed in any other respect. In other
words, whatever the law is with respect to other issues or third parties, it will con-
tinue to be-this legislation will do nothing to change it.
The relevant portion of Article XXVIII reads as follows:
"the Clubs and the Association will jointly request and cooperate in lobbying
the Congress to pass a law that will clarify that Major League Baseball Players
are covered under the antitrust laws (i.e., that Major League Players have the
same rights under the antitrust laws as do other professional athletes, e.g. foot-
ball and basketball players), along with a provision that makes it clear that
passage of that bill does not change the application of the antitrust laws in any
other context or with respect to any other person or entity."
Simply put, the owners and the players reached an agreement to resolve their dif-
ferences on the expiration date of the contract in conjunction with resolving their
differences on the application of the antitrust laws to major league baseball players.
No other parties or issues are affected or implicated by this agreement.
LEGISLATION
Early in this Congress, Senators Hatch, Leahy, Thurmond and Moynihan intro-
duced S. 53. That bill constitutes a much broader clarification of the application of
the antitrust laws to major league baseball than the bill contemplated in the collec-
tive bargaining agreement. As was the case in prior bills, however, S. 53 made clear
that it was not to affect the application of the antitrust laws with respect to fran-
chise relocation issues or the Sports Broadcasting Act, nor was it to affect "the ap-
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plicability or nonapplicability of the antitrust laws to the amateur draft of profes-
sional baseball, the minor league reserve clause, the agreement between profes-
sional major league baseball teams and the teams of the National Association of
Baseball (sic), commonly known as the 'Professional Baseball Agreement', or any
other matter relating to the minor leagues."
We fully supported that bill, and continue to believe it to be wise public policy.
But the hope was, and continues to be, that the collective bargaining agreement re-
cently signed will lead to the enactment of legislation relating only to major league
players quickly and cleanly, so that the owners and players can put this issue be-
hind them and set their sights squarely on working together to repair and improve
the game.
I have been advised that a substitute amendment recently circulated to S. 53, ap-
parently in anticipation of an early agreement to legislative language effectuating
the collective bargaining agreement, and to keep the process moving forward. That
amendment was taken virtually verbatim from Article XXVIII of the new Basic
Agreement. As such, we had no objection to it when it was originally offered, nor
do we now. It was the Association's hope, however, that to the extent the owners
and players could agree to legislative language that accurately reflected the intent
of that amendment, and which the parties felt comfortable supporting, the legisla-
tive process would be further facilitated.
To that end, and at the strong urging of Senators Hatch and Leahy, the Associa-
tion has attempted to develop with the owners an acceptable alternative to that
amendment. On 16 May, 1997 representatives of the Players Association reached an
agreement with representatives of Major League Baseball on language that the
MLB representatives would take to the MLB owners for approval. My understand-
ing is that they did so last week. Hopefully, by today, the Chairman has been ad-
vised of the owners' actions on this suggested language.
THE MINOR LEAGUES
In the past, the minor leagues have opposed all legislation to bring increased sta-
bility to the relationship between major league owners and major league players,
notwithstanding express language in each such bill stating that the bil did not af-
fect the application of the antitrust laws as applied to the minor leagues. Although
never articulated in a manner that made sense to me, the argument seems to have
been, that if the antitrust laws applied to major league player relations, that would
somehow result in a reduction of the number of minor league teams that the major
league owners would siipport. This assertion is particularly hard to understand be-
cause major league players were essentially granted free agency by an arbitrator in
1975, interpreting the language of the standard player contract. Player-owner talks
have centered on free agency in each negotiation since that time. Every round of
collective bargaining since 1976 has been a battle by the owners to reduce players'
free agency, and by the players to keep it. It is not the protection of the antitrust
laws that matter, it is whether or not the players can be free agents. The position
of the minor league owners seems to me to be beside the point.
In any event, of course, the sponsors of S. 53 have gone out of their way to indlude
plain language in the bill insulating the minor leagues from the application of thebill and thus giving more than adequate protection to the minor leagues. Stated oth-
erwise, it preserves the status quo. To do nothing to address the continuous instabil-
ity and disruptions in play in major league baseball in the face of such clear lan-
guage protecting the minor leagues is illogical and ignores the interests of the cities,
millions of fans, and other workers in uninterrupted play.
Likewise, the agreed upon language considered by the major league owners last
week to effectuate Article XXVIII of the new Basic Agreement protects the minor
leagues because the language makes clear that, other than as concerns major league
players, the application of the antitrust laws is not changed. Whatever the law oth-
erwise is, it remains. Thus, under both the express language of both S. 53 and the
language agreed to by player and owner negotiators, whatever the law is today with
respect to the affiliated minor leagues and their relationship with the major leagues
and minor league players will continue to be the law after either S. 53 or the pro-
posed agreement is enacted.
The language of both these versions of legislation preserves the status quo to the
extent that existing law would otherwise allow. These proposals do nothing to
threaten the minor leagues. They deal strictly with the relationship between major
league owners and major league players. To paraphrase a famous former member
of tis body, minor league owners 'ain't got no dog m this fight."
Recently, however, I have seen correspondence in which Stan Brand, lobbyist for
the minor leagues, accuses me of seeking the legislation in order to attack the ama-
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teur draft. If fact, he claims that I threatened to sue to overturn the amateur draft
when I was testifying some time ago on the House side. I would like to clarify the
record on this issue in three respects.
First, I do not believe that Mr. Brand's comments were addressing the actual lan-
guage that became part of the signed collective bargaining agreement, and certainly
were not addressing the specific language we have recently agreed upon. Second,
the question I was asked by a member of the House Judiciary Committee, well be-
fore the strike ended, much less the new agreement was reached, was whether I
thought someone would challenge the draft. I responded that I believed someone
would eventually do so, but clearly I was indicating that such a challenge would be
brought under existing law. This was neither a threat nor was it any great insight
on my part. Consider only that aspect of a system that requires that a young man
from Cleveland must enter baseball through the draft and negotiate the terms of
his employment with only one team, but permits a Cuban, who defects to the Do-
minican Republic, for example, to negotiate with any team. One cannot expect
American young men to ignore that situation. However, third, and most important,
this legislation does not affect the status of the amateur draft. If existing law pro-
tects the draft, it remains protected even after the passage of this legislation. If ex-
isting law permits a challenge to the draft today, that right is unchanged by this
bill. itigation as to the amateur draft would not be affected by the passage of S. 53
or the player-owner agreed upon proposal.
Moreover, my understanding is that the major leagues and the minor leagues re-
cently reached an agreement on a new 10-year Professional Baseball Agreement
that would guarantee 158 minor league teams in 1998, and 160 teams thereafter.
In other words, the major league teams would be contractually bound to continue
to support all existing minor league teams.
CONCLUSION
Let me conclude by again expressing the appreciation of all major league players
to the members of this Committee for their consideration of this legislation, legisla-
tion that we strongly believe is in the interest not only of the players and owners,
but also of the fans. We continue to support and are committed to seeking legisla-
tion to clarify that major league baseball players have the same rights under the
antitrust laws as do other athletes. Hopefully you will shortly have before you lan-
guage agreed upon by the players and owners, which we urge you to act upon favor-
ably in the near future. And, in any event, I want the Committee to know that the
Players Association strongly supports both S. 53 and the more narrow amendment
pending before the committee.
Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Peltier, we will take your testimony.
STATEMENT OF DAN PELTIER
Mr. PELTIER. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, my
name is Dan Peltier. I had the opportunity and the pleasure to
play professional baseball at all possible levels for 8 years. I played
rookie ball with the Butte Copper Kings in the Pioneer League,
double A with the Tulsa Drillers, triple A level with the Oklahoma
City 89ers and the Phoenix Fire Birds, and I also played with the
Texas Rangers and the San Francisco Giants at the major league
level. I also had the opportunity to play in the independent North-
ern League with the St. Paul Saints. I greatly appreciate this op-
portunity to talk about my experiences and about the realities of
baseball in the minors from the players' perspective.
Before beginning, I would like to point out that I recognize that
I am one of the lucky ones. Unlike most professional players, I got
the chance to play in the majors. Currently, there are approxi-
mately 4,500 active minor league players on affiliated minor league
teams. Every year, the major league teams draft more than 1,200
new players, more than 1,600 players this year in 1997. So the
turnover rate is very high.
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As I understand it, only 1 out of every 10 players drafted even
gets 1 day in the major leagues. Only 1 out of every 100 actually
has a career in the majors. Moreover, when I retired, I had my col-
lege degree, a degree in accounting from the University of Notre
Dame. Many players are out of the game by their mid- to late 20's,
with a high school degree, a wife, children, and no marketable
skills.
There are a lot of myths about playing in the minors. People
think that it is the last bastion of professional sports where win-
ning is all that matters, that economics are not as important as tal-
ent and the fun of the game. In reality, minor league baseball is
a tough business where failure is the norm and success is the rare
exception. Here are some basic facts.
First, the primary objective of every player in the minors is not
to have a winning season, to have the best team, or to be the
league champion. It is to play well enough to get off the team and
play in the major leagues. It is better to have a good season for a
losing team than to have average statistics for a winner. Rosters
are constantly changing and there is little chance to build team
chemistry or unity. Everyone in the minors-players, coaches, and
managers-have one thing in common; that is, to be in the big
leagues.
Second, no one gets wealthy in the minors. Most baseball players
do not make in a year as much as Cal Ripken makes for one game.
In fact, most minor league players would love to make what I un-
derstand you pay your entry-level staffers. When I played rookie
ball, although I was under contract for a year, I made $850 a
month for 22 months. In double A, I made $1,350 a month, and
in triple A I made $1,850 a month for 5 months. Club house dues
and tips cost roughly $1,500 for the season, leaving me about
$7,500 before taxes. I have no idea how some of my friends who
were married and had kids were able to make ends meet.
Third, a minor league baseball players has very few rights. Base-
ball's reserve clause is very much like the indentured servitude of
the 1700's. When you first sign, you are owned by that team for
basically 7 seasons. A team can buy you, sell you, send you to an-
other country, or fire you whenever they want. They can cut you
if you get hurt.
A player, on the other hand, cannot try to play for someone.else.
He can't try out for his home team. You have to play for the team
that drafted you even if they are loaded at your position. I got
drafted by the Texas Rangers after my junior year of college as an
outfielder. I also played some first base. When I was ready for the
majors, the Texas outfield included superstars such as Juan Gon-
zalez in left, Ruben Sierra in right, and Raphael Palmeiro at first.
I got the chance to play when Ruben Sierra got hurt, but was sent
back to the minors when he came back, even though at the time
I was hitting .385.
Under the standard minor league contract, a player is required
to waive all rights to appeal any action by the team in State or
Federal court. You can appeal to the commissioner of baseball, ex-
cept there has been no commissioner for almost 5 years. In addi-
tion, you are pushed to leave college or not to attend in the first
15
place and play in the minors, even though the chances are that you
will never have a career in the major leagues.
Oddly, if you are an American citizen, you have less bargaining
power than kids from other countries. Players in the United States
can only play for the team that drafts them. The only bargaining
power that some have is to stay in college. Players from other coun-
tries, such as the Dominican Republic or Cuba, are not subject to
the draft. They are free agents and can choose to play for the team
that makes the best offer. Because of this fact, teams from the
United States and Japan are signing players from Latin and South
American countries at an increasingly young age.
Perhaps most important, there is the mind set of the minors
which at best is a bit unrealistic. The longer you stay in, the fewer
options you have and more desperate you seem to get. You know
you are playing against a stacked deck, but in your heart you
firmly believe you are different, that you are going to be the excep-
tion. One's perspective of reality at 18 tends to be a little different
than one's perspective at 28 or 38.
Moreover, there is an incredible pressure to perform. You are al-
ways a day from being let go and there are hundreds of other guys
ready to take your place if you have a problem. At times, the mi-
nors seem to be a series of acts of desperation.
Given these facts, I think you can understand my surprise that
some want to stack the deck even further and create a new Federal
law exempting the owners' actions in the minors from the antitrust
laws. Quite frankly, what else do the owners need than what they
have already? What are the laws they must be able to break in
order to run minor league teams? How much more power do they
need when bargaining with an 18-year-old kid whom they own for
7 years, and what minor league player is going to jeopardize his
career by challenging the system? If you believe a player would do
that, then you really don't understand the mind set of a minor
league player.
Having played in an independent league, there are even some
differences between these two types of minor leagues. The North-
ern League was very similar to double A ball in terms of pay and
playing conditions, but there is a different atmosphere between the
team and the fans. The primary purpose of the St. Paul Saints,
which is the team that I played for, was to entertain the fans, and
that commitment by the team was mirrored by the commitment
from the community. Every game was a sellout. People came hours
ahead of the game for tailgate parties even though there was a
major league team literally only 10 miles away. The games were
more fun.
Despite these observations, I would not give up my experience in
playing baseball for anything. There is no greater feeling in the
world than the first time you get called up to the majors, and there
is also no greater low than the day that you get sent back down.
Knowing what I know, I would still do it all over again. The basic
fact is that you don't have to sign if you don't want to. However,
this obsession with making the majors should not be a justification
for the current treatment of minor league players, and I certainly
hope it would not be used as an excuse to give major league and
minor league owners a legal blank check.
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I understand that the legislation before this committee does not
address the minor leagues, however. It does not create any new
rights or delete any existing ones. It is only about the relationship
between the major league owners and the major league players.
Consequently, it should not be changed to award the owners with
even more power.
Before giving the owners an exemption for all of their activities
in the minors, I hope Congress will take the time to learn more
about the legal and economic realities of the minors, and not sim-
ply rely upon some of the current myths. Professional baseball
owners already have more power than they need, and certainly
more than they deserve.
Thank you for this opportunity and I will be happy to answer
any questions.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you, Mr. Peltier.
Let me make it clear that I said that Mr. Brand-I tried to meet
with him yesterday. He had an appointment with our staff yester-
day and I asked the staff to bring him over to the office so we could
chat with him because I had chatted with some friends who felt
that I should meet with Mr. Brand. He never showed up, so the
staff tried to get a hold of him all day long. Finally, just to note
for the record, Mr. Brand did express a willingness and desire to
meet last evening, but our staff wasn't in the office at the time, but
he did meet with some committee staff. So I wanted to make that
clear. I wasn't aware of that at the time.
Let me also put in the record a statement by Senator Charles
Grassley, and also an opening statement by Senator Jeff Sessions,
as well.
[The prepared statements of Senators Grassley and Sessions fol-
low:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR CHARLEs E. GRASSLEY, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF IOWA
Mr. Chairman, I would like to add my voice to this debate to emphasize the im-
portance of Minor League Baseball.
As everyone knows, baseball is not just a favorite American pastime-it is part
of our American culture. We grew up admiring the accomplishments of our favorite
players and rooting for our favorite teams. We grew up perfecting our curve balls
and sliders, and wondering why our fast balls were never as fast as our heroes' fast
balls. I want my grandkids and their children to enjoy the same outing to the ball-
park that I did.
But baseball wouldn't be baseball without the Minor Leagues. The Major League
teams would not have the pool of talent to draw from, and wouldn't have the train-
ing ground for promising players if it were not for the Minor Leagues. And, in my
part of the world, the Minor Leagues fill another very important role. The Minor
Leagues brings baseball to the towns and small cities. They bring baseball to my
state of Iowa, and to other states that do not have Major League teams. It doesn't
take a Cal Ripkin or a George Brett to make a city loyal to a baseball club. If you've
never been to a Burlington Bees game or a Des Moines Cubs game, you're really
missing something. And you haven't seen fan loyalty until you've gone to a Minor
League game where so much of the town turns out for a game.
These are the reasons that I will continue to work to protect Minor League base-
ball. It is vital that any legislation passed by this Committee and by the full Senate
be in the best interest of the Minor Leagues. I commend the Chairman for his ef-
forts in this regard, and sincerely hope he continues to work with the Minor
Leagues. For small town America, the Minor Leagues are baseball.
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PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE
OF ALABAMA
I would like to begin by thanking Senator Hatch for calling this hearing to discuss
S. 53, the Curt Flood Act of 1997, which, if enacted, would repeal professional base-
ball's 75-year-old antitrust exemption. I commend Senator Hatch for recognizing
that the legislation which we will be discussing today seeks to significantly change
the basic operating structure of "America's pastime", and for giving this committee
the opportunity to fully and fairly consider this issue. I would also like to thank
the witnesses assembled here today for their willingness to come before this commit-
tee to help us develop a clear understanding of the potential implications that could
result from any changes made to existing law.
Mr. Chairman, my home state of Alabama has a rich baseball tradition. On the
collegiate level one need only look as far as this spring's College World Series to
see that teams from University of Alabama and Auburn University were among the
participants. A third school, the University of South Alabama, came within one
game of being the third Alabama team in the College World Series, losing to even-
tual national champion Louisiana State University in the regional finals.
Many major league legends come from Alabama, and my hometown of Mobile has
an extraordinary record. Three of the greatest homerun hitters of all time, Hank
Aaron, Willie McCovey and Billy Williams were all from Mobile.
More than that, Satchel Paige, one of the game's legends, came from Mobile, and
as you recall those "Miracle Mets" please note that two of their outfielders, Cleon
Jones and Tommy Agee, were both Mobilians. These are just some of the many
major leaguers our state has produced.
Still, although Alabama has never had a Major League team, the minor leagues
have always been important. Mobilians still fondly recall "the Rifleman", Chuck
Connors, who played for the old Mobile Bears. And Birmingham hosted the entire
career of the most famous minor league player of all-time, the most well known ath-
lete in the world-Michael Jordan. To most he is a Chicago Bull, but to us he is
known as a Birmingham Baron.
Minor League activity continues to grow within our state. Alabama currently has
three minor league teams, the Birmingham Barons, Huntsville Stars and the Mobile
BayBears, which have all made tremendous contributions to the communities that
support them. Alabama's affection for minor league baseball has been reflected in
our teams attendance records as well, with Birmingham drawing 296,000 fans last
year while Huntsville attracted 255,000 fans. The new Mobile BayBears, in this,
their first full season of play, have already drawn 137,160 fans in only 31 home
dates. This support for these minor league teams has made itself known through
the mail and other communications that I have received in my office from individ-
uals in the state who are concerned about this issue.
Repeal of baseball's antitrust exemption is an issue of tremendous significance to
the minor leagues, and the potential impacts of this legislation on these teams
should not be overlooked. The importance of minor league baseball to small towns
and communities throughout America cannot be overstated. Many of these minor
league teams are located in states, such as Alabama, that have never hosted a
Major League franchise, and they provide their communities with unique social and
economic benefits that would not otherwise exist. My interest in this hearing is to
ensure that the concerns raised by these teams are fairly addressed and that the
actions we take do not unfairly damage minor league baseball and the communities
that support it. To this end, I look forward to hearing the testimony of the witnesses
on this issue.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Fehr, could you share with us your views on
how repealing Major League Baseball's antitrust exemption will
improve labor relations between the players and the owners, and
what broader benefits do you think that this might lead to?
Mr. FEHR. I think there are a couple of things. Essentially, the
circumstances that when it comes to player relations at the major
league level, as well as at the minor league level-the owners are
organized in such a way so as to deprive players of any meaningful
bargaining power on their individual contracts. Their object is to do
that. The union's job is to try and negotiate a better system.
When we have a circumstance in which the antitrust laws are
not there as a safety valve in the background if collective bargain-
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ing breaks down, what we have is a set of circumstances in which
it makes it much more likely that the owners will be interested in
pushing that forward, as we have seen in the past, so that hope-
fully they can get to the point where they can determine without
any restraint whatever the conditions are. If they know that there
is a safety valve that, come what may, they can't act in a way
which would otherwise be deemed to violate the Sherman Act, we
think that that will temper bargaining positions, as it has in the
other sports.
The CHAIRMAN. I understand that the players and the owners
have agreed upon specific language as an alternative to S. 53 as
currently drafted that both sides support. Can you summarize the
extent to which this language substantively differs from S. 53?
Mr. FEHR. I think the principal difference is this. S. 53 is a blan-
ket statement making it clear that the antitrust laws apply except
where otherwise noted, and there are a number of exceptions to
which you referred at the beginning of this hearing. The language
that we are suggesting is much more narrow than that. It is an af-
firmative statement that the antitrust laws apply to labor relations
at the major league level without making any comment whatsoever
on the state of the law otherwise.
The CHAIRMAN. OK. Well, can you tell us what the advantages
would be for the committee to proceed with your proposed sub-
stitute language as opposed to S. 53?
Mr. FEHR. Hopefully, what that would do is allow the committee
to proceed to consider legislation in a much more simple manner
with a much reduced range of issues that are there, thereby allow-
ing for a lot less controversy and hopefully a bill which can be
acted with broad support from all parties.
The CHAIRMAN. So I assume then, based upon your negotiations
with the owners, that you think it is fair to say that they would
support this language?
Mr. FEHR. Certainly, Randy Levine supports it. I understand
that the owners have agreed to support it, also. That certainly was
the intent of the collective bargaining agreement which they rati-
fied.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, would you agree with me that the owners'
support is rather significant, and that that is, as far as I can see,
a momentous development?
Mr. FEHR. I think it is a very significant development. I agree
with you, Senator. It indicates at long last that they are prepared
to treat major league players the same way their counterparts do
in other sports.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, I will put a letter in the record sent to me
by Bud Selig, dated June 16, 1997. Let me just read one sentence
in the letter. It says, "First, the language negotiated by representa-
tives of the Major League Baseball Players Association and the
Major League Baseball Owners was approved at the executive
council meeting and the legislative committee meeting."
He does say, "Our support is only tempered by the fact that our
business partner, the National Association of Professional Baseball
Leagues, has concern as to whether the proposed legislation ade-
quately protects their interests," and then mentions that "they
have contacted our office."
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I will put that in the record to express their concerns, and cer-
tainly we are interested in their concerns.
[The letter referred to follows:]
OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER,
MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL,
New York, NY, June 16, 1997.
Hon. ORRIN HATCH, Chairman,
Judiciary Committee, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
DEAR CHAIRMAN: I am writing to acknowledge your June 13, 1997, letter of invita-
tion to testify before the Senate Judiciary Committee on Tuesday, June 17, 1997,
at 10:00 a.m. Unfortunately, I will be unable to attend due to a previous long-term
commitment to the Boys & Girls Club of America. However, I would like to make
a couple of comments with respect to our recent meetings in Philadelphia, Penn-
sylvania, last week.
First, the language negotiated by representatives of the Major League Baseball
Players Association and the Major League Baseball Owners was approved at the Ex-
ecutive Council meeting and the Legislative Committee meeting. Our support is
only tempered by the fact that our business partner, the National Association of
Professional Baseball Leagues (NAPBL), has concern as to whether the proposed
legislation adequately protects their interests. I understand that representatives of
the NAPBL have contacted your office to arrange a meeting to discuss those con-
cerns.
Second, we announced on June 12, 1997, a ten-year agreement with the Minor
Leagues effective October 1, 1997. The Professional Baseball Agreement sets forth
a spirit of cooperation and commitment between the Major and Minor Leagues.
Third, we are reviewing our concerns about appearing to testify given that we
have been sued by one of our own member clubs in an antitrust lawsuit.
We look forward to working with you and your staff as the process moves forward.
Sincerely,
ALLAN H. SELIG,
Chairman, Major League Executive Council.
The CHAIRMAN. As I understand it, Mr. Fehr, your proposed lan-
guage only addresses labor relations at the major league level, is
that correct?
Mr. FEHR. That is correct.
The CHAIRMAN. Does the proposed legislation give anyone a right
to challenge the minor league draft or reserve clause?
Mr. FEHR. In my view, this is carefully drafted so that if this leg-
islation passes, it would be irrelevant to considerations about the
status of the draft or the minor league reserve clause.
The CHAIRMAN. Does it address the minor leagues at all?
Mr. FEHR. It only addressed it to say that whatever the status
of the law is, this doesn't change it. Otherwise, it does not.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, do you believe that the minor league
draft or reserve clause under current law are exempt from the anti-
trust laws?
Mr. FEHR. That is an interesting question. It has never been test-
ed. I don't know what-
The CHAIRMAN. Do you think they should be?
Mr. FEHR. Personally, do I think they should be?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Mr. FEHR. No, I don't think they should be.
The CHAIRMAN. Why not?
Mr. FEHR. Major League Baseball operating the amateur draft-
and make no mistake, it is operated by Major League Baseball, not
by the minor leagues; as a matter of fact, all the minor league con-
tracts are now signed by the major league clubs; they are not even
signed by the minor league clubs-effectively prevents any poten-
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tial baseball player from bargaining with more than one potential
employer.
It is not even like the Federal Government where you can apply
to a number of different agencies in a number of different locations.
You have one choice, and one choice only. We think that is fun-
damentally discriminatory. We don't know of any other place in
America in which we tolerate it. The amateur draft came in in the
mid-1960's. I know of no case in which it has been examined under
the antitrust laws. I can make the arguments as to how that would
come out either way. For purposes of this legislation, though, I do
want to emphasize that this legislation would not affect that one
way or another.
The CHAIRMAN. OK Now, Mr. Peltier, let me just take a second
with you and then I will turn to Senator DeWine. You have given
us some very helpful insight into life in the minor leagues and this
will, I am sure, prove helpful as we consider further legislation.
As I have stated earlier, our pending bill does not in any way af-
fect the applicability of the antitrust laws to the minor leagues
and, as I understand it, nor does the proposal agreed upon by the
owners and the players, as articulated by Mr. Fehr. But I suspect
that this is an issue that at some point is going to surface, and I
take it from your testimony that you would advise against chang-
ing the bill to insulate the minor league system from the antitrust
laws. Am I right in that?
Mr. PELTIER. That is correct.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you know of any minor league player or agent
who has challenged the legality of the minor league system?
Mr. PELTIER. Not off the top of my head, no, I don't.
The CHAIRMAN. Why do you think that that hasn't occurred, why
no player has actually challenged this system?
Mr. PELTIER. Well, I think, you know, what you have to realize
here is that minor league players that aren't part of the 40-man
roster which is protected by the Major League Players Association
basically have no rights in terms of voicing their opinion. You
know, the thing that you have to remember here is that the ur-
gency to get from a minor league level to a big-league level neces-
sitates the fact that you have to first perform well. And, second,
you have to, you know, perform in the bounds of what the major
league team wants you to perform in.
The CHAIRMAN. So, don't cause any trouble, is what you are say-
ing?
Mr. PELTIER. Exactly, exactly, you know, and that is a big thing.
You know, you look at some of the players today, you know, and
you can cite numerous cases where they do cause trouble, but-
The CHAIRMAN. And even though they are great players, they
never make it to the majors?
Mr. PELTIER. Yes, absolutely, absolutely, and one of the things
that you have to look at is, as I mentioned in my testimony, you
have to be in the right place at the right time. That not only means
talentwise, but also your personality has to fit that of the big-
league club that you are trying to make. And if that is not a perfect
fit, then, you know, you end up with the short side of the stick.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, assume for the moment that the antitrust
laws ultimately would be applied to the minor leagues either by the
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courts or the Congress. Were this to happen, do you believe that
minor league baseball would be destroyed, as some have suggested?
Mr. PELTIER. No, absolutely not. You know, one of the things
that I don't think people understand is that minor league owners
aren't the ones that pay the salaries for the minor league players.
As Don sort of alluded to, the fact that when you sign a contract,
you are signing a contract of the major league parent club-be-
cause of that, you know, I think that minor league owners tend to
feel that, you know, they are not operating on fair grounds. But
they have to realize that what they get out of their investment in
minor league baseball is not something that is construed as big-
league baseball, major league baseball. It is an entirely different
market.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, you are no longer playing professional
baseball, right?
Mr. PELTIER. Correct.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, we have tried to have a current minor
league player come and testify, but we couldn't get anybody to do
it. Can you tell us any reason why?
Mr. PELTIER. Well, I think that speaks volumes in itself that, you
know, I think guys are afraid to come out here and speak against,
you know, the people that are deciding their fate.
The CHAIRMAN. In other words, they don't want to rock the boat?
Mr. PELTIER. Exactly, exactly. They don't want to rock the boat.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there a difference for the players and the fans
between the affiliated minor leagues and the independent league?
Mr. PELTIER. Yes, absolutely. You know, one of the things that
I had the opportunity to do was to play for the St. Paul Saints in
1995 because I didn't cross the line and be a replacement player,
and what I noticed was that their whole existence is based on the
fact that the fans take part, you know, in the game itself. The way
that they have organized their organization was to make it more
of a family atmosphere and have the fans be part of the game.
As a result, you know, I saw things that I haven't seen since I
was a student at Notre Dame. The people were tailgating before
games on weekdays at 4:30 in the afternoon. We would have a
packed house. People really enjoyed going to the game not only be-
cause of the product that was on the field, but because of the enter-
tainment that they witnessed.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, Mr. Peltier, based on your experiences as
a minor league player, can you tell us what happens to a minor
league player if he has a career-shortening injury, such as torn lig-
aments or a torn rotator cuff or a knee or a shoulder that can't be
fully repaired? Can he be cut after sustaining the injury?
Mr. PELTIER. Yes, he can. What the teams are bound to do is pay
for their medical bills, you know, in the event that the injury oc-
curred while he was playing for that team. Beyond that, there is
no legal responsibility for the team to continue to pay him and give
him the opportunity to make it to the major leagues. You know,
there again, that ties in with the fact that minor league players
really do have no rights and they are not bound by-
The CHAIRMAN. So, basically, he is dead as far as baseball is con-
cerned if he has a career-shortening injury?
Mr. PELTIER. Right, and that is a very real possibility.
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The CHAIRMAN. And there is no real help for him?
Mr. PELTIER. No, and that is what separates the major leagues
from the minor leagues. Don Fehr and the Major League Players
Association represent the players such that they are treated fairly,
and the minor leagues really have no governing body to that ex-
tent.
The CHAIRMAN. I see. I understand that you were let go by the
Texas Rangers after you refused to cross the picket line and be a
replacement player during the labor dispute in 1995.
Mr. PELTIER. That is correct.
The CHAIRMAN. Could you please explain what happened, why
you refused to play?
Mr. PELTIER. Well, the reason why I refused to play is that I had
just been part of the Major League Players Association and felt a
responsibility to support the union. I realized that had I crossed
the line, I, in essence, would be admitting to myself that I don't
think that I could make it back to the major leagues on my own
volition. And, you know, as a result, I felt that it was an easy deci-
sion for me to make in terms of not becoming a replacement player
because of the fact that I did support the union and wanted to get
back to the big leagues, you know, on my own.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, were any threats made to you?
Mr. PELTIER. Well, one of the things that happened in spring
training was they had all of the players that weren't on the 40-man
roster at the time-and a lot of the teams did this; some of the
teams didn't participate, such as the Baltimore Orioles. But at the
time when I was with the Texas Rangers, they had everybody come
down early from minor league camp in February and play together.
There were a lot of players there on the field and, you know, we
had normal workouts for, you know, approximately 3 weeks or a
month-actually, around 3 weeks.
Then our general manager, who was Doug Melvin, called us all
on the field, with the exception of around 10 youn prospects who
they felt would make it to the big leagues eventually on their own.
He called everybody over onto this one field and said, you know,
verbatim, "Either you stay and play or you go home. We are not
going to pay for your hotel. We are not going to pay for your ride
home. We want you to be a replacement player because this is
where the game is right now." So, around 10 of us got up and left.
You know, it was clearly evident as to what they were trying to
do, you know, just given the fact that they had these 10 prospects,
these 10 young prospects, separated from the mass so that they
wouldn't be affected by this and had to make that decision because
I think in their minds they knew that this would definitely have
some repercussions on the players who did decide to cross.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, do you think that most players who are
drafted enter the minor leagues fully understanding what they are
getting into and have been given an accurate representation of
their chances of making the majors?
Mr. PELTIER. Well, you know, I think that as a scout or as an
organization as a whole, they try to paint a rosy picture and try
to make it sound as if everybody has a real good chance to make
it to the major leagues. In reality, that is not the case, as is evident
by the numbers that I had mentioned. But, you know, I think that
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they do try to make it-baseball is different from other sports, too.
Baseball does not use college as their minor leagues, whereas bas-
ketball and football basically do. So right from the start, there is
a pressure to enter the minor league level at a younger age so that
they can-you know, they can bring you along in their process as
they would have it. So this is a difference from these sports.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, could you just describe maybe in a little
more detail the kind of pressure placed on high school and college
students to leave school and play minor league baseball by the
team that drafts them?
Mr. PELTIER. Well, I think that the pressure exists in the fact-
you know, I can speak from my experience where, as a junior, in
going through the negotiating process once I was drafted, obviously
their desire was to have me sign and play professional ball right
away at the youngest possible age, OK, for the least amount of
money. So they used their tactics to try to get me to sign for as
little amount of money as possible.
Now, my feeling was that because I was a junior, I had an oppor-
tunity to play for Team USA. I had an opportunity to finish my de-
gree on time. I felt it was important for me to make sure that play-
ing professional baseball at that time was going to be the best pos-
sible scenario for me because I was putting a lot at stake, you
know, and the methods that they used to try to make me sign at
an earlier time for a lesser amount of money were such that the
scout came and said, you weren't picked until the 65th pick and
you want such and such for your signing.
So then my response was, so what you are saying is that you
view me as a number and not as a person. And, in turn, he said,
no, that is not the case, and then he said something as if, if you
don't sign, I am going to lose my job. Now I am a 20-year-old kid
and he is trying to use all these tactics to try to get me to sign.
Then there were comments made in my local newspaper as to I
would be crazy if I didn't sign, comments made by a scout who was
a national scout for the Rangers at that time, you know, therefore
putting more pressure on me by my peers and my family and ev-
eryone in the area.
So, you know, there are definitely tactics that are used to try to
force kids to sign at a younger age. You know, they are trying to
do their job and stay within their budget, but, you know, only I
think to put a feather in their cap if they can sign the diamonds
in the rough.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you. I think both of your testimonies
have been very interesting here today. Again, I would note that I
would have preferred to have had representatives of the minor and
major leagues here to respond and testify. It is unfortunate for
them that they aren't here represented, but we certainly did every-
thing in our power to try and get them here.
So I wish we had some of their responses to some of this, but I
am not without some understanding of this myself. Having been
born and raised in Pittsburgh, PA, and watching the Pirates and
having been a Pirate fan all those years, I saw a lot of things hap-
pen that concerned me.
24
Senator Specter would like to make a statement and then ask a
question or two of you, Mr. Fehr, and Senator DeWine has gra-
ciously agreed to allow that to happen, and I certainly agree.
Senator Specter.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ARLEN SPECTER, A U.S. SENATOR
FROM THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA
Senator SPECTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
thank you, Senator DeWine, for yielding to me for a few moments.
The issue of the antitrust exemption has been before this com-
mittee repeatedly during my tenure in the Senate, and we are
searching for a way that there can be fairness to all sides and base-
ball can be preserved as the great American pastime. My own basic
view is that the antitrust laws ought to apply to everybody, and I
have stayed with the baseball antitrust exemption really because
of an effort to preserve the small-market teams, one of which is
Pittsburgh. The Pirates have stayed in Pittsburgh, at least up to
the present time, and they are doing very, very well this season
with a very small budget, but their future is obviously precarious,
as are other small-market teams.
It has been my hope that in the controversy around baseball that
somehow the participants, the owners and the players, would come
to some sort of an agreement or understanding to preserve the
game. I think that necessarily involves revenue-sharing and salary
caps, or perhaps I shouldn't say "necessarily." Perhaps it can be
preserved without revenue-sharing and salary caps, but I do not
know how it can be done without those two features, and perhaps
more.
The Congress of the United States is not in a very good position
to tell people what to do about anything, and we like, in our free
enterprise society, for people to make their own judgments and the
market to prevail. However, baseball does have this great exemp-
tion, which is historical, but they have it, and it has seemed to me
that the Congress might be in the position to exercise some lever-
age on the owners and on the players to work out some arrange-
ment where the game could be preserved.
I personally still resent the moving of the Dodgers from Brooklyn
in 1958, and the Giants, and that fabulous baseball series on public
television was on again last night and talked about that again. I
think that there are major problems with the move of the football
franchises around, like the Cleveland Browns moving to Baltimore.
That is slightly different, but it is still in the same line. That draws
a response from Senator DeWine.
A few years ago, the Eagles were on their way to Phoenix and
that was stopped, and we had some really tough hearings here in
1982 with Pete Rozelle and Al Davis at the witness table when we
were trying to find some sense out of the move of the Raiders.
I read in the press last week, and I have yet to confirm the accu-
racy, that the "baseball commissioner," wants a new stadium in
Philadelphia for the Phils. Well, I didn't know baseball had a com-
missioner until I read it in the paper. I thought that they had an
acting commissioner, and there is a big difference between a com-
missioner and an acting commissioner. The paper said that permis-
sion had been given for the Minnesota team to look for new owner-
25
ship and a possible move, and that might be in the offing for the
Phils.
I have a lot of admiration for Bill Giles and the Phils organiza-
tion, but I am not too anxious to see the taxpayers pick up the big
tab on a new stadium. Our very distinguished Governor, Tom
Ridge, is looking at that with a commission, and Pittsburgh is in-
volved and so are the Eagles and so are the Steelers, and who
knows what comes next?
However, it seems to me that in a sport which is as lucrative as
baseball, where there is as much money as baseball has, that some-
one there ought to be making arrangements where baseball would
pay for its own stadiums. I think that the kind of salaries com-
manded in a free enterprise system is wonderful, although we took
an initial step a few years back in denying deductibility for ath-
letes' salaries over $1 million. We could do things like that under
our taxing power which would have a very profound effect.
I am not in favor of that, necessarily, but there is just a search
here as to what can be done to stabilize the game, something that
I have worked on for a long time. I recently retained special coun-
sel in the field, Gilbert Stein, who is here today-he was one of my
top deputies when I was district attorney, and later president of
the National Hockey League, and very, very well-informed on
sports-to try to take a fresh look to see if we can be of some help.
So the question I have, Mr. Fehr, after that relatively brief state-
ment, is what suggestion would you have, if any, as to some over-
arching principles that we might bring to baseball so that-when
I turn on the radio and listen to the Phillies, I can't tell who is at
bat because the players have moved around so much. I was at the
Phillies game on Sunday, a beautiful day and a big crowd, and the
Blue Jays were in town. We hadn't seen the Blue Jays since we lost
the Series to them in 1993.
What could be done to stabilize the game and perhaps provide
revenue-sharing, perhaps provide salary caps or, if those two fac-
tors are not to be done, to stabilize so that the small-market teams
stay and there is some continuity? This moves over into television
where we do have some greater authority with the Braves and
their television network and Ted Turner's big question, who wants
Rupert Murdoch to buy the Dodgers, and what that implies.
It is a very, very tangled web, and you have been in this a long
time, Mr. Fehr, and you are a very astute lawyer and pragmatist
and have a lot of experience. That is not a very concise question.
I feel a little like some of my colleagues, but what suggestions
would you have-to make it specific, what suggestions would you
have to stabilize the game?
Mr. FEHR. I will just open by noting that some people are hesi-
tant to ask me open-ended questions, but let me try and respond
as concisely as I can. You have raised a number of issues.
I remember those hearings in 1982, to which you referred. I am
reasonably certain that I testified in one segment of them, and my
own views on generalized number and location and relocation and
franchise issues and funding of stadiums, which is directly related
to that, are well-documented in testimony going back at regular in-
tervals over the 15 years. I will only respond to that issue by say-
ing that so long as we permit effective cartel-like organizations
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that can control the number and location of franchises, it is not un-
reasonable to expect that they will act like cartels and utilize what-
ever leverage they have. The only way that is going to change is
if you have teams competing for cities, rather than the other way
around.
Second, and much more directly related to the focus of your ques-
tion, the issues swirling around small-market clubs were in large
part responsible for the dispute that we had with the owners. It is
not, I think, an oversimplification to suggest that, fundamentally,
you had revenue-sharing rules in Major League Baseball which
were outdated by decades that the small-market clubs felt worked
to their peculiar disadvantage.
There was a generalized desire to reach a conclusion by which
they would be helped, but the question came down, where would
the help come. Our view was that how money is shared among
management is, if not anything else, perhaps the most traditional
management function there is. Ordinarily, when people come up
with a joint venture, they tend to write the rules as to how the
money flows as between the joint venture members, and as long as
they didn't rewrite those rules in a way which effectively destroyed
competition for players, they were going to be able to do that.
The owners as a group didn't want to do that because the large-
market owners' initial position in the bargaining, as is well-docu-
mented, was essentially that they would share, but only if player
salaries were reduced by amounts greater than the amount they
would have to share. Then they would do so. I would just refer you
to a congressional Research Service report in January 1995 which
documents what the positions of the parties were.
Having said that preliminarily-and I indicated in my prior testi-
mony before you were able to come into the hearing that the new
collective bargaining agreement we reached last November, which
was finally drafted and signed in March, has quite a number of
new provisions in it. Principal among those, and to which I did not
earlier refer, are provisions relating to increased revenue-sharing
and certain restrictions on the payments of players.
I will be glad to provide you with whatever level of detail you
want on this. Essentially, it comes down to the following. Over the
next 5 years, the level of revenue-sharing from large- to small-mar-
ket clubs-or rather small-income clubs-it is defined in terms of
income rather than market size-will go very substantially in
phases. In the initial years, there are certain taxes that would
apply to certain clubs if they spend over a certain amount on play-
ers. Those eventually go away as the revenue-sharing becomes
much more substantial.
In addition to that, in a gesture of what I consider, at least, to
be consummate good faith in an effort to rebuild the game, the
players have agreed on their own to kick into revenue-sharing in
1998 and 1999 exactly 2.2 percent of what their total salaries are,
which we expect to be several million north of $40 million. Vir-
tually all of that will go to small-market clubs.
In the end, baseball has to have a system which provides ade-
quate resources to the various teams. The definition of what is ade-
quate and the determination as to who pays that bill were the pri-
mary subjects of our collective bargaining negotiation and, if the
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provisions we put in place are successful, hopefully will pave the
way for the future. If not, we will have that issue again the next
time.
Senator SPECTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Fehr, for that an-
swer, and we will be pursuing it. I appreciate your allowing me the
deference here. Thank you very much, Senator DeWine and Mr.
Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Leahy, our ranking member.
Senator LEAHY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I apologize
for being late, but I have been tied up with the land mine issue
on the floor, and I guess you have been discussing the land mines
of this whole baseball situation.
You know, Senator Hatch and I as sponsors of this legislation
have shown an awful lot of patience in affording the Major League
Baseball owners some opportunity to implement the agreement
they reached with the Major League Baseball Players Association
8 months ago and to support legislation to end what I believe is
baseball's unjustified exemption from Federal antitrust laws.
I am sorry that Senator Hatch's efforts have been taken for
granted. I regret that the baseball team owners have responded to
his courtesies by refusing to appear here today. Frankly, the base-
ball owners are still in hiding in refusing to appear before the U.S.
Senate. Mr. Selig is the seemingly permanent acting commissioner.
He has been commissioner longer than most I have known.
If he were here, we could ask him what about the unsettling au-
thorization of the Minnesota Twins to negotiate to abandon the
team's fans in the Twin Cities? What about questions surrounding
demands for publicly-financed facilities in Seattle, Milwaukee, and
a number of other cities? We might ask him what about the Yan-
kees' lawsuit against the other major league baseball teams which
implicates the applicability of Federal antitrust laws to the busi-
ness of Major League Baseball?
We might ask him what is going on with the search for a strong,
independent baseball commissioner? It is sort of like "Waiting for
Godot" around here as we wait for a new baseball commissioner.
I am 57 years old. I would like to live long enough-and I come
from a family of long-lived people-I would like to live long enough
to see one. Then we would like to ask him questions about realign-
ment of teams among baseball's division, or the question of reve-
nue-sharing with small-market teams.
Mr. Chairman, I believe you have the patience of Job. Actually,
you have to to be chairman of this committee.
The CHARMAN. I am glad you recognize that. [Laughter.]
Senator LEAHY. I want to give you credit, but not so much credit
that it hurts you back home.
There is strong public interest in baseball. In Vermont when I
was growing up, you were automatically, or you weren't allowed to
live in the State, a Red Sox fan. But now, of course, loyalties are
split among teams, among various sports. We have a successful
minor league team, the Vermont Expos, the champions of the New
York-Penn League. They begin their new season later this week.
We have a lot of businesses and jobs that depend on baseball, and
we have baseball fans.
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I just worry that the public is being short-changed here, Mr.
Chairman. The first legislative day of this session, you and I and
Senator Thurmond and Senator Moynihan cosponsored a consensus
antitrust repeal measure. Instead of prompt action and agreement,
we have been stalled by these people for 6 months.
I would just ask this one question of Don Fehr, who is here. You
remember when some Senators argued over the past several years
that we should not proceed to repeal baseball's antitrust exemption
during a labor-management dispute. Well, now, you have a 5-year
contract. That contract included provision for the players and own-
ers to lobby for the antitrust laws to apply to labor relations in
Major League Baseball. Wouldn't this be the perfect time to pass
the legislation to repeal the antitrust exemption?
Mr. FEHR. As I indicated, Senator, before you came in, my views
on the exemption generally, what the effect has been, and how the
law should be in a perfect world are well-known. I have testified
to that many times and I don't have occasion to change those views
at all today. Simply put, the antitrust laws ought to apply univer-
sally, and I certainly don't want to presume to suggest to this com-
mittee or to the Senate or the Congress as a whole that with re-
spect to matters other than those covered by our agreement with
the owners that they should refrain from considering whatever
measures that you deem appropriate, especially given all that you
have learned.
I can say for my own part that after these many years of dif-
ficulty and trial and tribulation, we have reached an agreement
with the owners in the specific area which applies directly to my
membership and people that I represent, and that is the measure
that we hope that you will act on favorably and act on quickly. As
has been the case in the past, I will be glad to provide you or any
other member of the committee or the Senate any other assistance
with respect to other questions that you might find helpful.
Senator LEAHY. I appreciate that.
I see Mr. Peltier here. I commend him for his courage in being
here because he may want to go back and play at this level. I think
the Blue Jays released Ruben Sierra this week. You look in pretty
good shape. They may be looking for somebody who used to hit
.385.
Mr. PELTIER. Hopefully, for more than a couple weeks.
Senator LEAHY. Well, I think you would do OK. Certainly, you
are better prepared to do that than anybody on this panel, with the
exception of Senator Thurmond. He has got his new baseball bat
from Chairman Hatch.
Let me ask you one question, and this doesn't necessarily have
anything to do with this particular hearing, but I am just curious
to hear your thoughts. We have the tremendous growth and suc-
cess of women's sports following the college programs through title
IX. We have women's Olympic team victories, girls and young
women getting involved in soccer and baseball and basketball and
other sports. We have the Silver Bullets. We have stories about
women pitching in minor leagues.
Do you see a time when women will be playing or coaching or
umpiring in the major leagues?
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Mr. PELTIER. Well, you know, physically that may be the case
some day, but I think that the way that the minor leagues or the
major leagues exist today, I think it would be difficult, you know,
in the sense that the way that things have been established would
have to be changed to accommodate those needs because, obviously,
there would be different needs for club houses or showering facili-
ties or things of that nature.
You know, if you are asking me a question of talent, you know,
who knows what could happen in the future? But I think that-
Senator LEAHY. It is more a question of talent. I mean, all the
other things can be worked out.
Mr. PELTIER. Yes. I think in the future, I don't see why, you
know, you couldn't say if there is a woman that throws 95 miles
per hour and can get batters out, then she would be as deserving
as anyone else.
Senator LEAHY. Mr. Chairman, I commend you for doing this,
and again I commend your patience. You are truly a Latter Day
Saint.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, it is better than being a latter day liberal,
is all I can say.
Senator LEAHY. Oh, come now. Some of them are saints, too.
The CHAIRMAN. Let me turn to the chairman of our Antitrust
Subcommittee, who has been very patient here, and I also want to
say that Senator DeWine has been a leader in this area, as well,
and we are looking forward to his work with us on this matter.
So, Senator DeWine, we will turn to you and I am sorry it has
taken so long to get to you.
Senator DEWINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me first thank
you for holding the hearing and congratulate you for introduction
of the bill. I supported a similar bill, as you know, in the last Con-
gress. Quite frankly, it is hard to come up with any logical or ra-
tional basis why baseball should stand alone with the antitrust ex-
emption, and for that reason I supported its abolition in the last
Congress.
Let me turn to the issue of the minor leagues, which I think is
a troubling issue. First, let me say, Mr. Chairman, I am also sorry
that Mr. Brand is not here today. We have in the State of Ohio
three minor league teams. We plan to have a fourth within the
next year or two in Dayton. We obviously have two major league
teams in Ohio. So this issue holds more than academic interest for
me.
I have listened over the last few months to repeated statements
about what this bill or similar bills would do in regard to the minor
leagues, and people have told me that even though this bill is very
specific and says it will not impact the minor leagues, there still
have been a lot of comments that have been made about the fact
that it will have unintended consequences in regard to the minor
leagues. So I am sorry that he is not here today, Mr. Chairman,
to talk about it. I think it is very difficult, frankly, to approach this
issue without a representative of the minor leagues here.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, I do, too.
Senator DEWINE. I just think it is just a real shame. This is not
a new issue. This is not something that they have not had the op-
portunity to think about for a long, long time, and I don't know
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how we really approach this issue without a thorough discussion
about the minor leagues. I am going to have a couple of questions
for our witnesses in regard to that.
Let me also state, Mr. Chairman, that I think it is a shame that
the major leagues are not represented here. Bud Selig is not here;
the acting commissioner is not here. Again, I think it makes it dif-
ficult.to address this issue in his absence.
The CHAIRMAN. Will the Senator yield on that point?
Senator DEWINE. I certainly will, and I understand you have
been very plain, Mr. Chairman, that you extended the invitation
and these issues have been out there in the open for a long, long
time. There is nothing new, but I think that for neither of them
to be here creates a problem for us.
The CHAIRMAN. If the Senator would yield, I think it is a prob-
lem. But on the other hand, what we are trying to do is resolve the
major league problems at this point and leave the minor leagues
alone. Now, if, in the future, we find that there is a disadvantage
or some major problem, we can work on that.
Senator DEWINE. Mr. Chairman, I thoroughly understand that,
and I don't quarrel with that and I don't disagree with you. I don't
think you are wrong.
The CHAIRMAN. No. I know you don't.
Senator DEWINE. But we are still left, and I am still left with
statements that have been made by minor league teams, state-
ments that have been made by representatives of the minor
leagues, that even this bill leaves this open and that there are
going to be unintended consequences. I think it is very difficult for
me as a member of the Senate to deal with it. It is not the chair-
man's fault, but when people say there is going to be a problem
and then they don't come in and testify, I think that is just a real
problem.
The CHAIRMAN. I agree. If the Senator would just yield again, I
understand that, but again I want to just resolve this problem. I
was hopeful that Mr. Brand would be here with suggestions that
he would like to have.
Senator DEWINE. Well, I have also, Mr. Chairman, as you know,
asked for specific suggestions from Mr. Brand and we have not
been able to get any specific suggestions.
The CHAIRMAN. I know. We are in agreement. What I want to do
is turn the rest of the hearing over to you as the chairman of the
Antitrust Subcommittee because I need to get to Finance. That is
what I am trying to do.
Senator DEWINE. I will continue, then, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. If you will, and if you will forgive me for leaving.
I want to thank you both for coming. I think your testimony has
been very accurate, very good, and very helpful to the committee.
We will just move ahead and see what we can do here. I want to
be fair to all people here, but it seems to me the major league prob-
lem is solved. There. should be no griping about that.
With the minor leagues, we are happy to work with Mr. Brand.
I just don't want it to tie up the solution to the major league prob-
lems. And if there is an attempt to do that, then I have to say I
am going to be pretty irritated because I am willing to work to try
and resolve those problems in the future. But this is something I
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would like to get done today, since the major league owners and
players have basically agreed. It seems to me there is no reason not
to at least pursue and complete that aspect of this whole set of
problems, and then to the extent that we have other problems with
the minors, we will be happy to work with them, and even hold
hearings and do other things that may be helpful there. But right
now, I would like to get this problem solved.
Thank you, and if you don't mind finishing, I would appreciate
it.
Senator DEWINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be more than
happy to.
The CHAIRMAN. Good to see you.
Mr. FEHR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator DEWINE [presiding]. Let me make a couple more state-
ments and then I will turn to questions. As I was saying, I think
it is a shame that the acting commissioner of baseball is not here.
You know, some people may say, well, what in the world does the
U.S. Senate care about whether there is an acting commissioner or
a permanent commissioner, and what should our involvement be?
I think it is obvious that when we deal with antitrust, we have to
be directly involved. We have to be involved in resolving this issue.
I think, also, though, it needs to be pointed out that the public
has some interest in what goes on in baseball, not just as fans, but
we are seeing hundreds of millions of dollars in taxpayers' money
put directly into stadiums today, into ballparks today. So it is not
out of line for Congress to ask questions about the health of orga-
nized baseball. I don't think it is out of line for any member of the
public or a Senator or a Representative to wonder, as we continue
to, why in the world the owners do not want a permanent commis-
sioner, why they do not want a powerful commissioner, why they
do not want a commissioner with any power at all.
I think the answer is clear. The answer simply has to be that
they don't want anybody with that kind of authority. They want to
be able to control whoever the commissioner is. They do not want,
apparently, or think it is in the best interests of baseball to have
a commissioner who has the moral authority of an independent
commissioner and someone who can make decisions in the best in-
terests of baseball.
When Mr. Selig was testifying in front of this committee several
years ago, he told us that the commissioner would be imminent,
would be very shortly appointed, and we are still here today sev-
eral years later and obviously there is no commissioner. Now, I am
not going to spend a lot of time today talking about the problems
that that has created, but I think it has created a great deal of
problems with the public perception of organized baseball.
Let me, if I could, turn to the issue of the minor leagues. Mr.
Peltier, you have raised some very interesting issues in regard to
that, and I think for me, as I was telling the chairman, it really
is two questions or two issues, and they are separate and distinct
in a sense. First, what are the unintended consequences going to
be of this piece of legislation, where we state that it is going to
have no consequences, but there is a nagging feeling that it may.
Second, maybe the bigger question, is what you have brought out
as to whether or not we should look at the whole antitrust issue
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in regard to minor league baseball. I think that is probably some-
thing that this committee should look at. We have a merger here
of labor law and antitrust law and a few other things, but it seems
to me that one of the kind of interesting things that we may end
up with is that we pass this piece of legislation and we may have
ended the antitrust exemption for the major leagues and we may
still have an antitrust exemption for the minor leagues, which I
find to be a little odd, that in all of professional sports we may
have one small class of individuals, and that would be minor
league players, who now we have exemptioned from the antitrust
laws.
I understand some of the practical reasons that are given for
doing that, but I just wonder as a matter of public policy whether
that is good or not. But I think those are issues probably for an-
other day when we have the opportunity to have additional wit-
nesses on this subject.
Mr. Fehr, educate me a little bit in regard to your union. My un-
derstanding is that a professional baseball team has a roster of 25,
but they have contracts for, what, 40? You have 40 major league
contracts on a team. Is that how that works?
Mr. FEHR. Yes. The system can be easily described in the follow-
ing way. Each major league club can hold title to up to 40 player
contracts in its own name, and those are major league contracts.
We negotiate the form of those, and so on. They then can hold a
virtually unlimited number, subject to the number of minor league
teams they have, of minor league contracts, and those contracts are
now held in the name of the major league team, not the minor
league team.
Senator DEWINE. But you would represent only the 40, is that
right?
Mr. FEHR. Yes, and there are certain-
Senator DEWINE. The 40 who would have signed a "major league
contract?"
Mr. FEHR. Yes, although there are certain terms and conditions
of employment when they are assigned to the minor leagues out-
side the bargaining unit for which we do not represent them.
Senator DEWINE. But, in general, it is basically 40 people?
Mr. FEHR. Right.
Senator DEWINE. So if I go to a Toledo Mud Hens game and look
out on the field, there may be some players out there who have a
major league contract, correct?
Mr. FEHR. Yes.
Senator DEWINE. Some of them may have a minor league con-
tract. The rest of them would have a minor league contract?
Mr. FEHR. Yes.
Senator DEWINE. But they are all contracts with the parent club.
Would that be correct?
Mr. FEHR. That is the case now, yes.
Senator DEWINE. That is the case. So when I look out on the
field at the Akron Arrows, as I did the other day with my son,
when we watched a game-if I look at some of the players, some
of them you may represent and some of them you may not rep-
resent?
Mr. FEHR. That is correct.
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Mr. PELTIER. If I may say something?
Senator DEWINE. Yes, jump in. Please, jump right in.
Mr. PELTIER. One of the things, though, is that the players that
are on the 40-man roster that are playing in the minor leagues are
not bound by the terms of the major league minimum salary. So
even though the minor league players that are on the 40-man that
are playing in the minor leagues are represented by the Players
Association, some of the rules don't apply.
Senator DEWINE. When does the minimum salary kick in? Edu-
cate me further on that.
Mr. PELTIER. As soon as they make the major league team on the
active 25-man roster.
Senator DEWINE. So when you were brought up, though-and
you played, what, several weeks? Is that what I heard you say?
Mr. PELTIER. When I first got called up, yes.
Senator DEWINE. OK
Mr. PELTIER. So my salary was prorated each day that I was up
there based on the minimum salary.
Senator DEWINE. So once you were called up-let us say the
Reds call up somebody from Indianapolis, for example. Once they
walked on the field, that is a day. That is prorated, then. Is that
how that works?
Mr. PELTIER. Correct, and then when they get sent back down,
their pay scale goes up, as well, to a minor league minimum.
Mr. FEHR. Let me perhaps explain it in a slightly different way.
There is a minimum salary which applies to play at the major
league level, meaning each day that you are eligible to participate
in a major league game, you are on that particular roster. If you
are on the 40-man roster, but not assigned to the major league
team-you are assigned optionally to the minor leagues-you have
what is known as a split contract as a generalized term, a minor
league contract and a major league contract. If it is your second
year or later on a major league contract, there is a separate, much
lower minimum salary that applies to your play in the minor
leagues. In your first year on a 40-man roster, there isn't.
Senator DEWINE. That gives me a general feel without taking it
further. But that has been good. I thank you both very much.
Mr. Fehr, one of the allegations that has been made, or state-
ments that I have heard as I have talked to people about the agree-
ment that you have reached, and subsequently this bill, is that
there will be a suit brought challenging the reserve clause in the
minor leagues and that your Players Association will make an at-
tempt to represent the minor league players.
Now, I am not saying whether that is good or bad. I am just curi-
ous to know maybe what some of the unintended consequences
might be of this legislation. So I guess my question is, what is your
interest in the minor league players? There are an awful lot of
them out there.
Mr. FEHR. Yes, and a number of them will eventually become
major league players; by definition, the best of them, although, you
know, there are some players that fall through the cracks because
of the system.
Senator DEWINE. Right.
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Mr. FEHR. The short answer is this. I have long believed and still
believe that, sooner or later, some player or players will challenge
the amateur draft because it operates in an unfair and discrimina-
tory manner and deprives opportunity that everyone else takes for
granted to, in essence, look for a better job, try and apply some-
where where your talents may match what the need of the em-
ployer is, and there are a lot of specific examples of that.
Whether we would help or support any such legislation would de-
pend on how the Players Association executive board viewed it at
the time. I would tell you that we never have and there are no such
suggestions under consideration or have been. For purposes of this
legislation, however, I think both S. 53 and the suggested language
that we have negotiated with the major league owners-there is
one thing that ought to be made clear. We do not have an agree-
ment on the amateur draft or anything like that, but what we have
agreed specifically is that we would ask the Congress to consider
legislation that would solve the major league problem and leave the
application of the antitrust laws otherwise, including to the minor
leagues and the amateur draft, to whatever they would otherwise
be, so that this legislation would not affect that judgment at all.
As a matter of fact, it would be irrelevant to consideration.
Senator DEWINE. Well, do you find it a little strange that we
would be in the situation-I mean, we all know the historical back-
ground of the antitrust exemption for organized baseball. Then we
are coming along here-and I am not saying I am not going to sup-
port this. I think this is the logical thing to do, but isn't there
something a little ironic about going in and saying, well, we are
going to remove the exemption for major league baseball, but minor
league baseball-we are going to almost carve out an exception
within an exception?
Mr. FEHR. I think the reason that I was-
Senator DEWINE. I understand as a practical matter, that is why
it is happening. I understand that. I get that.
Mr. FEHR. As a matter of public policy, it has always been more
than difficult, virtually impossible, for me to rationalize the base-
ball exemption to the extent it applies other than by reason of his-
torical accident for whatever that has been. I think the short an-
swer is why the narrow bill that we are supporting-it is that, A,
those are the clients that I represent. B, that is what we were able
to get agreement on, and collective bargaining and politics both
deal with the possible. It is very difficult for me to make a logical
distinction as to why should have one and the other. I don't think
one can reasonably be made.
Senator DEWINE. Well, let me ask both of you a question, and
I am not proposing that we do this, but I am again just trying to
get some facts out here, or at least get some opinions out here from
the two of you anyway.
What happens if tomorrow, overnight, the whole antitrust ex-
emption was gone for all of baseball? What happens to the minor
leagues? I mean, the statement is made by many of the minor
league owners that if that occurs, the minor leagues as we know
them will be gone, that they will not exist, that we will not have
as many teams as we have, that communities that have invested
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money in teams and have now built some ballparks and stadiums
with public funds will totally change. The numbers will change.
Mr. FEHR. The reason I was shaking my head a little bit is I get
wistful sometimes. I have heard such statements, too. Whenever
we have made inquiry, what is the mechanism by which these bad
results will become accomplished, there is no mechanism which is
ever articulated. I recall Bowie Kuhn, who was then commissioner,
testifying in 1976 in the original free agency proceedings that the
American League would collapse and the National League would be
down to six teams if we had free agency in Major League Baseball.
Instead, what has happened is you have had the greatest period of
prosperity ever.
In addition to that, we have a new professional baseball agree-
ment which guarantees for somewhere between 7 and 10 years, as
I understand it, although I haven't seen it, at least 160 minor
league teams. I think the principal effect of your question on the
minor leagues, however, would be as follows. There would be a law-
suit brought somewhere and Major League Baseball would be
asked to defend that the minor league draft and the minor league
reserve system was a reasonable restraint, given the nature of the
industry. If they can do that, it will survive. If they can't, it will
change. To what degree, I think, is unknown.
But in any event, you have to have very large numbers of minor
league teams by which the talent progresses until it is capable of
playing at the major league level, unless and until the colleges are
prepared to substitute wholesale for it, and that is at the very least
some substantial period of time away.
Senator DEWINE. Mr. Peltier, do you want to comment on my hy-
pothetical, which is only a hypothetical, that if you would do away
with the whole antitrust exemption for all of baseball, including
minor leagues, what would I see in 10 years in the minor leagues?
Mr. PELTIER. Well, I think one of the things that you have to re-
alize, too, is that each player that goes through the minor league
organizations is paid by the parent club. So to the extent that the
minor league owner has an interest in the team itself or in the in-
dividual players, it is only to the extent that it helps the team win
so that they can increase their bottom line.
I think what people fail to realize is that from a minor league
perspective, your major goal as a player is to get to the big-league
level. Especially at the triple A level, it is difficult in the sense that
you have no sense of team unity because everyone is trying to get
to the ultimate goal of playing in the big leagues. So to say that
it would destroy minor league baseball, you know, in its present
form, I think, is stretching it, you know, to the extent that minor
league baseball exists now for the fans because they want to have
some feeling of belonging to the major league club that their team
is affiliated with. But I don't think that-you know, with the
present scenario, I don't think that the antitrust laws would have
any effect in terms of destroying the minor leagues in their entirety
right now.
Mr. FEHR. I just might add I think the figures are that last
year-and I think the projections are for this year upwards of 30
million-33 million sticks in my mind-fans will attend minor
league games in organized professional baseball. That is a large7
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consumer base. One would think that that audience will be served
especially if you had a more free market. It is difficult for me to
imagine people walking away from the fans.
Mr. PELTIER. Something else, too. I played with the St. Paul
Saints, and the difference between the St. Paul Saints and any of
the minor league teams that I played for before is the fact that the
team, the Saints, own the rights to that player because that team
individually-the owner of the St. Paul Saints pays the salaries, so
they have more of a vested interest in the players themselves. You
know, I think that scenario works best in the sense that, you know,
now they have a vested interest and they are going to promote
their players as best they can, which in turn will help the team
and the bottom line and the community.
Senator DEWINE. That team has been very, very successful.
Mr. PELTIER. Absolutely. I mean, the profit that they have
made
Senator DEWINE. They sell out, don't they?
Mr. PELTIER. I would say 95 percent of the time it is a sellout,
and I think it is a reflection of how the team is structured and
what the purpose of that team is. You know, not disregarding the
fact that every player on that team wants to get back to organized
baseball, but the way that that team is run has definitely been a
successful way of doing things.
Senator DEWINE. Well, I appreciate the testimony from both of
you very much. It has been very helpful, and we will conclude the
hearing. Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 11:32 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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An Act
Oct. 27, 1998 To require the general application of the antitrust laws to major league baseball,
[S. 531 and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
Curt Flood Act of the United States ofAmerica in Congress assembled,
1998.
15 USC 1 note. SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the "Curt Flood Act of 1998".
15 USC 27a note. SEC. 2. PURPOSE.
It is the purpose of this legislation to state that major league
baseball players are covered under the antitrust laws (i.e., that
major league baseball players will have the same rights under
the antitrust laws as do other professional athletes, e.g., football
and basketball players), along with a provision that makes it clear
that the passage of this Act does not change the application of
the antitrust laws in any other context or with respect to any
other person or entity.
15 USC 27a. SEC. 3. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO PROFESSIONAL
MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL.
The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 12 et seq.) is amended by adding
at the end the following new section:
"SEC. 27. (a) Subject to subsections (b) through (d), the conduct,
acts, practices, or agreements of persons in the business of organized
professional major league baseball directly relating to or affecting
employment of major league baseball players to play baseball at
the major league level are subject to the antitrust laws to the
same extent such conduct, acts, practices, or agreements would
be subject to the antitrust laws if engaged in by persons in any
other professional sports business affecting interstate commerce.
"(b) No court shall rely on the enactment of this section as
a basis for changing the application of the antitrust laws to any
conduct, acts, practices, or agreements other than those set forth
in subsection (a). This section does not create, permit or imply
a cause of action by which to challenge under the antitrust laws,
or otherwise apply the antitrust laws to, any conduct, acts, practices,
or agreements that do not directly relate to or affect employment
of major league baseball players to play baseball at the major
league level, including but not limited to-
"(1) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons
engaging in, conducting or participating in the business of
organized professional baseball relating to or affecting employ-
ment to play baseball at the minor league level, any organized
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professional baseball amateur or first-year player draft, or any
reserve clause as applied to minor league players;
"(2) the agreement between organized professional major
league baseball teams and the teams of the National Association
of Professional Baseball Leagues, commonly known as the
'Professional Baseball Agreement', the relationship between
organized professional major league baseball and organized
professional minor league baseball, or any other matter relating
to organized professional baseball's minor leagues;
"(3) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons
engaging in, conducting or participating in the business of
organized professional baseball relating to or affecting franchise
expansion, location or relocation, franchise ownership issues,
including ownership transfers, the relationship between the
Office of the Commissioner and franchise owners, the marketing
or sales of the entertainment product of organized professional
baseball and the licensing of intellectual property rights owned
or held by organized professional baseball teams individually
or collectively;
"(4) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements protected
by Public Law 87-331 (15 U.S.C. § 1291 et seq.) (commonly
known as the 'Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961');
"(5) the relationship between persons in the business of
organized professional baseball and umpires or other individ-
uals who are employed in the business of organized professional
baseball by such persons; or
"(6) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons
not in the business of organized professional major league
baseball.
"(c) Only a major league baseball player has standing to sue
under this section. For the purposes of this section, a major league
baseball player is-
"(1) a person who is a party to a major league player's
contract, or is playing baseball at the major league level; or
"(2) a person who was a party to a major league player's
contract or playing baseball at the major league level at the
time of the injury that is the subject of the complaint; or
"(3) a person who has been a party to a major league
player's contract or who has played baseball at the major league
level, and who claims he has been injured in his efforts to
secure a subsequent major league player's contract by an
alleged violation of the antitrust laws: Provided however, That
for the purposes of this paragraph, the alleged antitrust viola-
tion shall not include any conduct, acts, practices, or agree-
ments of persons in the business of organized professional
baseball relating to or affecting employment to play baseball
at the minor league level, including any organized professional
baseball amateur or first-year player draft, or any reserve
clause as applied to minor league players; or
"(4) a person who was a party to a major league player's
contract or who was playing baseball at the major league level
at the conclusion of the last full championship season imme-
diately preceding the expiration of the last collective bargaining
agreement between persons in the business of organized profes-
sional major league baseball and the exclusive collective
bargaining representative of major league baseball players.
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"(d)(1) As used in this section, 'person' means any entity, includ-
ing an individual, partnership, corporation, trust or unincorporated
association or any combination or association thereof. As used in
this section, the National Association of Professional Baseball
Leagues, its member leagues and the clubs of those leagues, are
not 'in the business of organized professional major league baseball'.
"(2) In cases involving conduct, acts, practices, or agreements
that directly relate to or affect both employment of major league
baseball players to play baseball at the major league level and
also relate to or affect any other aspect of organized professional
baseball, including but not limited to employment to play baseball
at the minor league level and the other areas set forth in subsection
(b), only those components, portions or aspects of such conduct,
acts, practices, or agreements that directly relate to or affect
employment of major league players to play baseball at the major
league level may be challenged under subsection (a) and then only
to the extent that they directly relate to or affect employment
of major league baseball players to play baseball at the major
league level.
"(3) As used in subsection (a), interpretation of the term
'directly' shall not be governed by any interpretation of section
151 et seq. of title 29, United States Code (as amended).
"(4) Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the
application to organized professional baseball of the nonstatutory
labor exemption from the antitrust laws.
"(5) The scope of the conduct, acts, practices, or agreements
covered by subsection (b) shall not be strictly or narrowly con-
strued.".
Approved October 27, 1998.
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Mr. HATCH, from the Committee on the Judiciary,
submitted the following
REPORT
together with
MINORITY VIEWS
[To accompany S. 53]
The Committee on the Judiciary, to which was referred the bill
(S. 53) to require the general application of the antitrust laws to
major league baseball, and for other purposes, having considered
the same and amendments thereto, reports favorably thereon, with
an amendment in the nature of a substitute, and recommends that
the bill, as amended, do pass.
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The amendment is as follows:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the "Curt Flood Act of 1997".
SEC. 2. PURPOSE.
It is the purpose of this legislation to clarify that major league baseball players
are covered under the antitrust laws (i.e., that major league players will have the
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same rights under the antitrust laws as do other professional athletes, e.g., football
and basketball players), along with a provision that makes it clear that the passage
of this Act does not change the application of the antitrust laws in any other context
or with respect to any other person or entity.
SEC. 3. APPLICAION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO PROFESSIONAL MAJOR LEAGUE BASE-
BALL.
The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the fol-
lowing new section:
"SEC. 27. (a) The conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons in the business
of organized professional major league baseball relating to or affecting employment
to play baseball at the major league level are subject to the antitrust laws to the
same extent such conduct, acts, practices, or agreements would be subject to the
antitrust laws if engaged in by persons in any other professional sports business af-
fecting interstate commerce; provided, however, that nothing in this subsection shall
be construed as providing the basis for any negative inference regarding the caselaw
concerning the applicability of the antitrust laws to minor league baseball.
"(b) Nothing contained in subsection (a) of this section shall be deemed to change
the application of the antitrust laws to the conduct, acts, practices, or agreements
by, between, or among persons engaging in, conducting, or participating in the busi-
ness of organized professional baseball, except the conduct, acts, practices, or agree-
ments to which subsection (a) of this section shall apply. More specifically, but not
by way of limitation, this section shall not be deemed to change the application of
the antitrust laws to:
"(1) the organized professional baseball amateur draft, the reserve clause as
applied to minor league players, the agreement between organized professional
major league baseball teams and the teams of the National Association of Pro-
fessional Baseball Leagues, commonly known as the 'Professional Baseball
Agreement', the relationship between organized professional major league base-
ball and organized professional minor league baseball, or any other matter re-
lating to professional organized baseball's minor leagues;
"(2) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons in the business of
organized professional baseball relating to franchise expansion, location or relo-
cation, franchise ownership issues, including ownership transfers, and the rela-
tionship between the Office of the Commissioner and franchise owners;
"(3) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements protected by Public Law 87-
331 (15 U.S.C. 1291 et seq.) (commonly known as the 'Sports Broadcasting Act
of 1961'); or
"(4) the relationship between persons in the business of organized professional
baseball and umpires or other individuals who are employed in the business of
organized professional baseball by such persons.
"(c) As used in this section, 'persons' means any individual, partnership, corpora-
tion, or unincorporated association or any combination or association thereof.".
I. PURPOSE
The purpose of S. 53 is to clarify that major league baseball play-
ers and owners have the same legal rights, and are subject to the
same restrictions, under the antitrust laws as the players and own-
ers in other professional sports leagues. As the bill expressly pro-
vides, it is not intended to affect the applicability or inapplicability
of the antitrust laws in any other manner or context.
As set forth in the S. Rept. 104-231, accompanying S. 627, the
"Major League Baseball Antitrust Reform Act of 1995," a bill that
was reported out of the Judiciary Committee but not enacted dur-
ing the 104th Congress, the unfortunate baseball strike of 1994-95
reemphasized the need for Congress to clarify its intent to apply
to professional baseball the same rules of fair and open competition
that are followed by all other unregulated business enterprises in
this country, including other sports leagues. In short, other profes-
sional athletes and similarly situated employees have alternatives
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to striking specifically because of the antitrust laws.' It is the Com-
mittee's belief that the applicability of the antitrust laws to major
league baseball player-owner employment relations will signifi-
cantly reduce the likelihood of future baseball strikes.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
A. INTRODUCTION OF S. 53
Many bills have been introduced over the decades addressing the
subject of baseball's antitrust exemption. During the 104th Con-
gress, this Committee reported out S. 627, a bill intended to affirm
that major league baseball's owners and players were subject to the
Nation's antitrust laws. This bill, however, was not considered by
the full Senate during the 104th Congress.
On January 21, 1997, Senators Hatch, Leahy, Thurmond, and
Moynihan introduced S. 53, the Curt Flood Act of 1997, which was
virtually identical to S. 627 from the 104th Congress. On June 17,1997, this Committee held a hearing on S. 53. The witnesses were
Donald A. Fehr, executive director of the Major League Baseball
Players Association, and Dan Peltier, a former minor league base-
ball player. Mr. Allan H. Selig, chairman of the Major League Ex-
ecutive Council, and Mr. Stanley Brand, vice president of the Na-
tional Association of Professional Baseball Leagues, Inc., were also
invited to testify at the hearing, but did not attend.
B. THE AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE
1. THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL OWNERS AND
PLAYERS TO SEEK ANTITRUST LEGISLATION
The 1990 collective-bargaining agreement between the major
league baseball players union and major league owners ("Basic
Agreement") expired in December 1993, subsequent to which the
industry, and the Nation, suffered through the unfortunate strike
that suspended portions of the 1994 and 1995 seasons, including
the 1994 World Series. After protracted negotiations, a new Basic
Agreement was finally signed in March 1997. As part of this new
agreement, the owners and players reached what was described by
both sides as a landmark pact regarding the applicability of the
antitrust laws to major league baseball. The parties memorialized
this agreement in article XXVIII of the Basic Agreement, which
reads in pertinent part as follows:
The Clubs and the Association will jointly request and
cooperate in lobbying the Congress to pass a law that will
clarify that Major League Baseball players are covered
under the antitrust laws (i.e. that Major League Players
have the same rights under the antitrust laws as do other
professional athletes, e.g. football and basketball players),
1As described in S. Rept. 104-231, the courts have developed a "nonstatutory" labor exemp-
tion from the antitrust laws. See, e.g., Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 116 S.Ct. 2116 (1996). Al-
though courts and academics have disagreed on the precise extent and scope of this exemption,it is clear that, at some point, the nonstatutory labor exemption ends and employees have a
right to invoke the antitrust laws. Like its predecessor S. 627, S. 53 is intended to clarify the
applicability of the antitrust laws in those contexts where the nonstatutory labor exemption does
not apply, and is not intended to affect the scope or extent of that exemption.
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along with a provision that makes it clear that passage of
that bill does not change the application of the antitrust
laws in any other context or with respect to any other per-
son or entity.
2. THE AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE
The sponsors of S. 53 continue to support it as introduced. After
introduction, however, the owners and players reached the above-
referenced agreement regarding the applicability of the antitrust
laws to major league baseball. Senators Hatch and Leahy subse-
quently made clear their willingness to substitute language de-
signed to implement the intent of the owners' and players' agree-
ment, believing that a bill which enjoyed both the owners' and
players' support would be passed expeditiously.
After considerable prodding from Senator Hatch, on June 12,
1997, the owners ratified specific legislative language, earlier
agreed to by representatives of the owners and the players, in-
tended to clarify that major league baseball players have the same
rights under the antitrust laws as other professional athletes. This
language provided the basis for the amendment in the nature of a
substitute to S. 53, offered by Senator Hatch at the Committee's
Executive Business Meeting on July 31, 1997.
C. THE MINOR LEAGUES AND SENATOR HATCH'S AMENDMENT
The Committee has consistently sought not to adversely affect
the legal status of the minor leagues or minor league players.
Thus, S. 53 (much like its predecessor, S. 627) expressly states
that:
Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect * * *
the applicability or nonapplicability of the antitrust laws
to the amateur draft of professional baseball, the minor
league reserve clause, the agreement between professional
major league baseball teams and teams of the National As-
sociation of Baseball, commonly known as the "Profes-
sional Baseball Agreement", or any other matter relating
to the minor leagues.
Notwithstanding this relatively clear language, Mr. Stanley
Brand indicated to the Committee that he still had concerns. As a
consequence, Mr. Selig stated in a June 16, 1997, letter to the
Chairman that, although the owners' Executive Council had for-
mally approved the legislative language which ultimately became
the amendment in the nature of a substitute to S. 53, their "sup-
port was tempered by the fact that our business partner, the Na-
tional Association of Professional Baseball Leagues (NAPBL) has
concern as to whether the proposed legislation adequately protects
their interests."
Responding to this concern, when the amendment in the nature
of a substitute to S. 53 was marked up at the Committee's July 31,
1997, Executive Business Meeting, Senator Hatch offered an
amendment intended to clarify even further that S. 53 would have
no impact on the legal status of the minor leagues. This amend-
ment stated that "nothing in this subsection shall be construed as
5providing the basis for any negative inference regarding the
caselaw concerning the applicability of the antitrust laws to minor
league baseball," and was incorporated by voice vote.
III. VOTE OF THE COVMITTEE
On July 31, 1997, with a quorum present, the Committee on the
Judiciary ordered S. 53 favorably reported by a vote of 11 yeas to
6 nays, with Senator Kohl having recused himself. In compliance
with paragraph 7 of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate,
the members of the Committee voted as follows on S. 53:
YEAS NAYS
Hatch Grassley
Thurmond Sessions
Specter (proxy) Biden
Thompson (proxy) Feinstein
Kyl (proxy) Durbin
DeWine Torricelli
Ashcroft (proxy)
Abraham
Leahy
Kennedy
Feingold
Senator Hatch, together with Senator Leahy, offered a substitute
amendment to reflect the agreement that had been reached be-
tween major league baseball owners and players. This amendment
was agreed to by unanimous consent.
Senator Hatch offered an amendment to the substitute, to fur-
ther clarify that this bill shall not be construed to affect the appli-
cability of the antitrust laws to minor league baseball. The amend-
ment was agreed to by voice vote, with Senators Biden and Fein-
stein noted as having voted nay.
IV. SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS
Section 1 states the bill's short title, the "Curt Flood Act of
1997."
Section 2 states that the bill's purpose is to clarify that major
league professional baseball players have the same rights under
the antitrust laws as do other professional athletes.
Section 3 amends the Clayton Act to add a new section 27. New
subsection 27(a) states that the antitrust laws apply to actions re-
lating to professional baseball players' employment to play baseball
at the major league level. Reflecting the Committee's interest in re-
porting a bill enjoying the support of both the owners and players,
subsection 27(a) implements the owners' and players' agreement
that major league baseball players have the same rights under the
antitrust laws as, for example, do professional football and basket-
ball players. The phrase "the antitrust laws shall apply" is in-
tended to incorporate the entire jurisprudence of the antitrust
laws, as it now exists and as it may develop. Subsection 27(a) also
specifies that nothing within the subsection provides a basis for
any negative inference regarding the caselaw concerning the appli-
cability of the antitrust laws to minor league baseball.
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S. 53 was specifically drafted so that it would not implicate is-
sues or actions other than those specified in subsection 27(a). Thus,
subsection 27(b) makes explicit the Committee's intent that the
passage of this bill does not affect the applicability or non-
applicability of the antitrust laws in any other context beyond that
specified in subsection 27(a). With regard to contexts, actions or is-
sues outside the scope of subsection 27(a) (that is, not constituting
"conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons in the business
of organized professional major league baseball relating to or affect-
ing employment to play baseball at the major league level"), the
law as it exists today is not changed by this bill. The specific areas
listed in the four subparts of new subsection 27(b) are intended to
be merely illustrative of the areas and/or issues as to which the law
remains unchanged by this bill. The specific reference to the minor
leagues in subsection 27(a) is only intended to clarify that the pas-
sage of the bill will have no impact on the law, or the future devel-
opment of the law, governing the applicability of the antitrust laws
to the minor leagues. This reference is not intended to provide any
inference or limitation regarding the scope of other issues and/or
areas as to which the law remains unchanged by this bill.
V. COST ESTIMATE
U.S. CONGRESS,
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE,
Washington, DC, September 23, 1997.
Hon. ORRIN G. HATCH,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has pre-
pared the enclosed cost estimate for S. 53, the Curt Flood Act of
1997.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be please to
provide them. The CBO staff contacts are Susanne S. Mehlman (for
federal costs) and Matt Eyles (for the private-sector impact).
Sincerely,
JUNE E. O'NEILL, Director.
Enclosure.
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE
S. 53-CURT FLOOD ACT OF 1997; AS ORDERED REPORTED BY THE
SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY ON JULY 31, 1997
S. 53 would remove major league baseball's current exemption
from antitrust laws, except that it would retain the antitrust ex-
emption for minor league baseball and for decisions regarding
league expansion, franchise location, the amateur draft and broad-
cast rights, and employment relations with nonplayers, such as
umpires. By removing the antitrust exemption under these limited
circumstances, S. 53 would allow the players to challenge in federal
court certain conduct by the team owners. Therefore, enacting S.
53 would impose additional costs on the U.S. court system to the
extent that additional antitrust cases are filed. However, CBO does
7not expect any resulting increase in case load or court costs to be
significant.
Because enactment of S. 53 would not affect direct spending or
receipts, pay-as-you-go procedures would not apply to the bill. S. 53
contains no intergovernment mandates as defined in the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) and would impose no costs
on state, local, or tribal governments.
S. 53 would impose a new private-sector mandate as defined in
UMRA by applying the antitrust laws to the conduct of owners of
major league baseball teams in employment relations with major
league players. As a result, the owners would be prohibited from
engaging in anticompetitive employment-related activities that are
now permissible under their judicially-created exemption from the
antitrust laws. Thus, if enacted, S. 53 would place owners of major
league baseball teams in the same position as owners in the other
major professional sports leagues by making their actions subject
to judicial review. In most lawsuits alleging an antitrust violation,
federal courts would review the conduct of owners under the "rule
of reason" standard and examine the economic consequences of the
action for its procompetitive and anticompetitive effects. Some con-
duct, such as collusion, would be per se violations of antitrust law.
Owners found to be in violation would be subject to treble mone-
tary damages.
If enacted, S. 53 would represent an explicit reversal by the Con-
gress of a portion of baseball's 75-year-old exemption from the anti-
trust laws created by the Supreme Court's decision in Federal
Baseball Club, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball
Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). In that case, the Court determined that
baseball was not a business involved in interstate commerce and,
therefore, was not subject to the antitrust laws, which prohibit
anticompetitive behavior and unreasonable restraint of trade. In
subsequent legal challenges to the ruling in Federal Baseball, the
most noteworthy being Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972), the Su-
preme Court acknowledged that its 1922 decision was flawed, yet
it declined to overturn baseball's antitrust exemption on the
grounds that this anomaly should be rectified by the Congress.
Thus, the bill would impose a new legislatively-crafted enforceable
duty on the business of baseball, which fits the definition of a pri-
vate-sector mandate in UMRA.
CBO estimates that the direct cost, as defined in UMRA, of the
private-sector mandate in S. 53 would not likely exceed the $100
million statutory threshold. Direct costs would be imposed on own-
ers to the extent that they would have to employ counsel to defend
their actions against antitrust suits from which they are now im-
mune. Moreover, baseball operates under a collective bargaining
agreement that runs through the 2000 season, and players have
the option to extend the current agreement through the 2001 sea-
son. Under that agreement players have recourse against owners
who engage in collusion on the terms of player contracts and can
recover treble damages through a process of binding arbitration.
Consequently, S. 53 would probably impose no direct costs from
1998 through 2000 or 2001 because no antitrust suits would be ini-
tiated while the collective bargaining agreement is in effect. Costs
in subsequent years are not likely to exceed the $100 million statu-
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tory threshold. CBO does not count possible monetary damages
that may be assessed against owners for antitrust infractions a cost
of complying with a private-sector mandate because CBO assumes
that owners would comply with the law's prohibition against anti-
competitive behavior.
The CBO staff contacts for this estimate are Susanne S.
Mehiman (for federal costs) and Matt Eyles (for the private-sector
impact). This estimate was approved by Robert A. Sunshine, Dep-
uty Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.
VI. REGULATORY TVIPACT STATEMENT
In compliance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the Standing
Rules of the Senate, the Committee concluded that no significant
additional regulatory impact or impact on personal privacy would
be incurred in carrying out the provisions of this legislation. After
due consideration, the Committee concluded that enactment of the
Act would not create any significant additional paperwork.
VII. MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATORS GRASSLEY, BIDEN,
FEINSTEIN, AND DURBIN
We oppose passage of this legislation for a number of reasons.
We advocate a comprehensive approach, from the fans' perspective,
to examining the problems in professional baseball. Most of these
problems would exist regardless of antitrust liability. Indeed, in at-
tempting to solve baseball's labor relations difficulties by modifying
the antitrust laws, we run too great a risk of creating more prob-
lems than we solve.
Unfortunately, as reported by this Committee, S. 53, "The Curt
Flood Act of 1997," takes the potentially counterproductive step of
engaging in a piecemeal approach to the issues confronting base-
ball by addressing only the application of the antitrust laws to
major league baseball labor relations. What is more, it is far from
clear that S. 53 even adequately addresses the labor relations
issue. Under current law, major league owners can unilaterally im-
pose new labor conditions on players following the expiration of a
collective-bargaining agreement. Players then have two choices: (1)
accept the unilateral terms and "play ball" or (2) go on strike. This
bill is designed to give the players a third option. It would allow
players to sue the owners under the antitrust laws for unilaterally
imposing collusive and unfair labor conditions. We support the goal
of encouraging the owners and the players to resolve their dif-
ferences at the bargaining table prior to Opening Day. But, it is far
from clear that S. 53 will generate the promised benefit of
strengthening the players' hand and reducing the likelihood of fu-
ture strikes. For one thing, the bill says nothing about the non-
statutory labor exemption, which removes union members engaged
in collective bargaining from the reach of applicable antitrust laws.
In other words, if S. 53 became law in its current form, the players
may not be able to sue without decertifying their union.
We also believe that the ability of the players to sue the owners
is not the only issue in professional sports today. Other important
issues include league expansion and franchise movement, taxpayer-
financed stadiums, revenue sharing, player salaries, and fan access
to television coverage. Despite the Committee's efforts, we have not
addressed these issues, other than to say that this legislation will
not affect the current system in these areas. This legislation contin-
ues to leave fans vulnerable to major league franchise relocations
and broadcasting decisions. In short, S. 53 in our view attempts a
simple fix to a complex problem and risks further alienating the
fans and irreparably harming the national pastime.
We are particularly concerned about the consequences of this bill
for minor league baseball. The minor leagues legitimately fear that
if S. 53 becomes law without being modified to protect them, the
major league teams will discontinue their financing of the minor
leagues and look for an alternative to the minors for developing
(9)
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players. Minor league teams in our home States promote commu-
nity-based and affordable events for citizens who for financial or
geographic reasons cannot attend major league games. Destruction
of minor league baseball, the sport for the fans in towns and small
cities across America, cannot be the effect of any bill we pass.
The proponents of this legislation argue that the current lan-
guage adequately protects the minor leagues. The limited evidence
before the Committee does not support their argument. At a Feb-
ruary 15, 1995, Antitrust Subcommittee hearing, the former Assist-
ant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division of the United
States Department of Justice, James F. Rill, testifying on behalf of
the owners, expressed the minor leagues' fears that removal of the
antitrust exemption, even on a limited basis, threatens to end the
major league funding upon which the minor leagues' viability de-
pends. The reason is clear: the majors pay 100 percent of the sala-
ries of all minor league players, managers, coaches, and trainers-
and supply five dozen baseballs per game-in return for the pros-
pect of major league talent someday down the line. Without the
ability to reserve their players, major league teams will no longer
have assurance that they can realize their investment in minor
league players. Moreover, the current major and minor league sys-
tems are inextricably intertwined. Attempting to address the major
league separately in this bill may lead to extensive litigation and
ultimately prove unworkable.
This Committee needs to understand the relationship between
minor league baseball and major league baseball's antitrust exemp-
tion more fully before we pass this bill. Left unresolved, this issue
may generate more litigation, more lawyers' fees, and more uncer-
tainty than we already have today. We hope that future consider-
ation of this issue will explore more fully the intended and unin-
tended consequences of congressional action in this area. And, most
important, we urge our colleagues to focus on how repeal of the
antitrust exemption for major league baseball would affect fans of
both the minor and the major leagues.
CHUCK GRASSLEY.
JOE BIDEN.
DIANNE FEINSTEIN.
DICK DuRBiN.
VIII. CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW
In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the Standing
Rules of the Senate, changes in existing law made by S. 53, as re-
ported, are shown as follows (existing law which would be omitted
is enclosed in bold brackets, new matter is printed in italic, and ex-
isting law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman type):
UNITED STATES CODE
TITLE 15-COMMERCE AND TRADE
CHAPTER 1-MONOPOLIES AND COMBINATIONS IN
RESTRAINT OF TRADE
§ 1. Trusts, etc., in restraint of trade illegal; penalty
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal.
Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any com-
bination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed
guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by
fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other per-
son, $350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by
both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
§ 12. Definitions; short title
(a) "Antitrust laws," as used herein, includes the Act entitled "An
Act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and
monopolies," approved July second, eighteen hundred and ninety;
sections seventy-three to seventy-seven, inclusive, of an Act enti-
tled "An Act to reduce taxation, to provide revenue for the Govern-
ment, and for other purposes," of August twenty-seventh, eighteen
hundred and ninety-four; an Act entitled "An Act to amend sections
seventy-three and seventy-six of the Act of August twenty-seventh,
eighteen hundred and ninety-four, entitled 'An Act to reduce tax-
ation, to provide revenue for the Government, and for other pur-
poses,"' approved February twelfth, nineteen hundred and thirteen;
and also this Act.
(11)
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SEC. 27. (a) The conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons
in the business of organized professional major league baseball re-
lating to or affecting employment to play baseball at the major
league level are subject to the antitrust laws to the same extent such
conduct, acts, practices, or agreements would be subject to the anti-
trust laws if engaged in by persons in any other professional sports
business affecting interstate commerce; provided, however, that
nothing in this subsection shall be construed as providing the basis
for any negative inference regarding the caselaw concerning the ap-
plicability of the antitrust laws to minor league baseball.
(b) Nothing contained in subsection (a) of this section shall be
deemed to change the application of the antitrust laws to the con-
duct, acts, practices, or agreements by, between, or among persons
engaging in, conducting, or participating in the business of orga-
nized professional baseball, except the conduct, acts, practices, or
agreements to which subsection (a) of this section shall apply. More
specifically, but not by way of limitation, this section shall not be
deemed to change the application of the antitrust laws to:
(1) the organized professional baseball amateur draft, the re-
serve clause as applied to minor league players, the agreement
between organized professional major league baseball teams
and the teams of the National Association of Professional Base-
ball Leagues, commonly known as the "Professional Baseball
Agreement" the relationship between organized professional
major league baseball and organized professional minor league
baseball, or any other matter relating to professional organized
baseball's minor leagues;
(2) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons in
the business of organized professional baseball relating to fran-
chise expansion, location or relocation, franchise ownership is-
sues, including ownership transfers, and the relationship be-
tween the Office of the Commissioner and franchise owners;
(3) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements protected by
Public Law 87-331 (15 U.S.C. 1291 et seq.) (commonly known
as the "Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961"); or
(4) the relationship between persons in the business of orga-
nized professional baseball and umpires or other individuals
who are employed in the business of organized professional
baseball by such persons.
(c) As used in this section, 'persons" means any individual, part-
nership, corporation, or unincorporated association or any combina-
tion or association thereof
0
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MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL ANTITRUST
REFORM
TUESDAY, JUNE 17, 1997
U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in room
SD-226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Orrin G. Hatch
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Also present: Senators Specter, DeWine, and Leahy.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ORRIN G. HATCH,
A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF UTAH
The CHmRMAN. We will call this hearing to order.
Clarifying that antitrust laws apply to Major League Baseball is
something that will benefit sports fans across the country, young
and old, rich and poor, Democrat and Republican. As evidenced by
the interleague play, agreements being reached on long-term player
and minor league contracts, and the continuing on-field heroics of
players like Cal Ripken and Ken Griffey, Jr., we are witnessing a
historical period for Major League Baseball. I have only mentioned
a few of them, as you know, of the great heroes.
Senator Leahy and I believe that we should take advantage of
this opportunity to ensure that the coming years will indeed be
among baseball's finest by doing all we can to minimize the poten-
tial for more of the bitter labor disputes which have plagued Major
League Baseball.
Baseball has witnessed more work stoppages than all other pro-
fessional sports combined, capped by the devastating 1995 strike
which led to the cancellation of the World Series and dealt a blow
to the hearts and loyalty of baseball fans from which the sport is
only now beginning to recover.
While there are, of course, different factors contributing to base-
ball's recently tumultuous labor relations, there is one root cause
about which we in Congress can do something. With their current
antitrust status, Major League -Baseball owners can, unlike the
owners in any other professional sport, conspire and collude with-
out restraint-the precise practices the antitrust laws were de-
signed to prohibit. They can take advantage of this unique legal po-
sition to gain leverage in their negotiations with the players and
their representatives.
Making it clear to the players, owners, and courts that the anti-
trust laws apply to Major League Baseball therefore will not only
put baseball on a level playing field with the other professional
(1)
2sports, but will also put the owners on a more level playing field
with the players, and will thereby bring stability to labor relations
in this area. Players, fans, investors, municipalities, and ultimately
the owners themselves will benefit.
Thus, on the first day of this Congress, I, along with Senators
Leahy, Thurmond, and Moynihan, introduced S. 53, the Curt Flood
Act of 1997, which, like its predecessor, S. 627, simply makes clear
that Major League Baseball, like all other professional sports, is
subject to our Nation's antitrust laws, except with regard to team
relocation, the minor leagues, and sports broadcasting. It overturns
the Court's mistaken premise that baseball is not a business in-
volved in interstate commerce, and it eliminates the unjustifiable
legal precedent that individuals who play professional baseball
should be treated differently from those who participate in other
professional sports. Perhaps most importantly, it helps ensure that
the 1995 labor dispute and the consequent cancellation of the 1995
World Series will never happen again.
[A copy of S. 53 follows:]
3105TH CONGRESS
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To require the general application of the antitrust laws to major lague
baseball, and for other purposes.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
JANUARY 21, 1997
Mr. HATCH (for himself, Mr. LEANY, Mr. THURMOND, and Mr. MoYNmIAN)
introduced the following bill, which was read twice and referred to the
Committee on the Judiciary
A BILL
To require the general application of the antitrust laws to
major league baseball, and for other purposes.
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 tives of the United States ofAmerica in Congress assembled,
3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
4 This Act may be cited as the "Curt Flood Act of
5 1997".
6 SEC. 2. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO PRO-
7 FESSIONAL MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL
8 The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) is amended
9 by adding at the end the following new section:
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1 "SEC. 27. (a) Subject to subsection (b), the antitrust
2 laws shall apply to the business of professional major
3 league baseball.
4 "(b) Nothing in this section shall be construed to af-
5 feet-
6 "(1) the applicability or nonapplicability of the
7 antitrust laws to the amateur draft of professional
R baseball, the minor league reserve clause, the agree-
9 ment between professional major league baseball
10 teams and teams of the National Association of
11 Baseball, commonly known as the 'Professional
12 Baseball Agreement', or any other matter relating to
13 the minor leagues;
14 "(2) the applicability or nonapplicability of the
15 antitrust laws to any restraint by professional base-
16 ball on franchise relocation; or
17 "(3) the application of Public Law 87-331 (15
18 U.S.C. 1291 et seq.) (commonly known as the
19 'Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961').".
5When I first sponsored similar legislation in the 103d Congress,
Congress was told that baseball owners would never support it.
Today, for the first time, I am pleased to report that the owners
have not only pledged in the new collective bargaining agreement
to work with the players to pass legislation clarifying that profes-
sional baseball is subject to the antitrust laws with regard to labor
relations, but just last week reached agreement with the players on
specific language that would accomplish this objective.
While I and the members of this committee would like to exam-
ine this proposed alternative to S. 53, I think it is safe to say that
the most important impediment to passage of baseball antitrust re-
form has been eliminated, and that it is truly a momentous occa-
sion when Major League Baseball owners have aligned in support
of such reform.
Given this recent positive development, I must say that I am sur-
prised that the owners were unable to send a representative to tes-
tify at this hearing. We invited them and we expected them to be
here. I should note that on the basis of repeated assurances that
such an agreement between the players and owners was imminent,
I have, since the beginning of this Congress, repeatedly agreed at
the owners' request to postpone this hearing and committee consid-
eration of S. 53.
I will not repeat the numerous such requests for more time to
which I have agreed, but I will insert for the record a chronology
of the relevant requests and delays at the owners' behest.
[The chronology follows:]
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
December 7, 1996-The owners and the players sign a memorandum of under-
standing, which deals with time-sensitive provisions to be included in the collective
bargaining agreement. A section of the memorandum calls for both the players and
the owners to work together to pass legislation that would give players the same
antitrust rights as other professional athletes at the major league level but that
would not change the application of the antitrust laws in any other context.
January 21, 1997-Senators Hatch, Leahy, Thurmond and Moynihan introduce
S. 53, the Curt Flood Act of 1997.
February 6, 1997-Representatives from the owners and the players meet with
Senator Hatch's staff to discuss the ongoing negotiations and the legislation. Sen-
ator Hatch's staff indicates that the Senator would like to place the bill on the cal-
endar for the mark-up scheduled for February 13, 1997, recognizing that it will be
held over. The owners make clear that a final agreement is near completion, that
both sides are moving "expeditiously," and that legislative language reflecting the
memorandum of understanding would be drafted if the mark-up is scheduled. They
also indicate that agreement on language should be relatively easy. They ask that
Senator Hatch postpone mark-up until after the collective bargaining agreement is
finalized. The players' representatives indicate that they will be sending draft lan-
guage to the owners and were ready to share these drafts with Committee staff.
February 7, 1997-The players' first draft is sent to the Gwners through their
Washington lobbyists and their negotiating team.
A Few Days Later in February, 1997-The owners indicate that there will be no
work on legislative language until the rest of the contract is completed and signed,
but completion will occur before the end of February.
Middle of February, 1997-Senator Hatch agrees to the owner request to delay
mark-up and a hearing for a few weeks, until the collective bargaining agreement
is completed.
February 20, 1997-Senator Hatch's staff meets with Stanley Brand, representa-
tive for Minor League Baseball, requesting that he communicate any proposed
changes to S. 53 either at the meeting or subsequent to it. Brand refuses to offer
any suggestions at that time or thereafter, and refuses to return staff phone calls
for over 3 months.
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February 28, 1997-Senators Hatch and Leahy send out a Dear Colleague letter
announcing their intention to move the legislation quickly.
March 11, 1997-A second meeting between representatives from the players and
the owners is held with Senator Hatch's staff. The owners' representative indicates
that pressure from Senator Hatch has helped to move the negotiating process along,
that neither side wants Congress to act on the legislation until the contract is com-
pleted and signed. The players state that since they have no idea when the contract
will be finalized, they will defer to Senator Hatch on timing, even if that means
moving the legislation before the contract is signed. They also offer two new ver-
sions of the legislation for the owners' review.
March 13, 1997-The Senate Judiciary Committee mark-up, with S. 53 on the
agenda, is postponed due to lack of a quorum.
March 14, 1997-The collective bargaining agreement is completed and signed.
March 20, 1997-The Senate Judiciary Committee holds a mark-up, at which time
both Senators Hatch and Leahy make it clear that they are tired of waiting and
want the promised language from the parties. Senator Hatch announces that the
Committee would mark-up the baseball bill after the Easter recess, and that he has
circulated a draft substitute amendment taken directly from the language of the col-
lective bargaining agreement. He stated that the players support the amendment,
but the owners would not take a position on his draft.
March 28, 1997-Notwithstanding his refusal to work with Senator Hatch's staff.
Stanley Brand writes letter to Senator Biden, reqiesting his help in defeating S. 53.
and stating that he was "surprised to be asked to cure the bill's defects before Con-
gress has conducted any study or review on its impact on grassroots baseball."
April 14, 1997-The owners and the players meet with Senator Hatch. The own-
ers' chief negotiator asks for more time to resolve this issue and asks Senator Hatch
to delay Committee consideration at this time. When pressed on how long he needs,
he subsequently indicates four weeks. As a result, Senator Hatch announces that
he will move the bill to mark-up on May 14, 1997.
May 8, 1997-Owners agree to meet with the players in New York. Drafts are
exchanged.
May 14, 1997-This latest deadline is missed.
May 16, 1997-The players agree to language offered by the owners' representa-
tives. After the players' acceptance, the owners negotiators indicate that this lan-
guage will have to be taken to the owners to see if they can accept it-
Early June, 1997-Senator Hatch's staff repeatedly requests-hearing dates from
owners, players, and minor league representatives. Stanley Brand agrees to testify
at June 17, 1997 hearing.
June 10, 1997-Senator Hatch announces that a hearing on S. 53 will be held on
June 17, 1997.
June 12, 1997-Owners sign new 10 year agreement with minor leagues and rat-
ify agreement with players regarding legislative language on antitrust reform.
June 13, 1997-Senator Hatch sends formal invitation letters for June 17 hearing.
Stanley Brand fails to appear at scheduled meeting with Senator Hatch's staff. The
owners indicate that they will refuse to attend the hearing or any subsequent hear-
ing until George Steinbrenner's suit against the owners for antitrust violations is
resolved.
June 16, 1997-Bud Selig and Stanley Brand write Senator Hatch Selig indicates
he will not attend June 17 hearing. Brand requests that the hearing be postponed
so that he can have an opportunity to draft proposed amendments. At 6 p.m.. Brand
meets with Senator Hatch's staff indicating that, contrary to his position 1 week
earlier, he will not testify at June 17 hearing.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Selig has written me indicating that because
of a conflict, he is unable to attend today. I understand and appre-
ciate his conflict, but one would expect that the owners could have
sent another representative in his stead, as we had requested.
Mr. Stanley Brand, representing the minor leagues, has also
written me requesting that this hearing be delayed, although as-
suring me that he would be prepared to provide specific legislative
suggestions later this week. I had intended to meet with him yes-
terday, but he was unable to meet with me. I had hoped that by
meeting with him, we might even have avoided this hearing, but
for some reason I couldn't get with him.
7Now, while I look forward to finally receiving Mr. Brand's com-
ments, I must say that I fail to see why he cannot present them
today, especially given the fact that we asked for his views in Feb-
ruary and that Mr. Brand specifically told the committee just last
week that he would attend today's hearing.
Moreover, given Mr. Brand's statement in a March 28, 1997, let-
ter to Senator Biden that he was "surprised" to be asked for legis-
lative input before the committee had conducted any study or re-
view on its impact on the minor leagues, it now seems odd that he
is asking the committee to postpone a hearing until he has had an
opportunity to draft legislation.
That being said, it is, as I have indicated from the outset, my
sincere intent that any legislation we enact have no negative im-
pact on the current law governing the minor leagues, and I truly
do look forward to hearing from Mr. Brand within the next week.
I would note that this legislation has always been aimed at
Major League Baseball labor relations, not at addressing any issue
regarding the minor leagues, and that S. 53 even states in express
terms that it shall have no effect whatsoever on the minor leagues.
To the extent that minor leagues believe this language unintention-
ally changes the law as it applies to the minor leagues, I will cer-
tainly consider their views. This is perhaps a subject on which we
will hear more from our witnesses.
Present with us today are Don Fehr, executive director and gen-
eral counsel of the Major League Players Association, and Dan
Pelter, a former minor league player. I would like to take this op-
portunity to thank them for making the effort to be with us here
today. I would also like to thank Senator Leahy, our cosponsors
Senator Thurmond and Moynihan, and Senator DeWine and other
members of this committee for their continued assistance in this
important issue.
This is an important hearing. This will be the one time we will
listen, and I have to say that we will listen to input from both the
owners and the minor leagues, hopefully, by the end of this week
one way or the other. But if not, we are going to proceed as best
we can, and so we will just see what happens from here.
There is nobody from the minority here, so I think what we will
do is begin with you, Mr. Fehr, and then turn to you, Mr.-am I
pronouncing it right, Peltier.
Mr. PELTIER. Peltier.
The CHAIRmAN. You bet. I appreciate having both of you here
and we will look forward to your testimony at this time.
PANEL CONSISTING OF DONALD A. FEHR, EXECUTIVE DIREC-
TORI MAJOR LEAGUE PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, NEW YORK,
NY; AND DAN PELTIER, FORMER MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL
PLAYER, HASTINGS, MN
STATEMENT OF DONALD A. FEHR
Mr. FEHR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Senator DeWine. My
name, as you know, is Donald Fehr, and for more than a decade
now I have been privileged to serve as the executive director of the
Major League Baseball Players Association. The Players Associa-
tion, of course, is the labor organization that represents all major
8league players with respect to terms and conditions of employment,
and also, interestingly enough, managers, coaches, and trainers
with respect to some.
Before making my brief comments here this morning, I do want
to take a moment to thank and express the appreciation of all
major league players to the chairman and to the ranking member
for the interest that they have shown in this issue, the steadfast-
ness with which they have pursued it during the tumultuous years
which have preceded 1997, the careful attention they have given
the various matters which have come into play, and perhaps most
of all to the chairman for his patience, especially over the last 6
months or so.
In November 1996, after just about 4 years of very difficult nego-
tiations, including a very long strike, to which the chairman has
alluded, and a long period of negotiations after that strike ended
following an injunction issued pursuant to section 10(j) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act against the owners, we were finally able
to reach a collective bargaining agreement. It is comprehensive. It
is long-term. It will expire most likely at the end of the 2001 sea-
son, and it has built into it a number of provisions, the object and
purpose of which is to cause the players and the owners to work
together on a day-by-day basis to operate the game, to rebuild the
game, to reach out to the fans, one result of which, we hope, will
be that the next time we negotiate, the relationship between the
two parties will be fundamentally different than it has been at any
time in the past.
That is the hope, and we certainly have a large task in front of
us. There have been in Major League Baseball eight work stop-
pages in the last eight negotiations, dating back to 1972, a fair
amount of strikes and a fair amount. of lockouts. There has not
been a settlement without a work stoppage since 1970. Our task
for the next go-around is to make sure that that record is broken,
and broken with as loud a thump as we can manage.
In this new agreement, we have, to which the chairman referred,
also reached, in principle, an agreement on the antitrust laws. As
I think everyone knows, the major league owners have believed
that, at least with respect to player relations issues, they have had
a total exemption to the antitrust laws. And we have believed, and
I have testified on many occasions here, that that has been a prin-
cipal cause of our ongoing disputes.
Simply put, what it does is give the owners an incentive not
present in the other professional team sports to attempt to effec-
tively break the union. The reason that they could do that is that
if they would accomplish that, they then could set the terms and
conditions free of any restraint that would otherwise be imposed by
the antitrust laws. That is not the case and has not been the case
in the other professional team sports, and whatever else we can say
about those sports, they have had far fewer disruptions on the field
and the difficulty that such disruptions cause the fans have been
more often avoided than it has been in baseball.
I will not make an attempt to read my statement that has been
prepared for the record, nor to otherwise indicate my views on anti-
trust and sports, and baseball in particular. I think those views are
9well-known from my prior testimony. I will, of course, be pleased
to answer any questions about it.
Let me then turn briefly to the nature of the legislation at hand,
and in particular to the agreement that was reached between, the
players and the owners. Last November when we were concluding
the agreement, the players made it clear that they wished, at last,
to be treated under the antitrust laws as other professional ath-
letes similarly situated, basketball and football players in the NFL
and the NBA being the most obvious examples.
The owners wanted some things, too, and-eventually we reached
a compromise which is reflected in article XXVIII of the collective
bargaining agreement. It is a very carefully drawn provision and
it says that the players and the owners will jointly request and co-
operate in lobbying the Congress to pass a law that will clarify that
major league players are covered under the antitrust laws to the
same extent as other professional athletes similarly situated, along
with a second provision and that second provision being one which
hopefully will obviate any concerns that third parties have, and
that is that whatever the application of the antitrust laws is in any
other context or circumstance or with respect to any other third
party or parties that the passage of such legislation would not
change the application of the antitrust laws. It has the benefit of
not attempting to specifically define how the antitrust laws would
apply in any particular circumstance, that being left to such legis-
lation that becomes law to interpretation in the event that there
is a dispute.
We then had a second round of negotiations which was conducted
sporadically, essentially, between March and late May, and the
purpose of that round of negotiations conducted principally be-
tween myself on behalf of the players and Randy Levine, who is the
owners' chief negotiator, on behalf of the major league owners, was
to see if we could agree on specific language that we could suggest
to the Congress be considered in order to effectuate the collective
bargaining provision to which we had agreed.
We were able to reach agreement. The players have adopted it,
and as the chairman indicated, we have been advised by Mr. Selig
that the owners have also agreed to the negotiated provision, and
I believe a copy of it has already been submitted to the committee.
I think if you review it, you will find that it is a very carefully
drafted provision.
The "Purpose" section simply replicates the language of the col-
lective bargaining agreement. The substantive sections provide that
the antitrust laws will apply to the business of organized profes-
sional major league baseball acts, practices, or agreements relating
to or affecting employment to play baseball at the major league
level, or, in other words, as the chairman summarized, labor rela-
tions at the major league level.
The remainder of the suggested language makes it clear that
whatever the law otherwise is in any context is not affected one
way or another by the passage of this legislation. We borrowed lib-
erally, I think it is fair to say, from the provisions of S. 53 and
some of the other bills that were submitted by the chairman and
other Senators in the prior Congress to make certain as best we
could that we were accomplishing that goal.
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I do believe that a fair reading of this suggested language should
reassure any third party, be they the minor leagues or otherwise,
that the passage of this legislation would have no effect one way
or another on their rights under law as existed otherwise with re-
spect to this legislation. It does carry a specific provision that says
that more specifically, but not by way of limitation, this section
shall not be deemed to change the application of the antitrust laws
to the amateur draft, the reserve clause as applied to minor league
players, or the various agreements between the major leagues and
the minor leagues, as well as other exceptions relating to franchise
location, relocation, the Sports Broadcasting Act, and so on.
With that, I think I am prepared to conclude the remarks I
would like to give this morning, other than to say that the Players
Association and the major league players supported S. 53 and the
similar bills offered in prior Congresses, and still do. We have seen
a copy of at least one narrow amendment that was being circulated
to S. 53 which we also think is sound public policy and we support.
But what we are asking the Congress to do now, and all that we
are asking the Congress to do now is to enact legislation that will
effectively give major league players the equal protection of the
antitrust laws, and to do so in a way which will avoid, if the Con-
gress so chooses, any of the other issues that swirl around antitrust
in sports and antitrust in baseball that can and have been the sub-
ject of so much contention.
I, of course, will be pleased to answer any questions that any of
the members have. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Fehr.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Fehr follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF DONALD A. FEIIR
Mr. Chairman, Senator Leahy and members of the Committee, my name is
Donald Fehr, and I serve as the Executive Director of the Major League Baseball
Players Association. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the Committee
today.
This Committee has spent considerable time in the last four years studying anti-
trust issues as they relate to baseball. On behalf of all major league players, I want
to thank Chairman Hatch and Senator Leahy for their interest in and attention to
these issues. My views on these matters are well known from my previous testimony
before this and other committees, and need no repetition here.
As has been often noted, over the last 25 years, there have been eight consecutive
work stoppages (strikes and lockouts) in major league baseball, more than in the
other three major team sports (football, basketball and hockey) combined. We be-
lieve that this results, in significant part, from the belief of the major league owners
that major league players, unlike their counterparts in basketball, football and
hockey, have no rights under the antitrust laws. Major league players have sought,
and continue to seek, the same rights under the antitrust laws as other professional
athletes similarly sitigated, no more but no less.
The importance of the antitrust laws to the collective bargaining process in profes-
sional sports is often misunderstood. It is not necessarily the use of the remedy that
is important; rather, it is the opportunity to resort to the remedy that matters. It
has been the desire to have an alternative course of action available to them, an
alternative course which would have a moderating influence on the bargaining proc-
ess, that has been at the heart of the players' efforts in the antitrust area. As we
learned too well in 1994, the players effectively had only one choice: accept the own-
ers unilaterally imposed terms and conditions of employment, or strike.i Unlike
I It is, of course, possible that the Courts would now hold, as we would argue, that in the
current circumstances, major leaue players do have the protection of the antitrust laws to the
same extent as other professional athletes. However, it is extremely unlikely that players would
forego their right to strike against the possibility of such a ruling.
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other similarly situated athletes, baseball players have no other alternative. And
unlike other professional sports team owner-, who know that their players are pro-
tected by the antitrust laws, baseball owners have believed that major league play-
ers do not have such protection, and therefore believe that if they can break the
union, the players have no recourse, and the owners can impose whatever conditions
they choose. That does not foster labor peace. Accordingly, major league players
have petitioned Congress to ensure that they have the same rights and protections
under law as do other similarly situated athletes. We are prepared to continue that
effort in order to avoid in the future what has been the seemingly inevitable disrup-
tion in the game every time we negotiate.
THE NEW COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT
Many people were surprised to learn that there was any mention of antitrust leg-
islation in e new collective bargaining agreement. With both sides knowing that
this effort would continue until either a bill was passed or the next work stoppage
was upon us, the parties chose to address this issue in the recently signed collective
bargaining agreement. Let me explain how Article XXVIII came to be.
The collective bargaining agreements in professional football, basketball and hock-
ey typically expire at the end of the month of the championship season, which
means that bargining may typically commence some weeks prior thereto. In base-
ball, however, the collective bargaining agreements have expired on December 31
of the final year of the contract. As a practical matter, this means that individual
player contract negotiations for the next season begin before the contract. Thus, not-
withstanding the fact that negotiations have not yet resulted in a new collective bar-
gaining agreement, new individual baseball contracts for the following season are
signed under the terms of the expired contract.
This time around, the baseball owners sought the players' agreement to change
the expiration date of our collective bargaining agreement to October 31 of the last
year of the agreement, just after the end of the World Series. They believe that by
doing so, their negotiating position may be enhanced. Owners believe that an earlier
expiration date would give them time to.commence negotiations and, if necessary,
declare an impasse and impose new terms and conditions of employment for new
individual contracts for the following season. In the end, the players were prepared
to accommodate the owners' request, but only on the condition that they have the
same rights under the antitrust laws as do the athletes in the other sports.
As a result, Article XXVIII of the new Basic Agreement was drafted. Article
XXVIII provides that the expiration date of the contract will move to October 31,
if legislation clarifying that baseball players have the same rights under the anti-
trust laws as do basketball and football players is enacted by the end of the 105th
Congress. If legislation providing that clarification is not enacted by the end of the
105th Congress, the expiration date reverts to December 31 of the final year of the
agreement. The players and owners were very careful to make certain that the bill
they would jointly support would deal only with major league player issues; the
scope and effect of the antitrust laws is not changed in any other respect In other
words, whatever the law is with respect to other issues or third parties, it will con-
tinue to be-this legislation will do nothing to change it.
The relevant portion of Article XXVIII reads as follows:
"the Clubs and the Association will jointly request and cooperate in lobbying
the Congress to pass a law that will clarify that Major League Baseball Players
are covered under the antitrust laws (i.e., that Major League Players have the
same rights under the antitrust laws as do other professional athletes, e.g. foot-
ball and basketball players), along with a provision that makes it clear that
passage of that bill does not change the application of the antitrust laws in any
other context or with respect to any other person or entity."
Simply put, the owners and the players reached an agreement to resolve their dif-
ferences on the expiration date of the contract in conjunction with resolving their
differences on the application of the antitrust laws to major league baseball players.
No other parties or issues are affected or implicated by this agreement.
LEGISLATION
Early in this Congress, Senators Hatch, Leahy, Thurmond and Moynihan intro-
duced S. 53. That bill constitutes a much broader clarification of the application of
the antitrust laws to major league baseball than the bil contemplated in the collec-
tive bargaining agreement As was the case in prior bills, however, S. 53 made clear
that it was not to affect the application of the antitrust laws with respect to fran-
chise relocation issues or the Sports Broadcasting Act, nor was it to affect "the ap-
12
plicability or nonapplicability of the antitrust laws to the amateur draft of profes-
sional baseball, the minor league reserve clause, the agreement between profes-
sional major league baseball teams and the teams of the National Association of
Baseball (sic), commonly known as the 'Professional Baseball Agreement', or any
other matter relating to the minor leagues."
We fully supported that bill, and continue to believe it to be wise public policy.
But the hope was, and continues to be, that the collective bargaining agreement re-
cently signed will lead to the enactment of legislation relating only to major league
players quickly and cleanly, so that the owners and players can put this issue be-
hind them and set their sights squarely on working together to repair and improve
the game.
I have been advised that a substitute amendment recently circulated to S. 53, ap-
parently in anticipation of an early agreement to legislative language effectuating
the collective bargaining agreement, and to keep the process moving forward. That
amendment was taken virtually verbatim from Article XXVIII of the new Basic
Agreement. As such, we had no objection to it when it was originally offered, nor
do we now. It was the Association's hope, however, that to the extent the owners
and players could agree to legislative language that accurately reflected the intent
of that amendment, and which the parties felt comfortable supporting, the legisla-
tive process would be further facilitated.
To that end, and at the strong urging of Senators Hatch and Leahy, the Associa-
tion has attempted to develop with the owners an acceptable alternative to that
amendment. On 16 May, 1997 representatives of the Players Association reached an
agreement with representatives of Major League Baseball on language that the
MLB representatives would take to the MLB owners for approval. My understand-
ing is that they did so last week. Hopefully, by today, the Chairman has been ad-
vised of the owners' actions on this suggested language.
THE MINOR LEAGUES
In the past, the minor leagues have opposed all legislation to bring increased sta-
bility to the relationship between major league owners and major league players,
notwithstanding express language in each such bill stating that the bill did not af-
fect the application of the antitrust laws as applied to the minor leagues. Although
never articulated in a manner that made sense to me, the argument seems to have
been, that if the antitrust laws applied to major league player relations, that would
somehow result in a reduction of the number of minor league teams that the major
league owners would siipport. This assertion is particularly hard to understand be-
cause major league players were essentially granted free agency by an arbitrator in
1975, interpreting the language of the standard player contract Player-owner talks
have centered on free agency in each negotiation since that time. Every round of
collective bargaining since 1976 has been a battle by the owners to reduce players'
free agency, and by the players to keep it It is not the protection of the antitrust
laws that matter, it is whether or not the players can be free agents. The position
of the minor league owners seems to me to be beside the point.
In any event, of course, the sponsors of S. 53 have gone out of their way to inaude
plain language in the bill insulating the minor leagues from the application of the
bill and thus giving more than adequate protection to the minor leagues. Stated oth-
erwise, it preserves the status quo. To do nothing to address the continuous instabil-
ity and disruptions in play in major league baseball in the face of such clear lan-
guage protecting the minor leagues is illogical and ignores the interests of the cities,
millions of fans, and other workers in uninterrupted play.
Likewise, the agreed upon language considered by the major league owners last
week to effectuate Article XXVIII of the new Basic Agreement protects the minor
leagues because the language makes clear that, other than as concerns major league
players, the application of the antitrust laws is not changed. Whatever the law oth-
erwise is, it remains. Thus, under both the express language of both S. 53 and the
language agreed to by player and owner negotiators, whatever the law is today with
respect to the affiliated minor leagues and their relationship with the major leagues
and minor league players will continue to be the law after either S. 53 or the pro-
posed agreement is enacted.
The language of both these versions of legislation preserves the status quo to the
extent that existing law would otherwise allow. These proposals do nothing to
threaten the minor leagues. They deal strictly with the relationship between major
league owners and major league players. To paraphrase a famous former member
of this body, minor league owners 'ain't got no dog in this fight."
Recently, however, I have seen correspondence in which Stan Brand, lobbyist for
the minor leagues, accuses me of seeking the legislation in order to attack the ama-
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teur draft. If fact, he claims that I threatened to sue to overturn the amateur draft
when I was testifying some time ago on the House side. I would like to clarify the
record on this issue in three respects.
First, I do not believe that Mr. Brand's comments were addressing the actual lan-
guage that became part of the signed collective bargaining agreement, and certainly
were not addressing the specific language we have recently agreed upon. Second
the question I was asked by a member of the House Judiciary Committee, well be-
fore the strike ended, much less the new agreement was reached, was whether I
thought someone would challenge the draft. I responded that I believed someone
would eventually do so, but clearly I was indicating that such a challenge would be
brought under existing law. This was neither a threat nor was it any great insight
on my part. Consider only that aspect of a system that requires that a young man
from Cleveland must enter baseball through the draft and negotiate the terms of
his employment with only one team, but permits a Cuban, who defects to the Do-
minican Republic, for example, to negotiate with any team. One cannot expect
American young men to ignore that situation. However, third, and most important,
this legislation does not affect the status of the amateur draft. If existing law pro-
tects the draft, it remAins protected even after the passage of this legislation. If ex-
isting law permits a challenge to the draft today, that right is unchanged by this
bill. Litigation as to the amateur draft would not be affected by the passage of S. 53
or the player-owner agreed upon proposal.
Moreover, my understanding is that the major leagues and the minor leagues re-
cently reached an agreement on a new 10-year Professional Baseball Agreement
that would guarantee 158 minor league teams in 1998, and 160 teams thereafter.
In other words, the major league teams would be contractually bound to continue
to support all existing minor league teams.
CONCLUSION
Let me conclude by again expressing the appreciation of all major league players
to theF members of this Committee for their consideration of this legislation, legisla-
tion that we strongly believe is in the interest not only of the players and owners,
but also of the fans. We continue to support and are committed to seeking legisla-
tion to clarify that major league baseball players have the same -rights under the
antitrust laws as do other athletes. Hopefully you will shortly have before you lan-
guage agreed upon by the players and owners, which we urge you to act upon favor-
ably in the near future. And, in any event, I want the Committee to know that the
Players Association strongly supports both S. 53 and the more narrow amendment
pending before the committee.
Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Peltier, we will take your testimony.
STATEMENT OF DAN PELTIER
Mr. PELTIER. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, my
name is Dan Peltier. I had the opportunity and the pleasure to
play professional baseball at all possible levels for 8 years. I played
rookie ball with the Butte Copper Kings in the Pioneer League,
double A with the Tulsa Drillers, triple A level with the Oklahoma
City 89ers and the Phoenix Fire Birds, and I also played with the
Texas Rangers and the San Francisco Giants at the major league
level. I also had the opportunity to play in the independent North-
ern League with the St. Paul Saints. I greatly appreciate this op-
portunity to talk about my experiences and about the realities of
baseball in the minors from the players' perspective.
Before beginning, I would like to point out that I recognize that
I am one of the lucky ones. Unlike most professional players, I got
the chance to play in the majors. Currently, there are approxi-
mately 4,500 active minor league players on affiliated minor league
teams. Every year, the major league teams draft more than 1,200
new players, more than 1,600 players this year in 1997. So the
turnover rate is very high.
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As I understand it, only 1 out of every 10 players drafted even
gets 1 day in the major leagues. Only 1 out of every 100 actually
has a career in the majors. Moreover, when I retired, I had my col-
lege degree, a degree in accounting from the University of Notre
Dame. Many players are out of the game by their mid- to late 20's,
with a high school degree, a wife, children, and no marketable
skills.
There are a lot of myths about playing in the minors. People
think that it is the last bastion of professional sports where win-
ning is all that matters, that economics are not as important as tal-
ent and the fun of the game. In reality, minor league baseball is
a tough business where failure is the norm and success is the rare
exception. Here are some basic facts.
First, the primary objective of every player in the minors is not
to have a winning season, to have the best team, or to be the
league champion. It is to play well enough to get off the team and
play in the major leagues. It is better to have a good season for a
losing team than to have average statistics for a winner. Rosters
are constantly changing and there is little chance to build team
chemistry or unity. Everyone in the minors--players, coaches, and
managers-have one thing in common; that is, to be in the big
leagues.
Second, no one gets -wealthy in the minors. Most baseball players
do not make in a year as much as Cal Ripken makes for one game.
In fact, most minor league players would love to make what I un-
derstand you pay your entry-level staffers. When I played rookie
ball, although I was under contract for a year, I made $850 a
month for 2V2 months. In double A, I made $1,350 a month, and
in triple A I made $1,850 a month for 5 months. Club house dues
and tips cost roughly $1,500 for the season, leaving me about
$7,500 before taxes. I have no idea how some of my friends who
were married and had kids were able to make ends meet.
Third, a minor league baseball players has very few rights. Base-
ball's reserve clause is very much like the indentured servitude of
the 1700's. When you first sign, you are owned by that team for
basically 7 seasons. A team can buy you, sell you, send you to an-
other country, or fire you whenever they want. They can cut you
if you get hurt.
A player, on the other hand, cannot try to play for someone.else.
He can't try out for his home team. You have to play for the team
that drafted you even if they are loaded at your position. I got
drafted by the Texas Rangers after my junior year of college as an
outfielder. I also played some first base. When I was ready for the
majors, the Texas outfield included superstars such as Juan Gon-
zalez in left, Ruben Sierra in right, and Raphael Palmeiro at first.
I got the chance to play when Ruben Sierra got hurt, but was sent
back to the minors when he came back, even though at the time
I was hitting .385.
Under the standard minor league contract, a player is required
to waive all rights to appeal any action by the team in State or
Federal court. You can appeal to the commissioner of baseball, ex-
cept there has been no commissioner for almost 5 years. In addi-
tion, you are pushed to leave college or not to attend in the first
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place and play in the minors, even though the chances are that you
will never have a career in the major leagues.
Oddly, if you are an American citizen, you have less bargaining
power than kids from other countries. Players in the United States
can only play for the team that drafts them. The only bargaining
power that some have is to stay in college. Players from other coun-
tries, such as the Dominican Republic or Cuba, are not subject to
the draft. They are free agents and can choose to play for the team
that makes the best offer. Because of this fact, teams from the
United States and Japan are signing players from Latin and South
American countries at an increasingly young age.
Perhaps most important, there is the mind set of the minors
which at best is a bit unrealistic. The longer you stay in, the fewer
options you have and more desperate you seem to get. You know
you are playing against a stacked deck, but in your heart you
firmly believe you are different, that you are going to be the excep-
tion. One's perspective of reality at 18 tends to be a little different
than one's perspective at 28 or 38.
Moreover, there is an incredible pressure to perform. You are al-
ways a day from being let go and there are hundreds of other guys
ready to take your place if you have a problem. At times, the mi-
nors seem to be a series of acts of desperation.
Given these facts, I think you can understand my surprise that
some want to stack the deck even further and create a new Federal
law exempting the owners' actions in the minors from the antitrust
laws. Quite frankly, what else do the owners need than what they
have already? What are the laws they must be able to break in
order to run minor league teams? How much more power do they
need when bargaining with an 18-year-old kid whom they own for
7 years, and what minor league player is going to jeopardize his
career by challenging the system? If you believe a player would do
that, then you really don't understand the mind set of a minor
league player.
Having played in an independent league, there are even some
differences between these two types of minor leagues. The North-
ern League was very similar to double A ball in terms of pay and
playing conditions, but there is a different atmosphere between the
team and the fans. The primary purpose of the St. Paul Saints,
which is the team that I played for, was to entertain the fans, and
that commitment by the team was mirrored by the commitment
from the community. Every game was a sellout. People came hours
ahead of the game for tailgate parties even though there was a
major league team literally only 10 miles away. The games were
more fun.
Despite these observations, I would not give up my experience in
playing baseball for anything. There is no greater feeling in the
world than the first time you get called up to the majors, and there
is also no greater low than the day that you get sent back down.
Knowing what I know, I would still do it all over again. The basic
fact is that you don't have to sign if you don't want to. However,
this obsession with making the majors should not be a justification
for the current treatment of minor league players, and I certainly
hope it would not be used as an excuse to give major league and
minor league owners a legal blank check.
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I understand that the legislation before this committee does not
address the minor leagues, however. It does not create any new
rights or delete any existing ones. It is only about the relationship
between the major league owners and the major league players.
Consequently, it should not be changed to award the owners with
even more power.
Before giving the owners an exemption for all of their activities
in the minors, I hope Congress will take the time to learn more
about the legal and economic realities of the minors, and not sim-
ply rely upon some of the current myths. Professional baseball
owners already have more power than they need, and certainly
more than they deserve.
Thank you for this opportunity and I will be happy to answer
any questions.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you, Mr. Peltier.
Let me make it clear that I said that Mr. Brand-I tried to meet
with him yesterday. He had an appointment with our staff yester-
day and I asked the stAff to bring him over to the office so we could
chat with him because I had chatted with some friends who felt
that I should meet with Mr. Brand. He never showed up, so the
staff tried to get a hold of him all day long. Finally, just to note
for the record, Mr. Brand did express a willingness and desire to
meet last evening, but our staff wasn't in the office at the time, but
he did meet with some committee staff. So I wanted to make that
clear. I wasn't aware of that at the time.
Let me also put in the record a statement by Senator Charles
Grassley, and also an opening statement by Senator Jeff Sessions,
as well.
[The prepared statements of Senators Grassley and Sessions fol-
low:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR CHARLEs E. GRAssLEY, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF IOWA
Mr. Chairman, I would like to add my voice to this debate to emphasize the im-
portance of Minor League Baseball.
As everyone knows, baseball is not just a favorite American pastime-it is part
of our American culture. We grew up admiring the accomplishments of our favorite
players and rooting for our favorite teams. We grew up perfecting our curve balls
and sliders, and wondering why our fast balls were never as fast as our heroes' fast
balls. I want my grandkids and their children to enjoy the same outing to the ball-
park that I did.
But baseball wouldn't be basebal without the Minor Leagues. The Major League
teams would not have the pool of talent to draw from, and wouldn't have the train-
ing ground for promising players if it were not for the Minor Leagues. And, in my
part of the world, the Minor Leagues fill another very important role. The Minor
Leagues brings baseball to the towns and small cities. They bring baseball to my
state of Iowa, and to other states that do not have Major League teams. It doesn't
take a Cal Ripkin or a George Brett to make a city loyal to a baseball club. If you've
never been to a Burlington Bees game-or a Des Moines Cubs game, you're really
missing something. And you haven't seen fan loyalty until you've gone to a Minor
League game where so much of the town turns out for a game.
These are the reasons that I will continue to work to protect Minor League base-
ball. It is vital that any legislation passed by this Committee and by the full Senate
be in the best interest of the Minor Leagues. I commend the Chairman for his ef-
forts in this regard, and sincerely hope he continues to work with the Minor
Leagues. For small town America, the Minor Leagues are baseball.
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PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONs, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE
OF ALABAMA
I would like to begin by thanking Senator Hatch for calling this hearing to discuss
S. 53, the Curt Flood Act of 1997, which, if enacted, would repeal professional base-
ball's 75-year-old antitrust exemption. I commend Senator Hatch for recognizing
that the legislation which we will be discussing today seeks to significantly change
the basic operating structure of "America's pastime", and for giving this committee
the opportunity to fully and fairly consider this issue. I would also like to thank
the witnesses assembled here today for their willingness to come before this commit-
tee to help us develop a clear understanding of the potential implications that could
result from any changes made to existing law.
Mr. Chairman, my home state of Alabama has a rich baseball tradition. On the
collegiate level one need only look as far as this spring's College World Series to
see that teams from University of Alabama and Auburn University were among the
participants. A third school, the University of South Alabama, came within one
game of being the third Alabama team in the College World Series, losing to even-
tual national champion Louisiana State University in the regional finals.
Many major league legends come from Alabama, and my hometown of Mobile has
an extraordinary record. Three of the greatest homerun hitters of all time, Hank
Aaron, Willie McCovey and Billy Williams were all from Mobile.
More than that, Satchel Paige, one of the game's legends, came from Mobile, and
as you recall those "Miracle Mets" please note that two of their outfielders, Cleon
Jones and Tommy Agee, were both Mobilians. These are just some of the many
major leaguers our state has produced.
Still, although Alabama has never had a Major League team, the minor leagues
have always been important. Mobilians still fondly recall "the Rifleman", Chuck
Connors, who played for the old Mobile Bears. And Birmingham hosted the entire
career of the most famous minor league player of all-time, the most well known ath-
lete in the world-Michael Jordan. To most he is a Chicago Bull, but to us he is
known as a Birmingham Baron.
Minor League activity continues to grow within our state. Alabama currently has
three minor league teams, the Birmingham Barons,,Huntsville Stars and the Mobile
BayBears, which have all made tremendous contributions to the communities that
support them. Alabama's affection for minor league baseball has been reflected in
our teams attendance records as well, with Birmingham drawing 296,000 fans last
year while Huntsville attracted 255,000 fans. The new Mobile BayBears, in this,
their first full season of play, have already drawn 137,160 fans in only 31 home
dates. This support for these minor league teams has made itself known through
the mail and other communications that I have received in my office from individ-
uals in the state who are concerned about this issue.
Repeal of baseball's antitrust exemption is an issue of tremendous significance to
the minor leagues, and the potential impacts of this legislation on these teams
should not be overlooked. The importance of minor league baseball to small towns
and communities throughout America cannot be overstated. Many of these minor
league teams are located in states, such as Alabama, that have never hosted a
Major League franchise, and they provide their communities with unique social and
economic benefits that would not otherwise exist. My interest in this hearing is to
ensure that the concerns raised by these teams are fairly addressed and that the
actions we take do not unfairly damage minor league baseball and the communities
that support it. To this end, I look forward to hearing the testimony of the witnesses
on this issue.
The CHAIRliAN. Mr. Fehr, could you share with us your views on
how repealing Major League Baseball's antitrust exemption will
improve labor relations between the players and the owners, and
what broader benefits do you think that this might lead to?
Mr, FEHR. I think there are a couple of things. Essentially, the
circumstances that when it comes to player relations at the major
league level, as well as at the minor league level-the owners are
organized in such a way so as to deprive players of any meaningful
bargaining power on their individual contracts. Their object is to do
that. The union's job is to try and negotiate a better system.
When we have a circumstance in which the antitrust laws are
not there as a safety valve in the background if collective bargain-
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ing breaks down, what we have is a set of circumstances in which
it makes it much more likely that the owners will be interested in
pushing that forward, as we have seen in the past, so that hope-
fully they can get to the point where they can determine without
any restraint whatever the conditions are. If they know that there
is a safety valve that, come what may, they can't act in a way
which would otherwise be deemed to violate the Sherman Act, we
think that that will temper bargaining positions, as it has in the
other sports.
The CHAIRMAN. I understand that the players and the owners
have agreed upon specific language as an alternative to S. 53 as
currently drafted that both sides support. Can you summarize the
extent to which this language substantively differs from S. 53?
Mr. FEHR. I think the principal difference is this. S. 53 is a blan-
ket statement making it clear that the antitrust laws apply except
where otherwise noted, and there are a number of exceptions to
which you referred at the beginning of this hearing. The language
that we are suggesting is much more narrow than that. It is an af-
firmative statement that the antitrust laws apply to labor relations
at the major league level without making any comment whatsoever
on the state of the law otherwise.
The CHAIRmAN. OK. Well, can you tell us what the advantages
would be for the committee to proceed with your proposed sub-
stitute language as opposed to S. 53?
Mr. FEHR. Hopefully, what that would do is allow the committee
to proceed to consider legislation in a much more simple manner
with a much reduced range of issues that are there, thereby allow-
ing for a lot less controversy and hopefully a bill which can be
acted with broad support from all parties.
The CHAIRmAN. So I assume then; based upon your negotiations
with the owners, that you think it is fair to say that they would
support this language?
Mr. FEHR. Certainly, Randy Levine supports it. I understand
that the owners have agreed to support it, also. That certainly was
the intent of the collective bargaining agreement which they rati-
fied.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, would you agree with me that the owners'
support is rather significant, and that that is, as far as I can see,
a momentous development?
Mr. FEHR. I think it is a very significant development. I agree
with you, Senator. It indicates at long last that they are prepared
to treat major league players the same way their counterparts do
in other sports.
The CHAiRMAN. Well, I will put a letter in the record sent to me
by Bud Selig, dated June 16, 1997. Let me just read one sentence
in the letter. It says, "First, the language negotiated by representa-
tives of the Major League Baseball Players Association and the
Major League Baseball Owners was approved at the executive
council meeting and the legislative committee meeting."
He does say, "Our support is only tempered by the fact that our
business partner, the National Association of Professional Baseball
Leagues, has concern as to whether the proposed legislation ade-
quately protects their interests," and then mentions that "they
have contacted our office."
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I will put that in the record to express their concerns, and cer-
tainly we are interested in their concerns.
[The letter referred to follows:]
OFFICE OF THE COMM ISSIONER,
MA.Jon LEAGUE BASEBALL,
New York, AY, June 16, 1997.
Hon. OmuN HATCH, Chairman,
Judiciary Committee, U S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
DEAR CHAIRMAN: I am wnting to acknowledge your June 13, 1997. letter of invita.
tion to testify before the Senate Judiciary Committee on Tuesday, June 17, 1997,
at 10:00 a.m. Unfortunately, I will be unable to attend due to a previous long-term
commitment to the Boys & Girls Club of America. However, I would like to make
a couple of comments with respect to our recent meetings in Philadelphia, Penn-
sylvania, last week.
First, the lanplage negotiated by representatives of the Major League Baseball
Players Association and the Major League Baseball Owners was approved at the Ex-
ecutive Council meeting and the Legislative Committee meeting. Our support is
only tempered by the fact that our business partner, the National Association of
Professional Baseball Leagues (NAPBL), has concern as to whether the proposed
legislation adequately protects their interests. I understand that representatives of
the NAPBL have contacted your office to arrange a meeting to discuss those con-
cerns.
Second, we announced on June 12, 1997, a ten-year agreement with the Minor
Leavues effective October 1, 1997. The Professional Baseball Agreement sets forth
a spirit of cooperation and commitment between the Major and Minor Leagues.
Third, we are reviewing our concerns about appearing to testify given that we
have been sued by one of our own member clubs in an antitrust lawsuit.
We look forward to working with you and your staff as the process moves forward.
Sincerely,
ALLAN H. SELIG,
Chairman, Major League Executive Council.
The CHAIRMAN. As I understand it, Mr. Fehr, your proposed lan-
guage only addresses labor relations at the major league level, is
that correct?
Mr. FEHR. That is correct.
The CHAIRMAN. Does the proposed legislation give anyone a right
to challenge the minor league draft or reserve clause?
Mr. FEHR. In my vi'ew, this is carefully drafted so that if this leg-
islation passes, it would be irrelevant to considerations about the
status of the draft or the minor league reserve clause.
The CHAIRMAN. Does it address the minor leagues at all?
Mr. FEHR. It only addressed it to say that whatever the status
of the law is, this doesn't change it. Otherwise, it does not.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, do you believe that the minor league
draft or-reserve clause under current law are exempt from the anti-
trust laws?
Mr. FEHR. That is an interesting question. It has never been test-
ed. I don't know what-
The CHAIRMAN. Do you think they should be?
Mr. FEHR. Personally, do I think they should be?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Mr. FEHR. No, I don't think they should be.
The CHAIRMAN. Why not?
Mr. FEHR. Major League Baseball operating the amateur draft-
and make no mistake, it is operated by Major League Baseball, not
by the minor leagues; as a matter of fact, all the minor league con-
tracts are now signed by the major league clubs; they are not even
signed by the minor league clubs-effectively prevents any poten-
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tial baseball player from bargaining with more than one potential
employer.
It is not even like the Federal Government where you can apply
to a number of different agencies in a number of different locations.
You have one choice, and one choice only. We think that is fun-
damentally discriminatory. We don't know of any other place in
America in which we tolerate it. The amateur draft came in in the
mid-1960's. I know of no case in which it has been examined under
the antitrust laws. I can make the arguments as to how that would
come out either way. For purposes of this legislation, though, I do
want to emphasize that this legislation would not affect that one
way or another.
The CHAIR N. OK. Now, Mr. Peltier, let me just take a second
with you and then I will turn to Senator DeWine. You have given
us some very helpful insight into life in the minor leagues and this
will, I am sure, prove helpful as we consider further legislation.
As I have stated earlier, our pending bill does not in any way af-
fect the applicability of the antitrust laws to the minor leagues
and, as I understand it, nor does the proposal agreed upon by the
owners and the players, as articulated by Mr. Fehr. But I suspect
that this is an issue that at some point is going to surface, and I
take it from your testimony that you would advise against chang-
ing the bill to insulate the minor league system from the antitrust
laws. Am I right in that?
Mr. PELTIER. That is correct.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you know of any minor league player or agent
who has challenged the legality of the minor league system?
Mr. PELTIER. Not off the top of my head, no, I don't. .
The CHAIRMAN. Why do you think that that hasn't occurred, why
no player has actually challenged this system?
Mr. PELTIER. Well, I think, you know, what you have to realize
here is that minor league players that aren't part of the 40-man
roster which is protected by the Major League Players Association
basically have no rights in terms of voicing their opinion. You
know, the thing that you have to remember here is that the ur-
gency to get from a minor league level to a big-league level neces-
sitates the fact that you have to first perform well. And, second,
you have to, you know, perform in the bounds of what the major
league team wants you to perform in.
The CHAIRMAN. So, don't cause any trouble, is what you are say-
ing?
Mr. PELTIER. Exactly, exactly, you know, and that is a big thing.
You know, you look at some of the players today, you know, and
you can cite numerous cases where they do cause trouble, but-
The CHAiRMAN. And even though they are great players, they
never make it to the majors?
Mr. PELTIER. Yes, absolutely, absolutely, and one of the things
that you have to look at is, as I mentioned in my testimony, you
have to be in the right place at the right time. That not only means
talentwise, but also your personality has to fit that of the big-
league club that you are trying to make. And if that is not a perfect
fit, then, you know, you end up with the short side of the stick.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, assume for the moment that the antitrust
laws ultimately would be applied to the minor leagues either by the
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courts or the Congress. Were this to happen, do you believe that
minor league baseball would be destroyed, as some have suggested?
Mr. PELTIER. No, absolutely not. You know, one of the things
that I don't think people understand is that minor league owners
aren't the ones that pay the salaries for .he minor league players.
As Don sort of alluded to, the fact that when you sign a contract,
you are signing a contract of the major league parent club-be-
cause of that, you know, I think that minor league owners tend to
feel that, you know, they are not operating on fair grounds. But
they have to realize that what they get out of their investment in
minor league baseball is not something that is construed as big-
league baseball, major league baseball. It is an entirely different
market.
The CHARMAN. Well, you are no longer playing professional
baseball, right?
Mr. PELTIER. Correct.
The CHAIRmAN. Well, we have tried to have a current minor
league player come and testify, but we couldn't get anybody to do
it. Can you tell us any reason why?
Mr. PELTIER. Well, I think that speaks volumes in itself that, you
know, I think guys are afraid to come out here and speak against;
you know, the people that are deciding their fate.
The CHAIRMAN. In other words, they don't want to rock the boat?
Mr. PELTIER. Exactly, exactly. They don't want to rock the boat.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there a difference for the players and the fans
between the affiliated minor leagues and the independent league?
Mr. PELTIER. Yes, absolutely. You know, one of the things that
I had the opportunity to do was to play for the St. Paul Saints in
1995 because I didn't cross the line and be a replacement player,
and what I noticed was that their whole existence is based on the
fact that the fans take part, you know, in the game itself. The way
that they have organized their organization was to make it more
of a family atmosphere and have the fans be part of the game.
As a result, yodi know, I saw things that I haven't seen since I
was a student at Notre Dame. The people were tailgating before
games on weekdays at 4:30 in the afternoon. We would have a
packed house. People really enjoyed going to the game not only be-
cause of the product that was on the field, but because of the enter-
tainment that they witnessed.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, Mr. Peltier, based on your experiences as
a minor league player, can you tell us what happens to a minor
league player if he has a career-shortening injury, such as torn lig-
aments or a torn rotator cuff or a knee or a shoulder that can't be
fully repaired? Can he be cut after sustaining the injury?
Mr. PELTIER. Yes, he can. What the teams are bound to do is pay
for their medical bills, you know, in the event that the injury oc-
curred while he was playing for that team. Beyond that, there is
no legal responsibility for the team to continue to pay him and give
him the opportunity to make it to the major leagues. You know,
there again, that ties in with the fact that minor league players
really do have no rights and they are not bound by-
The CHAIMAN. So, basically, he is dead as far as baseball is con-
cerned if he his a career-shortening injury?
Mr. PELTIER. Right, and that is a very real possibility.
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The CHAiRMAN. And there is no real help for him?
Mr. PELTIER. No, and that is what separates the major leaguesfrom the minor leagues. Don Fehr and the Major League Players
Association represent the players such that they are treated fairly,
and the minor leagues really have no governing body to that ex-
tent.
The CHAiRMAN. I see. I understand that you were let go by the
Texas Rangers after you refused to cross the picket line and be a
replacement player during the labor dispute in 1995.
Mr. PELTIER. That is correct.
The CHAIRMAN. Could you please explain what happened, why
you refused to play?
Mr. PELTIER. Well, the reason why I refused to play is that I hadjust been part of the Major League Players Association and felt a
responsibility to support the union. I realized that had I crossed
the line, I, in essence, would be admitting to myself that I don't
think that I could make it back to the major leagues on my own
volition. And, you know, as a result, I felt that it was an easy deci-
sion for me to make in terms of not becoming a replacement player
because of the fact that I did support the union and wanted to get
'back to the big leagues, you know, on my own.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, were any threats made to you?
Mr. PELTIER. Well, one of the things that happened in spring
training was they had all of the players that weren't on the 40-man
roster at the time-and a lot of the teams did this; some of the
teams didn't participate, such as the Baltimore Orioles. But at the
time when I was with the Texas Rangers, they had everybody come
down early from minor league camp in February and play together.
There were a lot of players there on the field and, you know, we
had normal workouts for, you know, approximately 3 weeks or a
month-actually, Around 3 weeks.
Then our general manager, who was Doug Melvin, called us all
on the field, with the exception of around 10 young prospects who
they felt would make it to the big leagues eventually on their own.
He called everybody over onto this one field and said, you know,
verbatim, "Either you stay and play or you go home. We are not
going to pay for your hotel. We are not going to pay for your ride
home. We want you to be a replacement player because this is
where the game is right now." So, around 10 of us got up and left.
You know, it was clearly evident as to what they were trying to
do, you know, just given the fact that they had these 10 prospects,
these 10 young prospects, separated from the mass so that they
wouldn't be affected by this and had to make that decision because
I think in their minds they knew that this would definitely have
some repercussions on the players who did decide to cross.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, do you think that most players who are
drafted enter the minor leagues fully understanding what they are
getting into and have been given an accurate representation of
their chances of making the majors?
Mr. PELTIER. Well, you know, I think that as a scout or as an
organization as a whole, they try to paint a rosy picture and try
to make it sound as if everybody has a real good chance to make
it to the major leagues. In reality, that is not the case, as is evident
by the numbers that I had mentioned. But, you know, I think that
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they do try to make it-baseball is different from other sports, too.
Baseball does not use college as their minor leagues, whereas bas-
ketball and football basically do. So right from the start, there is
a pressure to enter the minor league level at a younger age so that
they can-you know, they can bring you along in their process as
they would have it. So this is a difference from these sports.
The CHAIRMA. Well, could you just describe maybe in a little
more detail the kind of pressure placed on high school and college
students to leave school and play minor league baseball by the
team that drafts them?
Mr. PELTIER. Well, I think that the pressure exists in the fact-
you know, I can speak from my experience where, as a junior, in
going through the negotiating process once I was drafted, obviously
their desire was to have me sign and play professional ball right
away at the youngest possible age, OK, for the least amount of
money. So they used their tactics to try to get me to sign for as
little amount of money as possible.
Now, my feeling was that because I was a junior, I had an oppor-
tunity to play for Team USA. I had an opportunity to finish my de-
gree on time. I felt it was important for me to make sure that play-
ing professional baseball at that time was going to be the best pos-
sible scenario for me because I was putting a lot at stake, you
know, and the methods that they used to try to make me sign at
an earlier time for a lesser amount of money were such that the
scout came and said, you weren't picked until the 65th pick and
you want such and such for your signing.
So then my response was, so what you are saying is that you
view me as a number and not as a person. And, in turn, he said,
no, that is not the case, and then he said something as if, if you
don't sign, I am going to lose my job. Now I am a 20-year-old kid
and he is trying to use all these tactics to try to get me to sign.
Then there were comments made in my local newspaper as to I
would be crazy if I didn't sign, comments made by a scout who was
a national scout for the Rangers at that time, you know, therefore
putting more pressure on me by my peers and my family and ev-
eryone in the area.
So, you-know, there are definitely tactics that are used to try to
force kids to sign at a younger age. You know, they are trying to
do their job and stay within their budget, but, you know, only I
think to put a feather in their cap if they can sign the diamonds
in the rough.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you. I think both of your testimonies
have been very interesting here today. Again, I would note that I
would have preferred to have had representatives of the minor and
major leagues here to respond and testify. It is unfortunate for
them that they aren't here represented, but we certainly did every-
thing in our power to try and get them here.
So I wish we had some of their responses to some of this, but I
am not without some understanding of this myself. Having been
born and raised in Pittsburgh, PA, and watching the Pirates and
having been a Pirate fan all those years, I saw a lot of things hap-
pen that concerned me.
24
Senator Specter would like to make a statement and then ask a
question or two of you, Mr. Fehr, and Senator DeWine has gra-
ciously agreed to allow that to happen, and I certainly agree.
Senator Specter.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ARLEN SPECTER, A U.S. SENATOR
FROM THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA
Senator SPECTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
thank you, Senator DeWine, for yielding to me for a few moments.
The issue of the antitrust exemption has been before this com-
mittee repeatedly during my tenure in the Senate, and we are
searching for a way that there can be fairness to all sides and base-
ball can be preserved as the great American pastime. My own basic
view is that the antitrust laws ought to apply to everybody, and I
have stayed with the baseball antitrust exemption really because
of an effort to preserve the small-market teams, one of which is
Pittsburgh. The Pirates have stayed in Pittsburgh, at least up to
the present time, and they are doing very, very well this season
with a very small budget, but their future is obviously precarious,
as are other small-market teams.
It has been my hope that in the controversy around baseball that
somehow the participants, the owners and the players, would come
to some sort of an agreement or understanding to preserve the
game. I think that necessarily involves revenue-sharing and salary
caps, or perhaps I shouldn't say "necessarily." Perhaps it can be
preserved without revenue-sharing and salary caps, but I do not
know how it can be done without those two features, and perhaps
more.
The Congress of the United States is not in a very good position
to tell people what to do about anything, and we like, in our free
enterprise society, for people to make their own judgments and the
market to prevail. However, baseball does have this great exerhp-
tion, which is historical, but they have it, and it has seemed to me
that the Congress might be in the position to exercise some lever-
age on the owners and on the players to work out some arrange-
ment where the game could be preserved.
I personally still resent the moving of the Dodgers from Brooklyn
in 1958, and the Giants, and that fabulous baseball series on public
television was on again last night and talked about that again. I
think that there are major problems with the move of the football
franchises around, like the Cleveland Browns moving to Baltimore.
That is slightly different, but it is still in the same line. That draws
a response from Senator DeWine.
A few years ago, the Eagles were on their way to Phoenix and
that was stopped, and we had some really tough hearings here in
1982 with Pete Rozelle and Al Davis at the witness table when we
were trying to find some sense out of the move of the Raiders.
I read in the press last week, and I have yet to confirm the accu-
racy, that the "baseball commissioner," wants a new stadium in
Philadelphia for the Phils. Well, I didn't know baseball had a com-
missioner until I read it in the paper. I thought that they had an
acting commissioner, and there is a big difference between a com-
missioner and an acting commissioner. The paper said that permis-
sion had been given for the Minnesota team to look for new owner-
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ship and a possible move, and that might be in the offing for the
Phils.
I have a lot of admiration for Bill Giles and the Phils organiza-
tion, but I am not too anxious to see the taxpayers pick up the big
tab on a new stadium. Our very distinguished Governor, Tom
Ridge, is looking at that with a commission, and Pittsburgh is in-
volved and so are the Eagles and so are the Steelers, and who
knows what comes next?
However, it seems to me that in a sport which is as lucrative as
baseball, where there is as much money as baseball has, that some-
one there ought to be making arrangements where baseball would
pay for its own stadiums. I think that the kind of salaries com-
manded in a free enterprise system is wonderful, although we took
an initial step a few years back in denying deductibility for ath-
letes' salaries over $1 million. We could do things like that under
our taxing power which would have a very profound effect.
I am not in favor of that, necessarily, but there is just a search
here as to what can be done to stabilize the game, something that
I have worked on for a long time. I recently retained special coun-
sel in the field, Gilbert Stein, who is here today-he was one of my
top deputies when I was district attorney, and later president of
the National Hockey League, and very, very well-informed on
sports-to try to take a fresh look to see if we can be of some help.
So the question I have, Mr. Fehr, after that relatively brief state-
ment, is what suggestion would you have, if any, as to some over-
arching principles that we might bring to baseball so that-when
I turn on the radio and listen to the Phillies, I can't tell who is at
bat because the players have moved around so much. I was at the
Phillies game on Sunday, a beautiful day and a big crowd, and the
Blue Jays were in town. We hadn't seen the Blue Jays since we lost
the Series to them in 1993.
What could be done to stabilize the game and perhaps provide
revenue-sharing, perhaps provide salary caps or, if those two fac-
tors are not to be done, to stabilize so that the small-market teams
stay and there is some continuity? This moves over into television
where we do have some greater authority with the Braves and
their television network and Ted Turner's big question, who wants
Rupnrt Murdoch to buy the Dodgers, and what that implies.
It is a very, very tangled web, and you have been in this a long
time, Mr. Fehr, and you are a very astute lawyer and pragmatist
and have a lot of experience. That is not a very concise question.
I feel a little like some of my colleagues, but what suggestions
would you have-to make it specific, what suggestions would you
have to stabilize the game?
Mr. FEHR. I will just open by noting that some people are hesi-
tant to ask me open-ended questions, but let me try and respond
as concisely as I can. You have raised a number of issues.
I remember those hearings in 1982, to which you referred. I am
reasonably certain that I testified in one segment of them, and my
own views on generalized number and location and relocation and
franchise issues and funding of stadiums, which is directly related
to that, are well-documented in testimony going back at regular in-
tervals over the 15 years. I will only respond to that issue by say-
ing that so long as we permit effective cartel-like organizations
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that can control the number and location of franchises, it is not un-
reasonable to expect that they will act like cartels and utilize what-
ever leverage they have. The only way that is going to change is
if you have teams competing for cities, rather than the other way
around.
Second, and much more directly related to the focus of your ques-
tion, the issues swirling around small-market clubs were in large
part responsible for the dispute that we had with the owners. It is
not, I think, an oversimplification to suggest that, fundamentally,
you had revenue-sharing rules in Major League Baseball which
were outdated by decades that the small-market clubs felt worked
to their peculiar disadvantage.
There was a generalized desire to reach a conclusion by which
they would be helped, but the question came down, where would
the help come. Our view was that how money is shared among
management is, if not anything else, perhaps the most traditional
management function there is. Ordinarily, when people come up
with a joint venture, they tend to write the rules as to how the
money flows as between the joint venture members, and as long as
they didn't rewrite those rules in a way which effectively destroyed
competition for players, they were going to be able to do that.
The owners as a group didn't want to do that because the large-
market owners' initial position in the bargaining, as is well-docu-
mented, was essentially that they would share, but only if player
salaries were reduced by amounts reater than the amount they
would have to share. Then they would do so. I would just refer you
to a congressional Research Service report in January 1995 which
documents what the positions of the parties were.
Having said that preliminarily-and I indicated in my prior testi-
mony before you were able to come into the hearing that the new
collective bargaining agreement we reached last November, which
was finally drafted and signed in March, has quite a number of
new provisions in it. Principal among those, and to which I did not
earlier refer, are provisions relating to increased revenue-sharing
and certain restrictions on the payments of players.
I will be glad to provide you with whatever level of detail you
want on this. Essentially, it comes down to the following. Over the
next 5 years, the level of revenue-sharing from large- to small-mar-
ket clubs--or rather small-income clubs-it is defined in terms of
income rather than market size-will go very substantially in
phases. In the initial years, there are certain taxes that would
apply to certain clubs if they spend over a certain amount on play-
ers. Those eventually go away as the revenue-sharing becomes
much more substantial.
In addition to that, in a gesture of what I consider, at least, to
be consummate good faith in an effort to rebuild the game, the
players have agreed on their own to kick into revenue-sharing in
1998 and 1999 exactly 2.2 percent of what their total salaries are,
which we expect to be several million north of $40 million. Vir-
tually all of that will go to small-market clubs.
In the end, baseball has to have a system which provides ade-
quate resources to the various teams. The definition of what is ade-
quate and the determination as to who pays that bill were the pri-
mary subjects of our collective bargaining negotiation and, if the
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provisions we put in place are successful, hopefully will pave the
way for the future. If not, we will have that issue again the next
time.
Senator SPECTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Fehr, for that an-
swer, and we will be pursuing it. I appreciate your allowing me the
deference here. Thank you very much, Senator DeWine and Mr.
Chairman.
The CHARMAN. Senator Leahy, our ranking member.
Senator LEAHY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I apologize
for being late, but I have been tied up with the land mine issue
on the floor, and I guess you have been discussing the land mines
of this whole baseball situation.
You know, Senator Hatch and I as sponsors of this legislation
have shown an awful lot of patience in affording the Major League
Baseball owners some opportunity to implement the agreement
they reached with the Major League Baseball Players Association
8 months ago and to support legislation to end what I believe is
baseball's unjustified exemption from Federal antitrust laws.
I am sorry that Senator Hatch's efforts have been taken for
granted. I regret that the baseball team owners have responded to
his courtesies by refusing to appear here today. Frankly, the base-
ball owners are still in hiding in refusing to appear before the U.S.
Senate. Mr. Selig is the seemingly permanent acting commissioner.
He has been commissioner longer than most I have known.
If he were here, we could ask him what about the unsettling au-
thorization of the Minnesota Twins to negotiate to abandon the
team's fans in the Twin Cities? What about questions surrounding
demands for publicly-financed facilities in Seattle, Milwaukee, and
a number of other cities? We might ask him what about the Yan-
kees' lawsuit against the other major league baseball teams which
implicates the applicability of Federal antitrust laws to the busi-
ness of Major League Baseball?
We might ask him what is going on with the search for a strong,
independent baseball commissioner? It is sort of like "Waiting for
Godot" around here as we wait for a new baseball commissioner.
I am 57 years old. I would like to live long enough-and I come
from a family of long-lived people-I would like to live long enough
to see one. Then we would like to ask him questions about realign-
ment of teams among baseball's division, or the question of reve-
nue-sharing with small-market teams.
Mr. Chairman, I believe you have the patience of Job. Actually,
you have to to be chairman of this committee.
The CHAIRMAN. I am glad you recognize that. [Laughter.]
Senator LEAHY. I want to give you credit, but not so much credit
that it hurts you back home.
There is strong public interest in baseball. In Vermont when I
was growing up, you were automatically, or you weren't allowed to
live in the State, a Red Sox fan. But now, of course, loyalties are
split among teams, among various sports. We have a successful
minor league team, the Vermont Expos, the champions of the New
York-Penn League. They begin their new season later this week.
We have a lot of businesses and jobs that depend on baseball, and
we have baseball fans.
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I just worry that the public is being short-changed here, Mr.
Chairman. The first legislative day of this session, you and I and
Senator Thurmond and Senator Moynihan cosponsored a consensus
antitrust repeal measure. Instead of prompt action and agreement,
we have been stalled by these people for 6 months.
I would just ask this one question of Don Fehr, who is here. You
remember when some Senators argued over the past several years
that we should not proceed to repeal baseball's antitrust exemption
during a labor-management dispute. Well, now, you have a 5-year
contract. That contract included provision for the players and own-
ers to lobby for the antitrust laws to apply to labor relations in
Major League Baseball. Wouldn't this be the perfect time to pass
the legislation to repeal the antitrust exemption?
Mr. FEHR. As I indicated, Senator, before you came in, my views
on the exemption generally, what the effect has been, and how the
law should be in a perfect world are well-known. I have testified
to that many times and I don't have occasion to change those views
at all today. Simply put, the antitrust laws ought to apply univer-
sally, and I certainly don't want to presume to suggest to this com-
mittee or to the Senate or the Congress as a whole that with re-
spect to matters other than those covered by our agreement with
the owners that they should refrain from considering whatever
measures that you deem appropriate, especially given all that you
have learned.
I can say for my own part that after these many years of dif-
ficulty and trial and tribulation, we have reached an agreement
with the owners in the specific area which applies directly to my
membership and people that I represent, and that is the measure
that we hope that you will act on favorably and act on quickly. As
has been the case in the past, I will be glad to provide you or any
other member of the committee or the Senate any other assistance
with respect to other questions that you might find helpful.
Senator LEAHY. I appreciate that.
I see Mr. Peltier here. I commend him for his courage in being
here because he may want to go back and play at this level. I think
the Blue Jays released Ruben Sierra this week. You look in pretty
good shape. They may be looking for somebody who used to hit
.385.
Mr. PELTIER. Hopefully, for more than a couple weeks.
Senator LEAHY. Well, I think you would do OK. Certainly, you
are better prepared to do that than anybody on this panel, with the
exception of Senator Thurmond. He has got his new baseball bat
from Chairman Hatch.
Let me ask you one question, and this doesn't necessarily have
anything to do with this particular hearing, but I am just curious
to hear your thoughts. We have the tremendous growth and suc-
cess of women's sports following the college programs through title
IX. We have women's Olympic team victories, girls and young
women getting involved in soccer and baseball and basketball and
other sports. We have the Silver Bullets. We have stories about
women pitching in minor leagues.
Do -you see a time when women will be playing or coaching or
umpiring in the major leagues?
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Mr. PELTIER. Well, you know, physically that may be the case
some day, but I think that the way that the minor leagues or the
major leagues exist today, I think it would be difficult, you know,
in the sense that the way that things have been established would
have to be changed to accommodate those needs because, obviously,
there would be different needs for club houses or showering facili-
ties or things of that nature.
You know, if you are asking me a question of talent, you know,
who knows what could happen in the future? But I think that-
Senator LEAHY. It is more a question of talent. I mean, all the
other things can be worked out.
Mr. PELTIER. Yes. I think in the future, I don't see why, you
know, you couldn't say if there is a woman that throws 95 miles
per hour and can get batters out, then she would be as deserving
as anyone else.
Senator LEAHY. Mr. Chairman, I commend you for doing this,
and again I commend your patience. You are truly a Latter Day
Saint.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, it is better than being a latter day liberal,
is all I can say.
Senator LEAHY. Oh, come now. Some of them are saints, too.
The CHAIRMAN. Let me turn to the chairman of our Antitrust
Subcommittee, who has been very patient here, and I also want to
say that Senator DeWine has been a leader in this area, as well,
and we are looking forward to his work with us on this matter.
So, Senator DeWine, we will turn to you and I am sorry it has
taken so long to get to you.
Senator DEWINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me first thank
you for holding the hearing and congratulate you for introduction
of the bill. I supported a similar bill, as you know, in the last Con-
gress. Quite frankly, it is hard to come up with any logical or ra-
tional basis why baseball should stand alone with the antitrust ex-
emption, and for that reason I supported its abolition in the last
Congress.
Let me turn to the issue of the minor leagues, which I think is
a troubling issue. First, let me say, Mr. Chairman, I am also sorry
that Mr. Brand is not here today. We have in the State of Ohio
three minor league teams. We plan to have a fourth within the
next year or two in Dayton. We-obviously have two major league
teams in Ohio. So this issue holds more than academic interest for
me.
I have listened over the last few months to repeated statements
about what this bill or similar bills would do in regard to the minor
leagues, and people have told me that even though this bill is very
specific and says it will not impact the minor leagues, there still
have been a lot of comments that have been made about the fact
that it will have unintended consequences in regard to the minor
leagues. So I am sor that he is not here today, Mr. Chairman,
to talk about it. I think it is very difficult, frankly, to approach this
issue without a representative of the minor leagues here.
The CHmRMAN. Well, I do, too.
Senator DEWINE. I just think it is just a real shame. This is not
a new issue. This is not something that they have not had the op-
portunity to think about for a long, long time, and I don't know
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now we really approach this issue without a thorough discussion
about the minor leagues. I am going to have a couple of questions
for our witnesses in regard to that.
Let me also state, Mr. Chairman, that I think it is a shame that
the major leagues are not represented here. Bud Selig is not here;
the acting commissioner is not here. Again, I think it makes it dif-
ficult-to address this issue in his absence.
The CHARmAN. Will the Senator yield on that point?
Senator DEWINE. I certainly will, and I understand you have
been very plain, Mr. Chairman, that you extended the invitation
and these issues have been out there in the open for a long, long
time. There is nothing new, but I think that for neither of them
to be here creates a problem for us.
The CHAiRmAN. If the Senator would yield, I think it is a prob-
lem. But on the other hand, what we are tying to do is resolve the
major league problems at this point and leave the minor leagues
alone. Now, if, in the future, we find that there is a disadvantage
or some major problem, we can work on that.
Senator DEWINE. Mr. Chairman, I thoroughly understand that,
and I don't quarrel with that and I don't disagree with you. I don't
think you are wrong.
The CHAIRMAN. No. I know you don't.
S a DEWINE. But we are still left, and I am still left with
statements chat have been made by minor league teams, state-
ments that have been made by representatives of the minor
leagues, that even this bill leaves this open and that there are
going to be unintended consequences. I think it is very difficult for
me as a member of the Senate to deal with it. It is not the chair-
man's fault, but when people say there is going to be a problem
and then they don't come in and testify, I think that is just a real
problem.
The CHAIRMAN. I agree. If the Senator would just yield again, I
understand that, but again I want to just resolve this problem. I
was hopeful that Mr. Brand would be here with suggestions that
he would like to have.
Senator DEWINE. Well, I have also, Mr. Chairman, as you know,
asked for specific suggestions from Mr. Brand and we have not
been able to get any specific suggestions.
The CHAIRMAN. I know. We are in agreement. What I want to do
is turn the rest of the hearing over to you as the chairman of the
Antitrust Subcommittee because I need to get to Finance. That is
what I am trying to do.
Senator DEWIE. I will continue, then, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. If you will, and if you will forgive me for leaving.
I want to thank you both for coming. I think your testimony has
been very accurate, very good, and very helpful to the committee.
We will just move ahead and see what we can do here. I want to
be fair to all people here, but it seems to me the major league prob-
lem is solved. There should be no griping about that.
With the minor leagues, we are happy to work with Mr. Brand.
I just don't want it to tie up the solution to the major league prob-
lems. And if there is an attempt to do that, then I have to say I
am going to be pretty irritated because I am willing to work to try
and resolve those problems in .the future. But this is something I
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would like to get done today, since the major league owners and
players have basically agreed. It seems to me there is no reason not
to at least pursue and complete that aspect of this whole set of
problems, and then to the extent that we have other problems with
the minors, we will be happy to work with them, and even hold
hearings and do other things that may be helpful there. But right
now, I would like to get this problem solved.
Thank you, and if you don't mind finishing, I would appreciate
it
Senator DEWINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be more than
happy to.
The CHAIRMAN. Good to see you.
Mr. FEHR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator DEWINE [presiding). Let me make a couple more state-
ments and then I will turn to questions. As I was saying, I think
it is a shame that the acting commissioner of baseball is not here.
You know, some people may say, well, what in the world does the
U.S. Senate care about whether there is an acting commissioner or
a permanent commissioner, and what should our involvement be?
I think it is obvious that when we deal with antitrust, we have to
be directly involved. We have to be involved in resolving this issue.
I think, also, though, it needs to be pointed out that the public
has some interest in what goes on in baseball, not just as fans, but
we are seeing hundreds of millions of dollars in taxpayers' money
put directly into stadiums today, into ballparks today. So it is not
out of line for Congress to ask questions about the health of orga-
nized baseball. I don't think it is out of line for any member of the
public or a Senator or a Representative to wonder, as we continue
to, why in the world the owners do not want a permanent commis-
sioner, why they do not want a powerful commissioner, why they
do not want a commissioner with any power at all.
I think the answer is clear. The answer simply has to be that
they don't want anybody with that kind of authority. They want to
be able to control whoever the cominissioner is. They do not want,
apparently, or think it is in the best interests of baseball to have
a commissioner who has the moral authority of an independent
commissioner and someone who can make decisions in the best in-
terests of baseball.
When Mr. Selig was testifying in front of this committee several
years ago, he told us that the commissioner would be imminent,
would be very shortly appointed, and we are still here today sev-
eral years later and obviously there is no commissioner. Now, I am
not going to spend a lot of time today talking about the problems
that that has created, but I think it has created a great deal of
problems with the public perception of organized baseball.
Let me, if I could, turn to the issue of the minor leagues. Mr.
Peltier, you have raised some very interesting issues in regard to
that, and I think for me, as I was telling the chairman, it really
is two questions or two issues, and they are separate and distinct
in a sense. First, what are the unintended consequences going to
be of this piece of legislation, where we state that it is going to
have no consequences, but there is a nagging feeling that it may.
Second, maybe the bigger question, is what you have brought out
as to whether or not we should look at the whole antitrust issue
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in regard to minor league baseball. I think that is probably some-
thing that this committee should look at. We have a merger here
of labor law and antitrust law and a few other things, but it seems
to me that one of the kind of interesting things that we may end
up with is that we pass this piece of legislation and we may have
ended the antitrust exemption for the major leagues and we may
still have an antitrust exemption for the minor leagues, which I
find to be a little odd, that in all of professional sports we may
have one small class of individuals, and that would be minor
league players, who now we have exemptioned from the antitrust
laws.
I understand some of the practical reasons that are given for
doing that, but I just wonder as a matter of public policy whether
that is good or not. But I think those are issues probably for an-
other day when we have the opportunity to have additional wit-
nesses on this subject.
Mr. Fehr, educate me a little bit in regard to your union. My un-
derstanding is that a professional baseball team has a roster of 25,
but they have contracts for, what, 40? You have 40 major league
contracts on a team. Is that how that works?
Mr. FEHR. Yes. The system can be easily described in the follow-
ing way. Each major league club can hold title to up to 40 player
contracts in its own name, and those are major league contracts.
We negotiate the form of those, and so on. They then can hold a
virtually unlimited number, subject to the number of minor league
teams they have, of minor league contracts, and those contracts are
now held in the name of the major league team, not the minor
league team.
Senator DEWINE. But you would represent only the 40, is that
right?
Mr. FEHR. Yes, and there are certain-
Senator DEWINE. The 40 who would have signed a "major league
contract?"
Mr. FEHR. Yes, although there are certain terms and conditions
of employment when they are assigned to the minor leagues out-
side the bargaining unit for which we do not represent them.
Senator DEWINE. But, in general, it is basically 40 people?
Mr. FEHR. Right.
Senator DEWINE. So if I go to a Toledo Mud Hens game and look
out on the field, there may be some players out there who have a
major league contract, correct?
Mr. FEHR. Yes.
Senator DEWINE. Some of them may have a minor league con-
tract. The rest of them would have a minor league contract?
Mr. FEHR. Yes.
Senator DEWINE. But they are all contracts with the parent club.
Would that be correct?
Mr. FEHR. That is the case now, yes.
Senator DEWINE. That is the case. So when I look out on the
field at the Akron Arrows, as I did the other day with my son,
when we watched a game-if I look at some of the players, some
of them you may represent and some of them you may not rep-
resent?
Mr. FEHR. That is correct.
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Mr. PELTIER. If I may say something?
Senator DEWINE. Yes, jump in. Please, jump right in.
Mr. PELTIER. One of the things, though, is that the players that
are on the 40-man roster that are playing in the minor leagues are
not bound by the terms of the major league minimum salary. So
even though the minor league players that are on the 40-man that
are playing in the minor leagues are represented by the Players
Association, some of the rules don't apply.
Senator DEWINE. When does the minimum salary kick in? Edu-
cate me further on that.
Mr. PELTIER. As soon as they make the major league team on the
active 25-man roster.
Senator DEWINE. So when you were brought up, though-and
you played, what, several weeks? Is that what I heard you say?
Mr. PELTIER. When I first got called up, yes.
Senator DEWINE. OK.
Mr. PELTIER. So my salary was prorated each day that I was up
there based on the minimum salary.
Senator DEWINE. So once you were called up-let us say the
Reds call up somebody from Indianapolis, for example. Once they
walked on the field, that is a day. That is prorated, then. Is that
how that works?
Mr. PELTIER. Correct, and then when they get sent back down,
their pay scale goes up, as well, to a minor league minimum.
Mr. FEHR. Let me perhaps explain it in a slightly different way.
There is a minimum salary which applies to play at the major
league level, meaning each day that you are eligible to participate
in a major league game, you are on that particular roster. If you
are on the 40-man roster, but not assigned to the major league
team-you are assigned optionally to the minor leagues-you have
what is known as a split contract as a generalized term, a minor
league contract and a major league contract. If it is your second
year or later on a major league contract, there is a separate, much
lower minimum salary that applies to your play in the minor
leagues. In your first year on a 40-man roster, there isn't.
Senator DEWINE. That gives me a general feel without taking it
further. But that has been good. I thank you both very much.
Mr. Fehr, one of the allegations that has been made, or state-
ments that I have heard as I have talked to people about the agree-
ment that you have reached, and subsequently this bill, is that
there will be a suit brought challenging the reserve clause in the
minor leagues and that your Players Association will make an at-
tempt to represent the minor league players.
Now, I am not saying whether that is good or bad. I am just curi-
ous to know maybe what some of the unintended consequences
might be of this legislation. So I guess my question is, what is your
interest in the minor league players? There are an awful lot of
them out there.
Mr. FEHR. Yes, and a number of them will eventually become
major league players: by definition, the best of them, although, you
know, there are some players that fall through the cracks because
of the system.
Senator DEWINE. Right.
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Mr. FEHR. The short answer is this. I have long believed and still
believe that, sooner or later, some player or players will challenge
the amateur draft because it operates in an unfair and discrimina-
tory manner and deprives opportunity that everyone else takes for
granted to, in essence, look for a better job, try and apply some-
where where your talents may match what the need of the em-
ployer is, and there are a lot of specific examples of that.
Whether we would help or support any such legislation would de-
pend on how the Players Association executive board viewed it at
the time. I would tell you that we never have and there are no such
suggestions under consideration or have been. For purposes of this
legislation, however, I think both S. 53 and the suggested language
that we have negotiated with the major league owners-there is
one thing that ought to be made clear. We do not have an agree-
ment on the amateur draft or anything like that, but what we have
agreed specifically is that we would ask the Congress to consider
legislation that would solve the major league problem and leave the
application of the antitrust laws otherwise, including to the minor
leagues and the amateur draft, to whatever they would otherwise
be, so that this legislation would not affect that judgment at all.
As a matter of fact, it would be irrelevant to consideration.
Senator DEWINE. Well, do you find it a little strange that we
would be in the situation-I mean, we all know the historical back-
ground of the antitrust exemption for organized baseball. Then we
are coming along here-and I am not saying I am not going to sup-
port this. I think this is the logical thing to do, but isn't there
something a little ironic about going in and saying, well, we are
going to remove the exemption for major league baseball, but minor
league baseball-we are going to almost carve out an exception
within an exception?
Mr. FEHR. I think the reason that I was
Senator DEWINE. I understand as a practical matter, that is why
it is happening. I understand that. I get that.
Mr. FEHR. As a matter of public policy, it has always been more
than difficult, virtually impossible, for me to rationalize the base-
ball exemption to the extent it applies other than by reason of his-
torical accident for whatever that has been. I think the short an-
swer is why the narrow bill that we are supporting-it is that, A,
those are the clients that I represent. B, that is what we were able
to get agreement on, and collective bargaining and politics both
deal with the possible. It is very difficult for me to make a logical
distinction as to why should have one and the other. I don't think
one can reasonably be made.
Senator DEWINE. Well, let me ask both of you a question, and
I am not proposing that we do this, but I am again just trying to
get some facts out here, or at least get somie opinions out here from
the two of you anyway.
What happens if tomiorrow, overnight, the whole antitrust ex-
emption was gone for all of baseball? What happens to the minor
leagues? I mean, the statement is made by many of the minor
league owners that if that occurs, the minor leagues as we know
them will be gone, that they will not exist, that we will not have
as many teams as we have, that communities that have invested
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money in teams and have now built some ballparks and stadiums
with public funds will totally change. The numbers will change.
Mr. FEHR. The reason I was shaking my head a little bit is I get
wistful sometimes. I have heard such statements, too. Whenever
we have made inquiry, what is the mechanism by which these bad
results will become accomplished, there is no mechanism which is
ever articulated. I recall Bowie Kuhn, who was then commissioner,
testifying in 1976 in the original free agency proceedings that the
American League would collapse and the National League would be
down to six teams if we had free agency in Major League Baseball.
Instead, what has happened is you have had the greatest period of
prosperity ever.
In addition to that, we have a new professional baseball agree-
ment which guarantees for somewhere between 7 and 10 years, as
I understand it, although I haven't seen it, at least 160 minor
league teams. I think the principal effect of your question on the
minor leagues, however, would be as follows. There would be a law-
suit brought somewhere and Major League Baseball would be
asked to defend that the minor league draft and the minor league
reserve system was a reasonable restraint, given the nature of the
industry. If they can do that, it will survive. If they can't, it will
change. To what degree, I think, is unknown.
But in any event, you have to have very large numbers of minor
league teams by which the talent progresses until it is capable of
playing at the major league level, unless and until the colleges are
prepared to substitute wholesale for it, and that is at the very least
some substantial period of time away.
Senator DEWINE. Mr. Peltier, do you want to comment on my hy-
pothetical, which is only a hypothetical, that if you would do away
with the whole antitrust exemption for all of baseball, including
minor leagues, what would I see in 10 years in the minor leagues.
Mr.-PELTIER. Well, I think one of the things that you have to re-
alize, too, is that each player that goes through the minor league
organizations is paid by the parent club. So to the extent that the
minor league owner has an interest in the team itself or in the in-
dividual players, it is only to the extent that it helps the team win
so that they can increase their bottom line.
I think what people fail to realize is that from a minor league
perspective, your major goal as a player is to get to the big-league
level. Especially at the triple A level, it is difficult in the sense that
you have no sense of team unity because everyone is trying to get
to the ultimate goal of playing in the big leagues. So to say that
it would destroy minor league baseball, you know, in its present
form, I think, is stretching it, you know, to the extent that minor
league baseball exists now for the fans because they want to have
some feeling of belonging to the major league club that their team
is affiliated with. But I don't think that-you know, with the
present scenario, I don't think that the antitrust laws would have
any effect in terms of destroying the minor leagues in their entirety
right now.
Mr. FEHR. I just might add I think the figures are that last
year-and I think the projections are for this year upwards of 30
million-33 million sticks in my mind-fans will attend minor
league games in organized professional baseball. That is a large
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consumer base. One would think that that audience will be served
especially if you had a more free market. It is difficult for me to
imagine people walking away from the fans.
Mr. PELTIER. Something else, too. I played with the St. Paul
Saints, and the difference between the St. Paul Saints and any of
the minor league teams that 1 played for before is the fact that the
team, the Saints, own the rights to that player because that team
individually-the owner of the St. Paul Saints pays the salaries, so
they have more of a vested interest in the players themselves. You
know, I think that scenario works best in the sense that, you know,
now they have a vested interest and they are going to promote
their players as best they can, which in turn will help the team
and the bottom line and the community.
Senator DEWINE. That team has been very, very successful.
Mr. PELTIER. Absolutely. I mean, the profit that they have
made
Senator DEWINE. They sell out, don't they?
Mr. PELTIER. I would say 95 ercent of the time it is a sellout,
and I think it is a reflection of how the team is structured and
what the purpose of that team is. You know, not disregarding the
fact that every player on that team wants to get back to organized
baseball, but the way that that team is run has definitely been a
successful way of doing things.
Senator DEWINE. Well, I appreciate the testimony from both of
you very much. It has been very helpful, and we will conclude the
hearing. Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 11:32 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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In the United States District Court for the Committee on the Judiciary: h ei
District of Columbia, or In any similar law- S. R. 178 function as bunessea eatracting whatever
suit filed by former Judge Alcee I. Hastings
to challenge his impeachment trial. convic- asoiccol, That the bill IS. 1eb21 eatitied profit the morket will beac. exting anti-
tion. or removal from office. "A bill for the relief of land grantor In trut exempions ahould be limited 0r re-
Sec. 2. That the Senate Legal Counel is Hedern Union. and Webster Counties, minded unless big league sports franchise
satartedto pper o salcs ocic n th Eenuchy. and their helm." now Pending In owners demoastrate reasonable 000mmn farauthorized to appear as amicus curie In the
name of the Senate in Acee L Hastings v. the Senate. together with all accompanying the pabic's Inteemit' Therefore belt
United States of America, flied in the Papers. Is rferrd to the Chief Judge of the Resuleed, That Coageess should limit or
United States Claius Court, and In A!ce L United States Court of Claims. The Chief rescind the antitnust etemptions now at-
Hasting in. United States of Amerlrn. et al.. Judge hall Proceed with the nooe in s orded football, baseball. basketball and
filed in the United States District Court for odance with the pronisions nf sections hockey.
the District of Columbia, or in any similar 1482 and 2509 of title 28. United States Mr SPECTER. Mr. President, baoe-
lawsuit filed by former Judge Aee L. Hast- Code, and report back to the Senate at the
Ings. In order to defend the Senates sole earlinot practicable date, gicing auch find- balla deIsion to Shalt expasion to
corntitutional power to try impeachments logo of foot nd conlen that ar affi' only two cities and the numerous
and to defend, to the extent necessary, the dent to ifor Congrem of the amoont. i shifts of sporting events from tree TV
decisins and procedures of the Senate in any legally or eqoitably doe from the to pay cable are the moat recent of
the corurs of his impeachment. Goitd Stotm to the alaatn individually. many decisions by franchise owners to
____________________elecate their profit interests seer the
SENATE RESOLUTION 168-AU- SENATE RESOLUTION 171 To publics Interests, The NFL has
THORIZING REPRESENTATION REFER THE BfLL S. 1897 TO nouncod pians for pay-per-vlow onBY TE SNAT LEAL OUN- THECOUT O CLIMS cable telcviaion by 1992, aind it In likelyBYT that eventually there will be pay-per
SELMr. KOHL submitted the following clew far the super bowl, Sasketbill
Mr. WIRTH (for Mr MrTCHELL, for resolution: which was referred to the has mated from free TV for away
himself and Mr. Dorit) submitted the Committee on the Judlciary gaonc to pay television on gable,
following resolution; which was con- S.1cm. 171 The Philodelphta Phillico, who used
sidered and agreed to: Rroicd That S. 1657 entitled 'A bill fur to be alable on away games on free
S. Nm 108 the reltef of the Menominee Indian Trihe of TV. I ow require view-rsn to pay for to
WI, re. In the cae of Perkins v. United Wiccanain" ogcolig In the Senate. to- separate isfe channels to se away
States Snatt, No. 90-5230, pending In the griber with all the accompanying papers is gaies, she traditional Philfira
United Stalas Court of Appeals for the Dis- referred to thr chief 1dg of the United Suidsy afternoon game is now anail-
trirt of Columbia Cirlt. the appellant is Stno Cioiit Court, The chief jidge shall only on a premiut
seekina reviral of a detrict court order dis- proeed according to the prouhions of arc
misin as frivolous Is complaint against tioas f492 and 2509 of itLe 20. Urd Stot pay cable channel. Former Basubali
the United Stoles Senate: Code, and report back to the Senate, at the Cossioncr Ueberrut reportedly
Whetas. pursuant to sections 703(a) and ectilest ecaclicable date. prociding such abed cable operators If they would be
704'as) of the Ethics in Government Act findiogs of fast and conin that ae Interetted In exclusice rights to the
tf 1970 2 USC. 248Na) and 288r'tae1), the suffcient to inform the Cngress of the eitochampionshipscrie.
Seiate may dir--ct Its counsel to defend the ature. exteni, cud ciirc of the dama The sports franchne ocners argue It
Senate a civil actions relating to its official ages refereed to In such biii a legal or co' is their buolneas what thy charge for
responsibilities: Now, therefore, be it otble claim ogoinaf the United States or a the pricilege of watching their trais.
Resofred, That the Senate Legal Counel gratuity, ad the ount. If uy, legally ar
is directed to represent the Senate in the euitably doe from the United Staten to the However those entrepreneurs enjoy a
case of Perkins v. United States Senate. Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin by Special pric.ego In boing exempt from
__________reason of aueh damages. the antitrust lawa. Baseball wan that
SENAT; RESLUTIO exemption in 1922 because it was thenSENATE RESOLUTION 169-FOR- r regarded as a sport and not a business.
MALIZING MEMBERSHIP ON 'SENATE RESOLUTION 172-RE- Although no one today doubts that big
THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON LATIHO TO THE ANTITRUST league spsrting events are a business-
ETHICS EXEMPTION NOW ACCORDED and big business at that-thc Congress
Mr. WIRTH (fur Mr. MITCHEu., for BASEBAT. FOOTBALL. AND and the courts continue to allow the
himself and Mr. DoLu) submitted the HOCKEY sports entrepreneurs special exeinp-
following resolution; which was con- Mr. SPECTER submittcd the fellow- tions from the antitrust laws which
sidered and agreed to: log resolution: which was referred to govern all other businesses In America.
8. Rs. 169 the Committee on the Judiciary. Simply stated. if the spoots entropre-
Resolved, S. Rto. 171 neurs want to ron their businesses
Serero 1. For purpose of matters relating Whereas basbal has enjoyed an anttrust without the special privilege of anti-to the preliminary inquiries into the non- esemption aince 1922 when the Supreme trust exemption, then let them do so.
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If. on the other hand, they want to
enjoy the benefits of antitrust exemp-
lion, then, in my opinion, they should
show more concern for the public in-
terest without extracting every last
dollar through pay TV and limitation
of franchises.
Baseball's indifference to Its fans
was demonstrated In 1958 when the
Dodgers deserted Brooklyn and the
Giants abandoned New York for Call-
fornia's megabucks When profession-
al football teams like the Dallas Cow-
boys sell for $140 million and expan-
sion baseball teams cost $175 million,
which includes the expansion fee of
$95 million plus estimated startup
costs of $80 Million. the focus of the
future becomes clearer More pay tele-
vision is coming closer and closer into
view.
In addition to special consideration
which franchise owners owe fans arIs-
ing from the antitrust exemption, in
my judgment sports teams are affect-
ed with a public interest, There is
something unique about teams for
hometown fans which has created
America's love affair with sports. My
own views have been molded by being
an enthusiastic sports fan as well as
my appreclation, as a lawyer, S)r the
property rights of sports entrepre-
neurs.
My personal perspective developed
from living in Kansas as a youngster
where the sports ticker tape each half
Inning and the morning box scores re-
lieved the solitude of rural life. As a
city resident. I now regularly attend
sporting events and have been a
season ticket holder since the mid-
1950's. Anyone who sees the frenzy of
60,000 fans in an NFL stadium or the
passion of spectators for baseball, bas-
ketball, or hockey games knows that
the fan deeply feels a keen emotional
interest-arguably as important as a
proprietary interest-even though not
equally assertable in courts.
My populist views on Congress' role
in protecting America's sports fans did
not arise as a volunteer. In the
summer of 1982, Mr. Dan Rooney of
the Pittsburgh Steelers and then-Com-
missioner Pete Roselle asked for as-
sistance in arranging hearings by the
Senate Judiciary Committee on the
prospective move of the Oakland Rald-
ers to Los Angeles. Senator SRson
THu ons. chairman of the Judiciary
Committee, promptly honored my re-
Quest and those hearings were held
within a few days.
Legislation was introduced to grant
the NFL authority to limit franchise
moves without violating the antitrust
laws. The NFL ultimately solved the
problem without the necessity for
such legislation but those hearings
opened a broader inqub y by the Judi-
clary Committee into professional
sports. When the Philadelphia Eagles
contemplated a move to Phoenix in
1984. Judiciary Committee hearings
contributed to abandonment of that
proposaL Later Judiciary Committee
bearings extracted a commitment
from then-Commissioner Rozelle and
the NF's current Commissioner Tag-
liabue not to have pay-per-view for the
Super Bowl until at least the year
2000.
Evidence Is mounting, however, that
the NFL is moving toward telecasts on
a pay-per-view basis. First there was
the NFL's decision in 1987 to take
some 13 games off ABC-TV and move
them to ESPN on cable, although It
did require ESPN to sell broadcast
rights to the game in the markets of
the teams involved in each game. Now
there are press reports, in particular a
February 24, 1991 article in the New
York Times entitled 'NFL Planning to
Add Pay TV to Its Package" in which
NFL Commissioner Paul Tagliabue
was quoted as saying that the NFL
was considering putting some games
on pay-per-view because "It's a fact of
life now."
These reports are disturbing because
the NFL has publicly guaranteed no
move to pay-per view for t)se Super
Bowl until at least the year 2000. If
ever, At a May 9, 1989, hearing before
the Judiciary Committee, then-Com-
missioner Pete Roxelle confirmed that
"the National Football League will not
embrace pay television before 2000, If
then." (Tr. at 73). Commissioner Tag-
liabue confirmed this commitment at a
November 14, 1989, hearing before the
Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopo-
lies. and Business Rights (S. Erg. 101-
1209 at p. 93).
According to media expert Jay
Blumer. the $100 million pay-per-view
business is projected to be a $6 billion
business by the end of the 1990's. The
NFL obviously wants a piece of this
action. While the recent actions by the
NFL are not an explicit breach of its
public promises, they Indicate the di-
rection the league is moving and are
contrary to the spirit of their prior as-
surances.
Sports franchises are money-making
businesses and muc. of their value is
derived from the monopoly position of
the leagues, as evidenced by major
league baseball's expansion, franchise
price of $95 million. The June 19 Issue
of Financial World pegged the value of
the New York Yankees at $225 mil-
lion, the Miami Dolphins at $205 mil-
lion, and the Green Bay Packers, LA.
Dodgers, L.A. Lakers all at $200 mil-
lion. Financial World reported also
that professional sports franchises
averaged o ; 2 percent in annual
appreciation -s .c-,t years, grossing
a total of receipts topping $3.7 billion
each year, $1.7 billion of which comes
from broadcasting fees.
Only 2 years ago, the Baltimore Ort-
oles team was sold for $70 million and
today Financial World estimates the
Orioles' value at $200 million. Other
recent sales show that limiting team
expansions can up the price of existing
franchises The Montreal Expos
agreed to a sale in November 1990 for
a reported figure of $86 million; the
San Diego Padres were sold last year
for $75 million: the Seattle Mariners
were sold in 1989 for $16 million, the
Dallas Cowboys sold for an estimated
$140 million In 1989; the Denver Nug-
gets for $55 million in 1988; the
Denver Broncos for $75 million in
1984; the New Orleans Saints for $70.2
million in 1985; and the New England
Patriots for $85 million in 1988.
What is clear In all this is the harm
that the public will suffer if profes-
sional football games are available on
cable only. Apart from the extra cost
of pay-per-view on cable, there is the
simple matter of access to cable. Ac-
cording to Broadcast magazine and the
Televison and Cable Factboolk (1989-
90 ed.), only 77.4 percent of house-
holds with televisons nationwide can
obtain cable if they want It. Only 58.6
percent have chosen to purchase cable
service. In Pennsylvania, 81.5 percent
of households with televisions could
get cable If they want It, but again
only 63.5 percent have chosen to sign
up for it. In other words, even if all
those who could get cable purchased
It, over 20 mIllion households with
TV's nationwide and some 1 million in
Pennsylvania would still be locked out
of viewing sports If this trend toward
cable continues. And then there is the
very real fact that, for many people,
cable and in particular, pay-per-view is
simply too expensive.
Most recently, professional basket-
ball has joined the march toward pay-
per-view. The Philadelphia 78'ers have
concluded a contract to have almost
all of their games broadcast by a pre-
mium cable network. Prism. Prism had
been broadcasting 76ers home games,
while channel 17 had been broadcast-
ing away games. Thus, except for a
relatively few games, the 76'ers Will be
available only on premium cable ery-
ice. Only 16 percent of the homes in
the Philadelphia market subscribe at
additional cost to Prism. Moreover, it
is estimated that one-third of the
homes in the Philadelphia television
market will be unable to see any 76'ers
games on TV. even if they could pay
for them.
On the issue of baseball, population
statistics decislvely show the Ameri-
cans in 1901, when the American
League was fIrst formed, had greater
access to watching a baseball game in
the stands than they do today. In
1901. the population of our country
was approximately 78,212.168 and
there were 16 major league baseball
teams. In the National League in 1901,
there were franchises in Pittsburgh,
Philadelphia, Brooklyn. St Louis.
Boston. Chicago, New York, and Cin-
cinnati. In the American League, there
were franchises in Chicago, Milwau-
kee, Cleveland, Detroit, Washington.
Boston, Baltimore, Philadelphia. In
all, in 1901. there were 16 teams for a
per capita of 4.763,298 people for every
team. If that per capita were projected
against the population today, the
United States, with a 1990 population
of 248,709.873. should have approxi-
mately 52 teams, nearly twice the 28
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baseball teams that the latest expan- ed like any other business and bear (1) undertakes the application reoponlbil
don would allow. Put another way, the full fore of the antitrust laws. ies refered to In sectio 2(.);
today there are 8,882,495 people for There Is obviously no way that Con (2) partiiates to the vlati.. refenred
every team, in sharp contrast with the gress could or should regulate probes- to In maotion 3: and
figures of 1901. sbus] sports However, a display of ( provide the fundiss for adminicirs
Similarly. we can compare the popu- congressional terest and the posolbil- tion and evaluation coots referred to is
lation of a city with an American ity of our action to limit or rescind tin 4(h).
Leage franchise in 1901 with cities antitrust exemption is likely to aC a 555.oO P5O"S
today. The population of Milwuakee In produce restraint by franchise owners ( Aec .-The Triangle Colitio
1901 was 285,315. As the U.S. popula- In moving to pay TV or otherwise for Sence and Techoogy Eduos
tion has increased approximately 3.3 abusing the public interest. Last year, hall t
times sino ~~~(1) pubicizeteso -hpporntimes since 1901, a comparable city a few congressional inquiries led to t2) delop and administer an aPorlLO
today would he one with a population settlement Of a dispute between the process and
of 941.539. By that test, every city that Major Leagues and nor league (31 conduct an initlal screening of woO-
was turned down for an expansion owners. Hearing by the Senate Judic- oant, for the fellowsip p arn.
team would have gotten a team In rY Commttee on the resolution to fhi Sso .-
1901: Washington. DC, with a metro- limit or rescind antitrust exemptions The President pro temnare and the Ma-
Politan area population of 3.923,574; will provide guidance on the proper jority Leader and the Minority Leader of
Tampa/St. Petersburg with a metro- congressional course on this Important the Senate. in onsultation with tbe chai-
politan area population of 2,067,959; subJect It Is recognized that In ad- men and ranking minority parsy mees
Buffalo with a metropolitan area pop: dressing this Issue, there ace many. of the Committee so Labor and Huma Ba-
ulation of 968,532; and Orlando with many other matters of overriding us, amoes Of the Senate and the Coittee ow
1,072,748 people in its metropolitan lions] and International concern, but mmece Science. and Trasortation of
area. Included also would be such met- the American people have a love affair te Senate, shaB each select o of the -
ropolitan areas as Phoenix, Portland, with sprts and the American people Ic) ofeenat f'usbwps.
Vancouver. Norfolk. Sacramento, New have contributed greatly to t T P r pm P e t n
Orleans, Indianapolis, Buffalo, Provi- rea of sports franchises. At the in esitlnt lbs oer efrred
deance. Charlotte, Hartford, and Salt ther is a relatively limited It anhoeerln. ma t lace referred
Lake City. Public reaction to the moves to pay shiP reripient on the staff of the Committee
Some suggest that having many TV. but tht will expand exponential- en talon and Human lemooc and 0ne re-
more teams would diminish competi- y if. as and when the World Series or rient on the staff of the Committee on
tion because It would bring in less the Super Howl move to pay-per-vie. Commerce. Science. and Transportation.
qualifIed players. I think people over- In my Judgment. we have come to a and om recipient may sense so the personal
estimate the effect that new teams Point where It is worth the time o the staff of a membe of the Senate.
would have on the quality of players Congress to consider the implications Cdi acsa R a-Recipimt shall
just as some overestimate the effect of Pay television and the limitations he seleted from a pool of natlenoly 55mg-
higher salaries would have on the new franchises in proferaonal )rd Ostanding seodary school dcehihe lIr iebsbl.Iand omthematics teah. The pool bh.ll
quality players baseball could atract.
Back in the "good old days," when sal- detachwrs wo hae esee oStee
aries were not in the multi-millionwad-frExelec, 
nScec
aris ereno Int  utlmuion  SENATE RESOLUTION 173-ES- an isathrmatlm Teachtsa am eatsiallhed
dollar range, you had some of the all- T S Atio i fe o n
time greats: Cy Young Pitching 7.377A Poodail " of the Act f iS(4
Innings and winning 511 game STEIN CONGRESSIONAL PEt, taC. lo, outr similAr 'ogsttl(o
Walter Johnson pitching 5.924 innIngsP of akis experience, and ahilty scdee-
and winning 416 games and Christy Mr. SMI (for Mr. HAm ) sub- ormthemalimteaches.
Mathewson pitching 4.789 innings and mitted the following resolution: which (e) C o n-
winning 373 games. The skyroeleting %Vs consdered and agreed to- The President pro teePoe of the Senate
increase in salaries has not attracted S. s. ill shl Senate feas oepi
any greater talent these days: Pitchers ff n Sfl eowshih r
are still trying to break those old stading, communimtion, and coperaton elet shall serve for a period of so to I
records. An Increase in the number of betweeo Congress and the Ie education
teams should not have a negative mmmssty
effect on the Quality of baseball any Wharam5 the scien ectou community a aate x
more than salaries have had a positive ncludes a cadre of natmonalle i The Chairmen of each ommittee and
effet. Q~liY isIn te idiviualoutstandIng secondary school scmmo, and meme of the Senate referred to In sectioseffect. Quality is in the individual mathemativs teaches and 20(h) and the Execue Direor o the Tr-
player-it does not matter how much Whe-seadary arhool science and angle Coslition for Science and Technolosl
he is paid or how many there are. maeasim teachers cn provide Insight calr, shal sbmit to the President o
Indeed, a contrary argument can be into euetlan ograms tlot work efec- trepore of the Senate an annua report
made that the addition of new teams Iheip So. tharer. he it evaluating the fellowship progras. and
would allow new talented balplayers lts&-d. halt make reosnunedatlom rnc
to come up who would not otherwise 8vM04,.nn~oenraoosAx the contineation of the progr
have a chance at the big leagues. (a) IN G rThe President pro less- c . vo.c,
For many years, we on the Judiciary pore Of the Senate ar asthorised to estcr (.) Psswa.
Committee concerned about this issue into a ageenvet with the Triangle Coall- Poe (oral ye 1901 and 1983, the foods
have been assured that professional too for Scen and Technolo Education no ".r to provide any Semis fellwhipo
sports will act responsibly, that it willto establish an Albert Elatein Cos hll he Paid from the ontingent fund of
not go the way of Day TV and that il t Feowthip Program referred to in dhe
Nill respond responsibly on the issue prorcent r oid fth fscal 840 oco in (loal Year 19a1 and 142.500 Is
of expansion of sports franchises. But Year, beginning with fisca year 1N91 three
the evidence of the last decade, and in llmahipa within the Seate (refrred to Is (b) Aciasasoa s E-avo-Te
partieular the ctions of this year. thi cnncrent resolution an the insta Triangle Coalition for Science and Technol
have convinced me that professional fellowships"). oardoetlon shall ovide the fonds ne-
sports is bent on elevating their fluan- tb) roasms- The President V earn for the adssIstration of the felow-
ci~lIntresz I th exens ofthetempo", of the Senate may enter ito the ship pocram sod for the evaluation re-rial interests at the expense of theand farrrd to ha sectio 3
Public's interests. If that is their atti- und fellowshipa as apecified in sectio 4(.
tude, and professional sports wants to onl ii th Trisic Coan fo science
be a. business, then it should be treat- and Technology Edu reuion l

Document No. 5
First Worl4 War. and again twenty-five R C D - E i of awarded p,. 19. 19Yrs laterl In Afric. a eurnope and the Pactf. a e nd theres a full count The Marinera face major
lc. we joined with our alles In the u Macneb Ctie Of the yeu Award by the economic problems; their revenues caboutcrweo n edtarelefnttrumhOvr noeahewlydr -tt Of Dims$ for is extraordinary service keep up wtith the apirateg salaries Of major
casnincing triumph over those ow t a comuity leadership. league baseball Bu this Is ol a Mariners ill.heve pot freedom secoed to their awn a. M Caeci
In Koe,. we would fight with many na spent a distiguished ThisIsabaeba iAbillwhichwoldhelplIons, from the Commonwealth to the Phil- career n the coniruclion bunleoss Bor In all maller tatket teams compete end notIppine., from Luxembour to Columbia. the Provin of Provinune Italy John and hIs just the largest Of the-loge One ot the major
supporting the United Nations' call to family moved to Deiroit In 1946. He attended problems effecting baseball is tht currenlyoppose gresaon. And in Viet Nan as well the University of Detroit and then joined his Individual leamn beep all revenues from local
we were Joined by our friends in the region fathe In the constrtion businena. broadcstilg contacts This aeverely favorsto confront corrupt Ocpresalon. These have After serving In the armed sesvices in the mega-city teams ouch as Now York and Losbeen eapenive ieaaon indeed, and the mil- Korean war. John and his brother. Joe. Angeles. The Hew York Yanbeos local broad-tory order of the world wars baa existed for
over 72 years to makesur that the lesons foned Jahn Carlo, Inc. a concrete paving cantng contract Is 10 times the Seale Marl-
we have already learned are cherished and business, Though teir fird work and docica- ers, and over B times ala leams In the Amed-
ernemembered not forotten in the rush to tin, the company has grown Ifo One Of the can League, and four teams Is the Naional
embrace what's new. Across this country largest volume concreta and asphalt paving League.
they strive to preseve an appreciation for companies In the touchy. John Is responsible The Nationil Fantal League divden equal-
our Patriotic heritage, and to stimulate love for cow business acqursitions and the oera ty all brat broadcasting revenues. The Nation-
of country. Their ranks have included Pred admirlstsllon of John Carlo. In He has ex- at Basketball Assocation addrenses the slits-dents and Senators, generals and admirals lensiee exerience In radeground utily, los from a sapply-side theory by maintainingand common soldiers, allors, almen and grading, concrete, and asphalt paving projects a salary cap. Of the three major tour sports
mar-na. This Greater Kansas City chapter
Itatl boasts of Including PresIdent. a and has Introduced new and Innovative tech- America, baebal Is the Only ape whichS. Truman and Dwight D. Elsenhower netues 1t the prolessin. does not address the problem of mall-marl
among Its peat members, The order c be In the lane. John and Joe coundad t learn. One day not too tar elf, bazubll couldJustifiably proud of the outpouring of sup Tririty Land Development Go. a real estate face the prospect of loving learn lonaSuchDorn that greeted our servicemn and company Tinily has sic develope ufrp- baseball taditional town of Cncinnat, Pills
women during Desert Shield and Storm. We pig cenars, kiusblsl tailIngs, condoinium burgh, and Cleveland Or teams could face
are in your debt projects, ofice ildings. marinas, residential the prospect of conant losin seasons notWhile our mlsaion in Desert Shield and homes, end aeveral thousnd single-family became of any coe of the berbiao, but be-Desrt Stom has been accomplished, the residential lots. John Is active Is professional cause Of the me of the dollr,
need to continue to nurture friendships and
build alliances has not ended. Every week. res
somewhere in the world, events remind us d vc presiden, and teasurer Of the and erddress tis situation. The fegalin we
that we carnet predict where the dynaste Michigan Concrete Paving mlsoci a introduce touay celn tor major league base-
changes taking Place will lead us. We face Secretory of the Micigan Road Builders Assn' ball 10 dide all local broadcasting revenueshiw threats, such as the proliferation of the cietot sot 65 percent goes 10 the team that n-narcotics trade, and we face new challenses, Although his businens takes op. lot of Mr. s t
such asi nation-building. Collectively. our ef. oae h otatad3 ecn oeceac sooatuo~ufiIng oitineleu Calenact time lie mangers to contribute a forgo.. Sash league would owen ividie thisforts to build upon xing silarne grat deal to Is community. He serves on
serve to reduce the tensions which make the revenes erio an
world a dangerous pilce. In the words of c ommanity organization I- reveue majoylag allbow es iWill Rogers, "It's hard to hate someone you coding ow American Cancer S th e mjorev e gue aseall duos outknow." Support to allied and friendly n- Arssn Heart Association, ard the March of b rene arg plan th ti wtions rontinurs to be one of our Armys five Domes. He has been a stro srppnetOfeot fo Bo lae N fc i N w
strategic roles In support of our national Boys Towns of Italy ard many other Italan enmp Iroje. Bo the NanN a r
military strategy. That you are here, as part Organizations. H-s tieless effoets In organizing r iNil ale to te las l
of the 8.000 international military students on of to largest single fondraising events for
who will train In the United States this the lan Earthqpake Victim Rebef Fund ors trom leaxing Beatie. Only local businessyear, in evidence of our commitment to thata local gose ent will ho abletclapin,
role, I~eroo tht erenetto hebusnmaofHe has also donated a large amrount ot tme thore probeot an o t a. And thiy arelIt s rood that we're not in the buies ys raising sigoficant funds tor the taan Cullhredietin the future the last several years wI go beg way toward saving baseball as ahave put a lot of people in that m ci, teat t sport for all American. and not jest for theof work. But the future is less menacing,bigsoftei. twlhlpoenuehawhatever shape it takes, as long as we can to p ibte to John Carol Cetenaco I o o p emtinue to build upon trust and friendship. to March of Dim in honoming iis as to big b wll he to esure atWhile you're hero this year. you will come erande Macomb Citizen of to Year for bin cot jont ow mega-mooapole pashme.
to know a great many people, make malny many contribrtions to the citizens of hi cor-friends. We sorer a unique professan. and Tone of irs special rewards in the opportunity inanRyLEAGUE BASEEAGUto make friends. I hope youll make the EQUITY ACT
mot of the opportunity before you, and SEATTLE MARINERSbuild the friendship, which will play no
small role In designing the future of the HON. JOH CHlDER
community of man, Or wAniNcpsGood luck in Your studies, I wish you an er wanwv
rnlaltening and enjoyable stay In the IN THE HOUSE O7 ]=xflSrAsmnx Is HO Ot rEaraxxNrAT-ccUnited States, and continued great success Thursda, September 19, 1991 Thurufe, Sejifrnhr,1991
Ma omy itienaornhersarawardoymth
in Your camer at home. Mr. MILLER ot Waohisegon Mr. Spakrer Mt CHANDLER. M Speaer. today I am
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under this subsection wfth respect to that Co1by adding at the end the followng, local challenge which can only be met
person. rtificate of otralizaton received by in Seattle.
"(C) Worm or necoer Awraonrr.- any ek of court whiob may be defaced or major league baseball is the only
Notwithstanding the Drevious provisions of Injured In Such manner as to prevent Its mao esonal spot league that
this paragraph. a court may walve exclusIve as herein provided shal In any moo be de-
authority to naturallse a person under this strayed, but mcl certificate all be m- does not have a plan to Combat the
subsection If the Adorney General has not turned to the Attorney GeeraV coot spiral, mentioned earlier, or this
provided the court with notice of the ap- 14) Feet-Section 344 of Such Art'10 economic sratIfIcation. The NFL
proval of the person's application for natu. PRO. 1455) IS amened by-adding at the shar all broadcast revenue equally.
rallsation within a reasonable time before end the following new Subsection and the NBA han a players',slary cap,
the date scheduled by the court for such -M The Attorney General hal pay over 'Tis legislation Is necenanry became
naturalisation. to courts atrlo pe uder this
"(4) issuance or e sEach e one-half of all fee, up to the sum of
court exercising naturalization authority $40,00. described in Subsection ast) col- larger and smaller market teams In
under this subseetion shall provide for the lected by the Attorney General aIth respot major league baseball. It sets out a
asuance of certificates of naturalization at to persons naturalized by the repetive plan to rectify this stratification. This
the time of administration of the oath of al- coti during each fiscal year plan Will redistribute local broadcast
legianoe. (c) Errrva Oe-The amendmenis revenue. Currently, each team is free(5) ELsasata oovars-For purposes of made by this Act shall take effect on Otto- to negotiate its own local broadcating
this section, the term 'eligible court' her 151 contract and keep 100 petcent of the
me!ants-
"(A) a Distriot Court of the United States By Mr. (for his
7
' Tll plan would uivide local
In any State, or and Mr ADAw)' broadcst revenues of home games. 80
"(B) any court of record In any State & 172. A bill to snow Major League percent to the team negotiating the
having a seal, a clerk. and jurisdiction in ne- Bebal tems i smaller markets to contract and 20 percent to the league
tlions in law or equity, or law and equty, In
which the amount in controversy is unlimit- compete financially with teams in te iste egu; amn the
ed,'% larger markets: to the Conictee on tieam Inca thedas le g ende It wul(b) Coroaxxx A rs s.- the Judiciary. d ca t re neo(11 foa caanxa,-leton 33$(e) of such so u _cm, on suosar games. 20 er t to
Act Is U.SC. 1447(s)) is amended by strik . ating the contract and 80 percent to
ing "as part of the administration by a court alonG today, the league to be ditributed-equally
of the oath of allegiance under section with Senator AII I amIntro- among the teams in the league In ad-
337(la" and inserting "as part of the natu- ducist a bill designed to ensure com- etion, thin bi would require all
rallastion of any person by a court under petitive major league baseball actoo broadcast revenue gained from nation-
section 510(b". the country for many yews to come. al cable bi-adcasts, be equally divided(2) Csrrstaam or IoTAzow-See This bll will benefit tho smaller
uos 336 of Such Act 10 USC. 1449) IS market teams of major league baIso the teams in the league.
amended- balll mll of are a(A) by inserting "(or. in the case of natu- these teams facing a od threesball fallvt
rallsation under section 310(b), from the coot spiral that consists of okyrocket- ropy th is redtut of rev-
clerk of the naturalization court)" after log Salaries and ramnant free agency; be subject to the Soue antitrust laws
"Attorney General' the first place It ap. however larger market teams are able as the NFL and NBA
Dea illbyinsrtng'(o te eer ~ to controt these cost spirals because of Mr-. President, I ask unanimous con-(Bt by inserting "(or the clerk of e their local broadcast revenues Sent thst a text of the bin be printedcourt)" after "of an knmigration officer", NwYr ptmzsti oi
ad NwYr eptmrsti do I n the Macnn following my remarks.
(C) by inserting "(or the court)" at nance; the Yankees have a local cable There being no objection, the bill
"Department of Justice". television contract that will pay them was ordered to be printed in the(3) Poerons or cnaas-Section 339(a) 5 m a yea. Marge Schott, an an follows:
of Such Act (8 U.S.C. 1450(a) is amended- owner of the Cincinnati Redo, recently(Al in the matter before paragraph (1), by said, "We will not have baseball In
striking "that administers oaths of alle- small towns like Cincinnati. We can't Be If -acted by ft Sencis and Hoose ofglance under section 337" and inserting compete with what New Yetk gets eescfffe Or f~e Unted Sfoe of
"that naturalizes Demons under set from cable. Is going to be that base- Ascerfci is oone o ooehit
310(b)".(B)b a ) ball is only going to be In the big15 yamoiaisrsasoi o eda cities." Suc..s 1. This Act may be cited an thefollows
"(1) I-ue to each person admitted by the Baseball in the national pastime, it "Major League Baseball Equity Act.
court to citizenship a certificate of natural- brings together the entire country.
zation and to forward to the Attorney Gen- Baseball allows Seattle to relate to A- Sm 2. the Congress find that-
eral within 30 days after the close of the lington. , Kans City. MO, and lit Major League Baseball is becoming In-
month in which mc certificate was issued, New York, NY-three entirely fer
a duplicate thereof, and to make and retain t c eonmi pwrf in temso
in the clerk's office a record for each certifi-
cate so Issued of all the essential facts set Baseball is not only a unifying vle- (2) the current tractice of gale eelpt
forth In Such certificate, and to forward a ment for the Nation, it in a benefit to revenue sharing In both the American
duplicate of each such record to the Attor- each community that has a major Legue and National League also works in
ney Geneva) within 21 days after the rios lague baseball team o- exampleo the antitiv ad
of the month In which such certificate was Seattle the Mariners donate almost $1 the arge ea and
Issued." million in charitable contributions the lrr markets hate a competitive ad'(C) in paragraph (2), by striking "such an ouch as collectibles for auction$. free vantage over ether Major League Bseball
oath is administered' and "oath was admin- tickets for Seattea schools, ant teams In their ability to negotiate favorable
latered" and inserting "such a certificate is
asued" or "certificate was Iasued". respec- aking tours, This is not to mention Isdependent broadmoting cotracta
lively. the additional countless hours that In- morrarrcos(D) by striking "and" at the end of part dividual team members end with the Sm. 3. to tiis Act the tem-
graph (3), commIty's youth and participating () "antitrust Ia" has the meaning given(E) by redesnating paragraph (4) a In charity events. Sash term onder uretion 4 of the Federal
Paragraph (5), Currentiy. the Seattle Mariners are Trade Commssion Act Ill USC. 441:(F) by insertIng after paragraph (3) the In dire financial straits. This bill, how- (21 "Independent broadcasting contract"following new paragraphw
"aberpnobeforloallgblankparagtap- ever, will not solvo their problems in means any' contract, entered Into independ-4) be responsible for all blank certiff- the short run In tlyby or on behalf of a Major League
ca of naturaliastion received by them team for the transmission of onefrom time to time from the Attorney Gene' Mariners In Seattle. the local busine ar mor games of that Major League Bae
al and shall secount to the Attorney Gener- community and lust governmental ball team by means of television breadcaot,
al for them whenever required to do as-", leaders must put together a combined cable television tlmlowfor or radio
and effort to save the Mariners It IS a broadcast
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(3) "League" means the league of profes- Europe, the United States, ind to Stiner will Increase by at least one-third, and
aonal baseball teasma known as the Amer- degce In jpM A major. if not the only to- possibility by as much as 35 percent.
can Leazue or the league of professional plicalln Is aa ceedatock In the production Family I c In man S
baseball teams known as the National ofsecondarybutyilithinn h ao repot hg prieI
League and g T ~~T" aeas eotdhg rc n(4)A ppicatos creases. One large aily planning14 Le rLsseBsbl' ooabt-Ap~sie clinic in Massachuisetts reports that
tsW~s. ucoseSecondary butyilithhico haa several limit- one manufacturer has Increased. in
5 4 Th pupoc o ths ~Is ~ ed sasplications, which ar sensitive in world price for a widely, Used antifungalS 4. The purpose of this Act Is to Createythetic
equity within Major League Baseball, by butyl rubber is catalyzed And, secondary cream by 01 percent The director of
providing teams in smaller markets the op- butyllIthiet A major outlet fur this special reproductive health for the Mississippi
portunity to compete financially with the rubber is In shoe salesI Department of Public Health et-
teas in the largermarkets. . dOther markets for these special purpose mates that the price hikD* will cost
scOuscusrusa sane-us seancu synthetic butyl robbers Include inection her program an additlonat$250,000 for
Bar. S. (al Any revenue generated Purse- molded parts, fur examople-aulomuobil trim oral Contraceptives atone.
of ec ond btollrthum.wigtad uh
ant in an independent broadlcasting contract IeUIcs desgediY reduce eigtudtIU cuh-em National Association of State
shauld be shared In accordance with thene- Ion im spacoeciltoy asiveftrou anA
quire-enta of this setiti andScdr drug butylrelitou ss, srl
eEdpt in the De of drgatins whc arsen to wolcls r t ground conditions. ports that methadone Prices have dou-ce tsaeultofnthoaalry tansmtted The polyethylene indstry Inuergoing bledthinyear. These increases follow
that in party in such contract seen receice- mor changes a new highl strength, tear on the heels of normal increases jast(1) as percent of the revenue fram the rsistant l1near tu w density polyethylene year of 40 percent for this essential
transmission of the home gnames of that sn. Te dru. A White House official Dr.Her-
team and their specially engintere properties t bert Kiebar. Deputy National Drug(21 20 percnt of the revenue from the ldrd fur serialapplications.Acommon e- Control Policy Director, has Warnedtrasmission or gainea in which thot team in ample Is tear resistant twash bos which can that "This could eat up millions In
the vln teenm. be produced thinr, y t new treatment money a a 35 An in-
t) All other rocenue generated Puruant bos produced with polyethylene coh crease of this magnitude could have a
inseach contract. Including all revenue from po s p lmaly
nationaytransmitted cable tetevil, si is - major Impact onthe number of tia-
be divided equallyamong the other I Ofne seodry op hing a a- tiente that could be treated."
the eague of which the contracting team Is cPublic Health Service Act clinics
ambee, Each League, hall establish - pcrted from Europe displacing nil, pero have the Worst Of both Worlds. They
rthe d posit of revenue in which doed secondary butyllithu. This con- are notvable tohreceive the Sise din
this subsection appica and shalt' at reguiar potitive Catalyst systemco i mported wills count prices as Medicaid payers, andIntervals, distribute the correct shares of 3.7% tariff duty,. hyaebigfocdt cetmc
sDch reveoue.f Publcet esti
recth eBy Mr. forNesY sfor himself lmager than normal price Increases for
Sec" 6. Ulss Major League BaseOil1 has. Mr. SimoN, Ms. Mcmutsr, andi Prescription drugs. Even these normal
prior in the beginning cf the loss basebsall Mr. PRYnR): ,price Increases for drugs have been
rsuon, establihed an Implemented a pro- m. 1729. A bill to amend the Public mo r than twie the rate of general in.
grass Under which any rerenue generated Health Service Act to require drug flatim-lpusoans to independent broadcasting con manufactures to provide affordable Thin bill will extend the Medicaid
tracts is shared in accordance with setine 5 prices for drugs purchased by certain discount prices to Public Health Ners-
the antitnst lows shall apply n Major
League Baseball each Leugur, and i 1 entitles funded under the public Ice Act clinics. In addition, the bill at-
b1) seball teams uf Health Service Act. and for Other pa- tempts to relieve excessive price in
t i of- te h e apome to the Committee on Labor and eruses on the clinics by authorizing
By Mr. HELS H1man Resources. the Secretory Of I to attempt to
S. 1728 A bill to suspend untl teamsi- ensl e ista is tash a r wr negotiate with the drug Companies to
try 1, 1905, the duty on secondary a rAudcaCnUedAC o u voluntarily restore the prices in effect
butyl chloride; to the Committee on r KENNEDY, Mr. Presidents last before passage of the Medicaid drug
Finance. Year, Congress required that dicount provision, indexed for Inflation.
ausrmmea or. EacLaus shall establish drug price made available by pharma- I want to ke ofear that this legis-
Mr. BHMS, Mr. President, today reutiral manufacturco to certain fa- lation extends the discount drug prices
am Introducing legislation to extend cored large volu purchasers ohould only to a short lint of grantet who
through 1994 the duty suspension for elan be madc available to State Medic- purchase and dispense drugs to low
a substance called secondary butyleh- aid Programs. This initiative is now Income individuals. net to all grantees
rride. Congrenian Cans BEenr Providing much needed financial relief Under the Public Health Service Act.
has likewise introduced a Companion to Medicaid white at the sae time Im- The Cngreswional Budget Office has
bill t . 1is 0 In the Houseon behalf proing access of our met vulnerable estiutecthat the rebate program will
of MC Littco In sltonia NC. Citinens to needed drug therapies, save these clinics $0 milltion each
bI . President, I ask unanimous con Lat Years legi ation however, did year, This i real money to these pro-
sent that a facinheet explaining the not extend the discount to othcr grains that ae caught by rising health
nature and Uses of secondary butyl groups of purchasers who deserve It Care cost, but it is only a drop In the
chlord be Printed in the Relan at Public Hesth Service Act ciinin, uch bucket for the phrnaceutical indes
the conclusion of my remarc. as Community and migrant heslth c - try, In a hearing before the Senate
There being no objection, the fact- Zera, drug treatment centers, family Committee on Labor and Human Re-
sheet was ordered to be printed in the Planning clinics, and Ryan WiteI sources last year, It w Ms estimated that
RECss, as followa: AIDS grantees, which also serve the the indstry spends over $5 billion
FoccAnooo Nation's most v ailnrable citizens each year on advertising and market-
Product name: Secondary Butyl Chloride. Ufortunately to offset the os of ing alone.
Alternate 19r4: 2Ch utbutspen prof its from avileald drug manufac The bill does net technically require
Cham al formulc a secoa turer have incresed their prices to drug manufacturers to offer discount
Impert tariff ciasoiniratlon: m-ng uther purehaaera drug prices to the clinics. Rather, the
2r.C.oW tariff r Ct-assI As a result. many Public Health slo of drugs to ell Public Health Serve-
CAB registry number 7 -coa- n Service Act wlinice have reported l- Ice Act grantees is conditioned on the
b 10)ARy sorthe Cusen nlfi nt price Increases In recent signing of a rebate agreement to pro-
seoMdary butyl chloride has NIt ciths Community Health Centers vide discounts to the clinics. This is
Mr. Presient,"I as unniou con Las ye leisltio , hyowee mr im er hsiea oe oteepo
plentisa and Ifnot considered widely used in Texn hae een to o te gr ame apprach taken by the md
commodity Wrld demand in primaily In fRD turer that prices foe their drugs icd rebate program
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Pria****.t ft .. r consoele o a thid SutIaSSION OF CONCURRNT AND 8. 500. A bill to provide that protse-
oImsrt ot, to temor, 00 the i- BENATH adSOLMTIOrS sioal baseball teamn and legues ro.(-
tem llb sbjecAto teatitrbsif The oB. Ra .Alu ti resolutionsge e remov te slne exetto
tt . Anit Mr. GAXoN. r. L nt snd Senate resolutions were md. in the antitrust laws; to the Committee
.m. WARPO o r. thOesadAt. or. refered (or acted upon). as inoitaeeb Ths lgt
Lont. M. XIhl. dnd n . Bibl r to NS (fu r. M (fo i- P*O7OIA, RA1L AM, A rWna
Wd. OU ) 8. elf. 77. so e. r. to utho s. ri . test
B. M0L A bill b0 amnd theat mioftraa A G NS. MOr. INOCA. DOT. e.Mr. iTn dnAU r. President. I
bseebeLl Weax segos coaeposed of each inMueei, and Mr. Buzues))t rise today to Introduce legislaion that
teand oalt Ae t to a the sti noot w ls . SM. 7I . A soITion ei tReS O T sIbOS would remove the blanket wxemicoe
b y. M olt (o hn , r the J .dis rca Comtse of tne tited Natir. I aalo from the antitrust laws that major
m. U. AM uLm c o Rameogr, rtig p to gst a rolutot on league baseali currently enjoys a
1. Ui A ell to repeal the madealty 2 Ineru r eisl o Cbe ied and A. a This likeseedby en-
pert Is- t a vithholding dn eigible to. N i tors MA, GeAA1o wllA , WA lmt.
toHoos dletrlbelScs e50ah are not felled BY W0. IOOSEIZY-RliO (for Mr. wu.. ., tAMI Hove i,=
0 t Me C en Mee M ilrosime. prblem. (for biel s a d r atd misy of Nebosia-i long over-
BY Mr. liOCKZZMRm (fer ehbuef '.D") ue
Ma dMr. wAbl oathe od Rtet . A resoltlo to htIh o .ee ttt-
o. 1t0 A bill to ad Ute ari A t of in y sod to aitbnrle- resentatlon b the The game of baseball has been a am
105 e beero,. th. esta.Mog amd 0- Seosts Lefal CO-5esi ooealdr~d and areed tional treasure for Over a century. But
tUoaoe dsty proeioa and for otser; i tr w baseball Is also a big business that does
poees; te the Committe Mraoe. tot reed fSpeci l trement under the
C y . rAMAom antitrust laws. And baseball's owners
a. go6. A bill to seaead the morilyte STATEMENTS ON tRODUCD cartnily do not deserre the privilege
dt Naiesim At to id that m- BU S AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS of being exempt from la which other
hers so U-m (oouialy knoewe *" th . By Mr. L~OTT- - . businemeee-lnoluding all other penfes-
emle Roeloride tot bemteedered .l. A bill to eend title s9, Unit- stonal sports-must follow.
to he sogewe Ce a terrorist ecilvty and 1.- s~s oi. ~ ~ mnaoy .Beti e oblinaya ol
e toi e"tate the mo rde vnt Baseball oe 70 yea rss a er bfromes-
daNee a t. the NU Scriminal offt the Imprisonment for persons con_ nsem and many of Its teams n e wned
Crouoirt)ton the jethauly Midmide viated of a third violent felony; to the by 0 h affiliated with soO of Amesca's
o n . cHL e heif Mr. SA M Committee on the Juiiary. ' r largest corpoato er. e The bos
Mr. DSCONet014 M FDMsTm. en h~semoxser T0n MUMenSI~ deals of baseball's be-ions do not Just
Me. ofBRAol al vol nrtoffeders ACT affect the price of a ticket or the cost
B. O0. A bill to sem i sutlsp e Of title Mr. LOf Mr. President. today. I am of a hot dog at the sdium Theyalso
d Unted AScarte Code, to mmiake i Federal Introducg legislation aimed at mt- affect things like the a e paid by the'
11.i A steel to susedo tepoaiys touwttheormrinaerbllCR o e00ldrdnesae
creto Ptela toe om te o Cn ting a dent In the Nation's violent Poblic, the economi well-being of local
MU" o the JEdiey. crime problem. Thin bill is targeted at comnJliti, the sine Of conMmer's
8 y NM. AlCONNeLL (for hmeelf of. repeat offenders of violent felones. I cable bill and the educational and ca-
o noea . oad o . LmOAsi: cant to get these crimnae off the re choies of thousands of young men
o. MW A bll t sae the Feed Stamp Act streets for good. In this country. And yet these deals-
of 19T? to ldeetifY aod sortali fraed In the This bili Is very simple.,~ even if they hurt consumers or harma
food stop Wndra sd fur eter hea th tlghtforwaxd. -t is called Life tm- compadtIon-are completely exempt
to the oom- BItt. no yitOm Man'tto5 iri y.mut for IrEgBAu Recidivist frtom scrutiny under our Natin's fair
sd Forestry. o
aY r. ROTs. Act-or LIFEIM. for short. co upetition lawe.
S. SOL A bil to coetle. until JeaeI- IFER mould Impose a mandatory I believe It Is time to change ihat-
2.. ones r oasron o t o-Beml-t life Sentence on anyone convited of a a that Is b I 05 IntrodIuing this
Juoopheno to the aoeitte os " inNaoo . Federal violent felony if that, person bill. This billIs not desgned to ponish
S. sWT. A Nil to extend the exsting ieam- h12. two Previous violent feole~-Fed- the owners or threaten baeball. I be-
000507 suspesion of daty On fosias"; to the "ra or State-on his or her record. love that revoking baseball's antitrust
Cesadtee 0 Floses Sometimes there is really no better ac- -exemptlon Is in the best interest of the
& 102. A bill to se.d teoareoly the lotion than locking the door and public. the fanD. and the Sport ofb -
dehr to 3salaeonesenrorng1w0t0ky bali.
Phasod hyd-oohorlis: to the C-Iese oni i thein avay ate keviece. g The antitrust exemption. granted to
5. SOL. A bill to seed temporarily the that getting the moot hard-core violentbaelior70yregoythS-doty 00 N.N-dime*thy1-N'-i-((othYlemloo) crinhiliSd off the street would subete~n- preme Court wae rooted in eentiment
tcoh05710571o e-llKthe~ohid*ld tisily reduce the Incidence of violent rather than logic. Justloo Holmes. one
mohydrochldds: to the Committee on "1- crime. Statistics tell us that 0 perc~nt of Oer NAtien'S Most reveredl InStItes.
555e.of all violent offenders commit a full 70 writing for the Court In the 1012 Fed-
. 6106. A bUi to temporarily seepend the pdroent of eli violent crimes. And there eral Baseball caseflid that the anti-
detr -a B.adiooaott to the Conamittee on TI Is a 76-poredot recidivism rate among trout laws did not apply because base-
ben-~ those with three or more Incarcer- ball could not be considered Interstate
a. SUi. A bill to seed temporarily the atiucs. commerce.
doty00 CNXto hs oseoltee 0 ~ Again. I am proud to introduce this Today, few scholars Are wilting to de-
ny Mr. XERY bill In conjunction with ltepreeetrllve fend Justice Holmes' opinion. Meet
S. SIXA bWU to rsointate tie proding or SOn LrINOSTOM in the House. and I legal experts share the view expressed
les c5000. to ll baziss tescerns. sod also urge that all 50 States poea sin by the former chief judge of the Second
Re other proxpsg to the ommttee -oe legislation affecting violent trans- Circuit Court of Appeals, Henry
BankinR. ing. sod Uoba Afibir greseore of State law. Friendly, who stated that the Federal
BlY Mr. BRADIZr. The IFER bill very Simply Is three Baseball oslo "was not One Of Mr. Jos-
R. £11 A bil to sOed the Inernal Re-0 Strike. and you are out tics Holmes' happiest das." The So-
onO toacode ct Of 1 to us the reutn urge my colleagues to look at thi Promo Court Itself has quesrtioned the
rOs4 toe fundst. arst Ice the osltcalgisain Holmes ruling, calling It "an sherra-
reeaat oostotfedfrhat Mlgsain it tn" and"an anome],.e ht it hasre-
-- - t- 1 r y r MTENAIM (for him= oe to overturn the decision.
RY Mr. nXeOWITalf. Mr.' MAta, Mr. GnAHAII. - The Court. however. -bag eoggested
&L. R~e. 07. A joist resolutfios to eeelaseia Mr. LIAHY. Mr. Wml=sl. Mr. that Congrese should aet.-mn 187. the
iee 4 of each yea as "W25ai~ Mndway - BamuAAP, -Mr. LO10M. .3r. last time this Issue- came before the
Dasslle ly- to 9Me CositteeO es KoR~nY and Mr. WXLITWrulsl Justices, .the,,Court staled'that- -if
Jodiary. there IS any 1.esaeo' rilgoi
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&II this. it Is so Inconsistency and ii- have threatened to leave -their home Let me address the chief argument
logic of long standing that Is to he cities and desert their loyal fans, on- which basehall makes In support of the
remedied by the Congress sod not by lea the pubhic subsidized the costs of exemption. At the Antitrust Sub-
the Court." new tadlums. The players-especlally committee bearing. Bud Salig, who is
The bottom line is this: As a legal the minor league players-have been the owner of the Milwaukee Brewers
matter, tho basis for baseball's anti- forced to accept restrictions on their and the chairman of basehall's exeO-
trust exemption is insupportable. The mobility as a condition of employment. tive council, testified that application
question is whether there is some over- Fans in some cities cannot follow their of the antitrust law would render
riding policy reason to continue to teams closely unless they are willing baseball impotent to stop franchise re-
allow baseball to be totally exempt to pay for expensive cable TV channels. locations. In other words, baseball ar-
from the antitrust laws. At a hearing And some baseball owners use account- goes that the exemption promotes
in December held by my antitrust sub- ing gimmicks and transfer-pricing franchise stability. but that lifting It
committee on this lsce, former base- schemes to understate their profits in would prompt team owners to desrt
ball Commissioner Pay Vincent stated order to increase their leverage in ne- their loyal fans and move to greener
that baseball'd antitrust exemption gotiations with the players, the cities Pastures for bluer bucks and better
should be retained only if "the owners and. ultimately, the fans. stadium deals. This argument distorts
can justify the privilege of the special Clearly, the baseball, owners do not both the fucts and the law, It really is
status the exemption affords, shrink from playing the kind of tan- nothi but an overblown sares tactic.
I agree with Mr. Vincent that base- cial frmball you see in other bus- Look at the factse. HIesnt doss not
be l' ow er m A ttust sh w t at tue c a 3 b o o m mite. ; F ay Vne nt exbp inuase n n e f ct n
bail owuer mustis h els estie That aseblis nth sow suggest that bseasl'e anlltrust ex-
erption Is in the uinterest And I at be m nd t na by the emption leads to greater frsnph er et-
have come to o thh ule bt t ility. Basebelln overall record on
I hncsh ocuso that te "e antitrust rules that apply to fmnchis migration Is no better than
one e fple to ma  hat bur- other businesses, the record compled by the other three
en as er a tatn e Baseball's owners will try to g e major sport-football, basketball; and
naialeg telrlst h owners otui lk that removal of the hexemption will hackey, all of which are subject to the
cial status under the law to protect the throw the sport into chaos. Do not be- antitrust laws. Many tams have
Interert of the fans and preserve the leve it. At the hearings held by the moved during the 70 yen in which the
vitalty of our national onstier ste Antitrust Subcommittee. s Fay Vincent exetptton baa been in eret, and a
std they are acting more like selfsh tbsstid that, Baseball not eribuoly number of other teias have threatened
erones of a billion-dollr business dependent on the continoation of the to move, Taxpayers in a number of
which they believe belong to them ex antitrust exemption." He stated that, cities. Ave bean forced to cough up
luively. e antitrust immunity baseball en- millions of dollars in public subsidies
For example, the ouster of Fay Vin- joys ts not essential'elther to the son- In order to keep their team from inov-
cent was a ulear signal that any 1 nomic health or the legal integrity of Ig
bell com eissoner who placed the best the game." The owners also have distorted'the
interest of the sport ahead of tbe mt- No other professional sport ha i a law by agsesting that the antitrust
nanclal interests of the owners would blanket exemption from the antitrs t laws do cat permit a aprte le ap to
be out of a job. Chicago White eox laws. For example. both pro football impose reasonable restrictionsonri-
owner Jerry benodorf, one of the key and pro basketball sr subject to the chlse relotions i They point to the
Participante to Vincent's ostar, stated antitrust laws. Each Of those sports fact that the Oakland Raiders brought
that the Job of the next baseball com- currently enjoy better labor relations a successful antitrust challenge
missioner will be to 'run the business sind greater economo stability than against the NFL' effort to stop their
for the Owners, not the playars or the baseball, The Irony is that In bath In- movement to Los Angles But the
umpires or the fans, e w etances, Improved stability and better baseball owners have mIspresented
There the issue is summarised en- labor relations came about as a result the oidra cae. The court which de-
tirly. Baseball wants to be exempt of antitrut lawsuits filed okalnet the cded that case has made it clear that
frdom the laws, They want to be exempt leagues by the players. The antitrust the antitrust laws do permit s sports
from the ediclt of their own commis- suts forced the leaders of football and league to impose reasonable restri-
aloner. basketball to restructure their labor oe on franchise relocation. Even Far
The owners now tall us that they relations end financial arrangements Vincent admitted that If the antitrust
want a strong commissioner- Sure, be- In a manner that worked in the benefit law applied, the owners "could con-
cause they hera that thee may be of the fans and the longterh Interest struct approval conditions and terms
some action In the Congress with re- of thoee sports. nder which baseball could prevent ml-
spent to their antitrust exemption. But That is a crucal point The baseball gration [in a manner that would be e-
their actions speak louder than their owners are a legly-soantioned cartel galy validm"
words, Although they said they would which cannot be held accountable for Moreover, the evidence suggest n that
move Asickly to pick a new cmmls- conduct which hurts consumers or basbas antitrust exemption actually
"Ther, they ate nowhere close to pick- harms co petition. Giving the baseball promoes franchise Instaeblity. A nure
Ita replacement for Fay Vincent, Al- owners free rein to decide what is in bar of witnaest who testified before
though they said that by November 1 of the beet interests of the game is like the Antitrust Subcommittee stated
Last ye-r they would redefine the do- giving the members of OPEC free rein that the baseball owners deliberately
ties and powers of the commissioner's to st worid energy polcy. mantin an artifical scarcity of fran-
os. they still have not met that Unless g there isome form of account- chises it order to mais team rave-
deadline. He It Is critical to watch ability, the interests of the crtel will noes and maintain their leverage with
what the owners do, and ot what they aiweys take precedonce over the public the citis. A scarcity of franchises in-
say, As one sportewriter commented: Interest. - Glates the resale value of existing
"roton an the owners don't have a I believe the time has come for the teams and Increases each owanr's har,
strong commissioner now-or any oin- public to take back Its national pa- of baseball's national broadcasting ref-
missione-i because they fired the time. And the first step toward doing enue.-It also enables owners to squeeze
last one because he was acting too that Is to put major league baseball on concessions and subsidies from their
strong... the same iegal footing as other profes- home clties by threatening relocation
Vincent's Ouster was the latest In a slonai sports and other billion-dollar to another city which In eager for a
series of events signaling that the dl- businesses. Subjecting baseball to the franchise.
moction sod fuoture of major league pro-comp,,titive and pro-consmer Fans In Tampa, Bay, Washington, DC.
baseball are going to be dictated solely tests of our antitrust laws will impose Phoenlx, and other compunities. are
by the business interests of the owners. true accountability on baseball's own- eager to have the national pastime
In recent years, a number of owners er. played in their city. But It is more
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Profitable for the owners to threaten I1 the last four dated. a ofb
relocation to these cities than It ia to BeiteadbytUSoa4 Ho o/R*,- &IM04 Ati antu '
expend and put new teams in those egllle of Me ited Staes of Assors ti 0100 b= = bet oltbar
communitIte. As a result, fans In those tbe full House eo t foi Senate haver
citles are still without baseball-not = Acted ml sha .wprposl.
because they are Incapable of upport- TeAIsMoe House iewd Cot a
Ing a team but because the owners Baseball Antitrust eform Mt of 1W P.t Sprts bsatio aoeot finit
would rather use them as bargaining for basetall's lpecl enlptlc fron the
chips. C r a tht_ Antitrus laws eM Its 81enootbee should he
If baseball were subject to the anti- .I th bin ora is tofeaem- v.
trust aws, the owners woldot blket eemptio fom the tit t
lowed to maintain an artificial scar. Il the Antitrust laws should be aended to 10.6
city of teams for Anticompetitive or reveoss the result of the decisions of the So- No. Th. Courthce exressly deolleed toes-
anticonsumer reasons, IdtInr base- preme Court of the Doltei Slates in Federal tend the exemption to other -rofeesl
ball's Antitrust exemption should load Baseball Club v. NAtIonaegee. 25 U.S. port such is footbail, hekattsL aod boa-
to greater franchtse stability and put 200 21). Toolso v. Now York Yankees. tog. And the Court hss statsd that It is "Im-ma~r ea" baba i moe a. 344 ttO.C. 206 10). end Mlood . kobe, resilltii. lnoocsstent, sod 11.loe -i tomajoroltle . 26 1912), which exempted baseball from treat baseball diteretes. from other Peofe
Instead of threatening to move existing covere ueder the Antitrut laws. sloe.l eports-ehich are echiect to the nI-
teams to open cItIes, major league a & APUCATION Or ANMEXOT LAWS TO
baseball will look to fill those markets aFOOONAL5AS.0AL - . Baseball need the exemption?
with new teame. . The Clayton Aet 1 U.B.C. 12 At ne:) Is 7h." Mnths "0. forMer Baseball Com-
The bottom ine Is this: removing Am e t iONlr Fay Vivaint teetifled that 'Bass-
baseball's antitrust exemption should ,ew aittdoc: bil 1. 000 seriously dependent 0 the ome
encourage more expanslon, improve re- m. 27. Except As provded to Pehio law tnatloo ot the Antitrust eamption!" The
_=-1 6 USC, 101 et seq.) (mcemoely own-e do hlot need the exempn to he oeglations with the Dsyers. discourage k A t Sot of to joint Agreements which en reasonable or
owners from puttIng most or all of 1111 he Antitrust ls shall apply to the which Preserve or etoegtoeo the pport with-
their games on expensive pay TV bhan- usiess of ocgoled Professional bseball" out harming - msee Or Ocec.et.
nels. sAd spur better declsionmaking mcrcm An . That's why the other profeeloos sport. ae
about the direction and future of the The provlelo cod e-eadeents m.d by Ile totloo effectively. ee hough
gam., this Act shall hike'affect oxe year after the t e t J06 blseket saA-eOtb from
Neverthelese. this will be an uphill dote Of the enactment of this Act end- theactiletews ,
battle. The owners will--ss they a&- (ll shal apply to condct t c Mc' & Wt Is the relationship between tbs s-
ways have-come before us aX l y ntreemeet to effect alter suth effeoee dc the Authority of the Comd-plead d en.e's Offloelthat baseball continues to deserve it s h at
special treatment under the law. There ood before -h efet. dte . ba l privileged treaumt ceder the
alo will be threat-sOmeetimes im- antitroet ls in Put becse hs Coemle-
plit, sometimes explicit-that chang- QczS nAlwetAcOn 00 sloe., ox baseball had lndep*edee Authorityato plans ths best Ineests of toe sport ahead
Ing baseball's antitrust status will IZAGUa B"EAWe A of the basLes interests of the ow, Isle-
mean that sume legislators will se . What Is the basie for hislorLeue Ns- stances to whlch those two Intersts Might
teams In their cities and States move belle blaoket suemption fros the cotitrust be to onduct yoetoer Comisoner Fey
to other areas. lawel Viest ftoogrds*d that hsn had to he
I think It Is time for Congreee to The *-ptlo. was greeted to baseball e bledofsoleteeslheok thesbolty
wake up and recognize that baseball is 70 years ego. 10th. oe of Fedma Book- a hs owns to abe of their spedel 05101-
a billion-dollar business that It no Clob Basell C. Justice of Vige er od to lA Cntitrsloesr
longer worthy of special treatment writing for the Coot held that the Antitrust coemltee that "Oly a troag C-ls-
under the law. Indeed, Mr. President, it ls did 0o0 apply because the businese of slonreoting In h. letee of baseball end
Is becoming apparent that the financial baseball could not be 000100-d Intetate therefore the public, ten Protect lbs Its=-
interests of the owners and the beet In- oomo. Beeehall clearly Is Interetate 0100 fom the eelfish cod myoplo attitudes of
terests of the sDort and the fans am omMeras. sn the legal areie for the Holm
ofteg in conflict Withhe ort Itself staled Vanoth' oetr: suggests that ths .wes
The public wants more teams, t .IO. In the s of FoodY. gels, "rofee- on longer want a ebuteg Cooneeler withThe~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~. .u.iwet oeta. o l I baoeball 1.A busitos end it is engeged edepesodept Authority to plaoe the lnt.rat
the owners want to hold down the num- to tetett coso ." a o e-
ber of franchlies. The sport needs labor 2. f the legal basis for the sm to o teets an the face, h oennWn,
stability, but the owners seem intent tl 1 o W rry oflte n e of Whie
on forcing a showdown with labor. The While the Supreme Court has Called the Participsnts to Vlont' ouster etated the
public wants to iee more games on free Pedsu SOsil e "An erattoe" sod lob of the 0ext baseball tomsdlesorwlll he
TV. but the owners continue to move "so ceomay." Its refused to oveclem hs to "con the hoelees far tha sa, cot the
dsms to cable. eas Instlled Its Inacllon pye= or the bepirds or the fte
strong commissioner, but the nes' y stating that baseball bas "Hod so the In shot the OWpsee seem Poied to aban-strog tmmletonr, ut he wners' precedent establis ed to the I1= deuetoo. doe the nation that their secial statos
actions Indicate they want a weak But the Court has strogly co d that ceder the law impss upo them As oblia-
commisaloner. COog"M should act In IM, 36 years alter tin to put t publi Interest bead of their
Baseball's 28 owners can no longer bo the Pmdaz Baseboll docluloo. the court etat- finacil Iteret. Pay Vlocat tetied
entrosted with sole stewardship of our ed that that: "Ths exieting Antitrust soemptios f r
national pastime. The time has come 'Wee, we mOsldIos the QeeCtic of hs- falor Ossne Baseball should be reteed
to Ipos a easre f euontsbllt ball for -h le 0- 0 - m pa oleso slate we only iso long An baseball cae persuade [0ms-to Impose a Measure of accountability en d Bt Federsl Baseball res that it la s lttl withon the owners, by making them subjectto the same rules as every other sportsopo th bcieso asebl 0 , W the meel nterest Oblifis oweet
and every other business In America. fore, oncude. that the orderly way to saimi- of baseball otiees on their Staled more of
The time bas come to remove base- eats this error, If ther be soy, Is hrleoisla- making baseball ints their beslss sad at
ball's antitrust exemption. Andotby Court detlsow. I the cams tills Insist that the Oosulsioner
Mr. President, I ask unanimous Con- Th5 last tme the Court onsidered this i their CiO to be fifd at M I wouidho
sent that the text of the bill and ques- , In the 291 ieee Of Flood EeKs, It longer support the preservation of the 5x-
tions and answers be printed In the AM that "If there is any leteacy W sepuo,"
CN28JNl ILCOD h Wt~e in jan thi. it inI m o ssisteaey and , What does the AsielPtI0 soahis baseballThee beinr no ojec nlog stdig that is nt be re- to , --Tees o ded by the Congress d soby the Co ess the eades, numeri oa-
eo ete b ee a d oseofhee ea oege a-Onst-ohea ec
risk , Vias olo wsred bels cttrin mneced asm thtisi ePro f1essio ael w fA
RROM, as follows: ~ ~ Bsball Antitust eormpuu Act s ofiosgg 1985",w~gybeM
tI an sense or mthe fs ll senat rewa
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of gotitloot .p-o. or exe..moot. . A-0 -0, to o-t .yoouo- that man beot -o their oil aoooto 1.0011001. ioo loot' too.0001-
ber of witnesesa . hooin held by the lent, log Of roxnes 72. owom MY boes r..110
Atltrset Bkbooomitte testified that the 9. Why is 11fting lb. examptlon too p4 10 too tI tho fang' beat Interest. but to.
baseball omwner have deliberately beld down lie1Interes? 11000000 FI4OOtIIo 0r Amaool.0 boo .00
the nabor of francises In order to rap Liftin the exemption wi11 make tb. baso. seated tha1 ther 000 be hurting Ion.. w
monopoly Profits and to ma.1ims. their b-0b11 010oo l oountable to to. p01. .- pl.. these teol restrictions hike
railar levrage with the players and the Subjecting baseball 10 the satitsmot ls" to. voice of looal lotdot oootonts. .nd
c1.ie If the baseball oe wee..00 010(10 that t00 lb. cam 0 e hbld .ooot toos vio the ado to c.01e obrgagi ngic,
In suoh codoot while subjoot to the anti- able If they make joint decisio whic0 hoot unliko . atlon. have a dot' rar0.
trest laws. they would ram the risk of an0cometiton0o 1000onsume0. That moon =0 s10000 (La. they 001 1000 both
antitrust hb11sagr., th. 0w0e0s will bov. a legal obligation to .. 400tloaoo tod cable subscribers). In .881-
The baseball 'oner also agree among1tke Itoo tot Impact of their bust. 1100. too..oololtiou..11001a teamowcar0
thmlvs to divide market. ad allocate o. decisions 00 toe players, th. C11ies. .0d to move games to ma00 ensive mid less
territori. f locl toleaison broadcasting. to,. .oosooll cable TV channels wtooa oo
In some instaoo. these territorial ao- Iloo0*o baseball's antitrust exemption ompetition. When Georte ot oroold
tions are *oolusive. For0 example. the Red lp 00 expansion and 81.0000000 01 01 th 0 Yankee Cre toble TV 0hem-
0ox have the .xlus,. right to how their 100 ro m _0 reocatithret. 1A a.1 10 N00r York. ho dido't base to oOry
ordes on local telev n .an 1n for to o n py nnod s s toot a" TV s n might try to soimpoto
oth-t"'ielin ~ ~ 0000. oorta hi oeIt ubr .wt-. wito blo by patting together 0. peaksoog 0New Enrland States. n 0 r is t..t dtot tes. M.tiboopot- Aooon Leagoe 0 for tot 00nefi of
these territorial agremets01 limit the m0- toot bootbll'. apro0 deliberately .. to wbo doo't bov. 00 toor 000 L.100
Imr of toom who can sell games to loc-1 at&- al in an arti .. ty 01 s0- 1. 000er 00b10.
thons La & patcuatae Por ozmlonly t Ld ,t dr- e hi o hs ertra etitosd ,fcthe H1oo Astras and the 'Ibas Rangers
c0n s0ell0ame to local TV channels 10 T-txas w t Itea 00d 1. 000 .1001101 tot - 1it of game. toteOsubt
and 10talans. In sea0ne. the baseball 0w- T11001 bIgo.o 1o-.01 hoo. era ooono lb s0mn of face10w to I1
0rs Are aroig amir themselves to divide 0.00 0 b 01 l 1o- t bot c. 01 th mee11,f00800400 te .o1t,-. toey
markets and limit Output In an 0P9arent ef. o.- in t of t o. 1 tea-oit 110 Tol 00 toallenged .0.1 th ant 01000
fort to manimise their revenue lom broadl o t in -oti.W a010000 100000.4 Of tho n to.0 as thos citie "11 beigflo- oo.ft' obout raising prices f100f0000by0100
cotei. It 1sncertaly a tremendonsd hiv tan- tn 0 0 th toelr logo substantial chonk of ooto n-
tage for the ownrs to be able to eg.age J0 ome It. 01n, pan obaoOmls.1
these kiad of agreements without fear of if 0.001 0_ subject to t0. antitrust 10. Woifing to. exmon cause a
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To gle a little history. Mr. Preei- The San Francisco community has and nake progress In one of its weak-
dent, In 1M22, in a case entitled Federal been asked on fou occasions to build a eat Ares." But the Owners blew It.
Beaseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. versus new stadium to replace what, by all As Boswell pointed out, "a reel com-
National League of Professional Base- standards. is the least adequate najor missioner would have known It." But
ball Clubs, the Supreme Court ruled league baseball park in Amerlot On the owners wore too arrogant to want a
that major league baseball was not four occasions, voters In the San Fran- real coumisloner. They are not inter-
interstate commerce and therefore was Oeco Bay area have aid, no, they sated In the beat interets of baseball.
exempt from the Sherman Antitrust would not support the building of a They are Interested in the beet Inter-
Act At that time, baseball was consid- new stadium. S= Franciso's attend- eats of themselves.
erd a game, not a business. floe answer baa dropped by 25 percent Mr. President, major league baseball
This court-created exemption was since IM. Last year it had the second haa bad at lest three strikes It has
never pu t into law by Congress or ax- lowest attendance per game to the Ba- nised the ball. For the" reasons, our
panded to other professional sports. tional League. . legislation revisits the Is of the ex-
The 1922 decision on baseball Is part of In that context, the Tampa Say cor- emptiun. Our bill reverses the Supreme
the American psyche. It is just like munity has sold more than 31.00 sa- Court decision, and in doing so. the log-
apple pie. Baseball holds a uniQue pub- ann tickets for their new te in a islatlon which we am Introducing
le trust, and since the ruling, has been medern stadium. In spite of that, today applies the Federal antitrust law
untouched by Federal antimonopoly major league baseball rejected Tampa in organised professional baseball.
laws. Bays higher offer, using Its antitrust It Is Interesting that Justice Holmee,
Mr. President. the rationale for base- exemption as the oasis of oing so. In a law review article which preceded
ball's antitrust exemption is gone. to But the treatment of Communities the baseball decision, speaking on the
1922, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes that am able and desirous of having general principle of jurloprudecs. ar-
aid baseball games were "purely State major league franchisee is not the only ticulated the boot rason for our logla-
affair"-teams traveled to other rason why the antitrust exemption lation when he mid:
States for games, but this was not has become an Anachronism. It Is revlng to bs so beter reamoc for
enough to equal interstate commerce. The pour handling of baseball Cor- a mis than In Wes ld down is the time of
Fifty years later, however, the Su- znlelocer Fay Vincent als disqualifies Henry IV. It 1s still more roilo If the
preme Court ruled that professional the owner from its antitrust exemp- ercands which it w laid dows he
baseball Is a business engaged in inter- ton. I think It is significant tha Ong loe and the rol simply per-
state commerce, but upheld the ant- the time Oliver Wendell Holmes was slte for i-a o s
trust exemption. ruling that major league baseball was That Is what we have-blind units
Today, major league baseball is a exempt from the antitrust exemption MOn Of the past In a sport which no
vast, complex organization of multi- was auo the time baseball was going longer needs or justifies the antitrust
million dollar franchises, broadcast thrugh its greatest oriole-the Black exemption-
rights, and concession deals. If 1t talks, Box scandal of toil. As a result of that Mr. President, I am pleased to loin
walks, and looks like interstate corn- scandal, major lesgue baseball estab- Senator.MxrxXNxuw and others, in-
merce, then It must be interstate com- lised a strong Independent commis- cluding my colleague Senator MAc, In
merce. abner's office, this legislation which wili repeal this
Professional baseball, the great Mr. Preodent, installed In that pool- anachroniem.
American pastime, no longer deserves a ton, was probably the strongest cor- Mr. President, I ask unanimous con
place on the legal pedestal for the fol- mleor any professional sport has sent to print In the RECORD an Item
lowing reasons: had in the history of American athiet- from the New York Times of today and
The arrogant and self-serving manner lra, Judgs Keneaw Mountain Lndis. the article referred to In my statement
In which major league baseball has It was in that context of a strong lode- from the Washington Post of February
handled expansion and relocation dIs- pendant commissioner who wan rep- 4.
Qualifles the owners from special ex- reveting the public interest that Oi- Ther being no objection, the mate-
emption. ver Wendell Holmes ruled tit baseball rial Was ordered to be printed to the
Many communities. Mr. President, was not subject to the normal roles of REORD. as follows:
can cite their own example-this com- commorce. Cotr Or CO- tueno MOVES TO BA
munity, the District of Columbia. Well, today, that commissioners of-
Phoenix. and Buffalo, to mention floe has been largely eviscerated. The (By Mdcocy Chaos)
three. I want to talk about the experi- commissioner who most recently at- Pe . Mooch t-BIa months to the day
ones of the community that I know tempted to make strong decisions. FAY alter they asked Pay Vincent in resign as
well: Tampa Bay. Vincent, was fired, because he wa cormlo.er. mao leans rio ce
Major league baseball has continued found to be not making decisions gatocred today amid a growing mosent
to shun, to tease, and to lead the were In the best Interest of the ow among them to delay On selection nra.seweco missioner asti they bass cegotiatedTampa Bay ares to believe a major even though they were In the best to cew labor and television ootracte.
leagne baseball team Is on the way. tenet of the sport of baseball. The owners did appea to be
The baseball-hungry Tampa Bay are- In the meantime, the owners have procreas coat leat e frost Ata joint sea-
Probably the Nation's most attractive continued to stall In the appointment ales of 5ll 28 ownsre Traday. they ware
market without a team-played by the of a new Commissioner. I will submit scheduled in discuss a woc hy Richad
rules to get a franchise. Tampa Bay for the Rtnoce a sews Item from to- Rvtch. their chief labor execuive. to sha
was jiltqt. day's New York Time about an even anOther
Owners of the San Francisco Giants, further delay to the appointment of a IfOtoee..hifrustrated by setbacks. put the fran- major egue commiesiocer. the expe it wosark a Ig-
chise up for se. Baseball's commis- Third, Mr. president, the executive set ste to da.It eort to a a
stoner sent signals that the Glants committee's handling of the Marge malr revense haro agreement among On
could be relocated. Schott incident Is a glaring indication clubs. Ravitch has told the owners that the
Investors from the Tampa Bay area of the owner's inability to police them- plays olon Will aever saM to On salary
offered Slit million for the Giants. A elves without a strong commission. n50 the owners Want to implement if they
California group offered 3100 million, a One of the moat respected sport ml don't increse the amocot of ms they
group which wAs largely put together umniece In AmerIca, Tom Boswell, I sharamongthemslese,
by the current owners of major league an article entitled "Crime and No Pun- A tow-nY D55Mg
baseball. Major league baseball forced ishment, written for the WA tumetabis for the selection efa moLa-Wahigtn oser baa sot bean a topic of discussion atthe owner of the Giant to reject the Post, February 4 1991, thoughtfully re- any or th .s owners ees un lasthigher offer from Tampa Bay and aso- viewed this incident According to B- et. onste The debate baa been conducted
cept the lower offer from the San Fran- well, "She (Marge Schott) handed b- on an Informal, low-kay bas bese &0disco group, ball a Perfect chance to take t stand owner Wants to be on ecord a post -far
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the status qoe, the aboenc of w commi-0.1s- mire trpt i tb. ouncil passes It Baseball )oot didnt boo. tb. stomach for.
.I.-0 0. with or without r.0o~lanm i00 ' Light, trenon it cold' b-1,.10, loot .00 if
ad8 Slls of the Milwauke Brewers. the Jerry 1tai00400t ba be.. lead ounsel. Too
man ctIng 1 planc of . commissloner. aid [From tb. W-hington Post. Thursday. Fob. otab agyravatim Sorry, sa bi to o back
today that "there ar. people who boa. dif- 4. 19 . to Making mooy, Short of saying. '000.
forest opinions" on the selection of a 00,04 D No POOinizur or"y 04.. Schott. yoe W.-. the .onveO
sor to Vince. bt e doclined to .1ab.orat. (By Tboo... Dorsell) party" baseball 0o01401 bav. done les.
We bo a se.h "tommitt Ila that Baoeball dropped the big m0 on .000 Exocutive Council 1hb.1o010 0o1t. a key
sdoin .a Work and will continue to mobeScot 7010. player 10 cotting former ommissioner Fay
orrd,. e ad "Th. committ 1. -t- floo 7!m vo- . Ext Vioot, 0010.000 himself f00
inc this eveninlodhgWD o 
bot ie"n
lo - Ll" ulna0 01w0oth 0f boet 0.100 to 101orfroat St... 1 oul . 11004 finedSchot
Anoother club .ci.. who spoke on the toi bo III- o0 ; h. d.m money. She somotlm
condition that he not be Identified. ezplained g d tl bh. db i ooite. makes bor players pay for bell. tbey lp to
the thinking of the owners o th upo er dok ooot' lod., It You wan1 to can000 boo smalind
de4ay. A ooomissicoor he said. could Only That. it. folk.. 7 1. p.10. recb to boo p00se. S0 S011g Inked hot
the clubs' fforts to achieve the kindth top .Wht do y
of lowr a ttheywa01navy ft.and loo loore Shr ] joot rr to 010 up M extra b.o dr
fare With the work of the three-man owners U- djI u, to ft 10 those Af t
commin negotiating now televIson con- TV. .4d t 0.It S.th too ohio t A. f00 000i.
tracts which expire after this season. i h o et adsetwt h _ t.ogeo~i
"More an moro und.rstandlogingit
this.", the ofloa said.emow.. lb 121 .1.1 This loot 000. lp 00 tb. 0101. IV0. To Moog Schott. owpiosr a basehall 000am
o00rrING PmorOrrs wra~owr ] on th bhk of Sohotto hand from a 00 only two is: Making at leot $10
Revitch doesnt have & vote on Me I- = I- goup of oelo, 1 by millio a year. 
.d getting to eo-0 to th.
tIon of .
.comm n, but he has b00n 00.
qu oted by owners as telling them that theo st n 1 
. to 1001' 0y00 d a o n l b ig Schott .0 obyr.
home to determine their priorities. If their
irst priority Is to gain the kind of labor I MM I t queen iton. Sb. 4.. know lint 
bass from 10104
arrassent they think 1s necessary to the Wi11 000 gain0.0y that he ha. beon base. Bot oh. knows1tha anybody who works
soosene wll ea of baseball. Ravitch has blidaddsrmntdaantb ae o a n pnsbrpceseceloy
told the ownersl they should . head on b.cd boo. 
get. fld. 0 11.010 100 of view.
that ter m looo . . of 
means .0 0 0. 0l . w100.00 000 100
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bo been threatenlag to take satic- againist 00017 to Senior V President Bold
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0wasn' ocate of Viose.t 10 *ember that disappointed. - t b10l 1000(,10 mr1' -o.5tog . white ahot. s10 bo . bock of
caght the attention of sme 00ngree WM body el , tb. 0 .. th. rigbt to4000400myshot
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boalase. Loolodig the three otbe ma0o0jo ristmas ornmto .0 wbo te11 tho on 00s40oun4.
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matoe was In 1SM when Peter Uoborroth, gam. in American poloooo to no1 0 ka 100 0ati1000 evening TV
the the ocommolatomOr. Inud. them to dodend th. powers of tbo owa. T cutouts 0.1000. Boobo 004 Jon-
10 a part of labor negotiations. As delop-o Issues of 01r0l lads 0 o.
meats later showed. the opening of cnbs1 outhpiece "oldot . bo. had .01 0000000100.
books led to the owners' thryear period of to 10o1ect him
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Aupreme 00t00 told. 10 the 100 UNLV owners00 Dr4 000000404 ef bastngll-, hee o
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0ot*, "llakate" between rwrece sharing on 0100.0pa generally Aje01pli, th.ir marnberg Was lucky sbe waa~t being for04 to sel b
their Purt Sa a salary cap on tepaes
p a r t T h e o w n e r s a 1 w t h e o t e a l a y e r ' 0 0 w bt y s m 1 1 0 
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step tWard urritM & new ecoomo reltion- I attgt gt I arsru 
dmgdbsbllsrptto irprby
akpWith the players.cu 
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*10.10th.ploy...club. Owner.ha boe sus mpended "o forced national pariah it she 100.-it 00014 boO.
In another matter. the exent0e council 01 sell 01010 cl 0 oraoy101i from gan' bee0 =oay chance too baseball to 0.1010000
me toda Mad isonaed the restructurlg re b- s to tax evasion to (10101 I11e501 fam. 110 powers1n1t0000000. She handed baseball
porM W1ic 6 Is he role Of the cm00m0i- Petro ontribuons to merely bi00.010 a perfect 100 to take 0 004 010Ma0
010000' The 0 0M As0a0group. W111 0not ' 0with =ther0101 proepor punil0 the annofltsweakest 0.0x-0.
A re-l OVraselr would b.. known IL The antitrust eximptto. represents MOr fans-It if the best thing for
A real eo n soreoo would have gone on an r rticl iea frameork which the Major league baseball.
every TV Aws show to trampt his atud- Courts have set p around major league Mr. President, I have long family
*Mareg Sebott Is the past This Is we baseball to protect it. The exmtio tradItion In the game of baseball. I love
baeball Ia going ta the 21st Century."
Yes . aUOe tOelnt bae made the owner' pursuit of their the game. I believe this legislation willee.r -0 Otro be ca..ner self-interest inconsiatent with the be a poeltive step toward bringing theThere used to ho one. basic Interests of baseball fans. This is public Interest book Into the decision-
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The the opptete of what happens when making process of major league base-junior Senator from Florida [Mr. fr- skt competition is allowed to hall.
MACx Is recognized for not to exceed 5 work. Why will not the owners accept Mr. Preeident, I ask unanimous Coo.
toinwote the system which lhes brought so conch sent to print the following article In
Mr. MACK. Mr. President I thank wod to every other industry In t the Reono.
Senator MzrzzNxAUM for his leadership coontry? Ther being no objeotion. the article
on the Iseue of revoking the antitrust Istead their eystem is a frud n was ordered in be printed in the
status for major league baseball. The emotionally wrenchig fraud. The pea_ Rtoon. a foilowee
barons of baseball have treated the p1. of TampSt. Petersburg were used, (From the New York 'imes. mar. 4.1m]
people of the Tampa Bay area with dis- demeand, and Insulted. Owner, should C8Wf5 or OOM)UM ss MCIV9s 70 BACK
dan, utterly disregardir their hopes be Athamed of what they did, but they
and dreams for a future with a baseball are not. Since our hearing, the Owners ( Narray thss)
team. have done ittle to address any con- not. M c 3.-Oin m the to the day
Benator MrrzzNAAUM was keen to see Ceru Senators have expresed. Expan- a ye ione r.
the abuse of this special privilege and alon. league finance,, the Commis- gathered aj la ng ownes
he acted quickly with a hearing in his eloner's office, a potential iabor lock- a the today ths eeladino ofeaent
subcommittee last fall. I was pleased to out and minor league disputes are all oommlsuccer ntil they have neotiated
be a participant at the December hear- on the table. unaddresed. and un- ow labor en television oroicis.
Ing. solved. The owns. did apper in ma
Those involved learned a great deal Bsebsll's blundering of the location Proreee on at least 0 front. At a ot
from the testimony presented. Three of a tea In Taml3-St. Petersburg i .100 of al 2 Owners Thursday. they we
months later, the baseball owners have inexcusable. On "ven occasions in the scheduled to discuss a p-op..sI by RicherdI~altch. their Chief labor executie,. to stare
done nothing to mitigate the damage last 8 Year', Tampa-St. Petersburg has all of their fmanooal information with ons
of their onerous actions which are tried unocesafully to secure a team sooth.
shielded by the exemption they, and through expaneion or by . We If the owners approve the proposal. w
they alone, enjoy. awy lydb h u ucaebctheyalon, enoy.alwae plyed yt esle. We made they Sre exipected is do. It would Mark a sig-
The Senator oem Ohio [Mr.step in avits effort in achi a
BAu] was correct to introduce this We a Commitments promises, and mor reee shiareemet amo the
leglation and I am proud to be theRavitch as told the er that the
lead cosponsor. Perhaps, now bePayb nion will aevlr lgres to the salarylea c poso  Febae, owbaseball The good people of the Tampa, Bay Cep the owners want to implemenot If they
will come to terms with the many cri- area built a stadium: 30,000 seaon tick- dont increase the account of reveone thoy
ses it face, and come to know th ets wr sold. In the end, nothin snare amog thomseles
central force which can save the And when the Cities in Florida A Wwgsy DZRAT
*Dort-the free-market system. cried to "dross their rievancOZ A timetable for the selection of a coomlo-
The owners wil sing their tiredt oldand sbpoe- oer has nt be a top of discssion at
sonho and claim baseball acted old need National oeag-e President Bill sy of the seven ownec. meting in the lstLoog fand clai uholeding 5It poicyof White. we were inld by the courte that sin mOotha- The debate bee been omnsistact fans by upholding its policy of the antitrust exemption pot Mr. White o, so Informal, low-key heas becus no
locking tefms into their prsment hoes out of the homeh of soen, i Owner we to ho on record s pushing for
wheo it refused the legitimate sole andOneos00.t5Lecf 0001-
movement of the Giants to the ampa hort. major legue baseball is above staun
Fay area- Well, there are at least 1.2 Bud Balig of tbs Muiwaakee Brewer the
million households In the Tampa-t. Major league baseball has Used Us man arIn place of a ommissioner. mid
Petersburg metropolitan area filled a Pawn. Owners hold St. Petersburgas today that "thor, sre people who have did-
with brokenhearted fans whose Inter- If It were their market, not our,. Then fereot oPlalone' on tke selection of a soces-
eats major league baseball did not pro-they use It for leverage on the current, to Vincen. but ho declined in elaborate.
tact. P O-bst cities, and fans in extrat new at&-. "We have a b ommiteesInplae that
In fact, major league baseball showed is g eneich on taebl own ft-
no respect for those fans at all. I deeply ae nwih- u hs vnn.
noreet that baseball has tund Its p in, while everybody else lose Another dlb officIal who spoke on the
back on thes bsebserving people. M El ough i enough. Codition that ho nt be Identified. sa sdbac onthee dser~n peole. 1il- Since the Courts refuse to act end the thinking of the owners who favor alions, of fans deserve to be a purt of our major league baseball is Committed to delay. A Commisioner. ho sod, Could only
national pastime, instead they have Its present cooree the exemption from Impede th olub' efforts to achier, in, kindbeen unfairly left out. the antitrust laws must be removed of labor agmat they wat sod also inter
They merely want the thrill of catch- the Congress costant. fare wit the work of th thremao Owners
Ing a foal ball, getting an autograph. I urge my Colleagues to cosponsor the oommltee ootiatinw telelon n.
hollering at the ump calling a play, but bitoebauonrdck leglaion to Me tMor d e aonr 1.
they can not. I am convinced this oo-"MMad 
m W unesnigthe ca no. amconincd hisoc-nave fsas players, and ultimately the this," the official 'ad.
curred because baseball alone has en ownere from the undue burden the arnmao rioacrme ermr
antitrust exemption and that exemp- antitrust exemption has pot on them. Itavitch doo't havs a vo on On sele
tion had some bearing on the owners' A common question asked about the c. of a commieloner hot he baa bee
curious behavior, ant itrust exemption In: Will removing oted by Owoere s toling them that theyIt really solv the problems of major he to deermn their triorilie. If thirleague baseball? I believe it wil. And first priority Is is gain tbs kind of labor
in the end ther will be mese player, agreent thy think is neother to On
aend mo teams in more cities with 10 ell-bei of basebsle. faavitn Thhi
told One owner. they should more abead o0
that frost.
th the owners dehe to wait on chooser a
wom.ylooer. they probaey will, fatcco fe ire of members of Cogrss who
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have ben threatening to take action agalnt son might have 30,000 saved in his r But this law t entrap yo. hr creating a
teaeebl's satitruet eanemptio. It was the tirement plan. EIs now ompany will ta libty wher ore had to st. Zvee
oners ouster of Voeu In 5t-1 that accept the entir, amount in rollovert hoa, it rae" money only besth ill-In-
caught the attention of s" Com ee se an th delivryia decides to take foietem The welformed will how how to
bers and prompted a hearing of a Senate d i f old I
committee to to the ezemption in D mbRe.Jer= eyers I-e,) hoe lotrodeced a
and today so aide for Senator Howard M.
MetaenhaLm. Denocrat of Ohio' id 'hat need to he fine. But now that ed People should write to their sestoe end
Meteenbaun will Introduce legislatlon deverynan cen only get $400 of hi. repreestatiree. In support.
Thareday aimed at eding baseball's stel- money, because the Government Is '(he05provlelon &police to moot with-
trust exaption. _17 t..tpaeThe6,NcCe. wltholding £10,00. So to put ihl aWM00e0 tin fro) -h. -It -7rto.Mt oTheaid. isnr offr.5ei St Met~en into the new plen. this delivecyman kSiheea.10 wrnspelItl
bends position wa that -'basell shouldtofvanOUPD
Play by the same lsws as all other should his to come up with 10,0rc of ie own that ou have 20,000 in your 401(k)
buseses, lacluding the three other major savings because the Government la e d lee your coopuy fore now Ioh
professtonal holding hi money. ll roe reeses
t 
that 1"20.0 to a Personal
Mtetnbeam . t of people who go to work at 7:30 chek. e Is oft" done, Yo -ocipeoy tee
dicLery sboommittee on antitrust. moopo- every morning don't have S10.040 In now give YOe Osly 110,000. Eotly 20 per-
Is, sad business rights. their bank accounts. They sre fighting oent-4.ttO-tust he withhold for tocome
On the revenue-sharlg t avtch met o the orthodontit for their e
last daughter's brace, sd trying to meet t if
tmsin hi. mor to convince ownersd of theI1yu 41kteasee~ tof i.in stovet valos" otuof the the mortgage or the rent.. They have dietritwtion Into so todividusi retoumetnecsetcy of sharing financial Informtation.
One person who attended the meeting said c payments. insurance Premiums. suout (IRA) u toto your new employer's
Ravitch told them that esrything would aod grocery blle to pay. retirementplan.
ha. to be disclosed, Including side dealsod So what does the Government do if In that anee, you eo got you 34.00 1bec,
al" related transactlons, such as the re- this delivoryman can't come up with hr rlahelog It s & ref.d on your tax re-
meet the Atlanta Braves have with WTBS. the $10.000 to put in the saving, AC- Sg te h
the cable channel that is Owned by Ted T- count? They make him pay texts On deal? The temporary me of o rm to
er. that money sod make him pay al10 per- tn-ee free.
A IEIN smnn~ eXtst~vue cent penalty becauoe they say he took Bot the government hee so ace up ice
0wners lave always been reluctant to let hi. money before he retired at age 6D. eleee. To avoid paring ta. you ha. to
on. snother know their insocial picture. Tha' a had and confusing law, sod rol over So etire 401(k) fletIon-
The only Lime they have shared such infor- that's why I want t which in this .- pl. is 320.Bu.
matis was in 186, when Peter Boberroth,
then the commissionert loduced them to do W put Government back on the side of since your comcany gave you only lI.hadokn you have to fied 84.000 eomewhere eI.e. ifit ase pert of labor neotiations. As develop- h'n ecans You shoudn't you cet ese So money (ur dn't know
ment later showed. the opening of cluts' need an accountant and a pension actu- you had to). that 34.00 wii be t-ead see
hook. led to the owners' thre-rear period of ary every time you change a job or taoahle wlthdewsl.
coleluon eaislt free eet. make a decision, And you shouldn't be So you'll aese tn Cu a t4s000 withdrawal.
At the owners' Drevions meeting, her en penalizd thoueands of dollare for try- yo'd Owe 1.= to toe 28 pe t broet
Feb IT. they established, to A uoaimoue ing to do the right ig. lootlas the 10 perOst Penalty fur foods
vote. "liakae" between revenue sharing withdrawniPior to sge Wh). You'll alo he
their part and a salary cap on players I Congres was trying o c
part- The own-er -w the vote s a major help with this law. but they miesed the Thab . o sappoet the ue wt
step toward forging o mla relaioen, markWeneed to help make pensoes tog tow Point out that I' esy to avoi. Al
ship with the players, portable, so employees can take their you have to do is tall your employer to
1pthem wtaer your 401[k) fuds directly into sot t
met todaY and disoused the restructuring Jobs, and so they can to-nt that their dvidua reiremeut aooooot, or into So re-
report, which defles the rol of the commi- saving, will he protected for their re- tir-eet pisn of your new employer.In that
s4mer. The ownars, as a group, will not re- tiremet Sot this new 20 percent t uss. n0 tanes will he withheld.
Datve the report Until the l pe doesn't do the job. Ufortnately. not everone wl got t
on. with or without recoemmnd Soe employee will err, d e
,JI'll keep up my fight to mnake sure caeught o the tee trap.
By Ms. MUDLBtKI: that pensions are available to all Under the law, your employer he. to give
8. 501. A bill to repeal the mandatory Amerifans, and that those pensions are you a written espleustion of your choi, at
20 percent income tax withholding on effective and portable and will he there lst3 days before you lake the mouey.
eligible rollover distributions which when they retire. I urge my colleagues But my assocto Amy Eektod took alook
are not rolled over; to the Committee to join me and fight for the Intereets of at s of th memee employr. seputtlog
on Finance. all working Americans. out, sod found anmied bog.
DtC~[Z TX RLIOV1 AT OFUld Let'* repeal thie punitive oad unfair 50,55 aea lser end direct, sod will helpIKULtSKT Idr5 do-? I res people reach So right decon. Others me
s. IKULSKI. Mr. President, I rpea.
today on behalf of hard-working em- ing good jobs and a secure fite I eaw on especllly good 1dm, for Con-
Ploye in Maryland and across Amer- for the people of Maryland and of the Ceestel Corp. in Nw York city. Contleotel
Ica. Their retirement savings are nowInterim 
A at Metrpoltan e.
in JeoprdY becausteofonfusing new Mr. President, I sk nanmous con- If so empley" ls' ure wher to traser
Government bau a ounfmetat I bent that an article e printed In the his 
O her mtehy It me e wired O Metr-
amIvrun ta law Tormd b CONORSSIONAL tsxcolt. Poll=~': at a toter date, tome faod. men be
am Introducing a bill to repeal that treeered somewhere ele. Both of thm
law and protect employees' pensions, o t . te I te
My bill will remove the 20 percent You me alSO et up your own Interim MA,
withholding tax that affects people follow: ideally at a moser market mutual fund or
who change jobs and want to transfer tyrom the Weehicetu Pot Jso. I 3 baek mosey maket eroot. Tht keeps
their pension funds. Anyone who takes TA Low O 4110 ROciveu CAN Corr m wh ile you'reestditingnglout
possession of their own pension money, A LOT whe to etet Ilog tm,
even for one day, now has to pay 20 rer- (By Je rat Quinn) not levied en wipe>drale sot Op s lfetina
cent to the Government Immediately. TO Im.rov It. maser flow. Coores s snmities Or en tomet Payments bet-
Even If they put all of their money into Passed a new tsx oubootios law Sot will be toglpreareermore,
a new penslon plan or IRA, the Govern- otftf toe lot Of Pople. It ioe. everyone But tee wi he withheld best "hardehip"
ment still keeps 2D percent until tax who might withdraw money best s am- widrelx fg thinge Ilke medical pay-
teime the followingretirement mentearroollgerndL
But this law gets even more p confus-- Whe yo catl symoney out 
f the plan.Butthi la gae venmor cofus b t get, mewron I'm all In favo Of Yu will owe it5ote xe nd perhaps pee-
Ing. A deliveryman in Baltimore who roes St wil captore eve dime Sot tax- stie. ft rest, So roe might ot mindget. a job witha new company In Tow- laye n Owe. 77 neithh
accept~ the enir amounhinolrolover

Document No. 8

November 24, 1993 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- Extensions of Remarks
t-nce or close to it, regardless of what they while mate a Imposed lo their naees
actually did and what their backgrounds and by their voiten that art entirely at odds
may be. The members of Cones, who of n- with whit ].tios ant booic otliyy and eq-
ceaty deal only in general principles, can- . ty reeuire.
not be expected to be familiar with the dis- Oo intl word. In mny OunmO, the Da-
noctiens that should. to equity and fairnee. al- anaory tenee rqir ets will
be made, based on facts as distinguished he oounterprodootive. n their ow
from broad genraltitor Jur are tot etpid f d
It would seem that the judges who will I- and theyby and large have 
timately be nalied upon to implement the of basic fairnes When they learn, as they
sentencing lawn enucted by Congress. and will, what wll happen upon onviction inder
who have wreatled with sentencing problems the mandatory sentence regime to those who
day-la and day-out. thus have a contribution by any rational otandard are not really
to teak at the take-off, so he spoak not major offenders. they will eften engag In
only at the crash landing. The Judges. After the practice of toililnnon: They will
all, do know from experlence. not from philo- rhoose to exercise their ability to find the
sophlest o ether general writings that an detoant or defend-.toat guilty, an mat-
Individual who is a conler carrying a small er what the evidence.
amoount ef cocaine n la bus from one city to In soon notwithstanding their popul -
another. enticed to do so by a relatively peal ad the undoubted need for inugh.ete
small -um of m doey s net deserve the on crm ani criminl, mandatory sea
sme lined sentenca as a drug kingpin who tonces are likely very cftn be inoompt-
hoperts and diatributes drugs on a thie with the relaniremeot of jtco. The
scale. They aiso know from exerien atio shoeld be now cud carefl before em-
violent crimes may differ greatly with re- harking on u rodal . depsrttre from tra-
epect to such factors as Intent, total ntrmu.
premoditatin, provocation, brutality and
Many Others. All of the perpetrators of such
crimes desere punishmet, but srely ot PRESIDENTIAL MEDAL OF FRE
Identical pernishment.
Judges also know,. having seen the eam- M FOR "COLONEL MAGIE"
ples many times, that a grnulely contrite
offender. perhaps with a distinguished war RON. CHAEL I MNUTY
record ora reord of service he the commn- or pw -oog
nity before becomig addicted and thereafter IN THE HOUS oynyagSsrAvnS
enmeshed in the drug trade. should not be
punished to the goa extent as an antisocial Moeruele, Nooember 23,1993
defendant who bas ne-er done productive Mr. WcRULTY. Mr. Speaker. ou Tuesday,
work. does ot support hit family and 1 o Noonree 2, Preodeet Bil Cleton awarded in
likely for a long time. if ever, to be anything
but a leach on soolety. Yet under the leglila- Mlou Cogres may be about to decree. the F d- thighest codan award of the
practical effect would be that the sentencing U.S. Oveent
ludges must treat them all alike. That is not isuing bin 19d5 Executboe oder. Fei-
Justice. deeruy S. T u tted that rho Me" of
It is probably for these reasons that the Freedoe chal be awatded to any peroo
federal judges of this country, apparently - non perforned a ontroi act or
with few exceptions. regard the floed, man- ctice micai lio ed tho tited Staten i.
datory aentenclng laws as njust and on af-
front to conecnce. That revulsion is not e proeecurioe of a mar ogaiust an eeuy or
limited to the usual specto-the eo-cAlled eroem - Throgtou Word War 11
bleeding heart liberals. It extends from the Korea, and \ieheoie. Martha Rope did jut
udictal appointees of President Carer to that
those appointed by President Seasan and 'Colooel Maggio," as the became knowe t
Bush. And the members of the latter grouD e U.S. Monee ted Spetl Foes rute
at least. may safely be assumed to have been w co4sn-o he an horry liettnan
nomlated, at least in part, on account of
their known or expected toughness with re- olotel cletlonted maty tht at hog le 10
spect o crime. our nSring abroad during toes mors.
Why. then, are the judges of this view? Dining Word Wor I1. although strihen wmob
Cynic might surmise that this is so because yellowrfteer. Ms. Rayenterti an a U.S.
the mandatory sentonces and the related tionper She rsed dne wounded in Korea an
guideliaes Issued by the United Staten Son- wel yet never tught ecognion ho bee toll-
t.ncing Commiselot deprive them of their loo no
unrestrained sentenoing power and the pleas-
am that presumably come from the ability Ding tne Vtnar, e ent 3 to 6
to exercise that power. The cycens a monthe each yaar with or ervice ten aed
wrong. Loft to his or her own devices. each women. Sie truoeled ro remote camps, ndor
coancentions judge spends a great deal of etem ho, to enteotain tne soldiers nd t
time, energy and moral capital attemrpting care for the n ed.
to fashion a just sentenet. Balancing the Veteroun groupsnfhoo ul one te country
competleg forces of deterrence and retribu- coopeeuted ln on ott ueogeize Murtha
ino. the aoods of socirty. the Injury to the Raye' dedicut to her cottby. The
victim and the personal cireumstances of the
defendant is a complex and daunting task. m d T Mt e
taking much time and thought. the Purple Heart, nd the American Legion
It is far easier on the JudIclal schedule and Auoihey, 0110o whom rerentored her service
the judgea caonacence to issue a flat aren- and wishd in honor he accordingly
tence In accordance with a congressionally However, n group word horder in litune
Imposed mandate. Such a sentence requires tIM toonol Maggie- be recognized ho her
neither deliberation nor the balancing of wook than the Meclulo for Moggte C itee.
competing considerations: It is simply an- myiood in Atany NY. in my congres-
nounced. Under that system. when con-
aetne nails it can be stilled by the words
that others have used when required to per- aid Ms. Belle Pellegrno. both Vtet-ora
form najust. act, "I are just carrying out or- veleroom, wete deoted sod tiring in their et-
ders." Yet most judges feel a profound sense on t achueve is mel-detesoed tecogri
of wrong whoa they have sn it by, pimproe io Mue Raaem
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Mr. Speaker. on Monday, November 15, we
were successful. Marine M4 Leo Mencado,
rresenting the President of the United
States, presented the Medal of Freedom to
Mo. Martha Raye God ble you. Colonl
Maggie.
TRIBUTE TO CURT FLOOD
HON. WillAM (B I) ClAY
OF MISlO t
IfE HOUSE OF R9POESlmrAMVnS
Monday. Novemeber 22. 1993
Mr. CLAY. Mr. Speaker Curt Flood, a riend
of mine, was not only a great athlete and
great individual, but also a better than average
artist. I shall never forget the night I was pre-
paring to open a cockig lounge in St. Louis.
My cousin Arthur, another better than average
hrlist, and Flood started painting caricatures
on the walls and ceiling to be higtighted by
the black lights of my Glow Worm lounge. At
6 o'clock the next morning Flood left, wend
home, and preparod for a daytime game
where he started on usual.
I would like to share the following article
about Curt Flood with my colleagues. The art
cie appeared in the November 21, 1993, edi-
tion of the Washingon Post.
A BASEBALL LESSON i FRE.o.
(By George F. Will)
Now Yor.--Curt Flood, a 165-pound whip-
pet of a centerfieldar, could outrun meet fly
balo, but it took him 24 years to catch up to
his 199 Gold Clove award. is stary Is rich
with lesons about courage. freedom and the
coacelt that we can predict freedom's con-
sequences.
He has a career btung average of .2B3in 15
sesons. 12 with the Cndinals. But nothing
so became him In baseball as his manner of
leaving it. Although he played 13 games with
the 1971 Senators, he really left after the 1969
seson when the Cardinals traded him to
Philadelphia and be said. bell on, I wont go.
Black ballplayers have done much to move
freedom forward. 10 1944. 11 years before
Ros- Parks refused to mov to the back of a
bus in Montgomery Ala., a lieutenant in
Texas faced a court-martIal for a similar re-
fusal on an Army bu- Li. Jackle Robinson.
A elmilar epiritedness made Flood help win
for players the elemental right to negotiate
with employers their terms of employment,.
He was bo rIn NHouston in 1938 and played
his way up through minor leagues in the
South in the 1950s. before public accommoda'
tions were desegregated. He recelved food at
the back door of restaurants that served his
white teammates. and be relieved himself be-
brad the bus on the shoulder of the highway.
In the 1950s and 19e. pitchers were drivee
to distraction by black players such as
Henry Aaron and Frank Robinson who
played with an implacable intensity that
nggested the controlled venting of Indigna-
clon stored up during many minor league and
spring training experience. in a South In
transition. The Cardinals of the 1960s were
fueled partly by the fierce pride of our black
men who were taking out their anger on the
ball and on opponents-Plood. Bill White
(no president of the National League) and
two Hall of Famers. Lou Brock and Bob Gib-
eon, the take no-Drlsones pitcher who once
drlled the ribe of a rookie who had the Im-
pertinence to hit a long foul off him.
When the CardInals traded Flood, be chal-
leoged baseballsa reserve clause, which bound
a player to a team until that tearn traded or
releserd him. Seeking to win for players the
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right to sell their labor io a free mearket. he oraints they wil he bener prepared to make
uha.itasand haseballte sattret eaewouidn. a jxsth Imipact an this counitry.
He Lost the 17 season and test In he Su_ I tadroctorty coaed Pepresentaties ta
preme Court., but he had 11t a n.
In 175 the clause was overturned by 0n ar-
brosr Lod were the lamrene the idea of commre-ty developreeni end the
dicting the rnd of baseballe oomyrclsir hut Bant Enterprise Aa cmsd its ptsitr v of bal-kg
nce- few rich tearns would buy the best harde active par s in corsnsrty denet-
play-a d a drelne of atendance. Well. opent Their support made in bi work fin
The desede 118-8 was the first In baseball as of m.
history In mhieh t ditferent teams won the Mr. Speaker. t hose dedicated a great deaf
World Sere. Until sM there had been so my life to was
"worst-to-first" voltilty In this ecuy-notram lc yranstlty dI yeas ura neh osocstut in part hecause of the participationno tesm won a pennant the year after finish-
Ing last. The Twins and Brvem did in 1991, of mairtars financial instifotiono tn 1978. 1
and the Phillies did i 19G3. The 1993 A's arrived i Queens, NY to a coeunity which
the frst team since 1915--the As Philade- t media coged -A Oerity In dire
Phil ancesrs- finish alone In test place Today, Queens is bouncrg heidi Therm are
the year after osthing flet. strefront shopping districts, deces and at-
In 199S the team with the or attend- fordle housing toe to- a inre -oae
anc-the Padres with L.75.32-drewr mer tmOwonec and most ooren y despa-
ans than the St Loi Bron drew I the
entire 1930s (1184.435). The Ortoles t Sn ard stagnation hove hewn replaced hy
tandance for two consecutive regularly hope and pos
scheuled-games was 833Y-re than the Hope exists because of the hard work of
Bowes echo (b becme the Orioles Is 19u4 community organzaons nod residents who
dree to alt of 1935. hse fought bk is the face of adversty. t-
In 1964. the year Jtcquesm Brn wrote tot is ard thei nefticas has at-
shat nyne who would know Americs meet tened them to sea the ht at the end of a
know haseball. th ner-age ettendaace as r t
1.000. This year the Pade veraged 17.191.
ad the rajor eaue aerage was 31.37. The
Rockles drew 4,83.350, mare people than lIne coniitentn o the oretmren where they
In Minheseot or 31 other stases. major take deposits.
Leagoe attendance was 70.257.93. more than Mr. Speaker, when I hogan to develop the
the comhined population of 32 etes. conity areud my dearth in 1977, t won
But no one last year brought a ticket to unabe to gel baoks to peiticipote ta ther po-
see an owner. Because of what Flood stareid. Leati. Their paiticlpoh in 19T7 woudd have
the players. who largely create baseball Irsed my deaths ability to create the 700
eale. 0w receIv their share of that value.
In 1990 the players' averaei salary a s w
2.90". In tos3 It was $1.1 maillon, much more comnity. I would hose made it easier to
than Flaa redsot Is ti entire carer. ild decent attordehosing srts for him-
Rawlints Gold Glles are awarded ann- ard loderafO-eitni residents in Oieens.
ally to the ns players In each lease voted Their patwipehon would have ade the
best defensively at their positions. Flood greunds of my coenaty nore eriields of
won I in 19. when this could have been said tOfger economic growth which.idatefy
of him Two-tthirds of too plant le srd crates a sotn and healiorer place to fee.
by water and the met is covered by Flood."
But is the turbalence of his rebellon he S e g ni r
oever colted his idoe. He got it here last e g an tatacooitale nociahanetre pro-
week at this yeare awaed ceremony. gr. instead, thin egisotiot Is about
He once aid, I am pleased that God made naissteoorirg peOPtO who Otheie might
my skin black, but I wish He had made It nat ha. e access to needed capital and meait.Lcohier Friesito of basebl. and of free4 Aginl would ito o press ay appeecia-
dom. are Pleased that He idnt. l J211
leaTote Rboo arid their statfs arid to a
AMERICA'S ECONOMICALLY of the Mao-ter who nopported the Bat En-Lterpo Act amendment the Banitmg eone
Mr. Speaker. I urge my coteagues to sdp-
sucesfu in par becaus ofr the. par4cpaio
OF NEWe YORK
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, November 22. 1993 AAA PRESIDENT HONORED
Mr. FLAKE. Mr. Speaker. H.R. 3474 is the
product of biparisanship-both on the House HON. CHARLES  SCHUMER
Banking. Finance. and Urban Affairs Conmit- OF.e Yeas
tee and in the House as a whole. H.R. 3474 M THE HOUSE OF iZPHFlCAfl S
addresses oe of the Nations most urgent
and pressing concems-America's econi, Meoay, ernher 22, 2993
cally underserved communites. I commend Mr SCHUMER. Mr. Speaker, on Deceor
the President and my colleagues on the Barnk- 9. 1993, the New York County Larss Asso-
ing Cormritee for moving tis legislation with cation wilt hor Robed Coson, Presient of
such soeed and decision. The Nation coo he the American Abitrhon Association nce
proud of its House today as we strive to make 1972, with the William Nelson Croorweg Award
economic opportunity a reality for more Ameri- toe Usetul end outstanding serice to the pro-
cans. feosion aod the commuity. I join in otterng
Mr. Speaker, H.R. 3474 removes burden- ;W coogratoann to hen and ry appreciaton
some, regulations from financial instions for the energy end itelct he ts oughto
whitle not jeopardzing thei safety and sound- or, profession. todeed, his work has affected
ness or their ability to serve their customers. of cr Was and mont directly t cases of at-
By hreerog bankcs at these unnecessary coo- tereation dispute tesoltion arid legal reform.
Robert Codson joined the American Arbitra-
fkon Association in 1963. The AAA was found-
ed in 1926 by leaders in the fbursiness and
legal conimunities and has become the stand
ardtseing iristitutino for aterriative dspute
eesolution with more than 7,000 members, and
more than 52,000 panelists who work on
cases involving billions of dollrs each year.
Mr. Coulson explained AAA's growth an the
occasion of its 65th birthday several years ago
no a reflection of the fact that arbiteration rad
mediation are favored by business executives
and their lawyers as less costly, less time-cor-
sumring and more rahonal ways of setling dis-
putes. particularly when the court system is
flooded with cases
Robert Couson's passion for reform has at-
fected every activity in which he is involved.
He has been active in the Association of the
Bar of tho City of New York arid the Amerkcan
Bar Association, serving as chairman of the
Corrmrercial Arbitration Committee of the cor-
poration section of the ABA and cochairman of
the Collechie Bargaining and Arbitration Com-
mitiee of. the labor section. He serves on the
board of the Fund for Modern Courts and is
an Honorary Fellow of the Arbhatore Institute
of Canada. He has wrniten and enctured sten-
smely on management-abior relations and dis-
pute resolution. Mr. Coulson is the author of
'How to Stay Out of Court" -Fanly Medation
Will Work for You," -The Termination Hand-
book, tBusiness Araitration" 'Labor Arbitra-
tion,' 'Arbitratiron in the Schools, 'Alcohotl
Drugs and Arbitration." -Empowered at 40.'
How to Stay Out of Cort,' published in
198, sold more than 100,000 coples, at-
traced mainstrearn media atention, and
brought attematrve dispute resoltion to the at-
fention of the counity. The Arbitration Journal,
published by the AAA, corntinues as a
preemmineit publication in its field.
Robert Coulson is a graduate of Yale Uni-
versity and Harvard Law School. He has re-
calved honorary doctorates from Bryart Col-
lege and Holstra University. He is marded to
Cynthia Cenneighamr Coulson, has five chil-
dres, and lives with his family in Connecit.
GREGORY LEWIS HONORED BY
THE CARING INSTITUTE
HON. GEORGE J. HOCHBRUECKNER
OF Now YORK
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESElerATIVEs
Monday, November 22,1993
Mr. HOCHBRUECKNEFL Mr. Speaker, I -ise
today to recognize one of my constituents, an
exceptional young man from Kings Park, NY.
In December. Gregory Lewis will be one of 10
young adults honored by the Caring Institoue
for selftessness. compassion, and caring.
Gregory has been a leader among Long is-
land chapters of Students Against Drunk Driv-
ing [SADD). During his 3-year tenure as the
president of Kings Pad High Schoots Sta-
dents Against Dnrunk Driving. Mr. Lewis formed
a coaliton composed of SADD students from
every school district in Suffolk County. Long
Island. Among the group's activities was a
workshop dealing with drug holnes. drunk
driving, alcoholism, and govemmern relations.
In additin to his work with Students Against
Drunk Driving, Gregory established a drug
awareness reading program and founded the
Athletes Detest Drugs Organization in the
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I think we passed a good bill here. I models for the children, and Symbols
think it will help the country when f- around which to rally civic spirit. I
naly enacted, coming back from the know frm my Own personal experience
conference committee and put into with the Wlington Bins Rocks Sin-
written, law and then folly Imple- gin-A baseball team that cities and
mented- towns with a sports team eon .the
So 1 thank all invoived and m very wealthier for having a place to coin
gratefal for that support. together an a community to poil for
With that, ]dadam President. I yield the hnie team. In exchange, the fans
back the floor. not only bays paid admission to attend
Mr. D'AMATO. Madam President, let the ganies. hot he provided rions
me Jnst take several seconds to com- other finacial and legal Incentives not
mend the distinguished chairman of normnliy available to other businesses.
the committee, Senator RIEGL. to Regrettably. Mr. President. the ow-
commend his staff, and to commend e and players of professional sports
the staff on the minority aide for an today have forgotten that In return for
outstanding job. So many Members the special status they have been an-
have worked to bring this bill to a corded, they have obligations to their
point where we are really. I think, on a commnitiea that are more than mak-
threshold of accomplishing unusual lug a profit Or sIning a ralti-million
things; 'hecurization" in the area of dollar contract. The fans are Owed
small business loans, making commer- more because the fans have been anked
cial loans hopefully morn accessible. to do morn.
providing capital for the loans, and see- -Fans en taxpayers" provide their f-
ing to it that we have a sound flood in- nanelal support for the often massive
surance program. Infrastructure that is needed by a pr
None of this was accomplished with a fessional tear-whlch ran Include the
great deal of ease. It was lot of hard construction and maintenances! a eta-
work, and I might say a very bipart- d~s, parking lots. roads, sewers, otii-
san effort. tie, ad public transportaion.
So, may I start by again thanking -Fans a voter"provide exemptions
the staff, both on the Republican aide and exceptions in their laws, municipal
and on the Democratic side, and com- regulations and soning requIrements
mending the chairman and all of our that rotate to teievision contract
colleagnes who participated in putting rights, neighborhood curfews, and
forth a bill that I believe Is going to variances.
help put people to work. "Fana an fan." after Providing sop-
I believe you are going to see a great port a taxpayers end voters, are re-
deal of capital that otberwise would quired to pay more far parking, pay
not be made available to the little peo- morn for tickets, pay more for hot dogs
pie, small businesses, and entro- and pretsels, pay mor to watch their
prensers. They in turn will be able to favorite team on pay eleon, and
put their expertise to use, move this even then, Alter "Paying," ere some-
country forward, and in the truest times faced with threats by their teem
sense provide real Jobs and job opportu- that It will wave to another eity.
nities. Mr. President, clearly, the present
I just went to take this opportunity state of Affairs mnst change. The 4ues-
to thank the chairman again and all lion is how. Senator lDI Aum-a
those who participated, focus in the past has been baseball's
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- antitrust exemption He Introduced a
ator from Kentucky. the majority bill a year ago that would repeal major
whip. league baseball's anitrust exemption.
__________Lest. fali, 1. along with many of the
MORNING BUSINSSeme of the Judiciary 
Co
Mflhli~lO SISINSS itten, asked him to conduct a broader
Mr. FORD. Madam President. I ask examination of professional sporta The
unanimous consent that there now be complaints often directed a major
period for morning business with Sen- league baseballs antitrust exemption
ators allowed to speak therein for up to related to stadium financing, league
5 inntes each. expansion, franchise movement tale-
The PRESIDIIN 0 OPWICREt m Without vision nights and salaries have also c-
ojection. It is soa ordered. curred Or presenlly exist in profes-
glo-A bsors tado not enoy an anti-
TH UICIARY CObtfl =RES IlN-sTeJdcayCmitesealaY INTO FROFESSIOAL tion of proe al sports ill proceed
SPORTS along two tracks to determine the
Mr. BIDEN. l&. President. On Non- proper extent of congressional involve-
day. March 21. 104, Senator NETEN- ment Firt. the committee needs to
nAUM will open the Judiciary Commit- d termine ten role Congress should
tee's broad inquiry into profehsavnal take to deal with the ompisints frm
sports; when he convenes a fid hearing the public involving stadium financing,
in Tamopa lSy, FU. Professional spurts broadcasting rights, the move to pay
leagues in the United States are so- telegiin, and owner and player cou
corded specia treatment-a treatment duct. Conflicts in these areas have
that is cot neceesatllY undeserved raised Issues as to the "public minded-
Spectator spurts have provided fans nes" and responsibilities of profs-t
with entertainment for the faily, rain ional sporte leagnes and toeas to
March 17, 1994
local communities. Second, the com-
mittee needs to consider a set of grad-
uated step-ther than simply elimi-
nating baseball's antitrust exemption-
that Congress might take to guarantee
that all professional sports meet their
obligations to fans and taxpayers.
Because Senator MnrxnnBAUM's hear-
Ing will take place during major league
baseball's spring training, I have no
doubt that ample attention will be
given to the issues involving the anti-
trst exemption and the recent re-
structuring of the still racant commis-
sioner's office. As I pointed out last
fall. I certainly do not dispute that
major league baseball receives special
treatment under the antitrust laws,
and I think the assertion of some peo-
ple, including that of former Commis-
sioner Fay Vincent from the Septem-
ber 26, 199, New York Times, that
"baseball deserves its immunity from
the antitrust laws" should be reconsid-
ered in light of recent eventa. These
events suggest that the Judiciary Com-
mittee examine the legal and financial
advantages bestowed upon baseball and
other professional sports by the citI-
zens of this country.
The failure of the owners to hins a
commissioner Is disappointing. In the
past, an independent baseball conlnis-
sloner has maintained the health and
integrity of the sport by balancing the
interests of the fans with the concerns,
of the players and the owners. The
owners' omission is exacerbated by the
fact that a commissioner, the fans' rep-
resentative, will not be available to
help resolve the remaining and poten-
tially contentions labor lasnes over
which the Major League Baseball Play-
em Asuocintion bas threatened a strike
later this summer.
These issues are important and I look
forward to reviewing the hearing
record- As the committee carries out
this examination. the focus must be on
the issues that affect the fans. I am
specifically concerned about the poten-
tial effect the proposed repeal of base;
ball's antitrust exemption on minor
league baseball, and Issues that exist
regardless of the antitrust exemption
related to league expansion and fran-
chise movement. taxpayer financed
stadiums, television rights, and salary
caps, revenue sharing and player sala-
ricm.
The dependence of minor league base-
ball on major league baseball's anti-
trust exemption needs to be
ascertained. Minor league teanmeexist
in more than 150 communities across
the country, including Wilmington,
DE the home of the Blue Rooks. As
many of us are aware, on March 3, 1994,
the Nations.Association of.Profee-
sional Baseball Leagues held a "Con-
gressional Education Day" that
brought representatives fror. more
than 100 minor league baseball teams
to Capitol Bill offices, These minor
league teams oppose repealing the ex-
emption because they contend that
most minor league clubs do not have
the financial resources to Identify
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players and negotiate salaries Pres- take is a review of the aw that pro- he went to Harvard College where he
ently. major league baseball provides vides a limited antitrust exemption for graduated corn laude. After graduation
the players and pays all the salaries for al profesonal aportsleuee to nego- he spent a year in the Sudan and Nige-
minor league clube, in addition to pay- tints television contracts. The law was na as a Rockefeller fellow. Upon com,
ing expenses for uniforms, equipment. passed in 196 and has not heen amend- letlon of ie fellowship he returned to
and travel. The importance of the ed sinc that time even though tele- Harvard for law school, where he had
minor leagues to the more than 30 rail- csting has changed radically. Th the great distinction of winnin the
lion fana that attended games last year original purpose and foundation for the Ame. Moot Court Competition.
is undoubted. Before taking steps to re- law should be examined in light of the After coming i law degree, Doyal
peal the exemption, the Judiciary expanded use and availablity of cahle Patrick clerked for Judge inhardt on
Committee needs to explore the histor- television and pay per-view, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. He
Ical relationship between major league Normally. Congress would ndt take then joined the NAACP Legl Defense
baseball and the minor leagues to de- an interest in the calaries or finaci and Educational Fund as a staff attor
termine whether alternatives exist to arrangements of a private business. In soy. In thin position, he defended death
support minor league baseball from the the tas of professional sports, how- row inmates and litigated many voting
largest to the smallest communities. ever, the many Instancee Is which mu- rights cases.
Issues with regard to league expan- ololitie. and Staten provides funds Even after leaving the NAACP Legal
.on and franchise movement exist In for facilities create a public Interest in Defense and Educational Fund. ir.
all professional sports leagues. Increas- the fiscal health of a team. The cem- Patrick remained active In civil sights
ingly, stadium finacing and revenues mIttee has an obligation at least to isu. Me has devoted approximately
have been tied to whether a league will highlight the different option avail- 30 percent of his time since joining the
grant a city a new franchise or whether able to ssure that teems remain via- Boston law firm of Bill and Barlow to
an existing franchise will remain. Be- his and community mossy is sot wast- pro bonn work. most of which ware
cause this problem exists in all sports. ed. The owners of major league hose- civil rightsces. e ohtained a land-
It is not necessarily tied to the anti- hail have recommended a salary cap to mark settlement on hehalf of a large
trust exemption. he Imposed on each team. Presently. number of African-American burrower.
Recently. major league baseball an- the National Basketball Association who were victims of a lending scam. He
nounced the possibility of expanding has a salary cap, and the National also drafted an aricua brief in a soo-
the league by creating two additional Football League will have one In pince cosfal Supreme Court challenge to the
teams. No doubt, the announceoment next season, racially motivated se sf preemptory
will inspire a flury of activity and ex- In addition, the abilty of team In challenges in a civil cas.
penditures on the part of a number of small media markets to exist and re- Ther is a seed to America and in the
cities in order to attract a team. Such main competitive becomes lens certain Jutice Department for lawyers like
activity is not unique to baseball, how- as team alaries ris. A city's signhfl- Mr. Patrick. Last year. the civil rights
ever, as recently evidenced by the bid- cast investment In stadism Infrastruc- division filed a record number of cases
ding for two new NFL franchises on the tore Is threatened when a team falls, and launched a record number sf love.-
part of Memphis, St. Louis, Charlotte. Baseball has a revenue shoring pro- tigatione. Under the leadership of At-
Baltimore. and Jacksonville. In order pena under negotiation to attempt a torney General Janet teno and Deval
to gain Its franchise. Jacksonville cor- more equitable distribution of money Patrick, I amcertain the Civil Righte
mitted to a 121 million renovation of among teams from large and all Division wil continue to eradicate die-
the Gator Bowl. St. Louis has started media markets. The commitee seeds to criminatlen in America. In addition. I
construction of a 3258 million domed consider whether mesures such an a believe Mr. Patrick serve as an impor-
stadium in the belief it will get an NFL salary cap and revenue snaring will tent role model to or yung people
franchise eventually. All of the cities help to stabilize cubs fnancially in teday. Me has dedicated his life and
spent significant amounts of money small media markets and protect the committed his work and talents to the
merely to be considered as a viable 10- investment of the local community, struggle of overcoming racism and pre-
atio Mr. President. the Judiciary Coi- serving he basic concepts of fair powy
Recently, mavny football and baseball mattee has undertakes a held epamin and due proces inner society.
teams have threatened to leave for tin as part of Its obligation to address Mr. Patrick'a background clealy
other cities unless the city builds a the probles. facing sports fans. I look demonstrates his commitment to civil
new stadium or provides favorable or- forward to reviewing the proceedings of rghts. I as, confident that Mr. Patrick
rangemsents on concesaions each as Senator Mn'EiiWASIm'8 next hearing -Ml continue In the strsglile in uphold
parking and sky bos. Locally. Jack and those to the future. tama copfident our freedo by protecting ear chvti
Ite.t Cooke. owner of the Washington that in the end, the committee will de-rights He has cy strongest support for
Redskioa. is In the proess of trying to velop a comprehensive and effective ap- this nomination, and I also urge my
move his team out of Washingten if he proach to retore the Impotince of the colleague. to lend their support w this
can find a municipal or State gover- fan In the scheme f profesltn outstandingcandidate.
must to finance a stadiu. Thencitd aii ort
Buffto recently announced it will
spend = million on the Bills' a o VERONA CNIoELYn DOgENrdE OF
dium-4 mullion on the largest score- aN iPPORT OF DEVAL PATRICK CHARLESTON VOLUNTAISM
hoard in the country and an. undis- TO HEAD TEE3 CIVIL RlIGHTS DI- Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President. next
closed amount on new private suitea. VIBION OF THE Jg nTICE E- week tha family and ends of Verona
The Bills organization Indicated that PcasEN pnIrsys sill gather to celebrate her
any seeded additional revenue would Mr. DRCONCINI. Mr. President, I dese M0th birthday. Of course, this will be
be covered by increased ticket price.. in strong support of the President's much mor than a birthday party. ft
The Judiciary Committee should con- nomination of Dove] Patrick to head will beea celebration of&a life exception-
alder whether the taxpayers' retumn on the Civi ights Division of the Jtiece ally well lived, a life dedicated to vol
these stadium improvements ame com- Department. Mr. Patrick Is an acom- untarlarn and counity service.
pearasle to their investments. plihed lawyer, with experience in both 'Mr. President. to outiders. the city
Purportedly, there Is a movement to civl rights litigation and private prac- of Charleston is defined by Its culture
pay television among the profesioal tih. Throughout his legal careerhe and aonitecture. But to us native
spos'ts leagues. The recent television has demonstrated a pasonate com- Charlestonis. the city Is dfined fIrst
contract major league baseball signed mitment to civil rights. and foremost by the specisl people who
has raised concerns because it could bis personal and professional back- live there. Verona tlnsely is one of
mean that playoffs are not on network ground Is impressive. Mr. Patrick hai tense special people.
television for the fst time ever. Cer- froman impoverished neighborhood on Verona estabished herself an an envl-
taInly. o step the comittee should the smoth side of Chicago. lrom there. mental activist long befor mont
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statatics of Ty CobbWs batting average Ther have beer discussions - the ries. end a key point of diagreement is
and Bab. Ruth*. batting averge. flor of th Sea, since the an- whether ther shoold he a salary sap.
As a youngster. I Sound it fuepira- nounosineet was mad about the in- The players nake gigantic some of
ticeal to study the baseball players pending strike onAsgoat I that per- money. millon of dollas a year. and
and see the tenacity and discipline and hays the Congresa naght to enador the own havs tremendous revenues.
their chracter, and I think it has had some actin. to take away the antitrust although the owners claIm that ther
a propound effect on Americans, and exemption, are some I tees which a on the
really worldwide in many, many ways. I he hoen nilling to do that, Mr verge of bankruptcy and then is a di-
In being an example and providieg a Presient. hecas ff1 were to support pote e to whether those financial fig-
tremendous thrill when people would the antitrust exemption and taking ores a aecurate becase It Is corn
go to the park or listen on the radio,a away the antitust exemption, and It pieeer
I did as a yonngater. or in the base- iled to the committee moat recently Ther are may third-party con-
meet of the Wheeler Kelly Eagoer by only a singl vote, or if we were to tracts, where the Atlanta Braves have
Building. watch the scores on the big take away the antitruat exemption an agreement with the television net-
hosrd, haseball enloys more laoadly. there work and the Chicago Cua similarly
There may be sore wagering, per- would he a real threat that the Pitt- have an agreement And I do sot koow,
haps In violation of Kansas law. AdI burgh Pirates would leave the city of r- President. whole right and who Is
would see the squares o Pit gh, and that would he dsv- wru. It may be that both parties are
when someone would hit a home run, astalg for Plttshurgh, Night now, the wrong In shlecttng the fk- to the
an extra square, double square, or tri- representations are maria that the PI- threat of tis kind of a strike-
pe qare, on rare occasion when a month, and I a long leed, Mr President.
the ee to -m ocasornthee there has heeo a city group coining ia that sports ame unique, and that base-re wrue an three to take over the ownerahip of the Pi hell is ted with a public Interesthoesrunsan inning.
All of that is now threatened by the rates to keep the Pirates in Pittsburgh. and that football is affected with a
baseball strike. I think it is especially So with concern for the Interests of pohic hnterest.
troublesomePensyania and the city of Pit- Some he nalged sport i sb-trosies eMr.Presden. fbraned burgh. I cannot Join in en effort to re- lic otlitiesoed that may he going abaseball has a Unique and a ireferredmove the anlitrut exemption hecase title f.- If you have ailod strike,
status in America because It is a busi- of the risk that It would pass for the the Congress a intervene al stop
neas which is not subject to America's Pirates leaving the city. Bot from the s1rke Nobody is saggesting that
antirst laws. Every other bustness many points of slew, the Pirates have the natue of bawbal reaches the lovel
which exists in America bas to no- left the city, in a sense, when free of a railroad era publ utility, to that
tion in a competitive way, and ther agency bee taken away Dry Bonds to extent
may not be agreemente in violation of San PI-ssco end Bob Bonin. to Nw But it in my hope that the players
on competition. Baseball is the one York and other starplayers so that the and the ownes will find an agreement.
business. the only business, which does Pirates, whiebad enovins talent, When you talk shoot free market, you
not have to abide by the antitrust laws end had those players stayed there the talk about the very basis America at-
of this country. Pirates would he hero a pennant con, litde, al It l.s principl of slowing
It came about in a curious way whoa tender and would have been a much. people in earn a moch money a the
Jast.ce Oliver Wendell Holmes many mash stranger te market wil permit.
years ago said that baseball was a Mr. President. I think that all par- But I would suggest that ther may
sport and not-a businesa. When Justice ties to the dispote. the owners and the he -me cuter limits of public toler-
Holmest decision was tested many dec- playera ought io aware of the con, ance. amd Puhic tolernce in reflected
ades later, the Supreme Court said, core which exists In the Congress stout In the unique special position which
well. it is a businees now, but we are the Impeodlcgstrike and the conc baseball has asaresult of the antitrust
not galig to change its exemption from that exitas to whether we ought in exemption. And If the puhlic cisunse in
the antitrust laws because if tXagress continue the attrust exemptio sufficiet ad the oemeosiscal out-
had wanted to do so, Congress con.1A It may well he that Congress will sot sage Is ssfflcient we may find that
bave dose so. We are going to leave if ther in a strike, I think that there antitrust compensation removedt And
baseball in an exempt states i going to he eorus public rac- then we would in fot hase a situation
C the Judiciary Committee, I have lbs. Right nan. it In just speculative where the parties who benefited from
considered the tas of taking away as ho whether the strike will take place the goose which ld the golden egg
beball's antitrust exemption and for on Aogust 12 Rot sin the strike was would have in fact killed the goo&e.
. t4e cnaldered taking away foot- s nd, thaws ontacted represeot- So I hope te will he a co-nder-
bank limited antitrust exemption. atives of the Players and reorereota- alen and I have taken the initiative
Unlike baseball, procednzally foot- livns of the owners in an effort in se in talking to representatives of the
ball has a lindted satitrat exemption if I could be helpful in settling the playem and repreoenhativee of baseball.
which applies only to poollag receipts strike, or If ther in aything that the beaue the gm aught to be pre-
on bhedlso. I was concerned about Judiciary Committee could do, or eth- ered, at perhaps arbitration would
that when the Balders moved from en intieSent culddtosettlethe be the way. But ths partis oswht in
Oakland t Los Angelea. I was con- trike some together and realise the public
corned shout that when there was a I am advised ther inotking that we Interest and the puhic concem and
threatened move of the Phillies from could do. and from the discussins acert the strike.
Philadelphia to Phoenix in aboot 1984. which I have bed over the coos of the -1 thank the Chair end yld the fler.
We have never changed the antitrust past Idays, It moms in me thatware The PRSIDING OFPICER. The Son-
exemption for many, many reasons, headed for a baeball stzike and for a ator from Pennsylvania yields the
but there has long been a cocers in disruption which may nd the rest of floo.
the Congress about whether baseball the seson and may eliminate the The Senator frm few Jersey, [.%fr
oaght to continue to have that anti- leogos oship playoff games and Lentssma in rcegosest
trust exeraption. the World Series. Mr. IAtTENBEBD. Mr. President. I
Just a few weeks ago in the Judiciary I think. M. President, that the par- ask nanimous consent that I may
Committee, we took up the lene of tier may wel I the goose that Lays speak as if In morning husiness.
taking away the satitrust exemption the golden egg If we were to elimiate The FRESINi OFyICi Wil the
as it related to labor negotiations be- the antitrust exemption. I do net know Senatrindicatthe length of time?
case the representation was made at what would happen. I do not know if Mr. LAMTEEG. Probably less
that time that if we took that ation, baseball could survive in ita present theninlnntft.
perhaps the Iaeball strike would not form even if the players art the owners The PRFSfIiG OFPICEI. Without
ocur, got together- There onv eeoror s- ohjection, il s so ordered.
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The Senator is recognized for 15I is thin a real problem? mifortu This hind of oituation is intolerable.
nateiy, It In. I have Article alter Article Mr. Presidest. Something is terribly
________ ,,,'.,Jidentifying incident after incident of wrong when a dangerous sex: offender
sexual Abuse of Pupils by their school can, move into a community filled with
CHILD ABUSE bus driver. I would be happy to make young children, without any of the
Mr. AUTEBERG Mr. thene available to sny Member who is neighbors even being notified of hiaMr LUTENBERG Mr. President. Interested In seeing them, presce.
yesterday the Senate accepted an The ustion arises whether or not It Io time we did something about
Amendment that I proposed to the Im-aedeta!prooe torta~ h m-Fderal background checks work. I be- this, Mr. President- It Is long postproving America's School Ant of 1993
which is designed to protect the chil ove they will. My Amendment would time.
whihes fetin oontrwotechi toe los- Alao require-and there may be some In fart, lust year. the Senate adopteddrenInconvenience here-the ingerprnting As part of the crime bill a provision anfrom school on a schoolbus. of prospective driverso their true thored by the diatinguished Senator
Mr. President, the woeful truth isch Pe id.te weltuhIidentity can not be hidden, fvrm Washington [Mr. ioiRreJIi whichthat these children need protection During the 2 months after California would have conditioned Fedenl funds
from the people who drive their school- utofrom inn peopeo ive theifr school- jiti Fedlerai criminal hack- on a State adopting a registry of sexualbus. We all recognised the unfortunate ground chocks in IM, it screened nut predators, and providing for comma-
fact that some people ae ttrace to 0 convicted sex offenders, child mo- ity notification when a sea Offender
the teaching profession ecause igv lenters and violent criminals who tried esahiished a now residegie
them easy access to the chidrenperits to drive choolbuse. Senator GoToN's Amendment was an
are the focus of their sexual desire. That falls us smething. This is chock- por t addon
What we do not recogniz-r take Pro- Iora ii t h rm ilWat wdostrcgi-rtaei Ing and my amendment vwill address Unfortunately, the proposal opparently
cautions againsf-is the fact that some thin problem
people drive schoolbases for the same Mr. on any given'school hs ben w ane In cnene
very to children.
Children-access day, 25 milion children ride in school- able, and I hope I Am wrong I haeChilrenwhorid no cbnlboeo.bunco. For the vast nmajority Of these heard that the conference report doesparticularly those in their early years. children, the trip will be ae and un- not.prsvde for community notification
the elementary sebool years. are ex- eventful. Unfortunately, for coma it when A dangerous se Offender gets out
tremely vulnerable to physical abuse w
They are too young to comprehend
what is being done to them and they them for the test of their lives. SO That to disturbing to me, Mr- Slmol-
are too small to physically defend when that amendment Passed yeSter- dent, In oy view, when you're talking
themselves from an attack. Therefore day. Mr. President, I was relieved, about dangerous sexual offenders mov-
It Is the responsibility of society t I appreciate the fact that y eol- ing into A community, the neighboring
offer as much protection as possible to leagues support this Amendment in Parents have a right to know. And we
this vulnerable population. Protect children on their ride to and should use whatever resources w have
My amendment recognes that re- o school. I look forward woring to encourage States to Provide fr such
sponslbility by requiring all States to oerees o the lmproving notification
do a Federal background check on po- America's Schools Act in order to en- Mr. president, I know ther are se
tential schoolbus drivers before they sure that Federal background checks who feel that once someone ha served
are allowed to be alone with our chil- for sebonihus drivers remins in the his or her sentence, they've repaid
down, bill after conference, their debt In ociety and that's the end
School boa drivers are unique. They of it. But Mr. President, It to lust not
Ame alune with students off school prup- that simple. Yes, even convicted people
erty. often for extended periods of 'RE DY DN NEW JESE have rights. But comnmunities have
time. Mr. f.AiITSiBESi. Mr. Predideft. I right. too. Parents have rights Young
Mr. Presldent, we know that must of have another statement, Unforto- children have rights.
these People, by far, Are good. law-abid nately. It deals with not too dissimilar And th bottom line far me,
log citizes, often Parents themselves, a subject, and that In Attacks on chil- President, is that the rights of chlodren
wbs hav, so intentions In molest or at- dren. like Megan ank simply must come
tack children, But them Are the others, Mr. President. last week in New no- first, In fact, for me, it is not even a
sodws have to guard against them soy, a terrible tragedy took place, a close call Beus, when you get right
I believe As I hape do many of my tragedy us recent that the child who down to It, nothing In more importnt
colleagues, that parents deserve to wan killed has rot yet hd A funera than protecting cur children. Nothing.
know who i Alone with their children, service foerer burial. Be I look forward to worlng with
At prascot, Ii States already conduct A 7-year-old girl, Megan anks, wan Senator (brS to continue the pooh
sate And Federal background checks sexually cesaaltid first and then brou fr a comunity notification require-
on theIr driven. My Amendment would t1aly murdered. It was a despicable and mast, which already Is now widely
not effect how these Btates administer horrifying crime that shocked people knows In Nfew Jersey An a Megan law.
their programs. throeghout my State and throughout Because, at a minimum, parents have
There are 14 States which currently the Nation. Or hearte go out to her a right to know when their hide ae
selF do Stats background checks. My parents and her family. We can only going to be expo ed ti a dangerus eo
bill wold require those Staten to redi imagine the pan that they am w going offender. And we have a Moral respon-
ret the resourcs they am, putting through. We ali prcy that we will never sibility to help pco ide them with that
into tese background checks towards have in endure that hind of feeling Iyformatiln
A Federal p . While tha Intent of Mr. President. the mant who has con- Mr. President I hope we will pass toe
thes State programs are good, they fesoed Wo this ouimgpeou hilling al- Megan law, and dolIt soos.
soew flawed. A convicted sexual deviant ready bad been convicted of sexually I yield the floor.
cn eslly move to one of these States,' related offenses. Be spent a lsrg time I suggest the absence o a Quorum.
receive a clean background check, and in confinement, Yet when be moved The P SeDING OFFICES. The
begin driving his Prey to and from Into Megan's community, nobody In clerk will coil the roll.
school. . the neighborhood wan notified of his The assistant legislative edek pro-
Then there are the iS States which criminal history. So thin convicted sex ceeded to call the roil.
have no background checks for their offender was free to mingle freely with Ms. Mt LS Mr. Preident . Io k
school bus drivens. Theme s no rational the neighborhood children and to gain unanimous consent that the order for
reason for the lack of responsibility their trust. Meanwhile, the children's the quorum Call e rescinde,
these States Are demonstrating In this parents had no Idea who he wan or in. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
Area,- extreme danger he por.d. objection, It isso ordered
Document No. 11

Why do I bring this up? Because. It Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President. I First. coverage might he lost for
bears upon the leader's amendment to move to rcossider the vote by which some Federal employees
clarify what was done on page 1432. see- the Amendment sAS agreed to. Second, snlbs wor~e in the Privte
tion 1013 . lines 21 through 24. And I Mr DASCHLE. I move to lay that sector. Federal employees could not
understand his clarificatlon. motion on the table, get a Supplemestal besefit package to
But I must say. when it comes to a The motion to lay o the table was Close the gap between what they get In
issue. that is as important to the agreed to the standard package. Because the Of-
health and welfare of every American esios so cn fine of Personnel Management Is nt
sad every tkmnily as health reform. we Mr. COHEN. Mr. President. I regret required to offer Supplemental plans to
should not be thrust in a position, ny that earlier today a medical aanioyt- Federal employees they could end up
of us, where we are reading through most Prevented me from noting en a with 1em than they have sow.
this voluminous document in this ma- Amendmont offered by Scooter . I Worhed With Senator Hrny
ner toASciwn which sought to expand an- in the Labor Commiottee markup to re-
I do not lay blame upon anyone In ness to health care in raral Areas. Rep- snivL these lsses. I offered an Amend-
tis Chamber for our finding ourselves resesting a rural State like iaine. meat that woo Accepted that achieved
in ths circumstance. But I do think we Am cell aware of the speeial problems the following goals.
do ourselves and the people great harm thatroral Ara face Is fact, the first First the Federal employees health
if we attempt to proceed and enact leg- comprehensive health care bill I itr beneit program must offer a supple-
llation in this manner mental benefit package:
And I think the reasons come down didi 10 idcrudc alti of ne- Second It Allows Federal employeeto. We find that it is important politi- of rural - My efforts with respect organiatious to Meet and confer with
caly I think we do damage to the po- to health care hare rautiely included O.P.M for thes policies and agree
li. al process-the governmental proc- particular focus on the seed to expand uon ant
es-i we Insist on pursuing this ocality health care snrvices in Maine Third it aliens any American tor-
coUrse . and other ru States. Accordingly. ered by a health plan offered by
I beliete the Whole health care issue had I been able to vote, I wouid hare FEHRP to
has been moved forward in a masner joined my other colleagues in onani mes plan
whi h has already resulted in some mously supporting the Dasahie Amend- This p
s-bis-tial improvements. which has meet field. Federal employees would hav
already focused attention on some ir-e--L _ptavrs a,,,orr i.s5 access to supplemental benefit Pack-
pirtastc issues, his. MIKUtLSEI. Mr. President, I rise oges, that many private sector employ-I give the President credit for that, I today to speak to the importance of 0es sow hav acess to and would con-
give 1Ms Clinton credit for that. We opening up the Federal Employees tinue to have Access to through nego
Lve sees greater cost containment in Health Benefit Plan to all Americans tiations with their employers
cer'aIn areas. In the private sector, we and to explain what this decision will We seeded to correct ths situation
.a, seen hospitals. drug manufactur- mean to Federal employees. I would and this Anendmnt allowed that. This
ros and others undertake certain o- also like to respond to Comments made Is the proison that Senator MroCHti.
t:ns tihat probably never would have by the sesior Seator from Alaska who agreed to include In his bill and this is
b.n taken were it not for the serious- said too things that concern me: the Understanding of the Federal em-
ness of purpose that hls arisen around First, that Federal employees get pisyos Unions.
ad-e-s:rg this important national less on the standard benefit package. It doesn't mean that the
i and Government will necessarily pay forBut I implore my friends and co- Sec . that they gets supplemeetal the supplemental beneft
l.agues in this body. Democrats and benefit packae not available to 0th- Federal employees. Nor doss it ca
Repblticans. to take a step back now ern. that them will be a Federal contribu-
and let us see if we cannot continue the Opening up FEidP isa wise decision, ties to non Federal SEP enrollees
process of narrowIng our differences. It allows Americans to have Access to who want to puhase a supplemntal
ard atter.pting to come up with a bill the very noun choice of health boor- package.
that Will do the job and not one which ante plans that we have, that the It simply means that Federal cm-
is driven by time or by elections: one President lan, that Fedeeal employees pisyces. like workers in private laden-
I-i allch we come together and do the have. . try. c negotiate With their employers
ho-esu of the people the right way. FEllS? enrolls ever 9 millio em- to receive a contribution toward a sop-
That is the nature of the calls which ployees and their families. It isa struc- piemeotal benefit. Federal employees
I am getting from my constituents- tur that exists everywhere In the are just being treated fairiy-jest like
n. lobbyists. but New Yorkers. And by country. You nan go to Frederick. bID many other Americans.
as oterwheming margin. about 3.1 to and there am FEIBP enrollees er you I hope this clarifies the record. I be-
1. th calls that come in are saying. can go to Fairbanks. AE and there will lieve that we should have a health core
-Ye,. ce know there is a need for be FEHBS enrollees. It Is a system system for oh Americans-that in an-
h.a!th care. Plea,.e don't rush to judg- which is in place sd it works fer its ceSible, affordable, rewards people
:71.t enrollees. I amn An FEHSP enrollee. I who ploy by the rules, and lets people
r:k thi is a rush to judgment a a Sine CrossBlue Shield standard choose their own peovidern. That isI a ol lcfor ption songle nly. I like my coverage what this Provision does. That Is why
And I thank my distioguished friend and I think that it is only right that opening up FEBP isa good idea.
aI clleague for setting me straight Americans have Ammo to the name
o *hs 1080 tote health insurance plans. r FE B S
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ma- But While are Am openl p ES, T B L
tority leader is recognized I have worked hard to make sure that Mr. hETEENBAUM. Md. President.
.Mr MITCHELL. Mr. President. we we arc not taking anything away from ther are a lot of games being played
are prepared to proceed to have the the Federal employees. When concerns here on the floor of the U.S. Senate.
am-edment adopted. were raised during the Labor Commit- but ther are not many games being
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there tee markup. I Worked with the Federal played en the baseball fields In Amer-
forther debate? employee cos t meet those con- ins. Ther just 'Ain't no baseball being
If not, the question is on agreeing to corns. They Said that the bill treated played in the majer leagues these
the amensdment offered by the majority them differently free other Americans days."
leader. and foe what I could se they were The strike in major league baseball
The amendment (No. 2569) was agreed right. Is now 1 week old. Ther lane sign thatto. Why wts that? millions of baseball fans are likely to
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se their favors toI play any time Intered In One-toning our bill o ar sohjct tot11n reiw. Hsebslo
In the near future. that we con move quicy. own have n such .orea
Aa a Matter of fact. the rest of the Frankly, thin i. the hunt hope te to the ordinar neder no
seson. the playoffs. and the World Se- runo hove to prenrve the reniindor oi e n oor nenng fief d a-
rio are all in serions jeopardy. the bnorhll soccus, the playoffs, and meno la hutog. suiaali 110
We must bring this strike to a speedy t c rgronins unploln t
relution. Last week, Senator iATCli lon. ent with is huresi position- Should that
and I introduced legislation to do just tr. President. I nob ananleoon co- o . the employees io strikeen, f the
that. As you would expoCt, the owners sont that the Incter from Mr. Fehr be toms would othrWIe violateThd Ithe
told the media that the Metoznasen- printed In the RECORD. laws. eek Court review. In the eiittan
Halc bill would not do any good. But Tre being no Objectinn. the letter 1lur, the se hale ds It olcr that
the players said nothing. So I called wno ordered to be printed In the tony iatend pose their rar Cap Is the
Don Fehr. head of the players tssoola-o aP, the piers ca
tion, and asked him what be thought. M-. L neither tre i Noeme oureou the
Iast night I received Fehr'e response. OA-Act l' Vr AssoCIo na cede the ostitrolws. as no
The way I read this letter it repreents N rk, iY u A , str.
a strong indication that this strike Ilonoap HadS 200 becowe Inn prior to the trihe.
Could be brought to an early conclu- U. nact. Wnilstos. DC It would boos bees . major top fortard. to-
sion, and the season Could get under- Dan p R Mvti It with ded It might well hae had a heucil ef-
way very shortly after we act. great lotert that I reviewed the hill. S. fact on the negotiatios bemuse thu owners
Here Ia what be said: 238. the nel Face Protecto Act uf would hue sederteod that they mold cot
Itad S. 230, the Mtsenbaume.atch bill,. which w= wetly Ietroduced by yoularally impes the salary aP fre from
boee law prior to the strike, It would have sod Suracor Hatch loneffet to hring b antitous r-tiny. Mormoer. the players
hrsain tpfrad ido.I ih hail bach tc the field, and sa this wsen woald hcve sotiocs to mansder other thanbeen A maor atep frwad. Indeed. It raight for the let More than anyone. the players goinou strike. Aishoegh e manco knewwell have had a benefletal effect on the nego-
tlations because the owners would have on regret that the uwue-s left then n oice for cornie. It is my beet Judent that bad
dostn thttehclncneiteiy1.bt te scrike, and to Intoerpt .a- cron aS. moo baen las-, It isn meh iron likely thctderstood that they could n rom ale se grat n thre one, disappointing fans eleay- players cow Would be on strike. Ithe ownerspais hoesh sa the plafr o frss up wher. and.uenrtsstolc. affectieg ludiold- had aces equired to mnnudes the ntirruttiny. MAoreover, the pl-ae wouldave oyP-clue Inmsederothe thn legon ee ucle employed atI or seond roalor league r' toswhntey fsrulateti their ppsai totions to conalder other tha goin on stie
Alth one cannot snow forer-a.. ij dims during the s-uaii The layers ander- teslo players hod k that
Is my beat Judgment that had S. 2= been stood and appreia very much the= ,rle thy had protectin under the antitrust
law, it ia much loss rikely that players - lles by you end Sennoow Htch t ws the reent might well noew bees err
would ben strihe, this matter in resruatin us ines .pomabke. .
The same letter, I believe, wan sent You hansk d that I ever, not at that poles. S. em
to Senator HATCH. o te nwoere snernti to theolrion with rswtt .e.Meorsalary cap. end clearly Intend to ImPees It
The players believe that the Metsen- what li o u s a the su; ani a spike has begun.
baun-Hatch bill provides the key ele- the players to mushie ending the strike Even were S em to he ne e ted, it wd
mets to end this strike. What the bill wlthoorahicg a new mummie hargsin/pg be very inct . -ir play- to end the
lanks i.a way to protect the more than agreentwithewuers. strihe withut an egreemess. That would
SO major league players who could a n hns.there hs hes stoke or the salary rp
have their pay cut arbitrarily because imbout rn m Ironse bas/all overy time Is !1.e .. with the players' ny r
they do nut have the MLPA hau negotiated with te owers
Ilesue the lIxZ ,b aet 22 ym- The strike whichatery ben ap ws Iof ed inello in elsy-
season while the players hallene the Fd 12 Auust I the eighth nt the top sa d.ri g
owners In Court. The Players have a munecotins work toppage Is that periotr ct the pendec
good point which, l am frank to say, we em In sieslilcans, h it he lgation (calm they determined to
did not conalder when crafting this leg- dreseos the ralatiouslip between the senes' e us s lket aontracIs th e oisa
islation. I do not se any reason why antlmsot eesrytics ant their coletive ro- ofste ce phe mcir uldte sc-
we Conid not amend our bill to protect gaining relationship with
players from these arbitrary salary re- ot qurotin. th uique =emptin fro N% Pomd rules. % are more than see major
ductions while their labor dispute is d:r rocts eat ets dnot ave te lar
worked cut In court. According to.the use to he. amajor monributing factor to this to put themseles In that eceloan Mer-
players, if Congress passes the Mesten-sy history. The OWe ns lega Ouer S 28 wcu/t apply only to this merest
banns-Hatch bill with this alight Modi- It Iso surpris that they not like one. e spate, leang the placer-end tha f-
flation they are likely to go back to Simply pat, the owus position in thi lath e a -t time.
work. Peh- promised that: years raito. no It Is in ory argalung if. honmer. thes critical ant findarnenal
l e m r d d. Is to eist that tpt prhlems can be addressed. we would serr-
o cne a ed ayer wo er ta king the players to t
ctopcnsdee ning the player to whil emplunt cf players, dclgae I negotiations continue. Ai
to the "eld while urgotiaono uco . prayer, freedomn to seek employment anti to sahteaseneta e omuswl
Thi Imly oodnew. Te badartificially depress the free Msarket valrue ofh sged under toe previsions of tha piorTh/a is clearly good news. The headowaen iis use agrem t, rather than under ay slacer-
Of the players asoeciation /a telling U thy are moore In the kn d t ally Impod terms end renditions, the Play-
that if we pass a bill that applies the to their enorpon fro the anttrust laws, su will cut give ur, eves temporarily, the
antitrust laws when any unilateral no terms or conditions of employment that only recurse that the Congess has provded
conditions are imposed, and prteeth can tome pn thy player or us/later- for t . And the layers me als repared
against automatic nnal inspuan followin an Impose In hagsn to sray esdtuckts nolong no io nsaary to
durig a anitrot lwsut. b m~ht eg.mey be obalisogod undier the antitrust seomr an apP1 rate new ailenit.during all antitrust lasut, he might 0nomte o raubifsl- inya oetht r.fll d
reommoend that the players take thelasnunte ho orseahyat- ial./cto htsvrlfnadrCMand ta the saesn keth com isptt tomse terms and Conditiuns may cOnsusoemr g-r-esuch asen Sput. Faan/it-
field s nd complete the season.ed end toe Cunosmer 3etoatino eriea,
Our task Is obvious. at the appro- It Is this fredum frm the atitmet laws- among ethers) have today neca aga ladi-
priate point in time, the Senate should the atinrnot laws a Is plans everywhers sated their vlew that toe Cnnee shea/t
set aside the health care bill Just for a vise azeept in hirhy regulated odusmino- ant to eliminate toe oemo' etitean
few hour--because certa/ply the a- which gives the owe toe Inmetive to me- eseptius. nd that be their view. toe emp.
tiunal health care bill has far more /p- tines to -L no they hans. They haie m-uop- tIes Is Major Contributing ses In the
portance and priority than this Ma - w m b u. . tom enrant spike. Is Is worth esemberlng
tee-but for a few hours to move a bidl t ther Industris, and In pr tha
thats is - 01 Other is-ProfessIonsa teanhepoeto, or tPuhli Interest group takes a iffrenetthat would put an end to the baseball this Is set the moe. Rather, n these owners de.
strike, I wills continue work/pg with know. ad ind. no the NFL sens.e Needless to say, I Would he pdne toen-
PenA/or HATCH arid any other Seator rosily leaned. meter vr later their ationd e er any rther qustime yo may have.
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and.se work with you and Senator Hatchon fiottin in the appointment of non-
the precise details of any sncb leislation. res in the conforosne on the die
Siseerely. ' eing votes of the two Houses on
D .D M. Fam. the endmet of the House to tie ll
Mr. METZENBAUM. Mr. President. I IS. 1681) entitled "An Act to r-ise and
say to my colleague and friend ftrom treamine the acquisition lawe of the
New York, I am very grateful for him Federal oen ent. and for other per-
permitting me to have a few minutes ponee:
for the interruption of a more impor- An additional cooferees from the
taut debate on the health care bill. , Committee on Energy ad Commerce.
Mr. MITCHELL, Mr. President. I su- for cosideration of sections 4024(g)
gest the absence of a quorum. 6nS? (s)i4) and (b)(). and 8005(o)i6) of
The PESIDING OFFICER. The ma- the Senate bill. and modificatios eam
rity lead.- uggeste the absence of mitted to conference: Mr DInEtLL. Scr.
qofrm SwifTr ted Mr. MOORHEcAD.
The cierk will call the roil.resnh ofec
The maseitant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll. AENROLLED SILLS SIGNED
Mr. FORD. Mr. Pesideut. I ok uniai' At i:09 p.m.. a message from the
mos csent that the order for tire Hode of Reprosetat es. delivered byL .ri all be rescinlded. Mr. Hays, no f its reading clerks, to-ThePRESIDING OFFICER. Withoutj conc d that the Speaker bus signed
ebleatios. it toentordered. the folowieng enrolled bills:
olum 
_ IP. 2947. Ans o to eAtsnd for no . di
MORNIND BUSINESS tihne l to yetrs the Aothoriotin of tbe
Mr. FORD. Mr. President. I ask unan- tin to ertablish a wemorial; sod
Imous consent that there now be a pe- HiE. 4970. As tot t desigsate the United
riod for morning business, with Sen- States coershous undersestnotios In St
ators permitted to speak therein for up Los sil. s the Thnnns F Eagiet..
to 5 mint"0" United States Courthouse.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection. It is so ordered. MEASURES REFERRED
The following bill wus read the firstMESSAGES FROM THE HOUSE and send times by unanimous con
At 2 23 pm. a message from the Sent and referred as indicated:
House of Representatives, delivered by Hft 4". Ac at to e Coeces.
Ms. ontz. one of its reading clerks, as-s Coet Aer
nounced that the House has passed the Of 1974 to limit cossideratios of one
following bill. In which it requestse emergency matom emergeny lrgislation.
concurrence of the Senate.rrsuant to he oer or~oourreosof ireSente.gen 4. M,17 to t~ ouitos ans th conot
H 490 L An Act to ameed the Congres- td to the Cmmitre on orerentai Af-
a onal Budret ad Impoundment Coentrol Act fntrs
of 197 to limit consideration of non-
emergency matten in emergency legislation.
The message also announced that the MEASURES PLACED ON THE
House insists upon its amendments to CALEDAR
the bill (S. 1485), a bill to extend cer- The following Slls wore read the net-
tars satellite carrier compulsory 11, nd time ond planed os tie caleodan
ceoses. and for other purposes, and
ask a conference with the Senate on to hetnebl th e Seros Seashel
the disagreeing votes of the two Houses ployrm tadtheownersof r ler
thereon, and appoints Mr. BROOKS, Mr, ail In order to Intent 0 te by toe
HGE. Mr SYNNAR. Mr. BOUCHER. Mr. er or n loot by the eners so that
FRANrK of Massachusetts. Mr. MOOR- fant will he able t enjoy the minder ci
HAD. Mr, COBLE. and Mr. FInH as e the basebali ceason. the playoffs. cr5 he
managers of the conference on the part World Series.
Of the Hoe.A bil to reqire the &eretary ofirt the Sisuor ~leth sod liomn heonstv rsd
At 352 p m.. a message from thy health care fraed nn goida n
Hnuse of Reprsentatives. delivered by- f Abl thee.
Ms Goetz, one of its reading clerks. an- Heslth Core Roe Act.
ortced that the House agrees to the
r'port of the committee of confrence
on the disagreing votes of the two EXECUTIVE AND OTHER
Horoe on the amendments of the Sen- COMMUNICATIONS
ate to the bill (RR. 4603). making ap-
propriat i for the Departments of The follr wing communicatiess werepropmrito fo th Dertrtea laid before the Senate. together withCsmmerce. Justice. and State. the Ju- accompanying papers. reports, aod doe-
dinary. and related agencies progra.
for the fiscal Fear ending September 30cot w e d
1995. and making supplemental appro-
prlations for these departments and E
agencies for the fecal year ending Sep- Eoie Olor of tirerent norBdit.
tember 30, 1994. and for other purposes. tin. Orsoe o te rento tonmi-
The message also announced, that tery persoel accosnts for sol year 15;
tire Spetker makns the fellowingiodi- refTerud jointly. prsast to the ordsr of
S12097
,January 30. 197.ns modified by the order of
April 11. 1976. to the Committee On Appro-
priations. to the Committee on Budget and
to the Committee on Arred Services.
REPORTS OF COMMITTEES
The following reports of committees
were submitted II
By Mr. INOUYE. -from the Committee on
Indian Affais, with an amendment in the
nature of & substitute:
HR 4229. A bill th extend Federal recogr.i-
tien to the United Auburn Indlan Commu-
nity of the Auburn Rancheria of California
(Rept No. 13-340).
By Mr. PELL from the Committee on For.
eign Relations. without amendment and with
a preamble:
H. Co, Re. 215. A concurrent resolution
honoring Jaies Norman Hall and rcogniz-
Ing his oo-ecanding concributions to the
United States and the South Pcfic.
By Mr. PELL, from the Commctoee o For
eign Relations. without amendment:
S. 129. A bill to provide for an investiga-
tine of the whereabouts of the United States
citizens and others who have been missing
frem Cyprus sActe :s74.
EXECUTIVE REPORTS OF
COMMITTEES
The following esecutive reports of
committees were submitted:
By ir NUNN. trow the Con.i':-e on
Armed Serices:
Jadith A. Miller, of Oh. to be General
Counset of the Department of Defense
Walter Beaker Siocornbe. of ste District of
Columbiac to be Under Secretacy of Defse
for Policy;
Sandra Kapan Stuart of North Caroina.
to Se an Asrtant Secretary of Defense
Jan Lodal. of Virginl. to be Deputy Unde.
Secretary of Defense for Poiicy.
Joseph Nye. of Massachusetts. to be n As-
sistant Secretary of Defene; and
Phrlip Edward Coyle. III. of the District of
Columbia. to be Director of OperaNional Test
and Evaluation. Department of Defense.
(The above nominations were re-
ported with the recommendation that
they be confirmed. Subject to the nomi-
nees commitment to respond to re-
quests to appear and testify before any
duly constituted committee of the Sen-
ate.)
By Mr. PELL. from the Camittee on F..-
oegn Relations-
Neil H. Offen. of the District of Columbia.
to he a Member of the Board of Directors of
the Inter -American Foundation for a term
expiring October 6. 1908;
Ralph Earle. II. of the District of Colum
b!,. to te Deputy Director of the Uiled
States Arms Control and D:sarmament
Agenacy;
Richard Holbrooke. of New York, to he an
Assistant Secretary of State:
Richard L. Greene. of Maryland. to be
Chief Financtal Officer. Departmet of
State.
Phyllas E. Oakley. of Louisiana. to be an
AssIstant Secretary of State; and
Brady Anderson. of Arkansas. to be Ambas-
sador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of
the United States of America to the Unitod
Republic of Tanania.
Nomisnee Brady Arderson.
Post: Ambassador to Tanzania.
The following is a list of oil member of
my immediate family and their spouses. I
have asked each of these persons to inform
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ITRODUCTION OF THE HASEBAL I ,a uiiseu Incest and Sexual Abuse dramati lucre,
PANS AND COMMUNITIES PRO- H eit, Day. Sales at S75*
TECTION ACT As the co Hg hus doanaed oat altos Premium ha
ties his week. I think it is Important to retied bsiniress cas
HON. MIE SYNAR O why t is so iportant tat aiti-caime legis- playmest tar
ira.,sa tuon Strongly address tie probtem at sealt Ittugiiat its
!. THt, HOUSEOF EPRESENTATIV S abuse thrugh such measures us Stresgthei- Premium will
Thursday. Augg ietiary mss te th prosecutus of sry at a Tiirada. t sutI.199 caild swislatrs and naotying Communities farmer emyloyMr SYNAR. Mr. Speaker, t is a sad and when sexual predators are presest. Mr. Speaker
unfortunate fact that throughout our great Na- The Statistics on child abase end sexual mici Markei
tien this summer baseball tens from Little as at chiidren are grim In t992, 2.9 miliss nersary. Its no
Leaguers to the President are sorely dis- chid Cases were reportd to child pratecas mushy, as wet
appointed mat tor the eighth time in eight ne- Set-iwe [CPS] agencies. This represents a 50 Cloom. ant
gotiations major league players we on stnke. percent irease Is tetwared child abuse Cases my Colleague
While Hans are disapponted. many others feel hetween t9a5 and 1992. Bid despite this in- celnti n.
a real ecoaomm impact of the strike. Those crsase in the repothng at Cases, there rain
commumbetes that host major league teams theusands of children whose cros go unheard
have lost valuable jobs and ilelions in tenees ts uddos it is eshmated that iearey 1,n00
because their major league stadrmas have ati child abase ald nagtnc-eetatee fataldes is TRtGUT
been shuttered by the stsike. 19 were Confirmed by CPS ageie-as F
To ma matters worse, is the 2 weeks averge at aser three child deaths a day. At-
sice the stike began, tide progress in resolv- mat 84 parcent those ctildren mare undering ihe Strike has been made arid it appears Spears old at the time at their deaths. HON.
that nether side seems intent as ending the The tues at these who rive these
strike afy *me sson. Frustrated lans sit on the crimes tollow ho paths. The fotuiate os
sitelines and watch the remainder Of the sea- may be able to overcome Child abuse ry tN THE ti0
son dwndle away while the negotiations be- speakieg eel, creating us apes ard honest di Thu
tween players and owners stal. atag rn the subject Others, snake to Come to
That is why I join today with Congressmen terms wih what has occured, my face yeas Mrs. MORE
BUNIN, OWENS, and BiLtmIS to introduce at physiat and emotat problem. Meny sell agaitios athe
the Baseball Fans and Communties Protte- gram rp to became the seat genration of MO, a lvng
no Act. This legislation will apply the Federal abusers, perpetuatig a sasaus cycle at ic- Americas past
abtrst laws to major league baseball in a twce. e te iarm
marer designed to spur the now stagnant Mr. Speaker, I encoarage alt my collaues a, BrRiohe
negoations between the players arid Owners to jars me is hrigiag agentas to these asmes the atumn.
of major league baseball. The Hil is speci- and recogniig the brace survivors at bncest th its hsids
cary designed to allow the players to get back and child atos by cammemmating October rind Street
to the iekd while all paries to the strike have 1. 1g94 as -National Iced and Be Abuse haws. the 49
tie nghts and bargaintg positions protected Healsg Day.- And t hope me itl juis together sakes the Pas
through the apphcahon of the antitrust laws- t pass a mi Hit that hetps protect our chil Brskenilte
The carrer impasse betwsees owetrs anddes ard prcreat sash cawes is the turs. eiitssuroo
players is mat oesrs are committed to ie- 29, 1914
posing a salary cap follawig the season arid
players feat the Only way to negotiate an the RIBUTE TO THE PREMIUM MAR bi Himposition of the salary cap by the Owners is SYSTEMS ON THEIR 2 a e W
to strike now, dunng the season. when their ANNIVERSARY tory aache,
bargaining leverage is at a maxrmum. What
the Baseoall Fus and Comimundies Protec- HON. WILIAM 0. LIPINSKI mary at the
ton; Act will do is alfaw the players to retake OF tLLINOIS car PesnaG
the hed by gwrng them access to the rights tN TOE OUSE OF RcyocScTIrdtsri Bestley tas.
and remedes of the antitrust laws from which Thursday, Augusr 14.7.994 named the M
,aor league basehalt as currently exempt.
I believe giving the players antitrust re- M LIPNSK Mr. Speaker, t rise today to presidentl vr
edes wi preserve thee bargaining positi onng rncegsi Pransam Marhehig Syatems 0 n aid o
durang the upcoig negohations mithouta2n ther 25th annivrsary. it is as honor to haracv-
.ng to rsoart to a strke. This will allow alt par- pat a the celebrafion at this prosperous heni of tour Buoks
ties, players and ownrs, to sit donand nes ae that has Contibuted so much to my was bui, The
gatrin good tack asH an agreement that is usity aed the Slute at lilis
satitary to both sides is reached. Is the I Stephes. the president of Pre- 1808; 6 years
meantime. players can play bul. mini Moheting System, and Barbara was aihore
090trycoteugcsto asprwe tins Stephasses, secsrelury-tteanurer, biegan their paint its hirstI u.ge miy colleagues to cosponsor this is Iaporteant egisatis. and I look forward to its eai eting business to t969 with as small made cie t
sot consideration by the House judiciary office. is the 25 yeas class their humble he- its buries
womn thetenere e f gleeing. Prmium Marketing Systems hos tity Many 
ratiCo,,,,, grams to become the 99h uargent employer iti conducOf 8 O
INTRODUCTION OF ATNATIONAL IN- oldest tolamatheter itho world is re boa- ar slaughter
CEST AND SEXUAL ABUSE HEAL- ne. liits, r wer
ING DAY Premium specializes is the side at family The pepat
magazines such as TV Guide, McCotls, ad the time wais
HON. SUSAN MOLINARI Good Househeepig. Their alis and employ- tame In Mertp
or KIM nOse maid hose Soared ince 1991 with the ites- corperted by
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES dashes at state-t-the-art computer drhen pre- Today, Broodicone debuig eryirest, which autaidcae aend rem its 
Thursday, August 18,1994 cats prospectiae customers, statisticaly evats- to ceaslasia
Me, MOLINARI. Mr. Speaker, today I am In- ar data, ard esters orders, Is lact rerihed my catgrafida
otraidcing a resolurtieto 16desigeate October 1. 994ut saes totaled Sit iin tst year. a and g citiens
August 18, 1994
ase from Premiu-s lirst year o
to in 1969.
s become an integral part of the
minity of Cicero, prouiding em-
hundreds of Ilinois residents
history. On August 26. 1994.
officially celebrate their anniver-
rbecue with their current and
ees.
, I am proud to recognize Pre-
ng Systems on their 25th ann-
ntributions to the busrness cor-
l as its Seravice and dedication to
eserving of recognition. I uge
s to paricipale in this worthy
E TO BROOKEVILLE'S
BICENTENNIAL
)NSTANCE A. MOREllA
USE OF REPRESENTATIVEb
sday. August 12. 1994
LLA. Mr. Speaker, I rise in rec-
200th birthday of Brookesville,
y preserved link with our early
SOae a Quaker mill town ser-
of northeast Montgomery Coun-
a picture-perded backorop in
w pumpkins arid faing saves.
one and clapboard houses, pe
mps, and strict building restuc-
-household, 4-block village in-
played a signiicant role in the
nding the War of 1812. On As-
President James Madison fled
ngton, DC. and was given ref
e Bentley, wife of the towns
ith the President came his msk-
General Mason, and the Sec-
Treasury, and the assets-gold
e National Treasury. For 2 days,
iovemment was located at the
Later, the Bentley tam was re-
adison House in honor of the
sit. The town t Brookevilie had
in September 1794 by Richard
marded Deborah Brooke-a
sisters, on whose land the town
Maryland State Assembly off-
zed the down of Brookeville in
later, the town of Brookeville
d by the State Assemi to ap-
constulde. By 1890, Brooneylte
a visitors who passed through
that rt hid an agscultural iden-
the town's laws deal with the
ookeviltes animals. One regula-
t"no hogs or hog pen or peas
sase" were allowed with; toam
Sbaring dogs.
on of thie town of Brookevilte at
250. making Ait the ird largest
omery County. The town masts-
the State Assembly in 1890.
wile has a population of 150,
rural, snail-town flavor.
n, Mr. Speaker, I want to offer
tios to the town of Breeksville
son its 200th brthday.
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September 13, 1994 CO
lons wsith Sinn Fie s leader Gerry
Adams It was those Hume-Adams
talks that prodded Irish and British
leaders Into more active efforts to
reach agreement on a framework for
the peace process-eocompassed in the
Downing Street Declaration of Decem-
ber 15 1993. The Hume-Adams talks
also helped to create the political cli-
mate that enabled the IRA to decide to
foressear violence as an instrument for
ending British rule. And knowing John
Hume as I do. I'am confident that he
will continue to play a pivotal role as
the newly energized peace process
gains steam.
British Prime Minieer John Major
also deselves special Congratulations.
as well. for making a solution to the
crisis in Ulster a priority for his ad-
ministration. Although he has sought
additional clarifications from the IRA
concerning its August 31 declaration.
he has take some very constructive
stps to further the process, I applaud.
for example. his gesture of instructing
that British troops in Northern Ireland
replace combat helmets with berets-a
symbolic bat important signal that
Britain does have some measure of
faith in the IRA's declaration
Prime Minister Major s continued
participation in the peace efforts is
.cretical Only he can persuade the
Unionists that It is in their interest to
sit down at the negotiating sable and
find a political solution to their dif-
fecces with Ulster's Nationalist
Catholic pol:tical leaders Only he is in
a position to respond to events as they
unfold with gestures designed to build
confidence and trust in the negotiating
track Such actions as lifting the
broadcast ban on members of Sinn Fein
would serve to do so; and in any event.
the continuation of the broadcast ban
is inmpatible with an open political
dialog Returning Republican prisoners
currently held in Irish or British jails
to Beifast. and downsizing the deploy-
ment of British troops in Northern Ire-
land are also likely to reassure ele-
meets of the IRA that there truly is a
peace dit:dend in laying down their
arms
There are those in the United States
and particularly in the Irish-American
community who are already asking.
'What can the United States Govern-
men and the American people do to
further the peace initiative and end the
troubles?' The most important con-
tribution that the United States can
make is to assist in the rebuilding of
an Ulster economy that has been dev-
astased by decades of conflict and ne-
glect. In the end. peace will be fleeting
if there continues to be significant un-
employment and economic decay in
Belfast,
Both the U.S. public and private see-
tor have roles to play in revitalizing
the Ulster economy. President Clinton
has already pledged to provide finan-
cial assistance in support of the peace
process. I hope that before Congress ad-journs next month, we will have given
that President whatever authority he
NGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENA
needs to make good on his pledge of as-
sistance. More important. in the long
run. Is the increased interest of the
United States private sector in makingjob-creating investments in Northern
Ireland. Without increased employ-
ment and economic growth to build
upon a political settlement. the perms-
nence of peace is in serious question: in
my opinion.
We wait the next steps In the North-
ern Ireland peace initiative. I am con-
vinced that the moment has arrived to
begin the final march toward resolving
the troubles so neighbors can live in
peace and harmony. without the bullet
and the bomb.
Perhaps the historian J. Bowyer Bell
stated it best in the concluding sen-
tences of 'The Irish Troubles: A Gen-
eration of Violence." He wrote.
It is such a small. lovely island and they
are such a grand people * '- Great issues
have been fought ou ina Il compas bus
not to resolution or exhaustion. And so for
the Irish troubles a generation is gone and a
censury is running out, but not Irish pprsist-
ence The Irish. whatever else, are indomi-
sable.
Ultimately. It is that indomitable
spirit that will produce the peace that
all the men, women. and children of
Ireland have long sought and have so
long prayed for.
My sincere hope is that they will not
be disappointed as this process unfolds.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under
the previous order, the Senator from
Ohio is recognized for 15 minutes.
r THE BASEBALL STRIKE
Mr. METZENBAM. Madam Presi-
dent. I am about to ask unanimous
consent to bring up S. 2380. a bill spon-
sored by Senator HATCH and myself
that is designed to end the baseball
strike. Because I do not want to dis-
rupt the Senate's business, I would be
happy to limit debate on this bill to I
hour equally divided. I am willing to
take this unusual step because I have
no alternative. There are no amendable
items currently before the Senate. or I
would offer the bill as an amendment
to another pending piece of legislation.
But the baseball bill cannot wait any
longer. If we do not act immediately to
end the baseball strike, the owners
have threatened to declare the season
over as early as tomorrow. No more
season. no playoffs, no woe Id series, un-
les we act immediately.
Today I spoke with Don Fehr. head of
the Baset'1 Players' Association. He
stated that if we pass S. 2380, with a
few minor clarifications. he will rec-
ommend that the players call off their
strike immediately and resume the
baseball season. I want to repeat that
Madam President. Today I spoke with
Don Fehr. and he said inunequivocal
language that if we pass S. 2380. with a
few minor clarilications. he will ree-
ommend that the players call off the
strike immediately and resume the
baseball season, 
. .
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What that means is quite simple: If
we act quickly to pass this bill, the
baseball players are willing to com-
plete this season, the playoffs. and the
World Series. It is only fair to point
out that Don Fehr cannot speak for all
of the players. but as the leader of that
organization, he is in a position to ree-
ommend it. and I have every reason to
believe that his recommendation would
be accepted.
It Is very simple- If we pass this bill.
I believe the baseball season will be
salvaged. That is why it is so impor-
tant that we pass this strike-ending
baseball legislation immediately-not
tomorrow. not the next day, not next
week. not after the baseball season is
closed. although it is only fair to say
that I will not give up in my effort
even if the baseball season should be
shut down.
Our bill is very simple. It does not
eliminate the players' right to strike
or the owner's right to loch them out.
It is not a blanket repeal of baseball's
antitrust immunity-an effort that I
have made over a period of many years.
but I have not been successful. In the
committee it was voted down 10 to 7. I
did not have the votes to get it out of
committee. But this is a much mere
limited version. This is a totally knew
bill. very limited in its impact. The bill
allows the antitrust laws to be invoked
only if the owners impose a salary cap
or any other terms and conditions on
the players. This should take away the
owners' incentive to play hard ball and
impose unilateral conditions on the
players. It should also relieve the play-
ers fear that they need to maintain
their strike in order to prevent a sal-
ary cap from being shoved down their
throats when the season ends.
As everyone knows. I fought hard for
years to lift that very exemption that
baseball enjoys. It was not a congres-
sional enactment that gave it to base-
ball. It was the decision by the very
distinguished Supreme Court Justice.
Oliver Wendell Holmes. who deter-
mined that baseball was a sport and
not a business. I think the American
people now know that it is very much
a business-not a small business. a big
business. The antitrust laws should be
applicable to baseball as it Is to foot-
ball, hockey. soccer, and every other
sport in this country.
I believe that revoking the owner's
antitrust immunity is the best long-
term solution to the mess that the
owners and the players have made of
major league baseball. However. I de-
cided to offer this compromise bill,
with Senator HATCH as a cosponsor. so
that we could bring this strike to an
end quickly.
The fact is that this legislation has
only one purpose: To protect the sea-
son for all the fans. It is not for or
against a salary cap; it is not for or
against revenue sharing; it is not for or
against any other proposal the owners
have made.to the players, and it does.
not tip the balance of ongoing labor ne-
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SWATE
gotiations in favor of the owners or the
players.
The fact is I really do not have any
special sympathy for the overprivi-
leged owners nor for the very highly
paid Dlayers, but I care about the fans.
This strike is ruining the season for
the fans. Rlht now the big league
players cannot use the antitrust lass.
If they could, the owners would have to
deal with them fairly or face the can-
sequsces In a court of law. In other
words, what this bill does is it gives
the players another tool they can use
to avoid striking. go back to work, to
bring the strike to a quick end.
The last seven times the baseball
players and owners have met at the
bargaining table there has been a work
stoppage. Seven times across the bar-
gaining table resulted in a work stop-
page: a strike or a lockout.
This has not happened in other pro-
fessional sports because those players
could use the antitrust laws to settle
labor disputes. Professional basketball
players have avoided a strike for 24
years by using antitrust laws. Profes-
sional football players have not struck
since 1987 because they were able to se
the antitrust laws to settle their dif-
ferences. There has never been a strike
in professional hockey over labor Is-
sues.
If the antitrust laws applied to base-
ball, the owners could not fores the
players to accept unreasonable terms
and canditions if their labor negoti-
tions hit an Impasse. The players could
challenge the owners' unreasonable de-
mands by launching an antitrust uit
instead of shutting down the season.
Wonid that not be a better resolu-
tin? Would it not be better to have
this matter In the courts rather than
have it where it is at the moment with
no games being played and nothing
happening in baseball? I think that
would be a much better deal for the
fans, and, frankly, I think it would be
a mach better deal for the owners as
well as the players.
Passing this compromise legislation
is the only bope we have of saving the
seas for the fans and maybe next
year s season as well. But it Is up to
the players and the owners to come to
the bargaining table and work out
their differences, We, in Congress, can-
not make them do that. All we can do
is level the playing field so that the
owners do not have an unfair advan-
tage over the players because they are
immune from our fair competition
laws. I. like every other fan in Amer-
ica, want the players to play ball and
the owners to play fair. I believe our
bill can do just that.
I hope there will be no objection to
my unanimous-consent request, but I
recognize the roles in the Senate and
recognise the right of any Member to
object.-
Madam President, I ask unanimous
consent to bring up S. 23B0 for imme-
diate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection?
The Senator from Nebraska. position we permitted the owners to
Mr. EXON. Madam President. resery- take.
ing the right to object, I do not suppose I respect the fact that the objection
there Is a person in this body that is has been made, and I yield the floor.
more of a baseball fan from longstand-
Ing than Is the Senator from Nebska.
I an so discouraged and so distraught MORNING BUSINESS
as a fan that the owners and the play-
em-and they are jointly responsible It ISRAEL AND TEE PAtESTINIANS-
seems to mo-have brought upon them- ONE YEAR LATER
selves a pattern of these strikes that Mr PELL r today. Sop-
my long-time friend and colleague
from Ohio has brought out with his re- hsr . 1994. Is the anniversary of a
marks hismoricoccasion Is the march towardmarks.
However. I have to feel that It would a e peace in the Middl
be a bad precedent indeed for the U.S. lav es
Senate in the middle of this kind of a Miite Yltk Sahie and PO
strike or strife, as much as I would like Mhaistea Yasir Ratit some
to see the season continued and as gentle prodding from President lin-
much. as a fan, as I would like to see tos-osk handa to connlode the sign-
the World Series come about for the log ceremony for their agreement n
annual fall clssic, I think that the mutual recegnitin. That handshake
measure that the Senator from Ohio set is motion a ehain of events seer
has authored Is something that should the sect 12 months that led to the es-
be considered, but I think it is an Ill- tabisinnt of Palestioian self-govern-
coosidered move for us as the U.S. Sen- most Is Jericho and Gaza, and to an
ate to try to step into the breech at agreement for mor limited Palcotis-
this particular point in time. I think it ian autonomy-known as the "Early
would set a bad precedent. I think it Is Empowerment" of the Palestinans-in
not essential. moat of the remainder of the West
It is very essential for a baseball fan Bank
like myself and other fans similarly Today's anniversary Provides in op.
situated. Certainly it is critical to the portuolty to refict on the landmark
interest of the baseball playera and the signing ceremny, to see whether
owners of the baseball teams-. the agreement ha lived up to is i-
I simply will objnct to this unani- tial promise, and to ponder what lies
manus-consent request because I think a ahed in the coming yesr.
bad precedent indeed would be set here. ring my time in the Senate, I have
and I belleve that this Is not the proper attended many functions and cere-
time or action for the U.S. Senate to monies at the White Rose. Few Of
become involved in the matter of pro- these, however, he been a moving or
feasional baseball. memorable en the Iocael-PLU signing
With those remarks then and au- ceremony. Never have I witoesed such
ing my friend from Ohio that I feel and a discernible range of emotions and
share some of his concerns, I wish to seotimeote In a public setting. Ther
work forward and look forward to was hope that the agreement would
working on this again in the future and bring to a close decades of conflict,
although the distinguished Senator mistrust and hatred. Ther wes oadness
from Ohio will not be with us next year in the slemn remembhences of lost to-
when we come back and, therefore, will rH and Palestinian non and dangh-
not be able to lead the charge, I will as- te. There ws an undercurrent of reo
sore him that this is a matter that as oncllltlon in the act of mutual mc-
one Member of the Senate I will give ogmitin. Ahove all, ther was a sense
additional consideration to at the prop- of certitude among the participants
er time. and crowd that history was In the mak-
But for the reasons that I have ex- Ing
pressed, I feel compelled to object to Since the ceremonies and celebra-
the unanimous-consent request. tins, however, the terelis and Pal-
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. estiniano have encountered a great deal
MATHEws). Objection is heard. or difficulty in Implementing the peace
The Senator from Ohio. agreement. Ther have Seen charges of
Mr. METZENBAUM. Mr. President, I bad faith on both sides, and continoing
expected the objection and I respect acts of terrism-the homhings of in-
the rights of my good dear friend and oent Israeli$ at Mule and Hedeira,
colleague from Nebraska. and, indeed. I and the murder of scores of ncent
agree with him that there is no greater Palestinians at the Hebron Mosque-
enthusiastic fan of baseball than is he. have threatened to undermine the
He is within his rights in making the process at variou limes.
objection. I know that many toraeils, and for
I intend to keep trying to pass thin that matter, many Americans. remain
bill to the last moment that I am in distrustful of the PLO and Chairman
this body. Even if we cain no longer sal- Arafat. While 1, toe, continue to harbor
vage the season, I want to try to save some reservatine about Arafat, I
spring training and next season. I am think If the lst year has proven any-
concerned that tere just may not be a thing, it is that Arafat and the PLOds
next season if we here in the Senate do represent the will of Palestinian pe-
not do something aboot the e-sided pie. Notwithstanding our doubts, we
September 13, 1994812798
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It s not fair to say that, The polls keep perhaps 11 billion. In the last several ligh
saying that Americans want universal care. ar, communities in Florida have vers
They even say health care is a human right, made substantial invmtments in n TO
which of course It isnt isIs, at best, an ins
plied right the way privacy is.
There's a dialectic to being one's brother's very clubs that will not be able to play.
keeper It isn't simply. "Christ asserted it This crisis has hurt Ploroda and Unit
and therefore it's right." It's a living thing. America. Clearly, it is time to subject via.
I don't have the credentials to be theo- Mor League Baseball to the name the
logical, but I do think that the act of taking laws of competition chat apply to the o,
care of everybody in ott health cae system rest of business in our unt No Emb
will make us out brother's keeper. It will
emancipate as to attack the other enormoos o f rh
problems that we mass solve We can't have trust enemption. Cem
people hungry every night. We cant have Major League Baseball has used it
children uneducated. But we do. We have Cu antitrust oxemption to prevent fratn op
stop that We won't survive otherwise. And ehine migration ta areas mor willing Po
nowhere is it written that every society sur- to support teams, A fonsequence of ploy
vives' It's written somewhere that they al hi failure to allow che market to de toot
peih 'n eve got all the credentiastperish. Ad w vgaalsh entals Cu temrine franchise location in a wide As
go down the road to oblivion-not tomorrow
or the next day, but not necessarily very disparity between franchises. This, in frrst
much later. Time is running out. turn, had led to the revenue-sharing dens
You are patting heath care reform in the proposal to be financed by a ceiling on Clint
context of a much larger moral crisis. players' salaries. Thus, the issue which InIi
I do see health care reform as crucial to is at the heart of the current con-
national civic surival. Consider some of the
huge pr have: air pollution, waste
disposalb failed schools. he, lse, m e is attributble to a misuse of the Ing,Isel feled schank hmeso. tre antitrust nxemption. Additionally en-gonin the streets, hunger. The common denomi
nator is that there are no resure available moval of the antitrust exemption The
to solve these problems beyond what's a ould be an incentive to the players to Or t
ready out there. Then consider health care, go back to work and continue negutia' th
which is the biggest problem, and one that t thei
affects everybody. Homelessness affects I urge my in the name of De
those who have to live around the homele,thoa wo avetort restoring our national pastime-to coo- top
and it affects some sensitive people, but oth-
erwise the problem belongs to the people who
are homeless-and so on with all the prob-'ve baseball's antitrst nnemption.. and
lemes I mentioned. But when you get to -he
health. it's everybody's problem-if not luck]
today. then tomorrow And it's the only so- SPEECH BY U.S. AMBASSADUR TO cand
cial problem that we can fix using the e- ARMENIA mit
sorces-manpower facilities, expendi-
turns-we already have in place. Mr. SIMON. Mr. President. recently, is
I don's want tube apoalyptc, bus I think I ead in the news of the Armenian pope
che ease c he made in terms of the no General Benevolent Union, a eptech by pe
Iea. moo-the pnlarm n.the haere ee Ambansador Harry Gfilmore, the U.S he
despair, the dissatisfaction with]thr cu Ambassador to Armenia. tineol
petesa-thos health cure reform offers us Becau.e it har insights into the prtb- mom
nor last best chance to rLseorea Bssnse oft
cii iadcivic rnpmirit. lemrs fated in Armenia. I am nsking tO bass3awinsert it into the CONGESSIONAL A
RECORD at the end of these brief n- astir
COSPONSORSHIP GF THE marks, ankleBASEBALL PRESERVATION ACT The United States must eert ever
chis miraton o ras orewil is
aMr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, I lend effort to see chat Armenia and hoedm
y support to the Rational Pastime neighborsTurkey and Anerbaijan, can teof l-
Preservation Act submitted to the new lv toge ftr in peace. awnwi
Congress by Senator DANIEL PATRICK This Is in the best anceests of Arme
MGOYIHo'IAN and cosponsored by Senator olr and is in the best interests of Tur 
JOpN WARNER. key and Anerbaijan.
Ote again, Major League Baseball But there n e emotional barriers to O
has shown that it does not warrant an achieving this, mom
trovesy-aceilng o plaers'sala
exemption from or antitrust laws. Our While those emotional barriers re- S
national pesciase has been silenced, main, the people of Armenia struggle. Am r
ith little or no immediate prospect of 1This speech was given in Las Ange- and
a resumption in play. les, on Jose s d. 1ll4, to guests attend- been
Mr. President. today is perhaps the ing a fundraiSing banquet fur the after
coldest day of the winter so far thin American University of Armenia. for It
season, On these chilly days, our Na whir I have had the privilege of visit- gi n
tion shoeuld be on the verge of antici- inn in Armenia. and
patiog the annual ritual that signals The speech follows: way.
hope of warmer weather on the way; Hann GicoeancUtoTno SEA-s M.is
the crack of bats at spring training. A SSeAmaORo TOc SEP B rYC OU AMA ISS OA T Are
But spring training could ho lost. The Distinguished friends and guests of the gan
possibility-which would compound the Amerian Uniereity of Armenia, I brag you know
loss of part of the in9 regular season a otry tonight of darknms and light. The stna-
and the World Serieszunderscores the darkes you know, Armesia as going ther
urgesy uf prompt consideration of the rs mosgb perhaps the most duffsuls period It riohas red since the end of first Republic of and
Nat Armenia be 190A The people of Armeni have sh
ar Florida, the loss of spring train- been living wtiouc heat and light. bino t by train
mould result in an estimated lass in war end economie hardship. Sot in the mid Caine
tourism dollars of at least 111 R million, tle of the darkn ss thor are some islands of in trr
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-and one of those is the American Uni-
ty of Armenia.
night I want to tell you some of my nx-
enc as the first Ambassador of the
ed States to the Republic of Arenoia. I
t to tell you something about what the
ed States Government is doing in Arme-
And I want to tell you why I believe in
utum of Armenia.
r Embassy in Yerevan, the first foreign
assy in Armenia, opened In Februry
in the Brazdan Hotel Now we are In the
ding that once was home of the Young
munist League. We have about fifteen
cicaneswating in our Embassy from the
rtment of State, USAID, USIA and the
e Corps, and about sixty Armenin em-
es. Plus there are 25 Peace Corps Volun-
In Armenia. with more to come in July.
you may know, in August 1992 I was
nominated to be Ambassador by Presi-
Bush. After the 1992 elections, President
on re-nominated me. I was finally con-
ed by the Senate in May 1993. I arrived
erevan with my wife Carol that same
th, o year ago.
und our diplomats in Yerevan mute liv-
much like the residents of Yerean, fre-
tly without electricity, heat, or water.
e was, and often still is, only about one
wo hours of electricity each day. During
first winter, our diplomats often wrote
r cables by the light of butane lanterns.
diplomat found that his laptop computer
do t start unless he heated it up first on
f his wood stove.
w we are fortunate to have generators
kerosene heaters in our homes and at
Embossy. Most Aroenians are not so
y. Nuclear physicists are working by
lelight. A factory that used to produce
oprocessors is making kerosene stoves.
daily newspaper, The Voice of Armenia
eing printed on ice-cream wrapping
r. The winter before I arrived. the tem-
tore inside school classrooms was often
w freezing. Some classes consisted of lit-
imo thanjumping up and down to stay
eided from the beginning thee or Em-
should have three goals: first, to help
enia survive, emphasizing humanitarian
tance; second. to try to help Armenia
eve peace, and an end to its economic
lion, and third, to help Armenia build a
ocratis government and new free market
omy that will allow Arnenians to son-
their own destiny, and guarantee their
future.
LPN AR NIA SURVIVE: HTIMAUrARIAN
MSSIS" CE
r first job has been to help provide hu-
tartian aid, so Armenia can survive the
omic crises caused by the collapse of the
et Umon and the war. The Armenian-
Iean community, the Armenian Church
other private donor organizations have
extremely active in these efforts. Soon
the Embassy opened, the U.S. Agency
nternational Development located its re-
al office for the Coueasus in Yerevan,
or government got involved in a major
ch of our time has been taken up by the
tics of getting wheat and fuel moving to
nia. I now know more about the Geor
railway system than I ever wanted to
. When U.S. government wheat was
ded in Batumi, in Georgia, because
was no electricity to run the Georgian
ays, we chartered diesel locomotives,
rovided fuel for them. When there was
rtage of wheat in Armenia, because the
in Georgia weren't running. we ob-
d money to buy kerosene and diesel fuel
ade to the Armenian farmers for wheat.
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LEGISLATION TO ELIMINATE THE
SOURCE TAX
HON. BARBARA F. VUCANOVICH
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, January 4, 1995
Mrs. VUCANOVICH. Mr- Speaker, States
with a source tax levy a tax on the retirement
income of retirees who no longer reside in the
State. Thousands of seniors across the coun-
try receive tax bills from States even though
many of these retirees have not lived in that
State for years. In every Congress ince 1988,
I have introduced legislation to prohibit the
source is
I was very pleased last spring, when the
Senate unanimously passed a source tax bill.
I was even more pleased when, in the final
week of the 103d Congress, the House also
passed a bit to prohibit he source tax. Unfor-
tunately, the Senate and House versions were
not Identical and there was no time for a con-
ference,
Today I am again Introducing a proposal to
prohibit he source tax The bill I am introduc-
ing will exempt all retirement income trom
State income tax if the individual receiving the
income is not a resident of the State. This leg-
islatis will not place any cost on the Federal
Govemment and may even cause a modest
increase in Federal revenues.
This measure differs In two ways from the
bill I sponsored in the 103d Congress. That bill
included a cap on the amount of lump-sum
distributions exempted from the source tax.
My new bill Will have no caps. Also, for the
104th Congress the measure covers all retire-
ment plans, not just those that qualify for spe-
cial tax treatment by the Federal Govemment
These changes, which extend the measure to
all retirement income, make the bill more fair
because it will treat all retirees equally.
Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to sup-
port we in this cause. Retirees across the Na-
tion will thank you.
TOWN OF SCHODACK CELEBRATES
BICENTENNIAL IN 1995
HON. GERALD R.H. SOLOMON
OF NEW YORK
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, January 4, 1995
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, it's been my
privilege since entering Congress in 1979 to
return home nearly every weekend.
That's not only a wise policy for a Member
of Congress. its good for a Members peace
of mind. It's necessary to get away from this
artificial world of Washington, DC, and get
back to the real world where real people have
real jobs and raise real families.
Our 22d district is a largely rural area, and
it Is the tried and true virtues of our small
towns and villages that have made this coun-
try great, as recognized as early as the 1830s
by French visitor Alexis de Tocqueville. And
today I'd like to single out one of those com-
munifies, the Rensselaer County town of
Schodack.
Schodack will celebrate its bicentennial in
1995, a celebration that will culminate in a
gala-dinner dance on March 18.
Having visited Schodack many times during
my 16 years of Congress and 6 years in the
SSIONAL RECORD - Extensions
State assembly, Ican personally vouch for the
town's embodiment of all of those smailtown
virtues, the hard work, the patriotism, the spirit
of volunteerism and helping one's neighbor.
Notwithstanding my new duties as chairman
of the House Rules Committee, Mr. Speaker
I still intend to retun home as many week-
ends as possible to visit the good people of
Schodack and all the other small communities
that will always reflect he tre heart and true
character of America.
Mr. Speaker, I ask you and other Members
to join me in congratulating the town of
Schodack on this occasion of its 200th birth-
day.
EMPLOYEE COMMUTE OPTION
HON. DONALD A. MANZULLO
OF IU-Nols
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, January 4, 1995
Mr. MANZULLO. Mr. Speaker, today is truly
a landmark day in the history of this country.
On November 8, the eitizens spoke out
against big govemment and unfunded man-
dates.
We have a unique opportunity to curtail
many, if not all, unfunded mandates this Con-
gress. One key mandate is the employee trip
reduction contained in the Clean Air Act of
1990.
If you thought the electorate was angry in
November, wait until they hear about this re-
striction on their ability to drive their own car
to work. The employee trip reduction, known
also as the employee commute option, re-
quires businesses With over 100 employees in
certain areas to force their employees to car-
pool to work. Thus, the employee commute
option is really a misnomer, because if the
States do not enforce this mandate, they
stand to lose much needed highway funding.
in my own State of Illinois, that is $700 million
in the balance.
In other words, implement mandated car-
pooling, or else. That's not much of an option.
Affected areas are designated "severe"
nonattainment regions based on 1987-1988-
1989 statistics, even though recent data
shows these regions have cleaned-up their air
before these mandates take effect
The bill I am introducing today allows the
States to decide if they want carpooling to be
part of their clean air plan. It will not change
the goals of the Clean Air Act but simply gives
States the option to utilize carpooling as a tool
to help clean the air in their specific region.
My legislation sends a message to the EPA
that the voters voiced back in November-we
need common sense and flexibility in the law.
In Illinois, it Is estimated that this mandate
alone will only reduce air pollution levels by an
average of 1 percent. That small percentage
has a price tag estimated at $200 million for
businesses to enforce. This is a huge price
tag, for a very small benefit. There are cheap-
er and better ways to achieve the same goals,
but the States hould have the flexibility to fig-
ure that out.
Please join me and the many Members who
have cosponsored my bill in giving the States
back the authority to improve their own air
quality. Cosponsor and pass my bill to make
the employee commute option truly an option.
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rASEBALL FANS AND COMMJ
NITIES PROTECTION ACT OF 1995
HON. JOHN CONYERS, J .
OF McmCAN
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, January 4, 1995
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, today I am in-
troducing the Baseball Fans and Communities
Protection Act of 1995. It is time that Con-
gress finally steps up to the plate and ends
baseball's antitrust exemption which is at the
mot of the current strike and which has hi-jacked the national pastime away from the
fans and communities that have supported it
for so long.
Professional baseball is the only industry in
the United States that is exempt from the anti-
trust laws without being subject o alternative
regulatory supervision. There may have been
a time when this unique treatment under our
antitrust laws was a source of pride and dis-
linction for the many who loved the game. But
that time has ended. The continuing baseball
strike of 1994-whch ended the regular sea-
son, which ended the possibility of a World
Series for the first time in 90 years and which
has very nearly ended the love affair of the
American people with their national pastime-
has now became the Baseball strike of 1995.
If Congress fails to take swift action in the
104th Congress, this lingering strike has the
strong potential to destroy et another season;
and I, for one, am not going to stand by pas-
sively and watch that happen.
I am proud that the House Judiciary Com-
mittee at the close of the last Congress voted
to repeal the nonstatutory antitrust exemption
created by an anomalous Supreme Court de-
cision in 1922. That decision created the no-
tion that baseball somehow did not involve
"interstate commerce" and thus was beyond
the reach of the Federal Antitrust laws. The
committee acted to end this illusion, which has
now spawned very real and devastating eco-
nomic consequences for our citizens.
The bill I am introducing responds to the
current phase of the recurring labor crisis in
baseball in a very limited, yet crucial, way: By
subjecting the players' union and the owners
to the Nation's antitrust laws in the event one
party unilaterally imposes an anticompetitive
term or condition of employment on the other.
As introduced, the bill exempts minor league
baseball from the scope of its coverage. It
may be that the current situation will demand
an even stranger esponse and a broader e-
peal. But, in my judgment, this is an appro-
priate starting point for developing a bipartisan
consensus on the Issue in the committee and
in the full house.
The end result of basebal's special treat-
ment has been the perpetuation of a closed,
cartelized industry in which the few, incumbent
club owners possess inordinate economic
power and every other party-players, fans,
municipalities, minor league club Owners, po-
tential expansion investors-remain economi-
cally marginalized. In a very real sense, the
competitive landscape of major league base-
ball in 1995 resembles the very type of busi-
ness arrangements that spurred Congress to
enact the antitrust laws in the 1890's.
I am gratified by the bipartisan support re-
ceived for this legislation in the last Congress,
and the prospect hat both sides of the aisle
can work productively together to have swift
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enactment of my legislation. While I realize three major credit bureaus-TRW, Equifax, musical spoof of politico, over which Mr.
that there are some who wish to concentrate and Trans-Union. With this information ap- Emory will preside on March 25.
solely on the provisions of the so-called "con- pearing on credit reports, individual enders Mr. Speaker, Alan Emory has crooed many
tract with America" in the first 31Y months of will know on a monthly basis whether parents nable milestones in his career-roolint nf
the new session, I would urge all of my col- owe court-ordered child support and whether the Thomas L. Stokes prze for conservtion
leagues to join with me in moving this to a they are fulfilling this most basic obligations. reporting, election to the Society of Profes
high priority status so that spring training and After all, is a parent's obligation to pay court- sional Journalists, Fresideot of its Washington
the regulator season are not lost to the Amer ordered child support any less important than Professional Chapter and member of the
ican people, that parents obligation to make a car payment Chapter's Hall of Fame-hot he is prohably
We have the opportunity and ability to res- or pay their credit card bills? mast gratifed at his elenation to the presi-
cue the national pastime from its current Last year, I asked the GAO to survey 16 dency of Grdiron. He has twice been musicdispiriting condition, Let's not allow this oppor- States, credit bureaus, and some lenderse- chairman of their spring show, a producer ten
tunity to pass by or be deferred. garding this proposal. Iintroduced my bill after times ant always one of the Club' most pm
L I urge all colleagues to join in the effort. 3 receiving the favorable GAO report, entitled Oic wrter of lydic. As a member since 197
"Child Support Enforcement-Credit Bureau adms eetyisvc rsdnh ilb
CREDIT BUREAU REPORTING OF Reporting Shows Premise," on Juno 3, 1994. a most capable leader.
COURT-ORDEREDnerlly. e GA found that my proposal Coeg Washington plitc for more than
PORT ORDRDA HLDSS coo increase child spport coBlecLGos, that it in for decdes Mr. Emory is know as a joual-PO  OBIGTIOSadministratively feasible, sod, most impor- lot with thn highest of standards. He con be
HON. SANDER M. LEVIN tany, it can be implemented with lile cast to touti o newsmaker hot is an fair as thnyeither State or Federal gtovenments. tn short, came. What poblic otficial ouold ash for more?OF MICHICAN over time, my bill will help soon money and in- And who honor to be chief lampooner at the
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES crease cort-ordered child support collections. Gridiron?
Wednesday, January 4, 1995 Mr. Speaker, we boon done nearly all we Mr. Speaher, I join his fouth estate col-
Mr LEVIN. Mr. Speaker, as this historic an In the way of Federal statute; we already leagues, his family, particularly his beloved
104th Congress convenes, I am reintroducing mandate tax-refund istercopto, lbs withholding Wife, Nancy, and his Capitol Hill trends in con-
the Child Support Credit Bureau Reporting Act Of court-ordnrnd support from re , liens on gratating Mr. Emory on his assumption of
of 1995, to require all States to participate in property, end so on. But govomment cannot the Gridiron Club presidency and lash forward
a simplified, nationally uniform child-support do this alone. The ptivate sector must also re- to his continuing successes through the oew
credit-bureau reporting system. intorce the pdnciple of parental responsiility. year.
I first introduced this bill in 1994. It is aimed My bill will provide prvate-sector bas, credit
at combatting the woeftlly low rate of child card agencies, mercants. and businesses the
support payments in the United States, without information they should weigh when making CENTRALIZED AUTOMOBILE
creating a new Federal Govemment program loon decisos. Privatn sector lotors should EMtSSIONS tNSPECTION
to do it Credit bureaus and, through them, in- attac at least as mach importance to a par
dividual enders will know on a monthly basis at's Each record far paying court-ordorod HON. GEORGE W. GEKAS
whether or not parents are fulfilling this most child support an they do to credit cord bat
basi obligation. With negligible Federal costs, ances and loon payments. And failure Is pay OF PESrvu
this bill will begin to get the private sector in- court-ordored child support shoutd carry grave IN THO HOUSE OP REPRESENTATIVS
volved in addressing those adults who don't consequence. Wediesday, January 4,15
pay their cout-ordered child support. Mr. Speaker, if we support family values, Mr. GEIAS. Mr. Speaker t introduce today
Children are created by two people, and en urely this is a sensible and necessary legislation to hdng a commonsense approach
both of them must accept personal and finan- step. Those in the private sector-banks, t implerntation of the 1990 Clean Air Act
cial responsibility for raising their children. In credit coot agencies, and havinesses-should amendments. My legislation is designed 1000'
broken, or never-formed families, financial re- put court-ordered child support on the scale complish three goals: Rrst, to detay tar 2
sponsibility is often defined by court-ordered rhes weighing e decision to woke a loon, yearn the implementaton of the enhanced vo-
child support payments. Unfortunately, too We most send e message that both parents bide inspection cod muintnnce program:
many noncustodial parents toil to comply with ar responsibte for supporting their children second to require the Enviromentol Protoc-
the court orders. nd that child support isa doht parents cannot Con Agency [EPA] to reissue regulations for
A year ago, I rnceived a letter from a con- aford to ignore.
stiuent of mine in Warren, Mi. This mother of Mr. Speaker, I s Eat a copy of the bill he thigam od tr d odfrte re
two ran away from her husband, and moved inserted in the RORD at this point nonnooloment areas,
into a shelter for absed women, She wRtes: Thin legislation Is in respon to a consist-
I have been working as a sereaary for atd ent trend by the EPA of regilaning cirst aud
mann eight years now and it sftill seems thut ALAN EMORY ASSUMES GRIDIRON asking questions later. As far hack as April 2,there is never eenough seocy. My e-husband PRESIDENCY 1993,l1 cynracted EPA Admiistratnr Cmroo M.
beithe S es at oner Fora gtovrnpr shy ort
amouncsnsnsatt ttr imemywon'twll eopaaveaoneyand ir nrwt-egr sarqirmn htE
Little League regstraiona--and If t Or NoW vOnic ceraeclizeot ve-icl inspection program. While I
sound ery yenny, it wouldn't pot thew hoEf IN TE HOUSE OF REPEENTATIVES hove mrny concewn with the EPAS k Contrl-
way through college. Winy dam be do this? lzed Vehicle Emisusions Inspectison Program asBeaa heoets be can get away with t cand Wednesday, Janaey 4, 1w5 a means of actally improving air quality, myIsy hesrtght. Mr, McHUGH. Mr. Spaker, I want to recdga matn concxf is over the Agency's Ozone Na.
Unfortunately, she's not alone. The Officenf nize the achieve entt of a distinguished jour tonal Ambient Air Qoality Standards ReportChild Suport Enforcement in the Deartment nalist who has been covedng Washingtn which found Th of the 99 prsoioesly den-
of Health nd Human Services reports that of since the dap of President Trman. This gnated ronottolowent regions rerieotedtg$35 billion of cumalative coMrt-ordered child week, as we seek a ne- direction for Coo- oone ateaement for the years 1991 through
support od through 1992. $27 billion re gress and the country, no tao Will a new voice 1993. Additionally, according to asailhe ne
mains uncollected. Is 1992, nearly sic million gide Ie well known Gddiron Clb. Alas S oose air studies those regions will agah
absentee parents mode so child support pop- Emory, Washington cor esponden for the Wa- reach againment in 1994, Hod it not ee for
meets atoll. tertown (Na e Yorkn l aio yp ins, assumed the the iclusion of 19CC, 0 climatological nom
This in simply wrong ond my child s cpport presidency of the Club Jonury . He ban oiy, is the Epve 2-year overage of ozone
credit bureau reporting bill will help to change been that noespaper's Washington car- ocottalonment regions such as Harrisburgthis. resodentosince 1951, nd Lancaster, PA, woald never hae been
Very simply. State agencies responsible for Gdidirn is an organization sf C0 journalists caught in this breaucras i web of renelcsioss.
child support enforcement will report he status covering the Nation's Capital. They are well In my opinion. the EFA in looking for a prob-
ot alt child support acounts to tho Notion's recognized for their annual gala dither and em Is regulate which does sca exist
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I urge my colleagues to cosponsor the Gun to the YMCA, Groonpoint Volunteer Anbu- day end encourage her to cootinun in all her
Ban Repeal Act. lance Corys, Little Leue, Polish Neliont Al- endeovors. With best wishes t hope thut
__________liunce, cburches, Scouts nd the local police Rosa's life continues to he eu edventure nd
dnparm trn, yarhs and playgrounds. Others in otfers her many morn pleasunt memorien.
HONORING DR. STEPHEN K. need only hove touch.
ROBINSON The Cluhbs recnly sponuored the Toys
For Tots program, presiding gills, clothing ne~d RMAKE PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL
HON. BILL BARER toys t holidays throughout he Greenpeint SUBJECT TO THE ANTITRUST
OFc ronnra- ommounity. In additin, old eye glasn cullec- LAWS
IN THE HOUSE OF PEfilled mny time, dd-IN HE OU  G REROENTATS ing In the club's sphit of cornice Bo the needy.
Wednesday, January 4, 1995 Melvin Jones Fellowships contue to grow h HON. JAM A. 'RAFCANT, JR.
Mr. BAKER of California. Mr. Speaker, re- ause ot its onding ntributions, enpe- OF OHIO
markable Americans deserve recognition by daily to "Campoign Sight First THE ROUSE OP EORERTATOES
the Congres, which is why I am glad to honor I ask that my colleagues join me in salutig
Dr. Stephen K. Robinson for his recent selec- thn Grenpeint Lions Clb end end Mudden Wednesday January 4. 1995
lion as a mission specialist for future flights of for oil the of the wonderful work they do. Their Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Speaher. the game of
the Space Shuttle by the National Aeronautic nomnodous community spirit nd efforts to !m bunebull has pmoided Americans of all ages
and Spae Administration. pmve the linen of those in need in on Inspira with a neuron of entnment since the first
Dr. Robinson is a 1973 graduate of lien to un ol, professional game was played in 1g6g. It holy
Campolindo High School in Moraga, which is is the Amediua pest-time. But's reont peers
located in my District in the East Bay area of TRIBUTE TO ROSE WHtTE ugly tuber disputes hove tarished the game
Califoia. Currently a research scientist in the nd hurl hanebult fens. One of the reasons
Fluid Mechanics and Acoustics Division of HON. WILM 0. UPINSKI why the players hane felt compelled to go n
NASAs Langley Research Center in Hampton, ntrih-incodrng the present strike aulins
VA, Dr. Robinson will serve as one of several up ILiois thut the haseball oers urn euempt frn U.S.
mission specialists on future Space Shuttle IN TtE ROUSE OF PSFRTATTVES antitmst lawn.
flights. He mil relocate to Houston in March of Wednesday, January 4. 1995 As a former athlete twin the University of
next year to begin I year of training at the Mn. LIPINSKI. Mr. Spoaker I rise today to Pitsburgh, end a staunch supporten of ol
Johnson Space Center, during which he will pay tribute to Mm. Rose White, a prominent working people. I heliene that this is a del-
team how to operate and integrate the dozens member of the Third Congressional District of nimant to the great game of husali The ant-
of systems used on the Shutte. Illinois, who celehrated her B0th birthday en host exemption has deniad the plaper the
Dr. Robinson graduated from the University December B. 1994. I mould like to shur with some burgaining toos and levage currently
of Califomia, Davis in 1978 with a degree in my calnagnes the notable ao pyishments enjoyad by ether profesninnal thletes. While I
machanicallaeronautical engineering. He went that have highlighted Mrs. White's life, won't eues atempt to charactenie athletes
on to obtain masters and doctorate degrees in Ruse Whie was bur of Immigrnt parents whose average salaty Is well over $5g0.00g a
mechanical engineering from Stanford Univer- in Chicgo, IL on December 9,1914. Growing peon us nictims, they shuld be afforded the
sity. Dr. Robinson's parents, William andu p as one of nine brothers nd sistem daring some rights and bargaining opportunities as
Joyce Robinson, continue to reside in Moraga. the Great Depression, Rose teemed the come other prefessionl aletes.
Mr. Speaker, Dr. Robinson deserves high of bond work nd familp unity. She rem- Cleady, the American people aren't con-
praise for being chosen in a very competitive onstrated hon commitment to work and family cemed with the detals of the dinpute. They
process. His appointment is testimony to his during the Second World Wan when she jug don't core about salary caps. tine ageny on
diligent pursuit of professional excellence, and glad both a factory job nd three young chil- arhitrabon. All they want in fun the bickedig
I am pleased to commend this outstanding din while her husband fought the won over- and postudig to end, and for the umpires to
East Bay native for his contributions to our seas. Aher the mar, is 1947, Rose and her pelt "Flay Bull" Since the player went en
country. husband become homeowner and settled stake last August all etfors to mediut the
__________with their four childrn is the Garfield Ridge dispute hone foiled. Cleardy, the owners bane
community us the southwest oie. indicated that they no longer have the bent in-
HONORING THE GREENPOINT In addition to heisg a mel homemaker tnrnsta of baueball is mind and they hove Inst
LIONS CLUB AND BUD MADDEN and mother, Rose hoc always been on active the Irst Congresn placed in them buck in
member of the Gorfiold Ridgo community. Her 1022 when they moved to exempt Mujur
HON. CAROLYN B. MALONEY membership in the Democrati Club of Gut- League Banehatl from U.S. anti-trunt lawo. Re
OFew YeM field Ridge led to her cYrORr as Judge fur moving thin xemption mop he the osly way to
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES the ord of Bloctions ot the 23d Word, a pu- and the strike and sane the 1o95 season.
siion she hac held fer 35 yars. Rone in also Thnt's why today I am introducing tke Pro,
Wednesday, January 4, Joys a member of other various community organi- Passional Baseball An1i99st Reform Act of
Mrs. MALONEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise today caress. For example, Re is a member of 190. This bill provides that pmfesnional base-
to pay tribute to the Greenpoint Lions Club, the Garfield Ridge Civic Lague and has held bail teams end leagues composed of such
and its newest Melvin Jones Fellow, Bud Mad- the othies of Traurer and Membemhip teams shall he subject to all anitrust laws.
den, Chairperson. She bun sawved us treasurer of The bill also states that the Congress finds the
The Greenpoint Lions Club was organized the Garfield Ridge Conult of Organizatins business of organized professinl babll In
on December 1, 1939. and sponsored by the during hen Il-penn membership. She is a wet- in, or affcts intemtate commerce, end there
Brooklyn Lions Club. Past presidents of the me member of the American Legion Auxil- fore the existing antitmut town uhould be
Greenpoint Lions Club are practically a Who's iary and local VFW. In the post she has amended Is inverse the resell of the decios
Who of Greenpoint eed as on adviser to the Junior Auoiliary of of the Supreme Court of the United Ste,
The Gmenpoint Club is one of morn than 60 thn American Lngion one won on undue mew- which exempted basall from coverage under
area clubs. comprising a district which in- ban of the hymn end Kiozie Elmentary those laws
ciudes Brooklyn and Queens. This district is School Parent Teacher Organiztion. Plan, in In introducig this leginlatios, I ow nnt pm-
part of a larger district covering New York har spurn lime, Rose reles with the Garfield flssing to lake sides in the dispute. I believe
State and Bermuda. The local district joins Ridge Gordon Club nd volonteers at the Re- hulk parties share some of the bla for the
with other clubs in 178 countries and geo- gionul Veterans Administratin Hospital. seny state of the game of buseball. My denire
graphic areas, making the Greenpoint Lions Rosa bus filed her 90 yeaw of life with tar- is to fume the union and the ownem to si
Club a member of the largest service organi- lp, friends, hard work, dedication, nd newice rows, segotiate in good fuith, asd nome In an
zabon in the world. to her contry and ommunity. She is a model agreement that both sides can live with. Fr-
Every year the Club raises money and Citizen and deseres Is ha commended for her feSionut fuotball nd baskethall are both sob-
names a Melvin Jones Fellow to help fulfill its outstanding accomplishments. I ur sure that jeot to U.S. osil laws. Interentingly
motto, "We Serve." And who have they my colleaguen mould like to join me is con- enough, bulk spurts are doing extremely wall
sewed? The Lions give their steadfast support grotniating Mrs Rose White en her 80th birth- finuncilly, both sorts have salary cops-and
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - Extensions of Remarks
player income has never been higher. Profes- THE INTRODUCTION OF HR. 16
sional baseball players and owners should
stop posturing and take a look at basketball HON. JOHN D. DINGEL
and football (it's not hard to do-with the Na- OF WCHrmAN
tional Hockey League owners locking the play- I THE HOUSE OF REPRESNTATIVES
em out there's not much else for them to Wednesday, Januy 4,1495
watch)
Owners take heed: enactment of my legisia- Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, halt a century
tion won't bankrupt the game nor would it pre- ag, my Tamer introduced lets the Hause a bill
vent you from imposing a salary cap. Players: providing for a prvgram at nabonal health in-
dont think that this bill will be a panacea fvr rnce In each at the past 19 Cangresses I
all ora prbes eagi igsdtthad onleoad Ibis bill, hoth as a testamentalyour problems. Bargain in goo  faith and ~ 
n ue
remember that most Americans would give I th wisdom of the 1943 Muray-Wagner-
their right arm to be a bench warmer for a Dingell bill aod as a bopetal harbinger of an
Major League team and ears $150,000 for 6enlightened change a our Naien's approach
month health care In almost every decade sine,mth aIo.Tikcati hopes mere high that such a prograw mightMr. Speaker, I urge all of my colleagues to be enacted.
co-sponsor the Professional Baseball Antitrus Th ill containe the seeds at the essial
jReform Act of 1995, eements of a viable national plan: Universal
_________ovuerage, cst containment. malpractice re-
torm, and a fair financiog system that puts
HONORING THE LIFE OF compebtiveness first.
ELIZABETH GLASER Par folly 40 years, the introduction at this billhas reminded as at the justice, misdam, ad
neceutity of national health insuranca. The
HON. CAROLYN B. MALONEY consequences ot ear inacton are apparent.Na mare families need be mined, nor mare in-
OF NEW YORK dueldes destroyed, far our imperaties to he
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES dear. Let us most forward, with the lessons ofkistory as our guide, to finally enact rational
Wednesday, January 4W 1995 health insurance.
Mr. MALONEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise today
to pay tribute to one of the most Incredible
women I have ever known; and to moun her
premature death.
On December 4, Elizabeth Glasers life was
cut short by complications from the AIDS
virus. Infected from a blood transfusion, Eliza-
beth dedicated the last years of her life to
heightening our awareness of this horrible dis-
ease. Elizabeth inspired us all when she
spoke at the 1992 Democratic national con-
vention about her experiences. In a speech
which moved all those who saw it, she plead-
ed with the world not to forget about the
youngest victims of AIDS, including her two
children.
Struck by the lack of attention to children af-
fected by the HIV virus, Elizabeth helped
found the Pediatric AIDS Foundation. Dedi-
cated to the memory of her first daughter
Aiel, this foundation raised millions of dollars
for pediatric AIDS research, and has provided
support to dozens of children and families af-
fected by the disease.
But more than anything, Elizabeth taught us
that life's joy does not have to end, even
under the most horrible of circumstances. Try
as it might, AIDS never robbed Elizabeth of
love for life, nor her desire to help those in
need. Speaking about her daughter, Elizabeth
once said, "She taught me to love when all I
wanted to do was hate. She taught me to help
others when all I wanted to do was help my-
self."
Mr. Speaker, I would ask that my fellow co-
leagues not forget the lessons of Elizabeth
Glaser, and to join me in sending our deepest
condolences to her husband Paul and son
Jake. We have a responsibility to fight this
horrible disease on all fronts, and to never
abandon its victims. Elizabeth Glaser helped
on realize this fact, and now it is our job to
carry her legacy forward.
AMERICAN DREAM RESTORATION
ACT
January 5, 1995
expenses, and retirement would be allowed if
the money is held in the account for at least
5 years.
Mr. Speaker, it comes as no surprise to
American taxpayers to find that when you
combine their Federal, State, and local taxes,
they are currently being taxed at all time
record high levels. Tax relief for American
families is long overdue. With a new majority
in Congress, we now have the opportunity to
change direction. Indeed, we have a mandate
from the voters to dramatically change direa-
tion. This is a mandate that no one can ig-
nore. I look forward to working with my col-
leagues, both Democrats and Republicans, to-
ward the goal of making the American Dream
Restoration Act a reality.
I would like to close this statement on a per-
sonal note. In the years that I have served in
Congress, I have fought for tax relief, only to
see it thwarted or reversed at a later date. I
have been true to my philosophy of less
spending and lower taxes, only to see the ma-jority in Congress reject this philosophy ear
after year. I cannot possibly convey to my col-
leagues what it is Ike for me, after 25 years
in which my political views have been the mi-
nority in the House of Representatives, to now
have this opportunity to change the directon
of Congress. Congress has been on a course
that has been destroying the economic well-
being of the family and it is absolutely critical
that we change course. I am honored to serve
in this Congress and play a part in the effort
to make a change.
HON. PHILIP M. CRANE HONORING THE ST. NICHOLAS
- ROFcsrs NEtGHBOHOOD PRESERVATION
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES CORPORATION
Wednesday, January 4, 1995 HON. CAROLYN B. MALONEY
Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, today I have the svscmYoRK
distinct honor of introducing the American IN TE ROUSE OF EPFSENTATIVnS
Dream Restoration Act as the bill's principle
sponsor.
As 1 of 10 bills derived from the Contract Mrs. MALONEY. Mr. Speaker, I rite taday in
With America, this legislation will enable recapnitian of the 19th anniversary ot the
American families to use more of their hard Saint Nicholas Neighhorhood Presnrvation
earsed income to save, to invest, to pay for Carp.
their children's education, to buy a home, to St. Nicks, as it is commonly known, came
pay for medical expenses, or to use in what- into existece in resyonse to a catautrophin
ever way they so desire. The American Dream tine which InS 19 families homeless. Through
Restoration Act is divided into three sections, the spirit ot vunteerism, the families were re-
and I would like to briefly explain each provi- veted and tbe grasp began laking at rebsild-
sion for my colleagues. leg en the vacant lot end rehabilitang an ad-
The first section provides for a $500 per jacast building Pram that point is 1975, SL
child tax credit for dependents under the age Niks has flourished end grwn coder the
of 18. The full credit would be available to guidance at the Prll Center fur Community
families with adjusted gross incomes under and Eviromental Development into an era
$200.000. nizatin that provides comprehensive servicen
The bill's second provision eliminates what Is revitalize and redevelop the GreenpsinE'il-
is referred to as the marriage penalty. Under liamsbcrg areas of Brooklyn.
the current Intemal Revenue Code, many mar- Its 19 years af expedene with Brooktyn's
ried couples pay higher taxes than they would hausing mues has aoed SL Nicks Is an-
by filing two Individual retuns. In order to end camptsh some holy amazini feats, It bas in-
this inequity, families currently subject to the develoyed or cansbunted ever 26 ants of law-
marriage penally would be entitled to a tax and mudemle scams housing. intoring see-
credit. ior busing, hausing fur homeless families,
The final provision of the bill is referred to and two-family hames. St Riots als assists
as the American dream savings [ADSJ account aver 3ea families end individuals each year
and would establish a new back-ended individ- with tenant advocacy servies and bameless
ual retirement aount [IRA]. The ADS ac- neo prevention programs.
count would allow a nondeductible contribu- In addition, St Rinks provides economin d
tions of up to $4,000 for a married couple il- velaymest programs in an effort to revtalize
ing a joint return-2,000 for an individual- the ecanomin base of the Grenpaint and Wi
beginning in 1996. Tax free distributions for iamsburg awas yf Brooklyn. The servies pm-
fiout-lime hoe purchases, education, medical vided by St. Nicks include jab trainieg, security
E 52
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House of Representatives
The House met at 9:30 a.m. and was ttd the eliuce of the antitrt ex
called to order by the Speaker pro tem- emption.
pore Mr. BARerr of Nebraska]. I thought it was time that you heard
___________the other side of the story.
hoc. Selig. In hie letter. Islsted that
DEMIGNATION OF SPEAKER PRO major league baseball don not operate
TEMPORE as an eceomic tartel,
The SPEAKER pro tempore laid be- That 10 ao - Major league basebal
fore obe House the following commn- Operates u a cartel in c1ass1c manop-
nication from the Speaker oly fashion. The owners, ot market
WsnNoox. DC. forces, dictate how the supply of
uay product will be allocated. Te atitrt
I heby dsinate the Honoaable BIL exemption shields maoar league base
Boarrr to act as Speaker Pompare n ball from market fore and makes
th.. dy competition lesposelble-sThat sounS
llike a monopoly to me.
Speaker of the House ofR-eota Mr. Selig also inslote that repeal of
the antitrut exemption would set end
MORNIG USIESS the baseball stike. Wrong again. AllMORNING BUSINESS sig point ther way. o Fer.
The SPEAKER pro tempoes. Pursu- the hea of the Major League Baseball
at to the Order of the House of Janu- Players Asocation. has pulily at-
ary 4, 1995. the Chair will new zecog- d many times that If the exemption
alse Members from lists submitted by were repealed, be would stronglypurge
the majority and minority leaders for the players to ead the staiks.
morning oor t Mr. Selig insisted that the players
The Chair will alternate recognltion should agree to a salary cap because 15
between the parties, with eacb party is good and because it has worked for
limited to 30 minutes and each Member football and basketball.
other than the majority and minority Wrong Yet again. Football and bus-
leaders limited to 5 minutes.
The Chair recognzels the gentleman caps e ae hroughbt tel-
from Kentucky [Mr. BUNNIo] for 5 lectte bagainn Process. The bass-
min ute. 05t0. bal owerswant to Impose the cap
(Mr. BUNNING asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks) Baseball bs a problem because themarks)oweners have been unable to roeh
agremento how to share revenues
MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL bete Iml market teams and laoge
Mrh BUNNING. Mr. Speaker, last But, Instead of hammerig out a
week. the owners of major league base- agreement. they a now trying to
ball vited Capitol 11111 to urge Mem- arbtrarly impese a aary cap on the
bers of Congress to leave their exem- players to forte the players to seine
Lon from the antitrust laws alone. the owners'problem for them.
Many of you may also have seen a Mr. Selig mid that the antitrust ex-
letter which went out last week from emplie ha not hurt the players. That
Acting Major League Baseball Commie is as wrong wrong can be. I know it
sloner Bod Selig. which outlined a in bard to feel sorry for baseball play
number of reasons that he felt viodc- ers with median salaries of half a ntu-
lion dollars. And it is also true that the
baseball players union has been very
effective 1n the past several decades
and has been able to win-through cel.
lective bargaining-ome of the rights
that other American workers have
been guaranteed by law.
But the antitrust exemption does
hurt players. It Is a constant threat
hanging over their heads. The owners
know-chat because of the exemption-
that if they are able to break the
unio. the players have no place to
turn.
Mr. Selfg. in his letter, Insisted that
repealing the exemption would hurt
baseball, fans, and communities that
have franchles.
He is wrong again. The other major
professional sports do not have an anti-
trust exemption bat franchse move-
ment has been slight.
After eight work stoppages in the
last 24 years, and the current strike
that has destroyed one season and
threatens another, It In hard to imag-
ine anyone suggesting that the anti-
trust exemption is good for the fans.
And then Mr. Selig dredged up the
old trusty line that repealing and anti-
trust exemption would destroy the
minor leagues.
This is a very effective line becausd
minor league teams are scattered
around the country and touch the lives
and economies of small towns through-
out the Nation.
But the plain truth of the matter is
major league baseball has to have the
minor leagues. It traditionally takes
longer to develop professional baseball
players than football or basketball
players.
If the minor leagues were done away
with. the decline in quality would be
devastating to the integrity of the
game and destroy baseball. The owners
are smart enough not to jeopardize
their investments in their teams by
letting that happen.
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The minor leagues are Indispensable wonot permitted to ask questions. As far as the unfunded mandates bill.
to the future of major league baseball. Our side wan not permitted t offer Its I have so problem with requiring that
Repeal of the exemption does not own witnoss, if snobh the cone, ifphat thore be an analysis of what the cost in
threaten them in any way. That's a be a proper desoription of what the to State end local goverents I have
smoke screen. gentleman testifying won doing, no prohlem with greater consideration
Through it all. 1 can understand We were told It wonot a hearing, being given to those Issues I have o
where Mr. Selig Is coming from. Sot at the Smte time we could net problem with saying that Cansreks. he-Major league honeball has Wo have bring our fslde In. At that point then fore yen pits something onto home-
this exemption removed for the good of we nked soot the, whether we would body else. erery one ought to knowLhe fans, the game, and anybody else hae a opr unity to n qo etions hew much it costs and he able to orslu-
that wants a seson In 1h. tuho. e would, except then we ate.
learned uaeeuently every aendent What I do haoe a prohref with is
TH E LEGISLATIVE SEASON wan limited to 0 minutes for the pr- whe we have as opportunity to perposes. 5 minutes for the oppest oh tulphteo folly sod to explore thin hillThe SPEAKER pro tempore. Under It did not step there An we were
the Speaker's announced policy of Jan- going through the hill. looking forward
uary 4. 1995. the gentleman from West to offerisg some ameodments at ee-
Virginia [Mr. WISE] Is recogized dur- talc parts certain sections. home of RECESS
in, morning business for 5 minutes. those sectono wore removed from our The SPEARER pro tempere 'fre
Mr. WISE. Mr. Speaker, the gen- comitten's jurisdictin. It prbahiy being so further reqoests for morning
tieman before me spoke about the won the moot extraordinary procedure busns. pursuant to clause 12. role 1,
baseball seson. I want to speak some that 1 have noes, the House will stand in recse until 11
sheet the legIslative eono It has bad
ita s ei ayan s es It he I have great respect for the Chair of .m.its perdng dy ad no goe In oarh committee, who In known on both Accordiogly fat 9 O'clock and 43 mis-irst games of the season. The first sides of the aisle for heing eminently utes a-m.i the House stood ln rcese
game, obviously, beIng thin Thursday
and Friday as I enderstand it, the un- fair. I have great respect for oar oem- usi11 am.
funded mandates bill that will be on ieve, i empe on orbod o ah-
the floor of the House.
I hase no problems with voting on partisan basis. I have heensured that
this Issue. I have no problems with vot- thin Inot going to be the usual ran or
lgn on any of the issues that are In the henes. Yet It sets a very disturbing The recese having expired, the House
so-called Contract With America that tons. won called to order by the Speaker at
the Republican Party is bringing forth. Cld the ot have been a hearing, 11 a.
Indeed. I think that the debate is I day? We have hoeisseveral days new
wholesome and worthwhile to have on waiting to get this hill to the floor. We
many of these issues" are going to be her ontil Thureday
To debate though means debate. It nd then take the bill and the rule up
means having the opportunity. It Thoroday, as I understand IL and begin The Chaplain, Ree. James David
means being able to play. using the the amendment process Os Friday. Ford, 0.0.. offered the following pray-
baseball analogy. it means being able Could ther not have been a I day's er:
to play a full nine innings. But what delay so that there could have been a Our heart. sr grateful. 0 loving
does not help this House is when you go hearing so the propones and oppo. God, that we are surrounded by ethers
immediately from the opening ball to seet could have bad their chance? One who support w in our worries, who eel-
the ninth inning. That Is what is hap- of things, for Instance, that concers ebmte with on in our victories, and
pening in the unfunded mandates bill. me Is what happens to coal mine Safety whos prence Is ever with on At or
That is my concern about what is hap- laws? I am told, 'Don't worry. Bob, bent memento we anowledge that we
pening with the important balanced they won't be affected, particularly do net walk alone or possess all the
budget amendment and others. Let me those that are paused before thin bill strengths or energy or coage to fare
explain. becomes law." Well, perhaps. the opportunities sod the challenges of
As a member of the Committee on What happens to occupational Safety each day. With appreciation nd with
Overnment Reform and Oversight, and health? What happens to repels- thanksgiving. we remember those
which has the unfunded mandates bill, ties of hacking industry and the fleas whos liven are 0ousd with our and
I had the chance to participate last cal Indstries? What happens to all of whose grace in ever with us Io Yoer
week In an extraordinary process, a thin Important area rssene We pray. Am.
process by which the committee. which So that Is why I think It wnuld have
had not met previously, suddenly bees wise and appropriate to at leant
comes into session In Its opening ses- hld a hearing. Balanced bodget
sion. which is traditionally known AS amendment will come op amendments THE JOURNAL
its organioing meeting, that iS where were cut off by 6 the previous. In the The SPEAKER The Chair has coas-
you go through the amenities and an- committee markup then. And so I hope ied the Journal of the lent days pro
nounce who is on what comittee. and and urge the Republican majority to ceedis and announces to the Mouse
then launched from the point into tak- recognozc the Importance of the proce- his approval thereof
Ing up the unfunded mandates bill dare here. Pursuant to clause 1, rule L the Jour
without a hearing, without a hearing. We want to. we all wont to play in sal stands approved.
That Is right. A bill which is going to this haseball gase, but we want to
rewrite the relationship between Fed- make sur there are equal times at bat.
eral. State. and local governoents and. equal opportunitieo to pitch. equal op,
indeed, in some cases the private sector portonities to folly participate in this PLEDGE OF ALLEGINCE
won takes up without s hearing. game and that we do net run, go imme- The SPEAKER. The gentleman from
There was a hearing of sorts. The diacely from opening pitch to the ninth Nebraska (Mr. CISbrNSo] will lead
gentleman from the Republican side inning sod then the game Is called, the House In the Pledge of Allegiance.
was permitted, who is not a member of So if the Americas people ar going Mt. CHRISTENSEN led the Pledge of
the committee but is a sponsor of the to truly have faith is thin process. and Allegiance as follows:
bill, was permitted to address the com- In this contract, which the majority I Pledge alice to the Fleg of the
mittee for a number of minutes about ban vowed to have voted on by the 100 United Stots of Americad to the Reput
the reasons he thought It was a good days, then it must know that there has iecforubiehitsande.oneononderidbill, describing what wan is It. Oar side beena fll profess there .Indivisible. Aithsiberty w d Joseer eoral,
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Mr. President, now that we have both
managers on this bill, I would like to
proceed and lay out what course of ac-
tion we would like to follow. What I
will be doing is seeking a unanimous-
consent agreement so that the pending
amendment before us can be laid aside.
The reason that I will make that re-
quest is because a motion to table that
last night was not successful. During
the hours since then, different con-
cerned Senators have been discussing
what sort of modifications might be
made to that amendment language.
Since there has been no agreement at
this time, it will be my request that we
lay that aside so we can then take up
the next pending committee amend-
ment which would be before us. We
would dispense with that committee
amendment so that we can keep mov-
ing So that is going to be my intent.
Again, as I just confer with the other
manager, I would again suggest the ab-
sence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ab-
sence of a quorum has been suggested.
The clerk will call the roll,
The legislative clerk proceeded to
call the roll.
Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection. it is so ordered.
ORDER OF PROCEDURE
Mr. KEMPTHORNE, Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that the Sen-
ator from Pennsylvania be allowed to
make remarks as though in morning
business for approximately 10 minutes,
and that following his comments I re-
serve the right to the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection? Without objection, it Is so
ordered.
The Senator from Pennsylvania is
recognized for 10 minutes.
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I
thank the Chair. I thank my colleague
from Idaho.
THE BASEBALL STRIKE
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I have
sought recognition while there is a lull
in the action on the pending legislation
to talk for a few minutes about the
pending issues before the Judiciary
Committee on possible legislation re-
garding the antitrust exception which
might have an impact on the current
baseball strike.
I believe that it is highly unlikely-
virtually impossible-for the Congress
of the United States to act on an anti-
trust exemption to have any meaning-
ful impact on the pending strike and,
therefore, urge in the strongest pos-
sible terms that both parties return to
the negotiating table to work in a col-
lective bargaining sense to end the
strike and bring baseball to the playing
field this spring,
I have had long reservations about
the antitrust exemption as it applies to
baseball, as it applies to other major
sports, like football, which has an anti-
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trust exemption for revenue sharing,
and participated more than a decade
ago, in 1982, in extensive hearings when
the Los Angeles Raiders, then the Oak-
land Raiders, were proposing a move.
And those hearings were very impor-
tant and raised some of the same con-
siderations which are now pending on
the baseball strike.
As we have moved forward in the
consideration of the complex issues on
the antitrust exemption, my view has
been to retain the exemption as it im-
pacts on the Pirates, which are a major
factor in Pittsburgh, and a major con-
stituent interest of mine. If we elimi-
nate the antitrust exemption, we will
have bedlam with respect to franchise
changes. I notice my colleague Senator
GoRTON nodding in agreement because
of the impact on the Seattle baseball
team.
One thing is certain, Mr. President,
and that is that it is highly unlikely, I
am almost certain, that Congress is
going to act with any speed, and I
think that Congress should not act,
should not get involved in the midst of
a labor dispute, where there are very,
very serious issues, to try to affect the
outcome of that labor dispute. At the
present time, the Judiciary Committee
is totally involved in the consideration
of the constitutional amendment for a
balanced budget. And on the Senate
floor we are involved in very complex
legislation on taking away mandates
by the Federal Government which are
not paid for. There is a very, very
heavy agenda on economic issues,
budget issues, trying to reduce the size
of Government, trying to reduce spend-
ing, and the consideration of tax cuts,
so that far behind on the back burner
is this issue of changing the antitrust
exemption.
My comments this morning are
prompted, in part, by this banner head-
line in the Philadelphia Inquirer this
morning: "Phillies President Blasts
Union, Hinting at Player Defections."
Bill Giles is president of the Phila-
delphia Phillies, and he is a very, very
mild-mannered man. I cannot remem-
ber a headline on Bill Giles speaking
out in such emphatic terms. What he is
saying bears directly on my comments,
where he makes the statement that
"The union has spent most of their en-
ergy in Washington trying to do away
with our antitrust exemption instead
of negotiating and trying to grow the
game."
I have been in frequent contact with
Mr. Don Fehr, head of the union, ask-
Ing him what help I could be or what
help the Senate could be in a construc-
tive way in trying to bring the strike
to a close. I first made that contact
with Mr. Fehr last summer before the
strike started on August 12. And at the
same time period, I talked to the act-
ing commissioner, Bud Selig. and the
officials of both the Philadelphia Phil-
lies and Pittsburgh Pirates, my two
home State teams, to see what help we
could be. The antitrust exemption
came up briefly last fall on the Judici-
ary Committee calendar, and it was
voted down, I think, largely because of
ATE S 1025
a sense that the Congress and the Sen-
ate should not get involved in a pend-
ing labor dispute. The issue in Pitts-
burgh is especially touchy at the
present time because the Pittsburgh
Pirates are up for sale, and the Pirates
have been kept in Pittsburgh by a con-
sortium of hometown business people
who have bought the Pirates, to keep it
in Pittsburgh. That is a difficult mat-
ter because the Pirates are losing so
much money, which is a source of the
controversy today which has led to the
strike. The Pirates have had a prospec-
tive buyer, John Rigas. of Coudersport,
PA. I have been trying to be helpful in
meeting with officials of the Pitts-
burgh Pirates to see if that sale could
be effectuated. That sale Is going to be
held up because of the uncertainty of
what is going to happen in the strike
and to the antitrust exemption.
Obviously, I speak as only one Sen-
ator, one member of the Judiciary
Committee. I think that given the
complexity of the Judiciary Committee
calendar, and given the complexity of
the Senate calendar, and the complex-
ity of the House calendar, it is as close
to a certainty as anything can be that
there is not going to be legislation
coming out of the Congress between
now and April on the antitrust exemp-
tion. There are too many things ahead
of it. If it did come to the floor, I think
many would agree with my position
that the Congress ought not to inter-
vene to try to alter-ought not to
change the level playing field. That is
an expression we use very frequently
about our debates on many subjects,
but it is certainly applicable not to
change the level playing field when we
talk to the baseball effort.
What the Phillies' president has had
to say on one end of my State. and
what is happening with the Pirates at
the other end of my State, trying to
sell the team to keep it in Pittsburgh.
I hope that the parties will go back to
the bargaining table and will settle the
dispute so that we can have baseball
this spring, and not to look to the Con-
gress to try to intervene, which is not
our place and is so highly unlikely on
the current state of the record. I thank
the Chair.
I yield the floor.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to
call the roll.
Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it Is so ordered.
L J
UNFUNDED MANDATE REFORM
ACT
(Purpose: To prevent the adoption of certain
national history standards)
Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, I have
an amendment at the desk and I ask
that it be read.
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Honorable Ed Madigan. In the Congress, we of Santa Clr County. and for bin extnole
use the term 'honorable" as a matter of deco- work with his church.
rum and protocol; but when I think of my Despite the water worn tet raged in or
friend and colleague Ed Madigan, the word State for years, Ron Esaa has been a coice
"honorable" is truly appropriate. of reason with an eye to the tte for how we
Having served with Ed since coming to Con- work welt to develop a reliable water suppty
gress, I invariably found him to be a shining for Santa Clam County. One of the greatest
example of decency and civility in an environ- strengths Mr. Ena brought o our valley was
ment that, all too often, can be adversarial and the need to expand the diversity of or water
contentious. He was a consensus builder- nuppiy hose to deaf with the growth of our
one who warranted respect on both sides of county and the realities of drought His
the aisle as a reliable, sincere, and extremely thoughtful approach of developing a win of
capable statesman who stood tall and proud water nupplieo led thio coonty through the r-
on behalf of his fundamental values, his con- ontcrdticul drought expenence relatively on-
stituents, and his country. cated in a much stroger pogition than
As a fellow member of the House Agri- many areas oroand on. This feat in a testo
culture Committee, Ed was a joy to work with went to bin teodership and vision.
in developing and deliberating our Nation's g Ron Eu in a pdncipled and honet leader
riculture policy. He worked tirelessly on behalf and a denoted father nd hunband. I know
of farmers and ranchers and all that rural that whatever anon of endeavor he chooses
America represents. Having earned the re- nex, he will ecn. I wont to wish Ron and
sped and admiration for his years of service Connie and the ret of his family all the best
in Congress, he was suitably appointed to the In the tte, and thank him fur the wonderful
President's Cabinet as this Nation's 24th Sec- achievewents and progress be ban left for no
retary of Agiculture, where he again served to remember him by.
with dignity and honor on behalf of the agri-
culture community and consumers of food and
fiber Without question, Ed has left an indelible PERSONAL EXPLANATION
legacy and high standard for which all of us
should strive to follow.
Although I join the countless many in ex- on NNSvv
pressing regret and sorrow for a tremendous IN THE HOUSE OF EEPRESENTATIVES
loss' I consider us all to be extremely blessed Monday. Janary 30, 1995
with the oppotunity to have known and Mn. CLINGER. Mr. Speaker, official bust-
worked with the Honorable Ed Madigan. ness kept me frum the Cfamber durng the
note on the amendment offered by my cot-
TRIBUTE TO RON ESAU league from Pennsylnia, Mr. KANionogi.
Hod I been presnt, I would bane voted "no"
HON. NORMAN Y. MINETA on rolcall No. ha.
OF CAACFORNIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, January 30, 1995
Mr MINETA. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in HON. JOHN J. LaFAICE
tribute to a dedicated public servant and a uF NEW YOne
personal friend. As Ron Esau retires from his IN THE HOUSE OF BEPRESErTATVES
position as general manager of the SantaClara Water District, in San Jose, CA, this Monday, January 3, 1335
month, he caps a remarkable career as a Mr. LAFALCE. Mr. Speaker, I owtnday in-
major water resources force in Santa Clar trodung the National Commission gn Profes
County, This is a man whose interest in public sional Baseball Ad of 1h95. The legislation
service is so important o him that he made it centen a temporary regolatmy authodty to
his duty for more than half of his life. oversee the conduct of professiral baseball
Since 1957, Ron Esau has been serving the to assure that our national pastime will remain
citizens of Santa Clara County. He first joined available nd responsive to the American pub-
the Santa Clam Valley Water District as an lo.
assistant civil engineer and has held various Like all baseball fans, I bae found the
pots, including assistant general manager, events of the past poor edromely dishearten-
until appointment to his present position as ig. We witnessed oboe negotiations that fo-
general manager. coed mor on otlandish demands by both
During his 37 years of dedicated service, owners and players that on tangible objec-
Ron Esau has been appointed to numerous tines, a baseball stike that halted all major
directorships on water boards across the State league play nfon August 12 and, for the frst
including the State Water Contractors, the time in 0 years, the cancellatio of a Wold
Central Valley Project Water Association, the Sedie. Recentlp. the major league team own-
Califomia Water Resources Association, the em collaterally imposed a cap on player sole-
Califomnia Urban Water Agencies, the Western den that could also jeopardize the 1995 bane-
Urban Water Coalition, the Bay Policy Board, boll season. All these evuots hava taboo place
and others. behind cloed doom, in anoint cegotiation
Aside from his prestige as a high-ranking without roprentation ot and lisle apparent
water resources and community official, Mr. regard for, tho interests of thoso who pay Ihn
Esau has also been praised for the substantial cost of professional baseball-bseball fans
contributions he has made as a hard-working and taxpayers
volunteer He is known for the work he has These events tode to confion the moot
done an a cabinet member of the United Way negtie wagoe f major league baneball in
January30, 1995
the press as big business dominated by the
interests of obstinate team owners and over-
paid players. But baseball has always been
morn than just a business. Last years PBS
special on the history of baseball by Ken
Burs offered a timely reminder that baseball
is an important Amedcan institution and an
historic national treasure. For more than 100
years, baseball has been one of the few con-
stants in a changing American society. It has
been the measure by which generations of
Americans have recalled their past, identified
their heros and defined their values and aspi-
rations.
Today, the values and traditions of baseball
are at risk for future generations. In the stug-
gle for financial dominance between major
league owners and plays, nowhere are the
interests of baseball fans represented in any
negotiation. Ticket and concession prices are
now so high that the Nations pastime, if avail-
able at all locally, is priced out of the reach of
growing numbers of American families. Even
watching baseball on commercial television,
the only way many families now enjoy major
league games, could be eliminated if broad-
cast rights are sold to pay-per-view television.
It is clear that baseball owners and players
will continue to look out only for their own
needs. But there is a crying need for someone
to look out for the interests of fans, of tax-
payers and of the communities in which both
major league and minor league baseball Is
played. It is time for Congress to take steps to
return baseball to the American people.
The legislation I am introducing today seeks
to accomplish this by creating an independent
National Commission on Professional Base-
ball. The Commission would serve as a tem-
porary regulatory body and impartial arbitrator
to oversee the conduct of professional base-
ball until the legal status of major league
baseball can be redefined either by negotia-
tion or by congressional legislation. Its pur-
pose is simple-to provide a measure of pro-
tection for the interests of baseball fans and
taxpayers against the near absolute control
over baseball exercised by the major league
baseball owners.
Major league baseball is unique among pro-
fessional sports and American business in the
broad exemption it enjoys from legal challenge
under the Nation's antitrust laws. Major league
team owners have, in effect, the ability to write
all their own rules and to impose these roles
on the public. No outside regulatory authority,
nor any form of internal self-regulatory control,
now exists to check this exercise of take-it or-
leave-it market power by major league base-
ball.
The current player strike is the most obvious
result of this unchecked exercise of market
power. Where once basebati's antitrust ex-
emption was instrumental in allowing baseball
to expand and create playing opportunities, it
now encourages labor disputes and deadlock.
In every renegotiation of the major league
players agreement since 1972-in eight sepa-
rate negotiations in 22 years-agreement was
not reached without either a strike or a lock-
out.
But the problems created by the major
league's exemption from legal challenge go
beyond the labor disputes it fosters between
owners and players and its exclusiveness and
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expense for consumers. There are equally ad- with representatives at all the prncipal parties
verse consequences for minor league baseball ie prafassional baseball, together with a chair-
teams, local governments and taxpayers. man and two members representing the gee-
The relationship between major league and era public. The Commission mould seve as a
minor league baseball teams has become ex- temporary oversight and mediation body that
tremely imbalanced, to the extent that minor Could act immediately to help resolve as Irs
league teams appear analogous to closely passe between baseball Owners and players
contrelled franchises with little independent and also protect the rights and interests of
control or discretion. The key assets of minor baseball fans, minor league teams, local gas-
league teams-their players, managers, and emmeots and taxpayers. It mould also tact-
coaches-are owned and controlled by major tale a longer term, mare thoughtful and hot-
league teams, leaving minor league owners anced approech to resolving the brooder prob
with authority to undertake largely financial lins created by baseball antitrust exerp
management and marketing responsibilities for tioe.
their team. Rights to operate as a minor The legislaton ries not lobe a defntive Pu-
league team, together with players and coach- sition on the repeal of the antitrust exemption.
as, can be revoked for almost any reason, and A major daly of tha commission would be Is
with little or no recourse. undertahe a multi soar study of the anthrust
Major league owners have also learned that exemption, taking into account nil interests
by threatening to move a team to another city and perpectives, and to submit to Congress
they can extract hundreds of millions of dollars its indis nd any recommendations for leg-
from local govemments to renovate existing islative remedies. The commission would be
ball parks or build extravagant new stadiums. required to analyze the major prnpnsals Inn
Teams have attracted new fans and generated modifying baseball's antitrust exemptin, in-
substantial windfalls in the first few years after during tntal repeal o1 the exemption, partial
moving into new stadiums. Local taxpayers repeal for purposes of subjecting labor rit-
end up paying most of the costs. The major lins issues to anbtust jurisdictin, and repeal
leagues have also required smaller commu- at the exemption with protections to exempt
nities to invest substantial sums to renovate lnng-standing contractual arrangements hr
playing facilities in order to retain their minor twen major league and minor league teams
league teams, offering few, if any, guarantees from the ntrs laws.
that these teams will not be moved in future My legislation dos lobe the position that
years. In my own State of New York, for ex- baseball' antitrost exemption is, is effct, a
ample, the cost imposed on smaller towns to gonemment-granted monoy in mucb the
meet these facility requirements has amounted same mnner as a local public utility or tress-
to nearly $30 million. Once again, the tax- portotion authority. And like any other publicly
payers pay the bill. sanctioned monopoly, my bill would iquire
It has become clear that we really need public oversight In assure that self-teremt is
Federal egislation to solve some of the major not put above the interests of the public and
problems faced by baseball Since baseball is consumers.
a national sport and, indeed, is known as our In this regard, the propoted commission
national pastime, I believe Federal egislation would be similar to thn Fedural Cummunico
Is the best way to address this need. lions Commission, or any other pubic body
Proposals have been Introduced in the with oversight over a restricted indnstry or
House by Representatives MICHAEL BILlRAKIS market, An importnt difference. howener, is
and JiM TRAFICANT, and in the Senate by Sen- the act that the authority of the proposed
ator DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, to repeal commission is intended Is be tempary dun
baseball's antitrust exemption. I fear this may ieg a period of deregulation o1 baseball bum
be too simplistic an answer that does not the current market rentrictions imposed by
conie to grips with the totality of the problems baseball's current antitrus exemption. Since
of professional baseball. Repeal would cer- Federal lur has permitted a restricted natonal
tainly benefit major league players, and per- market for major league baseball the Federul
haps even consumers. if it results in team ex- Govemnt baa both the rght and the re-
pansion and lower ticket costs. But it could be sponsiblity to regate Ibis market, just us we
extremely disruptive of baseball operations regulate other monopoies, to assure that the
generally and potentially devastating for many pubi's interests are protested.
minor league teams. To resume play for fans The primary purpose of lbs commission is
in 28 major league cities could mean losing far to provide a fom fsr public sutiny over the
more affordable access to baseball for fans in Conduct of professioal baseball at both the
many of the 170 minor league parks acroas major leag e and minor league levels. It would
North America. have the sulbonty to investigate many aspects
The major altemative to this approach is in- ot basebll, Including the setting of tioket
corporated in bills sponsored by Representa- pricos, expansion or relocation of team trun-
tives Jim BUNNING and CHeALES SCHUMER and chises, terms and Conditionof motor and
seeks only pardal repeal of baseballs exemp- minor league player contracts, relatonships
tion to subject labor issues and negotiations to between major and minor league teams, utrur-
Federal antitrust law. These proposals uffer teral requirements and fnancing for stadiums,
from the opposite problem of addressing onp television broadcast rights, and licensing and
impediments to resolution of the current play- marketing of baseball mercandise. Tbs -
em strike while offering little to address the misso could intervene is these areas upon a
broader problems for baseball fans. local gov- determination that an action or poicy Is pnten
emments and taxpayers, and minor league tly harmful to the publics interests or the
teams. hst Interests of baseball.
The legislation I am introducing today offers The commissin also would have authority
a middle ground between these alternatives. If to conduct binding urbitration i  the event of a
creates a seven-member national commission labor impasse between major legue owner
E 213
and players. It could also provide for medi-
alion or arbitration of disputes between the
major leagues and minor league teams own-
ers. In these areas, the legislation aacords
players and minor league team Owners an op-
portunity to resolve disputes with major league
team owners where no means of viable re-
course are currently available.
A key power of the commission would be its
authority to hold public hearings and to obtain,
if necessary through court action, all relevant
information and documents needed for its pub-
ic investigations. Major decisions in baseball
that affect baseball fans, teams, and taxpayers
are made routinely in complete secrecy with-
out any public representation or disclosure.
Major league baseball's financial statements
are accorded the status of State secrets. And
secrecy and distrust between owners and
players have created major barriers to settle-
ment of labor disputes. The commission would
lift this veil of secrecy In baseball and permit
public disclosure of all relevant Information
pertaining to actions that affect the publlc
The commission would also have authority
to issue orders, and to obtain injunctions if
necessary, to delay or halt actions or policies
by major league team owners until it has had
sufficient opportunity to hold public hearings
and obtain relevant information.
Finally, the legislation requires that the com-
mission be seffunding through payment of
fees by the major league baseball owners.
Major league baseball has reaped enormous
benefits as a result of its protected market sta-
tus under Federal antitrust law and has an ob-
ligation to pay most of the cost of regulating
this market to protect the public's interests.
Funding would be in the form of annual fees
paid by major league baseball calculated as a
fraction-of-a-percentage-.002 percent-of
combined annual team revenues. The manner
and allocation of these fee payments among
major league teams would be determined by
the commission after consultation with major
league team owners.
Mr. Speaker, the single most important
issue of economic policy and legal principle
that every Member of Congress must consider
is whether baseball owners should retain their
unique prerogative to write all the rules of our
Nation's pastime themselves. The events of
the past year, and the cancellation of the
World Series for the first time in 90 years,
strongly suggest hat major changes are need-
ed.
I am particularly pleased about the recent
statements by both President Clinton and Sen-
ate Majority Leader DOLE urging the players
and owners to reach agreement as quickly as
possible. I hope that these and other efforts
am successful, and that the strike ends forth-
with. But that alone is not enough, or should
not be, because history shows that further
work stoppages in the future are highly likely
to occur. So Congress should act on this
whether or not a settlement is reached.
Everyone involved in seeking a solution to
this is doing so principally for emotional rea-
sons-reviving our national pastime. But as
the President pointed out, thnre are serious
economic onsequences as well. Spring train-
ing communities will lose $1 million for each
canceled game; major league Cities will lose
$1.2 million and some 2,000 jobs for each
E 214 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - Extensions of Remarks
canceled game, according to the U.S. Con- In tier, the Choir Academy of Harlem, a
forence of Mayor. This means that the strike ontettite or Community School Diotric 5,
has already cost our economy some $2 billion. was hon. Today, the acadomy teachm
We must not forget that it isn't just the owners yacagoeo acm 8 o 18 aod offer a Regeots
and players who are losing money in this dis- high choot program.
pute-we are all losing, one way or another. Mcm chan a year ago the academy moved
The many bills that have been introduced from a smatter buldina in Harlem to it first
demonstrate the wide ideological and geo- peanent hom-the former termediate
graphic extent of the interest in dealing with School 201 buidiog at Madisan Ave. and
the baseball crisis. But the complete or partial12tS.
repeal of the antitrust exemption is too simplis- Aside from proving 
tself'to critics, keep
reea othaolstepinitasitin lg rho echont finoancially stable tterough thetic an answer and will not get to the nub of the years has bn a challenge Ta resid.
problem, which is to protect fans, taxpayers, Perform e far myatoy and
and communities. My proposal offers a broad- atone dost cover the noses of trs. pianos
er altemative. Under my bill, we will have the nd more than t0t wortdwide cn each
equivalent of compulsory arbitration to resolve year. Ticket revennes cocer only hal its 02.7
the short-term problems and get major league mitton hudget.
baseball on the fields once again, followed by Despite generous pors. cothacks In city
an ia-depth study of how we can best orga- and orporate funding he mode tome tour
nize baseball at al levels under conditions that Impoesible.
provide futern stability for all concerned: play- evehetes. as fuodiot thrinks. the or-
em, owners, fans, communities and taxpayers yng people who auditinone
throughout the United States. so grow. Last yea 2,00 hopefuls tried oat for
I think this is good tegislation and sound eta seats to music. dance and drama.
public policy. I do not expect baseball owners The schoo popnletion ato is growing.
to support my pposal; I do no t expec S years ag the ajr reinsttoted its pre
league players to support it: but I do hope that gr f
fans and taxpayers across America will sup- the1top
port it. for it is the only proposal designed first choir ace chases from the t5t memher con-
and foremost for baseball fans and taxpayers. cft choir on a rotating his.
I urge the Congress to consider this legislation, Althnnghmnre thee 90 of the students an
at the earliest opportunity. oto cottege, Turnbsll said, ae yon
___________ reches gradniacin day. Ho loses sme ste-
ders to the tare of the screern.
BOYS CHOIR OF HARLEM: DOING "It's hard," the director seid. "Some yes
IT RIGHT FOR 25 YEARS cast reach."
Bat for maty. like tO year-ntd Hiletfih
HON. CHARLES B. RANGEL Scott, the Boys Choir or Harlem Is a sen-
iN Thh HOUSryO a pt:;e to get itot mic and nffteOF NEW YORKtees
IN TE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVESfriends
Monday, January 30, 1995 geccing iecn trohbe. I just come here after
Mr. RANGEL. Mr Speaker, I would like to schoot and go en rehearsal," said Scott. a
bring to your attention and to the attention of twoyear teran soprano and en aspiring enocntant. "!Wheo yea araduate firomn here.
my colleagues here in the House, a group of
young men who have been doing it right for Osman Armstrong, td, sings first atto. A
the past 25 years. choir momber since age , Is favorite sng
An outstanding article which appeared in the en the program Is Haydn "To De."
Daily News, December 11, 1994, speaks of "My mocher lovm t then t'i her hecause
the choir's humble beginnings to the cole- t get to trse," said Armstrong. "And I'm
brated musical success they take pride in gettiog away fram the city."
today Some gredaom, like Wiltiam Byrd, re
Please enjoy. tnrn.
m= s Cnm. A Boys Choir assistant conductor and
(By Sharline Chiang) waste theory teacher, Byrd, 26, graduoted to
-Guys It, - th burl chor d tots0. Amterieaurnino has cnmputer science do-
"Gays. it's pianissimo,' the hurly chair di-grefa HotrClgeemsieyd
rector bellowed. Then, clapping twice, he or- fho n ter C harige
d Ired "on't half do it. It must be rightl" In Prineton, H.J.
Doing it right. That s what the Boys Choir "The school hel
of Harlem has been specializing in for the pod me home in no mycon
past 25 years.
It hasnt always been easy. my own person.
k"Its been a long process of convincing pen- Lookig ahead, Turnbull drams ofhelping
pte-tlassical purists-that we wee rea." et p similar choir schos Is major
said Walter Turnbull. choir founder and di- U.S. citie. Mast teachers (rem Houston and
metr. Ott hate expresed interest.
Evidence of mat musicianhlip and diver- But fr n, creatint an endowment
sity can be found on the choir's first solo tirogh (sod-raising and corporate projers
album, "The Sound of Hope," which cele- is the Boys Chir's main goal. Turnhutl said.
brates the group's silver anniversary. Ho said an eedswmat will allow the Boys
The album. released in October by Choir of Hartem tn celehrate the tradion of
EastWest Records America, offers everything "dotng it right" for anther 25 years.
from pop and R&B toJa and gospel. "It's not jut about the their, it's aot
In 25 years, the choir has been turned from disctptine," ho said. "It's ahnos feeling gnod
a group of rambunctious boys in the base- ehont yaarseir that's hope"
ment of Ephesus Church in Central Harlem
tla major iCteroutinni S attraction.
January 30, 1995
PROPOSING A BALANCED BUDGET
AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITU-
TION
SPEECH OF
HON. DONAID A. MANZULLO
OF ILiNeOls
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Friday, January 27, 1995
The House in Committee of the Whole
House en the State of the Union had under
consideration the joint resolution (H.J. Res.
1) proposing a balanced budget amendment
to the Constitution of the United States:
Mr. MANZULLO. Mr. Chairman, a balanced
budget Is the best way to ensure the future
economic prosperity of the United States. It is
a long-term solution to a long-term problem.
Congress, over the past 40 years, has been
full of big spenders who couldn't restrain their
proclivity to spend. A balanced budget limits
the powers of Govemnment and brings stability
to the budget-making process.
Deficits am not a short-term trend. The Fed-
eral Govemment has run a deficit for 56 of the
last 64 years, and the last 24 years in a row.
Congress has tried to change its free-spend-
ing ways, but countless budget deals have
done very little. In the 1920's, Federal spend-
ing as a percentage of GNP was 3 percent; in
1940 it was 10 percent; and in 1992 it was
22.4 percent. Eliminating the deficit is one of
the most urgent priorities facing the country.
We can't begin to tackle our near $5 trillion
national debt until the Federal budget runs a
surplus. And unless we begin to repay our
debt soon, this country will be headed for a
deep and prolonged economic crisis.
When it comes to balancing the budget, the
defict is a convenient target for election year
attacks. But when it comes to getting re-
elected, deficit spending is the key. Why?
First, intense pressure for spending tends to
override a generalized preference for fiscal re-
straint and balanced budgets. In the short run,
deficit spending Is the most painless political
option and the path of least resistance. In
other words, wasteful spending has a curious
appeal to deficit-hostile constituents when it is
in their own district. Second, Intense pressure
for spending tends to override the general, dif-
fused targets of most tax increases. Tax in-
creases are purposely spread out enough so
they don't spark a Boston tea party. For Con-
gress, its easy to tax and easier to spend,
making It almost impossible to balance the
budget.
Mr. Chairman, a long-term, structural re-
sponse is needed to reverse a long-term,
structural problem. The solution is a balanced
budget amendment to the Constitution. I don't
take this step lightly, but it's one that Thomas
Jefferson endorsed. An amendment reestab-
lishes a level playing field, forcing Congress to
place higher priority on balancing the budget
rather than spending and taxing. It restores
the Constitution's goal of limited govemment.
Some critics of this legislation contend that
it will unfairly Impact Social Security. Nothing
could be further from the truth. These critics
say that Social Security is not part of the defi-
cit problem. I agree completely. Social Secu-
rity is soundly financed and runs a surplus
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Be it enacted by the Senate andHouese of Rp-
msetatre of the United Scares of Aaerica In
Congress asembled,
SECONI.SHORTHnE
This Act may be cited as the "Revenue
Sharing Reestablishment Act of 1995 .
5EC. 2. REHAUSMAE OF REVNUE SHAR-
mG PRoEas.
(at IN CEEe.-Subject to subsections (b)
ar (c), she Secretary of the Treasury shall
make payments to States and units of ge-
eral tocat govetnment in ascordance wick
the provisions of chapter 67 of title t, .nit-
ed States Code (formerly known as the "Rev-
eaue Sharing Act"I. as in effect on April 6,
1986 (in this section referred to as "chapter
(b) ENTUrEr)tEN PROD DErNED.-Not-
withstanding section 6701(a)(1) of chapter 67.
for porposes of this section the teres "enti-
tement period" (as used in chapter 67)
meam each fiscal year after fiscal year 199S.
(c) ATIORIZTION OF ArPROPRIATIS.-
Notwiothstanding section e6703(b) () and (2) of
chapter 67. there are authorized to be appro-
priated to the Secretary of the Tmeasury to
carry not this section t5,000,00000o. For per-
poses of this section, amounts appropriated
under this subsecttio shatt be treated as
amounts In the Trust Fund {as that term Is
used in chapter 67).
SEC 3, REDUMON OF AMOUNOO AUTHORImED
n BE APPOPRoOO D) FOR FOR-
force are unacceptable. The military actions
in Chechnya shake the confidence in the de-
mocratization process of the Russian Federa-
tion.
The Cerman Bundestag deplores the p-
palling loss of human lives, the sacrifice and
the suffering of the civilian population
caused by the armed conflict in Chechoya.
The German Bundestag supports alt eorts
to call on Russia emphatically to continue
the intensive dialogue started within the
OSCE and to use all posslblitles of the OSCE
to solve the crisis.
The Geroan Bundoestag calls on the Rus-
slan Government and the Chechen fighters to
sop the fighting Immediately and uncondi-
cionally, to end the bloodshed a sd o eek a
political solution of the conflict which takes
into account the legitimate Interests of Rs-
sia as well as those of the Chechen popu-
lation.
Only such a solution can exclode dangers
for the reform process, democratzation and
the stability of the whole region; only a
democratic Russia will be able to remain a
close partner of Germany, the EU and NATO.
The Goan Bundestag reaffirms Ion sup-
port for the Ressia democrats who cham-
pion human rihts and the role of law.
Cermany wants to remaln Rusta's partner
and friend.
End informal translation.
Adopted unanimously by the Bundstag on
January 20, test.
The amout auhorized so be appropriated rE GISLATION TO REPEAL ANTfr aid to foeign governments for fitocat
years after fiscal year 1995 Is reduced by TRUST EXEMPTION REGARDING$5,000.000,000. MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL
HON. ESTEBAN EDWARD TORESGERMAN PARLIAMENT DE- Or CALRNIA
NOUNCES SITUATION IN IN THE HOUSE OP SEPSmnTATtVFS
CHECHNYA
Tuesday Janurary 31 1,995
HON. TOM LANTOS Mr. TORRES. Mr. Speaker, today I am lo-
On CAIFOeRNA~s lrodooing legislation to repteal the antitrust ex-
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES emptoo under whisk Major Leagse Baseballhen operated sisce 1922.Tuesday, January 31, 1995 1 am doing this for o rasons. For the
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I would like to short term, I believe repealing the esttrut ex-
sham with my colleagues a very important empgoo will accelerate the and of the baseball
document brought to my attention by my very shotdown, which threatens the ivelihoods of
good friend, Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski. Below is thosonds of Americans and the Economies of
the text of a resolution unanimously passed by cites aed towns across the cutry.
the Bundesteg in Germany on January 20, For the long tem. I bolieve repeehig the
1995, regarding the Russian debacle is antitrut exemptios wilt restore faimess to the
Chechnya. I commend the German Parliament fragile relotioship of labor and masogement
for its pincipled stand and I urge my col- is professioat baseball. And is doing that we
leagues to careftlly consider it as a model for will help presetne the institstion of beboll
our own policy. und protect the liselioods of Americass for
The article follows: generotiono t come.
GERAN PARUAsMuENTsotus oe Although my ems backgONund bo deep
CHECUNYA. J NUARY 20,995 roots is the labor movemeni, I do not meas to
Begin tnformal trasation take sdes is the currant struggle between the
The German Bundestag is deeply concerned players and maement. All I want to do is
and dismayed at the dangerous development restore faimeso to the negotiating proceso and
of the situation in Chechnya. It does not allow the coeds to help accelerate the sage
contest the right of the Russian federatio aoes where necessary.
to preserve its territorial integrity Wi.tthin
the legal framework provided for by the Fr-
stan constitution and in observan c toe exemption from the ntitrst statntet, masage
national law and human rights, as welt as ment can impose its owe solory otructure free
OSCE principles and other rules with which from constrns of the cods or the open mar
it (the Russian Federation) had agreed to bet t base no doubt thot removing the anu-
comply under a binding obligation. The Rus- trust ecemptin would drmotically altar the en-
sian ations in Cheshnya constitute, ht- caling rate of ticket phwces which eam nr-
ever. a grave violation of the principtes of renty set by en unfettred cartel of 28 teem
the OSCE. the provisions of the 1992/199 Vi-
enas Document on confidence and serity wers.
buiding measures. and of the U.N. Huan Remoing the antitrut eoempton wuld put
Rights Coventions. The acts of violence. the profecsioal baseball in the reel wod ot cr
disregard of homan rights, and the Indis- pomb Aerica where it betongs. If we allowtrimnte and eareoratad one of miittary the free market to determine the cost of doing
business in professional baseball, the owners
will discover they can discipline their business
practices and the players will discover their
real value on the open market
We must recognize once and for all that
professional baseball is a business, abig busi-
ness. And if we can bring baseball's fiscal
house in order, I have no doubt we can bring
back fans to ballparks across the country and
restore the game of baseball, not the business
of baseball, and America's national pastime. J
PERSONAL EXPLANATION
HON. KWEISI MFUME
OFMNARYLAND
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, January 31, 1995
Mr. MFUME. Mr. Speaker, I was, unfortu-
nately, detained in my congressional district in
Baltimore arlier today and thus forced to miss
a record vote. Specifically, I was not present
to record my vote on rollcall vote No. 75, on
the amendment offered by Mr. COOLEY of Or-
egon.
Had I been here I would have voted "no."
$20,571.48 A YEAR FOR AN INDIVID-
UAL HEALTH INSURANCE POLICY
HON. FORTNEY PETE STARK
OF CALIFORNIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVSS
Tuesday, January 31, 1995
Mr. STARK. Mr. Speaker, I have just re-
ceived a letter from a 59 year old self-em-
ployed realtor in Caifomia-a man who has
no serious medical conditions. Several years
ago, he was divorced and used COBRA to
keep his wife's Prudential group rate policy of
$275.96 per month. At the end of his COBRA
health continuation period, he asked Pruden-
tial to convert to an individual policy. As the
gentleman wrote me, theta when Prudential
"dropped a piece of the Rock" on him. The
monthly cost of a $100 deductible policy was
$1,714.29-or $20,571 a year. For a $1,000
deductible, the monthly premium was
$1,030-or $12,360 per year.
To help stop these outrageous overcharges,
I urge the Congress to simply extend the
COBRA health continuation time periods in-
definitely. Once you are in a group policy, you
should be able to stay in at the group rate
plus an appropriate administiative fee.
PERSONAL EXPLANATION
HON. PHILIP M.CRANE
OF .ulsIS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday January31, 1995
Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, after receiving
assurances that we would not be voting on
final passage of the Unfunded Mandate Re-
form Act tonight, I am keeping a commitment
I made many months ago to travel back to Illi-
nois to speak before the Barrington Chamber
of Commerce. I regret that I may miss a num-
ber of votes relating to amendments to this
legislation. H-owever, regrettably, it has be-
come clear from the proceedings of recent
E 236
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been a single effort by any of the legis- Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, the who take the tickets. Theo People are
laturs to repeal the line-item veto au- Senator from Vermont would like 10 also out of a ob.
thority. In fact, It works so well that minutes to discuss end discourse on Ther Is a public Interest in the
there lea consenus i the States that what wee the ce end possibly future somption of major league baseball. I
it sould be left in place so that they national pastime. I yield those 10 rin- sue concerned that the owners show no
might continue to provide a foundation utes to the Senator. Intent of really getting a strong com-
for the financial Integrity of the Na- The PRESIDING OF'ICEJl The Sen- missIoner who might look cut for the
tio. ator fr-om Veroent is recognIsed, best Interest of baeeball. That is what
Someone came to me recently and the cemnsoner is supposed to do-
said, 'Jo-N, there is a State that hasnot the private Interest of those who
changed their lIne-Item veto. In 1990LAUBSB
the State of Wisconsin amended theirbut rather for the
provialon." Well, it was interesting bes intereste of b Itef
when I looked at what the amendment .s antitrust laws areidesigned to
really said. It reads, and I quote: "in my reed friend, the distinguished mu- protect consumers, but for over 70
approving an appropriations bill i n r Senator from New York and m years consumers have not seen these
part, the Governor may not create a neighbor. And like the distinguished applied to baseball, en the assumption
new word by rejecting individual let- Senator from New.York, L too, hope that there would be a strong commic-
tars is a word of the enrolledbIl." that wo will some day actually hays sicer and the major league wold sn-
Mr. President, what the legislature aelllayed' I share his sense of ime orate to the best interest of baseball.
said was that the Governor could not triotiam in all things. I admi his But thatis not what Is going on, .
change the word 'cannot' into 'can" sese of hintory. But I suspect he, like In Vermont wher I grew up, vir-
by striking out the last three letters of 1, is at IsuY. many eventa this time Of tually everybody wee a Ned Sox fan
the word. That is not a real change in year when our national anthem Is Mew ther is divided loyalty between
the philosophy behind the veto author- played. We are all very proud in hea' the Red Sox and the Montreal Biped,
ity. It is simply a housekeeping detail It, bat we sometimes, a springarrives and ther is also the minor league
about making the measure what it wait for the words, "Play ball," right team, the Vermont Bxpos.
ought to be, namely, the capacity of altar It Is played. We also have jobein the State of Tr'
the executive to knock those things So the Major League Baseball Anti mont that rly us, bebalL There to a
out of spending bills which are not in treat Reform Act Of IM Is being intro- company CallediMoot Wood Turnings In
the beat Interest of the State. So, it is doced, Mr. President, It Is being-Intro- Murthileld Fail, - Trnings" Is
important as we go to conference to duced by Senators HarCH TuMLOND, wood Vornibgs They mak The seu-
understand the success that the line- and myself I want the Senate to know venir. replica baseball bate, the Uttle
Item veto has enjoyed in the States, why I back this. . both that have'been passed out for 40
In the end, I was encouraged by the Senator Tuno and Introduced year on bat day at baseball- ames.
vote last night. Sixty-nine vetee t on Febroary 14 an saller version of They had to drop a thirdof the 24-
favor of the line-item veto reflected a this legislation to remuveths antitrust person work forc because of the strke
strong understanding that we must law exemption that major league base- test summer. That h-just one small
adopt measures to restrain spending, ball has enjoyed for over 70 years. company. These are not people who
and reduce the deficit. So we have Major league baseball, unlike po- make a great deal of money, - They
made a significant step forward. For If tically any other business In this coon- make 15 and 99 an hour, and they wer
ths people sent us here for any purpose try, has an exemption from the anti- nut of work because a sml group of
at all, it was to enact changes, such as trust lawe, - and Senator TnmN, people cannot fiu out how to dlylds
this, that will fundamentally alter the Senator Horcu, and I. and others lel up $2 biBlost It makes absoiutely n
way we do business. that should be removed. - sense.
I look forward to the time when the. Actually. we are just saying that no- We-lid a cbanos last year to night
conference report comes back and we body should be above tho law, We did this situation when we were consider-
again have an opportunity to address this for Congress. We passed the Con- log a bill to repeal baseballsantitrust
this issue. It is critically important. gresslonal Accountability Act, some- exemption, but we decided to hold off
The vote last night was encouraging. thing I backed for years. which applies in the Senate, thinking that maybe ev-
However, while the battle has been the asme law to Congress as apply to erybody would work It out. Bight siter
won, the war is not over. And as we everybody else. We ar Just saying that, negotiations between the major
work out the differences between the baseball should liv by the me laws league baseball owners and players die-
two bills., I hope that the end product en everybody eise. integrated. We saw a preemptive
gives us as great a promise for fIna- I regret very much that'the owners of strike, the unilateral impoeition of a
cial Integrity as the measure we passed major league baseball teams and major salary rap, failed efferts at mediation,
last night. league baseball players have been on- the loe of one sason and likely oblit-
Mr. President, as the Senator from able to get through their impasse. Me- eratio of a second, and pleas from all
Indiana, you are to be commended for diation ban not been successful, fled- mer to get It going again,
your role, along with Senator McCAIN. dential entreaties could not do It. Con- I think ifwe bed repealed this out-of-
It was your hard work that ensured we greselenal pleas for a veiuntary settle- data, judicially proclaimed im uity
arrived at a product which could be mont have gone for nought. fr the antitrust law, this matter
subscribed to by such a broad majority What we have always thought of as would not still be festering, No other
of the Senate. I hope that this body our national pastime may become a business, professional or amateur
acts on the conference report as it did thing of the post. lam afraid char what sport, has this exemption fr law
last night. It was nighttime behavior, we saw as children when we would fol- that major league baseball has enjoyed
maybe somewhat reminiscent of times low games, when we would go to our and, Mr. President, bee abused.
when we have done the wrong thing Little League games and Identify with In fact. one of the players who test-
under the cover of darkness. Last verous major ieaguers at-that time Is fled at the Judiciary Committee hear-
night's behavior, however, was com- gone. Seniors who look forward to the log this year asked a very perceptive
mendable In that It was in the national Joys of spring training and following question. Be sid, let us suppose that
interest. We should seek to replicate it their favorite tes on radio, young- baseball did cot have an antitrust ex-
In the future. star who identify with heroes in the emption and let us suppose they were
Mr. President, I suggest the absence world of taseball. this will herons, in the sorry sth they are in today and
of a quorum. And let us not forget so m wo tn let us suppose baseball came to
The PRESIDING OFFICER. If the make monthly mortgage payments by Congress and said, "Oh, by the way, we
Senator will suspend his request. The being vendors of everything from T- cannot clean up this mes we have, hutSnator from New York. shirts to hut dogs, who park the car, would you kindly give usan antitrust
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exemption? Would you pass a special Innocence, and loot otature for a game atrd today. About 4 million of thos
law to exempt us from the antitrust that n0 symbollnod Amorica like no who do not narry health insuronce ar
laws"-omething nobody elo has. Mr. other. In fomilies headed by a sow-employed
President. they would get laughed off I command our ohairman, Snators worker.
Capitol Hill. There would be no anti- RAn and TEoRlOnr, for taking up This deduction makes Insurance
trust exemption passed for them. this challenge. Wo will move forward more affordable and helpe to got the
so the question is, if we would not on it. families the health norance that they
eact it today, why do we allow them Mr. MOYREAN. Mr. Presideot, I need and deserve to get. Whether them
to have it? Why do we not just and it? suggeet the absence o a quorom. o eail businesse to the town or the
It is something that should be done. The PRESIDING OFFICR. The city, or farmers, or truck drivars. an I
I am concerned about the interest of clerk will nall the roil sold, or machers. them people deserve
the public. I am concerned particularly The bill clerk proceeded to cell tho to have the some kind of tax treat-
about the intelest of baseball fans. I rol. meet.
am not here to speak on behalf of the Mr, POONRAN. Mr. Presideot, I ask The bill provides for a permanent en-
baseball owners or the players. Former unanimonownet that the order for tension of the deduntion. whiob thin
conomialoner Pay Vincent said: the quorum Call he reminded. Is long overdue, and would provide ret-
Basaball Ia more than ownership of an ordi- The PRESIDING OFFICEt. Without reactive deduction for the 1994 returns
nary bsh-ese. Ownors have a duty to take objection, It is so ordered These returns are doe April 17.
ito conaIderation that they own part of Mr. MOYRIAI. Mr. President, in We moot ant swiftly no that those
Ameoricasnationni pastim-in trust. This the pirit of bipartisan hamony I people who hove paid the health boor-
trme soetimes reqcfre patting self-inter- would like to yield 5 minutes. or ouch anne claimsloat year will be able to de-
I m also concerned about som o. to the datin- duct them Unfortntely, we were notth a alocneedaotsme of guished senior Senator from Missouri_ abie to sot in time, for farmers' retorna;,the answers I got from some of major The PRESIDIG OFFICER. The Sen- whickwere due on March I-.
league baseball's representatives. In ator from isouri Is recognized. If we delay this hil further and are
fact. I ahould note her on the floor Mr. BOND. Mr. President, Iwant in not ableto get-it to the Prenident on
that the answers that they sent, their express my sincer appreciation to my time, even more people who oelig
written answers, are in severe variance good friend, the senior Senator from for the deduction will have to file
with their hearing testimony on sev- Nw York. We have worked together on amended returns. -
oral points. In other words. they said many Important prjetsI This Is going to burden the IRS with
one thing at the hearing and they said This is a Mesure before the Senate paperwork, not to mention what in
something ele after. in their answers. today that is very Important to smal even more Impotant, the bordens on
I think the public shlould look at what bonines people al across thia country. the, People whojhve'to reeMr.
they did. because either they are gross- Today the person who operas a small Prenident, it Is tough enogh to bawd
ly mistaken on one point or they are business has many problems. Ther is to fe a imome tax retorn one time.
not telling the troth on another. nothing so glaring as the failure of the It is certainly no pldasure in hav to
For example. I asked the acting com- node, as It now stands, to give any de- file one again
missioner whether fans who reject re- doctin for the payment of health in- I thin It is s vei very impcr
placement players and replacement auance for the businese owner or that tant-and I commend the m ra of
games would retain season tickets owners family, the bill and thi sponsors of toe legla-
when the strike ended and major This 2P-perrent deduction level, an we tien-thst we ar making thin measure
league players return? He testified em- all know, coired December 11. 111 Permanent, For Yesrs the self-em-
equivocally and without hesitation, According to toe Treasury Depart- ploysd have been subjected to the on-
"Yes. air." But in his written response ment, approximately 3.2 milimo. self- certainty of-not knowing whether the
to the same question, he did not con- employed taxpayers cannot currently extension cold be grantedfor toe de-
firm his testimony. Instead, he r- deduct any of their health Isrance duotlom I thinkIt has madelt very dIf-
sponded that policies with regard to premiums, unless thin is correted, The ficul fur the peoplto plan This
season tickets and priority seating are 3.2 million taxpayers represent ape should take thatpr'blenawsy ,
handled by the clubs individually. proximately 10 percent of the unoor Iam concerned about the fiscal pres-
Well, he has given two answers. One porated boniness owners in America sores end tha need for deficit redec-
has to be honest, and one contradicts today. - tin but thin Is cot an aws where we
the other. At the hearing. I asked We had hoped lat year, and we ought to ecnomis. Small boniness,
whether major league baseball owners, talked a great deal In heath reform, farmers, ranchers, trunk drivers-they
who benefit from a special antitrust ex- about the need to pot toe em1 heal- and their familes need to have the
emption in order to be able to join to- ness owner on toe esme footing as the health car-that thin wil encourage
gather with regard to sports broadcast- employee of a large crporatin who them to have,
ing, would make an unqualified com- can rece, essetially, 100 percent do- I would like to go forther, If we have
mitment that major league baseball ductioce for the cost of health care pr- an opportunity, If toe money itsaval-
playoff and World Series games would muos. able, coontme In en seeing If we can-
continue to be broadcast over free tle- large corporations already are shin not get the deduction-be a par with
vision through the year 2010. to exclude toes costs, and their em- those people who work for large oc-
The acting commissioner responded ployees do not have to report them on porations. But I am very pleased we no
in the affirmative. But when be got their tax returns. we ore putting entre moving en thi. I commend the man-
away from the TV lights and cameras preneor at a very, very serious din- agers of the bin, the ehairman and
and the hearing, he answers that "it is advantage. This problem afflicts sall ranking member of the committee as
not possible to make an unqualified business ownar who ore famers, who well as the sponrs. ThIn wil have ho-
commitment that far Into the future." ae ranchers, who now truck drivers. portantimpacte on the health ofmany.
I think the public Is being short- Thes people deserve fair tax credit many people, many of toes who are in
changed by the policies and practices treatment. small businesses anl their families.
of major league baseball and by such One of the biggest concerns that we I than the distinguished Senator
disregard for the interests of the fans have today is that witout this daduo- from New York for yielding te time
as evidenced from the hearing record, ton many families ore left without and I urge my colleagues to support
They ought to have a little bit of heth insurance because of Its already thin vry Important measure.
competition. If we withdraw the anti- high cost, We think this Is a terrible Mr. POTRIlAf addressed the Chair.
trust exemption, they will have it. impact on the families. It Is vry hard The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
There is no joy here in Washington as to imagIne a more difficult problem for Cocmux). The Senator from New York.
we continue these proceedings-just a them in face. Nearly one-quarter or 23 - Mr. MOYNMA. Mr. President I
sense Of loss, lost opportunities, lost percent of the self-employed fore oem know I speak for the distinguished
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chairman when I thank the senior Sen- actively, so that It covers the 1994 ta Commission with the authority t
ator from Missouri for his Incisiver- y. the Provisiono that Increse that defer capital gre-s taxes sloing from
marksdeduction to 3 Percent. begining in transactios Involving commica
I es pleased to see on the floor our 14%. and the provisions that make that Mono prpertio. ectlally it permits
colleague from the Committee on Fi- deduotion permanent, eliminating any those game to be roiled over as a non-
nance. the distinguished Senator from possihie future repetition of the kind of taxahie event. It does not eliminate
llinois. I yield her 10 minutes, as she sitation we find oucselves In right even ens dollar of tax liability; it sin-
evidently desiros. but in fact as much now, ply postpones the date when that tax
time as she requires for her statement. ootorlog the deduction, Increasing liability moot ho paid
which I look forward to. it. and making it permanent is the As initially reported by the Senate
The PRESITING OFFICER. The Sen- right thing in do. It eliminates the Finnc Committee In 9M, the provi-
ator from Ilinos. kind of anxiety and uncertain alto would have lloweda rollover if
Me. MOSELEY -BRAUN. Mr. Presi- sal-employed Americans ar facing the sale or exchange of the property
dent, I thank the Senator from New right now, and assures them that Con- wax required by the FCC a a condition
York. and the chairman of our commit- gross I committed in addressng the of the granting of the application.
tee. I stand to speak with regard to disparity in the tax treatment of However the provision was broadeed
Hit. health in rance costs Incr reosny Self- during the conference with the p s the
I amn a strong supporter of the prosy- employed Americana, and Americans of epresentaties. The conference e-
sloe that Is at the heart of H.R. 831, the wh1 work for larger busin ss for the pert stated that, btcahaat
permanent extension and Increase of nonprofit Sctor, or for government. . .. the Commilssion does sot order or re-the dedtion of health insuranc cents Self-employed Americans are hardt ing o.say partioular sale or nchane. It has
for the self-employed. There Is no qoes- working and make an enormous con- been deemd Mor apprsphiate is provide
tion that the health Insurance expenses tribtion in our economy. We should that the eletiof. bject to Other conditions
of rillion of self-employed indlviduafte net, we must not, make It mor dif 1cd. eall he aaiable upon certil-
around this country should be treated ilsit for them in make that coutribn- cellos h the comissos that the sal or
more like taxpayers who work ior lasg- Mon by handicapping their abil ty in he han" is necessary or appeewlat-I want
rsh emphasis this'tord-oo efIeetlaie theShalt a d Policies of the ciesin with espet
rporations that provide health inri- Unfortunately. Mr. Presdent, the t- oenership or centred of radio noa-ccsung
suracg coverage for their employees nansi Committee has choessin end statisus.
get 100-percent deductihility for the this unacceptable, Inequitable, and W1- .. In C is the FCC's authority in deferPortiso of the health Insurance cents of fair situation by creating another one capital gain taxes in transactions in-
their employees that they pay- The em- The price fur a public policyof moving velvIng the sale-of radio stations was
plOoss Of those companies use, afte- inwards greater euity In the Tax Cede broadened to in~iuds -televisison sta-tax dollars only for that Portion of treatment of the health insurance ex- tions ropI. thes FCC's authority inhealth insurance costs not paid far by Peuses of the self-employed, Is the or- this area was broadened yet aan no
their employers. ahion of a itlly unacceptable, ineqi- encbmapasb cable systems. n
vMeat businesses In thin country Pro- table, and unfair policy In the =a tUntii 19M9, this authority was- usedvids health insurance coverage far treatment of the purchase of bldeast virtuali edolelvey by the kind of
their emploes. as does the Federal or certain other oommnnieatios'bsi people who then ow ed radin, tel-Goveernment, and State and local go- ceases by minority Americans, and. in visin, and cable systems, and that pea-
eraeot. Employer-provided. health In-" Sums circumstances, women. I aMo f tainly. at the time, did nbt include mI-
sranse Is at the hsart of this seen- court, seaking of the provisions In the orities or women,
try's system Of health insurance 0ev- committee Substitute repealing. the it was not until i19 thteven ron
singe, and the tan deductibililty of ema- Provisisns known as section 1071. radiostation in thsantrcotywa
-financed health in e coats I Strongly Oppose the repeal of sec- owned by a minority, and it was not
encourages employer$ to Provide that Mon 1071 for both procedural and sub- until Ii that thee was evan one tol-
insudance. atantive reasons. It Is a statement that vis i station In the iation owned by aHowever, millions of American h do Coagress do s not cars about diversity minority. It was not until 4 that the
cot work far large corporations and do of voice in major portions or Nation's FCC first awarded a new radio Station
not have acce n the kind of group communications industry which, after lcesen to a minority-owned compeny
health e heart Plans that large Cur- all, are using the Public airwaves, or the sme way t bad awarded tens of
perations often prvide. Because they francises granted by the public, And billions of doiaron worth of bresorst
are alt-employed, these Americans It Is a statement that Congress, does sipectrum ionuom-inorities-for free-
usally have io pay more far their not cars about Americans who have by en FCC comparative hearIng.
health Insurance. Because they are proceeded In good faith in spend lit- The truth IS, Mr. President, that thefoself-employed e Is no 1 upercent orally ailions of dollarsmbased on the FCC initially handed out virtually all
tan deduction far the employer-pro- existence of Section 1m. They are of the broadcast spectrum to
video portion of health Insurance cents. being taught a very itter, expensive nominorities free of charge, and then
Congress has attempted in at least lesson, never ti rely on the govern- used Section 1s1 over and over andpartially remedy this serioce inequity ment's word, or in take actions based over again to allow them i roll over
by providing a 25-perct deduction of on the law, beause the Government the huge capital gains they made In
the health insurance costs of the Self- mar decide, in a matter of est a few tax-free transactions that allowed
employed. This provision of the Tax weeks i repeal that law-retro- them to defer their tax liability. waCoede, however, was only temporary, actively, FCC, as it handed ut the speotr m
and expired at the end of 199. What Most Americans, T arc sure, have owned by all Americans; relied heavilythat means Is that, unless this Con- never heard of section 1071. and It is on the qstion of the proviu broad-
gross acts-now-all of the self-em- fair n oy that, until o, monthe ago, cast experience of competing appli-psyed Americans across this country moot Members of Congress knew little cantaa D awardin new licnse, Yet for
will face a serious tsx Increase when or nothi n about It. And ther was no Several dcadlus, even broadoast train-
they file their 1994 tan returns next particular reason for Congress in fou pnlg was denied in minorities in this
month. os the section. After all, it was enacted country and in some ports of this ceun-
That is clearly a totally unaccept- in 1I as Prt of the wevenue amt of tryiasiamatter of lawi n n
able result, It Is unfair, it is Inequc- that year in help implement a new pol- State universities were legally barred
table. It is simply wrong. That Is why coy that prohibited the owner of radio from admitting i56oritih at the time
I Strongly support the provisions in the stations rom Owning more than one these stations were originally given
Pending substitute fnr it, u l that re- radio station in a given market out, State-owned public honadbasting
stores the 21-percent deduction for What ecion ao action does in to authorities refused in hire or trainhealth insurance expenses retro- provide the Federal Commninations them, State legislaturs denied black
State colleges the funds to start broad- This became an incentive for loves stations operating In the United
casting programs or to apply for broad- ore to help with preserving and en- States, only 2d. or about 1.9 percent ar
casting licenses. For example. the FCC panding diversity of voice, owned by women. African-Amerinans
routinely granted broadcast licenses to The FCC programs not a set-aide owned leos than that, only 21 stations.
colleges and universities that were seg- or a qanta. It fanctions in the same Hispanics owned 9, and Asians owned 1.
regated by law, such as WBKY-FM. voluntary manner s the FCC' other In radio, the Situation is a little hot-
serving the University of Kentucky. ose of ass certificatm. The FCC does tr. Oat of the 10.244 radio stations op
which was licensed In 1941. WUNC-FM. not require a percentage of licenaeo t orating in the United Staten. 3H. or
serving the University of North Caro- be contrlled by minorities, it does not about 3. percent are owned by women,
lina. which was licensed in 1952. and reqir Media properties to he cold to another 172 ar owned by African-
KUT-FM. serving the University of minority-controlled businesoes. it does Americans. Ill by Hispanics. 4 by
Texas. among many others. not emuire a set percentage, nor dons Asians. nd Shy native Americans.
These segregated policles helped en- reqaire a nonminority seller of Thes are the public airwaves we are
sure that a generation of minorities media property to a minority-con talking about. Mr. Prcsident. sod cabl
would be denied the skills and the an- trolled bsines to even request a, sro
cess necessary to enter the broadcast certificate, isoer to fui e amricas
industry-with the FCC's full endorse- So ther is nothing compulsory. oght to bantight to Arica
ment and ratification. ogtt aetergtt atcptmeetandatiicaton.Thoem ame no sooth aspcs of the tan in thin industry. nd there should he
The extent of the FCC's complicity is certificate Poicy at ail. The direct
illutrated by the case of Broward ogdiestofvceteauitratdb h oso rwr beneficiaries of the te certificate may tha our broadcast and cabin systemsCounty Broadcasting versus FCC. This or may nt be theiminority member. In meet the needs of all of our people.
1963 case involved a radio station. many instances t may be the non-
WIXX. located in a community with a miority seller and/or the investors And research confirms a link, or the
large African-American population, a who participate in the acquisition with nexus, between expading minority
population that received no black-orl- the minority purchaser. The benefit to ownership and diversity of voice.
ented programming from any station potential minority purchasers is the
serving that market. WIX decided to incentive it Creates for sellers, and the By diversity of voice we mean the no-
devote its program schedule to black- enhanced acces to capital it provid, tins that the airwaves that we sommo-
oriented news, public affairs, and nicate on an Americans will Include the
music. The city governmento n- The FCC certificate Program then op viw o everybidy and not Just one
plined to the FCC that WIXX was of- orates as a hey to unlock the dnor of segment of the population or commo-
feri a format which the city did nt opportunity for minorities who have a nityt hot of ali segments Of the pope-
need and did not want. The FCC. In role in she broadcat Industry in our latloc and the omnity. And Ia thatturn. threw the station into a public ation. diversity comes the kind of vitality
reocation proceeding, which placed its There can he n question that minor- that will keep our Nation vital and
broadcast license In jeopardy. Faced ity entrepreneurs have a tougher time keep our democracy aive.
with the loss of the ability to do busi- noceosing the capital Markets Of this You will recall George Orwell talked
neaa, the station dropped its black pro- contry. The FCC recngnLe this fact, In '1984" about the wave of cocoo-
gramming, and the FCC quietly and the minority ownershp program niction happening, and big brother
dropped the charges of "character vio- has expanded that access to capital, sent one message to the penple at al
lation."
These policies kept minorities from Iu 1987, Congress explicitly endorsed ties. Ther were no alteroative mm-
participating in the free broadcast the FCC's actions in expanding the t-- sages, alternative points of view, sitar'
spectrum "gold rush" that was going certificate program to encourage ex- native perspectives to encourage Pee-
on In America, And by the time these pded minority ownership of broad- pie to think for themselves. The whole
policies were ended, the gold rush was cast and cable systems. That year' idea of diversity of voice Is that the en-
over. and there was no more spectrum Conmere State, Justice, appropria- tire community henefita when It has
to allocate for free. tons bill contained laguage locking the point of view and the p ctive Of
In 1978, the FCC finally recognized Its Is the tao certifa program, they all our people, when the perspective
role in denying minorities any oppor- thought The committee report on the and the information that in ccmmu-
tunity to participate in the gold rush bili stated Diversity of ownership re- nicated through the public airve
and to enter the broadcast or cable in- suits in diversity of programming and represents the whole panoply of Ameri
dostries. That year, the FCC an- improved service to minority and cans In this country and that we can
nounced a policy of promoting owner- women audiences. Similar langege .il participate and draw from our di.
ship of broadcast facilities by offering has bees included Is ecery anual ap. erity a a eoree of our Strength.
an FCC tax certificate to those who propriatloes bili since that time, until Ths Supreme Court made this clear,
voluntarily sell such facilities to mi- now In a nse of Motro Broadcasting, In.
nority Individuals or minority-con- Betme 1978 and 1994. the FCC Issued versus FCC, In that cae, the Supreme
tralled entitles. The FCC's policy was 317 tax certificate under its minority Court held that benign. rscc-conseisus
based on the view that minority owner- ownership program. Radio stations rp. mesures mandated by Congress are
ship of broadcast properties would pro- resented abeut 3 percent of the certil- constitutionlly permissible, based on
ride a significant means of fostering cates issued, television stations 8 per- a record of empirical evidence dem-
the inclusion of the views of minority cent, cod cable systems, about 9 P- castrating a noons between minority
Arericans in programming, thereby cent. These certificates helped mineri- owership and diversity In program-
better serving the needs and Interests tis enter a busines which, as I have Ming.
of the minority community and enrich- Otined. was virtually completely
in h ag fmaterial available to Teewr iesuiso hscnIn, the r nge o  aei nalhe~ closed to them- And It did so not by ewrfIveeuioo hscnthe nonminority audience. The FCC taoing away a license from anyone. or section cited i the Metro Cas. Inclod
subsequently expanded its policy t through asy foo of direct finaniai ing a study by the Congressional t-
cover the sale of cable systems, as well. ssistance tO the minonty buys= hot search herce. 'Minority Broadcst
In i92, during the Reagan adminis-
tration. the FCC further expanded Ito s Iaeralrey stated. o ra s ONershi a r m
tax certificate program. At that time,
the FCC decided that. In addition t nd TV statins. and cable syotems, That is to sy, does minority owner-
those who sell properties to minorities and potential ivetors who were will- hip escourage diversity ofviews?
investors who contribute to the sta. log to enter partnerships with minorbit Iity buyers tW purchase these prop. This study. which looked at radiohilization of the capital base of a mi- etie, data collcted by the FCC from over
nority enterprise would be able to re- Th program has begun to make a 1,000 radio and TV stations, showed a
ceive a tax certificate On the ubse- difference ut it is worth keeping in strong correlation betwCes minority
quant sai of their interest in the mi- ind Cha. our of the 1,342 television ownership and programming targeted
oority entity.
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to minority ownerships and expansion
of diversity of voice for everyone. The
other studies all had similar findings,
showing differences in programming,
including news programming, and dif-
ferences in the willingness to hire
women and minorities as employees.
Mr. President, what the Finance
Committee and the House of Rep-
resentatives are now proposing with
this legislation, however, 1e to termi-
nate this progress toward diversity, to
terminate the 1071 tax oertifisate pro-
gram and to do so retroactively and
with virtually no notice at all.
The committee report sets out three
reasons for terminating the program.
It says that the tax certificate program
has evolved far beyond what Congress
originally intended. The rePort makes
this argument even though It was Con-
grees that gave the FCC broad discre-
tlion to set the terms of the tax certifi-
cate program.
Second, the committee report argues
that the FCC standards for Issuing the
certificates are vague and therefore
subject to significant abuse. It asserts
that the FCC's determination of con-
trol does not guarantee that a minor-
ity purchaser will continue, to manage
the broadcast or cable property after
the tax certificate has been issued.
Third, the report argues that the tax
certificate program is not supervised
and reviewed by the Internal Revenue
Service, and that the FCC does not re-
quest information regarding the size of
the tan beoefit or otherwise act to en-
sure that the nonminority seller does
not get the entire benefit of the certifi-
sate.
Mr. President, these arguments, It
seems to me, are sufficient to warrant
a reasoned. deliberate and careful re-
view of this program and not the total
elimination retroactively of it. As a
general matter. I believe that all Fed-
eral programs should be periodically
reviewed. We should take a look at ev-
erything is make sure It works as it
was intended to work by this Congress.
to make sure that it is more efficient.
However, that commonsense principle.
I believe. should not be exploited as a
blanket license to just carelessly throw
out longstanding Federal laws without
any review before the fact, without any
chance to take a look at it. And yet
that is exactly what we are saying
here.
No study of the effectiveness of sec-
tion 1071 was undertaken by the House
of Representatives before it rushed to
repeal this legislation. Nor has the
Senate undertaken the opportunity to
fully study the merits of section 1071.
The majority leader of this body stood
in the Chamber just last week talking
about the fact that there are over 10
Federal programs he would like to see
reviewed as part of a comprehensive re-
view of Federal affirmative action poli-
cies. And the majority leader asked
two Senate committees to hold hear-
ings as part of that review. The major-
Ity leader also commended this admin-
NGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENA
istration for its. ongoing review of af-
11rmative action policies and programs.
All of thes anggestinus that there be
a review indicate to me that the Fi-
cance Committee should have at least
awaited the results of the administra-
tion's efforts and should have consid-
ered whether or not section 1071 wan
working, whether It had problems,
whether Its objectives were important
ones, and whether or not reform rather
than retroactive elimination would
have been more appropriate.
That is not what. to happening with
this bill, Mr. President. Instead, we see
a rush to judgment. Instead, what we
see is an unwillingness to confront the
fact that minorities and women have
been excluded from the broadcast and
cable Industries and that minorities
and woman continue to have access-to-
capital problems that are significantly
greater and different than other poten-
tial acquirers.
Indeed, what we see Is a total dis-
regard of .the policy considerations
having to do with diversity of voice
that led to the creation of this tax oer-
tificate program ti the first place.
This hasty repeal would not just
eliminate a genuinely worthy minority
ownership program; it would also re-
peal all of the other uses of the FCC
tax certificates. For example, a broad-
cast or cable licensee Is eligible for a
tax certificate when it divests a media
property In order to comply with the
FCC's cable/broadcast cross-ownership
policy and the newspaperfrT croess-
ownership policy. Repeal of section
1071. therefore, eliminates a reasonable
incentive for FCC licensees to comply
with FCC policies.
Repealing section 1071. moreover,
does not mean ending capital gains
rollovers in the future. There will still
be many many ways to structure
transactions in ways that will avoid
capital gains taxes. And in fact the ex-perience is that the most recent sales
in the cable industry have all been tax-
free transactions that did cot involve
the tax certificate program which wss
calculated to give minorities and
women a chance.
Some recent examples illustrate this
point. Time/Warner announced in Jan-
unary of 15 that it will acquire KBL
Communication from Houston Indus-
tries In a tax-free stock transaction
with an estimated purchase price of
32.2 billion. Time/Warner has also an-
nounced a tax free acquisition of Sum-
mit Communications for 3350 million
via a stock exchange. Again, no tax
rollover questions there. Cox Cable ac-
quired Times Mirror Cable in a tax-free
merger with an estimated price of 12.3
billion. Minority entrepreneurs, how-
ever, bemuse they frequently lack the
access to capital of long-established
companies, cannot rely on ecotion =2B
of the Tax Code which authorizes those
tax-free transactions. Instead, they
have had to rely and have relied on see-
lion1071.
That is why It Is particularly trQu-
bling that the proposal before the Sen-
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ate is to tetroactively repeal section
1(o1 simply because a particular Afri-
can-American businessman is involved
in a large transaction that is eligible
for a tax certificate and the resulting
capital gains tax deferral. The rush to
undo thin transaction ignores. in my
opinion. some important facts. Thefirst is that the transaction that
precipitated the House Committee's ac-
tion, the so-called Viacom transaction,
Is not the only pending transaction at
the PCC. There are at least 39 othere.
Second.,al of these acquirers have
justifiably relied on the existence of
section 1011, which has now been in
place for over 17 years and which has
been explicitly endorsed by Congress
over and over again through the appro-
prIations process. -
In the Viacom transaction, the pur-
chasing group has incurred literally
mIlions of dollars in out-of-pocket ex-
panses for costs such as legal fees, com-
mitment fees, and travel. The preepec-
tive-minority purchaser has made it
clear that he wasentering into the
transaction in order to run the com-
pany; not to purchase it for a quick re-
sale or turnover. Enormous amounts of
time and energy and faith in our Gov-
ernment have been placed in putting
this transaction together. Major banks
have committed to participate And
the transaction was not hastily entered
into In the last S0 dalys in, order toget
in under the wire before the repeal of
this section. But the House of Rp-
resentatives and the Finance Commit-
tee seemed to ignore all the time and
money and energy that have beenex-
pended, all the faith andy oonfidence In
laws that have been around for 17 years
and seemingly went out of its way to
rppeal this section with a retroactive
effective date to get at this transaction
which because of its size had made the
newspapers.
Mr. President, I believe what we see
here is a good example of why people
are so cynical about Government. What
we see here is an effort to ignore the
facts, to ignore the good-faith reliance
on section 1071 exhibited by the pro-
spective purchaser in all traneactions
now pending before the FCC. What we
see here is a total disregard of the equi-
ties and due process in an effort to rush
to judgment,
Mr. President, retroactive effective
dates are very unusual in the Senate.
In fact, this body bas a long and con-
sistent history of using one of three
dates as the effective date of a tax
change that reduces or eliminates tax
redemptions, exclusions or similar pro-
visions. The usual choice for those ef-
fective dates are the date of enact-
ment, the first December.81st of the
year of enactment, or the first taxable
year beginning after one of the first
two date.
Putting aside tax rate changes, Mr.
President, -the Senate has departed
from the usual. effective dates only in
rare circumstances where there has
been a legitimate concern about the
ability of taxpayers to rush the market
and therefore avoid changes. Even in It is Interesting, In that situation Just yesterday, Mr. President. thin
those rare cases where Congress was also ther was consensus, a agreement Senate, by a very strong vote of 6D to
closing loopholes In the tax law be- between both bodies with regard to the 29, approved a form of line-Item veto
case taxpayers were abusing the sys- etting of en effective date. Again, that authority for too Prenident of tbe Uolt-
tem. Congress adhered to the standards is oot what happened here. Her, he- ad Stoics. Senator after Senator stood
of fairness to ensure that taxpayers cause of a press relesse of one.Chamber up to explain how unfai it was that
wosid have sufficient nodie end could by one individnal, the Senate has the Congre was. In effect, blackmail
plan their private transactions, o that rusthed W odgment o adopt that end log the President, by linking per-ber-
ths hesloess community could plan, thereby undo the work that all the rel item with most items In a single
the taxpayers could plan, so they could actors in tbe private sector have ader- btil. Yet that is what we sea her
order their affairs in reliance en our taken in reliance on ection 1011. today- Those who went- the Senate to
activity. This Is the precedent that this body consider tbe option of reforning ee-
That Isno ss not what happened he, wll overil If we approve the effe- don 107l have no choice butt to be
Mr. President. Th~be provisions repealing tive date In H res for the repeal of linked op. In effect, be blackmailed by
section therefore represent a de, section 1011. the fact that we alsowant to see te
made departure fues the general Pro- Imentioned earlier that Congress has reform with the self-employed health
cdure for drafting effectiveds departed from the general role where insurance dedcti n ns . We we to
After reviewing the facte Q endse there was a perceived abuse of the, tax see the health Insurance passed, but
dents. I remain convinced there is no law, The general practice In those sie- now we Sae being forcednbyathe coo-
policy reason to Justify singling ot aton to has beentob s the date of the muttee action to accept ti ill-consid-
this particular section of the In commIttee ntion as the effective date. ered r shw-to-jdament nfeir, rtro-
eaenue Cede for tansiecedeonted fr and even then to Provide fair and nea- active repeal of section 1. -b
mulation ofcn effective date. snabe transition rules. For example, As I slated at the ote , I asin a
th -ortheble to compare the offec t in the p revenae reconcilation iti, strong spporter of that proviseis and
oer their affairspin nceion o1 Congress shot down a loophole through I are that It needs expedIted conad-tiv te fo the reealnsseci t. an amendment to section ha of the In- eraoden. However,' ther Is no resec-htis hid to ha pre ened hret, teill o veue Code. The 1o 0 act was that the sectionloll issue had to be
dtae Whas the neary c 11 f 106fetie pasd on October 27, 16M. and signed linked to that provlson. T1he commit-date at t Mr. Pr esident. p Is e id Into law n November . of that year. to e substitute now befera'us baaofnetdaeon Wll, threresiet s the Hdae t that case. the genes.] effective date sufficient to ensure budget neutrality
oa wich te Croma the House applied to securlies purchased after even without the provision repealingWeys rea Mdafting e ie iuesd a October 9, 0o-the day befo -the section 10deuto iAfe revewing the ng fate adomittee Ways and Means Committee reperted However, the Provision repealing ec-
wold review this section a thnt ot the l ell. but Congress also provided tion 1071 te in the bill. And It i clear
they might censtder repealing the ec- a trnsition role where the material that the need for action in the next i
tdon In which case he intended to re terms of a transaction -were described weeks to complete action on the health
a Jenuary 17 effective date, in a written public annoiemant be- insurance provisions effectively pro-Ih has this body Over allowed a foe October 10, ee 0. and SHc ili 1ogll udes thso Senator, or any member of
ngle Meesber of the House of 107- was made before that date. The same the Senate, from acting to try to slow
retntativs to unilaterally dictate the role was provided in another section of down this train, and to ensure that the
effective date of a tan change? When the 1199 at dealin with debt e- objectives of the minority ownershipthe chief or sta si of the aeint Commit- chanOcs. tax certificate prograin et the aien-
tee en Taxation was asked this ues- Another example Is provided by the tion they deserve. b eurltdon dring the Ways and Means mark- 19 Hovenour econcliation Act, evet me conclude by reminding my
op. I anderand that he cited the tan- Again, ther were perceived atusee by colleagues that diversity ofd bvice In
exempt leasing bill that we introduced basinesses makin debt-financed stock our eletonhe media remains criticallyby ormer Congressman Jake Pickle sales to biOll s; there the general oef- Important. and thal we have i laspleWe, In that case, the aority leader, fective date for n iandment that siblity to every Americ n t e thSen.ator Dots, introduced a companion modified the Partial Interest exlrion entry is open enough to penit thatbill in the Senate. And In that ease, the for HOP oaes was for loans made business to meatthe neds of all of cur
srnlacdve effective date was made all after July 10 1o9r the day before that citiens. It Is also critically Important
but moot by three very generously, provision was presented in' a chair- that Government act responsibly, andbroadly applicable transition roles and mes ar to the Way atd Means that Government keep it Word, y re-
a host of targeted roles. Conmmittee. Pealing section 1011 retroactively, weThe most recent and mor relevant to t e tevenne Act of 1 deb, which waa are alling to meet our obligation to
example Of ant effective date that was signed into law on December 22, 1W1, those who have In good Seth relied on
eet by press release Occurred In the Congress closed a loophole that allowed the law of the land, s  d our obligation
Taxo Reform Act of 18n However, In m C" corpratio n to avoid LIO recap- to the American people gealyly to
. Iantthat htaxyers were Put on notice tore by converting to "b" corporation legisate responsibly,
n 1*4- 2 years before the press re- status. Them i the effective date was ie- ty pealing thin etion ctl-byase-wen CTreasury PblsPked a tax comber 16, 117-the date of the con- actively, we have also, I believe, taken
reform Propoal In that cae, a press ference committee action. Moreover, a a rush to judgment and puto t great
misse We, issued in reVolve the dir- transition ri was provided where peril an important policy considerationfbil ns between a retroactive Janusry ther was a hoard of directors reaolu- baing to do with diveroity of voice,
re i effective date to a House provil aton before the Decembera1 date. Mr. President I aintend to i ocl tinne
son dealing with tax-exempt ons, Why are taxpayers With applications working on the Issue rased by aection
and a Senate provision with a January pending before the FCC not desering 1071 and I intend e continue working1, 1 Prospective data. What Is Imper- of transition rele ? The only concrete to try to convince my coliaguos in
taut to note Is that this was a joint answer that I have received to this this body that the bbjectivs Of dierprens r ele; It Was sged not only by question Is that the sie of the one of slty of vcice a important ones thatboth chairman of the House and Senate those transactions, the Viaom. tre - must be preserved. I intend to continueta-riting committees, but also by acltion, Is Just too great-the Implia- epeaking out on the issue of the impor-
the two ranking members and the See- don is that we would somehow ae- tance of Inclusion of women and t-
retary of the Treasury. It Is elantoter tax revenues if we refuse t Provide a norities, in every industry in this Na-
eting that the Partis Involved chose a reaonable and appropriate transition tion, but certi n commnunIcatioe,dase wall after the etroactive January rule-nd so the committee ubstit e which hao such a broad-range effect on1, 1966, Hnes bill; they agree instead before the Senate has us reasonable the way that people see our country,
en September 2, tvda and appropriate transition r. e the way that people see the world, the
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kind of Information to which they are nently extend the health insurance Pre- Washington Post last Sandal, Morch
given access. 501cm for the self-employed bat that 19. 1995, and I socne In many other
It is cooes to Information that Is at they didn't have the money to get the newspapers, in which be in nyndinlod.
the heart of the section 1071 prograsm. lob done, a cannon whicb is an unfortunate ex-
And the notion that access to that in- For ton long. Members said they enple of tasteless, offensive, blank
formation ought to tome from as many wanted to Increase the deduction be- husno. It belittles the war record.
places as we can manage, to the extent yosd 25 percent-bet they did not have bravery, and selfless sacrifice of the
that section 1711 has had a positive ef- the money. distinguished majority leader. Mr.
fect In encouraging diversity of voice, Today, we wtll vote en legislation DOLE, by ridiculing the woonds he o-
encouraging diversity of ownership. l that, at long last, permanently extends fared and still carrie. and alwayn will,
lowing women and minorittee a chance the health insrance premium dednc- from the Italian campaign of World
to participate in an industry in which ten for the self-employed, and in War fI. The war record of all elected of-
they wqre historically deliherately ex- creses It from 25 to 10 percent for 95 1101509 in salli a matter of some at-
cluded, it had a ealutary effect an and afterward, tenlon dozing political campaigns, and
meaning and reason, and It is some- What does this mean hock home? Mr. I= lo exception. But why any-
thing that we should protect and pr- Well, this is real. Ts means tanners oue would take An excursion into cyni-
serve in this body, and not otherwise. and smal business people get relief, cal dock cartoon hor over thie is in-
I think It Is unfortunate that this I heard from Randy ionk in Eel- comprehensible and Inexcusable.
retroactive repeal has been associated ens who was plan to go Into his tin political system and cellure
with this Important health care initia- own husines, He needed the deductlon most be honed on civility, mutual re-
tive. I think it is something that I in- as he could continue to afford health spent and honor. The disoonree and do-
tend to continue to fight. And I hope. ansurice coverage. I think this lea- bate in Presidential campaigns, Indeed
that as we move down the road In con- lation is needed, It wil help Randy, any campaign, should pdoperiy tenon
alderation of thin tax legislation, we nd many other hardworking, gutsy the positions of the candidates on the
will not lose the one opportunity we entrepreneucs ilke hin start cat on major lses of the day. sod what scis-
had to unlock the door, to Provide op- their own tens are being offered, We have had
portunlty as a way of responding to Folly Rks of Missoula called me op too much of personal attacks, negative
oncerns that may be misplaced, to to sy hew angry she was that seif-em- campaignIng. add the politico of cyni-
concerns that need to be articulated played individuals were losing their I5- stm in Amnrca. In recent year I
and talked about, but concerns that we percet health insurance pkemdum do- thin It would be beneficial If we all
really have not looked closely enough dootlen while corporations kept their tried a little mom to elevate the pout-
at to see the bnellt for all Americans. 100-percent dedution,,And I thin Cal discourse In America, and that we
And so I hope that the health care Polly Is right to be angry.. focus on whom we should, tonstruc-
deduction passes. I want to snpport Today we will take a first step to tively, lead tie Nation.Or attitude
that. I want to help that. But on sec- help Folly. Randy. and an selle ehould certainly be positive sld, while
tion 1071. the fight is not over. The ptsyed across America, we differ n many issues, strv for on-
fight continues. My only lomplaint is that we should failing courtesy and respect.
I hope that what has happened here have acted earler, For the cash-basis Mr. DOLE rariis wtth him the sym-
with regard to this retroactive repeal farmers who had to pay their taxes by hol and the physical result of his valor
Is a wake-up call to women, to minori- Mach 1. Congress is Fwseks late. In combat, defending or cnty, do-
ties. to people In this country who care t Is true that the farmers an fending the very abilityof cartooniste
about diversity. who think that It le amend their returns and coliect a re- to exercise their rads in freedom, and
important, that we cannot sit back. tent Rot amending the return Will or very ability to conduct an honor-
And, as complex as this Issue may take time and, nes their acount- able, civil, enlghtened debate in a de-
seem. fundamentally It is a very simple ante work for free, will coot thes moory. Mr. DOLE has dedicted his
one. It is an isas of whether or not the fare money. Probably 3D in 50 bucks entire life to the serie or the Nation.
airwaves of this country are for all apiece. Mr. Trodeae, I believe. owe M. DOLE
Americans or for some Americans. I be- Rot with today's notion, Congress an apology for thJn entirely inappropri-
lieve that inclusion and diversity is the willatleastdotherightthing.. ate attack and Innuendo.
strength of our country and not other- We will permanently extend the Mr. President, I yield the fl.
wise, and I will fight to maintain no- health insrance premium deduction as
cess to the airwaves for all Americans. Montana farmer small business pee-
Thank you. Mr. President. plo: and all of America's self-employed SEfl"MPLOTRI EALTH
Mr. MOYNIHAN addressed the Chair. have at least one lees thing to worry INSURANCE COSTS DEDUCTION
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Son- stool In the years ahead- - The Senate continued with the Con-
ator from New Yort. Mr. President, I intend to vote for adoration of the bill.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, I this legislation and I strongly encour XAslrnc1 cUiws semomo
most emphatically wish to state the age my colleagues in vote for It. And I coosur ecelin D,
debt in whiet we all find ourselves to will push hard to make sore it gets to Mn. MOSEtY-RAUN. Mr. Pei-
the Senator from Illinois for her power- the President's desk fast so the dedo- dent, I rise in request a Clarification to
ful and persasive statement; her first ten Is avanable to an the self-em- a provtsion in HR. 9M relating to the
on this particular subject, but not, I played fiig their tax returns before binding Contract exception to the re-
dare think and hope, her last. April 17. peal of section 1071.
We will continue now with this de- I thank the Chair. and I yield the BindIng contract exceptions in
bate. floor changes to te tax laws are commonly
Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to Mr. EYRD addressed the Chair. Included In tax legislation in protect
my friend and colleague, the senior The PRESIDIG OFFICER. The Son- taxpayers who, in reiance on the laws,
Sena.tor from Montana. star from Weet Virginia. entered into legally binding agree
The PRtESIDING OFFICER- The Sen- Mr BYRD. Mr. reelent, I than mente prior in the effective date of the
ator from Montana- the diingtshed Senator from Oregon statutory change bet where the tans
Mr. SAtiGUS. Mr. President, I thank [Mr. PACKWOOD] for deterring to me action tnef will not be Completed
MY good friend, as well, the senior Son- brel othat I might make a brie 1cuti after that effective date. Thlt. 91
ama rm New York,. ins~inn.,,,J clodes such a binding contract eacep-
Mr President. in Montana, we haves a____ tion to the repeal of section 1IM1 The
ssylu-"l'Wa cot what yen say, lt'n intent of this exception in t honor tax-
what you do," BLACK HtUMOiR Payern' kcnd faith reliance on the law,
For too long. Members of Congress r. BYRD. Mr. President, a cartoon The binding contract exception In
saod they only wish they, Cold perm- by e Mr. Gerry Trudeut appesed in the this bill, however, wautd net apply It
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"(3) ANNUAL nPORT.-The program admin-
listrator of each State shall issue an annual
report summerizing the program evaluation
under paragraph (1). The report shall be
signed by each member of the citizens over-
sight committee of the State and shall be
submitted to the Secretary.
"(4) FEDERAL ADviSORY COMuTE E ACT.-
The requirements of sections 9, 10(a)(2). 10(e).
10f). and 14 of the Federal Advisory Commit-
tee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall not apply to a
citizens oversight committee established
under this subsection.
"(5) NOTICE.-A citizens oversight commit-
tee shall provide adequate public notice be-
fore conducting a meeting onder this set-
tlon, including notification in the official
StateJournal.
"(m) Fu s.-
"I) FUNDIG PiotrrY.-The Secretary
shall give priority to a waterways restora-
tion pmject under this section in making
funding decisions under this Act.
"(2) TRANSFERRED FUNDS.-The Secretary
may accept the transfer of funds from other
Federal departments and agencies to carry
ot this section.
'3) APPutcAr.trr OF REQtRmrsNTS.-
Funds made available to carry out this see-
tion, and fInancial assistance provided with
the funds. shall be subject to this section
and, to the extent the requirements are con-
sistene withis section. other provisions of
this Act..
By Mr. HATCH (for himself, Mr.
THURMOND, Mr. LEAHY, Mr.
MOYNIHAN, and Mr. GRAHAM):
S. 627 A bill to require the general
application of the antitrust laws to
major league baseball, and for other
purposes: to the Committee on the Ju-
diciary,
F MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL
ANTITRUST REFORM ACT
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, up until
now those of us who have supported re-
forming the application of the anti-
trust laws to baseball have been di-
vided between competing approaches. I,
together with Senators MOYNIHAN,
GRAHAM, and others, introduced S. 415.
Senator THURMOND, together with Sen-
ator LEAHY, introduced S. 416.
I am pleased to introduce today a bill
that brings together these competing
approaches and that has the consoli-
dated support of Senator THURMOND.
Senator LEAHY, Senator MOYNIHAN, and
Senator GRAHAM. We believe that this
bill will bring about sound reforms
that ensure that baseball is treated
fairly and properly under the antitrust
laws. We believe that in the long run
our bill will contribute to constructive
labor relations between the players and
the owners. We believe that the re-
forms proposed by this bill are worth
making even apart from the existence
of the ongoing dispute between base-
ball owners and players.
Let me emphasize that our bill would
not impose a big-government solution
to the current dispute between the
owners and the players, On the con-
trary. It would get government out of
the way by eliminating a serious gov-
ernment-made obstacle to settlement.
Seventy-three years ago, the Su-
preme Court ruled that professional
March 27, 1995
baseball is not a business in interstate my belief that it maybe worthwhile ro
commerce and is therefore immun viewing the franchise relocation issue
from the reach of the federal antitrust as it relates to all professional sports.
laws. This ruling was almost certainly The Hatch-Thureond-Leahy legisla-
wrong when it was first rendered in ton would also maintain the status
1922. Fifty years later, in 1972, when the quo for the minor leagues. It is impor-
Supreme Court readdressed this ques- vat to protect the cxstn minor
tion, the limited concept of interstate league relationships in order to avoid
commerce on which the 1922 ruling disruption of the more than 170 minor
rested had long since been shattered. league teant which exist throughout
The Court in 1972 accurately noted that our Notion, the Hatch-Thurmond
baseball's antitrust immunity was an Leahy bill also makes clear tht it
"aberration" that no other sport or i des not override the provisions of the
dustry enjoyed. But it left it to Con- Sports Broadcast Act of 11 which
gress to correct the Court's error. permits leaguewide contracts with tel-
A limited repeal of this antitrust im- viuton netwks.
munity is now in order. Labor negotia Our bill is not specially drafted in an
tions between owners and players are attempt to resolve the baseball's cur-
impeded by the fact that baseball play- rent labor dispute. The logislation doe
ers, unlike all other workers, have no not affect the so-called nonstatutory
resort under the law if the baseball labor exem
owners act in a manner that would, in ers from tionwit ls employ
the absence of the immunity, violate an othe an lwu whreathey
the antitrust laws. This aberration in with vlvdin colecte aning
the antitrust laws has handed the own-
ers a huge club that gives them unique will not automatially to-
leverage in bargaining and discourages moe problems, but I believe
them from accepting reasonable terms. it
This is an aberration that Government
has created and it is an aberration I noted earlier that as the chairman
that Government should fix. of the Senate Judiciary Committee's
The legislation that I am introducing Antitrust, Businm Rights, and Cue-
would provide for a limited repeal of petition Subcommittee, I held a hear-
professional baseball's antitrust immnu- ing en baseballs antitrust eoemption
nity. This repeal would not affect the on February 15, 1995. At the hearing,
two matters that owners say that the the subcommittee heard from bath
immunity legitimately protects: players and oners on whether the an-
Namely, franchise relocation rules, and emption helps or hur the sport, and
the minor leagues. Under our bill, what effect repeal would have on labor
major league baseball's ability to con- relations and other isues. the sub
trol franchise relocation and to deal committee very directly told the own
with the minor leagues would remain ers and players that it is up to them to
unchanged. Our bill also would not af- resolve their differences quickly and
feet any other sport or business. ploy ball for the sake of the American
I urge my colleagues in the Senate public.
and the House to support thi legislo Mr. resident. I do not believe that
tion. the Congress should interfere in base-
Mr. THURMONq. Mr. President, I ball's ongoing labor dispute. But it m
rise today en support of th d Major my belief that the Congress should re-
League Baseball Antitrust Reform Act peal the Court imposed antitrust ex-
of 19o, which I am cosponsoring with omption end restore baseball to th
Senator HATCH, Senator LEAHIY, and same level playing ield as other pro
others, Our legislation would repeal fessional sports and unregulated budsi
the antitrust enomption which ohields nessos. By removing the antitrust o-
major league bapseball from the anti- emption, the players and owners wi l
trust laws that apply to a11 other have one less distraction from their ne
sports and unreguloted businesses In gotiations, and the Congress well no
our Notion. This bill is a result of dis- longer be intertwined in bseboll's po
cussionsr between myself and Senaters c ntitrust enemption
HATCH and LnofY following the retestns
hearing which I chaired on this impor- By Mr. hield m
tent issue. I am particularly pleased HELMS) (orhmef n r
that this legislation focuses on the ore S 6s A bill to rpoal the Federal es
going policy issues relting to bs-e te a gn
boll's spncial antitrust exemption. eratlon-skipping tranrsfers; to tho Coin-The Hatch-Thurmond-Leahy legisla- miitte no Finance.
tion oliminates baseball's antitrust g-
emption, with certain exceptions. and raemt wil nRoSVAoTic ACT
is hosed on S. 41is the Major League Mr. RYL. Mr. President, I rise today
Baseball Antitrust Reform Act, which with my colleague from North Corn-
Senator LEAHY and I introduced on lina, Senator HELMS to introduce tha
February 14, 1995. Ono substantive Family Heritage Fredseriation Act, a
change has boon made to include a pro bill to repeal Federal estat and gift
vision relotiog to franchise relocation, taxes, and the tan on generation kip-
in order to address concerno raised by ping transfers. A companion bill, H.R.
some about the practical effect of end- 784. was introduced in the House of
Ing baseball's antitrust exemption. As I Representativ last month by Con-
have previously stated, however, it is gresomas CHIS C x of California.
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there, supposedly to stimulate the our antitrust laws to major league them an antitrust exemption today,
economy. All of them voted for the tax baseball, yet they hove it.
increase. The tax increase was the 1993 What we did was to remove the and So, I hope, by the same token, every-
tax increase that President Clinton trust exemption given to major league one in the Senate will join with Sen
had. It was characterized as the largest baseball. I hope that the full Judiciary ato TiIURdOND, Senator HATCH, and
single tax increase in the history of Committee, the Senate and the other myself-an Interesting coalition, if
public finance in America or any place body will take this up and pass it eel- ever there was one-and would with-
in the world, and those are not the atively soon, draw the antitrust exemption. It is not
words of conservative Republican JIM Baseball has for decades had a special deserved by baseball. It should not be
INHOPE. Those are the words of PATRICK exemption from the antitrust laws, continued for baseball. They should be
MOYNIHAN, who at that time was chair which laws apply to everything else, treated as anybody else.
man of the Senate Finance Committee. every other business in this country Their behavior in the past year has
Further down here they all had ei- and every other professional sport shown why they should not hve that
ther D or F ratings by the National What this means is that baseball and special exemption, if they ever really
Taxpayers Union. In other words, they these who own it and run it are baxi deserved it. But whether they have de-
were the big spenders. and those are tally above the law, served it or not, they hove now lost it.
the ones who were defeated. They are Now they have shown what this We should take it away.
not here. Look around. They are not means. They have shown great disdain So, Mr. President. I hope that this
here. for the fans, for those who do not make legislation will work its way through
In the House of Representatives, 66 of the $1 million alaries, like the people the committee process fairly quickly.
them went out. Almost all of the 66 who park the cars, that sell peanuts come to the flose of rho Senata, and be
voted yes on the stimulus bill, voted and beer and hot dogs and soda at the voted upon.
yes on the tax increase, and had a D or various stadiums, for the communities I have watched some of the activities
F rating by the National Taxpayers that have taxed their people through of the baseball teams, I mean things
Union bond issues to build stadiums, for those that ore so petty, so petty. For exam-
So I just suggest to you, Mr. Presi- who make the pennants and the T pie, the way they treat Little League
dent, that we make it abundantly clear shirts and the baseball caps, and even, teams.
to the liberals In Congress, the few lib- in the State of Vermont, those who When I was a youngster and when my
erals who are left, because most of make the souvenir bats given out on children were, the idea was, if you had
them were wiped out in the November bat day. Such people hove been out of a Little League team, you built up
8 revolution, there is going to be an- jobs over the past year because of the soe following for various teams. You
other wave coming up in 1996, and this baseball strike, proudly wore the logos of a team-the
is the opportunity for us to be fiscally And throughout all of this, people. Red Sax, the Yankees. whoever else it
responsible, for us to be able to stand some acting in extremely high-handed might be.
up and say no to some of these useless fashion, are able to say, Well, the fans Now they say: Well, we will require
programs that have outlived their use- be damned Because we hove this ex each one of those children to pay us I6
fulness and say yes to future genera- emption from antitrust, we can act to for the privilege of having their logo on
tions, including my two grandchildren. gether. We can do whatever we want. their uniform. This is just pennyante
Glade and Maggie Inhofe. This is what The antitrust exemption was pro baloney.
is going to work for America, and this tided for baseball on the assumption What it does. it says. 'We expect you
is probably the centerfold of the revo- that those who control baseball would to be fan supporting us, but, kid.
lution of November 8. act in the best interest of the game and you're going to pay for it.'
Mr. President, I suggest the absence the best interest of the fans, would do I recall as a child being at Feoway
of a quorum. it responsibly and that we would have Park and seeing some of the greats of
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The a strung commissioner. The practical baseball come by. If you held out a
clerk will please call the roll. matter is they have done nose of this baseball, they would autograph it for
The legislative clerk proceeded to in the loot few years. you. And they were paid a tiny fraction
call the roll. I recall testimony in a hearing that of what Is paid to these
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I ask Senator THUBSoND and I had in which moltimillonares today who tell you.
unanimous consent that the order for the question was asked: Let us assume Yes, you can come in and for x noe-
the quorum call be rescinded. baseball did not have an exemption her of dollars we may give you the au-
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without from the antitrust laws and let us as tograph." This is spoiling the whole
objection, it is so ordered. some we saw the situation, the sorry idea of baseball.
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I under- situation, we have seen for nearly a So, as I said, Mr. President, we ought
stand that the parliamentary situation year in baseball. If the owners came in to lift their antitrust exemption. They
is that we are in morning business: is and said, "Oh. by the way. Congress, do not deserve it. They never really
that correct? give us something you hove not given earned it in the first place. and they
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Tech- any other business. Give us an exemp have done nothing to keep it today.
nically speaking, the Senate is on H.R. non from the antitrust laws.' Would Let us get rid of it. Let us treat them
1131. they net be laughed off Capisol Hill? Of as the business they have become end
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, if no one course, they would, let us stand up for the fans for a
else is seeking recognition, I ask unan- Republicans and Democrats alike, change.
imous consent to proceed as though in both in the Senate and the House, I have seen a situation in the hear-
morning business. would say. "We are not going to give ings where even the acting commis
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without you that. We are not going to give you sinner of beseball in his testimony
objection, it is so ordered. this special exemption from tie anti tried to mislead the Senate; gave con-
trust laws that we don't give to foot- flieting testimony, gave testimony
ball or basketball or General Motors or that turned out not to be true: and did
VREMOVING THE ANTITRUST E71 Dow Chemial or Monsanto or Apple not move to correct his testimony.EMPTIN FRM MAOR LAG Computers or anybody else. We are not This is the kind of disdain that theyEMPTIONgog to give it to you And pcially show for the Congress.
BASEBALL we are not going to give it to you be- Well, then let us not give them the
Mr, LEAHY. Mr. President, yester- cause of the way you have been act- exemption to the laws. You can hve
day the Senate Subcommittee on Anti- ing." disdain for the laws, you can have dis
trust. Business Rights and Competition We would not pass a statutory ox- dam for the game. you can hove dis
of the Committee on the Judiciary emption. and I daresay. Mr. President, dai for your own responsibilities, you
voted out S.627, the Hatch-Thurmond- there would not be one Member of the cn have disdain for your own fans, but
Leaky bill clarifying the application of U.S. Senate that would vote to give we are not going to give you a special
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exemption under the law to carry out
that disdain.
Mr. President, I suggest the absence
of a quorum
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will please call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to
call the roll.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President. I ask unani-
mous consent that the order for the
quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
Lobjection, it is so ordered.
BUDGET BALANCING IS A THREE-
STEP PROCESS
Mr. KYL. Mr. President. I wanted to
comment on two things. one which has
just occurred and one which is about to
occur. I hope. We know that last night
the House of Representatives passed
historic tax relief for the American
people, I want to address that for a mo-
ment.
Second, we know there have been dis-
cussions between the majority and mi-
nority leader on an attempt to reach
an agreement on a rescissions package
which we could conclude before the
Easter recess.
Mr. President. the House of Rep-
resentatives adopted a rescissions
package of about $17 billion and the
Senate has been working on a package
somewhat less than that. It is our hope
between the majority and minority we
can come to an agreement on a pack-
age which would represent our effort to
meet the House, if not precisely their
figure, at least something close to it so
that as the House and Senate take the
recess during the Eastertime. our con-
stituents back home would know that
both the House and Senate were seri-
ous about saving money.
Mr. President, during the last cam-
paign. as I was running for this office.
people asked me what it would take to
balance the budget? I said it is a three-
step process.
The first thing we can do is imme-
diately try to save some of the money
that the Congress has already appro-
priated. We know that every year there
is money appropriated that really can
not be spent very effectively. If we
could make a head start on balancing
the budget by just saving some of that
money for next year. it would dem
onstrete our commitment to a long
term goal of balancing the budget.
That is what the rescission package
is about. I will come back to that in a
moment. The second step, of course, is
the decisions that we make throughout
the year for that year's budget. The
third step, of course, is the long-term
balancing of the budget process which I
have contended can only be done effec-
tively through the adoption of the bal-
anced budget amendment, because
without the discipline of the constitu-
tional requirement to balance the
budget I have always felt it doubtful
Congress would actually develop the
willpower and the commitment to see
that difficult project through.
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Those are really the three steps that
I articulate.
In the second step, what I had said
was each month throughout the legis-
lative year we deal with legislation
that spends money. We can make the
conscious decision not to spend as
much, to limit Federal spending. When
it comes time to appropriate the funds,
we can set priorities and we can end
passing appropriations bills that limit
the growth in Federal spending.
Mr. President, we have heard the fig-
ures that if we adopt a tax relief plan
for the American people we can still
balance the Federal budget by the year
2002 if we limit growth in Federal
spending to 2 percent a year. We are
not talking about draconian cute, but
talking about limiting the growth in
spending.
So the first step is to try to save
money that we do not have to spend
next year through a rescissions bill.
The second step is to make the tough
additions each week, each month, as
this year goes by, as we pass the appro-
priations bills, to spend less money
than we had anticipated spending.
If we do that each year for 7 years,
we will have achieved a balanced budg-
et by the year 2002, without the need
for a constitutional amendment.
We know that would provide more
discipline, would give the Congress a
better ability to control spending. but
we will deal with the issue of the con-
stitutional amendment later this year
and probably next year.
Let me go back to the first of those
three steps, the rescission package, be-
cause that is what has been before the
Senate for the past week.
The idea of rescissions-not a term
that the American people would nec-
essarily relate to-but the idea of re-
scissions is to simply not spend money
that we counted on spending, because
we really do not have to spend it.
Hero is an example: We appropriate
money to the General Services Admin-
istration to build a building. We say it
will cost $2 million, so here is the
money for it. GSA lets out the bids but
none of the companies that would bid
on it gives the GSA a bid they want to
accept. The bids do not supply the
right kind of construction or architect
or something.
So the GSA does not let the bids for
the contract, so the contract is delayed
a year. That $2 million which has been
appropriated for next year, really, can-
not efficiently be spent next year. The
construction project on which it was
supposed to be spent cannot be built.
Why should we force the GSA to
spend that money on something? We
can rescind the money. We can call
that money back, and save it for this
year, and either decide to apply it to
deficit reduction or apply it to some
other expenditure for next year.
There are a lot of different programs
that we have been talking about re-
scinding money in. The net result has
been an agreement that somewhere be-
tween $13 or $14 billion and $17 billion,
we can save the American people-tax-
payers-that much money in this com-
ing fiscal year because we really do not
need to spend that money even though
the money has been authorized to be
spent.
Now we have had some disagreements
in the Senate about whether we should
agree to the House level of $17 billion.
There has been some disagreement be-
tween the Democrats and Republicans
as to where to save that money.
I am hopeful that within a few min-
utes the majority and the minority
leader will announce an agreement
which represents not totally a Repub-
lican view or a Democratic view but a
view that both share, that we need to
save as much money as possible.
While it will not get to the S17 billion
level that the House of Representatives
has adopted, it will be close to that. It
will be in the range of $16 billion, I
hope. and that we will then be able to
quickly adopt that rescissions package,
go into conference with the House so
that as soon as we return from the
Easter recess we can send to the Presi-
dent savings of between $16 and $17 bil-
lion.
Some people have said, why are we
taking time to deal with that problem
when we have a much bigger problem
of developing a budget of over $1 tril-
lion? Beginning the process of reducing
Federal spending over a period of 7
years to reach a balanced budget, per-
haps in the order of magnitude of $1
trillion over the 7-year period.
What is $17 billion? Well, we have all
quoted Everett Dirksen, who use to
speak in this Chamber, and who made
famous "A billion here and a billion
there, pretty soon you are talking real
money." To the American people. $17
billion is a lot of money, and it is a
very good downpayment on the savings
that we have to make in the future.
Because of the consternation I have
seen expressed on the floor here about
some of the savings even within the $17
billion package, it makes it clear to me
that it will be a very hard process if we
cannot agree to some of the things that
are in the S16 or $17 billion package.
how will we agree to something 10
times greater than that or 100 times
greater than that?
Clearly, we have to start from the
bottom up. Each program has to be
prioritized. and we have to try and find
savings everywhere we can. In each
line of that Federal budget, there is
something to be saved. When we add it
all up, it adds up to big dollars.
If we only look to the big programs.
then we are forced to look at things
like Social Security and Medicare and
defense. Frankly, most Senators under-
stand that there is much about those
programs which precludes the Senate
from making the huge savings that
would have to be made there if we ig.
nore the smaller programs.
It is important to start at a level of
rescissions. I am very. very hopeful
that within a few minutes our leader-
ship will indicate an agreement on a
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I want our Vice President and their
Prime Minister to know that I support
their efforts to strengthen cooperation
between our two countries. I believe
here in the United States, despite our
concerns about issues like Chechnya,
Russia's continuing efforts to establish
democracy and an open market econ-
omy actually merit our support. I be-
lieve that the American people want to
engage the Russians constructively. We
want to assist them with reform. Most
of all, we want to prevent a return to
the authoritarianism of the old Soviet
regime.
One topic of conversation between
the Vice President and the Prime Min-
ister will be the future of United States
aid to Russia. Some Senators have ar-
gued that the aid should be terminated,
or at least substantially curtailed, and
I do not agree.
Indeed, I find that after a slow start
3 years ago. the United States aid pro-
gram to Russia Is now making a sig-
nificant contribution to advancing po-
litical and economic reform, I would
like tojust lay out a few examples.
The largest element of U.S. aid is to
provide technical assistance to help the
Russians privatize their state-owned
enterprises. Think what we have here.
We have people who have lived their
entire lives in a centrally planned
economy. They do not have any idea
how to run a private enterprise. They
have never had to sell their products.
They have never had to worry about
productivity. In fact, when the Berlin
Wall fell, there probably were not more
than 100 people in the Soviet Union
who actually knew how to analyze an
honest corporate profit-and-loss state-
ment. They also did not have stock
markets, banks or the legal system
necessary to support private enter
prise. You could not enter a contract in
Moscow and have it enforced in St. Pe-
tersburg. You could not enter a con-
tract in Moscow and have it enforced in
other parts of Moscow.
I think it is in our national interest
to help them acquire this know-how.
Thanks in large part to our assistance,
50 percent-50 percent-of the Russian
gross domestic product now comes
from the private sector, and with Unit-
ed States help the Russians are draft-
ing a commercial code, setting up
stock markets, and training their po-
lice to fight the organized crime that
could so easily stifle entrepreneurship.
I support this aid effort. I support the
aid effort because I think that the
more successful private enterprise Rus-
sia has, the more people are going to be
resisting any attempt to reestablish
Communist dictatorship.
I want to assure other Senators we
are simply not shoveling money out
the door to them. In fact, many aid
dollars are going to Americans. We are
sending Americans over to show people
how to run a private enterprise econ-
omy.
More and more, we are leveraging our
taxpayer dollars with contributions
from the private sector. There are pri-
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vate enterprises that are interested in
participating in the assistance program
as a part of an effort to sell products.
There are also lots of volunteers. In
fact, these enterprises and volunteers
allow us to multiply what we do.
Another significant element is bring-
ing Russians to the United States.
Most of us remember the days of the
Soviet Union. The Government pre-
vented most Russians from seeing what
life outside their country was like. Un-
less you held a special privileged posi-
tion in academe or the government,
you could not leave. Most people only
had a vague notion of the advantage of
living In an open society. I think that
the more Russians actually visit the
West. talk to Americans, see how we
live, the more likely it is they will re-
sist a return to totalitarianism.
Some have suggested that we suspend
all aid to show our objections to the
sale of nuclear reactors to Iran, or Rus-
sian actions in Chechnya. Of course, I
am intensely concerned about what is
happening in Chechnya. Russian mili-
tary violence against civilians has far
exceeded accepted standards of civ-
ilized behavior, regardless of what they
claim was the provocation by Chechen
separatists. Use of landmines aimed
primarily at the civilian population isjust one of the egregious things they
have done.
By its actions in Chechnya over the
last 6 months, the Russian Government
shows it still has a lot to learn about
democratic values and respect for
human rights. I hope now with the cur-
rent negotiations they are finally
learning. In fact, that is why I joined
with Senator McCONNELL this spring in
insisting on shifting some of our pro-
posed aid to Russia to provide humani-
tarian assistance to the Chechens as a
token of our disapproval.
Let us think about what we are talk-
ing about as far as aid to Russia is con-
corned. We are talking about $200-$300
million overall in aid. Think about
what we spent in waging the cold war
over the years with the former Soviet
Union. This does not even cover the in-
terest on what we used to spend. It is
also a drop in the bucket compared to
the Russian Government budget. If we
cut the aid off, nobody in the central
government in Russia Is going to no-
tice, because the amounts would not be
that large. The people who will notice
are those reformers and those entre-
preneurs and those in the private sec-
tor in Russia who are pointing to the
West and the United States especially
as somebody who is helping them move
to democracy. They will notice, be-
cause they are the ones who will find
their voices not heard as well if aid is
cut off.
And so, Mr. President. I support the
Vice President's mission to Moscow. I
believe that promoting democratiza-
tion of the second greatest military
power in the world enhances U.S. secu-
rity. I know that the Vice President
will convey forcefully to Prime Min-
ister Chernomyrdin America's concerns
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regarding Chechnya and the Iran reac-
tor sale. I also know that he will work
to strengthen dialog and cooperation
between our two countries. And I do
not know of any better way to promote
world peace.
MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL
ANTITRUST REFORM ACT
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I note
that we are approaching the end of
June. We are approaching the July
Fourth weekend. I must say. I hear
staff and everybody else's sigh of relief,
and I agree.
But as we approach the July Fourth
weekend, we know the All Star game,
featuring the finest major league base-
ball players, cannot be all that far be-
hind. It looks like the All Star game
will actually be played this year and
the year-old dispute about player pen-
sion fund payments has now been re-
solved.
We should also note that this year
the major league season did not begin
until a Federal judge granted an in-junction, and the owners and the play-
ers, who shut the game down last Au-
gust and robbed the fans of pennant
races and the World Series, finally de-
clared a cease-fire in their ongoing hos-
tilities. They then had to scramble to
begin a shortened 144-game schedule.
nother unfair labor practice pro-
ceeding against the owners is still
pending, although that hearing has
now been postponed. I hope that this is
a sign that the owners and the players
will finally do the right thing. finally
be responsible, finally get back to the
bargaining table and reach a collective
bargaining agreement that will remove
the cloud that is hanging over the rest
of the season and all of major league
baseball.
I am not the only one who expresses
that concern, Mr. President. Look at
the fans. Interest in major league base-
bail is undeniably down. Attendance
figures show It. They are down between
20 and 30 percent. I suspect the
viewership figures show it and cer-
tainly advertising and merchandising
revenue show it as well.
In fact. in another major blow to the
grand old game this morning, both
NBC and ABC have indicated that they
are not even going to bid on broadcast
rights for baseball in the future.
When I go to a baseball game this
evening, I suspect for the first time in
years I am going to see empty seats. I
think that is really something we
should all be concerned about, those
who love baseball.
Older fans have been turned off, and
the younger ones have decided to spend
their time and attention en other pur-
suits.
Of course, injuries to some of the star
players have not helped. Those injuries
are not the cause of baseball's decline,
however. Indeed, other players and
teams are having outstanding seasons
and major league rosters are full of
bright, young, talented players.
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The problems are anger, disillusion-
ment, and disdain. As the season
began, the acting commissioner was
quoted as saying: "We knew there
would be some fallout. It's very tough
to assess, but there is a residue from
the work stoppage. there's no question.
There is a lot of anger out there."
Let me tell him, there is. At our Feb-
mary 15 hearing on legislation to end
baseball's antitrust exemption, I asked
the acting commissioner how fans get
their voices heard. I will quote what I
said at that time: Fans are disgrun-
tIed; I mean, they are really ripped. Do
they vote with their feet?"
I asked that question of the acting
commissioner at that hearing. Unfortu-
nately, that was in February. The
strike dragged on, fans suffered
through the owner's experiment with
so-called replacement teams-and what
a laugh that was-and the matter re-
mains unsettled and unsettling.
Mr Selig answered me last February
by declaring he understood the frustra-
thon fans were feeling, but he observed
that when the strike ended, there
would be an enormous healing process.
I told him back in February. "The
longer you go, the harder that healing
process is going to be."
I wish I had been wrong; I believe I
was right. Because it is sad that for
some, the wounds will not heal; for
others, it will take a very long time;
for still others, they will never have
the attachment to the game that be-
gins in childhood and binds generations
and nurtures over time.
I do not think that those who are the
game's current caretakers appreciate
the damage they have done. I do not
believe those who are running major
league baseball today, with few excep-
tions, realize the enormous damage
they have done to baseball. Slick ad-
vertising and discount tickets and spe-
cial giveaway nights are not going to
make up the difference. The last year
has been disastrous. There are a lot of
people who are more interested in their
own egos and own pocketbooks than
they were in the true interest of the
fans.
What the fans are saying is. "You
took us for granted. you hurt us, you
insulted us, you disregarded us, you
worried only about your own egos and
your own pocketbooks, so now maybe
we will let you know how we feel."
With broadcast networks, who were
partners with the baseball owners in
the baseball network, today indicating
that they will be abandoning the game,
fans across the country who had ex-
pected to follow their teams over free
television will likely be forced to suffer
another blow.
Nothing has been solved. The prob-
lems and differences persist, and things
are getting worse. There is no collec-
tive bargaining agreement and, as far
as the public is aware, no prospects of
one any time soon. To borrow from an
old baseball observer, "It ain't over."
Why should people return to the
game or. as we are apparently viewed,
why should we patronize this commer-
cial activity if the risk remains of hav-
ing affections toyed with again and
having hopes of a championship
dashed-not by a better team but by
competing economic interests?
So I believe the time has come for
the Senate to act. The Senate Anti-
trust Subcommittee has reported a bill
to the Judiciary Committee. This con-
sensus bill, S. 627, is sponsored by Sen-
ators HATCH, THURMOND, MOYNIHAN,
GRAHAM; and myself. It would cut back
baseball's judicially created and aber-
rational antitrust exemption. Congress
may not be able to solve every problem
or heal baseball's self-inflicted wounds,
but we can do this: We can pass legisla-
tion that will declare that professional
baseball can no longer operate above
the law. We can say the same laws that
apply to every other business apply to
baseball. The antitrust laws that apply
to all other professional sports and
commercial activity should apply to
professional baseball, as well. Profes-
sional baseball has a very special ex-
emption that no other business got. It
was given to them with the trust and
expectation that they would use it in
the best interests of the game. They
have violated that trust. They have
had people testify before us who were
less than candid with the Congress.
And they turned their backs on the
most important people-the hundreds
of thousands, even millions, of fans
throughout this country.
Along with the other members of the
Judiciary Committee, I recently re-
ceived a report of the section on anti-
trust law of the American Bar Assocla-
tion that examines the Hatch-Thur
mond-Leahy, et al., bill. The antitrust
section of the ABA reasons that profes-
sional baseball's antitrust exemption is
not tailored to achieve well-defined,justified public goals. The antitrust
section, therefore. "supports legisla-
tive repeal of the exemption of profes-
sional major league baseball from the
Federal antitrust laws." Moreover, the
report notes that putting professional
baseball on an equal footing with other
professional sports and business and
having the antitrust laws apply "can-
not fairly be criticized as 'taking
sides'" in baseball's current labor-
management battle.
I look forward to working with our
Judiciary Committee chairman to have
our bill, S. 627, considered by the Judi.
ciary Committee at our earliest oppor-
tunity and then promptly by the Sen-
ate. It is time the Senate act and end
this destructive aberration in our law.
Then maybe when baseball is subject to
the same laws as everybody else, when
they are subject to the same laws as all
other professional sports, as all other
commercial activity, maybe they will
realize that they are not above the
law-just as I hope they begin to real-
ize they are not above the fans' inter-
ests.
So, Mr. President. when I go to the
baseball game this evening-something
I will thoroughly enjoy doing with
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friends and family-I hope I see more
people than we have seen in the past.
But I also hope I see owners and play-
ers coming together to put the inter-
ests of baseball above themselves.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the report of the ABA section
on antitrust law be printed in the
RECORD.
There being no objection, the mate-
rial was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD. as follows:
REPORT OF 'E SEmoN OF AtNTYRUST LAw
OF ME AMEoIAN BAR AsSocrXTION ON THE
PROPOSED MaOsR LEAC BASEALL Aen-
TRUST REPORMa ACT OF 1995-JUNE 9, 1995
These vie are presented on behalf of the
Section of Antitrust Law of the American
Bar Association. They have not been ap-
proved by the Board of Governorm or House of
Delegates of the American Bar Association
and. accordingly, should not be constmed as
representing the position of the Association.
INTRODUCTiON
On March 27, 1995, Senators Hatch, Thur-
mond, Moynihan, Leahy and Graham intro-
duced the Major League Baseball Antitrust
Reform Act of 1995 (te "Baseball Antitrust
Act").1
The bill would amend the Clayton Act to
subject the bsiness of professional major
league baseball to the federal antitrust lone.
EXECUTIVE SUsiARY
The Senate is considering legislation to re-
verse major league professional bseball'sju-
dicial exemption from the antitrust lows.
The exemption dates to a 1922 Supreme
Court decision that the business of major
league professional baseball was not engaged
in Interstate commerce.
Supreme Court decisions affirming the
baseball exemption on the grounds of stare
decisis In 1953 and 1972 indicate that judicial
reversal of the exomption Is highly onlikely.
These decisions cite repeated Congressional
consideration and Inaction in support of the
conclusion tha it is up to Congress to repeal
the exemption.
The American Bar Association disfavors
any exemptions that are not narrowly tai-
lored to achieve well-defined goals. The base-
ball exemption, rooted In a limited. long
since-abandoned, view of interstate com-
merce, does not meet this test. Accordingly,
the Section of Antitrust Law of the Amer-
ican Bar Association (the "Section" or the
"Antitrust Section") supports legislative re-
peal of the exemption of professional major
league baseball from the federal antitrust
laws.
Repeal of the baseball exemption can and
should permit uniform development of anti-
trust law in the sports Industry. The Su-
preme Court has ruled that other sports bust-
nesses are subject to the federal antitrust
laws, giving rise to a substantial body of
sports-related antitrust law, notably in con-
nection with football and basketball. The
very interest in uniform application and de-
velopment of antitrust law that prompts
support for repeal of baseball's anomalous
exemption demands that Congressional con-
sideration of any such provision be industry-
wide rather than baseball-specific.
DISCUSSION
In 1922. the Supreme Court ruled that the
business of professional baseball was not on-
gaged in interstate commerce, and, con-
sequently, was exempt from antitrust scm-
tinya Both professional baseball andjudicial
Interpretation of the commerce clause subse-
quently evolved. In 1953, the Court upheld
Footnotes at end of arfde.
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sports ~~~~~way.' and the preposed legislatien wifur- _~ 'caa Coraa d la dnt.Rmskfla
Sh crts have readily acknowledged, and gems of tt oaObae. 468 U.S. tO 1194)
the Section agrees, that a certain level of co We neither endorse nor reject ele mejor -s A blrdr IssH v. Bard at Re-
operation among franchises is essential l v player assottotions aument that oes af Ouls a e oiae. s. tod 1081 as
the business of baseball and that this is an fess basbal she to a a f e Cas v4 Natdea e ba
important difference from most other busi- trust lss thenon setuec o p aa o
neses. Although, for example, the Dodgers eempt fr antitrust e 0.5 0 bINK.
and Giants may want to dominate cue an- tiy the owners anilateral imposition of a 'The pepod enllmle aese both tt
other on the field, they do not wat therip ' rgument rouild be nnr lend foasubse rilucaslu lses. a=-
vals to go out of business. There is little dis mdeis can, ta I m oting In she pshal b
pute that sports businesses can agree en harony with analegous cases. Similarly. bilbruoft afet t laws t e e a
many matters, such as scheduling and rules the courts me alsu the proper forum for rese bilit ofc ises. low in mi l oo
ofplyesential to the joit enterprise."ofpa.esuIn t hjun uers. lotion of any dispote ever whether and to cot allent the application oe the Sporta Owatase-Accordingly, baseball owners may persua- what extent labor markets ore a pruper sub leoAtf 10.
sively argue that they may lawfully enter jt o n rust alacin 'doe deeov. a S. i' 10n r
into agreements asjoint venturers that own- Futteug prufesoiooal basball en en equal boots Hatu 1 0S 219 11: Addee Bradley
ers of other business could not. However. fCa Loral teoa Nu . MEW 10000 e9e boi4);
lon he same can be said of other Amer- fairly be critscired a saling sides In favor a bacal A.7189 Aesaled Me Carspic ary ephs fhie a of p i baseballs current labor strife. Jewel ae Caw ne1 s.S. 110111911. Censeld C Ca
particularly emphasize Franchise relcaion.I, , arecte epreeuatlen of the batehall owners have cPoe. & eafiuaw Laral 3M, 401 U.S, us
issues and their commitment to the minor repeatedly argued that haseballs crnt - 01175.
leagues i support of the exemption, all pro emptien Is irelevant so Its bargaining cela- "Macdry v Naoa Feombad Lage 543 P.d 6W
fessainal sports leagues face franchise rel- with majer league players because latr lt reeroedaed, 434 U.S. all 011:
cacion issues and at least one, professional thi r C a b
hockey, supports a minor league player de- the doesprttby labor trsvod a F. Nama al elae noteno taeoreabrmep go00 (D.HJ. Isis):P-se1dv. Naa taipmdadl
velopsent structure. With parity in cie- abase flRptal of the exemptin will afford ae0 F.s! 10 lish Cit. 10001. n dras.0.
cumstanem should come parity in treatment the ners the opponauity to prove this US 1910 (1991): Bm_ v. Fas Nast f- dc0 F
under the law
Arguments as to the alleged necessity of e o Freig tm e rep - on p Ill (D fit 1.IM. aebere 3 . il-lbs.
aios trade rostraints cana should be "aking sides" in fo of the ao Baskbl o ldoa. ese F leer 110s
court. Like professiona baseball o 1.0Sf. 1 ,91a. 1000 U.Sb App Lesl l5ll fri
and commerce clause interpretation, anti- e leek forward W warkieg with the mem t' Ja 14,11111.
truat law has also evolved since 1922. The hers of she Judlelaty Comttce en legisla- 'ay Fhsa- Is, 109. e aebas ars
'role of teason" standard of review, which tion ta re e major league baseball's e na epse ira eje Lae aeta Plar
has largely supplanted the labeling of var- Asfmhai slw usnehs tbe and Comeet
lous acts as per se antitrust violations. and m. ta tsusn
which Is reutinely applied to antitrust cases Fel ld eb rony W lose
involving sports will afford baseball ample 'A Copy of te pesisaed lendlasmoe. . l, p epsiso ass ools be subect to niness sctsly
opportunity to demonstrate that specifsc co- peoded he.. toiecelosas f legislatio s If the baseball v ps sees S'teent of
operatise activities among its franchises do shls topic bad been Icado..d by Senators Hath, Ketie J. AM.al. at8
aot unreasonably restrain competition. Any syolbes adGratha (0 15) oss scoos Thse Tateawe Ay.Mase Leaua eescal1Plae
truly pro-competitive conduct should be ade- and tt lb416 earlber Hear as bosh of s..losion escise dlmo Donald rate tasdne
quately protected by proper application of besesiveseeAsnieat. bySea- hts d tat sh esacsssy laor epl stil crc
the rule of reason. The existing baseball ex- t ien o Febroay is. Isi app)y so mnarally losed t hich differ
emption is not based on any determination '11 USC. 10 ean. osanslaly fm Ine pesiis of the tases
to che contrary; indeed. because of the ex- 
0
Fdad Basebal Club ef Badtaa v. Naaa meet whkt enpies en Decebar 31. 1991 lut
emption, there is essentially nojudicial his- Lague ofpFnslao Basebal Clubs, 010 101 mnee.b . a otofrsrreoo 1u.ttement
tory upon which to base a contention that BO-lI192W. fD-adOeh,. I.
the rule of reason cannot be properly applied ' "I Ne Yoa, 000 U.n 35, 357 'toe anple PbesayIt, losebaeba's
professional baseball. Nor do fact-specific 19551 uated ba oines Hi 0. 2 s Sseese oe bill usnee s Rthte
applications of the rule of reason in cases in- it had cd,,ay ceside at IFedeasdbala ret ad topedeirt e "Isit Notioal Later Rela
talving other sports support such a conten- lea, had at ..e. fuse rej i by aesedavey ltg -- Aas gsnre the relaffesbp tetweet
cn. 34layer " o U t r.) nd plny.. Thus, the dliesviepimn or betll
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aetitt eoemption told hat no efect on mat By at-risk, we mean children who
teok ltimajr lague players lie or iv.lhborhood e work is
strIke, ow or In the route, t loog a ply more the exception than the rule, cl-aminuio ". h10) o ti p~emmmimclood' ,p 10), dren who do not have any responsible
That time day. aetog bamball adults playingcommigioner
Allan Sell teti fied coat, "became doe Uno mouldtr me oe i
coo bagin collectively with a t the oerrdie live
itue of the pen infese hae n tot look up to, no one to trust.
able to teach n agreemnt . .[WIe will play the These young people are growing up so
.Ii et. Inclodlog Sleg t a9. moth abate for outside the mainstream that they
pfaye whowant to ork. . .Noe ofthathas a scntll a to do mth e antiot fain or tha are going to have really very little
a"ltw "tpto ejyed by meball ur inf chance of ever joining what you and Itiucibop oitb the Playens i  tcoS-a by dofederal know at the American community.
fiber laws (pp. 5-41
Mr. L AHY Mr. P t They will certainly have very little
that the distinguished Senator from chn tev c t
Ohio is on the floor. Mr. President. these young people do
I yield the floor.
Mr.I not o much that they reject our val-
unanimous consent to proceed as in te. It is not that they are protesting
morning lousiness.
The PRESIDING O ICER. Wi t against our values. Rather, they neverTbjeREIIN isFCE sooreedt learned these values to begin with.bjection, Th group of young people is unfortu-
nately, tragically, growing.
AT-RISK YOUTH Since 19i5, the juvenile arrest ratefor violent crime has tripled. Children
Mr. DEWINE. Mr. President, this are the fattest growing segment of the
Congress and the American people ar criminal population.
now engaged in a historic debate about Mr. President, since 1975. homeless-
welfare. I would like to talk this after-
noon about the people we need to focus creased fester among familiet with
on in that debate. children than among any othcr group.
Mr. President, when I was in Youngs- Every year, nearly one million young
town, OH, a couple of months ago. I people between the age of 12 and 19 are
visited a church that ran a program for themselves victims of violent crime.
what is termed "at-risk youth." The Mr. President, too many young peo
kids that I saw that evening were seat- ple are not getting the education they
ed in a circle talking about their lives, need either. Since 1960. we have spent
talking about their problems. One of 200 portent more on public schools, in
the teenagers was asked this question: real dollars. But the quality of edu-
"Why do you get up in the morning?" cation is not improving. A 1ii8 studyThat is a simple question. This young found that of all the notions tested, the
men responded: "Because I don't want United States finished dead lout in
to be dead." science.
Mr. President, people that were there In my home State. the State of Ohio.
that evening thought he might have the Ohio Department of Education oays
missed the meaning of the question and that they really do not have complete
misunderstood it. So they asked him statistics on graduation. But the sa-
his goals for the rest of the day. He tistim they do have suggest that of the
said, again, that he did not want to die, children who enter Ohio high schools,
That was his objective for an average only 71 percent graduate 4 years later.
day But that statistic really sugarcoats the
Mr. President, that teenager, that much more dismal reality in many of
young nc, is growing up in a different our cties. In Youngstown, ON, for I
country from most of the rest of us-a ample, the reported figure is that only
country most of Ts would have a very 4 w percent graduate after 4 yearlin
difficult time recognining. Columbus, only 44 percent: and in To-
Now, the sociologists call that teen- ledo, only 37 percent. I suspect that
ager at risk. That is kind of a strange these figures would not be different in
term. As parents, we know that, in a any major city in this country today.
sense. all children are at risk at all Mr. President, these children are
times. But these children are at risk in really not being educated. We all knew
a different sense, in a different way. what not educating a young pervon
They are in grave danger of living very leads to. According to the educational
sad, very unhappy. very tragic lives. resting service, half of the herds of
By the term "ac-risk," we mean thil households on welfare are dropouts.
dree who are not learing the skils That should not be a surprise. The Ohio
they need to really participate at all in lepartedent of Rehabilitaton and Car-
society: children who are more than a rections-cur State prison system -re-grade behind in school: children who ports that at least percent of the in-
drop out: children who are abused, as- mates in Ohio prisons are dropouts.
saulted and live in constant danger of I would soy, Mr. President, based on
violent crime: children who ae home my own experience as Lieutenant Gay-
less or who run away from home. By ernor in Ohio and being in charge oi
at-risk, we mean children who are hay our prison system and working with
Ing children. children who arejuvenile the Governor in this area, that figure
offenders themselves. already experit is probably a lot higher than that.
enring the justice system because of Mr. President, these young people are
the crimes that they have committed, falling behind every day. They are fall
June 23, 1995
ing behind too far and too fast. Almost
5 million children are growing up in
neighborhoods where the majority of
men are unemployed for most of the
year.
And certainly too many children are
having children. Since 1960, the rate of
unmarried teenagers having children
has increased almost 200 percent.
Since 1960, the percentage of families
headed by single parents has also tri-
pled. You hear a lot, of course, about
single-parent families. But I feel that
too many people really are missing the
point. They are missing the point
about why this is really an important
issue and what all of the ramifications
really are.
Let me point out for the Senate, Mr.
President, one reason why that statis-
tic, that figure, is so very important It
is important because children growing
up in single-parent families are poorer
than children, on the average, who live
with two parents.
Children who do not have fathers
around are five times more likely to be
poor. They are also 10 times more like-
ly to be extremely poor. to live in the
kind of grinding poverty which is very
hard to escape.
Mr. President. it is hard to escape
this poverty because it is more than
economic poverty. It is a poverty, real-
ly, of the spirit, the poverty especially
of young men who are growing up with
no role models.
It is a basic fact of human existence
that when boys grow up without fa-
thers, they become men without know-
ing what mature manhood really is
supposed to be. That is really what fa-
therhood is all about, giving young
people an adult male, a role model, to
learn from. Young people need to have
strong adult role models around if they
are going to break out of the cycle of
dysfunctional behavior.
All the social pathologies I talk
about in this speech really reinforce
each other. Only the involvement of
strong, caring adults in children's lives
can ever truly break this vicious cycle.
Consider another fact: 54 percent of
all females who drop out of school are
either pregnant at the time or already
have children. Mr. President, the early,
decisive intervention of a strong adult
role model can certainly prevent a lot
of problems. The young people I am
talking about many times lack fathers.
They lack role models, they lack edu-
cation, they lack hope. That is why
America today is losing these young
people.
The class of young people I am talk-
ing about who are seriously at risk is
growing, and it is heading toward an
explosion, right in the middle of what
is and what should remain the richest,
greatest, the most powerful country in
the world.
Mr. President, that is simply wrong.
We. as a society. cannot afford to lose
more and more young people to social
trends that hurt people and destroy
lives. We simply cannot let this prob-
lem continue to grow. We have to do
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this month. The Supply Corps is PREEMPTION OF STATE PRODUCT die proposed legislotion would create serious
charged with the responsibility of pro- LIABILITY LAWS new problems In the field of product liability
viding logistical support to all U.S. * Mr. COHEN. Mr. Predent, I have op- by dictatiog u siugle set of roles controliogdie iroess of claims aud the dssiiNavy ships. The Navy Supply Corps eitei disblNos shps.TheNay p l opsposed Federal produc liability reform sty of evidence It would conflict with long-
was created by Congress in the Naval legislation primarily because I believe standing state lows governiog tore hiaility,
Armament Act of 1794 and officially it is a mistake to replace laws that workers' compensation nd Insurance esela.
began its service to our Nation in 1795. have been carefully crafted by the bees, By dots1 so. sash proposals souldThe Supply Corps has seen many dra- State courts and legislature over the place ate legislures and state courts in
matic changes since the early days of two centuries with a o size-fits onoleruble lea straghejeches.
its founding. During the late 1790's.onfo nce with our geitsfoudin. Orin th lae 111'. al peceof egilaton eveope ii eral policy In opposition so federal preemp'each of our Navy ships was assigned a Washington. DC. Through the time tuo of state law aad in the soaction thac
single warrant officer with the enor- tested methods of common law adju it is partiaslarly improper foe the fedem
mous responsibility of purchasing and dication and legislative adjustentc erent to attempt to restrict citizen ne
providing all of the necessary equip- the State courts and legislatures have es to stote courts, the National Confemece
ment and provisions to maintain the worked together to develop tort laws of Sato Legislatures strocgly opposes all
ship's daily operations. A modern air that strike the appropriate balance a legielusio before Congress shut would base
craft carrier serving with the U.S. tseen the needs of plaintiffs and do the effect of preempting st laws regslat'
Navy today may have as many as 15 fendants, and those of consumers and log recovery for Injuries tased by defectise
supply officers aboard. The board vari- buciness. Over the past decade, the products..
ety of duties currently performed by State, have been reforming their own
supply officers require them to have tort systems by experirenting with al- rTNE MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL
detailed knowledge of accounting pro- ternative dispute resolution prose- ANTITRUST REFORM ACT
cedures, food service, foreign currency dures. caps on punitive damages and
exchanges, and management of pay changes in liability standards. In fact, Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, yescer
records. The Navy Supply Corps School day the Senate Judiciary Committee
currently trains about 3,800 students le Earecetscition ornA er- began consideration of the Major
per year so become specialists in busi- that State legislatores hove t League Basball Antitrust Reform Act,
ness. Inventory management, financial m. 627. I look forward to the committeedat prcesing trnsprtaio, E mor thn 7 ne tot aw ill inther cmpltbills cnsinraitheirhidata processing, transportation. stor- current sessions and that new product
age procedures, petroleum handling, measure at our neat business meeting
an ucaigliability lwhaebeenceinIi-and reporting it to the Senate.and purchasing.nosMihgn dNotDatahsI am pleased to note that the Navy This year the major league season
Supply Corps School has been located year.
in Athens, GA, since January 1,is the way the Federal system 1954ain thes.GAsice anary15 194.supposed to work. When a problem judga granted an injunction and theEvery supply officer serving with the arises the States should be the forum owners and players, who had shut the
US. Navy has been trained at the Sup- for experimenting with new practices game down last August and robbed fans
ply Corps School in Athens. In addition and devising now solutions. A Federal of pennant races and a World Series, 01-
the school is home to the foreign offi- law, such as the one passed by the Sen- nally declared a ceasefire in their on-
cer supply course [FOSCO]. Since the ate would bin
course began its operations in 1955. it to . t e r aoing hostiitis.The ghant scramble
has graduated more than 1.200 inter- a gin hl a mak te l-e schedule.
national studentslofficers from over 50 which has virtually no experience leg- As fars Iacanotelltten and
different countries. The foreign officer islating in this area, responsible for the b ab to t
. entire Nation's product liability sys- borahing abole.thvey bareain donretosupply course serves the extremely im- tea. It is ironic that this extension of
portant function of increasing the ment than they were 3 months ago. A
number of military contacts between whe w r try ing o r tine further unfair trade practices corn
the United States and other friendly and scope of the Federal Government plaint tomains pending against the
governments. Such contacts enhance to the States and owner
the level of understanding between na- Interest In major league baseball Is
tions and make significant contribu- localities undeniably down. Attendance figures
tions to the cause of peace. Recently, Recently the National Conferenco of chow it-they are down betw
the Navy Supply Corps School received Sing edeapd abili l- percent. Ratings for the recent All
the prestigious "E" Award, which rec- ispating The C orc not th Star Game were down 10 percent from
ognizes excellence in the field of train- e last year. Advertising and merchandis-ing from the Chief of Naval Educationwoulding.fru theChif ofNavl Edcatonlict with State laws governing tort i tg revenues show it, us well. Both
and Training. NBC and ABC recently indicated that
The outstanding relationship be- they will not even bid on broadcast
tween the Navy Supply Corps SchoolState egislathe Nay Supl  Cors Sc otres and courts in an intolerable legal rights for baellithfur,
and the local Athens community In spite of the outstanding years that
should serve as a model for other mili- saightjacket.I ask that the complete text of the the Boston Red Sow, Cleveland Indians,
tary installations and host commu- National Conference of State Legisla California Angels. Cincinnati Rods,
nities to follow. Many of the students tore's rsolution be printed in the Colorado Rockies and Atlanta Braves
and staff at the Navy Supply Corps R are having and the young, talented
School actively participate as tutors The iesalutioi follows, players throughout the leagurs, the
and mentors for local at-risk students NA- Coo CE oe 5TAt Losis s settled business affairs that haunt
in Athens area schools. While the stu- ROLUfIOAM=oJuLy 11 major league baseball and disillusioned
dents benefit from the interaction with NCSL has reviewed propsed federal logic many of its fans. Older fans have been
much-needed positive role models, the lociss thus would preempt stone law by on- turned off and the younger ones have
participating service members receive oely restricting the rights or persons in decided to spend their time and atten-
a boost in morale that comes from the Jured by defective peoducts to seek recory tion on other pursuits.
realization that they are making a ree- in state courts. Oath legislation task t Meanwhile interest and attendance
agnizable improvement in the lives of meet the stondaeds necessary far federal pm' at minor league baseball games contin.
their fellow citizens. emption. aes. If the Vermont Expos are any idi-
Mr. President, I ask my colleagues to I pericular, n temprehemive evidence cation fan
join me in congratulating the sdemantating either that stte prod-join mep in rp c onrultn th0ea U.S' cc liability laws hate creused a problem of of major league baseball have turned to
Navy Supply Corps for its 200 years of such dimension that a federal solution i minor lcague games. Attendance at
excellent service. We wish it continued warranted or chat rederal legislatin wuld Centennial Field for Expos' games is up
success in the future.. ashiev in stated ails. CSL believes dint more than 10 pereent and merchandis
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sales are booming. It is friendly, fun, professional baseball's antitrust ex- go right out the door as tan outs for
and entertaining. I know that I will emption is not tailored to achieve well- the wealthiest Americans.
enjoy taking in a few games during the defined andjustified public goals. The Republicans also claim that al
August recess, if there Is an August re- The antitrust section, therefore, they want to do is hold Meditate toot
cess. "supports legislative repeal of the an- increases to the same rate as private
As the season began. Bud Selig, base- eption of professional major league health care inflation. But such claims
ball's acting commissioner was quoted baseball from the federal antitrust simply ignore the fact that the number
as saying: "We knew there would be laws." Moreover, the report notes that of people an Medicare is increasing rap
some fallout. It's very tough to assess, putting professional baseball on equal idly, as is the average age. The fastest
but there is a residue from the work footing with other professional sports growing population segment in the
stoppage, there's no question. There is and business and having the antitrust United States is people over 15. and
a lot of anger out there." laws apply "cannot fairly be criticieed these people need a great deal of medi-
At our February 15 hearing on legis- as 'taking sides' In baseball's current cal care.
lation to end baseball's antitrust ex- labor-management battle. The budget for Medicare must in
emption. I had asked the acting com- I look forward to working with our crease simply to keep up with these d
missioner how fans get their voices Judiciary Committee chairmen to have mographic trends, If it does not, bane-
heard I observed even then: "Fans are our bill, S. 627, considered favorably by fits will decline and costs for recipients
disgruntled: I mean, they are really the Judiciary Committee at our earli will increase
ripped. Do they vote with their feet?" ant opportunity and then promptly by s eras
Unfortunately, the strike dragged on, the Senate. It is time that the Senate According to press reports, that is
fans suffered through the owners' ox- act and end this destructive exactly what the Republicans are plan-
perlesent with so-called replacement Lin our law,* Jnng: increased tests and reduced bene-
teams, and the matter remains unset- lfits. Unfortunately, we do not know all
tied and unpettling. he details of the plan because it is
Mr. Selig answered me last February MEDICARE'S 30TH ANNIVERSARY being drafted in secret. Ijoined with aby observing that when the strike f Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I rise number of my colleagues on the Budget
ended, there would be an enormous both to salute the sa th anniversary of and Finance Committees yesterday in
healing process. I said then: "The Medicare and to tall on the Bepub- sending a letter to our distinguishedlonger you go. the harder the healing licans to release their secret plan to Majority Leader asking him to release
process is gong to be." I soy now that overhaul the system. details of the Republican Medicare
major league baseball has gone too far Medicare has been an American sue plan before the August recess.
and has been above the law coo long. tess story. It has provided health and I am sympathetic to the occasionalI do not think chat those who are the financial security to millions of Amer need for confidentiality in drafting leg
game's current caretakers appreciate lean seniors for three decades now, islation. I believe, however, that the
the damage that they have done. Slick Along with Social Security, Medicare Republica have had ample time to
advertising, discount ticket and spe- has transformed the retirement years come forward with a proposal. It has
cial giveaway nights will not make up from a time of fear to a time of con- been nearly 9 months since the Repub-
the difference. The last year has been fidence. Searing anxiety that the next licanis cook the majority in Congressdisastrous. ilness would bankrupt you and your and nearly 7 months since they actu-
Wre, nothing has been resolved children has bean replatd by the su ally took power.
The problems and differences persist knowledge that a solemn contract will But now ur ay told they will not
bye obsrvng thaltiene tr keg ssr
eed you f thcare you ieed. unveil their plan for Medicare until
agreement and, so far as the public is Btnow, at a time when we should be September nearly a full year after
aware, no prospect of one any time celebrating Medicare and discussing they were elected. By that time, there
soon To borrow from a famous base- how to make it stronger, we ae in- will be little time for hearings cam-
ball great. "It ain't over, 'til it's over." stead discussing draconian cute and a mittee consideration or public discus-Why should people return to major secret plan to turn the system on its sion of these sweeping proposals. The
league ballparks or pacroniee major head. Medicare reforms will likely be folded
league teams if the risk remains of During the last week, word has into the reconciliation bill, which will
having affections toyed with again and leaked ou in the New York Times and be considered under special rules limit-
having hopes of a championship the Washington Post about the Medi- ing debate. We will be under the gun to
dashed-not by a better team but by care cuts being cobbled together in a pass the bill by October 1 In order to
labor-management problems? back room somewhere over on the keep the overnment running.I believe the time has come for the House side. According to both reports, That is no way to consider the moot
Senate to act. The Senate Antitrust the House Republicans have a plan that radical overhaul of Medicare in 30Subcommittee reported the bill to the would give seniors a devil's choice: face years. The Republicans must come for-
Judiciary Committee on April . This 1,000 a year in additional premiums, ward with their plan now so that sen
conseosus bill, S. ha7, Is sponsored by copayments and deductibles or be ira and their families will have timeSenators HATCH, Thexsoii, MOYNIHANi, forced into a health plan that could to digest the propsals and understand
CAH-AM, and myself, It would cut back very well deprive them of the choice of what they would mean to them person-baseball's judicially created and aber- their own doctor ally and financially. We must have ado
rational antitrust anemption. TAX cur' quate time to weigh this legislation-aCongress may not be able to solve Why re iush wrenching changes few hectic days in late September is
every problem or heal baseball's self' being contemplated for Meldicare? To not good enough.
inflicted wounds, but we can do this: pay for a ta cut for the wealthiest momou cboas
We can pass legislation that will d Americans. The 1270 billion in Medi As I said, we do not know the eact
a that professional baseball can no care cute are roughly equivalent to the nature of the Republicans' Medicare
longer operate above the law, The anti- Republican budget's proposed lids hil- cuts because they have not been re-
trust laws apply to all other profes- lion tax cut-more than half of which leased. What we do know from reports
sonal sports and commerial activity would flow to people earing more than in the press however, is quite dcour'
should apply to professional baseball, 10,00 a year a ig
I welli The Republican Medicare cuts would te Medicare budgt would not keep
Along with the other members of the not be reinvested bock into the system up with medical inflation or the influx
Judiciary Committee, I recently re to make it solvent The majority is not of new recipients and as a result it
celvoed a report of the section on arti cutting Medicare in order to strength would cover less and cost mo for to
trust law of the American Bar Associa- en it. Hardly one dime of the savings cipient with each pasing year.
clan that examines . 27. The anti would be put back into the system. The Republicans apparently con-
trust section of the ABA reasons that Nearly every bit of the savings would template transforming Medicare Into a
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widow, Ronalee, and the rest of the family, way. tt will merely provide an opportunity for sports combioed-incodiog the 1994-95 stoke
and a posthumous alute to a fallen hero, the consuwers of tere services to protect which ended the posihility of a World Series
Brian D. Myers, Sr., of Schuylerville, NY. their privacy it they oo wieh. After alt, the pis- for the tirst time to 90 yeaw and deprived aur
creation of onr privacy is one of car Nation's cities of thousands at jobs and mitteons ofdot-
CONSUMER INTERNET PRIVACYfreedoms which uncheck tare In tax revnes-e co no tonger tfrd
PROTECTION ACT OF 19 CY technotgy m st not e altwed to circ1m9net. to tat p fessional hase9alt in a anner nPROTC~tO ACTOP tes __________ (yed by no other proeeoional sport.
The bill I ow intreducing today ts based nHON. BRUCE F. VENTO END THE ABUSE OP PUSH POLLS a legistion approved by the Senate Judioiary
OF NNESOTA Commitee last Congress and is similar Is leg-
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES HON. JOSEPH R. PITTS stov aropted by the Heave Judiciary Cow
Tuesday, January;, 1997 O wite rirg the 103d Congres partially re-IN '~tESOUS OPBEPS ONA~tiOS pealing the antitrust exemptian. es e con-Mr. VENTO. Mr. Speaker, the age of the came have previoasly been wised that by re-
Inloet puts more and more Americans on- Tuesday ]anuary 7, 1997 pealing the antitrust exemphon me coald
ine-evolving faster than we ever imagined. Mr. PIS. Mr Speaker. in recent years, somehow ho disrptng the operation ot the
Each day new companies and industries grow many campaigns have sed assattied minor league, or professional hasebalf' abi-
out of the constant echnological innovation allegations against on opponent in their pelts. i to limit franchise relocation or jointly nego-
that has come to symbolize this information While these posh polts may he sn politirts netsorbroadcasting arrangemnts, the
superhighway. The Interet has reached into no some, I betieve that the one or negative lerislaton carefully eliminates these maem
our schools, businesses, and homes. It has al- sggestive, and anfoanded information in from the scope of the new antitmut coverage.
lowed average Americans sitting in the privacy poll fels to meet the democratic goal of per- After advoatig repeal of the exemption for
of their living moms to connect with and ex-vading notem with truth and faimeve. any em, I beleve the time is fially ripe far
plore the world. The Intemet provides us with That's why I introduced the Push Poll Dls- enactment of this legiston. to the past some
entertainment, information, and communica- claimer Act today. Thia hit wilt discoarage the legislators had objected to legislating in thin
tion. But with all the wonders of the Interet prctice of slandering a condidate in a Federa ara hecause of their hesitancy to take any
comes the potential for problems. Today, I am election sorer the gaise of a legitimate poll, echos which could impact the ongoing labor
introducing the Consumer Intemet Privacy The Posh Pall Disclaimer Act ill require that hove But are to eneri ano at-
Protection Act of 1997 in an effort to address any person or organization conducting pall
just one such glaring problem. brctive bargaining agreement, lbs objection no
To gain access to the Intemet's endless to provided in the poit. or a statement that ln soits.
web of sites, users must work through an them is no soarce If this is the case. Farther, agreed to mark with the players to neck a p-
intemet provider or server. Whilte Ibs sem- my bill will require that the idntbty of the por- gal repeal of the antitmut exemption as part of
ers provide a valuable service to their cu- son or gro p sponsoring the poll, s- wett as their new lahor accord. Their memorandum of
tomers, they are also capable of collecting an thy identity ef the callar, ha discloed. uoderstanding provides, [tjhe clefs and the
enormous amount of personal information Mr. Speaker, it is Vital that ma work together [Major League Baseball Players Association]
about these individual consumers. Besides the to redace the cegatiee impact pooh polls have mill jointly reqoest and cooperate in lobbying
personal information an Intemet sewer may on the Federal election proceso. I urge that the Congress to pose a law clarifying that
collect when they enroll a subscriber, seers the provisions is my bill be included in the Major League basebll playor are covered
are also capable of identifying the sites their larger campaign finance reform hilt which is ander the antitrust lowe (i.e., that major began
subscribers visit, Without doubt such informa- expected to he considered is Congress. I playere mill have the same rights coder the
lion would be quite valuable to those inter- thak the Speaks, and look fard to waik- antdrust laws an do oiher preesional ath
ested in marketing, while providing servers ing with him during the If5th Congress on this ise, e.g. foothall and baskethall players),
with yet another source of revenue for provid- important te alog with a provision which makes it clear
ing such personal and private information that paseage of the ft Ios not chango the
about consumers. The result-subscribers or a '1 application of the aretimet lame in any other
inundated with junk mail andlor e-mail, based BASEBALL PANS AND COMMIJ canted or with respect o any other person or
on such sales of their profiles to third parties. NtTgBS PROTECTION ACT OF 1997 entity."
My legislation is intended to inform and pm- I have asked that the bill he introduced an
tact the privacy of the Intewet user by rquir- HON. JOHN CONYERS, JR. H.R. 21, in hoor of the coageoos cantor
ing servers to obtain the written consent of On sacar folder, Cart Flood. Mr. Flood, one of the
their subscribers before disclosing any of their IN THE HOUSE OF RPSENTATIVES greateet players of his time, risked his cower
personal information to third parties. In addi- when h challnged baseball's rename clase
tion, my bill requires a server to provide its Tuesday, January, 1997 after he was traded from the St. Loots Car
subscribers access to any personal Informa- Mr. CONYERS Mr. Speaker, today I am in rinas to the Philadelphia Philles. Although
tion collected by the server on its users, along troducing the "Raveball Fans and Comma- the Sapreme Court rejected Flcod's challenge
with the identity of any recipients of such per- sims Protection Act of 1997" It is time that in 1972, we all owe a debt of gratitude for his
sonal infornation. Congress Really steps op io the plots and willingness to chollenge the baseball oiigarch
While this bill addresses many concems, I ends baseball's anitrust eoemption which was Professional baseball is now a mow than $
do not view this legislation as a final draf, at the ot of the debilitating triko of 1994-95. billion annal boniness and the time has long
complete with every detail, but rather as a first Professional baseball to te only Industry in since passed whey if could be contended that
stop down a road we are bound to travel. Ob- the United States that in eoempt from the anti- baseball did not constitute 'iatemsate cow-
viously, issues involving the Internet are new trus laws without being sabject o alterative memo.' There is bipatisan sopport in both the
and complex and deserve careful and thought- reouatory snpemison This circumstanco re- Hoose and Senate for taig action on this
ful consideration. The Intemet touches an in- soled bow an erroncoas 1922 Soyreme Cowl iss, and I took forward to Congress finally
credible and increasing number of people and decision holding that baseball did net involve repealing the longotanding anomaty of base
industries, and it is clear that the perspective "Interstate commerce" and was therefore be- 1 11's antihest exemption.
and input from these interests are vital to the pond the reach of the antitrust tows. Congress
success of this process. has toiled to overtar this decision despite THE STATE WATER SOVEREIGNTY
As the Intemet becomes a more integral subsequent court decisions holding that the PROTECTtON ACTpart of our daily lves, it is important hat we other pmfeional sports were folly subject to
In Congress take a commonsense approach, the antitrust lame
like this proposed legislation, to ensure the There may have been a time when base-
citizens of our Nation are able to benefit and bals unique treatment was a soarce of pride OP IDAHO
retain a voice in the use of this technology end distinctive for the many lal fees who
wihout involuntarily sacrificing their personal loed or national pastime. Ret with baseball Tuesday Jantary 7, 1997
privacy My legislation will not hamper the suffering more work stoppages over the last Mr. CRAPO. Mr. Speoker, I poets Introducegrowth and innovation of the Intenet in any 25 pem than all of Ithe other professional the State Water Sovereignty Prtction Act, a
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THE PRESIDENT'S CALL FOR IN- feets different utilization of hnalth corn sorv- MONTHLY PA MENT MAES TA MEEICAAE-PWIYYEE CARE
DISPENSABLE LEADERSHIP- ices. PLAN
JANUARY 21, 1997 In 1996, Dr. Jaho E. Wennberg, rho director
a fthAe Cantor for the Evatuative Cfloial Stud- Ins 195 99
HON. MAJOR . OWENS ies at Dartmouth Medioat School, pubtished nWq m M Pip p i
OF New Y 'The Dartmouth Atvlaoof Health Cae." The i
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ales shows that the rates of hospital bods and u0phrysloiaos par 1.000 residents determines ,=0Ow U 9 54 130.1 $40 5,9
Tuesday February 4, 1997 how much care Medicare hanAfciades use. ii5 4 t
Mr OWENS. Mr. Speaker, President Clin- Revtsing the highly oaie AAPCC payieot isae MN _ 359 2 299 15 99 4uton's inaugural address was not a State of the formuta will result in greater equi for Medi- Tera tE 20 t
Union speech obligated to provide substance core beoefciares regardless of where they
for general proposals. Appropriately, the Presi- he, allowinA choices emong plans and mor The payment rates also illust the ooeral
dent used his second inaugural statement to equitable distriution of out-of-pocket costs ioutahitity end unpredictability of MPCC's-
set a two for the next 4 years, the prelude to and additional Saneft paokages factom that discourage heuth plans tram on-
the 21st century. America is a great country Because at the need to correct he inequity tedig ew mothets and remaining is other
blessed by God with wealth far surpassing any is the MPCC payment formula for miltions of markets.
Nation on the face of the Earth now, or in the Medicare henefciudes, I strongly supported If there is a sitoer lininA to HCPA's release
past The Roman Empire was a beggur entity changes to fhe formula dudin consideraton of the 1997 55k-hosed managed core psyment
compared to the rich and powerful Americans. last session of the Medicarn Presemation Act, rules, it was contained in Dr% Vtodoc's rn-
God has granted us an opportunity unparalled Regreahl, congressional ents to reforo marks: "The forula used to set HMO pay
in history. President Clinton called upon both the geographic dispanty and inequites in the mont rutes is Yamed. It shortchunges rural
leaders and ordinary citizens to measure up to AAPCC formuta mere deniod by the stroke of areas and marketo where ne is delioered
this splendid moment. The President called the PresidentA nets pen more effiienty, and may limit heoefciary
spon alt of ust0hno nls ard n The legislation I am itoducing today ear- choice."uoalof us to abandon ancient hatreds and
obsessions with trivial issues. For a brief mo- rams the AAPCC paymont gap between rural Dr. Vtodeck's comments indicote HCPAs
ment in history we ar the Indispensable p e- nd eths arnas in u hudget noutral fashion. uoderstunding of the inequity is the current
pie. Other nations have occupied this position At a minimum, s cunty mould receive 80 per- AAPCC formula and the need for change it me
before and failed the world. The American o coot sf the natienul input-pdce-adjostod copi- are to oer all Medir benefciares true
lossus should break the historic paftem of em- ation rate. This change helps reflect the hoe choices is tho type end form at hoath core
pires devouring themselves. As we move into cot of doing hasiness, taking into consider- they ment e receive. I see this as a sigral that
the 21st century we need indispensable ad atiun uncontrollahle factors such s wage in the months ahead me can msrk in a bipard-
em with global visions. We need profound e- rates or supply costs. The language also im- son pragmatic way to improve the AAPCC
cisions, plomonta o3yeor average for the baselise poyment formsu
INDISPENS Erather than I yr. This hnge prides Mr Speakr, corretin the AAPCC pay-
Under God. The indispensabl reater rpresentuon t histodcl helth cre mot formula is tl. The 15th Congress hsUneG od h eeipsot ntieon costs tar an area. This bill Is based on the the opportunity to make the formula more eq-
uardiian of the pivotal generation. Most Physician Payt Reoe Commission
tunate or all the lands. For a brief M on, 1996 Ansual Rep
The whole world we hold in our hands, my colleagues en the Committee on WaysIternet sorcery ompuer gi. Tiny spir- W e Health Care Pinuncing Adminis- and Moans to mao tho nended chanes to
its make opportunity tragic. We ar the is the AAPCC anmat formula The tonger we
dispensable nation. Guardian of the pivotal rutes for Medicore managed core plune, the contnue to y
generation. Millionires must rise to see thelanera. itsoie otrsoleeeaeo oda htpyet aistyt efficient health core markets mill he penalized
seed. Or smother beneath their splendid Medicore-managed cor plans mould increase and rerat areas will tag hehisd, leaviog many
greed. Capitalism is King, With pteta oan aerage of 5.9 percent as of January 1 dicare beneciaes with feer choices.
be Pope. Banks hoard gold. Than coutd for- 1997-signicoultdy lower een the r-A6 n
tilize universal hope. Jefferson Lincoln R honat svetuge increaso f 10.1 perct.
seelt King, Make your star spangled legacy
sting, Dispatch your ghostseo bringa This is good rs in terms of the solency URT FLOOD: AN UNCOMMON MANIes D"puhysrgou. To rlog Nee of the Medicate trust fund-mo seed Is stowglobal visions, Indispensable the rate of AroarN of Mrdicre epeddinA to
profound decisions, Interet sorcery com-puter magic, Tiny spirits make opportunity stuve off its immioent baruptoy. The bad
tragic, We are the indispensable nation, sews is that this aoemge increase refects or rrcoto
Guardian of the pivotal generation. With lb- wide vadation in perentage Incrases from tN TOSs OP EESENTATIVS
erty and justice for the world, Under God. cunty ts county. Four countes: Vatencia, Tuesday, February4. 1997
N.M.; and three New York State counties Mr CONYERE. Mr. Speaker, 1 month ags,
SUPPORT GREATER MEDICARE EQ-and He o, actually will re- itroduced legislation repeig hasa'sSUPPT ANDEATRNME thy EQ- ceive negation grossib-real decreasos. Be- antitrust exemption. The bill was designatedUITYIYME cuse the actual dsllar vadations are also ex- HR. 21, in honor of Cort FleadRE -mberFORMING THE AAPCC PAYMENT reme, ma-i payment arnas get a dohte whon he played for the St. Louis Cardinals.FORMULA whommy-ismer percootage iscreoses off a loan ear when the terms hem asd courage
tamer base. are used all too frequently Curt Flood standsHON. JIM RAMSTAD This situaton continues a trend inherost 5 oat as the genuine aticle, a tine inspiran to
OF core' the gamed payment formula. The following alt AmeALFRIs who tore aAout enomic and
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES tabte illustrates the vast vaditin bteen
Tuesday, February 4, 17 t is i- President Clinton a sea artcles wotenM.RMTedyMr peakur, 19 portont o point out that eon though the 19A6 which descrdhe his corner und reiterate these
Mr RAMSTAD. Mr Speaker. I rse today to AAPCC payment increased an overage or pn
Introduce legislation to respond to an issue of 1a.1 percent not alt countie shared in the Ms ofsa
great importance to Medicare beneficiariess r wl waeoftecorggret r p~ace dio  larie hounty of that incrase. The same is also troe Curt Piood isplayed whoa he refused to ac-
and health core providers in my district and for the 1997 AAPCC payments. cept heing traded ta the Philadelphia Phnlies.
throughout he country-reforming the pay- Counties that typically lost ground were
ment for Medicare risk-based managed care those in efficient markets and ra cosntles His to thee o isser
plans with historically smer reimhursement rates To
Currently. Medicare payments to risk-based Bemuse of these lswer payment rates and After 12 years in tho Major Leagues. 0 do
health care plans are calculated on the basis lower anneal increses, these regime wilt csn nOt fee that t am a piece or property o hehughe and sotd Irreupeetine or my wishes. 0
of Medicare spending in each county's fee-for- tinue In lack the ahility ts atract managed betieve then ay syscem which produces ct
sevice section--medical care outside of man- case options ts their area or offer enhanced resut outes my has rtghra a a nittoes
aged care plans. The variation in the adjusted health core benefts often found in higher pay- and Is Inconsisten with the taws of the Uelt-
average per cpito cost [AAPCC] formula re- went commniies. ed Snatts and e useti ferai statza.
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Although Curt Flood lost his legal battle lasting inftuence as the sport be toted no self-imposed exfle. T
challenging baseballs antirust exemption, the moth. asd siospy, Plead trolled far t ting
public recognized the moral validity of his at- Wepe that the lovtng conten aad nap his stand."
goerel-hewaneela pateof eoprly H I oto you faily asd friends will ssain By 1976, tree agesoy had an-toed and teguments-he was not a piece of property. Hisin oar Jsice of Pied's stand against the reserve
case paved the way for free agency in all pro- thoaght lese was vindinated. Boo Plood stayed an
fessional sports. A national poll taken in the S ea
wake of Ffod v. Kuhn showed that fans op- BI CLISO. lster. he pet his toe back its hasehalt gin
posed the reserve clause, which bonsd play- gerly. as a radianouncer for the Oakland
em to teams for life, by an 8 to I margin. Pram the Washington Pose. Jan. 1997P A's far one sesson. He looked like a shy
And while thousands of athletes have sub- Qsr OrLy. A HMO hyperseaitive ghost of himself. Thogh
sequently benefited from free agency. Curt (By Thomas oswell) only 41, hn seemed for otder. His tounds were
Flood paid a heavy price for his decision to Every few years, Cart Plned wnuld re deep. Hin neme of isolatinn wan almost pal'
take on the baseball owners. The 3-time all- appear. Moyhe that was sowe coud tmrs an gFo
star and 7-me gold glove award winner hisgfast'agtog end haggard fete with she regarding him iks a soldier who'd sotfered
played only 13 more games before being laughing ballplayer's meg that ted ware Ishelt shank Io a necessey hassle. tobody,
forced out of baseball. the 1iS before he sank baseball to the Sa- howeter, hod a na far his fragile ndi
Less well known is the fortitude Curt Flood prow Coon-, teen He ha
displayed in fighting racial intolerance. At the ta wnt ie ae o mae. P and died
same time Jackie Robinson was breaking the of threat tanner Monday at 59 It was Martin seemed omwteind-ad wwighed earlk
color barrier with the Brooklyn Dodgers, Curt Lather King Jr. Day. Of alt the fIgr w
Flood was facing the Jim Crow laws as the spors is she las gontion. pehap only and undeniably-red cosldnt begin to getae It.
sole black man playing for the High Point, NC Plond cold die on the annversary of a ar- Finally, is 1994 Plead stood before she
.!_Tom.. tyr's death ted havt it seem a fitting memo- taenentts again briefly during the playern
He alone was barred from gas station rest rial, strike tens
rooms. Only Curt Flood was forced to eat at Par a few days perhaps we tan remember ' cil.h toe part o sible
the ktitchen door while his teammates were the difference between a ree ethl-ore ho League.
see tnIedso om n hnh takes risks far the take of a genuine nass- Really. he reek the stage to give modernserved a h ern he nden ol red ear phony. lank'at-me rebels who only players some baAkbnne. The message wasplayed a doubleheader, he experienced only the ver s t of their net o sblnal: This gy b ed the ytm fr
greater humiliation. As he explained to Ken biography. Il of yea
Bums: Rebellios that's worthy nf she name Ito' rak end aye h i pu h en the
After the end of the first game you take off about attitude. The rebel to wham our re' re owner toem abut breakieg the onion,
your uniform and you threw it into a big spent and or heart gumseat Is the use, sunk hove a little guts. The money in yur bankpile . . . [But the clubhouse manager] sent as Plead, whenever is this wend wanted an-aunt name ant of thin guy's peace of
my uniform to the colored cleaners which tank ajob Heles had the mined fortne to
was probably 20 minutes away and there tet tee what wan right and ng Pled's legany remains a tangled ne. Yo
while all the other guys were en the field. the tst to himself. coold soy he did the grndwork so athletes
[The crowd has] really been giving me hell'"Baeball players have lust a tree them'
alt day long, red now I'm sitting there stark pies;' sold playern asian heed Donald ehr se- Plead ld the tenterstune of the
naked weting for my uniform to come back en Monday. "A man of quiet dtgnty, Cart Shaq Pu martian, no to speak. Plead helped
tram the cleanern and the other guys were P make a world where Brett Facts known
ant us the field. So finally they get my uni- esaml fur all who had the privilege to body mill moth the Superman tattne en his
form back red I walk out on the field . knew him, When it name time in take a hicept self-lefateetion into routine. n.o
boy youd think that I had just burned the sta at great personal rink rnldd
American Flag. he believed right- be as "Bad As I Wares Ba" wtthout his $7
CoIt Floods talents and goodwill extended Plead had the braint red the se - million salary? If you tint tovehody. peel
wel aedbsbl.H a aoeinI iet noordta bueo' employ- off a big statck of Croe Cleottands. No pink.ell beyond baseball. e ran a foundation to sfair However, Ta Cr
benefit inner-city youngsters. An accomplishedh sliltee-ty ysogtei. s anamli ed by te eraenat, he wan nomplotely onie Cyivit will soy that Flood stood fur tame-
painter, his portrait of Martin Luther King to a pubit brawl shot lauted He thing to that shout who followed him culd
hangs today in Corretta King's living room, was in distrsed by nflirt as Fehr In Invig afford to stood tar sothg
In the end, we will remember Curt Flood for rated by it. And Floed' torment always in
having the courage to tell America what shamed, helping athletes woke market salaries for
should have been plain and obvious all along. When be arrived Is Washington 111 their sen-im, he allows them to lice en a
Distdmination is wrong. People-ven ath- after sitting eat a teason, be played only 13 bigger stole. We bear about the jerks. Bet
leteSre not property. Baseball is a business gin for the Benetr, Y e dut ed I th s ar stall in the minority. Mere eth'
and shold be subject to the competition laws. is C st r hld wer at le ar like Derreli ree of the Redskinstag fero Ahte the P -u tiewao o who wan thosen this week as the NPL' shirA few days before Curt Flood died. I wrote tog kim Inside. A tadium, meof of the Year for kin charity aed cammunity
him, suggesting that if the legislation I intm- chered. But enough boned to let Plood knew work
duced in his honor was to pass into law, he that, fur him, n plate was he O the Per some ef as, Head ould be a deity
should coame to the White House signing tere- read e was vilified eta traitor who wanted teai. Maybe hell themesanslute using the
mony That cant happen now, but I know hist t i the national pastie. language mere prenisely when me destribe
indomitable spirit will be with us as we con- Bank thee, memories of Blank Poaer so- ear famous atbees.
tinue his fight for equality and faimess. I know totes were in the ai. So Plead, thueghiel When me one "teerege" in destribe a qua,
all Members-and indeed all professional ath- hat never extreme, w pigeon-haled at redi- terbenk who takrn a peinkilling that,
lts oin me in mouing this courageous said wa t he was Sik f eg maybe we'll blush Whi we ll menesta-jon e i mewig tis oeageostreated-d traded "like a pitte of mat. inks maket a Jump shut at the homera
man. How tould Anserine saentias a system where "hero." maybe we'll hej.se a hit abashed. If
Te Warn blas, a e owned amn fur bin whole career? tht i herns, what weed have we HeOEed
Wshaingtan, DC, January24. 1997 After betting .100 in 30 at-hate, Pined fled,
Mrs. CURT FLOOD, Hard as It may be to betiee these days. And Doe sey as log r i
4139 CloverdaleAn. Plead didn't mret fame. He eethod when "tragio' perhays well think of she last 2
Lo Angele, CA. tatkig about himself and en admitted yearn of Plead's life-end the price be paid
DeR MRS. FLoOD: Hillary and I wete sad- thee be teethed the thught shot he might be far following his nsmeence. Thea, our per,
dened to learn of your husband's death. and horting hit sport. vyontive sharpened, maybe we'll oote a
we exteed our deepest sympathy Par yearn, Plood disappeared from the ya' hotter ward
Cars Ftood wan a main of eietraardinery tin tee, often living in tEmrpt. to 1972
ability, courage. and conviction. His achieve- Flood v. Kuhn,.the Suyreme Courtupheld tPea the New York Times. Jan. 21, 11
ments on the field were matched only by the haseball' rigkt tartitrust immunity. laEaN pLOes, A Ma r ALL
strength of his character, While there are no Plead Bad fought the law and, temporarily,
words to ease the pain of your loss. I hop the lam won.
you can take comfort In the knowledge that 'Yea hove en underutand that if yu do (By Money Chesni
Curt will ba remembered by so many Amer- what I did en baseball, yau oes hated, ugly, to a recent tetter to Fnk Slocum, ee-
tam an eone of baseball's finest player l and a detingta le person." he said, texlaining kin cite diretor at the Basebloe Asssstonce
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Team (B A.T.). Curt Flood wrote. "The 1996 ways Identified as his lawyer. had planoed to mining an error and in 1960 went tho ntire
holiday seaon brings mixed feelings ofjoy ppa before the BAT. board tomorrow tayon without making a misplay. Heaven
and sadns. Therefore. we'll take the advice morning to express Floods ppreta for hncame a portrols arit of some talnt who
that mother Laura gave to me when I was a the msista. Instead, Moss made plans to w oommissined to point August A. Bosch
kid. She'd say 'Start counting your bless- rotur to Los As. Jr! the owter of the Cardinals, and his chil-
Ings. Squirtis. by theI his letter to um. Flood also wrote, dfeni i oils.
yo o't hove time, fu"ntin a Say this: 'tort accomplished nvery goal At the peak of his career. though. the manFl , wo was 59, died yesterday after a that he st for himself, and simply moond with the flawless glove misjudged a lin
yearlong battle with throat cancer. and it is .'he
the players who came after him in the major He didot gais a victory 25 years ago, and rim ad shppCada tte f8orotet
leagues who should count their blessings for 't athieve statistcs that the asWold ereragale Detote
having had a man of his stature and dignity warn good enough for the Hall of Fame."t and Cardinnis we tied at
an rnag recede them when Flnod's oaron rot ape dontnHi three gameso apiecr with Bob Gibson facingProfession athletes, fur the most part. of Pane ballot, this svor marked o X. Mickey Leioc for the cbampioship In St.
live for their time. They generally don't rareW Lois In Game 7. The were stareless for six
what happened before them and. worse, they ave mo t f s o re.gnon. iT
often don't know. Sadly, many baseball play- ired the is twn TterseSot atrwo
ers wouldnot even be able to identify Flood, [Fro the Hew York Times. Jan. 1,1997] sigle Jirt folloed wit te har
wouldn't even know that he was the forerun- CoRT FLco Is DEAD r 59Z DrnrR ive to tooter,
ner of Andy Messersith. another name they Drivc . _car.
wouldnt reaognize for the impact he had on Flood lost night of the bali momentarily.
their les (By Joseph Grto tak a tople of steps in toward home plate.
But that day in Atlanta in the last month Car Fiood. the Ali'Stor center fielder fnr reversed direction and sipped while she ball
of 194, the players in the meeting room of the St. Louis Cardinals in the 19i0's who he- carried over his head for a triple and t
the players association executive board knew tents a pioneering figure In the legal atttc russ. The Tigers wan. 4-I. ad captnred the
about the man who was to speak to them. on hesohoilo rmerr clas that fore Series,
They saluted him with a standing ovation shadowed the a of free agents, died yastor After the game. Tim Mctarvnr stood in tan
before hespok day in Los Angeles. He was s9. p ee f.teCardinais' iooknr'room regret
"It almost made me forget what I was Flood died at the U.C.L.A Medical Center. a d "tor Flood, yasee bean
going to say." Flood said afterward. "It where he had been a patient in recus siol
taught ma little short, I felt a lump In my months, after developiag pnmonia He had
throea." een sfferig from throat roomr since last
Flood moo in the room that day in his ca - pri fourth plane and Booth eleaned boe. In n
parity as vice president of the United Base- At bat and espetially on the Ield, Flood bloohbooter trade. he snt Flood, Mctar
ball League. a venture that did not reach wm on outstnding player for a dome years and -In Hner to Philadelphia for within
fruition. Twenty-five years earlier, in 1969. with the St. Loo Cardinals, a castor fielder Alto, Cookie Rojat and Jerry Johnson. Bsr
he appeared before another Players Assocla' old Floo sed fr
tion ecutive board seeking support for the ln sen e in a r i th 10a tht "e d" players to their tea and
task he was about to undertake. The St. atted sa.00 or tunes,
Louis Cardinals, for whom he had played for Out in w his stiff rsolve regarding rhe laws - Oar back as 192.
12 years, had traded him to the Philadelphia unfairness of basehall's virtually enslave The trial opened May 1i, ii7g hefore Judge
Phillims. and he didn't want 0090 enra meet of players and his nourage in challeag, Irving Bee Cooper In the United States Court
RihadM os.,h wa tanu onns genral
nsel at the tie recalled yestrday g a ystem that peetated this condition Hoe i low Manhattan. Th defendantsI te im' lld eserdy ha Obat narred Flood heyend baseball. included Commissiner of Raseball BowieFlood came 0o hIm and Marvis Miller, theyheed o the oninmsdtl tMari haler wane It all erysixlllmd when the Cardinals trad. Ktohn, the presidents of tan Hationel andhead of the unon, and told them he wanted ad Flood to rho Philadelphia Philles after American Leagues and tan Cbief exncutive ofto challenge the tem that he said tan 1ret season and Flood refose to go. Rep- all 24 te then in the big leaes. They
"Malin d I weren't s i was t rested by Arruer J. Goeberg. forme
as. if he had some other agenda," Moss said. ciatd Jstice of the Supreme Court and fa
"We arranged for him to come to the board United Staes Ambassadr to the United Ha wan determined not to be traded without his
meeting in Puerto Rico. The idea wo to let tiaoo Flood triggered a legal war that shook toesent. When he was asked which team ha
him talk to the board and o ce them s w ted to play for. he tstified. "The team
that he fr real that he really believed a ally lost the btl in Federal that maks o th best rthisan he was snere."a eralyblee Distrlt Coort in How York when thn judge Tbe "reserve clause' is contracts woo otthis and he was sincere."
With the bard's support, Flood took his ugeste t ta piayers and club owners toppled during the trial, hot It tame under
rhallenge all the way to the United States e issu t almost sir years sustained attack. Martin Miller.
Supreme Coors. He lost. but his effort even- loser. he won the war when other baseball director of the players association, described
tually emboldened other players, players ssocefoly sued and broke from the how baseball contracts tied the playe to his
Mesuersmith in particular. Unfornately r system," which for almost a cn tlub forever and said. "The playr has no sy
beside losing the case, Flood sow his can to hod bound player to his team ynnr whatsoever in terms f what toditio hodi Ate sttngoa te ~i sasn.hnafter year plays under, always hearing in mind be hasdie. After sitting out the 1970 season. he myd~d ofnplayed briefly for the Washington Senators the on atrtie: Ha
lo191 passed. salaries in all sports soared, teurns dlfftrnnt way to main a living."
He knew be wasn't the same player he had sought salary saps no contain the damage 00 The Trial rasumed 10 weeks, 2.000 pages o
heen. and be walked away from the ony j b ir poynils and large citiesobare enqoired t scrlpt and 56 ehihits. Judge Cooper sug'
ha had known. A parIah In an owner domi- I a sd that reasonable men" could find a
nated business, Flood was not welcome to The solitary figure who prompted this rev solution outside rourt ood ruled: "We am
wear a baseball uniform. Instead, he drifted t C was
from country to country. first to Majorca, Hoao on -Ian 1..
where he opened a bar and became an alco- Okland. He was sbaft and skiany. bu he a
hol. then back to the United States, then signed his first professional cot w lond who sat otae 1919 season, did not
to Sweden. then back home aga. at Dk d Technical High think s. He signed with tan Washingto
In recent years, Flood operated a youth . S o
center in Los Angeles. He enjoyed working Aftnr two ars in the ir league and months s 1971 for 11, hot nfsr two
with children. He would have enjoyed work- briefly withythe Clocin Redsseswooenly quit end flew to Eope.
Ing with young professional baseball players, traded in 1950 to St. Losis. where ho played When the coon woo appealed to the So'
too, but he never had the opportunity. Ner, for the nex 12 nees._ and three times preee Cort. tan justices-in a 5-2 ruling
ertheless, he retained his dignity and, in the played lathe World Sr-aiest the Hew supported the Gistriet Cocrt and the Court
lasi year his rourge.Yr Yankees in 19b4. the Boston Red Boo in of Appeals and loft tan "eeserve clause" on,
Yasteray, Joe Garaglola. president of 1907 and the Detroit Tigers in 1968. sturbad. Bat Car Flood bad ser the stage
BAT,. recaled that he testified for baseball His talents were unquestined. Daring a for the e lutlon thot followed In 1976, and
in Flood s lawsuit, "I thought if the reserve earer that looted from lilt to 1911. he boned generat of free agents poored through.
clause went. baseball was going." Garugila . sool T hoots, appeared in thee World "seball players have lost a trGaragiml
said "I woo so wrong I cant begin t ttell S and reigned in nter field fnr if years pion" the players' anion had, Donald Fehr.
you. it took a lot of guts for him to do what for the Csrdioal. said yesterday. "Whm it came time to sake
he did." Gring one open. he played in 226 comeca a stand, at great persnnal risk and sacrifice,
Garagiolas organitios had helped Flood tire games without tarmnltlog an error and h prodly stood firm for what he believed
nthe lest year. and Moss, whom Flood al i 16the rtance irnseason witho r cm ads ight.n t
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quality of life in her community and for her so- correct location of the Aceeira offices at less than holy works of my colleagues us wel
cial activism. Thank you Ms. Barbaro. 4144 Lindell Bl. fare. Withut hying In npstage Mos. I offrWhen traded no the Phitadelptia Phillies. the following poenciples for consideratiun:
Flood refosedi to go. He petitioned no Corn Treasore the chutdren. Thoo sholt not
TRIBUTE TO CURT FLOOD mtloner Bowls Role Than the corect sys-te as akin to slavery and shut tt violated pr!iities moneyb= nosthesau o ea
anitrost lows. The nemmissioner refused Thous Shalt cotrak h tsso eaHON. WILLIAM (BILL) CLAY Floods requt for froe agency. He son nut of tgi'ai n0 t f phr.
OF Smissot basehal to 1970 whsle tegally hattling the lion children itpoety.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ihatt act eny disahility payiests so
rasesher of the Wasbington Senasoes, hatovr6
Wednesday, March 5,.997 ted just 13 g19nes. Ater toe gome he 97nr 0.000 of the 97rest childe of ou ca
Mr. CLAY. Mr. Speaker, I stand today to feond e hlack funerat wreath at his tocker.
recogoize and pay tribule to my friend and hece rehed le d' , 00000el d tee tsis hre a
he former St. Louis Cardinals outfielder Curthis awst. How- Th hall ot deceive our aton's go-Flood, who died on January 20, 1997. ever, la17 an arhitrator geted free age rs fenced to hear the hurden of a disinco-In addition to this status as professional ey to Bo ptayers, d permontly dite grted safety net and an evaporated entttle
baseball player, Curt will be remembered as the neserectause and led to creation of the eent. with the false prophecies of hous pay-
the man responsible for bringing collective froe-agost system still used today.
bargIIng to professional baseball. He took 
mat n lc Tu
hagingtopfsicahohn.Holc Thou shaft not disgrace a oatitn Is a timehis case of free-agency all the way to the U.S. [From the St. Look American, Jon. 2. t997I of widesing gaps of weat stder the guise of
Supreme Court. In his renowned later to Coon FLOOD's Faon Ln'c A SItNATtio reform.
former baseball commissioner Bowie Kuhn, D C0510T If Momes look to Ike Bible for jostifcation
Curt Flood eloquently articulated his well- (By Barry Cooper) of thoir octios, they would profi from tha
founded reasons and encouraged future pro- 0 he day that Martin Luther Riwcs bock of Joh:
fassional players to fight diligently for their hetg honored, yen another am . a-
rightsAmerican Paused cn. Curt Flood, who pie Do yo lit wisdom 
so yooef? What do
Curt Flood was a great humanitarian.hallenging 
hah's you knew Tat we do not know? Hhet to
Ceointe d wa relhmnion ebg-stoodng reserve clause In the ealy sights do you huve that we do cot have? Thedoted his time and resources to numerous 1970's died In Lee Ageles Jan10 after ahat way aired and she agad on on tide.
philaethropic causes. On my desk in my con- si wink throat cancer. He ses 59. even older thas your father. Why has
gressional offiea, there sits an award, an old Hero's the fraoos letter Food wren t your hours carried yo away. and shy dc
bronzied shoe, from Aunts and Uncles, and or- then hasebali rammissicr Bowie Rul'. y es flsh so hbyou to yoor rg
a ni whch Curt Flood helped fund to That letter-and h sohsequent t gomnt is ,1thtiyo
provide shoes In needy children in the St forced hasehal to what has now he-
Louis area Each iwe I look at that shoe. I am Decce4. 10
reminded of what a great man Curt Flood was. M .Re sA
I reme tr a y t a l. c 8u Fifth Aven, Hew York, How York CAMMAmDMEeTS
Of 1901 tha4 My cous1L Arthur 1 and I 1001B.
Spent several dape and nights painting cas Afer twetae yetrs In the Major Leagues. I r- Or
tonal en the mails and ceiling cf my Glum do not rfue aes a piece of property to a HON CHARLES W. omI-P PICKERING
Worm cocktail lounge. bmoght and sold Irrupective of my srn Ihelteve that any system which prlyad t s that 5.05 55O'm
There~~~~~~~ ar Owswevcfrotewoe-rs i l nittes my basic rights s tu ctan IN THlE HOUSE OF REFRESENTATIVES
totconeributions that professioiial athletes ad Ine cent with the law oftThe Uaint-tirusd
make hi makind. The spotlight ce he s ed Scates and of Thile leglStates. the
blinding that we Only remembher their home It is my desire toeplay hboit In IsfO, nd Mr. PICKERING. Mr. Speaker, religious
rues, Ibrea-ploltees. or touchdowns. Very set- I am caychic of playing* I hone received a freedom is once again under attack is oar
dow do we remember them for tbs work they -tract ofr fres the Phladephia Co i country. In my neighS og Slate bf Auatama,
de aiside of their pgmeseos. ThaI is why I hot I belsve I have the right to cnsider 0f the recent crtwoersy over the Ton Corn-
submit hi anr colleagues Cort Flood's story as fees fromothe e mahing ay de- madmeuk highight the cofnemyt that some
reperted in the Jannary 23. 19gy, St [nuis kisnos.T , Merer request that yoe d aho people in our coantsy baee ton religious fron-ii sw c hnd Mar League Clubs ry feelingrAmeca pper ado this matter, d advise them of ray avail-
issicer Bowio Kuhn regarding his abi for the 1 season. Arnbbma Circuga Court Judg Ray Moore
tree agency status. Secres y Yrcor, Curt Flood. pes each seso of his courom with a
[Fro-mithe Er. Louis American, Jae. 23. 19971 , Flood s o eSt the 1970 season and took the prayer. The Ten Comma1dm99t7 hung on IkeCRTas o court. A deal waos L Rd ot In 197 1 wells o his couin. Ocagain, the ACLU Is
Cotesso Fecr oEcO Ca A n him the Washington begators, saying that it is a terrhle thing for the basis
Cccr 171.0013 Oo Ar T but he played only 33 games and retied. or laws Is he displayed i f law. I
(By Alin A. Reid) Later, oter r players wr ableo toe adva
Las Asc -Cort Fined sed hks athletic sage of the free agency then he had fn ghtaba l s a
talent to help make the gt. Leuis Cardinaks Lurd fer. .1leagues and Alabama's Gsoeror Fob James
otime world chanplo and then coed hkisln-tdn in supporting Judge Morre v daghu to display
rnictin t1 change major lea died in- the Too CoA nandment.
Flood died nf threat cancer cc Moodayis REFL CTOh ON HOUSE COHCUR- The Tee C5mma9dments am a symhol of
Los Angeles. two days after his 59th hirth- RENT RESOLUTION li-THE TEN our past and a hoye far our future. They are
dy COMMANDMENTS lbs foundatitohl flammnts of our history, hedi
His dramatic stand cgo inst hasem Bl's re-Ku
se e e clause ended his ten.rT in St. Louis in letteOr -a de ahni swubsequen la to f -s a uto rt t
l9lt However. before he Moved to Spain to H .O N PT AR sbolsr the e alesan of the ahtr hao
further 24s dding 1rt9st69 ar, be a a
Profoond inpact on the St. Louis c m OF ca-roNI that gane biinh to hem." We hKme many such
Ity m aTsi HOUS OF RtPwrSe rTATIVS symbols cod 68adi0iFns in this Aativne We Naee
of"Curt Flood and former St Lois football biblical symbols in the Suyrewe Court, 'to
trdinsal seman rnie McMillan helped Tuesday, March 4, cac Gad We Trust" is iscdhed horn in Ie Cha-
fund the A lns h Uncles crelng tio ad Mr. STARK. Mr. apeakerm y's a day of bib- her of the Huse and on every piece of U.S.
the r mission was noses to it that n bd portions-Cengress debates the Ton currency and in additio each day of Cogress
she city had good shoes:' said Bnats od- Cmesm ena
gers. A-1r mankci.ie editor. "They oub d
hotsdshe sho give o woy at Chingas d pares o present the olaff he osed as Moses fonded spun religimos pebciyles. Unfor
usetee -odintero tsoands of eids she- to Mickey Muse' The theater of the absurd eately. soe belie freedom Of relgion
chdywound py frit." becomes mality cc the Hill cud off, Means h repdoe fres religirT.
Rodgers Said the shun gin--way became a I walk thrugh Ike oaluey if csngrossional O Septemer 17. 1796. Gaorge Wshing-
weekly event and woo headqoartered on the hypecrsy and lake Spdiual inetory ot the Inn goon his farewell addrss sayofg, 'Of all
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The United States, to maintain its credi- aod the foreign ootnrity tortes iseolved in Strike all after tt onatting claute nd in-
bility and honor amongst its allies and all din training program, and din information ot In lien thereof the following
nations of the torld. should make prompt relating to homan rights violations that no- ston i. SHOOT TITLE.
reparatioes for an accident clearly caused by reseicates the waiver. This Ace may he cited as the 'Con Flood
a United States mility airraIt. A;t 111."
A high-level delegation, Including the U.S. KERREY (AND OTHERS) SEC.o
Ambassador to Italy. recently visited It Is t poSEo
Cavalese and, as a result. 20 million dollars
was promised to the people in Cavalese for Mr. STEVENS (for Mr. KERREY, for din major league haehall players or rot
their property damage and business losses; himself. Mr. MOYNIHAN, and M ed onder the antitrust lass (Ce. that majorr.lengse hasehall players will have the tameWithout our prompt action, these families EAUX) proposed on omendment tO rights under the nitruet loss as do other
continue to suffer financial agonies, our the hill, S. 2132. supra: as fellows: professinal utrletes. e.g.. foothall aod hur'
credibility in the European community toO- At te appropriate plate. insert: kethall players), along with provision that
tinues to suffer. and our own citizens rmintenestotofee ad oe wi tiiaosreai SECTIOeN 1. SENE Or T0 sSATE REGARING makes it slene thot the passage of this Actpuzzled and angered by oar lack of a 'AYROLL Taw nIMe, does not diange die aacoiuatnon of the anti
ability,ahde ty e Ifetarnemn ehv a) PINIIS-Tho Senate fiode the followt- toost lows to any odier tontext or with e-Underg spt to any other person r entity.
with Italy in die context of our Status of () The poyroll tan onder die Federal In Ec. 3. APPLICATION OF TEES ANTITRUST LAWS
Fortes Agreement (SOFA), civil Claims aris- soranee Cootribetions Att (FICA) is die hig- e o tA n ILGE
ing from the accident at Cavalese must be ressive tan gold hy workog OSERALL.
brought against the Government of Italy. in fam s Tte
accordance with the laws and regulations of Tsded y adding at the nd the followisg
Italy. as if the ormed fortes of Italy had been tent tan hordes on the seges and teld em tioo:
responsihle for the accidet.
Under Italian law. every claimant for prop ployment rown of each Ameritan, with 12.4
erty damage, personal Injory or wrongful peeet of the pnyroll tan osed to o throogh (d) heloe. the condost, as. prat-
serneity henefis to torrent hete itiries and tire or agreements of persons In the hosi-death must file initially an administaivents as file coecll an ad2itrt .9 per..ent used to pay the meditore henefits ness of orgnized profossional major leagoe
cIle lot damages with the Ministry of tie-
ee i Roe hi Is epeted t take frrent nefil . asall diretly rel g to ffetig mI nta, Ifteinsys ff er in M a 13) The amoont of wages and teff ploy- ployment of emojor league hasehall ployers to18 months. and, if the Ministry's offer in set-
I h mooit inome tuhject to die socal security ploy hasehall at the major league level oreement is not acceptable, which it is at portion of he payroll tan is topped at sahjett to the antitrust lais to the same e-
likely to be, the claimant nmst thereaterlielyc to h.the Itlin moort thertoteh $68,400. Therefore, din loner a family's in- Toot soth sondut, acts, praotices or agree-
resortto t Itaia or m.where tme, the more they pay in payrll tan s a wents wold he serjeet to die antitrost laws
cil cases for wrongful death are reported to peroentage of income. The Coogressionol if ngaged in hy peross in nny other profes-
take up to ten years to resolve:
While under the SOFA process, the United Bodgt Ofire has
States-as the "sending state"-will be re- ie who poy payroll Oases, 0 ptrcentommerce.
sposile for 75 percent of any damages pay mor io payroll Oases then in ine "(h) N court shall rely on the ennot
awardeda and the otent of tal aass 
for ehangg eop-
awade a1 sh1oeoeto tl (4) In 196 the median household insome plictoe of di antitrust laws to, ony tot-lice meltiing state -will he responsihle for
25 perreot. the United States hns agreed to was $35,492, and a family ernig diat dost, ar, prastiem or agreencnts other25py nil. do.oges ownred Int diis aed t amoot and taking standard deductions and thon those set forth in sohseection (a). Thispay all damas awarded in tis case; 1
it is the Sense of the Congress that the exemptions paid 1211 in Federol iome section doss not create, permit or imply a
UttdSas shel reslv I i buio~ aht last 11,430 in itnom to the payroll caont of astin hy whisk to diallenge underUnited State ould resolve th Claims oftx hnattrs as rohews pl hthe victims of the February 8, 1998 U.S. Ma- the nt
rine Corps aircraft incident In Cavalese, Ownership of wealtis ettestial for e antitrust lows to, ny condost, noes, peso
Italy as quickly and fairly as possible. ocyno to hove a shot at the Americn tiers or gements thnt do not dirotly re-dream, hat tho payroll tan is tte principal latad to or attest temploymnt of major
hurdet to sovlegs and wealth treation for league hasehall players to ploy hnsehall so
LEAHY AMENDMENT NO. 3477 working famlies. the major league level, Icuding hot not
Mr. STEVENS (for Mr. LEAHY) pro- () Sinse 1903, the payroll too hot Seen limited to:
posed an amendment to the bill, S. higher don necessry to pay current See "(I) any tondoct. ats, pratle or agree-
2132. supra; as follows: ns of persons engaging in, condoctieg or(7) State most of the payroll tan reseipts participating In the husiness of orgaoned
At the appropriate place in the bill, inert are deposited in die socal sorioy trust professional hasehell relating en or affecting
the follnwing: foods. whitS msss the real amoutt of Goe employment to play heseholl at the minor
SEC. .TRAININGe AND OTHER PnOGRAMS. eroent horroning, those whom the payroll leagse level, any oeganizoed profossinal
(a) FtOeIBIerNs Nooe of the ftnds mode tan hits Snrdest, working families, hove hasehall ameunr or first-year player draft,
availble hy this Ast may he toed to sapport shoeldered a disproportyonte shore of die or any resent olase as applied to mitor
ay training program ineolding a init of the Federal hadgot deficit redurtien and, ther' leag e ponyer
security fortes of . foreign toutry If dir fore. a disproptrtionate share of the creation "12) the agreement herteen orgoniaed pro-
Secretacy at Defeote has resolved oredihie of die Federal hadget suirplos. feosionol maor league hasehall teams and
information from the Departmsent of Store ()l Over the nest 10 years. the Federal Doe- die teams of she Hational Assooiation of
that a membher of such toce has rommitted a crmcent will generate a hodget sorplos of Frofessionol asmehall Leagues, commooly
groet violation of homon rights. onless all $rla50,tingOOt, and oil hot 132,0000,Ioo of knen a die "Frofessional Baehall Agree
eoneoe oorreotiee steps h.aeen taken, that surplo will he geterated hy exness pay- est," the reltins..hip hetween organized
(SIb (esrTORNest. Nt more dian 90 days roll teussu professional major leagoe hasehall ad orga-afr ematirent of tis Aot, the Secretaty of (b) SESE OF THEo SENATE.-It is die sense nioed prodfasional minor leagoe hasehall, or
Defeme. It tomoultatin with the Seoretary ofthe Snate that any other matter relating to orgwaed pro-
of Stlate, Shall estahlish protedores to Orsore (1) ff Congress decides so provide tan relief, fessionel hosehall's minor leagues:
that prior to a decision to sondoot any train- redocing the harden of payroll Canes ohoold "(3) any conduct, ant. praccocem or agree-
leg program reterred to in paragraph fo).- foil hea ter priority; end moonts of prsses engating in, conducting or
coosideratin is given to all informatin (2) Congress and die Fresideot should work participating in the hasinees of organiaed
... aliahle so the Deparetment of Stote reeat- to reduce this payroll tan hordet no Amer- professional hasehall relating to or affecting
leint huan rights ecolations hy foreign so- i Tan faEilies. (ranfhise eMpoKsionE loeforon orelcation.
tey tortes. Thefrashhise sneership isses. MOeoding oner
it) WVE. Strtary of Defeoto, sRxhip transfe die relationship hepo a m et the
att a wih the Seoretty of CURT FLOO ACT OF 100 Office of the Cflisiooer and franchise
Stol nise the prohihition in gs- owners. die marketiog or tales f die enter
graph In) if he detercoes that soth wafter IaimNDeot Snodoct of orgaIsaTd proessisoal
is ergoiredhy estreordlooxy tirtomistanoes HATCH AMENDMENT NO. 3431 hosehall end die licensing of Iotellectoal(d) Roor-n7oeto I osae r RFRD frM AO)po propert rights owned or held hy organized
the The pyo tax 1r ersdthe F l Iy w e dr p
(s), the Setemscy of Dlefense shall sunmt psda odsn h il( 3 prfollielyh; hitasidvioyo
re o the e t to reque otti eneral appication of "H) any condtht, abts, potis or agree
regest, mos regesiv taxrsioa paidns byy worin
tees destribing the extraordinary ne- the antitrast laws to maojor league ents protested hy Fohtii Law 07-331 ( 
iootes. the purpose and dorotion of the Sanenail, and for other purposes: an fol U.S.C. §1291 nt seq.) (soenonly kow as
traning program. the United Seates forces lees: "the Sports troadpt mtieg Are of toil"):
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-(5) the relationship between persons In IDENTITY THEFT AND ASSUMP- "(5) in the case of y offense tnder sub
the business of organized professional base- TION DETERRENCE ACT OF 1998 section Ca), forfeiture en the Unind States of
ball and umpires or other individuals who aoy persoal property used nr Iounded so hn
are employed in the business of organized used to commit the sifens; and'.
professional baseball by such persons; or KYL (AND OTHERS) AMENDMENT (o) Cleocs ClS-Seotiss 1028(c) nf title
"(6) any conduct. acts. practices or agree- NO. 3480 18. United States Code, is amended by strib
ments of persons not in the business of orga- log pargraph (3) and inserting the fnllosing:
nizd professional major league baseball. Mr. JEFFORDS (for Mr. KYL for him 3)
(Ic) Only a major league baseball players 
ter
cas standing to sue Under this section. ar elf, Mr. LEAHY. MI. HATCH. Mrs. FEor- 
"(A) the production, nofer. possession.
bus stndn thsndethseol.Pr STEIN, Mr. DEWINEn Mr. D'AATO. Mr. or Use prohibited by this sestin Is In or uf-
the purposes of this section. a major league ORASSLEY, Mr. ABRAHA, Mr. FI. eoss interstate or foreign rommerce; or
baseball playerisbasbal plye is. CLOTH, Mr. HARKIN. Mr. WARNER. Mr. "ft the meos of Identificatin, ideoti-
"(1) a person who is a party to a majorn t dooument
lengue player's contract. or is playing base- mendm n to the bill i n m falm e ma ifim n is
bell at the major league level; or rented-us t main sh esen ot
'(2) a person who was a party to a major amend chapter 47 of title 1 ) t prdt in tnera in orse o-
league player's contract or playing baseball State Code, relating to fraud, and fur hiited by tisftpes."
at the major league level at the time of the other purpes; no fellows (d) DErision. 18
irir rhtis the subject of the complaint;. 
It[N-eco108ftilis
Injusy that istesb oo  pc  Stnike all after the encting clesse and in- United Snates Cede, is amnuded by striking
or.( sort the following: cobseotln (d) and inserting she follsowing:
I" a person who has been a party to a bEOf 1. 500RTTTf. "(d)DOtIMTOsS-t Is sectio
major l pague Player's contract or who has This Art may he cited as thn "Identity DOCoT EN IlSO EioLENI.-The
played baseball at the major league level, Theft nd Assumption Detereence Ant of menc mean
and wbs claims he bus been Injured in is ef- 199g"% eny implement, impemsion, electroic de-
forts In secure a snbsequees majnr league out. u. ENTITY THEFT. vice, or compter bardware or software. tht
pinaper s contract by an alleged violation of Ce) ESTAni-HvEe1oT OF OppgESE.-Seetloin sspiftaL confired on primily ase
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AUTHORIZING THE PRINTING OF
COPIES OF THE PUBLICATION
ENTITLED "THE UNITED STATES
CAPITOL' AS A SENATE DOCU-
MENT
Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President. I ask
unanimous consent that the Senate
proceed to the immediate consider-
ation of S. Con. Res. 115, submitted
earlier by Senator WARNER.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered. The clerk
will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
A concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 15)
to authorize the prietieg of copies of the
publication entitled "The United States Cap-
itol as a Senate document.
The Senate proceeded to consider the
concurrent resolution.
Mr JEFFORDS. I ask unanimous
consent the resolution be agreed to,
the motion to reconsider be laid upon
the table, and that any statements re-
lating to the resolution appear at this
point In the RECooD
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection. it is so ordered.
The concurrent resolution (S. Con.
Res. 115) was considered and agreed to
as follows:
S. CON. RSs. 115
Resolved by the Senate (the House of Rep-
resentatives onrrring), That (a) a revised
edition of the publication entitled "The
United States Capitol" (referred to as "the
pamphlet") shall be reprinted as a Senate
document
bi There shall be printed 2,000,000 copies of
the pamphlet In the English language at a
cost not to exceed $100.000 for distribution as
follows
(1(A) 206,000 coples of the publication for
the use of the Senate with 2.000 copies dis-
triuited to each Member;
(B) 886.000 copies of the publication for the
use of the Hoose of Representatives. with
2.000 copies distributed to eech Member and
(C) 908 000 of the publication for distribu-
tion to the Capitol Guide Service; or
(2) if the total printing and production
costs of copies in paragraph (1) exceed
$100.000, such number of copies of the publi-
cation as does not exceed total printing and
production costs of $100,000. with distribu-
tion to be allocated in the same proportion
ie) wasth nto the copies printed pursu-
ant to subsection (b). there shall be printed
at a total printing and production cost of not
to exceed $70.000-
(1) 50.000 copies of the pamphlet in each of
the following 5 languages: German. French.
Russian, Chinese, and Japanese; and
i2) 100,000 copies of the pamphlet in Span-
ish,
to be distributed to the Capitol Guide Serv-
tee.
AUTHORIZING THE PAYMENT OF
THE EXPENSES OF REPRESENT-
ATIVES OF THE SENATE AT-
TENDING THE FUNERAL OF A
SENATOR
Mr JEFFORDS. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the Senate
proceed to the immediate consider-
ation of S. Res. 263, submitted earlier
by Senator WARNER.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows: nothieg in this subsection shall be conotrced as
A resolution (S. Res 263) to authorize the providing the ob for any negative hseere
payment of the expenses of repreoetative regarding the .stiaw cneig he pplira'
of the Senate attending the fooetnl of a Sen al
acer. 'b) Nothing containedi in sehsectitn (a) of
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there this setion hall be demed in change the appl'
objection to the immediate consider- rati of ee antitrust Jw to the condact. acs,
ation of the resolution? pecee o geoeans by, between, or among
There being no objection, the Senate persons engaging In, onducting, or parsespat
proceeded to consider the resolution. lg In the business of organized prafesiaa
Mr. JEFFORDS. I ask unanimous baseball except the Condort acts, practies e,
consent the resolution be agreed to. agreement e which subsection (a) of this sos'
the motion to reconsider be laid upon eon shall apply Marc spotheaiiy hot net by
the table, and that any statements re- deme o chan thectio she nti
lating to the resolution appear at this to easest
point in the RECORD. '(I) the oganied pvofessiosal baseball ama-
The resolution (S. Res. 263) was tanr draft, the reserve ause as applied to minor
agreed to, as follows: league playes the agreemene betvoon o-
S. RES. 263 nzed professional major leagse baseball tenon
Resolved,and e teams o the Natonal Association of
mittee on Rules and Administration the knona the ' eaguessommoAge
Secretary of the Senate is authorized to pay, ment the relatioship between orgidr
from the contingent fund of the Senate. the frssbsso l eague baeeball and organieed
actual and necessary expenses incurred by
the representatives of the Senate who attend
the funeral of a Senator, including the f- matterlag ess
nraol of a retired Senator. Expenses of the any conct .i;
Senate representatives attending the funeral
of a Senator shall be processed on vouchers meats of persons in the business of orgasied
submitted by the Secretary of the Senate profcslianon aelaig frchise en
and appeoved by the Chairman of the Coesm- assin Isses or cin. froniow
mittee on Rules and Administration. eso te iodship transfe
CURT FLOOD ACT OF 1997 1 "(3) any condccch arepraetbce. or egree
meats protested by Poblic Law Sf 331 (15 US.C
Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President, I ask 12g0 , .co moy knon as the spert
unanimous consent that the Senate BroadoastingAct of1961'); or
proceed to the immediate consider- 'Y4) te relaionhip bersroo porseco IN the
ation of Calendar 231. 5. 53. husiness of organized profesonal baseball and
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without empires or other lndirldcalo irks are employed
objection. it is so ordered. The clerk in the business of organized profesiona base
will report. ballbysokpersons
The legislative clerk read as follows: 'Ye) As cod In this setion, Pn 'm5 any individual, paresnership. corporation, or so-A bill (S 53) to require the geral applica- inrporated association crony ronbination or
tion of the antitrust laws to major league aoclselm, thereof.
baseball, and for other purposes. Asotsc'aT SO. 3479
The Senate proceeded to consider the Mr JEFFOSDS. Senator HATCH has a
bill which has been reported from the
Committee on the Judiciary, with an sk for Its considerotion.
amendment to strike all after the e- Th PRESIDING OFFICER Thc
acting clause and inserting in lieu clerk will report
thereof the following: The assistant legislative clerk rad
SEGTON L. SHORT TITLE.
This Act maybe cited as the "Curt Flod Act
ofl1997" The Scooter froe Ventr. 3ev
SEC. . PUenpOSE. mos]. foe Me, HATCH, proposes a, and
It is the purpose of this legislation to clarify mint eumbered 3
that major league baseball players an covered The aendeent Is as follows:
under the antitrust las (Le., that major league Strike all after the enactine clause and Is-
players will have the same rights under the aet in lion thereof the feliowing:
antirust laws as do other profeesional athletes, SECTION I SHORTtIt
eg., football and basketball players), along with This Act esy he sited as the "Cov Flood
a provsion that makes it clear that the passage Act of 1998"
of this Act does not change the appication of
the antitrust lawns in any other context or with SEC 0. PURPOSE
respect to any othe person or encity. It ithe purysof shis legislation in stato
SEC a APPI.IATION OF TE ANTITRUST IAWS that major league baseball playes are c-
rio pnroptewsirsga acsjon £,escr ered undor the antitrust laws (i.,. shot
mASEmia major league baseball players will have the
The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq) in same elgbti under she oiose lass as do
amended by adding at the end the following other professional othletes, e.g., footbl and
newooeoron: basketball ployers), aloog with a pmtoision
"SEC. 27 (a) The conduct, acts, practices, or that makes it clear that the passage of this
agreements of persona in the business of orga- Act des sot change the application of the
nizedproessionalmajorleague basebalrelaing antitrust laws in any other mon or with
to or affecting employment to play baseball at reopoct to ony other person r enticy.
the major league level ate subject to the antsl- EQ z. aOLICATIOS Or won ktlSt LAWS
trust laws to the same etent such conduct acts t O ii 3 0 UE
practices, or agreements rould be subject to the BASEBAL.
antitrust lawns If engaged In by persons in any The Clayton Act (15 U.SC. 5ll ct seq. Is
other professional sports business affecting eded by adding at the cod the tollowinginterstate commbrce: PN i onded, hoever, That tction:
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Sc 27(a) Subject to subsections (b)
through (d) below, the conduct. acts, prac-
tices or agreements of persons in the buas-
ness of organized professional major league
haseball directly relating to or affecting em-
ployment of major league baseball players to
play baseball at the major league level ae"
subject to the antitrust laws to the same ex-
tent such conduct, acts, practices or agree-
ments would be subject to the antitrust laws
if engaged in by persons in any other profes-
slotal sports business affecting interstate
(b) No court shall rely on the enactment
of this sections a basis for changing the ap-
plication of the antitrust laws to any con-
duct, acts, practices or agreements other
than thise set forth in subsection (a). This
section does not create, permit or imply a
cause of action by which to challenge under
the antitrust laws, or otherwise apply the
antitrust laws to, any conduct, acts, prac-
tices or agreements that do not directly re-
late to or affect employment of major league
baseball players to play baseball at the
major league level. Including but oat limited
(1) any conduct acts, practices at agree-
ments of person engaging in, conducting or
participating in the business of organized
professional baseball relating to or affecting
employment to play baseball at the minor
league level, any organized professional
baseball amateur or first-year player droft,
or any reserve clause as applied to minor
leaseaplayats.
hl e agreement between organized pro
fessional major league baseball teams and
she teams of the National Association of
Professional Baseball Leagues, commonly
known as the 'Professional Baseball Agree
ment: the relationship between organized
profession majar league baseball and orga
nized prefessional minor league baseball, and
organized professional minor league base-
ball, or any other matter relating to orga-
nized professional baseball's minor leagues;
l(3) any conduct, acts, practices or agree-
ments of persons engaging in, conducting or
participating in the business of organized
professional baseball relating to or affectingfranchise expansin. location or relocation,
franchise ownership issues. including owner-
ship transfers, the relationship between she
o0ce of the Commissioner and franchise
owners, the marketing or sales of the et-
tamment product of organized professional
baseball and the licensing of intellectual
property rights owned or held by organized
professional baseball teams individually or
collectively.
"(4) any conduct, acts, practices or agree-
ments protected by Public Law 87-331 (15
US .C 1291 et seq.) (commonly known as
'the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961');
"(1) the relationship between persons in
the business of organized professional base-
ball and umpires or ether individoal who
are employed In the business of organized
professional baseball by such persons: or
(6) any conduct, acts, practices or agree-
ments of persons eat in the businae af orga-
nised prefesslonal major league baseball.(c) Only a major league baseball player
has standing to sue under this secton. For
the purposes of this section, a major league
baseball player is-
(1) a person who is a party to a major
league player's contract. or is playing base-
bill at the major league level. or(2) a person who a a party to a major
league player's contract or playing baseball
at the majar league level at the time of the
Injury that is the subject of the complaint;
"(3) a person who has been a party to a
major league players contract or who has
played baseball at the major league level.
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and who claims he has been injured in his ef- tell you that major league baseoll
forts to secure a subsequent major league players, along with hoth major and
player's contract by an alleged violation of
the antitrust laws, provided however, that
for the purposes of this paragraph, the al- reached an
leged antitrust violation shall not include ing that the antitrust lawo apply to
any conduct, acts, practices or agreements of major league professional basehall
persons in the business of organized profes- labor relation. This agreed upon Ian-
slana1 baseball relating to or affecting em- guage is refleoted in the sustitute we
ployment to play baseball at the minor are offering today.
league level, including any organized prfs- With this historic agreement I am
sional baseball amateur or first-year player confident that Congress will, once and
draft, or any reserve clause as applied o for all, make clear that professisnol
minor league players, or
(4) a person who was a party to a major baseball players have the same rights
league players contract or who was playing as other professional athletes. and will
baseball as the major leage level at the con- help assure basball fans across the
clusion of the last full championship season United States that our national pan-
immediately preceding the expiration of the time will not again be interrupted by
last collective bargaining agreement be- trikes With the home run battles and
nwen pertins in the buiness of organized
roffesional major league baseball and the
exclusive collective bargaining represents- jying a resurgence. And, as fans are
tive of major league beall playe. returning to the ballparks they de-
"(d)(1) As used in this section, - personmean() s usny edit  sut1 scayes ' s serve to knosw that players will he on
meam any entity, including an individual, the field, not mired in lahor disputes. I
partnership. corporation, trust or uincor- am pleased that Congreos will, it noe
pate soiaino any comb ination orratd a  tin oraycbhiai O appears, be able to help guarantee that
mssoiatian thereof. As used in this section, this is the case.
the National Association of Professional
Baseball Leagues. its member leagues and De t an aberrat reme Cu
the clubs of those leagues, are not 'in the d o i l a n
business of organized professional maJr major league baseball have not
league baseball. subject to antitrust laws, unlike any
e2) in uss nvolving conduct, acts, prac- other industry u America. In every
tices or agreements that directly relate or other professional sport, antitrust las
affect hash employment of major league serve to stabiize relatom between the
baseball players to play baseball at the em and players an
major league level and also relate to or af- on ons hatfeat any other aspect of organized profes- i
sional baseball, includlg but sot limited o recent years. baseball has eperinced
employment to play baseball at the minor mre work stoppages, including the
league level and the other areas set forth a disastrous utrike of 1i91nI95 than pro
subsection (b) above, only those components, Passional basketball, hockey and fast
portions or aspects of such condact, acts, bell combined.
practices or agreements that directly relate In the 10d Congress. the Noose Judi-
to or affect employment of major league siaiy Comittee teak the first Impsr-
baseball players to play baseball at the
majqor leagu level rant step by approving legislation
m ) As seed isubsection (a). interpreta- which would hove esured that the
tion of the term 'directly' shall not be gov- antitrust lawv apply to majar league
ered by any Interpretation of 29 U.S.C. b151 baseball labor relations, without in-
cs seq. a- -mended). patig the minor leagues or team re-
"ets Nosisg in this section shall be con- location issues. Daring the 104th Con
strued to affect the application to organized
professional baseball at the nonstatctry grsthe SenateJudiciary Committee
lar exemption fram the antitrust laws. a o n eote Ant627,sThe
'(5) The scope of the conduct. aces, prac-
tices or agreements covered by subsection farm Act, to apply federal antitrust
(b) shall not be strictly or narrowly con- laws to major league baseball labor re-
strued. lations. None of these bills were passtd.
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, today I however, as many Members of Congress
offer on behalf of myself and Senator ware reluctant to take final attics
LEAmY, the Ranking Member of the Ju- while there was an ongoing labor dis-
diciary Committee, an amendment in pate.
the nature of a substitute to S. 53. the With the settling of the labor dispute
Curt Flood Act of 1997. This bill, which and with the signing of a long term
was reported out of the Judiciary Com- agreement between the mjor league
mittee on July 31, 1998, by a vote of 12- baseball team owners and the players
6, clarifies that the antitrust laws anion, the time was right this Congress
apply to labor relations at the major finally en address this mortar In fact,
league level, but does not have any af- in the new collective bargaining ogre-
fect on any other persons or cir- mnt, the owners pledged to work with
cumstances. Given our limited time, I the players to pass legislation that
will only make a few brief comments, makes clear that major league baseball
and would ask unanimous consent that in subject to the federal antitrust laws
my full statement be entered into the with regard to owner-player relations.
RECORD. At the beginning of this Congress, we
In a baseball season that is likely to introduced S. 53, a bill which was spe-
set records In a number of different cifically supported by both the players
categories. I am extremely pleased to and osners and which was reported out
be able to report that a truly historic of the Judiciary Committee almost us
milestone in the history of professional aetly one year ago. At the Committee
baseball has been reached. People said markup, however, several Members in-
it would never happen, bat today I can dicated a concern that the bill might
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inadvertently have a negative impact
on the Minor Leagues Although both
Senator LEAHY and myself were firmly
of the view that the bill as reported
adequately protected the minor
leagues against such a consequence, we
pledged to work with the minor
leagues representatives, in conjunc-
tion with the major league owners and
players, to make certain that their
concerns were fully addressed.
Although this process took much
longer, and much more work, than I
had anticipated. I am pleased to report
that it has been completed. I have in
my hand a letter from the minor
leagues, and a letter co-signed by Don
Fehr and Bud Selig. indicating that the
major league players, and major and
minor league owners, all support a
new, slightly amended version of S. 53.
I ask unanimous consent that these
letters be printed In the RECORD.
There being no objection, the letters
were ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
NATtoNAL AssoclATION OF
PRFEssiONAL BASmoL LsGes, INC..
Wachingtao, DC, July 27, 1998.
Re baseball legislatico.
Hon. OiaN HATCt.
Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee. U.S.
Senate, Senate Dirksen Office Building,
Washington. DC.
Dcia MaR CeRAI N. As you know, the Na-
tional Assoation of Professional Baseball
Leagues, Inc. ("NAPBL") objected to S. 53 as
it was reported oat of the Judiciary Commit-
tee last year. Since that time, we have been
consulted about proposals to amend the bill
to assure the continued conival or mser
league baseball. We understand that a draft
of an amended bill has been put forth by the
major leagues and the Players' Association
(copy attached) that I believe addresses the
concerns of the NAPBL which we support in
its final form.
Respectfully yours,
StanleyM. Brand.
July 21, 1998.
Hoc,. O HATCH, Chahman,
Hon. PATRiCK LEAHY.
Ranking Member, Senate Judiciary Committee,
US Senate,
DcSA stADwin HATCH AND SENATOR LEAHY:
As requested by the Committee, the parties
represented below have met and agreed to
the attached substitute language for S. 53. In
particular, we believe the substitute lan-
guage adequately addresses the concerns ex-
pressed by some members of the Judiciary
Committee that S. 53. as reported, did not
sufficiently protect the interests of the
minor leagues. We understand that the
minor leagues will advise you that they
agree with our assessment by a separate let-
We thank you for your leadership and pa-
tiecce. Although, obviously, you are under
no obligation to use this language in your
legislative activities regarding S. 53. we hope
that you will look favorably upon it in light
of the agreement of the parties and ourjoint
commitment to work together to ensure its
passage
Ir you have any questions or comments,
please do not hesitate to contact us.
Sincerely.
DoNALO M. EcR,
Executive Director,
Major League
Baseball Players
Association.
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ALLA H. "BUD" SELIG,
Commissioner, Major
League Baseball.
OFFICE OF Too COMIeSSIONER,
MOR LEAGU BAsEBALL,
July21, 1998.
DONALD M. FEns, EsQuIRe.
Executive Director and General Counsel, Major
League Baseball Players Association, New
York, NY.
DEAR DON: As you know, in our efforts to
address the concerns of the minor leagues
with S. 53, as reported by the Senate Judici-
ary Committee, several changes in the bill
were agreed to by the parties. i.e., the Major
League Clubs. the Major League Baseball
Players Association and the National Ass-
ciation of Professional Baseball League(miner leagues). Among those changes was
the addition of the word "directly" imme-
diately before "relating to" in new sub
section (a) of the bill.
This letter is to confirm our mutual oder-
standing that the addition of that word was
something sought by the Minor leagues and
is intended to indicate that this legislation
is not meant to allow claims by con major
league players. By using "directly" we are
not limiting the application of new sub-
section (a) to matters which would be consid-
ered mandatory subjects of bargaining in the
collective bargaining context. Indeed, that is
the reason we agreed to add paragraph (d)(3).
Thre is no question that. under this Act.
major league baseball players may pursue
the same actions as could be brought by ath-
letes in professional football and basketball
with respect to their employment at the
major leagu te.
I as ceour with this intent and in-
terpretation.
Very truly yous,
Atan H. ScLIC.
Commissioner ofBaseball.
Mr. HATCH. This new bill specifi-
cally precludes courts from relying on
the bill to change the application of
the antitrust laws in areas other than
player-owner relations: clarifies who
has standing under the new law; and
adds several provisions which ensure
that the bill will not harm the minor
leagues.
Senator LEAHY and I have incor-
porate these changes into our sub-
stitute, which, given its support across
the board, we hope and expect to be
passed today without objection. I urge
my colleagues to adopt this substitute.
This amendment, while providing
major league players with the anti-
trust protections of their colleagues in
the other professional sports, such as
basketball and football, is absolutely
neutral with respect to the state of the
antitrust laws between all entities and
in all circumstances other than in the
area of employment as between major
league owners and players. Whatever
the law was the day before this bill
passes in those other areas it will con-
tinue to be after the bill passes. Let me
emphasize that the bill affects no pend-
ing or decided cases except to the ex-
tent a court would consider exempting
major league clubs from the antitrust
laws in their dealings with major
league playera.
But because of the complex relation-
ship between the major leagues and
their affiliated minor leagues, it was
necessary to write the bill in a way to
July 30, 1998
direct a court's attention to only those
practices. or aspects of practices, that
affect major league players. It is for
that reason, that a bill that ought to
be rather simple to write goes to such
lengths to emphasize its neutrality.
And, although much of the Report filed
by the Committee with respect to S. 53
is still applicable to this substitute,
there have been some changes.
Section 2 states the bill's purpose. As
originally contained in S. 53. the pur-
pose section used the word "clarify'in-
stead of the word "state" as used in
this substitute. That language had
been taken verbatim from the collec-
tive bargaining agreement signed in
1997 between major league owners and
major league players. When the minor
leagues entered the discussions, they
objected to the use of the word "clar-
ify" on the grounds that using this
term created an inference regarding
the current applicability of the anti-
trust laws to professional baseball. The
parties therefore agreed to insert in
lieu thereof the word "state," Both the
parties and the Committee agree that
Congress is taking no position on the
current state of the law one way or the
other. It is also for that reason that
subsection (b) was inserted, as will be
discussed.
Section 3 amends the Clayton Act to
add a new section 27. As was the case
with S.53, as reported, new subsection
27(a) states that the antitrust laws
apply to actions relating to profes-
sional baseball players' employment to
play baseball at the major league level
and as in S.53 is intended to incor-
porate the entire jurisprudence of the
antitrust laws, as it now exists and as
it may develop.
In order to accommodate the con-
cerns of the minor leagues however,
new subsection (a) has been changed by
adding the word "directly" imme-
diately before the phrase "relating to
or affecting employment" and the
phrase "major league players" has
been added before the phrase "to play
baseball." These two changes were also
made at the behest of the minor
leagues in order to ensure that minor
league players, particularly those who
had spent some time in the major
leagues, did not use new subsection (a)
as a bootstrap by which to attack con-
duct, acts, practices or agreements de-
signed to apply to minor league em-
ployment. This is in keeping with the
neutrality sought by the Committee
with respect to parties and ci-
cumstances not between major league
owners and major league players.
Additionally, the new draft adds a
new paragraph (d)(3) that states that
the term directly is not to be governed
by interpretations of the labor lawn.
This paragraph was added to ensure
that no court would use the word "di-
rectly" in too narrow a fashion and
limit matters covered in subsection (a)
to those that would otherwise be
known as mandatory subjects of bar-
gaining in the labor law context. The
use of directly is related to the rela-
tionship between the major leagues and
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the minor leagues, not the relationship
between major league owners and play-
ers. Mr. President, I have a letter from
the Commissioner of Baseball, Mr.
Allan H "Bud" Selig, to the Executive
Director of the Major League Baseball
Players Association, confirming this
interpretation of the use of the word
"directly" and I ask unanimous con-
sent that it be inserted in the RECoRD
at this time.
As in S. 53, as reported, new sub-
section (b) is the subsection which im-
plements the portion of the purpose
section stating that the "passage of
the Act does not change the applica-
tion of the antitrust laws in any other
context or with respect to any other
person or entity." In other words, with
respect to areas set forth in subsection
(b), whatever the law was before the
enactment of this legislation, it is un-
changed by the passage of the legisla-
thon. With the exception of the express
statutory exemption in the area of tel-
evision rights recognized in paragraph
(d)(4). each of the areas set forth de-
pend upon judicial interpretation of
the law. But Congress at this time
seeks only to address the specific ques-
tion of the application of the antitrust
laws in the context of the employment
of major league players at the major
league level.
Thus, as to any matter set forth in
subsection (b), a plaintiff will not be
able to allege an antitrust violation by
virtue of the enactment of this Act.
Nor can the courts use the enactment
of this Act to glean congressional in-
tent as to the validity or lack thereof
of such actions.
New subsection "c" deals specifically
with the issue of standing. Although
normally standing under such an act
would be governed by the standing pro-
vision of the antitrust laws, 15 U.S.C.
Sec. 15, the minor leagues again ex-
pressed concern that without a more
limited standing provision, minor
league players or amateurs would be
able to attack what are in reality
minor league issues by bootstrapping
under this Act through subsection (a).
The subsection sets forth the zone of
persons to be protected from alleged
antitrust violations by major league
owners under this Act.
New paragraph (d)(1) defines "per-
son" for the purposes of the Act, but
includes a provision expressly recogniz-
ing that minor league clubs and
leagues are not in the business of
major league baseball. This addition
was requested by the minor leagues to
ensure that they would not be named
as party defendants in every action
brought against the major leagues pur-
suant to subsection (a).
New paragraph (d)(2) was added to
give the courts direction in cases in-
volving matters that relate to both
matters covered by subsection (a) and
to those matters as to which the Act is
neutral as set forth in subsection (b).
In such a case, the acts, conducts or
agreements may be challenged under
this Act as they directly relates to the
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employment of major league players at
the major league level, but to the ex-
tent the practice is challenged as to its
effect on any issue set forth in sub-
section (b), it must be challenged under
current law, which may or may not
provide relief.
New paragraph (d)(5) merely reflects
the Committee's intention that a
court's determination of which fact sit-
uations fall within subsection (b)
should follow ordinary rules of statu-
tory construction, and should not be
subject to any exceptions or departures
from these rules.
As stated in the Committee Report,
nothing in this bill is intended to affect
the scope or applicability of the "non-
statutory" labor exemption from the
antitrust laws. See. e.g.. Brown v. Pro
Football, 116 S.Ct. 2116 (1996).
Before yielding to my good friend
from Vermont, I would like to thank
him for his hard work on this bill. His
bipartisan efforts have been vital to
the process. I would also like to thank
our original cosponsors, Senators
THURMOND and MOYNIHAN. I urge the
quick adoption of this bill, which will
help restore stability to major league
baseball labor relations.
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, this sum-
mer we are being treated to an excep-
tional season of baseball, from the
record breaking pace of the New York
Yankees and the resurgence of the Bos-
ton Red Sox, to a number of inspiring
individual achievements, including the
perfect game of David Wells and the
home run displays of McGwire, Griffey
and Sosa. Such are the exploits that
childhood memories are made of-and
which we all thought could be counted
on, that is until the summer of 1994.
Now finally, after years of turmoil,
major league baseball isjust beginning
to emerge from the slump it inflicted
upon itself, by returning to that which
makes the game great-the game and
the players on the field. And, last
weekend, Larry Doby and others at
long last were inducted into the Base-
ball Hall of Fame. These are steps in
the right direction.
Today, the Senate will give baseball
another nudge in the right direction by
passing 5. 53, the "Curt Flood Act of
1998." Murray Chass, a gifted reporter
writing for The New York Times noted
that on this issue we have finally
"moved into scoring position with a
bill that would alter the antitrust ex-
emption Major League Baseball has en-joyed since 1922."
I am gratified that 76 years after an
aberrant Supreme Court decision, we
are finally making it clear that with
respect to the antitrust laws, major
league baseball teams are no different
than teams in any other professional
sport. For years. baseball was the only
business or sport, of which I am aware,
that claimed an exemption from anti-
trust laws, without any regulation in
lieu of those laws. The Supreme Court
refused to undue its mistake with re-
spect to major league baseball made in
the 1922 case of Federal Baseball. Fi-
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nally, in the most well-known case on
the issue, Flood v. Kuhn, the Court re-
affirmed the Federal Baseball case on
the basis of the legal principle of stare
decisis while specifically finding that
professional baseball is indeed an ac-
tivity of interstate commerce, and
thereby rejecting the legal basis for the
Federal Baseball case.
Mr. President, as a result of that and
subsequent decisions, and with the end
of the major league reserve clause as
the result of an arbitrator's ruling in
1976, there has been a growing debate
as to the continued vitality, if any. of
any antitrust exemption for baseball.
It is for precisely this reason that this
bill is limited in its scope to employ-
ment relations between major league
owners and major league players. That
is what is at the heart of turmoil in
baseball and what is at the heart of the
breach of trust with the fans that
marked the cancellation of the 1994
World Series. At least we can take this
small step toward ensuring the con-
tinuity of the game and restoring pub-
lic confidence in it.
When David Cone testified at our
hearing three years ago, he posed a
most perceptive question. He asked: If
baseball were coming to Congress to
ask us to provide a statutory antitrust
exemption. would such a bill be passed?
The answer to that question is a re-
sounding no. Nor should the owners,
sitting at the negotiating table in a
labor dispute, think that their anti-
competitive behavior cannot be chal-
lenged. That is an advantage enjoyed
by no other group of employers.
The certainty provided by this bill
will level the playing field, making
labor disruptions less likely in the fu-
ture. The real beneficiaries will be the
fans. They deserve it.
Mr. President, I just wanted to com-
ment briefly on a couple of changes
made in the substitute from the bill as
reported by the Committee. First, the
changes in the language in subsection
(a) are not intended to limit in any
way the rights of players at the major
league level as they would be construed
under the language of the bill as re-
ported by the Judiciary Committee
last July. The additional language was
added to ensure that a minor league
player, or someone who had played at
the major league level and returned to
the minor leagues, cannot use sub-
section (a), concerned with play at the
major league level, to attack what is
really a minor league employment
issue only. Alternatively, neither can
the major leagues use the wording of
subsection (a) and that of subsection
(d) to subvert the purpose of subsection
(a) merely by linking a major league
practice with a minor league practice.
That linkage itself may be an antitrust
violation and be actionable under this
Act. It cannot be used as a subterfuge
by which to subject players at the
major league level to acts, practices or
agreements that teams or owners in
other sports could not subject athletes
to.
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Finally, the practices set forth in A bill (S. 1134) granting the consent aod
subsection (b) are not intended to be approval of Congress to an interstate forest
affected by this Act. While this is true. ire protection coopact.
it should be remembered that although The Senate proceeded to consider the
the pure entrepreneurial decisions in bill.
this area are unaffected by the Act, if Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President. I ask
those decisions are made in such a way unanimous consent that the bill be
as to implicate employment of major rad three timm and passed; that the
league players at the major league motion to reconsider be laid upon the
level, once again, those actions may be table: and that ay statements relating
actionable under subsection (a). More to the bill be placed at the appropriate
importantly, we are making no find- place in the REtORD.
ings as to how, under labor laws. those The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
issues are to be treated. objection, It lose ordered.
In closing, Mr. President, I would The bill (S. 1134) was deemed read the
like to thank all those involved in this third time and passed, as foilowo:
undertaking: Chairman HATCH, of S.1134
course, without whose unfailing efforts SeiteoattecbytheSmateandfoeeeflep
this result would not be possible; our aetatirm of the Uoited States ofAserica in
fellow cosponsors, Senators THURMOND Coogees' asseabled,
and MOYNIHAN. and other members of STIN 1 tONSENT Or tONGRES.
our Committee; and JOHN CONYERS, the Oi) In Gcocoa-Tho conseot and opproval
Ranking Democrat on the House Judi- Congress is given o so interstate forestfire pcotection compact, as set ot is sob-
ciary Committee, for making this bill a section In).
priority And I want to commend the (s) Cnoa.-The compact reads nobston-
interested parties for working to find a tinlly as follows.
solution they can all support. Not only "TE NORTHWEST WJLDLAND FIRE
have they done a service to the fans, PEOTECTION AGREEMENT
but they may find, on reflection, that "THIS AGREEMENT is entered into by
they have done a service to themselves med between the State. Feovincial. sod Tot
by working together for the good of the rtocial wildlaod fire preton ageie sig-
game. ntory hereto, hereioofter referred us as
Finally, Mr. President. I would be re- "Member".
miss if I did not comment on the man FO tNo N CONDTIN the
for whom this legislation is named. agree:
Curt Flood. He was a superb athlete "ArticleI
and a courageous man who sacrificed '1.1 Tho purpose of this Agreement is to
his career for perhaps a more lasting promo o
baseball legacy. When others refused, fetv rvntopeupsobaseall egac. Wenohersrefuednd control of forest fires in the Northwest
he stood up and said no to a system mildland tegion of the United States and ad,
that he thought un-American as it jent oceas of Canada (by the Members by
bound one man to another for his pro- prnvding motual old in preventioe
fessional career without choice and pressppresslon and control nfwildlaad firm.
without a voice in his future. end by estahlshiog pronedore in operating
I am sad that he did not live long plans that will fonilitate tech aid.
enough to see this day. In deference to "Article I
his memory and in the interests of 2.1 The agreement shell become affection
every fan of this great game, I hope r those Members ratifying it ws- any
every two or more Members, the States of Oregon.
that Congress will act quickly on this Washington. Alaska, Idahn, Montana. or the
bill. I am delighted that we are moving Yukon Torioiy. or the Frevin of British
forward today and that we are finally Colombi. or the Province nf Alberta bate
able to enjoy the game once again. retified it.
Mr. JEFFORDS. I ask unanimous '2.1 Any State, Province, or Territory not
consent the amendment be considered menciond in this Article mhich is contig-
as read and agreed to. the bill be con- nos to any Member may become a party to
sidered read a third time and passed as tbio Agreement nebjec to onanimos up-
amended, the motion to reconsider be Pre of the Memhers.
laid upon the table, and that any state- "Article I
ments relating to the bill be printed at "3.1 The role of the Members is to deter-
the appropriate place in the RECORD. mim. nimetane sd cntos am
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without be foond for eakandio te prvnin
objection. it is so ordered. presopprion. and cntrol of forest Bras in
The amendment (No. 3479) was agreed the area comprising the Membr's terriory;
to. so cbordinate the plaing ad the ho of ohn
The bill (S. 53). as amended. won con. appropriate agencies of the Members; and to
bSidered read a third time and passed. J con.rdisae the rendering of aid by the Mew,
apprvalof Cngrers to each oth  In fighting tildand fires.
'3.2 The Members may develop ct.pera
INTERSTATE FOREST FIRE siTe operating plans for the progrars toe
PROTECTION COMPACT ered by this Agreement. Operating plans
SFFORDS. Mr. President. I ask tern, fiscal pro
Mr JPPORS. M Prsidet, Iaskcediures, personel contacts. resoorces avail-
unaolmous consent that the Senate able, and snsdarde applicabl to the pro
proceed to the immediate consider- gram. Other sections may be added as neet
ation of Calendor No. 4t1h S. 1134. emlrya
I T he PRESIDING OFFICER. Without A ile TV
objection, it is so ordered. The clerk "4.1 A majsrity of Members sholl ten.
will report. stitute a qoor s for the trametion nf its
The legislative clerk read as follows: generol bosiness. Motions of Members
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present shall be carried by a simple majority
except as stated in Article II Each Member
will have one vote on motions brought before
them.
"Article V
'5.1 Whenever a Member requests aid
from any other Member in controlling or
preventing wildland fire, the Members
agree, to the extent they possibly can, to
rcnder all possible aid.
"Article VI
"6.1 Whenever the forces of soy Member
are aiding another Member under this Agree-
mest. the employees of such Member shall
operate under the direction of the officers of
the Member to which they are rendering aid
and be considered agents of the Member they
are rendering aid to and, therefore, have the
same privileges and imunities as com-
parable employees of the Member to which
the at
0 
rendering aid'
"6.2 No Member or its officers or employ-
ees rendering aid within another State, Ter-
ritory, or Provice, pursuant to this Agree-
ment shall be liable on account of any act or
omission on the part of such forces while so
engaged, or on accounat of the maintenance
or use of any equipment or supplies in con-
nection therewith to the extent authorized
by the laws of the Member receiving the as-
sistance. The receiving Member, to the ex-
tent authorized by the laws of the State.
Territory. or Province, agrees to indemnify
and save-hariless the assisting Member
from soy-sck hiability.
o.3 Any Member rendering outside aid
pursuant to this Agreement shall be reim-
bursed by the Member receiving such aid for
any loss or damage to. or expense incurred in
the operation of any equipment and for the
cost of all materials, tramportation, wages.
salaries and maintenance of personnel and
equipment incurred in connection with such
request in accordance with the prnvisions of
the previous section. Nothing contained
herein shall prevent any assisting Member
free assuming such loss. damage, expense or
other cost or from loaning such equipment
or from donating such services to the receiv-
Ing Member without charge or cost.
"6.4 For purposes of the Agreement. pcr-
sonnel shall be considered employees of each
sending Member for the payment of com-
pensation to injured employees and death
benefits to the representatives of deceased
employees injured or killed while rendering
aid to another Member pursuant to this
Agreemnt.
. The Members shall formulate proce
dures for claims and reimbursement under
the provisions of this Article.
"Article VII
'7.1 When appropriations for support of
this agreement, or for the support of com-
mon services in executing this agreement,
are needed, costs will be allocated equally
among the Members.
"7.2 As necessary, Members shall keep ac-
curate books of account, showing in full, its
rereIpts and disbursements, and the books of
account shall be open at any reasonable time
to the inspection of representatives of the
Members.
"7.3 The Members may accept any and all
donations, gifts, and grants of money. equip
ment, supplies, materials and services from
the Federal or any local government. or any
agency thereof and from any perosn, firm or
corporation. for any of Its purposes and func-
tions under this Agreement, and may receive
and ose the same subject to the terms, condi-
tions, and regulations governing such done-
tions, gifts, and grents.
"Article VIII
"8.1 Nothing in this Agreement shall be
construed to limit or restrict the powers of
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CURT FLOOD ACT OF 1998 1 BLONDIE LABOUISSE, 1915-1998 He,
* Mr WELLSTONE. Mr. President, e Ms. LANDRIEU. Mr. Fminit, I Stor
late last night, the Senate passed by note with sadnms the passing of a load hero
unanimous consent S. 53. I have been mg citizen of my hometown, New One Med
contacted by the Attorney General of ann. Louisiana. Caroyn Gay Louisse. Ge
my State. Hubert H. Humphrey III. and a community leader and civic activist over
asked to try to clarify a technical legal for many decades, deed this past week Corp
point about the effect of this legisla end at the ag of 3. She was the Wh
tion. The State of Minnesota, through daughter of Edward James Gay, a Sen- te
the office of Attorney General, and the star from Louisiana from lilt until Mat
Minnesota Twins are currently in- 1921 -an
volved in an antitrust-related inves- Known to everyone as "Blondie," she 2nd
tigation. It is my understanding that was the classic Southern woman who, an
S 53 will have no impact on this inves- when she saw something locking in the rime
tigation or any litigation arising out of community, would immediately stop held
the investigation, forward. m up her sleeves, and sot disti
Mr HATCH. That is correct. The bill about making things right For coon- oral
simply makes it clear that major plo, when she sas that New Orleans GIT
league baseball players have the same had an inadequate, out-of-date library for
rights under the antitrust laws as do facility, she immediately began to the
other professional athletes. The bill spearhead efforts to buid a nos, mod- OfS
does not change current law in any em Maln Library. She also worked to D
other context or with respect to any develop and expand public affairs pro, dens
other person or entity- gramrnng at our local public tele- anti
Mr. WELLSTONE Thank you for vision station (WYES). She was an ae- spoi
that clarification. I also note that sev- tiv participant in several task forte the
eral lower Courts have recently found committee dealing with education in beet
that baseball currently enjoys only a New Orles. cans
narrow exemption from antitrust laws Blondie was dedscated to progressive sons
and that this exemption applies only to politics. In the lilt's and lilt's, she Gulf
the reserve system. For example, the was part of a circle of young people in him
Florida Supreme Court in Butterworth New Orleans who fought hard to elimi well
v. National League, 644 So.2d 1021 (Fls nate corruption from politim and to TI
1994). the U.S. District Court in Penn- make state and local government more ship
sylvania in Piazza v. Major League responsive to the needs of its citizens, him
Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993) She campaigned to elect reform can Mar
and a Minnesota State court in a case didacas as governor of Louisiana and acre
Involving the Twins have all held the mayor of New Orleans. She was one of a1le
baseball exemption from antitrust laws the founding members of the Independ tio
is now limited only to the reserve sys- ent Women's Organization, which is a 5t5
tem It is my understanding that S. 53 leading reform organization in Nes Or- this
will have no effect on the courts' ulD leans. in-s
mate resolution of the scope of the She received the 1991 Times-Picayune Do
antItrust zomto 0nmtesbyn Loving Cup. the single mostc pres- hooantitt exe ption on matters beyond ..
those related to owner-player relations cigious award given annually in Ne Mac
atOrleans for community service. The s his
Mr. HATCH. That is correct. S. 53 is ction committee, in recommending san
intended to have no effect other than an cm a for comt a e Ho
to clarify the status of major league Csrn
players under the antitrust laws. Withlow man.regrd o al oherconestor th , I extend my sympathies to her fam- our
regard to all other context or other ily. Blondle Laboutse meant a great the
persons or entities. the law will be theperon orenitisth deal to the people of Now Orleans. She who
same after passage of the Act as it will be issed.
today.
Mr, LEAHY. I concur with the state- Be
ment of the Chairman of the Commit- RTIREMENT OF GENRRAL you
tee The bill affects no pending or de- RICHARD I. NEAL a tI
cided cases except to the extent that * Mr. LBAHY. Mr. President, I rise your
courts have exempted major league today to honor a fine Marine Officer, Rabaseball clubs from the antitrust laws General Butch Neal, the Assistant and
in their dealings with major league Commandant of the Marine Corps, who the
players. In fact, Section 3 of the legis- will soon retire from active duty. for
lation makes clear that the law is un- General Neal's long and distinguished give
changed with regard to issues such as career began more than thirty years
relocation. The bill has no impact on ago following his graduation from
the recent decisions in federal and Northeastern University when he was
state courts in Florida. Pennsylvania commissioned a Second Lieutenant in * Mr
and Minnesota concerning baseball's the United States Marine Corps. Pal- ted
status under the antitrust laws. lowing the completion of The Basic pss
Mr- WELLSTONE. I thank the Sen- School at uanico, Butch was trained lead
ator, I call to my colleagues attention as an artillery officer and was assigned kno
the decision in Minnesota Twins v. to duty in the Republic of Vietnam City
State by Humphrey, No, 62-CX-98-568 whore he served tours as a Forward Oh one(Mine. disc. Court. 2d Judicial disc., server and as anr Advisor to the Viet- A
Ramsey County April M. t) re namase Marine Corps. Pros
printed in 1998-I Trade Cases (CCH) While serving in Vietnam, he was of p
t! 2 ,1
36.- 3 wounded and received the Purple half
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rt. He was also awarded the Silver
r Medal on two occasions for his
ism as well as the Bronze Star
al with Combat 'V- device.
neral Neal distinguished himself
r the years as one of the Marine
s' finest commanding officers.
ther as a battery commander, ar-
ry battalion commander, Deputy
ne Expeditionary Force Com-
der or Commanding General of the
Marine Division, his reputation as
uncommonly gifted leader of Ma-
s has grown with each billet he
. In thejoint arena, he served with
iction as the Commanding Den-
Joint Task Force for Operation
MO, the humanitarian relief effort
Haitian immigrants in Cuba and as
Deputy Commander in Chief/Chief
taff for U.S. Central Command.
ay after day, year after year he
onstrated the rare quality of bal-
ng difficult and often dangerous re-
sibilities with a keen concern for
welfare of his Marines. Butch has
a superb staff officer. Most Ameri-
remember him from his no-non-
o daily briefings during the Persian
War, but he also distinguished
self in personnel management as
as in operational planning.
is unique combination of leader-
and administrative skills carried
to the very highest levels of the
ine Corps. His impeccable char-
r and strong moral fiber make him
ider among the very best of our na-
's military commanders. Yet what
ds out most to me when I think of
fine officer is his simplicity and
suming nature.
spite all the accolades and all the
ors, he remains a simple man from
sachusetts. I got to know him and
wife Kathy because they attend the
e church as my wife Marcelle and I.
i a hard working New Englander
with love of God, country and
ps dedicated a lifetime in service to
nation. Too often we do not thank
Butch Neals of the world, those
choose a lifetime of service and
ifice so that the rest of us can live
and free.
tch, we are grateful for the service
have rendered as a Marine. as well
ie sacrifices made by both you and
family. I wish Butch, his wife
iy and their children Andrew, Amy
Erin much health and happiness in
years ahead. Our country is better
the many contributions he has
n us.*
PAUL O'DWYER
DODD. Mr. President, I rise
y to pay tribute to one of the most
ionate and committed political
ers that this country has ever
en: Paul O'Dwyer of New York
. Sadly. Mr. O'Dwyer recently died,
day before his 91st birthday.
former New York City Council
ident, Paul O'Dwyer was the soul
litical activism in New York for a
century.
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Author Frank McCourt mourned him solved from both his Colleagues and his pariicipaing i the business of organiad
as "one of the pure souls" who "devel- odveraries. profesoal boseball relating to or affecting
oped convictions early in life and never Paul O'Dwyer was truly one of a fraschie expanion. locution or relcatisa,
wavered." And not only did Paul kind, end he will be dearly missed for franchise orihii issues. including siser-
O'Dwyer hold deep convictions, he also his leadership and more importantly sfic s the C eaionsr bedwfrnoche
acted on them. Mr. O'Dwyer once said, for his friendship.e Owie o he ioer a frhete
"Politics is the only machinery around oosent prktc n o rales ofeseiterl
owhich you can really straighten tiier 
rdc fognzdpoesoa
on whc y Sa.elystagtn~" 53-THE CURT FLOOD ACT OF" baseball and she licensieg of ietelleetuel
things out." And hardly a day wont by, 1998 proper righs owe or held by organiacd
where Paul O'Dwyer didn't work to profcssional baseball taus Indisidally or
"straighten things out" for the people The text of S. 53, the Curt Flood Act collectisely:
of our country and our world who were of 1998, as passed by the Senate on July - any condoct, acts, praoticm or agre
most in need. 30, 1i9i, is as follows: meets proced by Poblis Lu il-Ill (15
He was the quintessential champion U.C § 1291 at soil (somioely Zsw as the
of the underdog, and his thick white Be it coariod by She Senata and House effp 'Spot reasi Ass o ersonsiIn
mane of hair became the symbol of ata She husiness of orgaoized prof'..sioal base-
most every significant social move- Cesdi'aa obod,
ment in New York during the past 50 she "o so pall basbl oheriss o
years A a10esnyond a c prsor ag
The causes be championed were as di- Aca of96 ats odta c m tessr arga-
verse as the people and places of our It ithe purpose of this legislation t0 siete eee ofpsos ajo leaue bseball
great nation, but at the soul of each of char major league basehali players are cat- "let)Qely major league baseball player
his endeavors was the pursuit of social ered uer the antitrust laws (i.e., that has stadiog ts uoder this section. Par
justice major leagoe baseball players will base th the porposes of this section. a major leege
He immigrated to the United States same rights under the antitrust laws as do baseball player is
from Ireland when he was 17, and ha ether professional atblotes, eg.. footbell end "(i) a person who ft a party to a major
worked his entire adult life for a united bashetball player,), aloag with a provision league player's contrat. er is ployieg be
Ieland. He was the national coordina-he pssge f ballt the majr egue level orIrean. H s  atonl sorin- Act doss not chasnge the applicatien af the "-(2) a person who sas a party so , major
tor for the American League for an Un- ntitrust laws Ie toy other roext or wish league pler' contract or playiog baseball
divided Ireland. He worked very closely respect so any other person or totity. at the major league level us tho time of the
with Gerry Adams and fought for hio sE. 'PPLIAUON OcTHE ArIVsT tAS Injury tt is the subjecc of the complaist;
historic trip to the United States so he T PROFIONb tlOR LOSOC or
could plead his case for peace and an- ASmaIl_ '(31 a peron who has bee a party te a
derstanding in his homeland. And he Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. §10 et eqj is _ajar league player's coocract or who has
insisted on meeting with Protestant amsnded by addiog at the sd the followig played baseball es she mor league level,Ie teweste' and who claims he baa bees iejured In Mis of-loaders who visited our shores. "SC. 27. (a) Subjt to subsectioas (b) forts t secure a suoeqet major league
He fought diligently for the creation through (d). she condact, acts, practices, play' c
of the State of Israel. As chairman of ogretmeats at persoot In the business of or the cntrt w araded hoion Ta
the Lawyer's Committee for Justice in gasleed preieniseal major league bas.bell for she porposes of chit paragraph, the el
Palestine, he pleaded at the United Na- directly relating to er affossiog employment
tions in the late 1940s for Israeli soy- basealahe maea lers a sub-
ereigntyjs ah sins ast tev sae tstes af pcrisna Ohs husinest of erganized pro-ereignty.sre t
He was deeply committed to ending sash oade ats pattesa eea fsiese to pla b a or affecting
segregation in our country. He success- would be subject to the antitrost lowo it employmen y at the mior
fully litigated a critical desegregation gaged in by persons in soy ether prafenesal logus level, Ielodin0 asy organized praf-
suit in 1951, which opened the way for tporis booioos affeccing interstete sow draft, c b anreeeoclause as apppcdyto
blacks to live in Stuyvesant Town. a merce.
large Manhattan housing complex. Heeague players orlarg Mahattn husig cople, ef this Noiourtasha asis re ebeg the ap't "(4) a person who was a party to a major
also went to the Deep South to register ptis t th asis law tany ee- league player's contract or who was playing
African-American voters, campaign for piato fteattutlw oaycnAfrian-mercanvotesampignfardart, acts, practices, er agreemens other baseball at she major leegsio level at theses'-
black candidates, and provide legal as- than those set forth in subsection (a). This elatiofthe lest full champioship seaso
sistance. tection does sot Create, permit or Imply a lastl preceding the expiratios of the
He successfully argued before the Su- ca of action by whic so challeogesuder dye bargoiniog ageement be-
preme Court for the right of mainland the antitrust laws, or othersise apply the twoot persoes is the businws of organied
Puerto Ricans to take their voter lit- antitrst laws to, any conduct, acts prac- proecsional major league baseball and thesite, o ageewstitha dosetdirctl~ eoelasive colltctive bargaining represte-
eracy test in Spanish. lat areemeyateo o drerty f leag baseall players.
His constant support of minoritylaetorftepymnofajregu (d) dHi osas upr ofmnoiy sueball players to pley bateball as the "ivl) sa is tis section, 'pies'n
causes helped deny him a mainstream moor league lesel. insluding hot sot limited means any entity, inslsding a0 iedividual,
role in American politics. In all his ef- to- partership. corporation. tress or aelor
forts to win elective public office, he "(T) aoy s.nduct, acts, practices, or agree pasd association or any cewbination or
a associaties thereof. As toed in tis secion.
succeeded just twice, once as Manhat- mets of pecsons togaging is, conducting or the Notional Association cf Professional
tan's councilman at large and the participating in she butiness of organitod Basoball Lagues, its member leagues and
other time as New York City Council profossiol baseball relatiog to or affecting the clubs of those leagoes, are sot 'in ths
President. He also won the Democratic employment o plot baseball as the miter busiessofrganizd pmi'ecsiesul major
nomination for U.S. Senator in 1968, league level, any orgaized professional It.o-e basoball'.
but lost the general election to Senator or ay rer classo a ple s r .jes In ses involving condut, oets pros
.,bJvtBuPaul O'Dwyer didn't an y rs _ aasplidtmnor tieor agreements chat direccly relace soJacob Javits. But P laffe both employieat of majr leage
enter politics to win elections, he did "(2) the agreement benwein srganizd pro basoball players to play baseball at the
so because he saw injustice in this fesioaal major leegue baseball teams and major league lcvel and aho relat to or at
country, and he was determined to the tems of the Natioal Asiociation of focs any ether aspect sf srganiaed profes-
eradicate it. Prfessional Baseball Leagues. comoly sional basoball, iocludig bat set limited to
In the end, Paul O'Dwyer may have kown as the 'ProfeionalIgaseball Agree tmployent to play baseball at the minor
lost more elections than he won, but mot', the relationtbip hetween eaeised league level aed the ether areas sot forth Is
his leadership was not based on itiles. prfeiel major logus baseball and osga subsection (b) above, only chase componmns,
rs ""sited professional mineor league heseball. or portions or aspects of tush condoct, acts,It was built on principles. any ther masier relating to osganized pro- practices, or egreemenis that directly relaso
Perhaps that is why few individuals fwsiaaal baseball's miser leagues, o or attest employment of major league
have ever earned the level of respect "(3) any condect. acts, practices, or agree' players in ploy hasoball at the major league
and admiration that Fool OtDwyar r- meats of pemoos eagaging ie, condscting or lvel maybe challenged under tubsertion (a)
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and then only to the extent that they di- tting service, and other -1caed and cop
rectly relate to or affect employment of port octiriios.
major league baseball players to play base- (5) the tens tpac essptatisn service"
ball at the major league level, otion ofa space trampartlo
(31 As used in subsestion (a). Interprto a and Its payloads far asporain to,
tlon of the term 'directly' shall not be gov- fm. or within oter space, oI suborbital ea
erned by any interpretation of section 151 at jectery, and the cadoc of ransporting a pay
seq of title 29. United States Code (as lead to, from, or within eater ome or in sub-
amtended) obtltaetr
"(4) Nothing In this section shall be con- (6) te tea ac transprtat vehicle"
strued to affect the application to organized means any vehicle constructed for the parpe
professional baseball of the nonstatotory of oporatig . rasprting a payload so,
labor exemption from the antitrust laws. f w ter spac or in suborbital
'(5) The scope of the conduct. acts, prac- trajetory and Inciudea any component of'sash
tices. or agreements covered by subsection vehicle net specificaly designed or adapted for
(b) shall not be strictly or narrowly con- ayodjrel.- (7)theter 'State" ateant each af the sevra
Lsat______ State, ef the Union,' the District of Cailuabia,
HR 172-TF CMMEC C the Cotsatoalth of Pserta Mioo, the VirginH R 17f2-THE COMMERCIAL SPACE Islands, Gean. American Samoa, the Commo-
ACT 0OF 1991 wrealth of the Nsrthern Maclana Islads. and
The tent of HRE 1192, the "Cem ser i any ocher cmmneealther aocrity or posses-d ef the United States; and() the tenr "niced Statsta conmervcia p-
and passed by the Senate on July 30. rd' means a i vid, organized
1ehicl and Its payloads or raoraot,
romr the lows uf the United Sies or fa
Rejooed. That the bill from the Honsg of State, which is-
epreseatatses (H. 1702) etltlod "An A tt (A) mere than ii percent sned by Unsed
ts eourage the develapment af a cemmor- States nabonals;* ci'
cl space iadustey In the United States, and (B)aubsyoofafoeign copanytarjdtce
for other purposes.", do pest with the follow Secretaryefransporati n nds that
lg amendment' ii) ssh nyvediaiy has is the past eidenced
Strike sat all after the enacting eate and a sustantial cfmmrmoenmt o the Uied States
Insee market throagh-
SECTION, 1ios. SHORT op OF CONTENTS Mnthreanotnes in the United Staeesapt long
(a) StORT 7TtE.-Tit Act may be sited an tens rse(rch, development, and manofathstrig
ehe (incStgas the manfaitae of sajer Colmbi
(t) The OCom CeVTaSl o- aeut and ersRtbh i andffI0 siganiicant coantrbStiam eo empcommnthS h A OF of clottrhn the UnMitdStates a and
Iei) the ooanfRy or can70s in which ommh
TITLE I APROMOTION P COIsmERCnL foreign company is incorporated oganised
SPACE OPPORTU ITIES and if appropriote, th which it prSIeipanoy son
Scc if1i Commerciaiation of apace oeation. ducts its basiness, affsrdo resiprocai treatment
Sr ilZ Commercial spacel-och antndmmte. to compasies described i subparagraph (A)
Sec 103 Pomotioeod f United States Glvea pd comparable to that afforded hl froh ftrnign
atai g System standilds ctmpany's sosdiey i thc Unied Stairs, an
So 10 Acquiio of spce science data' idenmdmer
Se 1f I Adminiseration of Commercial Spacp (a piing comparabie opperttU etioc fr
Cesfs caspane described n do.apaigtph (A) t
ing~at amendment:-sart
TITLEIT-REMOTE SENSING pmbipt hi Poenmn spnoe M sac
Sect 201 Lad Remote Sensing Policy A dof s t
Se ll20 acusdnoedmrtscire clO providing no barriers, to companies de-Sec fl cqaiitia o e rh ssesc daa, cril~ si sahpararaph (A) with nspect to
TITLE III-FED)ERAL ACQUISITION OP localinstment Opportunites, that ane not pro-
SPA CE TRASPORTATION SRVICRS rided 00 foclgn companes- the United States
Se 301 RCqireme a to pSp oca somerAial and
space eoopoertai s-ices. (Il) prov'idisg adeqsate and effectbre protec
Sec 30 Acqtiten of conentsalspace erans-else.for the Ieetual Praperty rights ofm
poSr. --Di ices ponies described In sabposagraph H).
Sec 3TI Laach Servins Purchace Act of COME TLTLE I-PRO4L7TON Oi COMMERCIL
S aP dmeOTs SPACE OPPORTUNTIES
Set c , Sh1tloepralization. SEC os Cp tCaLtnION OP SPACE TA'
Sec 3M Use of ei lstcelnneal ballistic ION.
missile (a) Pcssr. -Tht Congress deslars tha ta potSec 3f Ntionlanch capability Gady ori goal of constructing the Internatisnal
SEC. DEFIsitOnS Spa Station I the econsiie derelspmet of
Far prsstofthioAc- Earth Orbital space. The Cosgress forther d(f) the tens "Adminiseratar" eeans the Ad- dares that free and cotmpetitire markts createSeitrarar of the Nationa] Aermnoties and the most effSieent coditioos fAr Promotin c
Spate Administrasisn nomi deveopment andmseold therfsreg
cth term "eumerttolprorider"cmeiany the eonmic derelopent of Earth ital
peison pridiag space transportation servics space. The Congress further deolars that the
or other pace-rlated actiities, primary control se of free maret principles I perating, er
of Which Is held by Persoss other than Federal, icing, ailosatisg the ese uf and adding capa-
Sam. loral, osfporin gn n nts; bsevies eo the Spasi Station, and the rsrveeg(3) the an h Sid means anythig thaca fist potsible engageent ofpro
"arsn todertahes to transport ta. from, or tsdeco and participatios of tomnmeroiai os
Within easer space, ar in suobital trajIectory, will redece Spore Station operational casts for
by means ofa apace traneporttisn vehicle, hot ailpartnen and the Federal Government'sshare
does nO include the spatone anos. in vehi of the United States burden to fond operataons
c it seif crcept ts I cotmpnents which are ) ReroRs.-() The Addistror shall de
spercally designed or adapted for that pay- bce hi the Commsittee on Science af the Nomteloadr osepresetatives and the Commietee on Coi
(4) the term "spase'rnlotedescirifies" ncludes eserso Science, and Transportation OF the Sn
research and dbveiopment manofactering, pros- ate, withis 90 days after the date of the nat-
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ment of this Act, a study that identilles and ex-
amines-
(A) the opportunities for commercial provids
to ploy a role In fntmatsonal Space Station as-
tivities including operation, use servicing, and
augmentation;
(B) the potential cost savings to be derivedfrom commercial providers playing a role in
each of these activItes;
(C) which of the opportunities described in
subparograph (A) the Administrator plans to
make available to cammercial providers in fiscal
year 1999 and 2000;
(D) the specific policies and inhatives the Ad-
minisrator is adranchg to encourage and fa-
clitate the e commercial opportsnies; sod
(E) the rerenues and cost resmburmsemnts to
the Federal Government from commercial uses
of the Space Station.
(2) The Administrator shall deliver to the
Committee o Science of the House of Reproesent-
atices and the Committee Onr Commerce, Science,
and Transportation of the Senate, Within 180
days after the date of the enactment of this Act,
an independently-cenducted market study that
examinas and evaluates potential industry inter-
est in proidding commercial goods and sevices
for the operaton, senicrig and augmeneatisn
of the International Space Station, and is the
commercial use of the International Space Sta-
tion. This study shall also include updates to
the cost savings and revenue estimates made in
the study described in paragraph (1) based on
the external market assesment.
(3) The Administrator shall dellver to the Con-
gress, no later than the submission of the Pres-
dents annual budget request for fiscal year
2T, a report detalIng how may proposals
(whether solicted er not) the National Aero
namics and Spaoe Administration received dur-
ing calendar year 1998 regarding commercial op-
eration, servicing, utilization, or augmentation
of the International Space Station, broken down
by each of these four categories, and speoifing
how many agreements the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration has entered into in
response to these proposals, also broken down
by these foor categories.
(4) Each of the studles andreportsrequiredby
paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) shall include consid-
eraton of the potential role of State govern-
ments as broken in promoting commercial par-
ticipation in the International Spate Station
progrm.
SEC, 102 COtstZCsL SPACE LALWCH MhiTND-
MENMS
(a) AMENDMErs.-Chapter 701 of title 49,
United States Code, is amended-
(I) in the table ofsections-(A) by amending the item relating to section
70104 to read as follows:
"70104. Restrictions on launches, operations,
and reentries.";
(B) by amending the item relating to section
70108 to read as follows:
"70108. Prohibition, suspension, and end of
launches, operation of launch
sites and reentry cites, and reen
tries."
(C) by amending the item relating to section
70109 to readasfolows:
"70109. Preemption ofscheduledlaunches or re-
and
(D) by adding at the end the folloinhg new
Item'
"70120. Regulations.
"70121. Report to Congress.
(2) in secion 70101-
(A) by inserting "microgradty rescarch,"
after "Information services," in subsection
(a)(3);
(B) by Inserting ", reentry. after 'Launch-
Ing" both places it appears in subsection (a)(4);
(C) by inserting ", rcentry vehicles." after
"launch vehicles"In subsection (a)(5);
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Sn the conference report was agreed
to
The result of the vote was announced
as above recorded.
A Motion to reconsider was laid on
the table,
ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SPEAKER
PRO TEMPORE
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr.
GUTKNFCHT). Pursuant to the provi-
Sions of House Resolution 577. the
Chair desires to inform Members that
the official picture of the House while
in session will be taken immediately
after approval of the Journal when the
House convenes tomorrow.
The Chair further announces that
any recorded votes requested tonight
will be postponed until tomorrow.
ANNOUNCEMENT OF BILLS AND
RESOLUTIONS TO BE CONSID-
ERED UNDER SUSPENSION OF
THE RULES ON THURSDAY, OC-
TOBER 8, 1998
Mr HULSHOF. Mr. Speaker. pursu-
ant to H. Res. 575. I arnounce the fol-
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lowing suspensions to be considered on
Thursday October 8:
H.R. 434, Depository Institution
Regulatory Streamlining Act of 19981;
H. Res. 578, Science Policy Report;
HN: Res 565, Maonugrams;
H.E. 2253. Theodore Rgosevelt;
H.R. 4506, International Child Labor
Relief Act of 1998;
HER. 4690, To Providn Rewards for In-
formation Leading to the Arrest or
Conviction of Any Individual for the
Commission of an Act. or Conspiracy
to Act, of International Terrorism.
Narcotics Related Offenses, or for Seri-
ous Violations of International Human-
ttarisn Law Relating to the Former
Yugoslavia;
H. Con. Res. 329. Supporting the Bal
tio People of Estonia, Latvta. and Lith-
uamia, and Condemning the Nazi Soviet
Pact of Non-Aggression of August 23,
1939;
H. Res. 557. Expressing Support for
U.S. Onvernesent Efforts Co Identify
Holocaust Era Assets, Urging the es
titution of Individual and Communal
Property;
H. Con. Res. 331, Expressing theSense of Congress Concerning the Inad-
equacy of Sewage Infrastructure Fa-
cilities in Tijuana, Mexoico;
N. Con. REm. 309, Condemning the
Forced Abduction of Ugandan Children
and Their Use An Soldiers;
H.E. 3874, William P. Coodling Child
Nutrition Reauthorization Act of 1998;
S. 2206. Coats Human Services Reau-
thorization Act of 1998;
S.1 Res. 51;
S. 1021;
H.R. 2281, WIPO; and
H.R. 2109, Campaign Finance San-
shine.
r CURT FLOOD ACT OF 1998
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I move to
suspend the rules and pass the Senate
bill (S. 53) to require the general appli
cation of the antitrust laws to major
lengue baseball, and for other purposes.
The Clerk mad as follows:
S.53
Be it enacted by the Senate and House ofRep-
resenatis of the United Steate of .America in
Congress assembled,
SE1ONLSHIORTTITLE.
Th Act may be cited as the "Curt Flood
Ant of 199i8'.
SEC. 2. PURPOSE.
Is is the purpose of this legislution co state
that major leage banball players am c n
ered ouder the antitrust lows (ie., that b
major league basoball players will hove the
sae righto sodrr the antitrnst Ins as do le
other professional athletes, e g.. fbotball and
hasketball playep) aln Ith arovision
that makes it clour that the Passage of this
Act does not change the applieaion of the
antinrust las in any other tootees or snith l
respect to any other person or entity. a
SEC. 3. APPLICATION OF TH ANTITRUST LAWS
TO PROPESSIONoJ. MtsLIOn LEAGUE
BASEBALL.
The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. §12 ec seq.) isn
aended by addieg at the end the following p
rn sectin;
SEct. 27. (a) Subject to subsections (b) ft
through (d), the conduct, acts, practices, or p
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agrerments of persons in the business of or-
ganized professional major league baseballdirectly relating to or affecting employment
of major Irgue baseball players to playbaseoll rat te major legur Intel are sob
ject to the antitrust laws to the same extent
sucb tonduct, arts. prartlem. or agreomento
old h suhject tn the antitrust lats Iten
gaged in by persons so any other professional
spurts business affecting interstate com-
f)No cnnrt shall rely on the enactment
of this sectuon as a honin to hnging the appllratinn of the antitrust lows tn any too-
duct, acts, practices. orc agrent nther
than those set forth io sohrtou a This
section does not create, permit or imply acause of action by which to challenge under
the antltrnst laws. nr othenvise apply theontitruso laos to, any cnduct, nan, peon-tice ooeent- that dn not dirrcly reiu-tor affect amploymcenst of mujor leagiue
baseball playnys tn play baseball at the
major leagun level, including but not limited
s-
"(1) any conduct. acts, practices. or agree-
ments of persons engaging in, conducting or
participating In the basinets of organiaedprofessional obeblH rluning to nr affeting
employmet to play baseb11 at the minor
leaun level, any organized proteuniooulbaseball amateur or first-year player draft.
or any reserve clause as applied to minor
league players;
"(2) the agreement between organized pro-fes iono. major leagae baseball teams and
the teans of the National Ascation of
Praeoional Baseball Leagues, commonlyh a s the Profrssioual Baseball Agree.
mot'r oen lat"oe'bip he e srganizedprafeoslosal ojar lenganibseball and rgad
nized professional minor league baseball. or
any other matter relating to organized pro-fessional baseball's minor leagues;
"() any tondnt, arts, practices. or agree-
ments of pesos engaging in, codncting or
prticipatine s the riness of srgonized
professonal basehall relating so or affectingfranchise epanson. location or relocation,
franchise ownership issues. including owncr
ship transfers, the relationship between the
Office of the Commissionier and franchise
owners, the marketing or sales of the enter-
talinment product of organized professional
baseball and the licensing of Intellectual
pruperty clgbLs owned or held hy organizedprofessional baseball teas individuolly or
:nllecrtvely;
(4) any conduct, ats. practices, or agree
mnts protectad hy Pablic Law 81-331 (1IU.S.C. 51291 et seq.) (commonly known as the
Spoots Broadcasting Act of 1961);
(5) the relationship between persons in
the business of organized professional base-
ball and umpires or other individuals who
ire employed in the busins of organized
irofessional heseball bysooo peruna; r
'(6) any conduct, acts, practices. or agree-
rnents of peisns not in the hasiness it orga-
ioed professional major legue baseball
-)c) Daly a major leaue buseball player
astansadingrtos~under ehis section. Pop
se purpose if this section, a major league
mseball player is-
"(1) a person who is a party to a major
eaea players ontrac, or is playing base-
al tcemjr leauae lend; or
e(2) a person who was a party to a majoreague player's contract or playing baseball
t the major league level at the time of the
njuy that is the subject of the complaint;
01 a person who hea ben a porty to arejor league playr's courract or who bas
layed baseball nt 000 majar leaue lenet,
rd so e eis he hus been injred in his of-
laer o cneuro a subsequent dmvjor leangelayoro contract by as alleged violation at
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the antitrust laws. Provided however That
for the purposes of this paragraph, the al-
leged antitrust violation shall not include
any conduct. acts, practices, or agreements
of persons in the business of organized pro-
fessional baseball relating to or affecting
employment to play baseboll at the minor
league level' including any organized profes-
sonal baseball amoteur or first-year player
draft. or any reserve clause as applied to
minor league players; or
(4) a person who was a party to a major
league player's contract or who was playing
baseball at the major league level as the con-
cluslon of the last full championship season
immediately preceding the expiration of the
last collective bargaining agreement be-
tween persons in the business of organized
professional major league baseball and the
exclusive collective bargaining reprsenta-
sitdo majo legu baseb~all players.,tdiv mrued hi s seae. person
means any ratify. including an individual.
partnership. corporation. trust or unincor-
parated association or any combination or
association thereof. As used in this section,
the National Association of Professisnal
Baseball Leagues, its member leagues and
the clobs of those leagues, are not 'in the
business of organized professional major
lagu baseball'.
(2) In cas e ivolving canduct, acts, prac
tices. or agreements that directly relate to
or affect both employment of major league
baseball players to play baseball at the
major league level and also relate to or af-
fet any other aspect of organized profes-
sional baseball, including but not limited to
employment to play baseball at the minor
league level and the other areas set forth in
subsecolon (b) above, only those components,
portionas or aspects of such conduct, acts.
practices, or agreements that directly relate
to or affect employment of major league
players to play baseball at the major league
level may be challenged under subsection (a)
and then only to the extent that they di-
rectly relate to or affect employment of
major league baseball players to play base.
ball at the major league level.
(3) As used in subsection (a). Interpreta-
tian of the term directly shall not be gu-
ered by any interpretation of section 151 ut
seq. of title 29, United States Code (as
amended)
(4) Nothing in this section shall be con-
strued to affect the application to organized
profesional baseball of the nonstatutory
labor exemption from the antitrust laws.
(5) The scope of the conduct, acts. prc-
sicrs. or agreemenso covered by subsection
(b) shall no ho strictly or narrowly con-
strued .
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursu-
ant to the rule, the gentleman from Il-
linois (Mr. HYDE) and the gentleman
from Michigan (Mr. CONYERs) each will
control 20 minutes
The Chair recognizes the gentlemanfrom Illinois (Mr. HYDE).(Mr HYDE asked and was given per-
mission to revise and extend his re-
marks)
Mr HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unani-
mous consent that all Members may
have 5 legislative days within which to
revise and extend their remarks on the
bill under consideration.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there
objection to the request of the gen-
tleman from Illinois?
There was no objection.
Mr HYDE. Mr. Speaker. I yield my-
self such time as I may consume.
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Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of S.
53, the Curt Flood Act of 1998. After
years of disagreement, the baseball
players, the baseball owners, and the
minor leagues have reached an historic
agreement on the application of the
antitrust laws to labor relations in
baseball. This agreement has already
passed the Senate by unanimous con-
sent, and I hope we will pass it today.
Mr. Speaker, let me just add. because
we are talking about baseball, let me
tip my cap to my good friend, the gen-
teman from Michigan (Mr. CONYERS)
the ranking member of the Committee
on the Judiciary. He has his own bill
on this topic. H.R. 21. and he has led
the charge on this issue in the House. I
want to thank him for his outstanding
work in bringing this bill to fruition.
I also want to thank my friends, Sen-
ators ORRIN HATCH and PAT LEAHY,
chairman and ranking member of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary.
They worked many long hours to nego-
tiate the delicate compromise that this
bill embodies. We are also indebted to
them for their outstanding efforts in
bringing this bill to passage. I am de-
lighted to support this simple but im-
portant bill, and I ask my colleagues to
do the same.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of S. 53, the
"Curt Flood Act of 1998." After years of dis-
agreement, the baseball players, the baseball
owners, and the minor leagues have reached
a historic agreement on the application of the
antitrust laws to labor relations in baseball.
This agreement has already passed the Sen-
ate by unanimous consent, and I hope that we
will pass it today.
The Supreme Court first held that the busi-
ness of baseball is exempt from the antitrust
laws in 1922. Federal Baseball Club of Balti-
more, Inc. v. National League of Professional
Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). The
Court. emphasizing organized baseball's long-
standing reliance on that exemption, has twice
declined to overrule its original 1922 decision.
Flood v Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Toolson
v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356
(1953). Instead, the Court has left it to Con-
gress to decide whether the baseball exemp-
tion should coantinue.
Given the agreement of the parties, Con-
gress has now decided to legislate in this
area, but we do so only in an extremely nar-
row manner. S. 53 leaves completely un-
changed all aspects of the baseball exemption
except for the narrow issue of the labor rela-
tions of major league players at the major
league level as set out in detail in the new
subsection 27(b) of the Claylon Act.
This bill originates from a compromise
struck during the last round of collective bar-
gaining between the major league owners and
the major league players. After a lengthy labor
dispute, these parties reached a collective bar-
gaining agreement that, among other things,
required negotiation to reach agreement on a
limited repeal of baseball's antitrust exemp-
tion. They did so because the players' union
argued that the antitrust exemption contributed
to the labor disputes that have long marked its
relationship with the owners. Specifically, the
union asserted that it was disadvantaged in its
labor negotiations with the owners because,
unlike unions of other professional athletes, it
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could not challenge allegedly unlawful employ-
ment terms under the antitrust laws.
The major league clubs, of course, dis-
agreed with this view. They contended that the
baseball exemption was irrelevant to their
labor negotiations with the union. The clubs
argued that, like every other muli-employer
bargaining group, they were protected from
antitrust challenges to their employment terms
by the nonstatutory labor antitrust exemption.
In that regard, I want to note that nothing in
this bill will affect in any way the protections
afforded to the major league clubs by the non-
statutory labor antitrust exemption.
As a result of this difference of opinion, both
the players and the owners were willing to
support the repeal of the specific and narrow
portion of the baseball exempton covering
labor relations between major league players
and major league clubs. The bill was carefully
drafted, however, to leave the remainder of
the exemption intact.
Before this bill passed the Senate, several
changes were adopted to address concems
raised by owners of the minor league teams--
the members of the National Association of
Professional Baseball Leagues. Minor league
baseball owners were concemed that the
original bill reported by the Senate Judiciary
Committee might not adequately protect their
interests. Specifically, the minor league clubs
were concemed that the original version of S.
53 was not sufficiently clear to preserve anti-
trust protection for (1) the relationship be-
tween the major league clubs and the minor
league clubs and (2) those work rules and em-
ployment terms that arguably affect both major
league and minor league baseball players.
Members of Congress agreed that this nar-
row legislation should not hurt the grass roots
minor league baseball played in over 150
towns across the country. For that reason, the
minor league clubs were invited into the dis-
cussion and given an opportunity to suggest
changes to address their concems, and those
changes have been incorporated.
As a result of these three-way negotiations,
the parties agreed to amend the bill in several
significant ways. These amendments clarify
the limited reach of the bill and the expansive
nature of the continued protection the bill af-
fords to minor league baseball. For instance,
to accommodate the concems of the minor
league clubs, subsection (b) of the new sec-
tion 27 of the Clayton Act was changed by
adding the word "directly" immediately before
the phrase "relating to or affecting employ-
ment" and the phrase "major league players"
was added before the phrase "to play base-
ball." These changes were made to ensure
that neither major league players nor minor
league players could use new subsection (a)
to attack conduct, acts, practices, or agree-
ments designed to apply to minor league em-
ployment.
In addition, new subsection (c) was added
to clarify that only major league players could
sue under the new subsection (a). Again, the
minor leagues were concemed that, without a
narrow standing section, minor league players
or amateurs might attempt to attack minor
league issues by asserting that these issues
also indirectly affected major league employ-
ment terms.
Therefore. the naw subsection (c) carefully
limits the zone of persons protected by the bill
to only major league players by providing that
"only a major league baseball player has
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standing to sue under" this limited antitrust
legislatin. The standing provision gives major
league baseball players the same right o sue
under the antitrust laws over the major league
employment ters that other professional ath-
letes have. Of course, the United States has
standing to sue to enjoin all antitrust violations
under 15 U.S.C §§4 and 25, and we do not
intend subsection 27(c) to limit hat broad au-
thoety.
This bill does not affect the application of
the antitrust laws to anyone outside the busi
ness of baseball. In particular, it does not af-
fect the application of the anhtrust laws to
other professional sports. The law with respect
to the other professional sports remains ex-
actly the same after this bill becomes law.
Because we are talking about baseball, let
me tip my cap to my good friend, the Ranking
Member of the Judiciary Committee, JOHN
CONYERS. Mr. CONYERs has his own bill on
this topic, H.R. 21, and he has led the charge
on this issue in the House. I want to thank him
for his outstanding work in bringing this bill to
fruition,
I also want to thank my friends Senators
ORRIN HArCH and PAT LEAHY. the Chairman
and Ranking Member of the Senate Judiciary
Committee. They worked many long hours to
negotiate the delicate compromise that this bill
embodies. We are also indebted to them for
their outstanding efforts in bringing this bill to
passage.
Mr Speaker, I am delighted to support this
simple, but important, bll, and I ask my col-
leagues to do the same. At this point, I will re-
same the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of
my time.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield
myself such time as I may consume.
(Mr. CONYERS asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, this
Curt Flood Act is an important piece of
legislation. I thank the gentleman
from Illinois (Chairman HYDE) for his
very charitable comments. As two
baseball aficionados, we know that the
right thing is being done as we move
this to finality.
Professional baseball is the only in-
dustry in the United States exempt
from the antitrust laws without being
subject to regulatory supervision. This
circumstance has resulted from a rath-
er sorry Supreme Court decision in 1922
holding that baseball did not involve
interstate commerce and was beyond
the reach of antitrust laws.
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For some reason, we in the Congress
have failed to rectify this, despite sub-
sequent court decisions holding that
all the other professional sports were
fully subject to these same laws that
baseball claimed to be exempt from.
There may have been a time when
baseball's unique treatment was a
source of pride and distinction for
many loyal fans who loved our national
pastime. But with baseball suffering
more work stoppages over the last cen-
tury than all the other sports com-
bined. including a 1994 strike which
ended the possibility of a world series
for the first time in 90 years, and de-
priving many of our cities of tens of
millions of dollars in tax revenues, we
can now no longer afford to treat pro-
fessional baseball in a manner enjoyed
by no other professional sport. And
that is what S. 53 and H.R. 21 attempt
to do.
I am very pleased to be a major spon-
sor of this legislation, because con-
cerns have been previously raised that
by repealing the antitrust exemption
we would somehow be disrupting the
operation of the minor leagues. That'
my colleagues will remember, was the
defense that was always raised. An
ugly specter. Or professional baseball's
ability to limit franchise relocation
might also occur. This legislation care-
fully eliminates these matters from
the scope of new antitrust coverage.
In the past, some of us in this body
objected to legislating in this area be-
cause of their hesitancy to take any
action which could impact an ongoing
labor dispute. But because the owners
and the players have recently agreed to
enter into a new collective bargaining
agreement, that objection no longer ex-
ists. Additionally, the baseball owners
are now in full support of this legisla-
tion, as of course the Major League
Players Association has always been.
This bill was introduced by myself in
honor of a very courageous and beau-
tiful ball player, center fielder. Curt
Flood, who passed away earlier this
year. in January, and. unfortunately, is
no longer with us to see the fruit of his
work. Mr. Flood, one of the greatest
players of his time, risked his career
when he challenged baseball's reserve
clause after he was traded from the St.
Louis Cardinals to the Philadelphia
Phillies. Although the Supreme Court
rejected the 1972 challenge of Flood, we
all owe a debt of gratitude for his will-
ingness to challenge the baseball oli-
garchy. And he paid the price, too.
By the way, at his funeral in Califor
nia, George Will, perhaps the supreme
baseball nut of all, was there, and Rev-
erend Jesse Jackson. Senior was there
as well. It was a very touching event.
Now, this bill has gone through many
changes over the years and was intro-
duced originally in the 103rd Congress
by our former beloved member of the
Judiciary, Mike Synar, of Oklahoma.
In order to address the concern of the
minor leagues. it contains many
redundancies and, accordingly, a court
may have questions about how the pro-
visions of this bill will interrelate. Any
court facing such questions would be
advised, if I may dare suggest, to re-
turn to the purpose section of the bill
for aid and interpretation. The purpose
section states what Congress intends;
that is, that it is no longer subject to
question that major league baseball
players have the same rights under
antitrust laws as do other professional
athletes.
This is a simple proposition, yet it is
indeed startling that 26 years after this
brave and eloquent player, Curt Flood,
stood alone before the Supreme Court
October 7, 1998
to seek an answer to a question whose
answer seemed obvious to him, that it
is only just now being addressed by
this branch of government. I am very
proud of the Congress for this.
If a court has any doubt as to the
meaning or purpose of any prevision of
this act, it should be guided by our pur-
pose. which is. at long last, to give the
answer that Mr. Flood indeed knew to
be the correct one. The legislation is
not intended to have an adverse effect
on any ongoing litigation nor intended
to limit the ability of the United
States Government to bring antitrust
actions.
It is overdue. I hope it will be quickly
passed for the good of the game, which
has once again demonstrated why we
love it, why baseball is on a resur-
gence, and we are just delighted that
now that McGwire and Sosa have
brought new enjoyment and life to the
game that we now have this legislation
to accompany it.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of
my time.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5
minutes to the gentleman from Ken-
tucky (Mr. JIM BUNNINC), a member of
Baseball's Hall of Fame.(Mr. BUNNING asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. BUNNING. Mr. Speaker, I thank
the gentleman from Illinois for yield-
ing me this time.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support
of S. 53. the Curt Flood Act, named for
the player who challenged the anti-
trust laws all the way to the Supreme
Court.
Baseball is the only sport, and just
about the only business in America,
that is immune from the antitrust
laws. Because of an outdated supreme
court decision, major league baseball
has been operating under a different
set of rules than everyone else for the
past 75 years. The legislation before us
today is very simple: It provides for a
limited repeal of that exemption when
it comes to labor-management rela-
tions.
Baseball has had big troubles in re-
cent years, and the antitrust exemp-
tion has been the root cause. There has
been eight work stoppages in the last
three decades, and it is no coincidence
that baseball, the only sport that en-joyed such special treatment, has had
more strikes and lockouts than all
other sports combined.
After playing and managing in pro-
fessional baseball for over 25 years, and
serving on the Executive Board of the
Players Association, I know firsthand
how the exemption distorts player-
owner relationships and has contrib-
uted to the turmoil in baseball. The ex-
emption effectively removes a nego-
tiating tool from the labor negotiating
process and forces both sides to play
hardball when it comes to bargaining
over contracts. It removes a way for
the players to push their grievances,
and encourages the owners to take a
hard line and reduces their incentive to
compromise.
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Personally, I think this exemption
should be repealed altogether. Baseball
is a multibillion dollar business that
should have to play by the same rules
as other sports and businesses. The ex-
emption is anti-competitive and anti-
American. But by passing this bill
today. and partially repealing the ex-
emption, we provide another avenue for
the owners and the players to explore
another way to vent steam before call-
ing a strike or staging a lockout.
This is a bipartisan consensus bill
that the Senate passed without opposi-
tion. It is supported by all of the af-
fected parties in baseball, owners. play-
ers. and the minor leagues. Everyone
agrees that it represents a positive step
forward for cur national pastime.
But most importantly, this legisla-
tion represents a win for the fans. Just
4 years ago the players were on strike.
The world series was canceled. Baseball
seemed doomed. But this year, as the
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. CON-
YERS) has said, baseball has had a ren-
aissance. Mark McGwire and Sammy
Sosa thrilled us with the home run
race. The playoffs are more exciting
than ever before. And baseball is back.
Fans are returning to baseball, and
passing this bill today will help ensure
that the game does not spiral back-
wards, down into the abyss of labor
strife. It will help ensure that the fans
are not robbed of their right to the
greatest game ever invented.
Mr. Speaker. I urge strong support
for the bill.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield
myself such time as I may consume.
I neglected to mention that the gen-
tleman from Kentucky (Mr. JIM
BtNNING), Hall of Famer, worked dili-
gently on this bill with myself and the
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. HYDE),
and be was also a Detroit Tiger, where
his greatest playing took place, and we
still claim him, although he represents
the great State of Kentucky. And. Mr.
Speaker, he has a baseball in his hand
now, as we watch.
Mr Speaker, I yield back the balance
of my time.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2
minutes to the gentleman from Arkan-
sas (Mr. HUTCHINSON).
Mr. HUTCHINSON. Mr. Speaker, I
want to thank the chairman for yield-
ing me this time, and I want to thank
the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr.
BUNNING) for signing my baseball and
being such a great baseball hero.
I speak as a fan today. In Arkansas.
we do not have major league baseball
in the State. but we have minor league
baseball and we have a great baseball
tradition. This bill that Is before us has
been agreed to by the players and the
owners, but, more importantly, in my
judgment, it is a bill for the fans. The
fans want to see the boys of summer
out on the field. They want to see them
play ball. This has been a great year
for the fans and we want that to con-
tinue without interruption.
This bill, as has been explained, and
so eloquently by the gentleman from
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Michigan (Mr. CONYERS). and also by
the chairman, provides baseball play-
em with the same rights already af-
forded the National Football League
and the National Basketball Associa-
tion players. So they can act as their
counterparts do in other fields of en-
deavor. But this also recognizes the im-
portance of an antitrust exemption for
certain aspects of the game so team
owners may continue to cooperate on
issues such as league expansion, fran-
chise location and broadcast rights,
without fear of lawsuit. So it protects
and helps minor league baseball that is
important In my State.
Mr. Speaker, baseball is America's
pastime and it is my State's as well.
Arkansas has produced its share of
baseball greats as well, men like Lou
Brock. Dizzy Dean, George Kell, and
Brooks Robinson, all Hall of Famers,
that have made us proud as they have
carried a little bit of Arkansas to the
far corners of this country.
Mr. Speaker, this is a good bill for
baseball, the players and owners alike;
it is a good bill for the fans, and I urge
my colleagues to support it.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker. I yield 2
minutes to the gentleman from New
York (Mr. BOEHLERT).
(Mr. BOEHLERT asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Speaker, I rise
in support of this conference report. I
do so in my capacity as chairman of
the Minor League Baseball Caucus. The
common thread that unites all of us in
this caucus is our love for America's
pastime.
I am a little bit disappointed that the
two gentlemen that preceded me in the
well, the gentleman from Kentucky
(Mr. BUNNING), who is a member of the
Baseball Hall of Fame, when he talked
about the great year of 1998, I am sur-
prised that he, a great Hall of Fame
pitcher, did not mention that David
Wells pitched a perfect game for the
New York Yankees. The gentleman
from Kentucky knows more than most
that good pitching beats good hitting
all the time.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, will the gen-
tleman yield?
Mr. BOEHLERT. I yield to the gen-
tleman from Illinois.
Mr. HYDE. I would like to point out
to the gentleman that the gentleman
from Kentucky (Mr. BUNNING) also
pitched a perfect game when he was in
the major leagues.
Mr. BOEHLERT. Reclaiming my
time, Mr. Speaker, the gentleman is
exactly right, and I was one of the
great fans cheering him on when he
pitched that perfect game.
And my colleague from Arkansas ne-
glected to mention another great Hall
of Famer from his home State. Arky
Vaughn.
The fact of the matter is, one of the
reasons why this settlement was de-
layed was the genuine concern for the
future of minor league baseball. Be-
cause when all is said and done, while
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we are all thrilled by America's pas-
time, most people have to watch it on
television. But across America, 35 mil-
lion fans are going to the ball parks to
see minor league baseball, in places
like Syracuse, New York. and Utica,
New York, and all over America. In To-
ledo, Ohio, the Mudhens. Who can for-
get them.
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It is indeed America's pastime. The
great concern that all of us had was
the preservation of minor league base-
ball. I am pleased to report to my col-
leagues that the minor league baseball
officials have worked cooperatively
and they do endorse this package. It is
good for baseball at all levels.
Mr. LUTHER. Mr. Speaker, in an attempt to
clarify the legislative intent of S. 53, I would
like to place the following Senate colloquy be-
tween Senator PAUL WELLSTONE, Judiciary
Committee Chairman ORRIN HATCH and Rank-
ing Judiciary Committee Member PATRICK
LEAHY in the House record.
CURT PLCD Act o 1998
Mr. WELsTONE. Mr. President, late last
night (July 30, 1998), the Senate passed by
unanimous cosent S. 53. I have been con-
taoted by the Attorney General of my State,
Hubert H. Humphrey III. and asked to try to
clarify a technical legal point about the ef-
feet of this legislation. The State of Min-
nesota. through the office of Attorney Gen-
eral, and the Minnesota Twins are currently
involved in asantitrust-related investiga-
tion. It is my understanding that S. 53 wi
have no impact on this Investigation or any
litigation arising out of the investigation.
Mr. HATCH. That is correct. The bill simply
makes it clear that major league baseball
players have the same rights under the anti-
trust laws as do other professional athletes.
The bill does not change current law in any
other context or with respect to any other
person or entity.
Mr. WELtOsNo. Thank you for that clad-
fication. I also note that several lower courts
have recently found that baseball currently
enjoys only a narrow exemption from anti-
trust laws and that this exemption applies
only to the reserve system. For exaeple, the
Florida Supreme Court in Bttensorth v. Na-
donal League, 644 So.2d 1021 (Fla. 1994), the
U.S. District Court in Pennsylvania in Plazza
v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420
(E.D. Pa. 1993) and a Minnesota State court
in a case involving the Twins have all held
the baseball exemption from antitrust lace
is now limited only to the reserve system. It
Is my understanding that S. 53 will have no
effect on the courts ultimate resolution of
the scope of the antitrust exemption on mat-
ters beyond these related to snerplayer re
latlons at the major league level.
Mr. Hate. That is correct. S. 53 Is In-
tended to have no effect other than to clarify
the status of major league players under the
antitrust laws, With regard to all other con-
text or other persons or entities, the law will
be the same after passage of the Act as it is
today.
Mr. LEAHY. I concur with the satement of
the Chairman of the Committee. The bill af-
fects no pending or decided cases except to
the extent that courts have exempted major
league baseball clubs from the antitrust laws
in their dealings with major league players.
In fact. Section 3 of the legislation makes
clear that the law is unchanged with regard
to issues such as relocation. The bill has no
impact on the recent decisions in federal and
state courts in Florida, Pennsylvania and
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Mitesota concerning baseball's status clubs in the collective bargaining process p- meat this objecin no anger exists, In addi
snder the antitrust laws.Mndr W nitust l sank thveoo., ided by the ronstatatoty labor antitrust en- taon, the bosebal owners are now is full sop-Mr. WELLSTONE. I thank the Senator I calaM rLautom aisusaatie tndss empflon axaisable to aii unions and emplayers. port of this legislation as am the MaoLaumy colleagues ttenti the decisi. o The egiulation is a ooncess becuse it has Payer Associatin.Minnesota Twins v. State by Humphrey, No. 62-
CX 98-568 (Minn. dist. Court. 2d Judicial hes carefally crated to woke clear that onty I originally intoduced the House vemion of
dis.. Ramsey County April 20, 1998) r major teague haobalt player, and n other the bill aa H.R. 21, in honor ut the curageoas
printed in 1998-1 Trade Cases (CCH) tt, party, can bring salt coder this amendment to center holder, Cudt Fid, who passed away
Mr. BILIRAKIS. Mr. Speaker, I rise to sup- the Caon Act. eedier this year on January 21. Mr. Flood, one
port S 53, the Curt Flood Act, which gives This pretion wilt help to ensure the can- of the greatest player uf his time, rished his
major league baseball players the same rights hnaod viahility of minor league hasehall career when he challenged baseball's rese
other professional athletes have under anti- Minor league baseball owners mere coo clase after he was traded from the St. toxin
trust laws seed that any legislahio presere the antr Cerdinals to the Philadelphia Fhritrus. Although
As a longbme proponent of lifting baseball's twut protections for the historic relationship the Supreme Court rejected Floods challenge
antitrust exemption, I have sponsored bills in between the major league clubs and the minor in 1972, we ol awe a debt of gratitude for his
the past to lift this exemption completely as it leue clabs The miner legue owners were willingoeso t  challenge the hosehall oligarchy.
applies to all aspects of baseballs business. particulady concmed ahout the work roles This hilt has gone through mony iteratiurs
Although the bill we are considering now is and terms of employment that tmpacl both over the yeam. beginning with its ftrst enaction
mom limited in scope, it is an important first major leogue and minor league baseball ptay- by the House Judiciary Committo at the and
step in corncting a seven decade-old mistake.m. The language of the hilt guarantee that of the lead Congress. That legislation was in-
Federal antitrust laws prohibit businesses neither major league player nor minor legun traduced by my former colleague Mihe Spoar
from taking actions that "unreasonably" con- Player tas use subsection (a) of new sectio In order to address the conoem of the minor
strain interstate commerce. However, many 27 of the Clayton Act to attack conduct, acts, leagues, it contains many redundancies As-
years ago Major League Baseball was singled practicus or agreements designed to apply cordiogly, a court may hsve quostios about
out for a complete xemption from America's oly to minor leogue employment bow the provsos of this bill interrelato, Any
antitrust laws by the Supreme Court. The I believe tho compromise is saccessful be court facing such qoosttsns would be well-ad-
Court said baseball was an amusement and cauoe it prects minor league bauehll by vised to returo to the purpose sectio of the
not a business, exempting It from antitrust barng minor league players or omuteur play- bill for aid to interpretation. The purpose sec-
laws. This exemption created a monopoly for em from using the antirust laws to attach ton is the statement of what Congress intends
baseball and established artificial barriers to issues unique to the continoed economic set- the handle of works now hnown as the 'Curt
league expansion. It sent the wrong signal to Cess of minor league baseball. Fixed Ant of 1998i to mean-that is, it is no
Americans that baseball did not have to com- Mr. CLAY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong sup longer subject to question that major league
ply with our country's antitrust laws. pert of S. 53, the "Cart Flood Act of 1998." baseball player have the same dghts underIn 1972, the Supreme Court called the situ- This is the Senate counterpart of HR. 21, tee- the antitrust laws as do othr professional th
ion an "anomaly" and an "aberration" which islation I introduced in the oath of the lost two lutes. That is a simple proposition, petit ts In
Congress hould remedy. A 1976 report by Congresses providing far the partial repeal Of deed startling that 26 years after a brave and
the House Select Committee on Professional baseball's antitwus etemption Id like to thank eloquent player stsod atone before the So
Sports concluded that them was no justifica- Chairman Hyde for his leadership in seeing preme Court to seek an answer that waobvi
tion for baseballs special exemption. Unfortu- that this vital ond tong overdue legislation 008 to him, it is only now being addressed di
nately, no action was ever taken. reached the House Floor. rectly by any branch of the United Statex gon
Mr Speaker, baseball has seen a resur- Professinl baseball Ie the only industry in ement It a court ban any doubt as to the
gence since the dark days of the 1994 strike. the United States exempt from antitrust laws meaning or porpose of any provision of this
Who can forget Cal Ripkens triumphant lap without being subject to alternative r gulatory new Act, it should te guided by our purpose
around Camden Yards after breaking Lou superuisio. Thts circumstance resulted twom which is 01 long lost to give the answer Mr.
Gehdg's Iron Man streak of consecutive an erroneos 1922 Supreme Court decision Flood knew to ho the correct one. This legisla
games played? Or the incredible home run holding that baseball did oot involve 'Interstate lion is not intended to have any adverse effect
chase this year between Mark McGwire and commerce' and moo therefore beyond the on any ongoing litigaton or is it intended to
Sammy Sosa that culminated in both players rach of the atihust laws. Congress has limit the ability of the United States to bring
smashing the thirty-seven-year home run failed to ovetro this decion despite sabse- antitrast actons.
record held by Roger Mans? quent noon docisions holding thot the other Mr. Speoher, this bill is long overdue. I hope
I fel immense personal pride when I professioal sports were folly subject to the the House will act qoichly tu pass it for the
watched my hometown team, the Tampa Say antitrust laws. good of the game, which has once again duo-
Devil Rays, take the field for their inaugural There may hava been a tme when base- enstrated why we Iova it, and for the good of
season at Tropicana field. The debut of a ball' unque treatment was a source of pride the fans, who deee to enjoy the notional
major league team in the Tampa-St. Peters- and distinctioo for the many loyal fans wto pastime without the continuous interruptious
burg area was delayed for years because bond cur nat'onal pastime, hut with baseball that bane became nearly as predictuble and
Major League Baseball did not have to abide suffedig more work stoppages user the last plentdul, as Mctwim or Sos home moo.
by our nation's antitrust laws. 2e eare than all of the ether professional Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I have no
I urge my colleagues to support S. 53 be- sports cambioed-ircladng the 1994-95 strke further requsts for cloe, and I yield
cause it makes baseball ive by the same laws which ended the possibility of a Word Series bunt the balance of cy time.
as the fans who sit in the bleachers. It tells for the int time in fi year end depdnvd our The SPEAKER pro remyore (Mr.
baseball fans that competition and fairness in cties of thoosands Of lobs and millions of dol GtTtNncH'). The questiun is on the
baseball boardrooms is just as important as it em in too rexerues-we can no longer afford cation offered by thu gentlemen from
is on the field. Let's give America its game to treat professional baseball in u monner en Illinois (Mr. HYDE) that the House sus-
back. joed by no ether professional sport. pond the rates and pass the Senate hilt.
Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Speaker, the legislation Bemuse coocamo have prexiously been S.5ha
before us today is the result of a negotiation ratsed that by repealiog the antirust ecemp- The question was taken: and (to-
resulting in a compromise among the union tiu we could somehow he riruptig the op- thirds having voted in favor thereof)
that represents major league players, the own-stadon of the minor leagues, or professosal the rles mere suspended aid the Sun-
ers of major league baseball clubs, and by the haseball's ability to limit franchise relocation, ate hilt was passed.
owners of minor league baseball teams affill- the legislation carefuly eliminates these mat- A cation to reconsider was laid on
ated with major league clubs. The compromise ters from the soope of the rem antitrust 000 cabin. J
addresses only the limited area of the labor erage.
relations of major league players at the major In thn post some in Congress had objected
league level. The bill does not affect any other to legislahig in this area becuse of their hesi SONNY BONO COPYRaGHT TEEM
aspect of the organized baseball exemption. luncy to lobe any action which could topont EXTENSION ACT
Also, the legislation does not change in any the ongoing labor dispute. But because the Mr. SENSENEEENNEE. Mr. Speak-
way the antitrust exempt-o for the major o-oem and players hnve recently agreed to ar, t move to suspend the rates and
league players union or the major league ester into a new collective bargaining agree- pass the Senate hil (S. t5) to amend
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Section 107 requires that the Secretary of
State grant U.S. citizens access to U.S. mis-
sions abroad for religious activities on a basis
no less favorable than that for other non-
governmental activities unrelated to the con-
duct of the diplomatic mission. State Depart-
ment policy already allows U.S. Government
mission employees access to U.S. facilities for
religious services in environments where
such services are not available locally. The
extension of this practice to U.S. citizens who
generally enjoy no privileges and immunities
in the host state has the potential to create
conflicts with host country laws and to impair
the ability of U.S. missions to function effec-
tively. Care also must be taken to ensure that
this provision is implemented consistent with
the First Amendment. Accordingly, I have
asked the Department of State to prepare
guidance to clarify the scope of this provision
and the grounds on which mission premises
are generally available to nongovernmental
organizations.
Finally, I will interpret the Act's exception
in section 405(d) concerning the provision of
medicines, food, or other humanitarian as-
sistance to apply to any loam, loan guaran-
tees, extensions of credit, issuance of letters
of credit, or other financing measures nec-
essary or incidental to the sale of such goods.
Additionally, I will interpret the license re-
quirements in section 423 regarding speci-
fied items to apply only to countries of par-
ticular concern.
William J. Clinton
The White House,
October 27, 1998.
NOTE: H.R. 2431, approved October 27, was as-
signed Public Law No. 105-292. An original was
not available for verification of the content of this
statement.
legislation is the successful culmination of bi-
partisan efforts to treat employment matters
with respect to Major League Baseball play-
ers under the antitrust laws in the same way
such matters are treated for athletes in other
professional sports.
It is especially fitting that this legislation
honors a courageous baseball player and indi-
vidual, the late Curt Flood, whose enormous
talents on the baseball diamond were
matched by his courage off the field. It was
29 years ago this month that Curt Flood re-
fused a trade from the St. Louis Cardinals
to the Philadelphia Phillies. His bold stand
set in motion the events that culminate in
the bill I have signed into law.
The Act appropriately limits baseball's spe-
cial judicially created antitrust exemption by
expressly applying the antitrust laws to cer-
tain conduct of Major League Baseball; the
applicability of the antitrust laws with respect
to all other conduct is unchanged. The Act
in no way codifies or extends the baseball
exemption and would not affect the applica-
bility of those laws to certain matters that,
it has been argued, the exemption would le-
gitimately protect (including franchise relo-
cation rules and the minor leagues).
The Act does not in any way limit the
standing of the United States to bring an
antitrust action. The antitrust laws protect
the public's interest in the efficient operation
of the free market system, thereby protecting
consumers, and the United States has stand-
ing to sue to enjoin all violations.
It is sound policy to treat the employment
matters of Major League Baseball players
under the antitrust laws in the same way such
matters are treated for athletes in other pro-
fessional sports.
Willian J. Clinton
-1 The White House,
Istatement on Signing the Curt Flood Cctober27,1998.
Act of 1998
October27, 1998 NOTE: S. 53, approve
Today I am pleased to have signed into
law S. 53, the "Curt Flood Act of 1998." This
-I
ed October 27, was assigned
Public Law No. 105-297. An original was not
available for verification of the content of this
statement.
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To require the general application of the antitrust laws to major league
baseball, and for other purposes.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
JANUARY 21, 1997
Mr. HATCH (for himself, Mr. LEAHY, Mr. THURMOND, and Mr. MoyNIHAN)
introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the
Committee on the Judiciary
A BILL
To require the general application of the antitrust laws to
major league baseball, and for other purposes.
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 tives of the United States ofAmerica in Congress assembled,
3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
4 This Act may be cited as the "Curt Flood Act of
5 1997".
6 SEC. 2. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO PRO-
7 FESSIONAL MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL.
8 The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) is amended
9 by adding at the end the following new section:
2"SEC. 27. (a) Subject to subsection (b), the antitrust
laws shall apply to the business of professional major
league baseball.
"(b) Nothing in this section shall be construed to af-
5 feet
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
"(1) the applicability or nonapplicability of the
antitrust laws to the amateur draft of professional
baseball, the minor league reserve clause, the agree-
ment between professional major league baseball
teams and teams of the National Association of
Baseball, commonly known as the 'Professional
Baseball Agreement', or any other matter relating to
the minor leagues;
"(2) the applicability or nonapplicability of the
antitrust laws to any restraint by professional base-
ball on franchise relocation; or
"(3) the application of Public Law 87-331 (15
U.S.C. 1291 et seq.) (commonly known as the
'Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961').".
0
1
2
3
4
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[Report No. 105-118]
To require the general application of the antitrust laws to major league
baseball, and for other purposes.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
JANuARY 21, 1997
Mr. HATCH (for himself, Mr. LEAHY, Mr. THURMOND, and Mr. MOYNIHAN)
introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the
Committee on the Judiciary
OCTOBER 29, 1997
Reported by M.r. HATcH, with an amendment
[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed in italic]
A BILL
To require the general application of the antitrust laws to
major league baseball, and for other purposes.
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3 SEGTION i SHORT TITLE.
4 This At my be eit-ed as the "GC t Fleed Aet ef
5 1-997"-
2
1 SEC. -2 APPLGATIO OF THE MANTRUST LAWS TO PRO-
2 FESSIONAL MAJOR LEAGUE EASEwALLn
3 The Glayten Aet +5 USG- 2 et seeq is amended
4 by adding at the end the following new seetiomt
5 "Se 2- (-a Subjeet to subseetion {-b- the antitrast
6 laws shall apply t-o the business of professional major
7 league basebal-
8 {b Nothing in this seetion shall be eonstr'ued to f-
9 feet-
10 "(1) the applicabilt or nonapplicability of the
11 entitms laws t-o the anatenr draft f professional
12 baseball the miner league reserve elase the agree-
13 ient between professional maaor league baseball
14 teams and teamus of the National Asseeiatien f
15 Baseball; eemmenly knmwn as the 'Professional
16 Baseball Ag#eement', or any ether matter relating to
17 the iner leagues,
18 "-)the applicabili r-nonapplicabiliy ef the
19 entitrast laws to any restraint by professional base-
20 ball n fra-nehise reloeation; or
21 l-'} the applieation of Publie Law 87 331 (1-
22 -- S07 1291 et seq. feonizatly known as t-he
23 ASpes Broadestinig Aet of 19 61').".
24 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
25 This Act may be cited as the "Curt Mood Act of 1997".
3
1 SEC. 2. PURPOSE.
2 It is the purpose of this legislation to clarify that
3 major league baseball players are covered under the anti-
4 trust laws (i.e., that major league players will have the same
5 rights under the antitrust laws as do other professional ath-
6 letes, e.g., football and basketball players), along with a pro-
7 vision that makes it clear that the passage of this Act does
8 not change the application of the antitrust laws in any
9 other context or with respect to any other person or entity.
10 SEC. 3. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO PROFES-
11 SIONAL MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL.
12 The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) is amended by
13 adding at the end the following new section:
14 "SEc. 27. (a) The conduct, acts, practices, or agree-
15 ments of persons in the business of organized professional
16 major league baseball relating to or affecting employment
17 to play baseball at the major league level are subject to the
18 antitrust laws to the same extent such conduct, acts, prac-
19 tices, or agreements would be subject to the antitrust laws
20 if engaged in by persons in any other professional sports
21 business affecting interstate commerce: Provided, however,
22 That nothing in this subsection shall be construed as pro-
23 viding the basis for any negative inference regarding the
24 caselaw concerning the applicability of the antitrust laws
25 to minor league baseball.
41 "(b) Nothing contained in subsection (a) of this section
2 shall be deemed to change the application of the antitrust
3 laws to the conduct, acts, practices, or agreements by, be-
4 tween, or among persons engaging in, conducting, or par-
5 ticipating in the business of organized professional baseball,
6 except the conduct, acts, practices, or agreements to which
7 subsection (a) of this section shall apply. More specifically,
8 but not by way of limitation, this section shall not be
9 deemed to change the application of the antitrust laws to-
10 "(1) the organized professional baseball amateur
11 draft, the reserve clause as applied to minor league
12 players, the agreement between organized professional
13 major league baseball teams and the teams of the Na-
14 tional Association of Professional Baseball Leagues,
15 commonly known as the 'Professional Baseball Agree-
16 ment', the relationship between organized professional
17 major league baseball and organized professional
18 minor league baseball, or any other matter relating to
19 professional organized baseball's minor leagues;
20 "(2) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements
21 of persons in the business of organized professional
22 baseball relating to franchise expansion, location or
23 relocation, franchise ownership issues, including own-
24 ership transfers, and the relationship between the Of-
25 fice of the Commissioner and franchise owners;
5
1 "(3) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements
2 protected by Public Law 87-331 (15 U.S.C. 1291 et
3 seq.) (commonly known as the 'Sports Broadcasting
4 Act of 1961'); or
5 "(4) the relationship between persons in the busi-
6 ness of organized professional baseball and umpires or
7 other individuals who are employed in the business of
8 organized professional baseball by such persons.
9 "(c) As used in this section, 'persons' means any indi-
10 vidual, partnership, corporation, or unincorporated asso-
11 ciation or any combination or association thereof ".
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105TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION S 5
AN ACT
To require the general application of the antitrust laws to
major league baseball, and for other purposes.
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 tives of the United States ofAmerica in Congress assembled,
3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
4 This Act may be cited as the "Curt Flood Act of
5 1998".
2
1 SEC. 2. PURPOSE.
2 It is the purpose of this legislation to state that major
3 league baseball players are covered under the antitrust
4 laws (i.e., that major league baseball players will have the
5 same rights under the antitrust laws as do other profes-
6 sional athletes, e.g., football and basketball players), along
7 with a provision that makes it clear that the passage of
8 this Act does not change the application of the antitrust
9 laws in any other context or with respect to any other per-
10 son or entity.
11 SEC. 3. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO PRO-
12 FESSIONAL MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL.
13 The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 12 et seq.) is amended
14 by adding at the end the following new section:
15 "SEC. 27. (a) Subject to subsections (b) through (d),
16 the conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons in
17 the business of organized professional major league base-
18 ball directly relating to or affecting employment of major
19 league baseball players to play baseball at the major
20 league level are subject to the antitrust laws to the same
21 extent such conduct, acts, practices, or agreements would
22 be subject to the antitrust laws if engaged in by persons
23 in any other professional sports business affecting inter-
24 state connerce.
25 "(b) No court shall rely on the enactment of this see-
26 tion as a basis for changing the application of the anti-
3
1 trust laws to any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements
2 other than those set forth in subsection (a). This section
3 does not create, permit or imply a cause of action by which
4 to challenge under the antitrust laws, or otherwise apply
5 the antitrust laws to, any conduct, acts, practices, or
6 agreements that do not directly relate to or affect employ-
7 ment of major league baseball players to play baseball at
8 the major league level, including but not limited to-
9 "(1) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements
10 of persons engaging in, conducting or participating
11 in the business of organized professional baseball re-
12 lating to or affecting employment to play baseball at
13 the minor league level, any organized professional
14 baseball amateur or first-year player draft, or any
15 reserve clause as applied to minor league players;
16 "(2) the agreement between organized profes-
17 sional major league baseball teams and the teams of
18 the National Association of Professional Baseball
19 Leagues, commonly known as the 'Professional
20 Baseball Agreement', the relationship between orga-
21 nized professional major league baseball and orga-
22 nized professional minor league baseball, or any
23 other matter relating to organized professional base-
24 ball's minor leagues;
4
1 "(3) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements
2 of persons engaging in, conducting or participating
3 in the business of organized professional baseball re-
4 lating to or affecting franchise expansion, location or
5 relocation, franchise ownership issues, including
6 ownership transfers, the relationship between the Of-
7 fice of the Commissioner and franchise owners, the
8 marketing or sales of the entertainment product of
9 organized professional baseball and the licensing of
10 intellectual property rights owned or held by orga-
11 nized professional baseball teams individually or col-
12 lectively;
13 "(4) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements
14 protected by Public Law 87-331 (15 U.S.C. § 1291
15 et seq.) (commonly known as the 'Sports Broadcast-
16 ing Act of 1961');
17 "(5) the relationship between persons in the
18 business of organized professional baseball and unm-
19 pires or other individuals who are employed in the
20 business of organized professional baseball by such
21 persons; or
22 "(6) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements
23 of persons not in the business of organized profes-
24 sional major league baseball.
5
1 "(c) Only a major league baseball player has standing
2 to sue under this section. For the purposes of this section,
3 a major league baseball player is-
4 "(1) a person who is a party to a major league
5 player's contract, or is playing baseball at the major
6 league level; or
7 "(2) a person who was a party to a major
8 league player's contract or playing baseball at the
9 major league level at the time of the injury that is
10 the subject of the complaint; or
11 "(3) a person who has been a party to a major
12 league player's contract or who has played baseball
13 at the major league level, and who claims he has
14 been injured in his efforts to secure a subsequent
15 major league player's contract by an alleged viola-
16 tion of the antitrust laws: Provided however, That
17 for the purposes of this paragraph, the alleged anti-
18 trust violation shall not include any conduct, acts,
19 practices, or agreements of persons in the business
20 of organized professional baseball relating to or af-
21 fecting employment to play baseball at the minor
22 league level, including any organized professional
23 baseball amateur or first-year player draft, or any
24 reserve clause as applied to minor league players; or
6
1 "(4) a person who was a party to a major
2 league player's contract or who was playing baseball
3 at the major league level at the conclusion of the
4 last full championship season immediately preceding
5 the expiration of the last collective bargaining agree-
6 ment between persons in the business of organized
7 professional major league baseball and the exclusive
8 collective bargaining representative of major league
9 baseball players.
10 "(d)(1) As used in this section, 'person' means any
11 entity, including an individual, partnership, corporation,
12 trust or unincorporated association or any combination or
13 association thereof. As used in this section, the National
14 Association of Professional Baseball Leagues, its member
15 leagues and the clubs of those leagues, are not 'in the busi-
16 ness of organized professional major league baseball'.
17 "(2) In cases involving conduct, acts, practices, or
18 agreements that directly relate to or affect both employ-
19 ment of major league baseball players to play baseball at
20 the major league level and also relate to or affect any other
21 aspect of organized professional baseball, including but
22 not limited to employment to play baseball at the minor
23 league level and the other areas set forth in subsection
24 (b) above, only those components, portions or aspects of
25 such conduct, acts, practices, or agreements that directly
71 relate to or affect employment of major league players to
2 play baseball at the major league level may be challenged
3 under subsection (a) and then only to the extent that they
4 directly relate to or affect employment of major league
5 baseball players to play baseball at the major league level.
6 "(3) As used in subsection (a), interpretation of the
7 term 'directly' shall not be governed by any interpretation
8 of section 151 et seq. of title 29, United States Code (as
9 amended).
10 "(4) Nothing in this section shall be construed to af-
11 feet the application to organized professional baseball of
12 the nonstatutory labor exemption from the antitrust laws.
13 "(5) The scope of the conduct, acts, practices, or
14 agreements covered by subsection (b) shall not be strictly
15 or narrowly construed.".
Passed the Senate July 30, 1998.
Attest:
Secretary.
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I105TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION S 5
LN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
JULY 31, 1998
Referred to the Committee on the Judiciary
AN ACT
To require the general application of the antitrust laws to
major league baseball, and for other purposes.
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
4 This Act may be cited as the "Curt Flood Act of
5 1998".
2
1 SEC. 2. PURPOSE.
2 It is the purpose of this legislation to state that major
3 league baseball players are covered under the antitrust
4 laws (i.e., that major league baseball players will have the
5 same rights under the antitrust laws as do other profes-
6 sional athletes, e.g., football and basketball players), along
7 with a provision that makes it clear that the passage of
8 this Act does not change the application of the antitrust
9 laws in any other context or with respect to any other per-
10 son or entity.
11 SEC. 3. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO PRO-
12 FESSIONAL MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL.
13 The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 12 et seq.) is amended
14 by adding at the end the following new section:
15 "SEc. 27. (a) Subject to subsections (b) through (d),
16 the conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons in
17 the business of organized professional major league base-
18 ball directly relating to or affecting employment of major
19 league baseball players to play baseball at the major
20 league level are subject to the antitrust laws to the same
21 extent such conduct, acts, practices, or agreements would
22 be subject to the antitrust laws if engaged in by persons
23 in any other professional sports business affecting inter-
24 state commerce.
25 "(b) No court shall rely on the enactment of this sec-
26 tion as a basis for changing the application of the anti-
3
1 trust laws to any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements
2 other than those set forth in subsection (a). This section
3 does not create, permit or imply a cause of action by which
4 to challenge under the antitrust laws, or otherwise apply
5 the antitrust laws to, any conduct, acts, practices, or
6 agreements that do not directly relate to or affect employ-
7 ment of major league baseball players to play baseball at
8 the major league level, including but not limited to-
9 "(1) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements
10 of persons engaging in, conducting or participating
11 in the business of organized professional baseball re-
12 lating to or affecting employment to play baseball at
13 the minor league level, any organized professional
14 baseball amateur or first-year player draft, or any
15 reserve clause as applied to minor league players;
16 "(2) the agreement between organized profes-
17 sional major league baseball teams and the teams of
18 the National Association of Professional Baseball
19 Leagues, commonly known as the 'Professional
20 Baseball Agreement', the relationship between orga-
21 nized professional major league baseball and orga-
22 nized professional minor league baseball, or any
23 other matter relating to organized professional base-
24 ball's minor leagues;
41 "(3) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements
2 of persons engaging in, conducting or participating
3 in the business of organized professional baseball re-
4 lating to or affecting franchise expansion, location or
5 relocation, franchise ownership issues, including
6 ownership transfers, the relationship between the Of-
7 fice of the Commissioner and franchise owners, the
8 marketing or sales of the entertainment product of
9 organized professional baseball and the licensing of
10 intellectual property rights owned or held by orga-
11 nized professional baseball teams individually or col-
12 lectively;
13 "(4) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements
14 protected by Public Law 87-331 (15 U.S.C. § 1291
15 et seq.) (commonly known as the 'Sports Broadcast-
16 ing Act of 1961');
17 "(5) the relationship between persons in the
18 business of organized professional baseball and um-
19 pires or other individuals who are employed in the
20 business of organized professional baseball by such
21 persons; or
22 "(6) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements
23 of persons not in the business of organized profes-
24 sional major league baseball.
5
1 "(c) Only a major league baseball player has standing
2 to sue under this section. For the purposes of this section,
3 a major league baseball player is-
4 "(1) a person who is a party to a major league
5 player's contract, or is playing baseball at the major
6 league level; or
7 "(2) a person who was a party to a major
8 league player's contract or playing baseball at the
9 major league level at the time of the injury that is
10 the subject of the complaint; or
11 "(3) a person who has been a party to a major
12 league player's contract or who has played baseball
13 at the major league level, and who claims he has
14 been injured in his efforts to secure a subsequent
15 major league player's contract by an alleged viola-
16 tion of the antitrust laws: Provided however, That
17 for the purposes of this paragraph, the alleged anti-
18 trust violation shall not include any conduct, acts,
19 practices, or agreements of persons in the business
20 of organized professional baseball relating to or af-
21 fecting employment to play baseball at the minor
22 league level, including any organized professional
23 baseball amateur or first-year player draft, or any
24 reserve clause as applied to minor league players; or
6
1 "(4) a person who was a party to a major
2 league player's contract or who was playing baseball
3 at the major league level at the conclusion of the
4 last full championship season immediately preceding
5 the expiration of the last collective bargaining agree-
6 ment between persons in the business of organized
7 professional major league baseball and the exclusive
8 collective bargaining representative of major league
9 baseball players.
10 "(d)(1) As used in this section, 'person' means any
11 entity, including an individual, partnership, corporation,
12 trust or unincorporated association or any combination or
13 association thereof. As used in this section, the National
14 Association of Professional Baseball Leagues, its member
15 leagues and the clubs of those leagues, are not 'in the busi-
16 ness of organized professional major league baseball'.
17 "(2) In cases involving conduct, acts, practices, or
18 agreements that directly relate to or affect both employ-
19 ment of major league baseball players to play baseball at
20 the major league level and also relate to or affect any other
21 aspect of organized professional baseball, including but
22 not limited to employment to play baseball at the minor
23 league level and the other areas set forth in subsection
24 (b) above, only those components, portions or aspects of
25 such conduct, acts, practices, or agreements that directly
7
1 relate to or affect employment of major league players to
2 play baseball at the major league level may be challenged
3 under subsection (a) and then only to the extent that they
4 directly relate to or affect employment of major league
5 baseball players to play baseball at the major league level.
6 "(3) As used in subsection (a), interpretation of the
7 term 'directly' shall not be governed by any interpretation
8 of section 151 et seq. of title 29, United States Code (as
9 amended).
10 "(4) Nothing in this section shall be construed to af-
11 feet the application to organized professional baseball of
12 the nonstatutory labor exemption from the antitrust laws.
13 "(5) The scope of the conduct, acts, practices, or
14 agreements covered by subsection (b) shall not be strictly
15 or narrowly construed.".
Passed the Senate July 30, 1998.
Attest: GARY SISCO,
Secretary.
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of the
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Begun and held at the City of Washington on Tuesday,
the twenty-seventh day ofJanuary, one thousand nine hundred and ninety-eight
2n 21t
To require the general application of the antitrust laws to major league baseball,
and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States ofAmerica in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the "Curt Flood Act of 1998".
SEC. 2. PURPOSE.
It is the purpose of this legislation to state that major league
baseball players are covered under the antitrust laws (i.e., that
major league baseball players will have the same rights under
the antitrust laws as do other professional athletes, e.g., football
and basketball players), along with a provision that makes it clear
that the passage of this Act does not change the application of
the antitrust laws in any other context or with respect to any
other person or entity.
SEC. 3. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO PROFESSIONAL
MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL.
The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 12 et seq.) is amended by adding
at the end the following new section:
"SEC. 27. (a) Subject to subsections (b) through (d), the conduct,
acts, practices, or agreements of persons in the business of organized
professional major league baseball directly relating to or affecting
employment of major league baseball players to play baseball at
the major league level are subject to the antitrust laws to the
same extent such conduct, acts, practices, or agreements would
be subject to the antitrust laws if engaged in by persons in any
other professional sports business affecting interstate commerce.
"(b) No court shall rely on the enactment of this section as
a basis for changing the application of the antitrust laws to any
conduct, acts, practices, or agreements other than those set forth
in subsection (a). This section does not create, permit or imply
a cause of action by which to challenge under the antitrust laws,
or otherwise apply the antitrust laws to, any conduct, acts, practices,
or agreements that do not directly relate to or affect employment
of major league baseball players to play baseball at the major
league level, including but not limited to--
"(1) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons
engaging in, conducting or participating in the business of
organized professional baseball relating to or affecting employ-
ment to play baseball at the minor league level, any organized
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professional baseball amateur or first-year player draft, or any
reserve clause as applied to minor league players;
"(2) the agreement between organized professional major
league baseball teams and the teams of the National Association
of Professional Baseball Leagues, commonly known as the
'Professional Baseball Agreement', the relationship between
organized professional major league baseball and organized
professional minor league baseball, or any other matter relating
to organized professional baseball's minor leagues;
"(3) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons
engaging in, conducting or participating in the business of
organized professional baseball relating to or affecting franchise
expansion, location or relocation, franchise ownership issues,
including ownership transfers, the relationship between the
Office of the Commissioner and franchise owners, the marketing
or sales of the entertainment product of organized professional
baseball and the licensing of intellectual property rights owned
or held by organized professional baseball teams individually
or collectively;
"(4) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements protected
by Public Law 87-331 (15 U.S.C. § 1291 et seq.) (commonly
known as the 'Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961');
"(5) the relationship between persons in the business of
organized professional baseball and umpires or other individ-
uals who are employed in the business of organized professional
baseball by such persons; or
"(6) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons
not in the business of organized professional major league
baseball.
"(c) Only a major league baseball player has standing to sue
under this section. For the purposes of this section, a major league
baseball player is-
"(1) a person who is a party to a major league player's
contract, or is playing baseball at the major league level; or
"(2) a person who was a party to a major league player's
contract or playing baseball at the major league level at the
time of the injury that is the subject of the complaint; or
"(3) a person who has been a party to a major league
player's contract or who has played baseball at the major league
level, and who claims he has been injured in his efforts to
secure a subsequent major league player's contract by an
alleged violation of the antitrust laws: Provided however, That
for the purposes of this paragraph, the alleged antitrust viola-
tion shall not include any conduct, acts, practices, or agree-
ments of persons in the business of organized professional
baseball relating to or affecting employment to play baseball
at the minor league level, including any organized professional
baseball amateur or first-year player draft, or any reserve
clause as applied to minor league players; or
"(4) a person who was a party to a major league player's
contract or who was playing baseball at the major league level
at the conclusion of the last full championship season imme-
diately preceding the expiration of the last collective bargaining
agreement between persons in the business of organized profes-
sional major league baseball and the exclusive collective
bargaining representative of major league baseball players.
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"(d)(1) As used in this section, 'person' means any entity, includ-
ing an individual, partnership, corporation, trust or unincorporated
association or any combination or association thereof. As used in
this section, the National Association of Professional Baseball
Leagues, its member leagues and the clubs of those leagues, are
not 'in the business of organized professional major league baseball'.
"(2) In cases involving conduct, acts, practices, or agreements
that directly relate to or affect both employment of major league
baseball players to play baseball at the major league level and
also relate to or affect any other aspect of organized professional
baseball, including but not limited to employment to play baseball
at the minor league level and the other areas set forth in subsection
(b), only those components, portions or aspects of such conduct,
acts, practices, or agreements that directly relate to or affect
employment of major league players to play baseball at the major
league level may be challenged under subsection (a) and then only
to the extent that they directly relate to or affect employment
of major league baseball players to play baseball at the major
league level.
"(3) As used in subsection (a), interpretation of the term
'directly' shall not be governed by any interpretation of section
151 et seq. of title 29, United States Code (as amended).
"(4) Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the
application to organized professional baseball of the nonstatutory
labor exemption from the antitrust laws.
"(5) The scope of the conduct, acts, practices, or agreements
covered by subsection (b) shall not be strictly or narrowly con-
strued.".
Speaker of the House of Representatives.
Vice President of the United States and
President of the Senate.
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HR 3368 IH
102d CONGRESS
1st Session
H. R. 3368
To allow Major League Baseball teams in smaller markets to compete financially with teams in larger
markets.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
September 19, 1991
Mr. CHANDLER (for himself, Mr. MILLER of Washington, Mr. DICKS, Mr. MCDERMOTT, Mr.
SWIFT, Mr. MORRISON, and Mrs. UNSOELD) introduced the following bill; which was referred to
the Committee on the Judiciary
A BILL
To allow Major League Baseball teams in smaller markets to compete financially with teams in larger
markets.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House ofRepresentatives of the United States ofAmerica in
Congress assembled,
SHORT TITLE
SECTION 1. This Act may be cited as the 'Major League Baseball Equity Act'.
FINDINGS
SEC. 2. The Congress finds that--
(1) Major League Baseball is becoming increasingly stratified in terms of the relative
economic power of its teams;
(2) the current practice of gate receipt revenue sharing in both the American League and
National League also works to the competitive advantage of the teams in the larger
markets; and
(3) the Major League Baseball teams in the larger markets have a competitive advantage
over other Major League Baseball teams in their ability to negotiate favorable
independent broadcasting contracts.
DEFINITIONS
SEC. 3. In this Act, the term--
(1) 'antitrust laws' has the meaning given such term under section 4 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 44);
(2) 'independent broadcasting contract' means any contract, entered into independently
by or on behalf of a Major League Baseball team, for the transmission of one or more
games of that Major League Baseball team by means of television broadcast, cable
television transmission, or radio broadcast;
(3) 'League' means the league of professional baseball teams known as the American
League or the league of professional baseball teams laown as the National League; and
(4) 'Major League Baseball' means both Leagues.
PURPOSE
SEC. 4. The purpose of this Act is to create equity within Major League Baseball, by providing
teams in smaller markets the opportunity to compete financially with the teams in the larger
markets.
BROADCASTING REVENUE SHARING
SEC. 5. (a) Any revenue generated pursuant to an independent broadcasting contract should be
shared in accordance with the requirements of this section.
(b) Except in the case of revenue generated as a result of nationally transmitted cable
television, the Major League team that is party to such contract shall receive--
(1) 80 percent of the revenue from the transmission of the home games of that team; and
(2) 20 percent of the revenue from the transmission of games in which that team is the
visiting team.
(c) All other revenue generated pursuant to such contract, including all revenue from nationally
transmitted cable television, shall be divided equally among the other teams of the League of
which the contracting team is a member. Each League shall establish accounts for the deposit
of revenue to which this subsection applies and shall, at regular intervals, distribute the correct
shares of such revenue.
PENALTY
SEC. 6. Unless Major League Baseball has, prior to the beginning of the 1993 baseball season,
established and implemented a program under which any revenue generated pursuant to
independent broadcasting contracts is shared in accordance with section 5, the antitrust laws
shall apply to Major League Baseball, each League, and all Major League Baseball teams.
END
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HR 5489 IH
102d CONGRESS
2d Session
H. R. 5489
To provide that professional baseball teams, and leagues composed of such teams, shall be subject to
the antitrust laws.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
June 25, 1992
Mr. BILIRAKIS introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary
A BIELL
To provide that professional baseball teams, and leagues composed of such teams, shall be subject to
the antitrust laws.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House ofRepresentatives of the United States ofAmerica in
Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. FINDING.
The Congress finds that the business of providing for profit public baseball games between
teams of professional baseball players in a league and between such teams of rival leagues is in,
or affects, interstate commerce.
SEC. 2. APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST LAWS TO PROFESSIONAL
BASEBALL.
The antitrust laws shall apply to the business of providing for profit public baseball games
between teams of professional baseball players and to leagues composed of teams of
professional baseball players.
SEC. 3. DEFINITION.
For purposes of this Act, the term 'antitrust laws' has the meaning given it in subsection (a) of
the first section of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12(a)), except that such term includes section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 45) to the extent that such section 5 relates to
unfair methods of competition.
SEC. 4. APPLICATION OF SECTION 2.
Section 2 shall not apply with respect to conduct occurring before the date of the enactment of
this Act.
END
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S 1727 IS
102d CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 1727
To allow Major League Baseball teams in smaller markets to compete financially with teams in larger
markets.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
September 19, 1991
Mr. GORTON (for himself and Mr. ADAMS) introduced the following bill; which was read twice
and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary
A BILL
To allow Major League Baseball teams in smaller markets to compete financially with teams in larger
markets.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House ofRepresentatives of the United States ofAmerica in
Congress assembled,
SHORT TITLE
SECTION 1. This Act may be cited as the 'Major League Baseball Equity Act'.
FINDINGS
SEC. 2. The Congress finds that--
(1) Major League Baseball is becoming increasingly stratified in terms of the relative
economic power of its teams;
(2) the current practice of gate receipt revenue sharing in both the American League and
National League also works to the competitive advantage of the teams in the larger
markets; and
(3) the Major League Baseball teams in the larger markets have a competitive advantage
over other Major League Baseball teams in their ability to negotiate favorable
independent broadcasting contracts.
DEFINITIONS
SEC. 3. In this Act, the term--
(1) 'antitrust laws' has the meaning given such term under section 4 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 44);
(2) 'independent broadcasting contract' means any contract, entered into independently
by or on behalf of a Major League Baseball team, for the transmission of one or more
games of that Major League Baseball team by means of television broadcast, cable
television transmission, or radio broadcast;
(3) 'League' means the league of professional baseball teams known as the American
League or the league of professional baseball teams known as the National League; and
(4) 'Major League Baseball' means both Leagues.
PURPOSE
SEC. 4. The purpose of this Act is to create equity within Major League Baseball, by providing
teams in smaller markets the opportunity to compete financially with the teams in the larger
markets.
BROADCASTING REVENUE SHARING
SEC. 5. (a) Any revenue generated pursuant to an independent broadcasting contract should be
shared in accordance with the requirements of this section.
(b) Except in the case of revenue generated as a result of nationally transmitted cable
television, the Major League team that is party to such contract shall receive--
(1) 80 percent of the revenue from the transmission of the home games of that team; and
(2) 20 percent of the revenue from the transmission of games in which that team is the
visiting team.
(c) All other revenue generated pursuant to such contract, including all revenue from nationally
transmitted cable television, shall be divided equally among the other teams of the League of
which the contracting team is a member. Each League shall establish accounts for the deposit
of revenue to which this subsection applies and shall, at regular intervals, distribute the correct
shares of such revenue.
PENALTY
SEC. 6. Unless Major League Baseball has, prior to the beginning of the 1993 baseball season,
established and implemented a program under which any revenue generated pursuant to
independent broadcasting contracts is shared in accordance with section 5, the antitrust laws
shall apply to Major League Baseball, each League, and all Major League Baseball teams.
END
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102d CONGRESS
1st Session
S. RES. 172
To limit or rescind the antitrust exemption now accorded baseball, football, basketball, and hockey.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
August 2 Qegislative day, JULY 8), 1991
Mr. SPECTER submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on the
Judiciary
RESOLUTION
To limit or rescind the antitrust exemption now accorded baseball, football, basketball, and hockey.
Whereas, baseball has enjoyed an antitrust exemption since 1922 when the Supreme Court of the
United States held that baseball was a sport and not a business;
Whereas, baseball, today is admittedly a business;
Whereas, baseball's recent moves to pay cable television and baseball's recent announcement that
only two new franchises would be created by the National League shows disregard for the public's
interests compared with the owners' financial interests;
Whereas, recent moves by football, basketball and hockey to pay cable and/or pay-per-view
demonstrates disregard for the public's interests compared with the owners' financial interests;
Whereas, football, basketball and hockey enjoy a special limited exemption from the antitrust laws as
provided in the Sports Broadcasting Act (15 U.S.C. 1291-95);
Whereas, only 58.6 percent of United States households have purchased cable service and only 77.4
percent of United States households have access to cable service; and
Whereas, big league sports franchises may function as businesses extracting whatever profit the
market will bear, existing antitrust exemptions should be limited or rescinded unless big league sports
franchise owners demonstrate reasonable concern for the public's interest. Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, That Congress should limit or rescind the antitrust exemptions now accorded
football, baseball, basketball and hockey.
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HR 108 IH
103d CONGRESS
1st Session
H. R. 108
To provide that professional baseball teams, and leagues composed of such teams, shall be subject to
the antitrust laws.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
January 5, 1993
Mr. BLIRAKIS (for himself, Mr. BUNNING, and Mr. MCCOLLUM) introduced the following bill;
which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary
A BIELL
To provide that professional baseball teams, and leagues composed of such teams, shall be subject to
the antitrust laws.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House ofRepresentatives of the United States ofAmerica in
Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. FINDING.
The Congress finds that the business of providing for profit public baseball games between
teams of professional baseball players in a league and between such teams of rival leagues is in,
or affects, interstate commerce.
SEC. 2. APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST LAWS TO PROFESSIONAL
BASEBALL.
The antitrust laws shall apply to the business of providing for profit public baseball games
between teams of professional baseball players and to leagues composed of teams of
professional baseball players.
SEC. 3. DEFINITION.
For purposes of this Act, the term 'antitrust laws' has the meaning given it in subsection (a) of
the first section of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12(a)), except that such term includes section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 45) to the extent that such section 5 relates to
unfair methods of competition.
SEC. 4. APPLICATION OF SECTION 2.
Section 2 shall not apply with respect to conduct occurring before the date of the enactment of
this Act.
END
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HR 1549 1H
103d CONGRESS
1st Session
H. R. 1549
To amend the Act of September 30, 1961, to exclude professional baseball from the antitrust
exemption applicable to certain television contracts.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
March 31, 1993
Mr. BILIRAKIS introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary
A BILL
To amend the Act of September 30, 1961, to exclude professional baseball from the antitrust
exemption applicable to certain television contracts.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House ofRepresentatives of the United States ofAmerica in
Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the 'Baseball Antitrust Restoration Amendment of 1993'.
SEC. 2. AMENDMENTS.
The Act of September 30, 1961 (15 U.S.C. 1291-1294) is amended--
(1) in the first section by striking 'baseball,' each place it appears,
(2) in sections 4 and 6 by striking 'baseball,' each place it appears, and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
'SEC. 7. The antitrust laws referred to in section 1 shall apply with respect to joint agreements
of the kind described in such section entered into by or among persons engaging in or
conducting the organized professional team sport of baseball.'.
SEC. 3. EFFECTIVE DATE; APPLICATION OF AMENDMENTS.
(a) EFFECTIVE DATE- Except as provided in subsection (b), this Act and the amendments
made by this Act shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.
(b) APPLICATION OF AMENDMENTS- With respect to joint agreements entered into before
the date of the enactment of this Act, the amendments made by section 2 shall not apply until
the expiration of the 1-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act.
END
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HR 4965 IH
103d CONGRESS
2d Session
H. R. 4965
To encourage serious negotiations between the major league baseball players and the owners of major
league baseball in order to prevent a strike by the players or a lockout by the owners so that the fans
will be able to enjoy the remainder of the baseball season, the playoffs, and the World Series.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
August 12, 1994
Mr. OWENS introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary
A BILL
To encourage serious negotiations between the major league baseball players and the owners of major
league baseball in order to prevent a strike by the players or a lockout by the owners so that the fans
will be able to enjoy the remainder of the baseball season, the playoffs, and the World Series.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House ofRepresentatives of the United States ofAmerica in
Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the 'Baseball Fans Protection Act of 1994'.
SEC. 2. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO MAJOR LEAGUE
BASEBALL IN EXCEPTIONAL AND EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES.
The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new
section:
'SEC. 27. (a) IN GENERAL- In the event that a unilateral term or condition is imposed by any
party that has been subject to an agreement between the owners of major league baseball and
the labor organization representing the players of major league baseball, the antitrust laws shall
apply to that term or condition.
'(b) TERMINATION OF EFFECTIVENESS- Subsection (a) shall cease to be effective upon
the mutual adoption of an agreement between the owners of major league baseball and the
labor organization representing the players of major league baseball to replace the basic
agreement between the two parties that expired on December 31, 1993, but subsection (a) shall
continue to apply to conduct occurring prior to the adoption of such an agreement.
'(c) DEFINITION- In this section, 'term or condition' does not include a strike or a lockout.'.
END
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HR 4994 1H
103d CONGRESS
2d Session
H. R. 4994
To apply the antitrust laws of the United States to major league baseball.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
August 18, 1994
Mr. SYNAR (for himself, Mr. BUNNING, Mr. OWENS, and Mr. BILIRAKIS) introduced the
following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary
A BILL
To apply the antitrust laws of the United States to major league baseball.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House ofRepresentatives of the United States ofAmerica in
Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the 'Baseball Fans and Communities Protection Act of 1994'.
SEC. 2. PURPOSE.
It is the purpose of the amendment made by section 3 to encourage serious negotiations
between the major league baseball players and the owners of major league baseball, to prevent
the continued economic loss to individuals not involved in the negotiations whose livelihood
depends on baseball being played, to prevent ongoing losses to those communities that host
major league baseball, and to preserve the remainder of the season, the playoffs, and the World
Series for the fans of baseball.
SEC. 3. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO MAJOR LEAGUE
BASEBALL IN EXCEPTIONAL AND EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES.
The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new
section:
'SEC. 27. (a) In the event that unilateral terms or conditions are imposed by any party that has
been subject to an agreement between the owners of major league baseball and the labor
organization representing the players of major league baseball, the antitrust laws shall apply to
such terms and conditions and such terms and conditions may be challenged by any party to
such agreement in any district court of the United States for the district in which one of the
parties is doing business.
'(b) If, prior to the mutual adoption of an agreement between the owners of major league
baseball and the labor organization representing the players of major league baseball that
replaces the basic agreement between the parties that expired on December 31, 1993, unilateral
terms and conditions are imposed by any party to the prior agreement, and those terms and
conditions are challenged in a court action in accordance with subsection (a), the application of
such unilaterally imposed terms and conditions shall be stayed during the pendency of any such
action or appeal therefrom.
'(c) The term 'terms and conditions' shall not include either a strike or a lockout.'.
END
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HR 4994 RH
Union Calendar No. 488
103d CONGRESS
2d Session
H. R. 4994
[Report No. 103-871]
To apply the antitrust laws of the United States to major league baseball.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
August 18, 1994
Mr. SYNAR (for himself, Mr. BUNNING, Mr. OWENS, and Mr. BLIRAKIS) introduced the
following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary
November 29, 1994
Additional sponsors: Mr. WILLIAMS, Mr. GORDON, and Mr. Sanders
November 29, 1994
Reported with an amendment, committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the
Union and ordered to be printed
[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed in italic]
A BILL
To apply the antitrust laws of the United States to major league baseball.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House ofRepresentatives of the United States ofAmerica in
Congress assembled,
[Struck out->] SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. [<-Struck out]
[Struck out->] This Act may be cited as the 'Baseball Fans and Communities
Protection Act of 1994' . [<-Struck out]
[Struck out->] SEC. 2. PURPOSE. [<-Struck out]
[Struck out->] It is the purpose of the amendment made by section 3 to
encourage serious negotiations between the major league baseball players and
the owners of major league baseball, to prevent the continued economic loss
to individuals not involved in the negotiations whose livelihood depends on
baseball being played, to prevent ongoing losses to those communities that
host major league baseball, and to preserve the remainder of the season, the
playoffs, and the World Series for the fans of baseball. [<-Struck out]
[Struck out->] SEC. 3. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO MAJOR
LEAGUE BASEBALL IN EXCEPTIONAL AND EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES. [<-
Struck out]
[Struckout->] The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) is amended by adding at
the end the following new section: [<-Struck out]
[Struckout->] 'SEC. 27. (a) In the event that unilateral terms or conditions
are imposed by any party that has been subject to an agreement between the
owners of major league baseball and the labor organization representing the
players of major league baseball, the antitrust laws shall apply to such
terms and conditions and such terms and conditions may be challenged by any
party to such agreement in any district court of the United States for the
district in which one of the parties is doing business. [<-Struckout]
[Struck out->] (b) If, prior to the mutual adoption of an agreement between
the owners of major league baseball and the labor organization representing
the players of major league baseball that replaces the basic agreement
between the parties that expired on December 31, 1993, unilateral terms and
conditions are imposed by any party to the prior agreement, and those terms
and conditions are challenged in a court action in accordance with
subsection (a), the application of such unilaterally imposed terms and
conditions shall be stayed during the pendency of any such action or appeal
therefrom. [<-Struck out]
[Struck out->] '(c) The term 'terms and conditions' shall not include either a
strike or a lockout.' . [<-Struck out]
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the 'Baseball Fans and Communities Protection Act of.1994'.
SEC 2. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LA WS TO MAJOR LEAGUE
BASEBALL IN EXCEPTIONAL AND EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES.
The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq) is amended by adding at the end the following:
'SEC. 27. (a) If unilateral terms and conditions of employment in restraint of trade or
commerce are imposed by any party that has been subject to an agreement between 2 or more
major league baseball clubs and the labor organization representing the players ofmajor
league baseball, such unilateral imposition shall be subject to the antitrust laws.
'(b) Subsection (a) shall not apply to a term or condition imposed solely with respect to a
professional baseball player who is a party to a unform player contract that is assigned, at the
time the imposition described in such subsection occurs, to a baseball club that is not a major
league professional baseball club.
'(c) This section shall not be construed to modif, impair, or supersede the operation of--
'(1) the Act ofSeptember 30, 1961 (Public Law 87-331; 15 U.S.C 1291 et seq.), or
'(2) any Federal statute relating to labor relations.
'(d) For purposes of this section, the term 'terms and conditions' does not include a strike or a
lockout.'.
Union Calendar No. 488
103d CONGRESS
2d Session
H. R. 4994
[Report No. 103-8711
A BILL
To apply the antitrust laws of the United States to major league baseball.
November 29, 1994
Reported with an amendment
END
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103d CONGRESS
1st Session
S.500
To provide that professional baseball teams and leagues composed of such teams shall be subject to
the antitrust laws.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
March 4, (legislative day, MARCH 3), 1993
Mr. METZENBAUM (for himself, Mr. MACK, Mr. GRAHAM, Mr. LEAHY, Mr. WARNER, Mr.
BINGAMAN, Mr. LOTT, Mr. KERREY, Mr. WELLSTONE, and Mr. ROBB) introduced the
following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary
A BILL
To provide that professional baseball teams and leagues composed of such teams shall be subject to
the antitrust laws.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House ofRepresentatives of the United States ofAmerica in
Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the 'Professional Baseball Antitrust Reform Act of 1993'.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
The Congress finds that--
(1) the business of organized professional baseball is in, or affects, interstate commerce;
and
(2) the antitrust laws should be amended to reverse the result of the decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States in Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259
U.S. 200 (1922), Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S.C 356 (1953), and Flood
v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972), which exempted baseball from coverage under the
antitrust laws.
SEC. 3. APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST LAWS TO PROFESSIONAL
BASEBALL.
The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new
section:
'SEC. 27. Except as provided in Public Law 87-331 (15 U.S.C. 291 et seq.) (commonly known
as the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961), the antitrust laws shall apply to the business of
organized professional baseball.'
SEC. 4. EFFECTIVE DATE.
The provisions and amendments made by this Act shall take effect one year after the date of the
enactment of this Act and--
(1) shall apply to conduct that occurs and any agreement in effect after such effective
date; and
(2) shall not apply to conduct that occurred before such effective date.
END
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103d CONGRESS
2d Session
S. 2380
To encourage serious negotiations between the major league baseball players and the owners of major
league baseball in order to prevent a strike by the players or a lockout by the owners so that the fans
will be able to enjoy the remainder of the baseball season, the playoffs, and the World Series.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
August 11, 1994
Mr. METZENBAUM (for himself, Mr. HATCH, and Mr. FEINGOLD) introduced the following bill;
which was read the first time
A BILL
To encourage serious negotiations between the major league baseball players and the owners of major
league baseball in order to prevent a strike by the players or a lockout by the owners so that the fans
will be able to enjoy the remainder of the baseball season, the playoffs, and the World Series.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House ofRepresentatives of the United States ofAmerica in
Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the 'Baseball Fans Protection Act of 1994'.
SEC. 2. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO MAJOR LEAGUE
BASEBALL IN EXCEPTIONAL AND EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES.
The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new
section:
'SEC. 27. (a) IN GENERAL- In the event that a unilateral term or condition is imposed by any
party that has been subject to an agreement between the owners of major league baseball and
the labor organization representing the players of major league baseball, the antitrust laws shall
apply to that term or condition.
'(b) TERMINATION OF EFFECTIVENESS- Subsection (a) shall cease to be effective upon
the mutual adoption of an agreement between the owners of major league baseball and the
labor organization representing the players of major league baseball to replace the basic
agreement between the two parties that expired on December 31, 1993, but subsection (a) shall
continue to apply to conduct occurring prior to the adoption of such an agreement.
'(c) DEFINITION- In this section, 'term or condition' does not include a strike or a lockout.'.
END
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I104TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION
To apply the antitrust laws of the United States to major league baseball.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
JANUARY 4, 1995
Mr. CONYERS introduced the following bill; which was referred to the
Committee on the Judiciary
A BILL
To apply the antitrust laws of the United States to major
league baseball.
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
4 This Act may be cited as the "Baseball Fans and
5 Communities Protection Act of 1995".
6 SEC. 2. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO MAJOR
7 LEAGUE BASEBALL IN EXCEPTIONAL AND EX-
8 TRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES.
9 The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) is amended
10 by adding at the end the following:
21 "SEC. 27. (a) If unilateral terms and conditions of
2 employment in restraint of trade or commerce are imposed
3 by any party that has been subject to an agreement be-
4 tween 2 or more major league baseball clubs and the labor
5 organization representing the players of major league
6 baseball, such unilateral imposition shall be subject to the
7 antitrust laws.
8 "(b) Subsection (a) shall not apply to a term or con-
9 dition imposed solely with respect to a professional base-
10 ball player who is a party to a uniform player contract
11 that is assigned, at the time the imposition described in
12 such subsection occurs, to a baseball club that is not a
13 major league professional baseball club.
14 "(c) This section shall not be construed to modify,
15 impair, or supersede the operation of-
16 "(1) the Act of September 30, 1961 (Public
17 Law 87-331; 15 U.S.C. 1291 et seq.), or
18 "(2) any Federal statute relating to labor rela-
19 tions.
20 "(d) For purposes of this section, the term 'terms
21 and conditions' does not include a strike or a lockout.".
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I104TH CONGRESS1sT SESSIONHeR 10
To amend the Act of September 30, 1961, to exclude professional baseball
from the antitrust exemption applicable to certain television contracts.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
JANUARY 4, 1995
Mr. BILIRAKIS introduced the following bill; which was referred to the
Committee on the Judiciary
A BILL
To amend the Act of September 30, 1961, to exclude profes-
sional baseball from the antitrust exemption applicable
to certain television contracts.
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
4 This Act may be cited as the "Baseball Antitrust
5 Restoration Amendment of 1995".
6 SEC. 2. AMENDMENTS.
7 The Act of September 30, 1961 (15 U.S.C. 1291-
8 1294) is amended-
9 (1) in the first section by striking "baseball,"
10 each place it appears,
21 (2) in sections 4 and 6 by striking "baseball,"
2 each place it appears, and
3 (3) by adding at the end the following:
4 "SEC. 7. The antitrust laws referred to in section 1
5 shall apply with respect to joint agreements of the kind
6 described in such section entered into by or among persons
7 engaging in or conducting the organized professional team
8 sport of baseball.".
9 SEC. 3. EFFECTIVE DATE; APPLICATION OF AMENDMENTS.
10 (a) EFFECTIVE DATE.-Except as provided in sub-
11 section (b), this Act and the amendments made by this
12 Act shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this
13 Act.
14 (b) APPLICATION OF AMENDMENTS.-With respect
15 to joint agreements entered into before the date of the
16 enactment of this Act, the amendments made by section
17 2 shall not apply until the expiration of the 1-year period
18 beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act.
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I104TH CONGRESS1sT SESSION HeR 10
To provide that professional baseball teams, and leagues composed of such
teams, shall be subject to the antitrust laws.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
JANUARY 4, 1995
Mr. BILIRAKIS (for himself, Mr. JACOBS, Mr. BUNNING of Kentucky, and Mr.
OWENS) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Commit-
tee on the Judiciary
A BILL
To provide that professional baseball teams, and leagues
composed of such teams, shall be subject to the antitrust
laws.
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3 SECTION 1. FINDING.
4 The Congress finds that the business of providing for
5 profit public baseball games between teams of professional
6 baseball players in a league and between such teams of
7 rival leagues is in, or affects, interstate commerce.
2
1 SEC. 2. APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST LAWS TO PROFES-
2 SIONAL BASEBALL.
3 The antitrust laws shall apply to the business of pro-
4 viding for profit public baseball games between teams of
5 professional baseball players and to leagues composed of
6 teams of professional baseball players.
7 SEC. 3. DEFINITION.
8 For purposes of this Act, the term "antitrust laws"
9 has the meaning given it in subsection (a) of the first sec-
10 tion of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12(a)), except that
11 such term includes section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
12 mission Act (15 U.S.C. 45) to the extent that such section
13 5 relates to unfair methods of competition.
14 SEC. 4. APPLICATION OF SECTION 2.
15 Section 2 shall not apply with respect to conduct oc-
16 curring before the date of the enactment of this Act.
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I104TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION HeR 12
To apply the antitrust laws of the United States to major league baseball.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
JANUARY 4, 1995
Mr. BUNNING of Kentucky (for himself and Mr. BILIRAKIS) introduced the
following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary
A BILL
To apply the antitrust laws of the United States to major
league baseball.
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
4 This Act may be cited as the "Baseball Fans and
5 Communities Protection Act of 1995".
6 SEC. 2. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO MAJOR
7 LEAGUE BASEBALL IN EXCEPTIONAL AND EX-
8 TRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES.
9 The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) is amended
10 by adding at the end the following:
2
1 "SEC. 27. (a) If unilateral terms and conditions of
2 employment in restraint of trade or commerce are imposed
3 by any party that has been subject to an agreement be-
4 tween 2 or more major league baseball clubs and the labor
5 organization representing the players of major league
6 baseball, such unilateral imposition shall be subject to the
7 antitrust laws.
8 "(b) Subsection (a) shall not apply to a term or con-
9 dition imposed solely with respect to a professional base-
10 ball player who is a party to a uniform player contract
11 that is assigned, at the time the imposition described in
12 such subsection occurs, to a baseball club that is not a
13 major league professional baseball club.
14 "(c) This section shall not be construed to modify,
15 impair, or supersede the operation of-
16 "(1) the Act of September 30, 1961 (Public
17 Law 87-331; 15 U.S.C. 1291 et seq.), or
18 "(2) any Federal statute relating to labor
19 relations.
20 "(d) For purposes of this section, the term 'terms
21 and conditions' does not include a strike or a lockout.".
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I104TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION
To apply the antitrust laws of the United States to major league baseball.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
JANUARY 4, 1995
Mr. SCHUMER introduced the following bill; which was referred to the
Committee on the Judiciary
A BILL
To apply the antitrust laws of the United States to major
league baseball.
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
4 This Act may be cited as the "Baseball Fans and
5 Communities Protection Act of 1995".
6 SEC. 2. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO MAJOR
7 LEAGUE BASEBALL IN EXCEPTIONAL AND EX-
8 TRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES.
9 The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) is amended
10 by adding at the end the following:
2
1 "SEC. 27. (a) If unilateral terms and conditions of
2 employment in restraint of trade or commerce are imposed
3 by any party that has been subject to an agreement be-
4 tween 2 or more major league baseball clubs and the labor
5 organization representing the players of major league
6 baseball, such unilateral imposition shall be subject to the
7 antitrust laws.
8 "(b) Subsection (a) shall not apply to a term or con-
9 dition imposed solely with respect to a professional base-
10 ball player who is a party to a uniform player contract
11 that is assigned, at the time the imposition described in
12 such subsection occurs, to a baseball club that is not a
13 major league professional baseball club.
14 "(c) This section shall not be construed to modify,
15 impair, or supersede the operation of-
16 "(1) the Act of September 30, 1961 (Public
17 Law 87-331; 15 U.S.C. 1291 et seq.), or
18 "(2) any Federal statute relating to labor rela-
19 tions.
20 "(d) For purposes of this section, the term 'terms
21 and conditions' does not include a strike or a lockout.".
0
Document No. 56

I104TH CONGRESS1sT SESSION o38
To provide that professional baseball teams and leagues composed of such
teams shall be subject to the antitrust laws.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
JANUARY 4, 1995
Mr. TRAFICANT introduced the following bill; which was referred to the
Committee on the Judiciary
A BILL
To provide that professional baseball teams and leagues com-
posed of such teams shall be subject to the antitrust
laws.
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
4 This Act may be cited as the "Professional Baseball
5 Antitrust Reform Act of 1995".
6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
7 The Congress finds that-
8 (1) the business of organized professional base-
9 ball is in, or affects, interstate commerce, and
21 (2) the antitrust laws should be amended to re-
2 verse the result of the decisions of the Supreme
3 Court of the United States in Federal Baseball Club
4 v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922), Toolson
5 v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953),
6 and Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972), which ex-
7 empted baseball from coverage under the antitrust
8 laws.
9 SEC. 3. APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST LAWS TO PROFES-
10 SIONAL BASEBALL.
11 The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) is amended
12 by adding at the end the following section:
13 "SEC. 27. Except as provided in Public Law 87-331
14 (15 U.S.C. 291 et seq.) (commonly known as the Sports
15 Broadcasting Act of 1961), the antitrust laws shall apply
16 to the business of organized professional baseball.".
17 SEC. 4. EFFECTIVE DATE; APPLICATION OF AMENDMENTS.
18 This Act and the amendments made by this Act
19 shall-
20 (1) take effect 1 year after the date of the en-
21 actment of this Act,
22 (2) apply to conduct that occurs and any agree-
23 ment in effect after such effective date, and
3
1 (3) not apply to conduct that occurred before
2 such effective date.
0
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I1ST SESSION
To establish a national commission to oversee and regulate major league
and minor league baseball, to promote the interests of consumers, local
communities, and taxpayers, to recommend modification of the antitrust
exemption for Major League Baseball, and for other purposes.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
JANUARY 30, 1995
Mr. LAFALCE introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Commit-
tee on Commerce and, in addition, to the Committees on Economic and
Educational Opportunities and the Judiciary, for a period to be subse-
quently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such
provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned
A BILL
To establish a national commission to oversee and regulate
major league and minor league baseball, to promote the
interests of consumers, local communities, and taxpayers,
to recommend modification of the antitrust exemption
for Major League Baseball, and for other purposes.
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
4 This Act may be cited as the "National Commission
5 on Professional Baseball Act of 1995".
2
1 SEC. 2. ESTABLISHMENT.
2 There is hereby established the National Commission
3 on Professional Baseball (hereafter in this Act referred to
4 as the "Commission").
5 SEC. 3. MEMBERSHIP.
6 (a) NUMBER AND APPOINTMENT .- The Commission
7 shall be composed of seven members, all of whom shall
8 be appointed by the President. The President shall ap-
9 point-
10 (1) one member after consultation with the
11 owners of Major League Baseball;
12 (2) one member after consultation with the
13 Major League Baseball Players Association;
14 (3) one member after consultation with the Na-
15 tional Association of Professional Baseball Leagues,
16 Incorporated;
17 (4) one member after solicitation of rec-
18 ommendations from government officials of cities,
19 towns, or counties in which major league and minor
20 league baseball teams are located; and
21 (5) three members after consultation with base-
22 ball fan organizations and the informal solicitation
23 of recommendations from the general public, one of
24 whom the President shall designate as Chairman of
25 the Commission.
31 (b) TERM.-Members of the Commission shall be ap-
2 pointed for a five-year term. In the event that the term
3 of the Commission is extended by the Congress pursuant
4 to section 10 of this Act, the term of individual members
5 shall also be extended, except that no individual may serve
6 as a member for more than six years.
7 (c) QUORuM.-A majority of the members of the
8 Commission shall constitute a quorum, but the Commis-
9 sion may provide for the taking of testimony and the re-
10 ception of evidence at meetings at which there are present
11 not less than three members of the Commission.
12 (d) APPOINTMENT DATE.-The first appointments
13 made under subsection (a) shall be made within sixty days
14 after the date of enactment of this Act.
15 (e) FIRST MEETING.-The first meeting of the Com-
16 mission shall be called by the Chairman and shall be held
17 within ninety days after the date of enactment of this Act.
18 (f) PUBLIC MEETINGS.-All Commission meetings
19 and hearings shall be open to the public.
20 (g) VACANCY .- If any member of the Commission is
21 unable to serve a full term or becomes unqualified to serve
22 in such position, a new member shall be appointed to serve
23 the remainder of such term of office, within forty-five days
24 of the vacancy, in the same manner in which the original
25 appointment was made.
4
1 SEC. 4. DUTIES OF THE COMMISSION.
2 The duties of the Commission are to oversee and in-
3 vestigate any aspect of major league baseball and minor
4 league baseball, where, in the opinion of the Commission,
5 it is in the best interests of baseball to intervene, including
6 but not limited to the-
7 (1) negotiation of contract agreements between
8 major league team owners and players;
9 (2) renegotiation of the professional baseball
10 agreement between major league and minor league
11 team owners;
12 (3) setting of ticket prices;
13 (4) expansion and relocation of major league
14 and minor league team franchises;
15 (5) structural requirements and financing of
16 baseball stadiums and facilities;
17 (6) terms and conditions of minor league player
18 contracts;
19 (7) licensing of television broadcast rights and
20 allocation of television revenues;
21 (8) licensing and marketing of merchandise and
22 allocation of revenues; and
23 (9) revenue sharing among owners of major
24 league teams and among the major and minor
25 leagues.
51 (b) ARBITR ATION AND MEDIATION .- The duty of the
2 Commission to intervene in any aspect of major league or
3 minor league baseball, pursuant to subsection (a) of this
4 section, shall include but not be limited to the-
5 (1) conduct of binding arbitration in the event
6 of a labor impasse between Major League Baseball
7 and players; and
8 (2) mediation or arbitration of disputes between
9 Major League Baseball or individual owners of
10 major league teams and minor league baseball team
11 owners.
12 SEC. 5. POWERS OF THE COMMISSION.
13 (a) HEARINGS AND MEETINGS.-The Commission or,
14 on authorization of the Commission, a panel of at least
15 three members of the Commission, may hold such hear-
16 ings, sit and act at such times and places, take such testi-
17 mony, and receive such evidence, as the Commission con-
18 siders appropriate.
19 (b) OBTAINING INFORMATION.-The Commission
20 may secure directly from any Federal department, agency,
21 or court information and assistance necessary to enable
22 it to carry out this Act. Upon request of the Chairman
23 of the Commission, the head of such agency or department
24 shall furnish such information or assistance to the Com-
25 mission. In addition, the Commission may request any rel-
61 evant information from any appropriate parties with an
2 interest in major league or minor league baseball.
3 (c) SUBPOENA POWER.-
4 (1) ISSUANCE.-The Commission may issue
5 subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of
6 witnesses and the production of any evidence that
7 relates to any matter under investigation by the
8 Commission. The attendance of witnesses and the
9 production of evidence may be required from any
10 place within a judicial district at any designated
11 place of hearing within the judicial district.
12 (2) ENFOR CEMENT .- If a person issued a sub-
13 poena under paragraph (1) refuses to obey the sub-
14 poena or is guilty of contumacy, any court of the
15 United States within the judicial district within
16 which the hearing is conducted or within the judicial
17 district within which the person is found or resides
18 or transacts business may (upon application by the
19 Commission) order the person to appear before the
20 Commission to produce evidence or to give testimony
21 relating to the matter under investigation. Any fail-
22 ure to obey the order of the court may be punished
23 by the court as a contempt of the court.
24 (3) MANNER OF SERVICE.-A subpoena of the
25 Commission shall be served in the manner provided
71 for subpoenas issued by a United States district
2 court under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for
3 the United States district courts.
4 (4) PLACE OF SERVICE.-All process of any
5 court to which application may be made under this
6 section may be served in the judicial district in
7 which the person required to be served resides or
8 may be found.
9 (d) ORDER S AND INJUNCTIONS .- Whenever the
10 Commission has reason to believe that an act or practice
11 of Major League Baseball or of any individual owner of
12 a major league baseball team may not be in the public
13 interest or in the best interest of baseball, the Commission
14 shall have authority-
15 (1) to issue orders to stay temporarily such act
16 or practice pending review by the Commission or
17 pending a request for mediation or arbitration of
18 disputes involving such action submitted to the Com-
19 mission by baseball players, minor league team own-
20 ers, or public officials; and
21 (2) to bring a civil action in an appropriate dis-
22 trict court of the United States to enjoin such act
23 or practice and, upon proper showing that such ac-
24 tion would be in the public interest, to obtain a tem-
25 porary restraining order or a preliminary injunction
81 against such act or practice: Provided, however, That
2 in proper cases the Commission may seek, and upon
3 proper showing of proof, the court may grant a per-
4 manent injunction.
5 (f) FACILITIES AND SUPPORT SERVICES.-The Ad-
6 ministrator of General Services shall provide to the Com-
7 mission on a reimbursable basis such facilities and support
8 services as the Commission may request. Upon request of
9 the Commission, the head of a Federal department or
10 agency may make any of the facilities and services of such
11 agency available to the Commission to assist the Commis-
12 sion in carrying out its duties under this Act.
13 (g) EXP END ITU RES AND CONTRA CTS .- The Commis-
14 sion or, on authorization of the Commission, a member
15 of the Commission may make expenditures and enter into
16 contracts for the procurement of such supplies, services,
17 and property as the Commission or members consider ap-
18 propriate for the purposes of carrying out the duties of
19 the Commission. Such expenditures and contracts may be
20 made only to such extent or in such amounts as appro-
21 priated under section 9 of this Act.
22 (h) MAILS.-The Commission may use the United
23 States mails in the same manner and under the same con-
24 ditions as other Federal departments and agencies of the
25 United States.
9
1 SEC. 6. COMPENSATION OF THE COMMISSION.
2 (a) COMPENSATION .- Each member of the Commis-
3 sion shall be a full-time Federal employee and shall be
4 paid at an annual rate of basic pay payable for level II
5 of the Executive Schedule under section 5313 of title 5,
6 United States Code.
7 (b) EXPENSES .- Members of the Commission shall
8 be reimbursed for travel, subsistence, and other necessary
9 expenses incurred by them in the performance of their du-
10 ties.
11 SEC. 7. STAFF OF COMMISSION; EXPERTS AND CONSULT-
12 ANTS.
13 (a) STAFF.-
14 (1) APPOINTMENT .- The Chairman of the
15 Commission may appoint and terminate no more
16 than ten staff personnel to enable the Commission to
17 perform its duties.
18 (2) COMPENSATION .- The Chairman of the
19 Commission may fix the compensation of personnel
20 without regard to the provision of chapter 51 and
21 subchapter II of chapter 53 of title 5, United States
22 Code, relating to classification of position and Gen-
23 eral Schedule pay rates, except that the rate of pay
24 may not exceed the rate payable for level V of the
25 Executive Schedule under section 5316 of such title.
10
1 (b) EXPERTS AND CONSULTA NTS.-The Commission
2 may procure temporary and intermittent services of ex-
3 perts and consultants under section 3109(b) of title 5,
4 United States Code.
5 SEC. 8. REPORT TO CONGRESS.
6 (a) COMMISSI ON STUDY .- The Commission shall un-
7 dertake a study of the antitrust exemption for Major
8 League Baseball that shall include but not be limited to
9 analysis of the-
10 (1) effects of the antitrust exemption on major
11 league and minor league baseball players, minor
12 league baseball teams, baseball fans, local govern-
13 ments, and taxpayers of municipalities in which
14 baseball teams are located;
15 (2) possible effects of continuing the antitrust
16 exemption;
17 (3) possible effects of proposals for modification
18 of the antitrust exemption on Major League Base-
19 ball, minor league baseball teams, major league and
20 minor league baseball players, baseball fans, local
21 governments, and taxpayers, including but not lim-
22 ited to proposals for-
23 (A) elimination of the antitrust exemption;
24 (B) partial elimination of the antitrust ex-
25 emption for purposes of labor relations between
11
1 Major League Baseball and professional base-
2 ball players or for purposes of major league
3 team franchise expansion or relocation; and
4 (C) elimination of the antitrust exemption
5 with protections to hold harmless existing con-
6 tractual relationships between major league and
7 minor league baseball teams with respect to
8 player development, territorial arrangements,
9 and other activities that might otherwise be
10 subject to the antitrust laws.
11 (b) REPORT.-Not later than three years after the
12 date of the enactment of the Act, the Commission shall
13 submit to the Congress a report containing its findings
14 and conclusions pursuant to this section, together with its
15 recommendations as to any legislation it may consider ap-
16 propriate for modification of the antitrust exemption for
17 Major League Baseball.
18 SEC. 9. AUTHORIZATION AND FEES.
19 (a) AUTHOR IZATION.-There are authorized to be ap-
20 propriated such funds as may be necessary to carry out
21 this title, except that the amount of such funds shall not
22 exceed the amount of funds made available pursuant to
23 subsection (b) of this section. All funds appropriated
24 under this section shall remain available until expended.
12
1 (b) FEES.-Major League Baseball shall pay to the
2 Treasury of the United States on or before March 15 of
3 each calendar year a fee in the amount of two-tenths of
4 1 per centum of the aggregate dollar amount of combined
5 team revenues received during each preceding calendar
6 year, except that the Commission, by rule, may exempt
7 any revenue or class of revenue from any fee imposed by
8 this subsection, if the Commission finds that such exemp-
9 tion is consistent with the public interest. The Commis-
10 sion, by rule, shall set forth the manner and terms under
11 which such payment shall be made after consultation with
12 the Secretary of the Treasury and Major League Baseball.
13 Payment of any fee under this subsection shall be made
14 for each of the five years that this Act shall be effective,
15 and for any additional years the Congress shall determine
16 pursuant to section 10 of this Act.
17 SEC. 10. TERM OF THE COMMISSION.
18 The duties and powers set forth in this Act shall
19 cease to be effective five years after the date of enactment,
20 unless otherwise extended by the Congress.
21 SEC. 11. EFFECTIVE DATE.
22 This Act shall take effect on the date of enactment.
0
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I104TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION HeR 74
To provide that professional baseball teams, and leagues composed of such
teams, shall be subject to the antitrust laws.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
JANUARY 31, 1995
Mr. TORRES introduced the following bill; which was referred to the
Committee on the Judiciary
A BILL
To provide that professional baseball teams, and leagues
composed of such teams, shall be subject to the antitrust
laws.
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3 SECTION 1. FINDING.
4 The Congress finds that the business of providing for
5 profit public baseball games between teams of professional
6 baseball players in a league and between such teams of
7 rival leagues is in, or affects, interstate commerce.
2
1 SEC. 2. APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST LAWS TO PROFES-
2 SIONAL BASEBALL.
3 The antitrust laws shall apply to the business of pro-
4 viding for profit public baseball games between teams of
5 professional baseball players and to leagues composed of
6 teams of professional baseball players.
7 SEC. 3. DEFINITION.
8 For purposes of this Act, the term "antitrust laws"
9 has the meaning given it in subsection (a) of the first sec-
10 tion of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12(a)), except that
11 such term includes section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
12 mission Act (15 U.S.C. 45) to the extent that such section
13 5 relates to unfair methods of competition.
14 SEC. 4. APPLICATION OF SECTION 2.
15 Section 2 shall not apply with respect to conduct oc-
16 curring before the date of the enactment of this Act.
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I104TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION H .
To require the general application of the antitrust laws to major league
baseball, and for other purposes.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
MAY 11, 1995
Mr. BUNNING of Kentucky (for himself, Mr. JOHNSTON of Florida, Mr.
OWENS, Mr. PARKER, Mr. McKEON, and Mr. TRAFICANT) introduced the
following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary
A BILL
To require the general application of the antitrust laws to
major league baseball, and for other purposes.
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
4 This Act may be cited as the "Major League Baseball
5 Antitrust Reform Act of 1995".
6 SEC. 2. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO PRO-
7 FESSIONAL MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL.
8 The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) is amended
9 by adding at the end the following new section:
2
1 "SEc. 27. (a) Subject to subsection (b), the antitrust
2 laws shall apply to the business of professional major
3 league baseball.
4 " (b) Nothing in this section shall be construed to af-
5 fect-
6 "(1) the applicability or nonapplicability of the
7 antitrust laws to professional baseball's amateur
8 draft, the minor league reserve clause, the Profes-
9 sional Baseball Agreement, or any other matter re-
10 lating to the minor leagues;
11 "(2) the applicability or nonapplicability of the
12 antitrust laws to any restraint by professional base-
13 ball on franchise relocation; or
14 "(3) the application of Public Law 87-331 (15
15 U.S.C. 1291 et seq.) (commonly known as the
16 Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961).".
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104TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION H.R2022
To require the partial application of the antitrust laws to major and minor
league baseball.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
JULY 12, 1995
Mr. McHALE (for himself, Mr. STUPAK, Mr. FILNER, Mr. BUNNING of Ken-
tucky, Mr. POMEROY, Mr. WYDEN, Mr. ORTIz, Mr. BEILENSON, Mr.
McNuLTY, Mr. BARCIA, Mr. ZIMMER, Mr. TAYLOR of Mississippi, Ms.
WOOLSEY, Mr. ORTON, Mr. EVANS, Mr. JACOBS, Mr. HINCHEY, Ms.
LOFGREN, and Mr. VISCLOSKY) introduced the following bill; which was
referred to the Committee on the Judiciary
A BILL
To require the partial application of the antitrust laws to
major and minor league baseball.
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLES.
4 This Act may be cited as the "Professional Baseball
5 Antitrust Reform Act of 1995" or the "Giles Act".
6 SEC. 2. AMENDMENT TO THE CLAYTON ACT.
7 The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) is amended
8 by adding at the end the following:
I
21 "SEc. 27. The antitrust laws shall apply to any re-
2 straint or agreement imposed by professional baseball,
3 major or minor league team owners, their agents or em-
4 ployees, on the location of any minor league team or fran-
5 chise.".
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II
104TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION S 1
To provide that professional baseball teams and leagues composed of such
teams shall be subject to the antitrust laws.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
JANUARY 4, 1995
Mr. MOYNIHAN introduced the following bill; which was read twice and
referred to the Committee on the Judiciary
A BILL
To provide that professional baseball teams and leagues com-
posed of such teams shall be subject to the antitrust
laws.
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
4 This Act may be cited as the "National Pastime Pres-
5 ervation Act of 1995".
6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
7 The Congress finds that-
8 (1) the business of organized professional base-
9 ball is in, or affects, interstate commerce; and
21 (2) the antitrust laws should be amended to re-
2 verse the result of the decisions of the Supreme
3 Court of the United States in Federal Baseball Club
4 of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Profes-
5 sional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922), Toolson
6 v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953),
7 and Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972), which ex-
8 empted baseball from coverage under the antitrust
9 laws.
10 SEC. 3. APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST LAWS TO PROFES-
11 SIONAL BASEBALL.
12 The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) is amended
13 by adding at the end the following new section:
14 "SEc. 27. (a) IN GENERAL.-Except as provided in
15 Public Law 87-331 (15 U.S.C. 291 et seq.) (commonly
16 known as the 'Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961'), the
17 antitrust laws shall apply to the business of organized pro-
18 fessional baseball.
19 "(b) APPLICATION OF SECTION.-This section-
20 (1) shall apply to any agreement that is in ef-
21 fect on or after the date of enactment of this section
22 and to conduct engaged in after that date in further-
23 ance of that agreement or in furtherance of any
24 other object; but
31 (2) shall not apply to conduct engaged in before
2 that date.".
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104TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION * 1
To apply the antitrust laws to major league baseball in certain circumstances,
and for other purposes.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
FEBRUARY 14 (legislative day, JANUARY 30), 1995
Mr. HATCH (for himself, Mr. MOYNIHAN, Mr. GRAHAM, and Mr. BINGAMAN)
introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the
Committee on the Judiciary
A BILL
To apply the antitrust laws to major league baseball in
certain circumstances, and for other purposes.
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
4 This Act shall be known as the "Professional Base-
5 ball Antitrust Reform Act of 1995".
6 SEC. 2. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO PRO-
7 FESSIONAL MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL.
8 The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) is amended
9 by adding at the end the following new sections:
2
1 "SEC. 27. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS.
2 "(a) IN GENERAL.-The antitrust laws shall apply
3 to the business of organized professional major league
4 baseball with respect to labor relations between labor and
5 management (including agreements between the labor or-
6 ganization representing the players of professional major
7 league baseball and the owners of professional major
8 league teams and agreements between such individual
9 owners and players).
10 " (b) RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.-Nothing in this
11 section shall be construed to affect-
12 "(1) the outcome of any antitrust litigation
13 based on any area or activity of the business of pro-
14 fessional baseball other than the area of, or an activ-
15 ity relating to, relations between labor and manage-
16 ment of major league baseball;
17 "(2) the application of Public Law 87-331 (15
18 U.S.C. 1291 et seq.) (commonly known as the
19 'Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961'); or
20 "(3) the applicability or nonapplicability of the
21 antitrust laws to professional baseball's amateur
22 draft, the minor league reserve clause, the Profes-
23 sional Baseball Agreement, or any other matter re-
24 lating to the minor leagues.
3
1 "SEC. 28. THE NONSTATUTORY LABOR EXEMPTION.
2 "(a) IN GENERAL.-The nonstatutory labor exemp-
3 tion from the antitrust laws shall not apply to any term
4 or condition that-
5 "(1) is unilaterally imposed or maintained by
6 any party that has been subject to an agreement be-
7 tween the owners of major league baseball and the
8 labor organization representing the players of major
9 league baseball; and
10 "(2) differs substantially from the provisions of
11 the basic agreement between the two parties that ex-
12 pired on December 31, 1993.
13 "(b) RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.-
14 "(1) IN GENERAL.-Nothing in this section
15 shall otherwise be construed to affect the scope or
16 application of the nonstatutory labor exemption from
17 the antitrust laws.
18 "(2) DEFINITION.-As used in this section,
19 'term or condition' does not include a strike or lock-
20 out.
21 "(c) TERMINATION.-Subsection (a) shall not apply
22 to conduct that is incidental to, or that occurs after, the
23 mutual adoption of an agreement between the owners of
24 major league baseball and the labor organization rep-
25 resenting the players of major league baseball to replace
26 the basic agreement between the two parties that expired
41 on December 31, 1993, but shall apply to other conduct
2 occurring before the adoption of such an agreement.".
0
Document No. 63

II
104TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION
To require the application of the antitrust laws to major league baseball,
and for other purposes.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
FEBRUARY 14 (legislative day, JANUARY 30), 1995
Mr. THURMOND (for himself and Mr. LEAHY) introduced the following bill;
which was read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary
A BILL
To require the application of the antitrust laws to major
league baseball, and for other purposes.
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
4 This Act may be cited as the "Major League Baseball
5 Antitrust Reform Act of 1995".
6 SEC. 2. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO PRO-
7 FESSIONAL MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL.
8 The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) is amended
9 by adding at the end the following new section:
2
1 "SEc. 27. (a) Subject to subsection (b), the antitrust
2 laws shall apply to the business of professional major
3 league baseball.
4 "(b) Nothing in this section shall be construed to af-
5 fect-
6 "(1) the application of the antitrust laws to
7 baseball's amateur draft, the minor league reserve
8 clause, the Professional Baseball Agreement, or any
9 other matter relating to the minor leagues; or
10 "(2) the application of Public Law 87-331 (15
11 U.S.C. 1291 et seq.) (commonly known as the
12 Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961).".
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104TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSIONS 62
To require the general application of the antitrust laws to major league
baseball, and for other purposes.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
MARCH 27, 1995
Mr. HATCH (for himself, Mr. THURMOND, Mr. LEAHY, Mr. MOYNIHAN, and
Mr. GRAHAM) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and re-
ferred to the Committee on the Judiciary
A BILL
To require the general application of the antitrust laws to
major league baseball, and for other purposes.
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
4 This Act may be cited as the "Major League Baseball
5 Antitrust Reform Act of 1995".
6 SEC. 2. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO PRO-
7 FESSIONAL MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL.
8 The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) is amended
9 by adding at the end the following new section:
21 "SEc. 27. (a) Subject to subsection (b), the antitrust
2 laws shall apply to the business of professional major
3 league baseball.
4 "(b) Nothing in this section shall be construed to af-
5 fect-
6 "(1) the applicability or nonapplicability of the
7 antitrust laws to professional baseball's amateur
8 draft, the minor league reserve clause, the Profes-
9 sional Baseball Agreement, or any other matter re-
10 lating to the minor leagues;
11 "(2) the applicability or nonapplicability of the
12 antitrust laws to any restraint by professional base-
13 ball on franchise relocation; or
14 "(3) the application of Public Law 87-331 (15
15 U.S.C. 1291 et seq.) (commonly known as the
16 Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961).".
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2D SESSION S*627
[Report No. 104-231]
To require the general application of the antitrust laws to major league
baseball, and for other purposes.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
MARICH 27, 1995
Mr. HATC (for himself, Mr. THURMOND, Mr. LEAHY, Mr. MOYNIHAN, and
Mr. GRAHAM) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and re-
ferred to the Committee on the Judiciary
FEBRUARY 6, 1996
Reported by Mr. HATCH without amendment
A BILL
To require the general application of the antitrust laws to
major league baseball, and for other purposes.
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 tives of the United States ofAmerica in Congress assembled,
3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
4 This Act may be cited as the "Major League Baseball
5 Antitrust Reform Act of 1995".
2
1 SEC. 2. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO PRO-
2 FESSIONAL MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL.
3 The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) is amended
4 by adding at the end the following new section:
5 "SEc. 27. (a) Subject to subsection (b), the antitrust
6 laws shall apply to the business of professional major
7 league baseball.
8 "(b) Nothing in this section shall be construed to af-
9 feet-
10 "(1) the applicability or nonapplicability of the
11 antitrust laws to professional baseball's amateur
12 draft, the minor league reserve clause, the Profes-
13 sional Baseball Agreement, or any other matter re-
14 lating to the minor leagues;
15 "(2) the applicability or nonapplicability of the
16 antitrust laws to any restraint by professional base-
17 ball on franchise relocation; or
18 "(3) the application of Public Law 87-331 (15
19 U.S.C. 1291 et seq.) (commonly known as the
20 Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961).".
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n104TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION S.1696
To provide antitrust clarification, to reduce frivolous antitrust litigation, to
promote equitable resolution of disputes over the location of professional
sports franchises, and for other purposes.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
APRIL 23, 1996
Mr. THURMOND introduced the following bill; which was read twice and
referred to the Committee on the Judiciary
A BILL
To provide antitrust clarification, to reduce frivolous anti-
trust litigation, to promote equitable resolution of dis-
putes over the location of professional sports franchises,
and for other purposes.
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 tives of the United States ofAmerica in Congress assembled,
3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
4 This Act may be cited as the "Professional Sports
5 Antitrust Clarification Act of 1996".
6 SEC. 2. ACTIONS AUTHORIZED.
7 (a) IN GENERAL.-Notwithstanding any provision of
8 the antitrust laws, and subject to section 3 and subsection
21 (b) of this section, a professional sports league or its mem-
2 ber franchises may establish and enforce rules and proce-
3 dures for the purpose of deciding whether a member fran-
4 chise may change its home territory.
5 (b) CONsTRUCTION.-Nothing in this section shall be
6 construed to exempt from the antitrust laws any conduct
7 which would be unlawful under any antitrust law if en-
8 gaged in by a single entity.
9 SEC. 3. REQUIREMENTS FOR ANTITRUST PROTECTION.
10 (a) IN GENERAL.-This Act applies to a professional
11 sports league and its member franchises if such league-
12 (1) establishes applicable rules and procedures
13 to govern whether a member franchise may change
14 its home territory that are available upon request to
15 any interested party;
16 (2) affords due process, including 180 days no-
17 tice and an opportunity to be heard, to interested
18 parties prior to deciding whether a member fran-
19 chise may change its home territory; and
20 (3) promotes comparable economic opportuni-
21 ties by sharing revenue among member franchises to
22 account for disparities in revenue received or costs
23 saved due to direct or indirect public benefits and
24 subsidies, including publicly financed facilities, rent
25 abatement, special tax treatment, favorable arrange-
3
1 ments for parking, concessions, and other amenities,
2 and other public benefits not generally available to
3 businesses as a whole within the jurisdiction.
4 (b) RULES AND PROCEDURES.-Rules and proce-
5 dures established under subsection (a)(1) shall require
6 consideration of various factors to protect the public inter-
7 est, including-
8 (1) the extent to which fan support for a mem-
9 ber franchise has been demonstrated through attend-
10 ance, ticket sales, and television ratings, during the
11 period in which the member franchise played in its
12 home territory;
13 (2) the extent to which the member franchise
14 has, directly or indirectly, received public financial
15 support through publicly financed facilities, rent
16 abatement, special tax treatment, favorable arrange-
17 ments for parking, concessions, and other amenities,
18 and any other public benefits not generally available
19 to businesses as a whole within the jurisdiction, and
20 the extent to which such support continues;
21 (3) the effect that relocation would have on con-
22 tracts, agreements, and understandings between the
23 member franchise and public and private parties;
24 (4) the extent of any net operating losses expe-
25 rienced by the member franchise in recent years and
4
1 the extent to which the member franchise bears re-
2 sponsibility for such losses; and
3 (5) any bona fide offer to purchase the member
4 franchise at fair market value, if such offer includes
5 the continued location of such member franchise in
6 its home territory.
7 SEC. 4. JUDICIAL REVIEW.
8 (a) STANDARD OF REvIEw.-The standard of judi-
9 cial review shall be de novo in any action challenging the
10 establishment and enforcement of rules and procedures for
11 deciding whether a member franchise may change its
12 home territory, except that the reviewing court shall give
13 deference to actions of the professional sports league re-
14 garding compliance with paragraphs (1) and (3) of section
15 3(a).
16 (b) DECLARATORY ACTIONS.-A professional sports
17 league or any interested party may seek a declaratory
18 judgment with respect to whether paragraphs (1) and (3)
19 of section 3(a) are adequately satisfied by the professional
20 sports league for this Act to apply.
21 (c) LIMITATION ON MONETARY DAMAGEs.-A judi-
22 cial finding that a professional sports league did not com-
23 ply with any provision of section 3 shall result only in fur-
24 ther proceedings by the professional sports league and
51 shall not result in liability under the antitrust laws or
2 monetary damages, if-
3 (1) the professional sports league implemented
4 a revenue sharing plan in a good faith attempt to
5 comply with section 3(a)(3) prior to the specific dis-
6 pute in issue; or
7 (2) a prior declaratory judgment held that the
8 revenue sharing plan of the professional sports
9 league complied with section 3(a)(3).
10 (d) VENuE.-In any action challenging the establish-
11 ment and enforcement of rules and procedures to decide
12 whether a member franchise may change its home terri-
13 tory, venue shall be proper only in the United States Dis-
14 trict Court for the District of Columbia, except that-
15 (1) venue shall be proper only in the United
16 States District Court for the Southern District of
17 New York if the existing or proposed home territory
18 of a member franchise is located within 100 miles of
19 the United States District Court for the District of
20 Columbia; and
21 (2) venue shall be proper only in the United
22 States District Court for the Northern District of Il-
23 linois if-
24 (A) the existing home territory of a mem-
25 ber franchise is located within 100 miles of the
6
1 United States District Court for the District of
2 Columbia or the Southern District of New
3 York; and
4 (B) the proposed home territory of the
5 member franchise is located within 100 miles of
6 the United States District Court for the Dis-
7 trict of Columbia or the Southern District of
8 New York.
9 SEC. 5. DEFINITIONS.
10 For purposes of this Act-
11 (1) the term "antitrust laws"-
12 (A) has the same meaning as in subsection
13 (a) of the first section of the Clayton Act (15
14 U.S.C. 12(a)), except that such term includes
15 section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
16 (15 U.S.C. 45) to the extent that such section
17 relates to unfair methods of competition; and
18 (B) includes any State law comparable to
19 the laws referred to in subparagraph (A);
20 (2) the terms "professional sports team",
21 "team", "member franchise", and "franchise" mean
22 any team of professional athletes that is a member
23 of a professional sports league;
24 (3) the terms "professional sports league" and
25 "league" mean-
7
1 (A) an association of 2 or more profes-
2 sional sports teams that governs the conduct of
3 its members and regulates the contests and ex-
4 hibitions in which such teams regularly engage;
5 (B) whose decisions relating to franchise
6 relocation would otherwise be subject to the
7 antitrust laws; and
8 (C) that has combined franchise revenues
9 of more than $10,000,000 per year;
10 (4) the term "interested party" means the
11 member franchise at issue, local and State govern-
12 ment officials, owners and operators of playing fa-
13 cilities, concessionaires, and others whose business
14 relations would be directly and significantly affected
15 by the franchise relocation at issue, and representa-
16 tives of organized civic and fan groups; and
17 (5) the term "playing facility" means the sta-
18 dium, arena, or other venue in which professional
19 sports teams regularly conduct their contests and ex-
20 hibitions.
21 SEC. 6. EFFECTIVE DATE.
22 This Act applies to any action occurring on or after
23 the date of enactment of this Act.
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H104TII CONGRESS
2D SESSION S.1767
To harmonize the application of the antitrust laws to professional sports,
and for other purposes.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
MAY 16, 1996
Mr. HATCH introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred
to the Committee on the Judiciary
A BILL
To harmonize the application of the antitrust laws to
professional sports, and for other purposes.
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 tives of the United States ofAmerica in Congress assembled,
3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
4 This Act may be cited as the "Sports Antitrust Re-
5 form Act of 1996".
6 SEC. 2. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO PRO-
7 FESSIONAL SPORTS.
8 The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) is amended
9 by adding at the end the following new section:
2
1 "SEC. 27. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO PRO-
2 FESSIONAL SPORTS.
3 "(a) DEFINITIONS.-For purposes of this section-
4 "(1) the term 'home territory' means the geo-
5 graphic metropolitan area within which a member
6 team operates and plays the majority of its home
7 games;
8 "(2) the term 'interested party' includes, with
9 respect to a member team-
10 "(A) any political subdivision of a State
11 that provides, or has provided, financial assist-
12 ance, including tax abatement, for facilities (in-
13 eluding a stadium or arena) in which the mem-
14 ber team plays;
15 "(B) a representative of the political sub-
16 division with jurisdiction over the geographic
17 area in which the stadium or arena of the mem-
18 ber team is located;
19 "(C) a member team;
20 "(D) the owner or operator of a stadium
21 or arena of a member team; and
22 "(E) any other person who is determined
23 to be an affected party by the sports league of
24 the member team;
25 "(3) the term 'member team' means a team of
26 professional athletes-
3
1 "(A) organized to play professional foot-
2 ball, basketball, or hockey; and
3 "(B) that is a member of a professional
4 sports league;
5 "(4) the term 'person' means any individual,
6 partnership, corporation, or unincorporated associa-
7 tion, any combination or association thereof, or any
8 State or political subdivision of a State;
9 "(5) the term 'professional sports league' means
10 an association that-
11 "(A) is composed of 2 or more member
12 teams;
13 "(B) regulates the contests and exhibitions
14 of its member teams; and
15 "(C) has been engaged in competition in a
16 particular sport for a period of more than 7
17 years; and
18 "(6) the terms 'stadium' and 'arena' mean the
19 principal physical facility within which a member
20 team has played the majority of its home games.
21 "(b) ESTABLISITMENT OF RULE.-
22 "(1) IN GENERAL.-Subject to the require-
23 ments set forth in this section, any professional
24 sports league may establish a rule-
4
1 "(A) authorizing the membership of that
2 league to decide whether or not a member team
3 of that league may be relocated outside of the
4 home territory of that member team; and
5 "(B) requiring that any person seeking to
6 change the home territory of that member team
7 obtain the approval of the appropriate profes-
8 sional sports league.
9 "(2) INAPPLICABILITY OF ANTITRUST LAWS.-
10 Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the
11 antitrust laws shall not apply to the enforcement or
12 application by a professional sports league of any
13 rule established pursuant to paragraph (1).
14 "(c) PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS.-
15 "(1) REQUEST FOR APPROVAL.-
16 "(A) IN GENERAL.-Not later than 210
17 days before the commencement of the season in
18 which a member team proposes to play in a new
19 location, any person seeking to change the
20 home territory of that member team shall sub-
21 mit a request for approval of the proposed
22 change to the appropriate professional sports
23 league.
51 "(B) REQuIREM~nENT.-Each request for
2 approval submitted under subparagraph (A)
3 shall-
4 "(i) be in writing;
5 "(ii) be delivered in person or by cer-
6 tified mail to each interested party by not
7 later than 30 days after submission to the
8 appropriate professional sports league
9 under subparagraph (A);
10 "(iii) be made available by the date
11 specified in clause (ii) to the news media;
12 "(iv) be published by the date speci-
13 fled in clause (iii) in 1 or more newspapers
14 of general circulation within the home ter-
15 ritory of the member team; and
16 "(v) contain-
17 "(I) an identification of the pro-
18 posed location of the member team;
19 "(II) a summary of the reasons
20 for the change in home territory based
21 on the criteria described in paragraph
22 (2) (B); and
23 "(III) the date on which the pro-
24 posed change would become effective.
25 "(2) PROCEDURES.-
6
1 "(A) ESTABLISIIENT.-Each professional
2 sports league shall establish rules and proce-
3 dures for approving or disapproving requests
4 submitted under paragraph (1), that shall-
5 "(i) include criteria to be considered
6 by the professional sports league in ap-
7 proving or disapproving such requests; and
8 "(ii) be made available upon request
9 to any interested party.
10 "(B) CRITERIA TO BE CONSIDERED.-The
11 criteria described in subparagraph (A)(i) shall
12 include-
13 "(i) the extent to which fan loyalty to
14 and support for the member team has been
15 demonstrated during the tenure of the
16 member team in the home territory;
17 "(ii) the degree to which the member
18 team has engaged in good faith negotia-
19 tions with appropriate persons concerning
20 the terms and conditions under which the
21 member team would continue to play its
22 games in the home territory of the member
23 team;
24 "(iii) the degree to which the owner-
25 ship or management of the member team
7
1 has contributed to any circumstance that
2 might demonstrate the need for the reloca-
3 tion of the member team;
4 "(iv) the extent to which the member
5 team has, directly or indirectly, received
6 public financial support by means of any
7 publicly financed playing facility, special
8 tax treatment, or any other form of public
9 financial support;
10 "(v) the adequacy of the stadium or
11 arena of the member team, and the willing-
12 ness of the stadium or arena authority and
13 the local government to remedy any defi-
14 ciencies in the stadium or arena;
15 "(vi) whether the member team has
16 incurred net operating losses, exclusive of
17 depreciation or amortization, sufficient to
18 threaten the continued financial viability of
19 the member team;
20 "(vii) whether any other member team
21 in the professional sports league is located
22 in the home territory of the member team;
23 "(viii) whether the member team pro-
24 poses to relocate to a territory in which no
8
1 other member team in the professional
2 sports league is located;
3 "(ix) whether the stadium or arena
4 authority, if public, is opposed to the relo-
5 cation; and
6 "(x) any other criteria considered to
7 be appropriate by the professional sports
8 league.
9 "(3) HEARINGs.-In determining whether to
10 approve or disapprove a proposed request submitted
11 under paragraph (1), the professional sports league
12 shall-
13 "(A) conduct a hearing at which interested
14 parties shall be afforded an opportunity to sub-
15 mit written testimony and exhibits; and
16 "(B) keep a written record of that hearing
17 and any testimony and exhibits submitted
18 under subparagraph (A).
19 "(d) JUDICIAL REVIEW.-
20 "(1) IN GENERAL.-A decision by a profes-
21 sional sports league to approve or disapprove a re-
22 quest submitted under paragraph (1) may only be
23 reviewed in a civil action filed by an interested party
24 in accordance with this subsection.
25 "(2) VENE.-
9
1 "(A) IN GENERAL.-Except as provided in
2 subparagraph (B), an action under this sub-
3 section may be filed only in the United States
4 District Court for the District of Columbia.
5 "(B) EXCEPTIoN.-If the home territory
6 of the member team or the proposed home ter-
7 ritory of the member team is located within a
8 50-mile radius of the District of Columbia, an
9 action under this subsection may be filed only
10 in the United States District Court for the
11 Southern District of New York.
12 "(3) ThmE.-
13 "(A) FILING.-An action under this sub-
14 section shall be filed not later than 14 days
15 after the date of the formal vote of the profes-
16 sional sports league approving or disapproving
17 the proposed relocation.
18 "(B) REvIE.-Not later than 30 days
19 after the filing of the action in accordance with
20 subparagraph (A), the district court shall issue
21 an order with respect to that action.
22 "(4) STANDARD OF REVIEw.-The scope of ju-
23 dicial review in any action under this subsection
24 shall be limited to a determination of whether-
10
1 "(A) in deciding whether to approve or dis-
2 approve a proposed relocation, the professional
3 sports league failed to comply with this section;
4 and
5 "(B) the decision of the professional sports
6 league to approve or disapprove a proposed re-
7 location was arbitrary or capricious.
8 "(5) RELIEF GRANTED BY COURT.-
9 "(A) IN GENERAL.-In any action under
10 this subsection, if the district court makes a de-
11 termination described in subparagraph (A) or
12 (B) of paragraph (4), the court shall-
13 "(i) remand the matter for further
14 consideration by the professional sports
15 league; and
16 "(ii) enjoin any relocation of the
17 member team at issue until the profes-
18 sional sports team has reconsidered the
19 matter in accordance with the order of the
20 court under this paragraph.
21 "(B) LIiTATION.-The court may not
22 grant any relief in any action under this sub-
23 section other than enjoining or approving en-
24 forcement of the decision by the professional
11
1 sports league to approve or disapprove a re-
2 quest submitted under paragraph (1).".
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I105TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION H Re21
To require the general application of the antitrust laws to major league
baseball, and for other purposes.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
JANUARY 7, 1997
M01r. CONYERS introduced the following bill; which was referred to the
Committee on the Judiciary
A BILL
To require the general application of the antitrust laws to
major league baseball, and for other purposes.
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 tives of the United States ofAmerica in Congress assembled,
3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
4 This Act may be cited as the "Baseball Fans and
5 Communities Protection Act of 1997".
6 SEC. 2. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO PRO-
7 FESSIONAL MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL.
8 The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) is amended
9 by adding at the end the following:
2
1 "SEc. 27. (a) Subject to subsection (b), the antitrust
2 laws shall apply to the business of professional major
3 league baseball.
4 "(b) Nothing in this section shall be construed to af-
5 feet-
6 "(1) the applicability or nonapplicability of the
7 antitrust laws to professional baseball's amateur
8 draft, the minor league reserve clause, the Profes-
9 sional Baseball Agreement, or any other matter re-
10 lating to the minor leagues;
11 "(2) the applicability or nonapplicability of the
12 antitrust laws to any restraint by professional base-
13 ball on franchise relocation; or
14 "(3) the application of Public Law 87-331 (15
15 U.S.C. 1291 et seq.) (commonly known as the
16 Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961).".
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To require the general application of the antitrust laws to major league
baseball, and for other purposes.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FEBRUARY 12, 1997
Mr. BUNNING (for himself and Mr. Conyers) introduced the following bill;
which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary
A BILL
To require the general application of the antitrust laws to
major league baseball, and for other purposes.
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
4 This Act may be cited as the "Major League Baseball
5 Antitrust Reform Act of 1997".
6 SEC. 2. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO PRO-
7 FESSIONAL MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL.
8 The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) is amended
9 by adding at the end the following new section:
2
1 "Sc. 27. (a) Subject to subsection (b), the antitrust
2 laws shall apply to the business of professional major
3 league baseball.
4 "(b) Nothing in this section shall be construed to af-
5 feet-
6 "(1) the applicability or nonapplicability of the
7 antitrust laws to professional baseball's amateur
8 draft, the minor league reserve clause, the Profes-
9 sional Baseball Agreement, or any other matter re-
10 lating to the minor leagues;
11 "(2) the applicability or nonapplicability of the
12 antitrust laws to any restraint by professional base-
13 ball on franchise relocation; or
14 "(3) the application of Public Law 87-331 (15
15 U.S.C. 1291 et seq.) (commonly known as the
16 Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961).".
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BASEBALL FANS AND COMMUNITIES PROTECTION ACT
OF 1994
NovzmBER 29, 1994.-Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
Mr. BROOKS, from the Committee on the Judiciary,
submitted the following
REPORT
together with
DISSENTING VIEWS
[To accompany H.R. 4994]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the bill
(H.R. 4994) to apply the antitrust laws of the United States to
major league baseball, having considered the same, report favor-
ably thereon with an amendment and recommend that the bill as
amended do pass.
The amendiment is as follows:
Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert in lieu thereof
the following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TrrLE.
This Act may be cited as the "Baseball Fans and Communities Protection Act of
1994".
SEC. 2. APPIICATION OF THE ANITTRUST LAWS TO MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL IN EXCEP-
TIONAL AND EXrRAORDINARY CICUMSTANCES.
The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the fol-
lowmng:
"Sic. 27. (a) If unilateral terms and conditions of employment in restraint of trade
or commerce are imposed by any party that has been subject to an agreement be-
tween 2 or more major league baseball clubs and the labor organization represent-
ing the players of major league baseball, such unilateral imposition shall be subject
to the antitrust laws.
"(b) Subsection (a) shall not apply to a term or condition imposed solely with re-
spect to a professional baseball player who is a party to a uniform player contract
99-006
2that is assigned, at the time the imposition described in such subsection occurs, to
a baseball dub that is not a major league professional baseball club.
"(c) This section shall not be construed to modify, impair, or supersede the oper-
ation of-
"(1) the Act of September 30, 1961 (Public Law 87-331; 15 U.S.C. 1291 et
se.), or
"(2) any Federal statute relating to labor relations.
"(d) For purposes of this section, the term 'terms and conditions' does not include
a strike or a lockout.".
EXPLANATION OF AMENDMENT
Inasmuch as H.R. 4994 was ordered reported with a single
amendment in the nature of a substitute, the contents of this re-
port constitute an explanation of that amendment.
SUMMARY AND PURPOSE
Professional baseball is the only industry in the United States
that is exempt from the antitrust laws without being subject to al-
ternative regulatory supervision. There may have been a time
when such singularity was a secret source of pride and distinction
for the many who loved the game as perhaps the finest outward
manifestation of the American way of life and culture that bound
a diverse people together. That time has ended. The continuing
baseball strike of 1994-which ended the regular season, which
ended the possibility of a World Series for the first time in 90
years, and which has very nearly ended the love affair of the Amer-
ican people with their national pastime-has more than any other
event or legal argument created the necessary political will to sub-
ject this business to the same rules of fair and open competition,
of respect for the ultimate consumer, as all other business enter-
prises in this country.
The Committee's formal action of partially repealing the
nonstatutory antitrust exemption-which Congress never initiated
or endorsed but by which it has been saddled for over 70 years-
is really the first step in ending a legal fiction about the game cre-
ated and perpetuated by the Supreme Court, as perhaps one of its
greatest indulgences. That indulgence, fueled first by sentimental-
ity and then by risk-aversion, has now vested such complete power
over the sport by its financial owners as to enable them to end the
game at will.
The Committee now acts to end the illusion which has spawned
very real economic consequences. It does so by partially repealing
the nonstatutory exemption created by the 1922 decision in Federal
Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Professional Base-
ball Clubs. In so doing, the Committee responds to the current
phase of a recurring crisis in baseball in a very limited, yet crucial,
way: by subjecting the traditional parties to Major League Base-
ball's 2 collective bargaining agreement-the players' union and
owners-to the Nation's antitrust laws in the event one party uni-
laterally imposes an anticompetitive term or condition of employ-
259 U.S. 200 (1922).
.
2
"Major League Baseball" is an unincorporated association, consisting of the 28 major league
baseball clubs: the term is commonly used to describe the operations of the American League
and the National League in professional baseball.
3ment on the other.3 The legislation, H.R. 4994 (the "Baseball Fans
and Communities Protection Act of 1994"), exempts minor league
baseball from the scope of its coverage, and does not interfere with
either the Sports Broadcasting Act 4 or any Federal labor relations
statute.
Congress enacted the antitrust laws a century ago to safeguard
business freedom and consumer welfare in the economic sphere,
much as personal liberties were safeguarded at the Nation's found-
ing.5 Born in reaction to the massive consolidation of economic re-
sources into well-integrated monopolies and cartels caused by the
rapid industrialization in the mid-to late nineteenth century, the
antitrust laws were conceived as statutes of general applicability.
The history of antitrust legislation in Congress demonstrates a
heavy presumption against any departure from this principle.
Unfortunately, this same presumption has not always obtained
in the courts, as judicial rationales were constructed to declare the
conduct of certain industries as lacking the sufficient nexus to
interstate commerce to trigger the application of the Federal stat-
utes, including the antitrust laws. Such a rationale was applied by
the Supreme Court to the business of insurance in the 1868 deci-
sion of Paul v. Virginia,6 during an era when commerce was indeed
more localized and before the advent of Federal regulation. To its
credit, the Supreme Court by 1944 recognized that the reach of the
Commerce Clause, through its own subsequent decisions and
through the development of Federal regulatory agencies, made the
Paul decision antiquated. In United States v. South-Eastern Under-
writers Association,7 the Court set aside the anomalous rationale
underlying its holding of 75 years earlier.
The judicially-created baseball exemption had no such logical de-
velopment and denouement. Instead, the Supreme Court, in a fit
of sentimentality and an act of denial, clung to the type of nine-
teenth century analysis found in Paul v. Virginia by holding that
Federal jurisdictional requirements were not met with respect to
the business of baseball. Whether this action in 1922 was the
Court's way of attempting to bolster the game in the wake of the
"Black Sox" scandal and the welcomed arrival of Judge Kenesaw
Mountain Landis as Commissioner is unknown. But whatever the
motive, it ceased to have any validity as developments unfolded in
the succeeding decades. When the next antitrust challenge occurred
25 years later, the Supreme Court declined to reconsider its hold-
ing in light of changed circumstances, claiming "detrimental reli-
ance" on behalf of the owner-beneficiaries.8 Mereover, the Court
then shifted the barden of reconsideration to Congress, which had
never statutorily authorized the spurious immunity in the first
place. In a final stroke of audacity, the Court proceeded to preempt
'While the antitrust laws apply to the realm of professional sports in numerous ways, many
of the antitrust issues raised in the professional sports context concern allegations of player re-
straints imposed by team employers. See generally Warren Freedman, Professional Sports and
Antitrust 72 (1987); Ethan Lock, -The Scope of the Labor Exemption in Professional Sports",
1989 Duke LJ.. 339, 344-345.
15 U.S.C. § 1291 et seq.
The antitrust laws have been aptly termed the "charter of economic liberty." Northern Pac.
Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
6 75 U.S. (8 Wall; 168 ('186A).7 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
e2oolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953).
4State antitrust challenges through a convoluted estoppel theory
akin to "admission by silence": that because Congress had been si-
lent on what the Court had wrought on its own initiative, then
Congress should be construed to have approved the exemption,
thereby entering and preempting the field even with respect to any
State law to the contrary 9
The end result was the perpetuation of the business of baseball
as a closed, cartelized industry in which the few, incumbent club
owners possess inordinate economic power and every other party-
players, fans, municipalities, minor league club owners, potential
expansion team investors-remain economically marginalized. In a
sense, the competitive landscape resembles the very type of busi-
ness arrangements that spurred Congress to enact the antitrust
laws in the first place.
The statism of the anticompetitive situation is obvious: since or-
ganized baseball began in 1871 right through the baseball strike of
1994, the same patterns of oligopolistic control are discernible: con-
trol over the players through the "reserve clause"; control over the
franchises through collusive agreements; control over the Commis-
sioner as agent and not activist. That the most recent strike is but
one of a series of work stoppages in recent years appears no coinci-
dence, given the unchanging intersection of an untettered antitrust
exemption together with what Judge Jerome Frank labelled a "pe-
onage" labor arrangement.10
As indicated earlier, the action taken by the Committee is pur-
posely narrow and targeted to deal with the most pressing problem
connected with the antitrust exemption. As such, the Committee
wishes to make clear that by applying the antitrust laws to base-
ball in the delineated circumstances of H.R. 4994, it is in no way
endorsing the view that the exemption extends beyond the facts of
Federal Baseball." Nor should the Committee's more limited ac-
tion create any possible implication that a broader repeal of base-
ball's antitrust exemption is not indicated from a public policy
standpoint-or that the courts are not the more appropriate forum
to take this step if only the fortitude were found. However, if the
record compiled before the Committee is considered a reliable guide
to action, then there appears to be a strong agreement for sweep-
ing, if not total, repeal.
HEARINGS
The Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial Law conducted
oversight hearings on baseball's antitrust exemption on March 31,
1993, and September 22, 1994.
Witnesses at the March 31, 1993 hearing included the Hon. Bob
Graham and the Hon. Connie Mack, U.S. Senators from the State
of Florida; the Hon. Michael Bilirakis and the Hon. C. W. Bill
Young, U.S. Representatives from the State of Florida; the Hon.
Jim Bunning, U.S. Representative from the State of Kentucky; the
Hon. Frank Horton, former U.S. Representative from the State of
New York; Allan H. "Bud" Selig, chairman, Executive Council of
9Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258. 284-285 (1972). See also infra note 52 and accompanying text.0
oGardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402, 409 (2d Cir. 1949).
"See infra notes 63-70 and accompanying text.
5Major League Baseball, and owner of the Milwaukee Brewers, ac-
companied by Jimmie Lee Solomon, direc.tor of minor league rela-
tions for Major League Baseball; Stanley Brand, Brand & Lowell,
and special counsel, Professional Baseball Leagues; Gary R. Rob-
erts, vice dean and professor of law, Tulane University; Donald M.
Fehr, executive director, Major League Baseball Players Associa-
tion; James A. Michener, author of "Sports in America"; James W.
Quinn, Weil, Gotshal & Manges; and Stephen Ross, professor of
law, University of Illinois.
Mr. Bilirakis, Mr. Selig, Mr. Fehr, and Mr. Brand also testified
at the September 22, 1994, hearing, along with the Hon. Sherwood
L. Boehlert, U.S. Representative from the State of New York; John
Feinstein, sportswriter and author of "Play Ball-The Life and
Troubled Times of Major League Baseball"; and Adam Kolton, exec-
utive director, Sports Fans United.
COMMITTEE VOTE
On September 28, 1994, a reporting quorum being present, the
Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial Law ordered H.R.
4994, amended with an amendment in the nature of a substitute,
reported to the Committee on the Judiciary by voice vote. On Sep-
tember 29, 1994, a reporting quorum being present, the Committee
on the Judiciary ordered H.R. 4994, as amended, reported to the
full House by voice vote.
DIscuSSION
I. HISTORY OF BASEBALL'S ANTITRUST EXEMPTION
A. Early history
Although the game of baseball as we know it today had its gen-
esis in 1842, the first professional association, the National Asso-
ciation of Professional Base Ball Players, was not organized until
1871. Soon thereafter, the formation of the National League of Pro-
fessional Base Ball Clubs in 1876 led to the transfer of power over
the game from the players to their financial backers.12 These finan-
cial backers-the National League club owners-soon began col-
laborating on issues such as player control, and by 1887 were re-
quiring that the best players on each club (or team) be bound to
that team through a "reserve clause." 13
1See generally Geoffrey G. Ward and Ken K. Burns, Baseball: An Illustrated History 23-
24 (1994) [hereinafter Ward & Burns]. In February 1876, Chicago White Stockings owner and
coal magnate William A. Hulbert met with seven other club owners eager as he was to tighten
their gnp on the game" and formed the National League of Professional Base Ball Clubs. There
were eight charter members: Boston, Chicago, Cincinnati, St. Louis, Hartford, New York, Phila-
delphia, and Louisville. Id. at 24.
13A reserve clause" seeks to give a club owner the perpetual right to bind, or "reserve," a
player to a team. In 1879, the National League owners adopted Boston Red Stockings owner
Arthur Soden's proposal to secretly "reserve" 5 players per team-and thus the "reserve system"
was born. See Lee Lowenfish and Tony Lupien, The Imperfect Diamond: The Story of Baseball's
Reserve System and the Men Who Fought to Change It 18 (1980); Ward & Burns, supra note
12, at 24 ('To solidif their power, [Chicago White Stockings owner] Hulbert and his allies soon
added a reserve clause to the contracts of the five beat men on every team: this required that
each pla for his current employer and, in ffect, 'reserved' his services in perpeity. Play-
ers too strenuously were fired, then blacklisted."). The number of reservd players
was enl to 11 per team in 1883, to 12 in 1885, 14 in 1887-and by the early 1 the
reserve cluse was in the contract of every professional baseball player. See Michael Canes, The
Social Benefits of Team Quality, in Government and the Sports Business 83(1974).
6In response to the owners' reserve system and other unilateral
practices--such as the capping of player salaries--the players, led
by John Montgomery ("Monte") Ward, a star pitcher and shortstop
for the New York Giants, in 1889 organized a new league known
as the Players' Leagui. Most of the star players went to the new
league for the 1890 season. 4 The National League owners re-
sponded with cutthroat aggression; and Chicago White Stockings
owner A.G. Spalding openly declared at the time: "I am for war
without quarter. I was opposed at first, but now I wani to fight
until one of us drops dead. * * * From this point on it will simply
be a case of dog eat dog, and the dog with the bull dog tendencies
will live the longest."15 Within a year, the National League owners
had eliminated the Players' League as a competitor.18 When the
National League owners eliminated yet another competitor league
(the American Association) after the 1891 season, their monopoly
control over professional baseball was firmly established.17
Another brief period of economic competition in professional
baseball began in 1899, with the formation of what was to become
the American League. But by 1903, the American and National
Leagues agreed that it would be less expensive if they were to col-
laborate in their business, rather than competitively bid for player
services and fan support. The leagues formalized their cooperative
intent in a "National Agreement," which called for two separate but
equal leagues that would honor each other's contracts (maintaining
the reserve clause system for the leagues' mutual benefit), and pro-
vided for an annual "World's Series" to be played between the
champion of each league.' 8 A National Baseball Commission was
established, composed of the presidents of the two leagues and a
permanent chairman. The National Agree ment empowered the
commission to control baseball by its own decrees, enforcing them
without the aid of law, and answerable .o no power outside its
own.' 9
Soon thereafter, the death of major league player Addie Joss, and
the financial need of his widow, inspired a benefit game organized
by the players with proceeds to benefit Mrs. Joss. This experience
galvanized anew the players' attention on their own future secu-
14See generally Andrew Zimbalist, Baseball and Billions 5-6 11992) [hereinafter Zimbalist,
Billions].
,
5 Quoted in Ward & Burns, supra note 12, at 39.
16 Although the National League initially reacted to the Players' League by commencing a sal-
ary war and giving tickets away to build attendance, the Players' League at first held its own
financially. Sever National League owners then sought court injunctions to prevent players
from moving to the Players' League; but the courts rejected the owners' requests for i nunctions,
on the ground that the reserve clause contracts lacked "mutuality" -as players coud be dis-
missed by the clubs with a mere 10 days' notice, yet were obligatcd to play for the clubs their
entire baseball playing lives. See Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. ward, 9 N.Y.S. 779 (1890). Ulti-
mately, however, the National League owners were able to coopt the backers of the Players'
League through a combination of financial inducements and merger proposals. See, e.g., Zimba.
list. Billions, supra note 14, at 6; Robert Berry et al., Labor Relations in Professional Sports
49 (1986) [hereinafter Labor Relations; E.C. Alft, Jr., The Development of Baseball as a Busi-
ness: 1876-1900 [hereinafter Alft], in Study of Monopoly Power: Hearings before the Subcomm.
on the Study of Monopoly Power of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, Part 6, Organized Base-
ball, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 1432-1443 (1951) (hereinafter 1951 House Hearings].
1
7 See, e.g., Zimbalist, Billions, supra note 14, at 6 ("The AA dissolved after the 1891 season
with four of its teams added to the NL"). The National League soon reaped the harvest of its
monooly power as player salaries fell an average of 40 percent in 1893, while team profits rose.
See , in 1951 House Hearings, supra note 16, at 1443.18See Ward & Burns, supra note 12, at 65-67; see also Dan Abramson, Baseball & the Court,
in Constitution 68, 69-71 (Fall 1992) [hereinafter Abramson].
I9See generally Wa-d & Bums, supra note 12, at 65-06.
7rity. Following the 1912 season, the players organized the Frater-
nity of Professional Base Ball Players of America-with the avowed
purpose of eliminating the reserve clause and gaining for the play-
ers a larger percentage of the profits produced by the game.20
B. Origin of professional baseball's nonstatutory antitrust exemption
By the end of 1913, another league, the Federal Baseball League,
was formed by a group of wealthy businessmen. Several major
league players joined the new Federal League, even at the risk of
being "blacklisted" by the two entrenched, cooperating major
leagues. 2 1 In 1915, after incurring significant financial losses, the
Federal Baseball League brought an antitrust suit against the
American and National Leagues, asking the court for a declaration
that the National Agreement was anticompetitive and that the re-
serve clauses in individual player, contracts were void.22 Subse-
quent to trial, and pending a decision by Judge Kenesaw Mountain
Landis (later to become the first professional baseball commis-
sioner), the Federal League reached a settlement with the Amer-
ican and National Leagues. In return for agreeing to dissolve the
Federal League, its owners were to receive $600,000 each and own-
ers of the Chicago and St. Louis Federal League franchises were
permitted to purchase two existing major league teams.
The owners of the Baltimore Federal League franchise, denied
the opportunity to purchase an existing major league team, filed
their own antitrust suit.3 Following a trial, a jury found that the
defendants had unlawfully conspired to destroy the Federal
League, and that the Baltimore club had been damaged in the
amount of $80,000 (which by law was trebled to $240,000).24 How-
ever, in 1921, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit reversed, holding that the antitrust laws did not apply to pro-
fessional baseball because the sport was neither trade, nor com-
merce, nor conducted among the States.25 And in 1922, the Su-
preme Court affirmed the appeals court in a lengthy opinion deliv-
ered by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes:
[T)he fact that in order to give the exhibitions the
Leagues must induce free persons to cross state lines and
20 See id. at 121. Like the short-lived Brotherhood of Professional Base Ball Players founded
in the 1880's by Monte Ward, which was crushed along with Ward's Players' League (see supra
notes 14-16 and accompanying text), the fraternity was a precursor to the current Major League
Baseball Players' Association (MLBPA). The MLBPA was formed in 1954 primarily as an out-
growth of player unhappiness over the lack of progress in bargaining for an improved pension
plan. But between 1954 and 1966, the MLBPA's legal counsel was Judge Robert Cannon, a man
who aspired to be baseball's commissioner and supprted the reserve clause. As a result, the
MLBPA did not prove to be an active force until after 1966, when Marvin Miller, a longtime
negotiator for the United Steelworkers, was chosen as the MLBPA's first executive director. See
Zimbalist, Billions, supra note 14, at 17.
21 See Ward & Burns, supra note 12, at 121-123.
2 See id. at 123.
23 See generally Ward & Burns, supra note 12, at 123, 127; Lionel S. Sobel, Professional
Sports and the Law 1-7 (1977) [hereinafter Sobel].24 See generally Abramson, supra note 18, at 72; Sobel, supra note 23, at 56 n.18; National
League of Professional Baseball Clubs v. Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, 269 Fed. 681, 682
(D.C. Cir. 1921), ald, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). Private persons injured in their business or property
by reason of a violation of the antitrust laws are entitled to recover treble damages. Clayton
Act §4, 15 U.S.C. §15. In addition to compensating injured plaintiffs, treble damages serve to
punish wrongdoers and enlist private plaintiffs in the work of detecting, punishing, and thereby
deterring anticompetitive conduct.
25 National League of Professional Baseball Clubs v. Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, 269
F. 681 (D.C. Cir. 1921), affd, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
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must arrange and pay for their doing so is not enough to
change the character of the business. According to this dis-
tinction insisted upon in Hooper v. California, * * * the
transport is a mere incident, not the essential thing. That
to which it is incident, the exhibition, although made for
money, would not be called trade or commerce in the com-
monly accepted use of those words.26
Although this reasoning and result may have comported with the
narrow view of interstate commerce as articulated in the earlier
Hooper opinion, that narrow view had already been significantly
undermined by statutes passed and Judicial decisions rendered in
the years intervening between Hooper and Federal Baseball.27 (The
Hooper rationale was explicitly overruled in United States v. South-
Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).28) The Court's
failure to recognize these developments and apply the antitrust
laws to the burgeoning interstate business of professional baseball
allowed the National and American Leagues to continue strength-
ening their cartel, and through it, their grip on the game and the
players.
The power and influence of the National and American leagues
during this period was vividly illustrated by professional baseball's
"farm system," by which major league clubs, through ownership
and affiliation, were able to control minor league teams stocked
with large numbers of players subject to long-term reserve clause
requirements. The farm system, which was perfected by Branch
Rickey's St. Louis Cardinals in the 1920's, strengthened the major
league owners' control over baseball players in a number of re-
spects. First, being bound by the reserve clause, players in the
minor league system had no choice but to stay within that team's
system or leave professional baseball altogether. Second, low minor
league salaries helped pressure major league players to reduce
their own salary demands, lest they lose their jobs to a minor
26 Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259
U.S. 200, 208-209 (1922) (citing Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648 (1895)).
27 Hooper was itself a decision by a Court believing that it was constrained to follow prece-
dent-in that case the precedent of Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868). Both Paul
and Hooper dealt with the extent of State regulatory authority; Federal authority was not at
issue. Moreover, at the time of Paul, Congress had made scant use of its Commerce Clause pow-
ers, and the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause analysis at the time of Paul had generally treat-
ed the "interstate commerce" threshold as a bright line dividing Federal and State authority.
See, e.g., Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 282 (1875); Steamship Co. v. Postwardens, 73 U.S.
(6 Wall.) 31 (1867); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). With the creation of the
Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887, however, Congress clearly had signaled an intent to
assert its authority over key business sectors having interstate ramifications. The Sherman Act
of 1890 had, of course, gone even further, forbidding "[e]very contract, combination * * *, or
conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States." By 1922, there were
a number of Supreme Court opinions indicating that the Court had increasngly broadened its
view of the activities that came within the Federal Government's Commerce Clause Powers,
while holding that recognition of Federal authority in no way diminished State authority unless
Congress clearly preempted the field. See, e.g., Southern Ry. v. Reid, 222 U.S. 424, 434-435(1912); Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 398 (1905); Covington & Cincinnati Bridge
Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U.S. 204, 209-210 (1894); County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691, 699-
702 (1880).
2s 322 U.S. 533 (1944). Hooper had rested upon the notion that the issuance of insurance poli-
cies throughout several States did not constitute interstate commerce. But South-Eastern Un-
derwriters held that a fire insurance company conducting substantial interstate business was
involved in interstate commerce, and that it was therefore subject to the Sherman Act. Id. at
541 ("This business is not separated into 48 distinct territorial compartments which function
in isolation from each other. Interrelationship, interdependence, and integration of activities in
all the states in which they operate are practical aspects of (these] companies' methods of doing
business.").
9league player willing to work at the major league level for less.
Third, major league omers were able to sell the contracts of minor
league players bound by reserve clauses.29
The antitrust exemption conferred upon professional baseball by
the Supreme Court in Federal Baseball went unchallenged for 25
years. The first challenge grew out of the 1946 attempt by entre-
preneurs in Mexico to establish a competitive new league by re-
cruiting players with promises of higher salaries. When the Mexi-
can entrepreneurs succeeded in signing 18 major league players,
the major leagues blacklisted all 18 players, and suspended them
for 5 years. 0 The major leagues also entered into agreements with
foreign leagues in the Caribbean, South and Central America, and
Canada not to hire the blacklisted players. And when the promot-
ers of the Mexican League failed financially and abandoned their
battle, the new leaders of that league entered into a like agreement
with the major leagues, to honor each other's player contracts, in-
cluding the reserve clause provisions.3'
With no place left to play, one of the suspended players, Danny
Gardella, brought suit under the antitrust laws challenging his
blacklisting. Apparently, the Supreme Court's recent broadening in
South-Eastern Underwriters of what constituted interstate com-
merce in the insurance context gave Mr. Gardella cause for hope.
And in the 1949 decision of Gardella v. Chandler,32 the Second Cir-
cuit held, in opinions by Judges Learned Hand and Jerome Frank,
that the advent of nationwide radio and television baseball game
broadcasts, in conjunction with the interstate movement of teams,
was enough to bring the business of professional baseball within
the definition of interstate commerce for purposes of the antitrust
laws. In his opinion, Judge Frank not only characterized the Fed-
eral Baseball decision as "an impotent zombie," but pointed out
that the exemption created by the decision had led to a pernicious
restraint on basic human liberty:
I think [Federal Baseball] should be * * * distinguished,
if possible, because * * * we have here a monopoly which,
in its effect on ball-players like the plaintiff, possesses
characteristics shockingly repugnant to moral principles
that, at least since the War Between the States, have been
basic in America, as shown by the Thirteenth Amendment
to the Constitution, condemning "involuntary servitude,"
and by subsequent Congressional enactments on that sub-
ject. For the "reserve clause," as has been observed, results
in something resembling peonage of the baseball player.3
Professional baseball quickly settled out of court with Gardella, but
by 1951 found itself defending eight additional antitrust suits.3 4
" See Abramson, supra note 18, at 72-73. See also Benjamin Rader, Baseball: A History of
Amerca's Game 134 (1972); NeI Sullivan, The Minors: The Struggles and the Triumph of Base-
ball's Poor Relation from 1876 to the Present 99-100 (1990); Lance Davis, Self-Regulation in
Baseball, 1909-1971, in Government and the Sports Business 349, 365 (1974); Murray Polner,
Branch Rickey 86 (1982).
'o See Abramson, supra note 18, at 73.
" See Sobel, supra note 23, at 7-19.
'2 172 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1949).
Id at 409 (citations omitted).
' See Zimbalist, Billions, supra note 14, at 13.
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Uncertain of its chances in the courts, professional baseball
turned to Congress. Three bills were introduced in the House-
each of which would have codified a blanket antitrust exemption
for all professional sports organizations. These bills were exten-
sively studied by Representative Emmanuel Celler's Subcommittee
on the Study of Monopoly Power (predecessor to the Subcommittee
on Economic and Commercial Law), which recommended against
their passage.35
Perhaps as significant as the Subcommittee's rejection of the bills
was the rationale for the rejection that was provided in the Sub-
committee's report. The report premised its reasoning and conclu-
sions on the expectation that Federal Baseball would be overru!ed:
The Supreme Court's decision in the Federal League
case has not been over-ruled. Nevertheless, as the various
opinions in the recent case of Gardella v. Chandler dem-
onstrate, it may be seriously doubted whether baseball
should now be regarded as exempt from the antitrust laws.
Since 1922, there have been important changes both in the
operations of organized baseball and also in the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the scope of the statutes enacted
pursuant to Congress' constitutional power to regulate
interstate commerce.36
The Subcommittee's assumption that the courts would apply
more current interstate commerce jurisprudence to overrule the
Court-created antitrust exemption of professional baseball proved
to be mistaken. Notwithstanding the judicial and legislative devel-
opments in the area during the 1940's and the first years of the
1950's, Federal Baseball was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in
the 1953 decision of Toolson v. New York Yankees.37 The case was
brought by George Toolson, a player in the New York Yankees'
farm system who objected to his reassignment from the Newark,
New Jersey, club to one in Binghamton, New York. When he re-
fused to report to the Binghamton club, the club placed him on its
"ineligible list," barring him completely from playing professional
baseball.3 8
The district court dismissed Mr. Toolson's claim without a trial,
holding: "If the Federal Baseball Club case is, as Judge Frank inti-
mates, an 'impotent zombie,' I feel that it is not my duty to so find
but that the Supreme Court should so declare."3 9 The Ninth Circuit
affirmed. 0 In a short per curiam opinion affirming the dismissal,
the Supreme Court avoided reconsideration of the interstate com-
merce question, emphasizing instead professional baseball's 30-year
reliance on the exemption:
The business [of baseball] has * * * been left for thirty
years to develop, on the understanding that it was not sub-
35 See 1951 House Hearings, supra note 16; Subcomm. on the Study of Monopoly Power of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, Organized Baseball, H. Rep. No. 2002, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1952) [hereinafter Celler Report).36Celler Report, supra note 35, at 228.
3346 U.S. 356 (1953).
"See generally Abramson, supra note 18, at 74.
39ooson v. New York Yankees, 101 F. Supp. 93, 95 (S.D. Cal. 1951), affd, 200 F.2d 198 (9th
Cir. 1952), affd, 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
'Toolson v. New York Yankees, 200 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1952), affd, 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
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ject to existing antitrust legislation. The present cases ask
us to overrule the prior decision and, with retrospective ef-
fect, hold the legislation applicable. We think that if there
are evils in this field which now warrant application to it
of the antitrust laws it should be by legislation."1
A series of court decisions holding other professional sports sub-
ject to the antitrust laws has only highlighted the anomalous sta-
tus of professional baseball's antitrust exemption.4 2 Meanwhile, the
phenomenal growth of baseball revenues from broadcast con-
tracts,4 3 coupled with the continued judicial acceptance of base-
ball's reserve clause, has led to increasingly difficult labor rela-
tions 44-- and pressure for additional congressional scrutiny.' 5
The next chapter in this history is the Supreme Court's redffir-
mation of Federal Baseball in the 1972 decision, Flood v. Kuhn.46
The case arose as a result of a trade between the St. Louis Car-
dinals and the Philadelphia Phillies. One traded player, Curt
Flood, refused to accept the trade and sign a contract with thc
Phillies, and instead challenged the reserve clause by bringing an
antitrust suit. Reiterating the rationale of its Toolson ruling, the
Supreme Court again stressed the "reliance" factor and stated it
was the responsibility of Congress, not the Judiciary, to change this
longstanding anomaly.
"Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. at 356, 357 (1953) (emphasis added).
"See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
"According to Marvin Miller, former executive director of the Major League Baseball rlayers
Association. player salaries rose insignificantly in the 20 years after World War 11, despite ateep
inflation, an by 1967 the average major league player salary was only $19,000. See Abramson,
supra note 18, at 74.
The average major league player salary for 1993 reportedly was $1.2 million. See Timothy K.
Smith and ir~e Norton, "Trowing Curves," Wall St. J., Apr. 2, 1993, at Al [hereinafter Smith
& Norton); Andrew Zimbalist, "Field of Schemes," The New Republic. Aug. 15, 1994, at 11 [here-
inafter Zimbalist, Field]. At this level overall players' salaries equal 50 to 58 percent of Major
League Baseball revenue. See Smith & Norton, supra. Such percentages are not considered par-
ticularly high for a labor-intensive business such as professional baseball: for example, advertis-
ing agencies and consulting firms generally spend between 50 percent and 60 percent of revenue
on worker pay, and law firms can spend as much as 75 percent on employee salaries. Id. It is
also important to recognize that a major league player's average professional life is less than
6 years; and that the median baseball Is er salary for 1993 reportedly was $410,000-far less
than the average salay See Andrew Zmblist, "Baseball Economics and Antitrust Immunity,"
4 Seton Hall J. Sport Law 287, 291 (1994) [hereinafter Zimbalist, "Immunity") ("Of those who
make it [to the Major Leagues], only one in eight stays for more than six years"); Zimbalist,
Field, supra.
"The industry's labor difficulties were highlighted by the 1966 holdout of the Los Angeles
Dodgers' star pitchers Sandy Koufax and Don Drysdale. Kourax and Drysdale, who were pri-
manly responsible for their team's World Series victory in the previous year, held out for 32
days into the season before settling with the team for a combined contract of $240,000, after
having threatened to bring suit against the team under California's anti-peonage laws. See
Abramson, supra note 18, at 75.
"One of the better known attempts by Congress to review baseball's unique antitrust status
occurred in 1958, when then-New York Yankees manager Casey Stengel and star center fielder
Mickey Mantle testified before the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly. Stengel's
testimony included an extended speech highlighted by his famous double talk (known as
"Stengelese"), by which he managed to speak for 45 minutes without ever taking a position on
the pending legislation.
Asked by Tennessee Senator Estes Kefauver why a bill should be passed, Stengel answered
with rambling testimony marked by bursts of laughter from the audience:
Mr. KEFAUVER. Mr. Stengel, I am not sure that I made my question clear. [Laughter.]
Mr. STENGEL Yes, sir. Well that is all right. I am not sure I am going to answer
yours perfectly either. [Laughter.]
Mantle then brought down the house by stating, "My views are just about the same as
Casey's." Organized Professional Team Sports: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and
Monopoly of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 85th Cong., 2nd Sess. 13, 24 (1958). See also Ward
& Burns, supra note 12, at 354-355.
"407 U.S. 258 (1972).
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Justice Blackmun's majority opinion is perhaps best known for
its frequent romantic homages to professional baseball's heritage
and place in our Nation's history.'? While Flood followed the
Court's decisions in Federal Baseball and Toolson, the Justices visi-
bly wrestled with the bizarre results these decisions had wrought.
Even the majority opinion characterized the exemption as "an
anomaly" and "an aberration confined to baseball."48 And in his
dissent, Justice Douglas proclaimed professional baseball's anti-
trust exemption to be a "derelict in the stream of law that [the
Court), its creator, should remove." 49 In the end, though, the ma-
jority concluded that "what the Court said in Federal Baseball in
1922 and what it said in Toolson in 1953, we say again here in
1972: the remedy, if any is indicated, is for congressional, and not
judicial, action."so In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger
emphasized this point by unabashedly declaring: "[Ilt is time the
Congress acted to solve this problem."5 I
One of the more remarkable aspects of the Flood opinion is that
after inferring congressional intent from congressiona "positive in-
action," the Court went on to hold that Congress had preempted
State antitrust law enforcement in the area.52 This judicial con-
struction of the law has severely limited the States' power to en-
force their own antitrust laws against professional baseball for ac-
tivities covered by the judicially created exemption from Federal
antitrust laws.
ronically, in earlier times, the author of the original 1922 Fed-
eral Baseball decision that spawned professional baseball's
nonstatutory antitrust exemption-Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr.-would have taken issue with the Court's illogical adherence to
any precedent that flew in the face of fundamentally changed cir-
cumstances over the years. In criticizing such blind acceptance
nearly 90 years prior to Flood and 35 years prior to his own opin-
ion in Federal Baseball, Justice Holmes noted:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law
than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It
is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was
laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply
persists from the blind imitation of the past.5 3
C. Recent history-Loss of the reserve clause and the collusion cases
Professional baseball's reserve clause, as upheld in Federal Base-
ball, Toolson, and Flood, permitted the major league clubs to exclu-
sively reserve the right to contract with and employ players, deny-
ing them the right to consider alternative job offers in baseball.
"Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court included references to Ring Lardner's short stories;
Ernest L. Thayer's poem, "Casey at the Bat"; and some 88 professional baseball player greats.
Id. at 262-264.
"Id. at 282.
49Id. at 286 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 285 (emphasis added).
lId. at 286.
52Id. at 284-285 (embracing the lower courts' reasoning that State antitrust regulation would
conflict with Federal policy and that national uniformity is required relative to the regulation
of baseball and its reserve system; and that, as the burden on interstate commerce outweighs
the States' interest in regulating baseball's reserve system, the Commerce Clause precludes the
application of State antitrust law).
-Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., "The Path of the Law," 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 469 (1887).
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Baseball's owners insisted that the reserve clause was necessary to
maintain the "competitive balance" of the game.5 4 However, devel-
opments since the Flood case have disproved this contention. In
1975, the reserve clause was invalidated and player "free agency"
was born when an arbitrator ruled, in response to a grievance filed
by major league players Andy Messersmith and Dave McNally,
that the language of the uniform player's contract and certain
major league rules did not provide the clubs with a legal right to
perpetually reserve a player's services.55 The owners' loss of the re-
serve clause does not seem to have disrupted the competitive bal-
ance of the game, as prophesied by the owners, but rather to have
enhanced it.56
Following the arrival of free agency in baseball, beginning in
1985, baseball owners organized a surreptitious industry-wide boy-
cott of free agents that continued for several years and led the
players to file three labor grievances alleging collusion.5 7 These
collusion cases" have been well documented in the press. A lead
article in the Wall Street Journal described how then-Commis-
sioner Peter Ueberroth chided the owners for being "dumb" and
"stupid" in bidding on free agents; and he was quoted by an owner
to have closed a meeting where the collusion was planned by say-
ing, "Well, you are smart businessmen. You all agree we have a
problem. Go solve it."58
The first two grievances stemmed from the owners' agreement
not to bid on each other's free agents during the 1985 and 1986 off-
seasons; both times, the arbitrator found in favor of the players. 59
But the owners' collusion had taken its toll. For example, it had
left Atlanta Braves player Bob Horner no choice but to sign with
a Japanese baseball club. And Montreal Expos star Andre Dawson
had been able to sign with a new club only after he publicly an-
nounced he would sign a 1-year, nonguaranteed contract with the
Chicago Cubs for any figure the Cubs chose-a figure that report-
edly turned out to be a 60-percent reduction from his previous
year's salary.6o
"See generally Zimbabst, Billions. supra note 14, at 13-14. See also, e.g., Inquiry Into Pto1fes-
sional Sports: Hearings before the House Select Comm. on Professional Sports (Part 1,. 94th
Cong, 2d Ses 19 (1976) [hereinafter 1976 Select Committee Hearings (Part 1)] (statement of
Bowie K. Kuhn) ("We believe that a reserve system remains necessary to ensure the continu-
ation of 'honest and vigorous' competition in Baseball.").
"See Professional Baseball Clubs, 66 LA 101 (1975), affd sub nom. Kansas City Royals v.
Major League Baseball Players Assh, 409 F. Supp. 233, af'd, 532 F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1976). See
also Zimbabst. Immunity. supra note 43, at 290. (The district and circuit courts held that the
arbitration provision of the collective bargaining agreement was broad enough to cover the dis-
pute in question-namely, the players' grievances.)
,&See James Quirk and Rodney D. Fort Pay Dirt 284-285 (1992) [hereinafter Quirk & Fort]
ex plainng various studies showing no statistical distinction with regard to competitive balance
in the American League in the 14 years following the introduction of ree agency, and indicating
that the National League actually experienced increased competitive balance under free agency).
See also Zimbabst, Bailbons, supra note 14, at 14, and authorities cited therein (argument that
reserve clause could preserve competitive balance rebutted by prevalence of player sales over
the years)
"See generally Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. The 26 Major League Clubs, Grievance
No 86-2 (1987) (Roberts, Arb) [hereinafter Grievance No. 86-2]; Major League Baseball Players
Ass'n v. The 26 Major League Clubs, Grievance No. 87-3 (1988) (Nicolau. Arb.) [hereinafter
Grevance No. 87-31; Major League Baseball Players Assn v. The 26 Major League Clubs, Griev-
ance No. 88-1 (1990) (Nicolau, Arb.) (hereinafter Grievance No. 88-1].
"John Helyar. How Peter Ueberroth Led the Major Leagues in the "Collusion Era," Wall St.
J . May 20, 1994, at Al [hereinafter Helyar].
"See Grievance No. 86-2, supra note 57; Grievance No. 87-3, supra note 57.
-See Zimbalist, Billions, supra note 14, at 25.
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The third grievance concerned an "information bank" used by the
owners in the 1987 off-season to share information about their var-
ious offers to free agents. The players alleged that the purpose and
effect of the bank was to control player salaries and contract
lengths. The players prevailed on this grievance as well,6 1 and the
owners subsequently agreed to pay a record $280 million in dam-
ages stemming from the three grievance decisions. 62 Had the anti-
trust laws also been available to the players, there could have been
the additional deterrent effect of treble damages.
D. Scope of baseball's nonstatutory antitrust exemption
Although the Supreme Court has upheld professional baseball's
reserve clause against antitrust challenge on three separate occa-
sions, it is unclear how far the exemption extends. Baseball owners
have asserted that the scope is practically unlimited, relating
broadly to the entire business of baseball. 63 A number of courts,
however, have held that the exemption is limited in scope. In Hen-
derson Broadcasting Corp. v. Houston Sports Ass'n.,64 a Federal
district court in Texas held the exemption inapplicable to local
broadcasting. And in Postema v. National League of Professional
Baseball Clubs,65 a Federal district court in New York held the ex-
emption inapplicable to alleged anticompetitive actions taken wiLh
respact to umpires.
More recently, two courts narrowed the scope of the exemption
even further, holding that it applies only to the reserve clause sys-
tem. Both cases concerned the owners' refusal to approve the relo-
cation of the San Francisco Giants to St. Petersburg, Florida. The
first case was Piazza v. Major League Baseball.66 In denying the
owners' motion for summary judgment, the Piazza court explained
that "[i]n 1972 . . . the Court in Flood v. Kuhn stripped from Fed-
eral Baseball and Toolson any precedential value those cases may
have had beyond the particular facts there involved, i.e., the re-
serve clause."67 Piazza's rationale was adopted by the Supreme
Court of Florida in Butterworth v. National League of Professional
Baseball Clubs,68 in which the court reversed a lower court ruling
that had quashed a civil investigative demand issued in connection
with the State's antitrust review of the owners' refusal to approve
the relocation. The court noted the disagreement among the courts
Grievance No. 88-i, supra note 57.
See, e.g., Murray Chass, "Record Collusion Damagei Reported," N.Y Times. Nov. 4, 1990,
at G1.
.See, e.g., Butterworth v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 1994 Fla. LEXIS
1531. '9 (Fla. 1994). However, in answer to Chairman Brooks' question as to whether baseball's
antitrust exemption should give baseball owners the nht to conspire to squash the development
of a rival league by denying it access to stadiums an broadcast revenue, Mr. Selig responded:
"No, I do not believe it does." Baseball's Antitrust Exemption: Hearings before the Subcomm.
on Economic and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciay, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.
(Sept. 22, 1994) (forthcoming) [hereinafter September 1994 House Hearngs] (tr. at 70).
1'541 F. Supp. 263 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
65 799 F. Supp. 1475 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
6833 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
67Id. at 436 (quoting and citing Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258,282-283 (1972)). But see Charles
0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 P.2d 527, 541 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978); accord
Professional Baseball Schs. & Clubs v. Kuhn, 693 F.2d 1085, 1086 (11th Cir. 1982). Major
League Baseball reportedly has settled the Piazza suit, which concerned both antitrust and defa-
matiwn allegations, through a payment in excess of $6 million and a written apology. See Mi
chael Bamberger, "Baseball Apologizes to Rejected Investors," Phil. Inquirer, Nov. 3, 1994, atD5.
e6Butterworth v. National League of Profe-sional Baseball Clubs, 1994 Fla. LEXIS 1531 (Fla.
1994).
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as to the scope of professional baseball's antitrust exemption, but
embraced the Piazza court's determination that Flood repudiated
the stare decisis "rule" of Federal Baseball and Toolson (namely,
that the business of baseball is not interstate commerce and thus
not subject to the Sherman Antitrust Act>-and left only the stare
decisis "result" (namely, the exemption of baseball's reserve system
from Federal antitrust law):
As explained by the district court in Piazza, prior to
Flood lower courts were bound by both the rule of Federal
Baseball and Toolson (that the business of baseball is not
interstate commerce and thus not within the Sherman
Antitrust Act) and the result of those decisions (that base-
ball's reserve system is exempt from the antitrust laws).
Because Flood invalidated the rule of Federal Baseball and
Toolson by declaring that baseball is interstate commerce,
the Piazza court concluded that no rule from the earlier
cases binds the lower courts as a matter of stare decisis.
Instead, lower courts are only bound by the disposition of
the case based upon the facts presented, namely that the
reserve system is exempt from the antitrust laws."6
Recognizing the current judicial uncertainty over the scope of
professional baseball's antitrust exemption, the Committee wishes
to make it abundantly clear that in taking action to permit the
antitrust laws to apply to certain conduct in the particular context
of H.R. 4994, the Committee is in no way endorsing a view that
the exemption extends beyond the facts of Federal Baseball,
Toolson, or Flood-or even endorsing the application of the exemp-
tion in those specific factual circumstances. At the same time, the
Committee does not wish to repeat the mistake of the Celler Sub-
committee on the Study of Monopoly Power, which in 1952 chose
not to act to repeal baseball's nonstatutory exemption, based in
part on the assumption that the Supreme Court would overrule
Federal Baseball.70
E. Application of the antitrust laws to other sports
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Federal Baseball, the
courts have held the antitrust laws to apply to other professional
sports, including professional football, basketball, and hockey.7 '
The scope of activities prohibited under the antitrust laws as ap-
plied to these other sports is circumscribed in important respects,
however, by two antitrust doctrines of general applicability-the
"rule of reason" and the nonstatutory labor exemption. A descrip-
tion of these judicially created doctrines follows.
NId. at '12 (citing Piazza, 331 F. Supp. 420, 437-438 (E.D. Pa. 1993)).
'See supra notes 3-36 and accompanying text.
"See Radoutch v. National Footoad League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957) (professional football); Hay-
wood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971) (professional basketball); Nassau Sports
v. Peters, 352 F. Supp. 870 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (professional hockey). Indeed, in every other instance
in which a court has had to decide whether an organized sport is subject to the antitrust laws,
the court has decided in the affirmative. See Desson v. Professional Golfers Ass'n. of America,
358 F.2d 165 (Oth Cir.), cert. denied. 385 U.S. 846 (1968) (professional golf); Washington State
Bowling Pronrictors Ass'n v. Pacific Lanes, Inc., 356 F.2d 371 (9th Cir.) (professional bowling),
cert, denied. 384 U.S. 963 (1966); Amateur Softball Asan. of America v. United States, 467 F.
2d 312 (10'h Cir. 1972) (amateur softball).
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The rule of reason
Section 1 of the Sherman Act literally prohibits "every contract,
combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade." But the Supreme
Court quickly recognized that every commercial agreement "re-
strains" trade in some fashion-even if only between two parties-
and that Congress surely did not intend for courts to construe the
Act to invalidate every agreement, but rather, only those agree-
ments imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition.7 2 Some
types of agreements-such as price fixin -have been shown re-
peatedly by their nature and necessary effect to be so plainly anti-
competitive that no further elaborate study is needed to establish
their illegality; they are "illegal per se."7 3 For most types of agree-
ments, however, the reasonableness of a challenged restraint can
only be evaluated by balancing its procompetitive and anticompeti-
tive effects-through an analysis of the facts peculiar to the busi-
ness, the history of the restraint, and the reasons why the restraint
was imposed. 74 The requirement that such a balancing analysis be
undertaken is known as the "rule of reason." The courts have long
recognized that a professional sports league is a joint venture,
whose product-a series of contests leading to a championship-re-
quires a level of business coordination beyond that required in
most other industries.7 5 Accordingly, in evaluating the joint con-
duct of sports teams acting under the auspices of their league,
courts have generally applied the more tolerant "rule of reason." 76
Nonstetutory labor exemption
In order to more closely harmonize the Nation's antitrust and
labor laws, beginning in 1914 Congress by statute has chosen to
2See United States v. Joint Traffic Assn, 171 U.S. 505 (1898); Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1(1911); Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231,238(1918).
7See, e.g., National Soc'y of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978);
Northern Pac. Rv. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). The Supreme Court has established
that it is only after considerable experience with certain business relationships that courts may
classify those relationships as per se violations of the Sherman Act. See United States v. Topco
Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); accord Broadcast Music v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S.
1(1979).
7See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); National Soc'y of Pro.
fessional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978).
7s See, e.g., Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 619 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dis-
missed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of Univ. of
Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85, 86 (1984).
Some professional sports leagues have argued that their teams' separate ownership should be
disregarded and the league treated as a "single entity" for purposes of antitrust analysis. See,
e.g., Los Angeles Mem. Coliseum Com'n v. National Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1387 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984); San Francisco Seals, Ltd. v. National Hockey League,
379 F. Supp. 966 (C.D. Cal. 1974). See also Gary Roberts, The Single Entity Status of Profes-
sional Sports Leagues Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act: An Alternative View, 60 Tul. L. Rev.
562 (1986); Myron C. Grauer, Recognition of the National Football League as a Single Entity
Under Section I of the Sherman Act: Implications of the Consumer Welfare Model, 82 Mich.
L. Rev. 1 (1983). Since there can be no "contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of
trade" unless the conduct involves two or more separate entities, such treatment would immu-
nize sports leagues against most antitrust liability. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube
Corp., 467 U.S. 762 (1984). However, the courts have rejected the argument that sports leagues
constitute a single entity. See, e.g., Los Angeles Mem. Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football
League, supra; North Am. Soccer Leaue v. National Football League, 670 F.2d 1249, 1257-1259
(2d Cir.), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982).
See, e.g., Naional Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma,
468 U.S. 85, 86 (1984); Los Angeles M . Coliseum Commn v. National Football League. 726
F.2d 1381, 1386 (9th Cir. 1984). Indeed, Congress has codified this more favorable, ruleof-rea-
son treatment of joint ventures that do not involve naked anticompetitive collusion, first for
R&D Joint ventures in the National Cooperative Research Act of 1984, Pub. L 98-462, 98 Stat.
1815, and more recently for production joint ventures in the National Cooperative Production
Amendments of 1993, Pub. L. 103-42, 107 Stat. 117.
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protect from antitrust assault the formation of labor unions and
their organizational and collective activities as sanctioned under
the labor laws.r In addition, in order to further encourage Con-
gressional policy favoring collective bargaining, as embodied by the
National Labor Relations Act,78 the courts have recognized that
certain union-employer agreements should be accorded a limited
nonstatutory labor antitrust exemption.
The Supreme Court first set forth the nonstatutory exemption in
1965 in Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co, in which a
three-justice plurality held that a restriction on the number of
hours butchers could be required to work was not in violation of
the antitrust laws because the union had obtained it "through bona
fide, arm's length bargaining in pursuit of its own labor union poli-
cies, and not at the behest of or in combination with nonlabor
groups." 79 The Court elaborated the exemption 10 years later in
Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union
No. 100, holding that a picket to secure a contractor's agreement
to subcontract plumbing and electrical work only to firms with a
current contract with the union violated the Sherman Act. The
Court explained the rationale for and the limits to the nonstatutory
labor exemption as follows:
The non-statutory exemption has its source in the strong
labor policy favoring the association of employees to elimi-
nate competition over wages and working conditions.
Union success in organizing workers and standardizing
wages ultimately will affect price competition among em-
ployers, but the goals of federal labor law never could be
achieved if this effect on business competition were held a
violation of the antitrust laws. The Court therefore has ac-
knowledged that labor policy requires tolerance for the
lessening of business competition based on differences in
wages and working conditions.80
However, it is well established that implied exemptions to the
antitrust laws, such as the judicially created nonstatutory labor ex-
emption, are strongly disfavored 81 and are to be construed as being
no broader than is clearly necessitated by the public policy requir-
ing their recognition.82 Thus, the nonstatutory labor exemption set
forth in Jewel Tea and Connell is inherently limited. 83
77In response to Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908), in which the Supreme Court held a
union's nationwide secondary boycott of nonunion-made hats to be violative of the Sherman Act,
Congress enacted Section 6 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17, explicitly exempting the operation
of labor organizations from the antitrust laws by stating that labor is not an article of com-
merce. To bolster section 6, Congress subequently enacted section 20 of the Clayton Act, 29
U S.C. 152, and later the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §J 101-110, 113-115, to prevent the
antitrust laws from being used to enjoin labor organizational and strike activities that are au-
thorized under the labor laws.
7229 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq.
'381 U.S. 676,689-90 (1965).
so421 U.S. 616,622-623 (1975).
o See, e.g., United States v. Philadelphia Nad1 Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-51 (1963) ("Repeals
of the antitrust laws by implication from a regulatory statute are strongly disfavored, and ave
only been found in cases of plain repug cy between the antitrust and regulatory provisions.").
s2 See, e.g., California Retail Liquor lers Ass' v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105-
106 (1980); Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 733 (1973); Silver
v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963).
*1Connell, 421 U.S. at 621-622.
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In 1976, in Mackey v. National Football League,84 the Eighth Cir-
cuit while concluding that the nonstatutory labor exemption would
apply to some restraints imposed by professional sports team own-
ers in connection with collective bargaining agreements, held that
the particular player restraint involved in that case was outside
the scope of the exemption.8S (The restraint at issue in Mackey was
the so-called "Rozelle Rule," named after then-NFL commissioner
Pete Rozelle, whereby an NFL team signing a player after the play-
er's contract with another team expired was required to provide the
player's former team with compensation, which could even take the
form of other players or draft choices.) Mackey held that the
nonstatutory labor exemption applies only where the restraint: (i)
primarily affects only parties to the collective bargaining agree-
ment relationship; (ii) concerns a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining; and (iii) is a product of bona fide arm's-length bargain-
ing.86 The Mackey three-pronged test has become the standard
used to apply the nonstatutory labor exemption in other sports
player restraint cases.87
The court in Mackey did not address the extent, if any, to which
the nonstatutory exemption continues after the expiration of a col-
lective bargaining agreement.8 8 But in recent years a number of
courts have considered the issue. For example, in the 1987 decision
in Bridgeman v. National Basketball Association, a Federal district
court in New Jersey held the exemption lasts only so long as the
employer continues to impose a particular restriction unchanged
from the expired agreement, and reasonably believes that the chal-
lenged practice or a close variant of it will be incorporated in the
next collective bargaining agreement.8 9 In the 1988 decision in
Powell v. National Football League ("Powell I"),90 a Federal district
court in Minnesota, reviewing the lawfulness of certain restraints
on player free agency unilaterally imposed by the NFL, held that
the nonstatutory labor exemption continues only until the parties
have reached an "impasse" in their collective bargaining.9 ' And in
1991, in Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., a Federal district court in the
District of Columbia ruled that the nonstatutory labor exemption
ends simultaneously with the expiration of the collective bargain-
ing agreement. 92
"543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
"Id. at 616-616.
"Id. at 613-614. The Eighth Circuit ruled that the "Rozelle Rule" met the first 2 prongs of
the standard, but that there was no bona fide arm's length bargaining over the Rule Rather
the court held, the Rule had simply remained unchanged since being unilaterally promulgated
by the NFL in 1963. Id. at 616.
87See, e.g., Powell v. National Football League, 930 F.2d 1293, 1297 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. de-
nied, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991); McCourt v. California qports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1198 (6th Cir.
1979); Bridgeman v. National Basketball Ass'n, 675 F. Supp. 960, 964 (D.N.J. 1987); Zimmer*
man v. National Football League, 632 F. Supp. 398, 403-404 (D.D.C. 1986); Wood v. National
Basketball Ass'n, 602 F. Supp. 525, 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). The Mackey court concluded that the
Rozelle Rule did not meet the third prong of the test-that the restraint be a product of bona
fide arm's-length bargaining-because the Rule had originally been unilaterally imposed by the
owners, and had simply been carried forward in later agreements without ever being the subject
of bona fide arm's-length collective bargaining.
*See Mackey, 543 V.2d at 616 n.18.
89675 F. Supp. 960, 967 (D.N.J. 1987).
90678 F. Supp. 777, 788-789 (D. Minn. 1988), rev'd, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. de-
nied, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991).
91The court defined "impasse" as the point at which "there ap no realistic possibility that
continuing discussions concerning the provision at issue would be fruitful." 678 F. Supp. at 788.
92782 F. Supp. 125, 130 (D.D.C. 1991), appeals docketed, Nos. 93-7165, 94-7071 (D.C. Cir.
Sept. 27, 1993, Mar. 31, 1994).
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In contrast, two courts have held that the nonstatutory labor ex-
emption continues to apply even after impasse, for so long as the
"labor relationship" continues between the players' union and the
owners: Powell v. National Football League ("Powell II," reversing
Powell I); 93 and National Basketball Association v. Williams.9 4 The
Powell II and Williams decisions have been widely criticized by
legal commentators,9 5 and both the Bush and Clinton Justice De-
partments have filed amicus briefs in opposition to the positions re-
flected in these cases.96 Powell II and Williams, in extending the
duration of the nonstatutory labor exemption beyond impasse, cre-
ate a potentially interminable immunity from the antitrust laws.
By sanctioning conduct which would otherwise be seen as collusive,
the decisions certainly do not appear to serve any legitimate anti-
trust policy; as the dissent in Powell II noted, such an indefinite
exemption eliminates "the owners' fear of the antitrust lever; there-
fore, little incentive exists for the owners to ameliorate anti-
competitive behavior.9 ' * * *" And by impeding constructive labor
management dialogue and making collective bargaining even more
difficult to achieve in the future,9 8 the decisions seem to turn on
its head the original rationale for the nonstatutory labor exemp-
tion-the encouragement of collective bargaining.
F. Historical arguments concerning outright repeal of baseball's
antitrust exemption
The merits (and demerits) of the nonstatutory antitrust exemp-
tion granted professional baseball by the Supreme Court in Federal
Baseball have been extensively reviewed and debated in the seven
decades following the decision. There have been a number of con-
9930 F.2d 1293. 1304 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991). The court concluded
that the NFL's "Right of First Refusal/Compensation" system--a successor to the "Rozelle Rule"
--satisfied the Mackey test. The court noted that the system had been incorporated into the re-
cently expired collective bargaining agreement, as well as the previous one, both of which had
been "negt tiated in good faith and at arm's length." 930 F.2d at 1303. The court also noted that
negotiating impasses were often temporary ann in fact could ultimately help move negotiations
forward-that under the labor laws, impasse is regarded as "a recurring feature in the bargain-
ing process and one which is not sufficiently destructive of group bargaining to justify with-
drawal." Id. at 1299 (citing Charles D. Bona-no Linen Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404
(1982)). The court held that an agreed restraint thus "conceived in an ongoing collective bargain-
ing relationship" and "clothed with union approval" would continue to be insulated from anti-
trust challenge for as long beyond impasse as labor grievances before the National Labor Rela-
tions Board are still pending or possible. Id. at 1302-1304.
84547 F. Supp. 1069 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (player challenge to restraints imposed from an expired
collective bargaining agreement without the players union's consent), appeal docketed, 94-7709
(2d Cir. Jul. 19, 1994).
"See, e.g., Ethan Lock, Powell v. National Football League: The Eighth Circuit Sacks the Na-
tional Football League Players Association, 67 Den. L. Rev. 135, 151-153 (1990); Daniel C. Nest-
er, "Labor Exemption to Antitrust Scrutiny in Professional Sports", 15 S. Ill. U. L.J. 123, 136-
140 (1990); Note, "Releasing Superstars From Peonage: Union Consent and the Nonstatutory
Labor Exemption," 104 Harv. L. Rev. 874, 891 (1991); Note, "When Does the Buzzer Sound?:
The Nonstatutory Labor Exemption in Professional Sports", 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1045, 1064-1065
(1994); Note, Powell v. National Football League: "Modified Impasse Standard Determines Scope
of Labor Exemption", 1990 Utah L. Rev. 381, 395-397.
"See Supreme Court Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Powell v. National Foot-
ball League. On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit (No. 89-1421). cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991); Second Circuit Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae, National Basketball Association v. Williams, On Appeal From
an Order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (No. 94-
7709).
"930 F.2d at 1307 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
"Powell II has had the effect of forcing the football players' union to decertify and cease all
bargaining in order to permit its members to bring an antitrust challenge. See Powell v. Na-
tional Football League ("McNeil"), 764 F. Supp. 1351 (D. Minn. 1991).
20
gressional bills and hearings concerning the issue.9 9 And two con-
gressional committees have previously filed reports.
The first report, filed in 1952 by the House Judiciary Subcommit-
tee on the Study of Monopoly Power, chaired by Emmanuel Celler,
recommended against adoption of legislation that would have codi-
fied professional baseball's antitrust exemption.1oo The Celler Re-
port concluded that a legislative grant of complete immunity to
baseball would be unwise because of the potential that such power
would be used arbitrarily:
If a blanket immunity were granted, all appeals to the
courts from a possibly arbitrary decision by the rulers of
professional baseball would be foreclosed. In the past the
reserve clause has been employed as a war measure to
fight the development of competing leagues, sometimes at
the expense of individual players. Although instances of
arbitrary exercise of power have been rare, they have oc-
curred in the past. The possibility, however remote, that
power will be misused in the future makes it unwise per-
petually to preclude resort to the courts in such cases.' 0
A second congressional report grew out of the investigation con-
ducted by the House Select Committee on Professional Sports. The
Select Committee was established by the House of Representatives
in 1976, with a mandate to investigate the apparent instability pre-
vailing in professional baseball, basketball, football, and hockey,
and to assess and report on the need for any remedial legisla-
tion.10 2 In its 1977 Final Report, issued after some 28 hearings, the
Select Committee concluded that "adequate justification does not
wThere have been numerous bills and resolutions introduced relative to Major League Base-
ball's antitrust exemption. See, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 281 n.17 (1972) (listing 16
bills that had been considered by Congress between 1953 and 1972). See also, e.g.. H.R. 11078,
93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973); H.R..3789, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 11382, 94th Cong..
2d Sess. (1976); H.R. 11940, 95th Cong.. 2d Sess. (1978); H.R. 1239, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979);
H.R. 2129, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); S. 130.3, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979); S. 1476, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 3287, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 3094, 98th Cong.. 1st Sess.
(1983); H.R. 2687, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. (1987); H.R. 2593, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (1989); H.R.
2976, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); S. Res. 172, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. (1991); H.R. 5489, 102d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); H.R. 108, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 1549. 103d Cong.. 1st Sess.
(1993); S. 500, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. (1993); H.R. 4965, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); S. 2380.
103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); S. Andt. 2601, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); H.R. 4994, 103d Cong..
2d Sess. (1994). .
Congress has conducted a number of hearings on the matter over the years. See Flood v.
Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 281 n.18 (1972) (listing hearings conducted between 1953 and 1972). See
also, e.g., Inquiry into Professional Sports: Hearings before the House Select Comm. on Profes-
siona! Sports (Part I and 2), 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 425-439 (1976) [hereinafter 1976 Select Com-
mittee Hearings]; Antitrust Policy and Professional Sports: Hearings Before Subcomm. on Mo-
nopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st and 2d
Sess. 23 (1982) (hereinafter 1982 House Hearings]; Baseball's Antitrust Immunity: Hearing be-
fore the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopolies, and Business Rights of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary on the Validity of Major League Baseball's Exemption from the Antitrust Laws, 102d
Cong., 2d Sess. 406 (1992) (hereinafter 1992 Senate Hearings]; Baseball's Antitrust Exemption:
Hearings before the Subcomm. on Economic and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) [hereinafter March 1993 House Hearings); Can a Weak
Commissioner Protect the "Best Interests" of the Game? St. Petersburg, Florida Hearings before
the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopolies and Business Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (March 21, 1994) (forthcoming); September 1994 House Hearings,
supra note 63.
'o See sipra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
ion Cellar Report, supra note 35, at 230.
O2Final Report, Inquiry Into Professional Sports, House Select Comm. on Professional Sports,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1977) [hereinafter 1977 Select Committee Report].
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exist for baseball's special exemption from the antitrust
laws * * *." 03
During and subsequent to the hearings conducted by the Select
Committee, the Justice Department has consistently and forcefully
advocated. full repeal of baseball's antitrust exemption. In 1976,
Deputy Assistant Attorney General Joe Sims was unequivocal in
expressing the Department's view that the exemption should be
lifted:
Simply stated, I know of no economic or other data
which supports in any way the conclusion that professional
sports should be exempted from the antitrust laws. That
being the case, this question should be laid to rest, unless
and until baseball or another professional sports industry
comes forth with a compelling case to apply different com-
mercial rules to their business than are common in this
country.1 04
Sims further explained that current antitrust principles, includ-
ing rule of reason analysis, would recognize and take into account
those practices within a sport or league that are "essential to the
continuing viability of the sport or league," and noted that several
sports antitrust decisions have in fact taken industry needs into ac-
count in their analyses.10 According to Sims, "[tihe availability of
this sort of an analysis * * * marks as absurd any claim that the
antitrust laws cannot rationally be applied to the professional
sports business."10 6 These views were reiterated by the Reagan
Justice Department during a 1982 hearing, when Deputy Assistant
Attorney General Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr. testified:
It has been the position of the Antitrust Division for
some time that baseball's exemption is an anachronism
and should be eliminated. I reaffirm that position today. I
know of no economic data or other persuasive justification
for o.ntinuing to treat baseball differently from the other
professional- team sports, all of which are now clearly sub-
ject to the antitrust laws. As I stated earlier, antitrust
courts have sufficient flexibility in the rule of reason anal-
ysis to take into account any special considerations that
may be found to exist in baseball.107
For their part, baseball's owners have repeatedly sought congres-
sional support for the antitrust exemption granted in the Federal
Baseball case, 108 focusing on a number of rationales they believe
justify their exemption. As the Committee reviews the owners' ar-
guments, it is important to note that, as with any other group ad-
vocating an antitrust exemption, the burden of persuasion lies with
the owners.109 It is also important to note that a number of the po-
1lId. at 60.
,04 1976 Select Committee Hearings (Part 2), supra note 99, at 288.20 Id. at 289.
1oe Id.
107 1982 House Hearings, supra note 99, at 23.
1osSee generally supra note 99 and accompanying text.
09As the Justice Department has repeatedly noted:
[T1he burden of proof for purposes of the decision making process should be on the
proponents of continuing antitrust immunity to show a convIDcing public interest ra-
Continued
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tential concerns raised by the owners and set forth in the following
pages are not implicated by H.R. 4994, which relates only to the
unilateral imposition of anticompetitive terms and conditions of
employment.
1. Baseball is not a business
The rationale for professional baseball's nonstatutory exemption
from the antitrust laws, as articulated by Justice Holmes in the
Federal Baseball case, was that professional baseball was not
"trade or commerce in the commonly accepted use of those
words."o1 0 However, as of 1993, Major League Baseball has ex-
ploded into a $1.9 billion-per-year industry,"' and it is now indis-
putable that it not only involves interstate commerce, but con-
stitutes a significant interstate financial enterprise." 2 Much of this
growth has occurred in the last 20 years, with gross revenues hav-
ing grown more than tenfold since 1975.113 And the indirect fiscal
impact of professional baseball is even more significant: the most
recent strike has been estimated to have cost an average of 1,249
full- and part-time jobs per major league city, and to have cost the
local economy of each major league city an average of $1.16 million
per home game. 114
Despite the size and financial impact of professional baseball, its
owners have long asserted that their industry is distinguished by
its lack of profitability,' 5 and prior to the most recent strike had
predicted industrywide losses of some $100 million for the 1994
season.'16 However, it has also been noted that baseball franchises
may have strong incentives to generate paper losses in order to ob-
tain tax writeoffs and obtain more favorable financial conditions
during negotiations with labor unions and municipalities." 7 As a
tionale for abandoning competition. Each existing or proposed exemption should be jus-titied in terms of empirically demonstrated characteristics of the specific industry that
make competition unworkable. The defects in the marketplace necessary to justify an
antitrust exemption must be substantial and clear.
Report to the President and the Attorney General of the National Commission for the Review
of The Antitrust Laws and Procedures (Jan. 22, 1979). See also 1976 Select Committee Hearings(Part 2), supra note 99, at 299 (statement of Joe Sims) ("the proponent of an antitrust exemption
has the burden of establishing the necessity of getting that antitrust exemption."); 1982 House
Hearings, supra note 99 (statement of Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr.) and accompanying text.
no259 U.S. at 208.
n'Roger G. 11zl, Baseball Economics in the 1990's: A Report to the Major League Baseball
Players Association 3 (Aug. 1994) [hereinafter Noll Report] (to be printed at appendix 1 of Sep-
tember 1994 House Hearings, supra note 63). This report was based on owner-provided financial
data covering the years 1991-1993, and on pre-strike forecasts for 1994.122See id.; Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. at 282. See also Quirk & Fort, supra note 56, at 1-2 (in
July 1991, Financial World estimated the annual revenues for Major League Baseball to be even
greater than those of the other professional sports leagues: $1.35 billion, as compared to $1.3
billion for the National Football League, $606 million for the National Basketball Association,
and $465 million for the National Hockey League).
"3 March 1993 House Hearings, supra note 99, at 129 (statement of Donald Fehr). See also
Zimbalist, Billions, supra note 14, at xiii (noting that attendance at Maior League Baseball
games rose 47 percent between 1977 and 1991, attendance records were set in 6 of the 7 years
between 1985 and 1991, and annual revenues for Major League Baseball grew from $718 million
in 1985 to nearly $1.4 billion in 1990).
11 4 The United States Conference of Mayors, The Economic Impact of the Baseball Strike: A
Survey of Major League Cities 2 (Sept. 1994). See also Matthew Purdy and Richard Sandomir,
Colleagues or Competitors? 28 Owners in the Spotlight, N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1994, at sec. 1,p. 1 (hereinafter Purdy & Sandomir); Steve Rushin, Casualties of War, Sports Illustrated, Oct
10, 1994, at 37 (discussing impact of strike on nonplayer employees).
'"See, e.g., September 1994 House Hearings, supra note 63 (tr. at 59-60).
"
5 See Noll Report, supra note 111, at8, 10.
"'See Smith & Norton, supra note 43. One way owners can obtain tax writeoffs is to assign
a high share of the purchase price of a baseball franchise to the value of its players-allowing
an owner to depreciate, or deduct from taxable income from other businesses, a certain share
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result of these and other factors, Stanford Economics Professor
Roger G. Noll, in his capacity as a consultant for the players union,
reported that, had the owners not significantly underestimated
their projected 1994 revenues and overstated their 1994 expenses,
they would have shown a profit of between $50 million and $140
million had the season continued uninterrupted.' 8 Moreover, the
debate about current operating income does not account for the
perhaps more salient issue of the overall capital value of a baseball
franchise, which has increased dramatically in recent years." 19
Historically, obtaining fair and accurate financial data and pro-jections concerning professional baseball has proven difficult. 120 As
a result, at the Subcommittee's September 22, 1994 hearing, Chair-
man Brooks sought full disclosure of the owners' books and finan-
of the purchase pnce every year. See generally Zimbalist, Billions, supra note 14, at 34-36,
Charles C. Euchner, Playing the Field Why Sports Teams Move and Cities Fight to Keep Them
45 (1993) Ihereinafter Euchner). When asked to comment on whether this tax shelter situation
is fair, Bill Veeck, former owner of the Indians and the White Sox, argued: "Look, we play the
'Star-Spangled Banner' before every game. You want us to pay income taxes too?" Bill Veeck.
The Hustler's Handbook 328 (1965).
The case of the Texas Rangers is illustrative of the clubs' municipal subsidy leveraging Incen-
tive The Rangers have posted 3 profit only once in the past 5 years. However, Rangers co-owner
tand Texas Governor-elect) George W. Bush recently admitted that such losses are just "for book
purposes, not for cash purposes. Cash-flow-wise the Ringers are doing very well " Quoted in Ken
Herman. "Bush the Business Man- Baseball Has Ben Very Good to Him. Candidate Admits.
Hous Post, Oct 9, 1994, at A33 Bush also credited h mself and his franchise co-owners for their
entrepreneuralism in building 'a brand-new ballpark which adds franchise stabiuity " Id low-
ever, this new $190 million ballpark (named "The Ballpark") was actually financed for the Rang-
er, by the taxpa ers of the -it) of Arlington. Texas--through $135 million in local public bonds
bi-ked by a halfcent sal,-- tax. along with money expected to be paid by the Rangers through
lutrt revenue to be generated by The Ballpark. See id. Even before Arlington considered build.
ing The Ballpark for the Rangers, it had been estimated that the net loss over a 30-year penod
to the city for its vanous subsidies paid to obtain i-nd retain the Rangers would be well over
$21 millon See Mark S Rosentraub, "Financial Incentives, Locational Decision-Making and
Pro---ional Sports The Oase of the Texas Rangers Baseball Network and the City of Alington.
f. xi-, in 1977 Select '.-mmittee Report," supra note 102. at 201, 208-212 (unpublished paper
hv Uraversity of Texas at Arhngton Urban Studies Professor Rosentraub. presented to the 1976
>.-c- Committ.'e on Sports and repnnted by the committee as appendix l-4 to its 1977 Final
Ri-port See al-o Michael K Ozanian and Brooke ;rabarek, "Foul'," Financial World, Sept 1.
1 a91,it IR, 19-20 explaining that stadium revenues have replaced local media revenues as the
most important factor in franchise value and profitability, and noting that the Baltimore On-
e Cleveland Indians and Texas Rangers are ext mples of midsiue market clubs whr will be
in Maser L-ague BasebiP's upper echelon in terms >f operating income this year--despite their
lower-than-average mecia revenues-because of thei- publicly financed new ballparks)
"'S- Noll Report. supra not,? Ill, at 16 See alsc Smith &s Norton, supra note 43 ("The scant
fgtor-s that have tnckled out over the years md cate that team owners go to considerable
l- rqth- t-, inflate expei-es and deflate revenue " Club representatives have been quoted as
-iu-otic-ng their own linancial data Tornto Blue Jays President Paul Beeston has acknowl-
.- e.A- "Anyone who qu tes profits of a baseball ck b is missing the point. Under generally ac-
S-I,[d accounting print ples I can turn a $4 milhoi profit into a $2 million loss, and I can get
*, ry natio,,Il account ng firm to agree with me " Quoted in Zimbahst, Billions, supra note 14,
at 62 And 'eveql yea-- ago ar owner anonymousl - stated that what all the spending (eg., forfrahilhses and playc-i "shows is just how healti y the industry really is." Quoted in Peter
Gammons. "Pch Man'X tAme." Sports Illustrated, E ec 11, 1989, at 60.
'Fr example, the B iltimor? Onoles franchise ,ias sold for $12 million in 1979, $70 million
in 1499. and $173 minlliin in 1993--the highest amount ever paid for a sports franchise. See
P 1rdy & Sandomir, ipr note 114 Even the Seattie Manners, one of baseball's weakest teams
financially and on te field, sold for $6 5 million in 1977. $13 million in 1981, $77 million in
u1988, and S1660r milben ir 1992 See Zimbabst, "Immunity," supra note 43, at 287, 299 Likewise,
the pnce to enter the league as an expansion franchise, through the payment of expansion fees
t'- exi'ting team, has suadily nsen from the $1.9 milhon the New York Mets and the Houston
Colts each paid in IS-62 '- the $95 million that tf e Colorado Roclues and the Flonda Marlins
each aid in 1993 See Ziribalist, Billions, supra note 14, at 141
Ied,, '- me' of ite oranized baseball team osners concerning player salaries have been
heard since at least 1881 when Chicago White Stxkings owner A.G Spalding declared: "Sala-
nem must come down, or the interest of the publ c must be increased in some way. If one or
the other does not happer, bankruptcy stares eveiy team in the face." Quoted in Smith & Nor-
i-n, supri note 43. Eighty four years later, in 1965, the book No Joy in Mudville examined "the
decine and fall of besebah " See id. However, the major leagues have only experienced one team
hankruptcy filing in their tustory. See Zimbalist, Billions, supra note 14, at 72, 217 n.73 (citing
Labor F-laton-. up-a not1 16, at 78).
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cial data. 12 1 In response, Major League Baseball provided the Com-
mittee with summaries of financial information for the various
clubs in the aggregate for the years 1975--1992, along with an un-
edited copy of the 1994 Noll Report.122 Unfortunately, this informa-
tion is not adequate to permit the Committee or the public to
evaluate objectively the clubs' true financial condition. For exam-
ple, the owners failed to provide the Committee with any club-spe-
cific financial data, tax returns, information concerning actual "sal-
aries" and "expenses" paid to a club owner's own family members,
information pertaining to related party transactions, stadium
leases, and broadcast agreements and the clubs' broadcast alloca-
tion agreement.123 Absent this information, it is impossible to as-
sess Professor Noll's contention that Major League baseball clubs
have significantly understated their revenues and overstated their
expenses.12 4
2. Effect on the minor leagues
Another argument offered in support of the continuation of pro-
fessional baseball's antitrust exemption is that it is necessary to
preserve the minor league system. Currently, the various minor
league teams are bound to major league affiliates through the Pro-
fessional Baseball Agreement (PBA), pursuant to which, among
other things, the major league teams contribute to the payment of
minor league player costs.' 25 The owners of the major league and
minor league baseball clubs assert that if the antitrust exemption
were repealed, the major leagues would reduce or eliminate this so-
called "subsidy" payment.12 6 The owners further argue that certain
a21September 1994 House Hearings, supra note 63 (tr. at 60-61).
12 2 See supra note 111.
12At the September 22, 1994 hearings, Mr. Selig, although initially offering to provide infor-
mation only under a "controlled procedure," later appeared to withdraw this precondition:
Mr. BROOKs. Controlled procedure is not what we had in mind. I mean, that is what
we are t to avoid. We would like to take an open look at them, as we can at the
publicly dsosed financial statements of every corporation in the country *
Mr. SELIG. I understand that.
Mr. BROOKs. Not a controlled procedure. That word is-
Mr. SELIG. I understand that, Mr. Chairman. We have obviously turned over all of
our information and we would be very happy to sit down and give you all the informa-
tion that we have.
September 1994 House Hearins, supra note 63 (tr. at 60-61). However, in a November 8, 1994
letter to the Subcommittee on behaf of Major League Baseball, the owners' outside lawyers in-
sisted on unspecified confidentiality protections for certain additional information. Id., to be re-
printed at appendix I.
124Even if Major League Baseball's assertion of unprofitability were accurate this would not
serve to justify an exemption from the Nation's competition laws; experience has shown that
unprofitable firms can collude to impair consumer welfare. See, e.g., Martin Tolchin, "U.S. Sues
8 Airlines Over Fares: Computers Caled Price Fixing Tools," N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1992, at D1
(reporting the Government's filing of antitrust suit accusing the eight largest American airlines
of using a computerized reservation system to fix airfares, and that the airlines responded by
saying it is wrong for the Government to be adding to the troubles of an industry that has lost$7 billion in the last 2 years); United States v. Airline Tariff Publishing Co., 836 F. Supp. 9(D.D.C. 1993Xapproval of consent decree in airlines price fixing case); Joe Davidson, "Six Big
Airlines Settle U.S. Suit on Price Fixing- Scheme Using Data System May Have Cost Public
$2 Billion in 4 Years," Wall St. J., Mar. 18, 1994. at A2 (re rting the filing of a proposed con-
sent decree concerning six remaining defendant airlines, unir which they agreed to modify the
ticket reservation system at issue).
12 Professional Baseball Agreement between the American and National Leagues of Profes-
sional Clubs and the National Association of Professional Baseball Leagues (1991) [hereinafter
Professional Baseball Agreement).
"
6 See, e.g., March 1993 House Hearings, supra note 99, at 65 (statement of Jimmie Lee Solo-
mon) ("the many benefits of minor league baseball * * * flow directly from the Major League
Clubs' financial support of this system.' * * [I1n 1992 the Major League Clubs spent over $211
million on this player development system."); September 1994 House Hearings, supra note 63,
at 49 (statement of Stanley Brand) ("Without support from the Major Leagues which might not
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aspects of the operation of minor league baseball, such as its re-
serve clause (by which players are bound to teams for up to 6V2
years), would be susceptible to legal attack if the exemption were
repealed.127
Re Committee traditionally views with extreme skepticism
those who argue that their particular industry is in need of a spe-
cial shield from the antitrust laws in order to survive. As Rep-
resentative Watt remarked to Mr. Selig at the Subcommittee's Sep-
tember 22, 1994 hearing:
How is [the argument in support of baseball's antitrust
exemption] different from any other industry? I mean,
* * * if I buy that, then I guess I buy exempting IBM and
a number of other industries from antitrust also. I, for the
life of me, can't understand why you think baseball has
any more vested public interest in those things than any
other business would have. 128
However, repeal of the exemption would not necessarily have any
impact on the major leagues' continuing need to develop player tal-
ent to remain competitive. As University of Illinois Law Professor
Stephen Ross explained:
The bottom line is that major league owners spend over
$5 million annually on player development because it is a
prudent investment to do so, not out of altruistic charity
to small and medium-size minor league communities.
Whether that money is spent directly on players in their
own farm system, or indirectly on players purchased from
independent minor leagues, the prudence of the invest-
ment will not be affected by the antitrust exemption.129
It is also instructive to note that even with (and arguably be-
cause of) its exemption, Major League Baseball has sought to dra-
matically increase the share of player development costs borne by
minor league franchises and their local communities in recent
years. This is illustrated by the Professional Baseball Agreement
negotiated between Major League Baseball and the minor leagues
in 1990. The agreement reduced the major league teams' share of
minor league operating expenses, required the minor leagues to
make new and higher payments to the major leagues out of ticket
be available if the exemption were stripped, minor league baseball in these [small] towns could
go the way of the 5 and 10.").
'"See, e.g., March 1993 House Hearings, supra note 99, at 117 (statement of Stanley Brand).
See also Zimbalist, Billions, supra note 14, at 105-106 (describing mechanics of minor league
player reserve clause).
122September 1994 House Hearings, supra note 63 (tr. at 137) (statement of Representative
Watt).
Equitable arguments for the restrictions mandated by the current minor league system are
called into doubt by the fact that fewer than 1 out of 10 minor league players ever achieves
a viable major league career (see Zimbalist, Billions, supra note 14, at 1061, and that the aver-
age slary earned topplayers in the minors re presents only about 4 percent of a major league
salary (see Zimbalit, Billions, supra note 14, at 85). For a detailed account of the personal costs
exacted by collusive minor league behavior in restricting player movement, see the testimony
of former minor league p layer Roc Harrison before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on
Antitrust, Monopolies and Business Rights. 1992 Senate Hearings. supra note 99, at 406.
n March 1993 House Hearings, supra note 99 at 177 (statement of Stephen Rosa). Indeed,
it ha been asserted that the minor leagues would be better off if they were rated independ-
ently from the major leagues. See Neil Sullivan, The Minors, at iz (1990) (notin that on several
occasions over the years the minor leagues were in a position to operate Iependenty, yet
chose to accept the "artifAcial hierarchy" of the major leagues rather trhan assume the potential
economic risks-and rewardsof independence).
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revenues, and required the minor leagues (and their home commu-
nities) to make a variety of costly stadium facility improvements.130
These changes came on top of a series of rules changes adopted
prior to 1990 that further constrained the minor leagues' ability to
operate profitably.' 3 1
The owners have also argued that repeal of the exemption willjeopardize the minor leagues by preventing them from maintaining
their current method of operations, and that "unlike the other
major sports," baseball needs a special minor league structure in
which it can develop its future players.' 32 But this assertion does
not fully account for the fact that major league professional hockey,
a sport subject to the antitrust laws, relies on a complex system of
amateur, semi-professional, and minor league programs that are
heavily subsidized by the major league teams. Evidence submitted
during the investigation of the Select Committee on Professional
Sorts indicated that professional hockey spends an amount on
aoer development comparable to that spent by professional base-
9 .133
Further, any possible impact that repeal of baseball's antitrust
exemption might have on the minor leagues may well be mitigated
by the fact that in such event the operations and key agreements
pertaining to the minor leagues would be subject to a "rule of rea-
son" analysis, thereby protecting those restraints whose procom-
petitive effects outweigh any harmful impacts on competition. -4
Even if some aspect of baseball's minor league operations was
found to be unreasonably restrictive-such as the reserve clause re-
strictions-players could continue to agree to similar restrictions on
their movement, on an individual contractual basis or as part of a
collective bargaining agreement. Removing baseball's antitrust ex-
emption should not change the fact that major league owners have
strong negotiating leverage when dealing with prospective minor
league players, and the vast majority of minor leaguers are there-
fore likely to prove amenable to long-term contracts binding them
to a team for a specified period of time. 35
The greater threat to the viability of the minor leagues would ap-
pear to be the continued availability of the antitrust exemption to
the major leagues. For example, if the major league owners jointly
conspired to eliminate whole divisions of the minor leagues, the ex-
emption could leave the minor league franchises powerless to fight
back from a legal perspective. In such an event, as University of
"3See Professional Baseball Agreement, supra note 125, at Art. VII (F) and Attachment A.
See also Jon Scher, The Major League/Minor League Scorecard, Baseball Am., Jan. 10, 1991,
at 13; Jon Scher, Majors, Minors Set to Sign Long-Term Deal, Baseball Am., Jan. 10. 1991, at
13; Mike Dodd Minor Leas Have Until 1995 to Upgrade Ballparks USA Today, Sept. 2
1993 at 2C. The General ;er of one minor league team described the new Professional
Baseball Agement as follows: All of a sudden, we the Class A Asheville Tourists] go from
being a fairly profitable, fairly solid club to struggling to break even again. So if you have the[San Diego] Chicken coming in on a Friday night and it gets rained out, you're in trouble." See
Jon Scher, Minor League Notebook, Baseball Am., January 25, 1991, at 16 (quoting Ron McKee).
"'As early as 1988, a minor league owner stated: "[e]very year, [the major leagues] do some-
thing that makes it more impossble for us to operate. Every year, the major league teams
change the rules a little bit to make it harder for us." See Bill James, The BiB James Baseball
Abstract 1988, at 19 (quoting unidentified minor league owner).
"'See March 1993 House Hearings, supra note 99, at 63 (statement of Jimmie Lee Solomon);
September 1994 House Hearings, supra note 63 (tr. at 137) (statement of Allen "Bud" Selig).
'33 1977 Select Committee Report, supra note 102, at 56.
"
4 See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.35See March 1993 House Hearings, supra note 99, at 228-231 (statement of Stephen F.
Ross).
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Maryland Professor Arthur T. Johnson has noted: "[t]he preserva-
tion of baseball's antitrust exemption * * * guaranteels] that the
major leagues' dominance will go unchallenged. There will be no
guarantee that the current number of minor league teams will be
maintained." 136 These very concerns were highlighted during the
contentious negotiations leading up to the 1990 Professional Base-
ball Agreement, when Major League Baseball threatened to com-
pletely sever its relationship with the minor leagues.'3 7 It was re-
ported that in light of such developments, the minor leagues began
fashioning a lobbying strategy to repeal the antitrust exemption.' 3 8
The fact that the 1990 Professional Baseball Agreement was ulti-
mately agreed to by the parties does not diminish the future risk
to the minor leagues. Indeed, Eddie Einhorn, an owner of the Chi-
cago White Sox, has complained about spending over $3 million to
develop one prospect who may not even make it to the minor
leagues, and has previously proposed that the major leagues dis-
band the minor leagues and instead contribute to a centralized de-
velopment program into which players would be drafted.139
3. Effect on franchise relocations
Defenders of the antitrust exemption also contend that it is nec-
essary in order to enable professional baseball to protect local com-
munities and fans against abandonment by teams seeking more lu-
crative venues.140 They point to the 1984 Ninth Circuit decision in
Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football
League ("Raiders 1"),'4' in which the owner of the Raiders football
team and its new home community (Los Angeles) successfully chal-
lenged on antitrust grounds the National Football League's refusal
to permit the Raiders to relocate from Oakland under the League's
three-fourths owner approval rule.142 However, it is important to
note that in Raiders I, the district court did not hold that the
NFL's restrictions on franchise relocations were per se unlawful,
but rather, allowed the jury to evaluate the restriction under the
"wArthur T. Johnson, Minor League Baseball: Fact Versus Myth 8(1994) (unpublished paper)
[herebsafter Johnson, Minor League Baseball).
"See supra notes 125, 130-131 and accompanying text. The Associated Press reported that,
"The chief negotiator for the major leagues said the commissioner's office would begin discus-
sions to start new minor leagues and clubs outside the* * *current minor league governing
body." Ronald Blum. AP Sports News, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, AP Pile (Nov. 18,
1990). And the Sporting News reported that Major League Baseball was "sending out franchise
applications" and that as soon as leases were signed, the major leagues would abandon attempts
to reach a deal with the minor leagues. Majors, Minors Can't Agree, Sporting News, Nov. 26.
1990, at 37.
"'Mark Maske, Major-Minor Reconciliation Effort Begins; Vincent 'Planning on New
System.' Wash. Post, Nov. 27. 1990, at E4 (reporting that members of the minor leagues' execu-
tive comnuttee were so concerned about the negotiations that they were "eyeing possible legal
measures against the majors" and "seeking to determine what congressional support [they)
might have for challenging the major leagues' exemption from federal antitrust laws ).
"'See Jack Sands and Peter Gammons, Coming Apart at the Seams: How Baseball Owners,
Players, and Television Executives Have Led Our National Pastime to the Brink of Disaster 98
(1993*
'oSee, e g., March 1993 House Hearings, supra note 99, at 48-49 (statement of Bud Selig).
14726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984).
142 Onginally, the rule required unanimous consent of all owners for a club relocation into the
"home territory" of another team-including consent of the owner who would face the new com-
petition. When an earlier Sherman Act challenge to the rule by the LDs Angeles Memorial Coli-
seum Commission was dismissed for lack of ripeness, 468 F. Supp. 154 (C.D. Cal. 1979), the
NFL revised the rule to require a 3/4 majority for any relocation. See Los Angeles Mem. Coli-
seum Comm'n, 726 F.2d at 1384-1385.
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rule of reason.143 The court of appeals made it clear that there was
araple room for the NFL to apply franchise relocation rules in a
manner that did not unreasonably restrain competition, explaining
that restrictions on team movement should withstand antitrust
scrutiny where they are:
closely tailored to serve the needs inherent in producing
the [professional sports league's] "product" and competing
with other forms of entertainment. An express recognition
and consideration of those objective factors espoused by
the NFL as important, such as population, economic pro-
jections, facilities, regional balance, etc., would be well ad-
vised. Fan loyalty and location continuity could also be
considered.'"
And a subsequent Ninth Circuit decision reviewing the damage
award stemming from the Raiders' move to Los Angeles specifically
held that the NFL franchise relocation rule was not necessarily un-
lawfil in all cases--but only that it was unreasonable as applied
by the owners under the particular facts involved. See Los Angeles
Memorial Coliseum Comm. v. National Football League ("Raiders
II").145
It is important to recognize that the application of "rule of rea-
son" antitrust analysis in Raiders I and Raiders II has not disabled
professional sports leagues from preventing objectionable franchise
relocations. In 1984, the NFL was able to block the Philadelphia
Eagles from moving to Phoenix.'" And, in 1985, the National
Hockey League reached an agreement with the St. Louis Blues,
keeping the Blues from moving to Saskatchewan.147 Moreover, the
National Basketball Association, while ultimately approving the
San Diego Clippers' 1984-1985 move from San Diego to Los Ange-
les, first won a court ruling that under its rules it could block the
move.'4
Furthermore, an antitrust exemption is a suspect means of pro-
tecting local communities against franchise relocation. Franchise
relocation worries flow directly from a symptom of classic cartel be-
havior: the suppression of product output, or supply, below demand
in order to increase price, and profits, for the benefit of the cartel
members.'4 9 Because the incumbent baseball club owners may ex-
ercise their franchise power not only to restrict relocations of exist-
ing clubs, but also to limit the formation of new clubs, many com-
munities desirous and fully capable of supporting a major league
club are unable to obtain.pne; and communities that have a club
"3See 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984). See notes 74-76 and accom-
panying texL
I-Los Angeles Mem. Coliseum Commn, 726 F.2d at 1397 (citations omitted).
145791 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 826 (1987).
'*See Professional Sports Community Protection Act of 1985: Hearings on S.259 and S.287
Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce. Science, and Transportation, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 61
(1985) (hereinafter Senate Community Protection Hearings] (statement of Pete Rozelle, NFL
Commissioner).
'47See id. at 84; Los Angales Times, June 28, 1985, pt. III, at 12, col.1.
1*See National Basketball Assn v. SDC Basketball Club, 815 F.2d 562 (9th Cir.), cert. dis-
missed sub nom. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Basketball Ass'n, 484
U.S. 060 (1987); Michael A. Cardozo and Jeffrey A. Mishkin, "Does a League Have a Right to
Deternune Where Teams Play?" Nat'1 L.J., Nov. 30, 1987, at 23-24.
'#See, e.g., Zimbalist, Billions, supra note 14, at 123-124; Quirk, An Economic Analysis of
Team Movements in Professional Sports, 38 Lay & Contemp. Probs. 42, 43-47 (1973) [Lerein-
after Quirk, Team Movements).
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know they keep it only at the owner's pleasure and at the risk of
other communities' efforts to "steal away" one of the few existing
major league teams for themselves. This chronic shortage of clubs
gives incumbent owners powerful leverage during negotiations with
their home communities over taxes and community-subsidized sta-
dium construction and renovation.o5 0 And because the individual
clubs, though part of an organized league, maintain their separate
financial identities, they have an incentive to act in their own in-
terest when casting a vote on a franchise expansion or relocation.
For example, the notes of the owners' meeting to discuss the San
Francisco Giants' proposed relocation to St. Petersburg indicate
that a major consideration leading some owners to oppose the fran-
chise m6ve was that their own revenues would be adversely af-
fected.' 5
To date, baseball refuses to publicly commit to oppose any fran-
chise relocation not agreed to by the community threatened with
losing its club, or even to give the home community a "right of first
refusal"-either of which would serve as a more straightforward
means of preventing harm to fans and communities.152 Indeed,
under the supposed "stabilizer" of the Major League Baseball
nonstatutory antitrust exemption, both major league and minor
league professional baseball have experienced widespread franchise
relocations and threats of relocations, impacting scores of commu-
nities. Since 1950, Major League Baseball has permitted eleven re-
locations,' 53 with litigation ensuing after a number of the moves. 5 4
'
0 Some observers have noted that soon after Mr. Selig defended baseball's antitrust exemp-
tion as the protector of franchise stability at the 1992 Senate hearings, he was reported to have
threatened to move the Brewers out of Milwaukee unless the city agreed to finance the building
of a new stadium for the team. See Zimbalist, Immunity, supra note 43. at 303; Dave Van Dyke,
Brewers: If You Build It, New Stadium Vital to Keep Franchise, Chi. Sun-Times, May 17, 1993,
at 101. Likewise. Holy Cross Politizal Science Professor Charles C. Euchner has chronicled the
means by which the Chicago White Soi <tsed the leverage of possible relocation to negotiate pub-
lc concesions relative to the building of a new stadium for the White Sox:
Some experts predicted that organized baseball wouid reject a move of the White Sax
from the third largest market in the nation, but at no time did the baseball hierarchy
intercede to restrain th- bidding. In fact, the American League president injected him-
self into the process, only to strengthon the White Sox's bargaining position, when he
argued that Comisky Park was iwadequate.
ELchner, :upra note 117, at 148 (citing correspondence from Robert Brown, Presidert of the
Amenern League, to Mary O'Connell of the fans organization Save Our Sox (undated)).
'"See Minutes of Special Meeting, Nov. 10, 1992, reprinted in March 1993 House Hearings,
supra note 99. at 246-252.
"When the controversy surrounding the National Football League Raiders brought this issue
to Congressicnal attention, various bills were introduced to regulate professional sports fran-
chise relocation. One bill, S. 259, was reported by the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science
and Transportation in the 99th Congress. S 259 would have imposed requirements for league
consideration of team relocations, with judicial review. The team seeking to relocate would have
been required to give notice, stating the justification for the move, based on 12 specified factors.
The league would have had to hold a public hearing, and articulate the reason for its decision
on the record. The league's decision would have been subject to judicial review, under which
the decision could be overturned if not suportd by substantial evidence. And thes local commu-
nity would have retained the option of challenging the league's decision tunder the antitrust
laws. SeeS. 259,99th Cong., let eas. &-7 10 (1985).
'"See, e.g., Arthur T. Johnson, Murucipaf Administration and the Sports Franchise Reloca-
tion issue, Pub. Admn. Rev 519-520 (Nov.-Dec. 1983). Contrary to poular assertion, many of
the moves, such as the relocations of the Dodgers and the Giants to Cfomia, were completely
unrelated to lack of fan support. See, e.g., Quirk, Team Movements, supra note 149, at 60.
as*Bosh Seattle and Milwaukee filed antitzrast suits following the transfer of local baseball
franchises. See 1976 Select Committee Hatings (Part 2), supra note 99, at 425 (Seattle's law-
suit, stemming from Mr. Selig's moving the old Seattle Pilots team to Milwaukee, was settled
through the award to Seattle of a new expansion team in 1977); Wisconsin v. Milwaukee Braves,
Inc., 144 N.W.2d 1 (Wis.), cart, denied, 385 U.S. 990 (1966) (application of State antitrust laws
Continued
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At least as importantly, during this same period major league fran-
chises have threatened to move many more times.155 As commenta-
tors have noted, by simply exploring options for playing in other
cities, teams have procured all manner of largess.15 6 As for the
minor leagues, between 1987 and 1993 alone, forty-nine franchises
moved--one out of every four minor league teams.'5 7 The smaller
communities appear to have an especially difficult time retaining
their minor league franchises; nearly two-thirds of the franchise re-
locations between 1987 and 1993 occurred from communities with
a population of less than 100,000.158 This trend has been exacer-
bated by recent stadium facility improvement requirements im-
posed on minor league clubs and their communities by Major
League Baseball through the 1990 Professional Baseball Agree-
ment.159
4. Effect on broadcast relationships
Another concern voiced in relation to the possible repeal of base-
ball's antitrust exemption is that it might unreasonably intrude
upon the owners' ability to jointly negotiate national broadcast con-
tracts. However, the Sports Broadcasting Act, which provides a
limited antitrust exemption to enable the member clubs of profes-
sional sports leagues to jointly pool their separate rights in spon-
sored telecasting of their games to sell to a purchaser, clearly ap-
plies to professional baseball.160 Therefore, any congressional re-
peal of baseball's nonstatutory antitrust exemption would not prej-
udice professional baseball's ability to jointly negotiate such agree-
ments with the networks. Major League Baseball would be in pre-
cisely the same position as the other major professional sports-
governed by both the Sports Broadcasting Act and the antitrust
laws.
Repeal of baseball's nonstatutory antitrust exemption, however,
would permit the antitrust laws to apply to unreasonable restraints
of trade imposed by a league on individual teams with respect to
to Major League Baseball's approval of the Braves' relocation was held to unconstitutionally
interfere with interstate commerce).
"See, e.g., Euchner, supra note 117, at 5 ("At some point in the past decade, virtually all
professional franchises publicly threatened to move to a different city in order to extract the
financial) benefits they desired from local governments."); Zimbalist, Immunity, supra note 43,
at 313 ("The standard ploy for a (Major League Baseball] franchise is to threaten to move the
team.").
'"See, e.g., Zimbalist, Immunity supra note 43, at 313 ("Such threats have consistently
brought owners either more favorabe rental contracts for their teams, . . . or stadium retrofits
. or entire new stadiums with a wide array of revenue-generating accoutrements. . . .");
Euchner, supra note 117, at 24 ('Even thou h teams infrequently move, threats of transfers
drive cities into exensive bidding wars. .. . The number of cities seeking teams is so large that
franchises always have plausible alternatives for their current sites."); id. at x ("New stadiums
are only the beginning. The willingness to threaten departure has secured for teams a variety
of land deals, lower taxes, more revenues from parking and concessions, control of stadium oper-
ations, guaranteed ticket sales, renovation of stadiums with luxury seating, control over neigh-
borhoods and transportation systems. The list goes on.").
'"See Johnson, Minor League Baseball, supra note 136, at 5. Moreover, 74.2 percent of the
communities polled in a 1989 survey reported that the stadium lease with their minor league
team was for a term of 5 years or less (many were year-to-year). Such short-term leases invite
frequent demands for stadium improvements or better lease rental terms. See Arthur T. John-
son, Local Government and Minor League Baseball: A Survey of Issues and Trends 8 (Washing
ton, D.C.: International City Management Association) [hereinafter Johnson, Local Govern-
ment]. According to the same survey, 40 percent of the communities reported that they were
the target of demands for stadium improvements or better rental terms at the time the previous
lease had expired; and in every case, the team had threatened to relocate. Id. at 10.
"'See Johnson, Minor League Baseball. supra note 136, at 5.
"'See supra notes 125, 130-131 and accompanying text.
'-See 13 U.S.C. §§ 1291 et seq..
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their local broadcast rights. Well-established case precedent exists
limiting sports leagues latitude in abusing their local broadcast
market,'61 and there is no reason to conclude that baseball cannot
live under the same rules as govern the other professional sports
leagues. Indeed, antitrust rules in this area should serve to in-
crease overall consumer choice and welfare, by permitting a team
to broadcast more of its own games than a league might otherwise
permit.16 2 For example, a recent antitrust action brought by the
Connecticut Attorney General resulted in a settlement permitting
State residents to view professional basketball games involving the
Boston Celtics as well as the New York Knicks. 6 3
5. Role of the baseball commissioner
It has also been asserted that professional baseball need not be
subject to the antitrust laws, because of the existence of a strong
and independent commissioner. 1
Although the Committee does not accept the premise of this ar-
gument-that private regulation is sufficient to justify an antitrust
exemption-close examination of the relevant history and facts in-
dicates that baseball's commissioner has not been characterized by
"strength" and "independence." The argument is even further di-
minished by the fact that Major League Baseball has been operat-
ing without an even nominally independent commissioner in the
two years since Fay Vincent's departure.16 5
The office of the commissioner was created in 1919, following the
infamous "Black Sox" scandal-in an effort to restore public con-
fidence in the integrity of the game.' 66 The owners at the time
chose Federal Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis to be the first com-
missioner.167 He served as commissioner for almost 24 years, and
"'1See Chicago Professional Sports Ltd Partnership v. National Basketball Ass'n, 961 F.2d
667 (7th Cir. 1992) (the Chicago Bulls--owned by Jerry Reinsdorf, co-owner of the Chicago
White Sox-successfully challenged an NBA rule limiting the number of games "superstation"
WGN could carry), cart. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S. CL 409 (1992). See also NCAA
v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (NCAA rule restraining member
schools in the number of games they could contract to broadcast held unlawful).
" See, e.g., Senate 1992 Hearings, supra note 99, at 420 (statement of Gene Kimmelman)
("To promote maximum sports viewing options at the lowest price and to infuse competitive
market pressures in the structure of Major League Baseball, [the Consumer Federation of Amer-
ica] urges Congress to eliminate Major League laseball's antitrust immunity and to ensure that
the Sports Broadcasting Act's antitrust exemption is limited to national off-air broadcasting con-
tracts.").
6Cable Television Basketball Blackout Settlement Agreement between the Attorney Gen-
eral's Office of the State of Connecticut and the National Basketball Association, Apr. 28, 1993.
See Commerce Clearinghouse Report, 150,101 (May 18, 1993).
"Baseball owners contend they are operating the business of baseball, through the commis-
sioner system, in a highly responsible manner-i.e., obviating the need for subjecting the sport
to antitrust regulation. See, e.g., 1992 Senate Hearings, supra note 99, at 13-14 (stat -ent of
Bud Selig). See also Report of the Restructuring Committee [hereinafter Restructuring Report]
("The role of the Commissioner in protecting the public interest has long distinguished (Major
League Baseball) from all other professional sports and has justified the special status of Base-
ball as the national game.").
"
3 See infra note 179 and accompanying text.
'"See, e.g. Ward & Burns, supra note 12, at 133-145. The scandal involved eight members
of the 1919 Chicago White Sox, accused of intentionally losing the 1919 World Series for payoffs,
and caused the White Sox to be dubbed the "Black Sox." See Eliot Asinoff, Eight Men Out
(1963); David Q. Voigt, 2 American Baseball, at xiii-xvili (1970).
"' Landis, a man who had built a formidable reputation through his activities on the bench-
including fining Standard Oil $29 million for antitrust violations and attempting to extradite
the Kaiser of Germany because a Chicagoan died when a German submarine sank the Lusita-
nia-demanded and received from the owners control over "whatever and whoever" had to do
with the game. See Harold Seymour, 2 Baseball: The Golden Age 322, 369 (1971) [hereinafter
Seymour]; Ward & Burns, supra note 12, at 133-145. The day after the eight accused "Black
Continued
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is generally credited with restoring to the game a certain degree
of the respectability it had lost during the "Black Sox" scandal.168
However, since Judge Landis' tenure, the independence-not to
mention the strength-of baseball's commissioners has been un-
even, to say the least. Happy Chandler served as Commissioner
from 1945 until 1951, when the owners failed to reappoint him, re-
portedly because he had supported union activities of umpires, and
had advocated the admission of African-Americans into the major
leagues.169 Chandler was followed by Ford Frick, who served from
1951 until 1965, but was perceived by many to be dominated by
Dodgers owner Walter O'Malley.o70 Retired Air Force Lieutenant
General William Eckert served only from 1965 until his firing in
1968.171 Eckert was followed by Bowie Kuhn, formerly outside
counsel to Major League Baseball. Kuhn's 15-year tenure was
scarred by his failure to receive the owner's support for another
term, despite his very active campaign to remain as commis-
sioner.172 Peter Ueberroth followed Kuhn in 1984. While Ueberroth
was perhaps the strongest commissioner since Judge Landis, his
single term was marred by the collusion cases brought by the play-
ers in the mid-1980's.' 73 As Smith College Professor Andrew Zim-
balist has written:
Ueberroth stands out among baseball's commissit, aers in
his ability to discipline and galvanize the owners behind a
clear economic project. Unfortunately for the owners, the
Sroject involved collusion and left them saddled with a
280 million settlement.' 7 4
Ueberroth's successor, Bart Giamatti, died in 1989, after just 5
months in office.175 He was followed that same year by Fay Vin-
cent, who was "relieved" of his duties in September 1992, when
powerful owners objected to his proposed division realignment plan,
his allocation of expansion fee revenues, and his perceived
intermeddling in the owners' labor negotiating strategies.' 7 6 As an
anonymous owner reportedly remarked after Vincent's assignment
of a minority share of $190 million in expansion fee revenues to the
American League: "That's it. Fay Vincent is history. Every Amer-
Sox" players were acquitted in a court of law, he barred them from baseball for life. See Will
Lingo, "Baseball's Eight Commissioners," Baseball Am., Nov. 28-Dec. 11, 199.1, at 14 [herein.
after Lingo, Commissioners]-
'"See Seymour, supra note 167; Ward & Burns, supra note 12, at 133-145; Lingo, Commis.
sioners, supra note 167.
165 See Zimbalist, Billions, supra note 14, at 43.
"old. at 44.17 1See Lin, Commissioners, supra note 167, at 14-15; Kenneth M. Jennings, Balls and
Strikes: The Money Game in Professional Baseball 86 (1990). See also Lingo, Commissioners,
supra note 167, at 14 ("Baseball historians are almost universal in their aisdain for Eckert'o
work and their assessment that he was completely overmatched in his job. (The retired Air
Force general was] so invisible and lacking in strong views that some called lum "The Unknown
Soldier.").
172See Bowie Kuhn, Hard Ball 366-427 (1987); Zimbalist, Billions, supra note 14, at 44. See
also Lingo, Commissioners, supra note 167, at 15 ("Like most commissioners who acted at all
independently and served long enough, Kuhn eventually drew the scorn of enough owners to
become ineffective, and left his post.").17 3 See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text. See also Lingo, Commissioners, supra note
167, at 15; Helyar, supra note 58.
174 Zimbalist, Billions, supra note 14 at 44.
37 5 See Lingo, Commissioners, supra note 167, at 15.
u7 See Zimoadst, Billions, supra note 14, at 45; Lingo, Commissioners, supra note 167, at 15.
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ican League Owner I've talked to * * * has serious doubts about
renewing Vincent's contract." 177
At the conclusion of his service, Vincent pointedly warned that
the "[o]wners have a duty to take into consideration that they own
a part of America's national pastime in trust. This trust sometimes
requires putting self-interest second."1 78 But since Vincent's depar-
ture, Major League Baseball has operated without outside super-
vision, having instead chosen to police itself through an owner-
dominated executive council headed by Milwaukee Brewers owner
Bud Selig.179 The commissioner's position has remained empty for
more than 2 years.
The powers of the vacant commissioner's office were recently
weakened by an owners' "Restructuring Committee." Previously,
the linchpin of the commissioner's authority derived from a clause
in Article I of the Major League Agreement and the Commis-
sioner's contract bestowing upon him powers to take any and all
actions deemed to be in the "best interests" of the game. 8 0 The
newly adopted Restructuring Committee's recommendations pre-
vent future commissioners from using the "best interests" powers
with respect to a whole host of matters-including issues relating
to the expansion, sale, and relocation of teams; scheduling;
interleague play; divisional alignment; and revenue sharing among
the owners.' 8 Moreover, the commissioner is explicitly proscribed
from using the "best interests" powers with regard to collective bar-
gaining matters, so that he would have no power, for example, to
end or prevent a play-stopping decision by the owners to stage a
lockout of players over bargaining issues.182 Significantly, the new
guidelines do not attempt to resolve the issue of whether the own-
ers have the power to fire the commissioner without cause 1ss-the
core dispute in Fay Vincent's 1992 departure, and a key consider-
ation relative to the widespread call for the next commissioner to
be truly "independent."
After reviewing the changes the owners made to the commis-
sioner's office, former commissioner Ueberroth commented:
Basically, the commissioner seems to have no portfolio,
power or job. That's what it looks like from a distance. I
think the changes dramatically change the position. There
will be the appearance of more responsibility, but substan-
tially less authority. That's the recipe for a non job. 8 4
"Quoted in Bob Nightengale, "Herzog Turned Off by Baseball's Greed," Baseball Am., Aug.
10. 1990, 't 14.
usQuote in David Greising, "Baseball's Bases Are Still Loaded With Problems," Bus. Wk.,
Sept. 21, 1993, at 37.
**Se", e.g., Joe Gergen. "Baseball Still in No Hurry to Choose a Commissioner," LA Times,
Jan. 21, 1994, at 1; Roger Angell, Shades of Blue, The New Yorker, Dec. 7, 1992, at 124, 127
[hereini.fter Angedl. See also Will Lingo, "Baseball Seeks Strong Leaders," Baseball Am., Nov.
28-Dec. 11, 1994, at 14 (hereinafter Lingo, Leaders) ("Brewers owner Bud Selig is the de facto
commitsioner. But Selig is nothing more than an extension of the owners.").
SO&e, e.g., Angell, supra note 179.
18s1t-e Restructuring Report, supra note 164.&82SM id. at 6. See also Jack McCallum, "The Toothless Commissioner," Sports Illustrated,
Feb. 2.1 1994 at 14; "Owners Plan Limits Commissioner's Power- 'Best Interests' Ruling Re-
vised," Chi. TAb., Feb. 12, 1994, at CI.
IssSee Restructuring Report, supra note 164.
'" Quoted in Ronald Blum, "Res'tructuring," AP, Feb. 12, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Li-
brary, AP File. Chicago White Sox co-owner Jerry Reinsdorf candidly summarized his view of
the position when he stated that the Job of the next commissioner will be to "run the business
Continued
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II. H.R. 4994
On August 12, 1994, Major League Baseball experienced its
eighth baseball work stoppage since 1972 a5 -more stoppages than
in professional basketball, football and hockey, combined. 8 6 This
most recent work stoppage ultimately led to the cancellation of the
remainder of the regular season and the World Series. The strike
has become the longest-running strike in professional sports his-
tory, and the only sports work stoppage not only to result in the
complete loss of post-season play, but to threaten to carry over into
the next season. The emotional and financial damage to profes-
sional baseball and the country caused by the strike is tangible,
and has been well noted by the media and the fans.'8 7 This course
of events has crystallized for the public the peculiar tendency of
professional baseball to be forced to resort to strikes and lockouts
as a means of resolving labor disagreements-a result, in large
part, of its judicially granted antitrust exemption.188
H.R. 4994 would subject Major League Baseball's owners and
players to the Nation's antitrust laws in the event one of those par-
ties unilaterally imposes an anticompetitive term or condition on
the other. While the case for a far broader repeal of the antitrust
exemption is compelling, at this late juncture in the 103d Congress,
the Committee opted to respond legislatively to the most urgent
competitive problem facing Major League Baseball-its failure to
be subject to the same antitrust rules as the other sports in the
event of a breakdown of the collective bargaining process and the
unilateral imposition of terms by one of the parties. As such, the
legislation was specificall3 drafted so that it would not implicate is-
sues relating to other activities, such as the operation of the minor
leagues or franchise relocation.
The hearing record provides clear evidence that the availability
of antitrust remedies as a last resort, while not a panacea, has con-
for the owners, not the players or the umpires or fans." Quoted in Angell, supra note 179, at
127.
s
5 See, e.g., Athelia Knight and Richard Justice, "Work Stoppages a Part of Baseball," Wash.
Post, Aug. 11, 1994, at D1.256
*See BNA Plus Work Stoppage Statistics.
187 See, e.g., Richard Sandomir, "Field of Dreams Turns into Nightmare in New Jersey," N.Y.
Times, Aug. 23, 1994, at B9; Ira Berkow, "Yesterday Was Just Perfect for a Ball Game," N.Y.
Times, Aug. 29, 1994, at C9; Murray Chass, "Game's Ultimate Strikeout Is Hang in the Bal-
ance," N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1994, at B11: Thomas Boswell, "Baseball Season Ends Now," Wash.
Post, Sept. 15, 1994, at BI; Shirely Povich, "For Years, the Game Changed; Now, It Has
Stopped," Wash. Post, Sept. 15, 1994, at B4; Claire Smith, "What Strike Needs Is a Designated
Hero," N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1994, at 26. See also September 1994 "House Hearings," supra note
63 (tr. at 57) (statement of Adam Kolton) (stating that he harbors "no doubt that many fans
have been so alienated by the strike" that they will stay away and boycott future baseball
games); id. at 55-56 (explaining the view of his group, Sports Fans United, that 'ithe antitrust
exemption as we see it is really a giant permission slip issued by the courts for baseball owners
to treat fans any way they want without any consequences," and reporting that his rup had
joined the Consumer Federation of America, Fans First, and more than a dozen other fan groups
across the country on a national petition drive to end professional baseball's antitrust exemption
and that the petition had well over 15,000 signatures even though the campaign had just
be8ne, e.g., Jim Bunning, "Repeal that Anti-trust Exmption," N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1994. at
A15; Kathleen Madigan, "l ul :Ball Major League Baseball's Monopoly," Bus. Wk., Nov. 1992,
a- 42; Connie Mack& Richard M. Blau, 1The Need for Fair Play Repealing the Federal Baseball
Antitrust Exemption," 45 Fla. L. Rev. 201 (1993; Robert G. Berger, "After the Strikes: A Reex-
amination of Professional Baseball's Exemption From the Antitrust Laws," 45 U. Pitt. L. Rev.
209 (1983); Claire Smith, 'Antitrust Exemption is Also in Question," N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1994,
at B9; Charles Rembar, "When Justice Holmes Swung and Missed," N.Y. Times, Aug. 20, 1994,
at A23; Thomas Boswell, "Step up to the Plate, Mr. President," Wash. Post, Sept. 14, 1994, at
B6; "Kiss it Goodbye," Wash. Post, Sept. 16, 1994, at A26.
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tributed in a positive fashion to resolving several labor disputes ex-
perienced in other professional sports. The case of professional foot-ball is illuminating. For example, in 1987, after the failure of nego-
tiations both during and after the expiration of the collective bar-
gaining agreement and an unsuccessful player strike, a number of
players brought an antitrust challenge against the owners' unilat-
eral imposition of a "Right of First Refusal/Compensation System,"
which was included in the expired collective bargaining agree-
ment.18 9 A Minnesota Federal district court ultimately ruled that
the owners' unilateral imposition of the "Right of First Refusal/
Compensation System" was unlawful, 9 0 and the NFL owners and
players were then able to enter into a new collective bargaining
agreement.1ax Likewise in professional basketball, several judicial
decisions and settlements, reached during antitrust litigation be-
tween the players and the National Basketball Association after
the breakdown of collective bargaining, have facilitated-and then
been incorporated into-new collective bargaining agreements. 192
asiSe Powell 1. 678 F. Supp. 777, 781 (D. Minn. 1988), rev'd, 9,0 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991). A "Right of First Refusal/Compensation System" restricts the
ability of a player to sign with another team as a "free agent." Under this system, a team could
retain a veteran free agent by exercising a right of first refusal and by matching a club's offer.
Even if the old team decided not to match the offer, it would receive compensation from the
new team in the form of additional draft choices. Id. at 779.
soSee Powell 1, 678 F. Supp. 777 (D. Minn. 1988); "McNeil," 764 F. Supp. 1351 (D. Minn.
1991). But see- supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text (regarding criticism of Powell II for
having the effect of forcing the union to decertify, thereby delaying the availability of antitrust
remedies to the harmed players).
"'See White v. National Football League, 836 F. Supp. 1508 (D. Minn. 1993). See also Letter
From Gene Upshaw, Executive Director, National Football League Players Association, to Rep-
resentative Jack Brooks, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee (Sept. 22, 1994):
Only when [NFL] players prevailed in a series of antitrust actions, and gained signifi.
cant damages, did the owners finally agree in the labor context to a drastic amelioration
of [owner-imposed player restrictions).
In my view, giving any group of sports owners an exemption from the antitrust laws
gives them a huge additional and unneeded advantage in labor negotiations. With the
exemption in hand, the owners know they can jointly impose severe labor negotiations.
When this is coupled with the owners' already overwhelming economic advantage. the
result is that the collective bargaining rights guaranteed by the labor laws lecome a
meaningless sham.
The NFL's 1977 collective bargaining agreement was also incorporated in a court-approved class
action settlement that ended 5 years of labor discord. See Alexander v. National Football
League, 1977-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 161,730, 1977 WL 1497 (D. Minn. 1977), affd sub nom. Reyn-
olds v National Football League, 584 F.2d 280 18th Cir. 1978).
1In 1970. NBA players commenced a class action antitrust suit against the NBA, challeng-
ing certain league-imposed player restrictions. See Robertson v. National Basketball Assn. 389
F Supp 867, 884-889 (S.D.N.Y, 1975). By 1976. the parties in Robertson were able to enter
into, and the district court approved, an antitrust settlement agreement, which gave rise to col-
lective bargaining agreements between the NBA and NBA players. Moreover, after a collective
bargaining agreement between the players and the NBA expired in 1982, when the NBA sought
for the first time to impose a salary cap on the players, the players were able to successfully
challenge this uulateral action by the NA in court as violative of the terms of the parties'
settlement agreement in Robertson. The players and the NBA were then able to negotiate a mu-
tually agreeable Memorandum of Understanding modifying their settlement agreement, and
likewise entered into a rew multi-year collective bargaining agreement that included a salary
cap. When the collective bargaining agreement expired in 1987, the players and the NBA en-
tered into a Moratorium Agreement, whereby certain NBA practices would remain in effect but
no new contracts would be signed.
When the Moratorium Agreement expired on October 1, 1987 without a mutually agreeable
resolution the players brought another antitrust suit, which culminated a year later in a new
collective bargaining agreement. Although this collective bargaining agreement expired on June
23, 1994, the parties have been able to reach a no strike/no lock out agreement, so that the
1994-1995 season has been able to proceed without interruption, despite the parties' ongoing
legal battle. See National Basketball Assn v. Williams, 857 F. Supp. 1069 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). ap-
peal docketed, 94-7709 (2d Cir. Jul. 19, 1994); Richard Justice, "A Strikes a Labor Deal:
ers, Players Agree to Play Uninterrupted Season", Wash. Post, Oct. 28, 1994, at Cl; Sam
Smith, "NBA Keeps Eye on Ball, Avoids Strike 3: Players, Owners Announce They'll Play Full
Season", Chi. Trib.. Oct. 28, 1994, at NI.
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This has permitted professional basketball to continue operating
without significant interruption.
Despite its neutral and narrowly written goals, H.R. 4994 has
been criticized by some as being unfair. For example, at the Com-
mittee's September 29, 1994 markup, it was asserted that the bill
would give professional baseball players a unique "choice" of rem-
edies by allowing them to proceed under either the labor laws or
the antitrust laws.193 However, there is no language whatsoever in
the Committee-approved bill which would grant baseball players
any rights not enjoyed by professional players of other sports. The
legislation merely subjects any unilateral imposition of employment
terms and conditions to possible challenge under the antitrust
laws. It does not specify that any particular unilateral imposition
would necessarily violate the antitrust laws; nor does it alter the
operation of the rule of reason or the nonstatutory labor exemption.
It was further asserted that the bill would somehow create a risk
of sweeping the minor leagues within its coverage, by subjecting
them to the direct impact of antitrust claims, challenges and litiga-
tion.194 But again, close examination of the bill indicates that by
intent and application, it could only grant rights to major league
players. While it is far from clear that as a public policy matter the
minor leagues should be entitled to any antitrust exemption,s95
H.R. 4994 is nonetheless specifically limited to the unilateral impo-
sition of terms, outside of a collective bargaining agreement, involv-
ing the major leagues.
Finally, it was asserted at the Committee's markup that Con-
gress should not become involved in any labor strike "when there
is no national security interest involved" and that the Committee
should not take sides in the current strike.' 96 This argument also
misses the point. The Supreme Court has repeatedly and affirma-
tively solicited Congressional action in response to the Court's
grant of antitrust immunity in its now-discredited Federal Baseball
decision. '19 By failing to repeal the exemption in the face of the Su-
preme Court's granting professional baseball a unique antitrust ex-
emption, Congress has effectively taken sides in an ongoing labor
dispute. Given this history, it should not now require a "national
security interest" to remedy such an inequitable anomaly.
The Committee wishes to make it clear that by zupporting a nar-
rowly crafted limitation on baseball's nonstatutory antitrust ex-
emption, as reflected in H.R. 4994, it does not intend to imply in
any way that a more comprehensive response is not also justified-
or to imply that the courts should not act decisively themselves to
correct this misinterpretation in an appropriate case. Indeed, the
record before the Committee appears to provide a clear and compel-
'See September 28, 1994 Markup of H.R. 4994, Subcomm. on Econ. and Commercial Law
of the House Judiciary Comm. (tr. at 21) [hereinafter 1994 Markup) (statement of Representa-
tive Hamilton Fish)
-See September 1S94 House Hearings, supra note 63, at 47 (statement of Stanley Brand).5 See supra notes 128, 157-159 and accompanying text.
'eSee 1994 Markup, supra note 193 (tr. at 21) (statement of Representative Fish).
1In 1953, in Toolson, the Court wrote: "We think that, if there are evils in this field which
now warrant application to it of the antitrust laws it should be by legislation." Toolson v. New
York Yankees, 346 U.S. at 357. And in 1972, in Flood, Justice Blackmun wrote that 'what [the
Court] said in Toolson in 1953, we say again here in 1972: the remedy, if any is indicated is
for congressional, and not judicial action." Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. at 289.
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ling case in support of outright repeal of baseball's antitrust ex-
emption.
SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS
Section 1
This section states the bill's short title, the "Baseball Fans and
Communities Protection Act of 1994."
Section 2
Section 2 of the bill amends the Clayton Act to add a new section
27 partially removing the judicially created antitrust exemption for
professional baseball.
Proposed new section 27(a) of the Clayton Act provides that if
unilateral terms and conditions of employment in restraint of trade
or commerce are imposed by any party that has been subject to an
agreement between two or more Major League Baseball clubs and
the labor organization representing the players of Major League
Baseball, such unilateral imposition shall be subject to the anti-
trust laws.
The reference in section 27(a) to the unilateral terms and condi-
tions being imposed "in restraint of trade" is intended to incor-
porate the same limitations as are presently set forth in the anti-
trust laws; such reference is not intended to create a new require-
ment, in addition to that imposed generally by the antitrust laws
and their attendant bodies of jurisprudence. The references to
"major league baseball" include the major league clubs comprising
the National and the American Leagues,'9 8 and any similar new
clubs that may be established in the future.
The phrase "unilateral terms and conditions of employment" is
taken from the law of labor-management relations. It refers to
terms and conditions of employment imposed by employers on their
employees, or vice versa, outside the context or beyond the dura-
tion of a collective bargaining agreement.
The phrase "shall be subject to the antitrust laws" is intended to
incorporate the entire jurisprudence of the antitrust laws, as it ex-
ists and as it may develop.
By subjecting the unilateral imposition of terms and conditions
of employment to the antitrust laws, the Committee does not in-
tend to create any implication that such imposition would nec-
essarily be unlawful under the antitrust laws. Rather, such imposi-
tion would merely be subject to challenge under the antitrust laws,
as would be the case in other professional sports.
In so applying the antitrust laws, the various judicial doctrines
which have developed over the years with regard to professional
sports leagues would, depending on the applicable facts, apply to
professional baseball. Thus for example, Major League Baseball
owners would presumably be able to benefit from the rule of reason
where appropriate with respect to analyses of player restraints,19
and the players would be able to seek equitable relief to invalidate
such restraints to the same extent as players in other professional
'"See supra note 2.
I"See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
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sports. 200 And in the context of an antitrust challenge to a unilater-
ally imposed term unchanged from an expired collective bargaining
agreement, the defending party may be able, depending on the ap-
plicable facts and judicial construction, to incorporate the
nonstatutory labor exemption into its substantive defense.20' How-
ever, in the case of a new term or condition-one that was not con-
tained in the expired collective bargaining agreement or one that
is imposed in a form changed from the expired agreement-the
term or condition would appear to fail the second and third prongs
of the Mackey test. That is to say, it would not be a subject of col-
lective bargaining, nor the product of bona fide arm's-length nego-
tiations. 202
Proposed new section 27(b) of the Clayton Act would exempt
from the application of subsection (a) any term or condition in-
tended to apply solely with respect to a professional baseball player
who is a party to any uniform player contract that is assigned, at
the time of the imposition of the term or condition occurs, to a
baseball club that is not a major league professional baseball club.
This section clarifies that the bill does not confer any rights under
the antitrust laws on any minor league players (i.e. players who
are not on the roster of a major league club or who are not a free
agent).
Proposed new section 27(c) of the Clayton Act clarifies that the
legislation shall not be construed to modify or affect the rights or
duties that any person may have under Federal labor law. All cur-
rently available processes and remedies under labor-related laws
continue to be available to the parties. For example, the parties'
duty to bargain collectively, under sections 8(a)(5) and 8(bX3) of the
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(5) and (bX3), will
be unaffected by this legislation. Similarly, the legislation will also
not affect the operation of the Sports Broadcasting Act, 15 U.S.C.
§1291 et seq., which explicitly permits the owners of professional
-See, e.g.. Jackson v. National Football League, 802 F. Supp. 226, 234-235 (D. Minn. 1992)
(granting a temporary restraining order to four NFL players, effectively making them free
agents, in response to players' antitrust challenge to owners' application of player restraints
after termination of the collective bargaining relationship between the parties).
21See supra notes 77-98 and accompanying text.2 2 See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
Brown v. Po Football, Inc. appears to represent the only antitrust challenge to a sports
league's alleged imposition of new employment terms not pruviously included in a collective bar-
gaining agreement See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 782 F. Supp. 125, 137-139 (D.D.C. 1991),
a ppeals docketed, Nos. 93-7165, 94-7071 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 27, 1993, Mar 31 1994) In that case
which involved the NFL's unilateral imposition of a term providing that developmental squad
players would be paid a fixed salary rather than being permitted to negotiate their own salaries,
the district court held that because the salary restraint was never included in a collective bar-
aining agreement, the nonstatutory labor exemption did not apply. Id. at 139. (The court also
held, in te alternative, that the non-statutory labor exemption had ended with the expiration
of the collective bargaining agreement. See supra text accompanying note 92.) See also Bridge'
man v. National Basketball Association, 675 F. Supp 960, 965 (D.N.J. 1987).
Although some commentators have read Powell 11 very broadly, as authority for immunizing
even some new employment terms imposed after "impasse" (see, e.g., Note, "When Does the
Buzzer Sound?: The Nonstatutory Labor Exemption in Professional Sports," 94 Colum. L. Rev
1045, 1064 (1994)), the case did not involve the impocition of a new term or cnndition, but rath-
er, the maintenance of a term contained in the most recent collective barguning areement See
Supreme Court Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Powell v.National Football
League, On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit (No. 89-1421), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991) at 13 n.5. In the Committee's view,
the broad construction of Powell II suggested by these commentators would go far beyond the
limited purpose of the nonstatutory labor exemption. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying
text.
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baseball and other sports leagues to pool their separate rights in
sponsored telecasting of their games.
Proposed new section 27(d) of the Clayton Act excludes from the
term terms and conditions" as used in section 27 any strike or
lockout. Thus, both sides are permitted to continue to use the re-
spective remedy available to them, and the use of that remedy can-
not be challenged under the antitrust laws. This merely codifies the
existing antitrust understanding applicable to collective bargaining
in other industries.
COMMITIEE OVERSIGHT FINDINGS
In compliance with clause 2(IX3XA) of rule XI of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the Committee reports that the findings
and recommendations of the Committee, based on oversight activi-
ties under clause 2(bX 1) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Rep-
resentatives, are incorporated in the descriptive portions of this re-
port.
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS OVERSIGHT FINDINGS
No findings or recommendations of the Committee on Govern-
ment Operations were received as referred to in clause 2(lX3)(D) of
rule XI of the Rules of the House of Representatives.
NEW BUDGET AUTHORITY AND TAx EXPENDITURES
Clause 2(lX3XB) of House Rule XI is inapplicable because this
legislation does not provide new budgetary authority or increased
tax expenditures.
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE
In compliance with clause 2(IX3XC) of rule XI of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the Committee sets forth, with respect to
the bill H.R. 4994, the following estimate and comparison, prepared
by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office under section
403 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974:
U.S. CONGRESS,
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE,
Washington, DC, October 4, 1994.
Hon. JACK BROOKS,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has re-
viewed H.R. 4994, the Baseball Fans and Communities Protection
Act of 1994, as ordered reported by the House Committee on the
Judiciary on September 29, 1994. CBO estimates that enacting
H.R. 4994 would result in no significant costs to the federal govern-
ment or to state and local governments. Also, enactment of this bill
would not affect direct spending or receipts. Therefore, pay-as-you-
go procedures would not apply.
H.R. 4994 would remove major league baseball's exemption from
antitrust laws if the club owners unilaterally impose terms and
conditions of employment on the players. By removing the antitrust
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exemption under these circumstances, this bill would allow the
labor organization representing the players to challeng the own-
ers' decision in federal court. Enactment of H.R. 4994 would impose
additional costs on the U.S. court system to the extent that addi-
tional antitrust cases are filed. However, CBO does not expect any
resulting increase in case load or court costs to be significant.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased
to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Susanne S. Mehlman,
who can be reached at 226-2860.
Sincerely,
JAMES F. BLUM
(For Robert D. Reischauer, Director).
INFLATIONARY IMPACT STATEMENT
Pursuant to clause 2(1X4) of rule XI of the Rules of the House
of Representatives, the Committee estimates that H.R. 4994 will
have no significant inflationary impact on prices and costs in the
national economy.
CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED
In compliance with clause 3 of rule XIII of the Rules of the House
of Representatives, changes in existing law ma-de by the bill, as re-
ported, are shown as follows (new matter is printed in italic, exist-
ing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman):
CIAYTON ACT
SEc. 27. (a) If unilateral terms and conditions of employment in
restraint of trade -r commerce are imposed by any party that has
been subject to an agreement between 2 or more major league base-
ball clubs and the labor organization representing the players of
major league baseball, such unilateral imposition shall be subject to
the antitrust laws.
(b) Subsection (a) shall not apply to a term or condition imposed
solely with respect to a professional baseball player who is a party
to a uniform player contract that is assigned, at the time the imposi-
tion described in such subsection cccurs, to a baseball club that is
not a major league professional baseball club.
(c) This section shall not be construed to modify, impair, or super-
sede the operation of-
(1) the Act of September 30, 1961 (Public Law 87-331; 15
U.S.C. 1291 et seq.), or
(2) any Federal statute relating to labor relations.
(d) For purposes of this section, the term "terms and conditions"
does not include a strike or a lockout.
DISSENTING VIEWS
As introduced, the "Baseball Fans and Community Protection Act
of 1994" (H.R. 4994) contained a number of fundamental flaws.
First, the language of the original bill would have pre-determined
that the antitrust laws were to apply ("the antitrust laws shall
apply") in the event the baseball players' union challenged an at-
tempt by the club owners to unilaterally impose a term or condition
of employment (such as a salary cap). So, te bill itself would have
directed the district court to find what is normally the issue to be
decided in these cases. That is, whether it is appropriate for the
antitrust laws to apply or whether, instead, the parties should be
required to continue the collective bargaining process. In effect,
H.R. 4994 would have decided the issue of antitrust applicability
before the suit authorized by the bill was ever filed.
Secondly, the original bill was inconsistent with the provisions
and intent of the Norris-LaGuardia Act (29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115).
That statute strictly prohibits the federal courts from issuing in-
junctions in labor dispute cases. Despite this longstanding federal
policy of non-intervention, H.R. 4994 would have imposed an "auto-
inatic injunction", the effect of which would have been to stay the
implementation of any unilateral term or condition of employment
pcnding the outcome of the union's antitrust action.
The substitute sponsored by Congressman Synar and favorably
reported by the House Judiciary Committee, is an admitted im-
provement over the original version of H.R. 4994. (For example, the
language explicitly imposing a stay has been removed.) However,
we continue to be concerned about both the propriety and timing
of this legislation and oppose its enactment. Simply put, Congress
should not intervene in an ongoing collective bargaining dispute
unless a national security interest is involved. Clearly, as impor-
tant as baseball is to our national psyche, a baseball strike is not
a national security matter. The decision to legislatively move ahead
on this matter at this point is also highly questionable. It would
make more sense for Congress to revisit the basic issue of base-
ball's antitrust exemption next year, when the emotion and acri-
mony surrounding the current strike hopefully will have subsided.
Furthermore, the language of the substitute contains potentially
inconsistent provisions that must be clarified. The new subsection
27(a) of the Clayton Act states that the unilateral imposition of a
term or condition of employment "in restraint of trade * * * shall
(emphasis added) be subject to the antitrust laws." Then, sub-
section 27(c) says that this language "shall not be construed to
modify, impair, or supersede the operation of * * * (2) any Federal
statute relating to labor relations." When read together what do
these two provisions mean? Does the language preserve the non-
statutory labor exemption as it has been construed by the courts?
Does this language require that the baseball players' union decer-
(41)
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tify itself before bringing the action under subsection 27(a)? Or,
does it mean that the union could pursue an antitrust suit under
subsection (a), without foregoing any of its rights or remedies
under federal labor law?
At the Judiciary Committee markup, the substitute's sponsor in-
dicated that its language was intended to place baseball teams on
equal footing with all other organized employers with respect to the
interplay between the labor and antitrust laws. Congressman
Synar assured Committee members that subsection (c) of the sub-
stitute was added to make clear that baseball teams would have
the same rights and defenses that are enjoyed by all other profes-
sional sports leagues and all other organized employers. That is,
subsection (c) was intended to make all of the exemptions to the
antitrust laws, particularly the statutory and non-statutory labor
exemptions, available to baseball teams in any antitrust action
brought under the substitute.
While we were pleased to hear Congressman Synar indicate that
the substitute would allow the baseball teams to retain all of the
usual exemptions and defenses in this area, we are concerned that
the language of the substitute does not say this as clearly as it
should. Specifically, we remain concerned that the language of the
substitute could allow the players' union to pursue antitrust rem-
edies in federal court while retaining all of their rights under the
National Labor Relations Act. If so, they would be permitted to
continue their strike and could continue to file unfair labor prac-
tices complaints with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).
Such a repalt would not be consistent with the preponderance of
the caselaw on the so-called non-statutory labor exemption. In such
cases, the courts have generally ruled that a union must elect be-
tween labor law remedies and antitrust remedies. The question,
here, is whether the labor exemption applies after a collective bar-
gaining agreement has expired. The only circuit court of appeals
that has decided this question, held in Powell II that the labor ex-
emption survives an expired agreement as long as there is an "on-
going collective bargaining relationship." Powell v. NFL, 930 F.2d
1293, 1302-03 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. den. 498 U.S. 1046 (1991).
The Powell II litigation began when the National Football
League Players Association's ("NFLPA") ended their 1987 strike.
Initially, the NFLPA challenged the NFL's continued adherence to
the free agency rules of the expired collective bargaining agree-
ment. By the time Powell II got to the Eighth Circuit, however, the
NFL had unilaterally implemented its "Plan B" free agency system
after a collective bargaining impasse had been reached.
The Eighth Circuit disagreed with a district court finding that
the exemption ended when the parties reached a bargaining im-
passe. The court noted that the labor laws provided the opposing
parties in a collective bargaming relationsbip with "offsetting tools"
through which either side coul' seek resolution of their labor dis-
pute. The court reasoned that to allow the players to "pursue an
action for treble damages under the Sherman Act [once impasse
has been reached] would * * * improperly upset the careful bal-
ance established by Congress through the labor law." Id. at 1302.
The court concluded that the labor laws, not the antitrust laws,
govern disputes over terms and conditions of employment:
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The labor arena is one with well established rules which
are intended to foster negotiated settlements rather than
intervention by the courts. The League and the Players
have accepted this "level playing field" as the basis for
their often tempestuous re ationship, and we believe that
there is substantial justification for requiring the parties
to continue to fight on it, so that bargaining and the exer-
tion of economic force may be used to bring about legiti-
mate compromise. 930 F.2d at 1303.
The same rationale was followed in the most recent labor anti-
trust decision involving the expiration of a collection bargaining
agreement in a professional sports league. NBA v. Williams, Civil
Action No. 94 CIV. 4488 (L.D.N.Y. July 18, 1994). The collective
bargaimng agreement between the National Basketball Association
("NBA") and the National Basketball Players Association
("NBAPA") expired this summer. Nevertheless, the NBA teams
have continued to operate under tie terms of that expired agree-
ment, including the salary cap and free agency provisions. After
the NBAPA threatened to sue the NBA under antitrust laws for
continuing to apply these terms, the NBA filed suit against the
NBAPA and representative players. The NBA sought a declaratory
judgment that the federal labor laws governed the dispute between
the parties and that, as a result, it lawfully could continue to apply
the terms of the expired agreement. The NBAPA and representa-
tive players counterclmed, alleging the continued imposition of
the salary cap and free agency rules violated and antitrust and was
not protected by the labor exemption.
Judge Duffy of the Southern District of New York found that
both sides were "simply using the court as a bargaining chip in the
collective bargaining process" in what was "a labor dispute that
does not belong in litigation." Williams, slip op. at 6-7. The court
found that the rationale of the Supreme Court precedent establish-
ing the nonstatutory labor exemption and the policies of the federal
labor laws "mandate that the appropriate standard to apply in the
Powell II standard." Id. at 24.
The court concluded that the labor laws control in such disputes.
Quoting from Professor (now Judge) Winter's seminal work on the
interplay between the federal labor and antitrust laws, the court
explained that:
Collective bargaining seeks to order labor markets
through a system of countervailing power. Thus, it is often
referred to by economists as bilateral monopoly. If such a
structure is to be protected by law, then logically the anti-
trust claims between employers and employees must be ex-
tinguished. William, slip op. at 24 (quoting Jacobs & Win-
ter, Antitrust Principles. 81 Yale L.J. at 22.)
The court declared that the antitrust laws did not apply in what
was purely a labor dispute between the NBA and the players' col-
lective bargaining representative. According to those labor laws,
the NBA could lawfully continue to operate under the terms of the
expired agreement. The court closed with the following suggestion
to the parties:
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[The] Parties are once again urged to pursue the only ra-
tionale course for the resolution of their disputes; that is,
of course of collective bargaining pursued by both sides in
good faith. No court, no matter how highly situated, can
replace this time honored manner of labor dispute 'resolu-
tion. Rather than clogging the courts with unnecessary liti-
gation, the parties should pursue this course. Williams slip
op. at 28-29.
It is important to emphasize that neither the NFL nor the NBA
have an antitrust exemption. It should be further pointed out that
the National Hockey League (NHL)--currently involved in a work
stoppage-is also generally subject to the federal antitrust laws.'
There is also considerable speculation that there could be a work
stoppage in the NBA within the month. Nevertheless, all three of
the other professional sports leagues have seen considerable labor
strife, not dissimilar to that which we are witnessing with respect
to baseball. It would appear that labor strife in professional sports
has more to do with economics, than it has to do with the applica-
bility of the federal antitrust laws.
Baseball's antitrust exemption has received considerable criti-
cism and has been "under Fire" for many years. The Synar sub-
stitute, of course, would not repeal many aspects of baseball's anti-
trust immunity. However, at this point, it might be useful to point
out the problems that outright repeal of the antitrust exemption
would bring with it. For example, the relationship between the
major league teams and their minor league affiliates would be seri-
ously undermined if the antitrust exemption is repealed in its total-
ity.
Specifically, the major league teams currently enter into con-
tracts with minor league players that bind those players to a par-
ticular club under a "reserve clause" for a period of six and one-
half years. That reserve clause-which no longer applies to major
league players after a certain number of years of service-would be
subject to challenge under the federal antitrust laws as a restraint
on trade. No major league team would have the financial incentive
to continue to invest large sums of money in the minor leagues in
such an uncertain situation. Specifically, why should they invest in
minor league player development if they had no on-going assurance
that the players (they had initially signed) would remain part of
their organization for a reasonable evaluation period? In addition,
the amateur draft. which provides the bulk of players for tile minor
leagues would also be subject to a challenge under the federal anti-
trust laws. Consequently, it is important for Congress to recognize
that the business relationship between the major league clubs and
their minor league affiliates would be altered if legislation uncondi-
tionally repealing the antitrust exemption were to be enacted.
Furthermore, there are other aspects of major league baseball
thac are currently exempt that could be challenged under the anti-
trast laws if the exemption was removed in its entirety. For exam-
0Ae, the territorial broadcasting rights that each te'am is allocated
IThe only exception to antitrust coverage for the NFL, NBA and NHL is contuined in the
Sports Broadcasting Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291-94. Under this law, the professional sports leagues
(baseball included) are protected from antitrust suits when they enter into league-wide contracts
wi!h television networks.
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for specific regions of the country could be challenged. Similarly,
the reasonableness of the rules governing franchise expansion and
franchise relocation decisions could also be challenged under the
antitrust laws if the exemption were to be removed. The point is
that a number of baseball's everyday business operations would be-
come the focus of antitrust litigation, bringing with it confusion,
delay and the threat of treble damage awards.
The substitute attempts to limit its scope of labor disputes be-
tween the major league players and the owners, thereby not having
any impact on the minor leagues. Once again, during the Commit-
tee's markup, Congressman Synar attempted to allay concerns
about the language of the substitute. He stated: "It specifically ex-
empts (the) minor leagues from the repeal of the antitrust law ex-
emption in the bill." Nevertheless, concerns have been raised about
the language in subsection (b) of the substitute from the minor
league perspective. They note that it does affect some minor league
players in that the recent "Basic Agreement" between the major
league owners and the players' union involved certain aspects of
minor league contracts and affects the rights of minor league play-
ers carried on major league rosters. The bill needs to be further
amended to ensure that there is no adverse impact on the minor
leagues.
To summarize, the problem with the substitute version of H.R.
4994 is that the players' union may not be required to elect be-
tween labor law remedies and antitrust remedies, a result that
would be inconsistent with policies previously established by Con-
gress and the federal courts with respect to labor disputes. The
Major League Baseball Players' Union could be permitted to retain
its rights and remedies under labor law while, at the same time,
seeking an antitrust law treble damage award in federal court.
That result would amount to Congress picking sides in a highly
publicized labor dispute-a dispute with no national security impli-
cations. The enactment of H.R. 4994, as reported by the Judiciary
Committee would be a bad precedent and serious public policy mis-
take. Congress should not intervene but, rather, allow the collective
bargaining process to continue.
HAMILTON FISH, Jr.
HENRY J. HYDE.
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr.
GEORGE W. GEKAS.
HowARD COBLE.
STEVEN SCHIFF.
JIM RAMSTAD.
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2I. TEXT OF S. 627, AS REPORTED
1104th Cong.. 1st sess.
A BILL To require the general application of the antitrust laws to major league
baseball, and for other purposes
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the "Major League Baseball Antitrust
Reform Act of 1995."
SEC. 2. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO PROFESSIONAL
MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL.
The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) is amended by adding at
the end the following new section:
"Sec. 27 (a) Subject to subsection (b), the antitrust laws shall
apply to the business of professional major league baseball.
"(b) Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect-
"(1) the applicability or nonapplicability of the antitrust laws
to professional baseball's amateur draft, the minor league re-
serve clause, the Professional Baseball Agreement, or any
other matter relating to the minor leagues;
"(2) the applicability or nonapplicability of the antitrust laws
to any restraint by professional baseball on franchise reloca-
tion; or
"(3) the application of Public Law 87-331 (15 U.S.C. 1291 et
seq.) (commonly known as the Sports Broadcasting Act of
1961)."
II. PURPOSE
This Committee has long held the view that free market competi-
tion, protected by the antitrust laws, is the foundation of our eco-
nomic system. Immunity from the antitrust laws is appropriate
only in very limited circumstances, and only if certain precautions
are taken. Immunity should be granted and maintained only where
it is clear that competition will not work in a particular industry
or market. Moreover, any industry that is granted immunity is well
advised to adopt the least anticompetitive practices possible, in
order to preserve the fairness of the economic system and maintain
its exemption. With these principles in mind, the Committee has
reviewed S. 627, the "Major League Baseball Antitrust Reform Act
of 1995."
The purpose of S. 627 is to affirm that major league baseball's
owners and players are subject to the Nation's antitrust laws. Pro-
fessional baseball is the only industry in the United States that
claims an exemption from the antitrust laws without being subject
to alternative regulatory supervision. Yet Congress has never de-
clared professional baseball to be exempt from the antitrust laws.
Instead, the U.S. Supreme Court shielded the owners of major
league baseball from the antitrust laws through its judicial deci-
sions, beginning in 1922. While subsequently finding the exemption
to be an "anomaly," the Court expressly left it to Congress to mod-
ify the exemption.
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This legislation, S. 627, will end the anomalous antitrust loop-
hole enjoyed by the owners of major league baseball, by clarifying
that the antitrust laws do apply to major league baseball with cer-
tain exceptions. Under S. 627, the antitrust laws will apply ex-
pressly to areas of immediate concern such as player relations,
competition from new leagues, and telecommunications activities
that are not within the scope of the Sports Broadcasting Act of
1961. However, S. 627 will not affect existing law with respect to
professional baseball's ability to restrain franchise relocation, mat-
ters relating to the minor leagues, or the statutory provisions of the
Sports Broadcasting Act.
The baseball strike of 1994-95-which tarnished the national
pastime by curtailing the 1994 season and shortening the 1995 sea-
son-has reemphasized the need to express Congress, intent to
apply to professional baseball the rules of fair and open competition
that are followed by all other unregulated business enterprises in
this country, including all other sports leagues. The strike, which
started in August 1994 and did not end until April 1995, was not
prompted by the players' demand for more money, but by their lack
of any alternative when faced with the owners threats to impose
unilaterally terms and conditions of employment that could violate
the antitrust laws. Other professional athletes and similarly situ-
ated employees have alternatives to striking specifically because of
these laws. Unfortunately, negotiations were unproductive and, to
the fans great dismay, the 1994 World Series was never played.
These failed negotiations achieved what the Great Depression,
world wars, and scandal could not-the cancellation of the World
Series. The strike continued into the 1995 season, which began
only after a Federal injunction restored the terms of the old agree-
ment. Remarkably, the owners and players have yet to reach a new
labor agreement. It is clearly time to end baseball's antitrust ex-
emption.
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Many bills have been introduced over the decades in response to
the Supreme Court's 1922 decision establishing baseball's antitrust
exemption. During the previous Congress, this Committee voted on
June 23, 1994, and narrowly failed to pass S. 500, which as amend-
ed, would have eliminated the antitrust exemption for major league
baseball as it related to labor issues.
In the 104th Congress, Senators Hatch, Moynihan, Graham, and
Bingaman introduced S. 415, the Professional Baseball Antitrust
Reform Act of 1995, on February 14, 1995. On that same day, Sen-
ators Thurmond and Leahy introduced S. 416, the Major League
Baseball Antitrust Reform Act of 1995. While the two bills had
similar goals, the primary difference was that S. 415 would have
overridden the "nonstatutory labor exemption" in certain cir-
cumstances. The Subcommittee on Antitrust, Business Rights, and
Competition promptly held a hearing on the bills.
Senator Thurmond chaired the Antitrust Subcommittee hearing
on February 15, 1995, at which both S. 415 and S. 416 were ana-
lyzed. Witnesses included: Senators Hatch, Moynihan, Kassebaum,
and Graham; Mr. Selig, chairman of the Major League Baseball
Executive Council; Mr. O'Connor of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius; Mr.
4Rill of Collier, Shannon, Rill & Scott; Mr. Fehr, executive director
of the Major League Baseball Players Association; Mr. Cone and
Mr. Murray, both baseball players and members of the Major
League Baseball Players Association; and Mr. Arquit of Rogers &
Wells.
Following the hearing, on March 27, 1995 Senators Hatch, Thur-
mond, and Leahy introduced a compromise bill, S. 627, the Major
League Baseball Antitrust Reform Act of 1995, which was cospon-
sored by Senators Moynihan and Graham. The legislation was re-
ferred to this Committee and the Antitrust Subcommittee. On April
5, 1995, with a quorum present, the Antitrust, Business Rights,
and Competition Subcommittee approved S. 627 by voice vote for
full Committee consideration.
IV. VOTE OF THE COMMITTEE
On August 3, 1995, with a quorum present, the Committee on
the Judiciary ordered S. 627 favorably reported by a vote of 9 to
8, with one member abstaining. In compliance with paragraph 7 of
Rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the members of the
Committee voted as follows on S. 627:
YEAS NAYS
Hatch Grassley
Thurmond Specter
Simpson Brown
Thompson Kyl
DeWine Biden
Abraham Heflin
Kennedy Simon
Leahy Feinstein
Feingold
ABSTENTION
Kohl
Senator Simpson offered an amendment that would have main-
tained the existing antitrust exemption if an independent baseball
commissioner was appointed in accordance with specific proce-
dures. The amendment was not adopted by a vote of 6 to 11, with
one abstention, as follows:
YEAS NAYS
Hatch Thurmond
Simpson Specter
Grassley Thompson
Brown Kyl
Kennedy DeWine
Leahy Abraham
Biden
Heflin
Simon
Feinstein
Feingold
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ABSTENTION
Kohl
V. DIscussIoN
Major league baseball has enjoyed an esteemed position in this
Nation over the last century. Often referred to as America's na-
tional pastime, the game has been a bond linking generations and
evokes special memories of family and childhood for many.
Unfortunately, the realities of baseball do not always match this
perception. The game is, in fact, a lucrative business-when not
sidelined by labor problems-generating billions of dollars in reve-
nues and related income each year. With their current antitrust
status, the owners may conspire and collude without restraint, and
they have repeatedly taken unfair advantage of their unique legal
position. The antitrust laws were designed to prohibit the very kind
of economic practices that exist in major league baseball today.
The list of those harmed by baseball's antitrust exemption is
long. Municipalities, minor league owners, prospective investors,
players, and fans have all been victims of professional baseball's
anticompetitive practices. It is no surprise that the owners' rela-
tionship with the players has been so contentious; in fact, baseball
has been plagued with more work stoppages than all other profes-
sional sports combined. Nor is it surprising that record numbers of
fans decided to demonstrate their frustration in 1995 by staying
away from ballparks across the country-overall, the decline in at-
tendance is estimated at more than 20 percent.
As the Committee began its consideration of S. 627, Chairman
Hatch summarized the need for legislation to resolve these prob-
lems by stating:
This bill will bring about sound reforms that ensure that
baseball is treated fairly and properly under the antitrust
laws. In the long run, our bill will contribute to construc-
tive labor relations between the players and owners, and
will subject Major League Baseball to the same treatment
under the nation's laws that the other professional sports
experience.
Among groups which have analyzed and support this legislation,
two are particularly noteworthy. By letter of August 3, 1995, the
Department of Justice-which has enforcement responsibilities
over our Nation's antitrust laws-responded to Senator Leahy, the
ranking member of the Antitrust Subcommittee, stating that the
"Department supports legislation that would narrow baseball's spe-
cial antitrust exemption by applying the antitrust laws to Major
League Baseball with certain exceptions." Likewise, the Section of
Antitrust Law of the American Bar Association supports S. 627 be-
cause it "reverses baseball's anomalous antitrust exemption and
places professional baseball on the same footing as other profes-
sional sports."
At the Committee's markup, Senator Leahy observed: "Congress
may not be able to solve every problem or heal baseball's self-in-
flicted wounds, but we can do this: We can pass legislation that
will declare that professional baseball can no longer operate above
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the law that governs all other professional sports and commercial
activity."
A. BACKGROUND OF BASEBALL'S EXEMPTION
Major league baseball's unusual antitrust status began with the
U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Federal Baseball Club, Inc. v. Na-
tional League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
Explaining why the antitrust laws should not apply, the Court held
that exhibitions of baseball did not satisfy the interstate commercejurisdictional requirement because they were "purely state affairs"
and not "trade or commerce in the commonly accepted use of those
words." In 1922, the Supreme Court could not have envisioned the
1993 World Series, where Canada's Toronto Blue Jays defeated the
Philadelphia Phillies in a game televised around the world. The
game the Court sought to protect bears little resemblance to the
billion dollar industry operating today.
A series of cases followed the 1922 decision of Federal Baseball,
in which the Federal courts refused to extend an antitrust exemp-
tion to any other sport, I and held that other sports were subject
to the antitrust laws.2 These decisions acknowledged the erroneous
nature of Federal Baseball, but refused to abandon the precedent
as it applied to baseball.
The decision of the Supreme Court in Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S.
258 (1972), repudiated the legal basis of the Federal Baseball case
and its progeny. The Court correctly acknowledged in Flood that its
prior decisions which created the exemption were now outdated
and incorrect. Specifically, the Court found that "[p]rofessional
baseball is a business and it is engaged in interstate commerce."
407 U.S. at 282. Rather than modify the exemption it had created,
however, the Court avoided the issue by holding that "[i]f there is
any inconsistency or illogic in all this, it is an inconsistency and il-
logic of long standing that is to be remedied by the Congress and
not by this Court." Id.3 Without the Supreme Court decisions in
Federal Baseball and Flood, major league baseball would have no
arguable claim to antitrust immunity. 4
1 Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957) (professional football); Haywood
v. National Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971) (professional basketball); Nassau Sports v.
Peters, 352 F. Supp. 870 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (professional hockey).
2 See eg. Dessen v. Professional Golfers Ass'n, 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
846 (1966) (professional golf); Washington State Bowlng Proprietors Ass'n v. Pacific Lanes. Inc.,
356 F.2d 371 (9th Cir.). cert. denied, 384 U.S. 963 (1966) (professional bowling); Amateur Soft-
ball Ass'nv. United States, 467 F. 2d 312 (10th Cir. 1972) (amateur softball).3 The Court in Flood also held that state antitrust enforcement Is pre-empted, affirming the
appellate court's Ironic conclusion that the "burden on interstate commerce outweighs the states'
interests" in enforcing their own antitrust laws against baseball. 407 U.S. 284. To the extent
that the Federal exemption was due to baseball not being in interstate commerce and a "purely
state affair," however, State antitrust laws are the only ones that would apply to baseball.
4A federal court recently grappled with the Supreme Court's Flood decision in Piazza v. Major
League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420, 436 (E.D. Pa. 1993). The underlying facts in Piazza con-
cerned the efforts of investors to purchase the San Francisco Giants and move the team to St.
Petersburg. FL. The league thwarted the move, and the investors sued. Noting that the Su-
preme Court in Flood had repudiated the legal basis for the decision in Federal Baseball, thedistrict court limited the case to its facts and denied the league's motion for summary judgment.
Specifically, the court found that the reserve clause at issue in Federal Baseball and Flood re-
mained exempt from the antitrust laws, but that in all other respects baseball was a business
in interstate commerce and was therefore subject to the antitrust laws. The league reportedly
settled the suit before trial for $6 million. In a related case, the Supreme Court o Florida found
the Piazza rationale persuasive and adopted it in Butterworth v. National League ofProfessional
Baseball Clubs, 644 So.2d 1021 (Fla. 1994). See also Morsani v. Major League Baseball, 1995
Fla. App. Lexis 10391 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (following rationale of Butterworth to reinstate state
antitrust claims). But see New Orleans Pelicans Baseball, Inc. v. National Ass'n of Professional
7B. GENERAL APPLICABILITY OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS
Courts have repeatedly held that the antitrust laws do apply to
other professional sports, including professional football, basket-
ball, and hockey, as discussed above, as well as all other unregu-
lated businesses. However, the courts also have long recognized
that a professional sports league is a joint venture whose product-
a series of contests leading to a championship-could not be ob-
tained if the individual franchises or teams were not permitted a
high degree of cooperation and business coordination beyond that
required in most other industries.5
Courts generally review the conduct of a bona fide joint venture
under the so-called "rule of reason" analysis, discussed next, which
balances benefits against any harm to competition, rather than
holding the conduct per se illegal without analyzing any defense orjustification. A second important doctrine explained below is the
nonstatutory labor exemption from the antitrust laws, which ap-
plies generally to all sports and industries.
1. The rule of reason
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits contracts, combinations,
or conspiracies that unreasonably restrain trade. 15 U.S.C. 1. Le-
gality under the antitrust laws generally depends on whether the
conduct in question is considered "procompetitive" or "anticompeti-
tive." Actions and conduct by joint ventures often have both pro-
competitive and anticompetitive aspects, so legality is determined
by balancing the beneficial effects on competition against the re-
straints the conduct imposes on competition. This balancing in-
volves analyzing the facts peculiar to the business, the history of
the restraint, and the reasons why the restraint was imposed. 6
This balancing analysis is known as the "rule of reason," and is
routinely used by courts in deciding antitrust cases involving pro-
fessional sports.7
Baseball Leagues. Inc., No. 93-253, 1994 WL 631144 (U.S.D.C., E.D. La. Mar. 1. 1994) (rejecting
Piazza as an "impressive dissent from precedent" and granting summary judgment based on ex-
istence of antitrust exemption).
sSee, e g. Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 619 (8th Cir. 1976). cert. dis-
missed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of Univ. of
Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85. 86 (1984).
6 See, e.g., Chicago Bd of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); National Socy
of Prfessional Eng'rsv. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978).7 See, e.g., National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 468 U.S. at 86; Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum
Comm'nv. National Football League 726 F.2d 1381, 1386 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990(1984).
Some professional sports leagues have argued for treatment as a "single entity" for purposes
of antitrust analysis, rather than individual teams. See, e.g., Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum
Comm'n, 726 F.2d at 1387; San Francisco Seals, Ltd. v. National Hoey League, 379 F. Supp.
966 (C.D. Cal. 1974). See also Gary Roberts, The Single Entity Status of Professional Sports
Leagues under Section I of the Sherman Act An Alternative View, 60 Tul. L. Rev. 562 (1986);
Myron C. Grauer. Recognition of the National Football League as a Single Entity under Section
1 of the Sherman Act Implications of the Consumer Welfare Model, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1983).
Because there can be no 'contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade" unless the
conduct involves two or more separate entities, such treatment would immunize sports leagues
against most antitrust liability. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752(1984). Courts have rejected the argument that sports leagues constitute a single entity. See,
e.g., Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n, 726 F.2d 1381; North Am. Soccer League v. Na-
tional Football League, 670 F.2d 1249. 1257-1259 (2d Cir.). cert denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982);
cf Chicago Professional Sports & WGNv. National Basketball Ass'n, 961 F.2d 667 (7th Cir.),
cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 409 (1992) (Judge Easterbrook remanded case and encouraged league
to raise single entity theory before district court).
8While most restraints of trade are analyzed in terms of their rea-
sonableness based on their nature, purpose, and effect, practices
such as price fixing have such a pernicious effect that they are pre-
sumed conclusively to be unreasonable. Under the per se rule, these
"naked restraints' on competition are deemed to be automatic anti-
trust violations without inquiry into their specific harm or businessjustifications.
In sports cases, as noted, the courts typically rely on the rule of
reason to look at the purpose of any restriction and whether it rea-
sonably relates to legitimate objectives or whether it is motivated
by an anticompetitive intent, such as eliminating a competitor from
the marketplace. The legality of a practice under the rule of reason
can only be determined by its effect on competition in a relevant
market. That is, to constitute an antitrust violation, the restriction
must result in the substantial foreclosure of competition of a par-
ticular product in a particular geographic area.
2. Nonstatutory labor exemption
Understanding the broad outlines of the "nonstatutory labor ex-
emption" is necessary to determine the practical impact and effect
of S. 627. The nonstatutory labor exemption from the antitrust
laws applies to all sports and industries, regardless of the existence
of other antitrust exemptions.
In an effort to harmonize the nation's antitrust and labor laws,
Congress has since 1914 protected from antitrust challenge the for-
mation of labor unions and their collective activities as authorized
under the labor laws.8 While the statutory exemption is limited to
unilateral activities of labor unions and employees, the courts have
developed a limited "nonstatutory" labor exemption from the anti-
trust laws that applies to concerted activities and agreements be-
tween labor and nonlabor parties, such as between a union and em-
ployers in a collective bargaining setting.
The nonstatutory labor exemption is limited, both because the
exemption lasts only as long as there is a collective bargaining re-
lationship and because all implied exemptions to the antitrust laws
are strongly disfavored and to be construed as being no broader
than clearly necessary. See, e.g., California Retail Liquor Dealers
Ass'n v. Mideal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105-106 (1980).
That being said, there are conflicts and disagreements among
courts and academics over the extent and scope of the nonstatutory
labor exemption and, in particular, whether a union must decertify
in order for individual employees to be protected by the antitrust
laws.9 It is clear, however, that at some point the nonstatutory
labor exemption ends and employees have a right to invoke the
antitrust laws. Thus, any assertion that the antitrust laws have
nothing to do with labor relations is incorrect.
The recent bargaining between the National Basketball Associa-
tion and the NBA Players Association provides an instructive ex-
8 Clayton Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. 17 (exempts operation of labor organizations from the antitrust
laws by stating that labor is not an article of commerce): Clayton Act §20, 29 U.S.C. 52; and
Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. 101-110, 113-115.9The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in order to review Brown v. Pro Football, 50 F.3d
1041, 1053-54 (D.C. Cir. 1995), which adopted a broad view of the nonstatutory labor exemption
as protecting the entire collective bargaining process, and rejected the players' argument that
the exemption expires with the formal collective bargaining agreement.
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ample of the importance of the possibility of invoking the antitrust
laws in the context of labor relations. The threat of union decerti-
fication led the parties to return to the bargaining table and ulti-
mately to a new contract. The National Football League has also
experienced successful application of the antitrust laws to the rela-
tionship between labor and management in the multiemployer con-
text.
The Committee need not address or resolve the debate over the
scope of the nonstatutory labor exemption and whether decertifica-
tion is a necessary prerequisite before players invoke the antitrust
laws. It is sufficient to recognize that the antitrust laws play a role
in the labor-management context, and S. 627 will ensure that the
same rules apply to baseball as to all other sports and industries.
C. IMPACT OF EXEMPTION ON BASEBALL'S LABOR RELATIONS
On August 12, 1994, major league baseball experienced its eighth
baseball work stoppage since 1972-more stoppages than in profes-
sional basketball, football, and hockey, combined. The strike unde-
niably has had an impact on this legislation. For many supporters
of this legislation, the strike provided the motivation to seek modi-
fication of baseball's anomalous antitrust exemption. On the other
hand, among those who defend the current exemption, the strike
provided a reason to take no action. Senator Thurmond discussed
the effect of the strike during his subcommittee's hearing on Feb-
ruary 15, 1995:
Some Members of Congress believe that we should not
get involved during the current strike, while other Mem-
bers have asserted that in the absence of a strike there is
no need for the Congress to take action on this issue.
Whether there is a strike or not, it is my belief that it is
proper for the Congress to consider this antitrust issue as
a matter of public policy. The Congress has considered
baseball's antitrust exemption in the past, including seri-
ous attention by the Senate Judiciary Committee last year,
prior to the current strike. I intend to continue working on
this issue, even if the strike were to end today.
This most recent strike ultimately led to the cancellation of the
remainder of the 1994 regular season and the World Series. The
1994-95 strike was the longest in professional sports history, and
the only sports work stoppage to result not only in the complete
loss of postseason play, but to carry over into the next season. The
strike caused immeasurable emotional and financial damage to
professional baseball and the country, as has been noted by the
media and fans. This course of events has crystallized for the pub-
lic the peculiar tendency of professional baseball to resort to strikes
and lockouts as a means of resolving labor disagreements-a re-
sult, in large measure, of its judicially granted antitrust exemption.
In testimony before the Antitrust Subcommittee, Mr. Arquit ex-
plained the impact of baseball's special antitrust status on labor re-
lations as follows:
At present, because of the baseball exemption, owners
can act in concert to impose conditions on players, even in
the absence of the nonstatutory labor exemption. Knowing
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that they have the legal freedom ultimately to play this
trump card, the owners have less incentive to negotiate se-
riously at the early stages of the process. In contrast to the
Congressional policy favoring collective bargaining, as em-
bodied by the National Labor Relations Act, the baseball
antitrust exemption encourages exactly the opposite con-
duct by owners: protracted collective bargaining, leading
precisely to impasse. Given the jagged interface between
antitrust and labor relations created by the exemption, the
acrimonious history of collective bargaining in the context
of Major League Baseball comes as no surprise.
The facts leading up to the strike demonstrate its connection to
baseball's antitrust exemption, for baseball players faced a choice
that would never be faced by any other professional athlete or simi-
larly situated employee. In 1993, even though the collective bar-
gaining agreement in major league baseball had expired, the own-
ers promised the players that they would not unilaterally imple-
ment new terms of employment in the off-season. Consequently,
there was no work stoppage. In 1994, however, the owners would
not make the same promise. If no agreement was reached between
the owners and players before the 1994-95 off-season, then the
owners could unilaterally attempt to change the terms of employ-
ment before the period for signing contracts for the 1995 season.10
The difference between baseball and other sports is that other
athletes have the option of challenging new terms of employment
under the antitrust laws.I1 Baseball players, having no such option,
are forced to either accept the new conditions or strike. Mr. Fehr
discussed this dynamic at the February 1995 hearing:
When parties sit down at the negotiating table they do
so fully knowledgeable of the rights and obligations of the
other side. In the case of baseball, when the owners sit
down at the table they look across the table at athletes
who they believe, if negotiations break down, have two and
only two options-accept their offer or strike. In any other
sport, when the owners sit down at the bargaining table
they look across the table at athletes who they know, if ne-
gotiations break down, have three options-accept their
offer, strike, or exercise their rights under the antitrust
laws.
As a result, the players chose to strike in August 1994 in an at-
tempt to force negotiation of a new collective-bargaining agreement
during the season. Unfortunately, negotiations were unproductive
and on December 22, 1994, the owners implemented new terms of
employment. The strike continued, as players refused to sign con-
tracts under new terms that were less favorable to the players than
those in the expired collective-bargaining agreement. The remain-
der of the 1994 season was lost, including the first cancellation of
the World Series. The 1995 season began only after a Federal judge
0 Labor law permits the major league baseball owners, as it does other employers and owners
in other sports, to change the terms of employment at an impasse in the negotiations.
" As discussed above, players in other sports might have to decertify their union to be able
to bring an action in court, but the option remains nonetheless.
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issued an injunction restoring the terms of the old agreement.12
While the strike has ended, the dispute continues, as no labor
agreement has been reached. This legislation would help resolve
baseball's labor problems. As Chairman Hatch emphasized at the
Committee's markup, S. 627 "does not impose a big-government so-
lution to baseball's problems. On the contrary, it would get govern-
ment out of the way by eliminating a serious government-made ob-
stacle to resolution of the labor difficulties in baseball."
Arguments that Congress should not interfere in ongoing labor
negotiations are unconvincing when there are no significant nego-
tiations in progress. As Chairman Hatch said during the Commit-
tee markup: "There are no meaningful negotiations underway. The
players made their last proposal on March 30, 1995, and the own-
ers have not made a counterproposal. Indeed, the owners sus-
pended negotiations for 14 weeks after the March 30 proposal." In
light of this record, the Committee believes that S. 627 could pro-
vide the incentive to bring both parties back to the negotiating
table to resolve a labor dispute that threatens the very future of
the game.
D. OWNERS' ARGUMENTS FOR SPECIAL TREATMENT UNDER THE
ANTITRUST LAWS
The Committee views antitrust exemptions with skepticism, be-
cause free market competition, protected by our antitrust laws,
forms the foundation of our economic system. As with any other
group advocating an antitrust exemption, the burden of persuasion
lies with the owners, for an exemption should be maintained only
so long as it serves the public interest. In reviewing the owners' ar-
guments, it is important to note that a number of the potential con-
cerns raised by the owners are not implicated by S. 627, for the leg-
islation does not affect the application of the antitrust laws to fran-
chise relocation decisions or the relationship of the major leagues
to the minor leagues.
1. Baseball is not a business
The rationale for professional baseball's judicially created exemp-
tion from the antitrust laws in the Federal Baseball case was that
professional baseball was not a business in interstate commerce.
259 U.S. at 208. It has long been recognized by the Court, however,
that such a proposition is no longer true. Flood, 407 U.S. at 282.
It is now indisputable that major league baseball not only involves
interstate commerce, but constitutes a significant interstate finan-
cial enterprise, generating revenues and related economic activ-
ity-when not on strike-of billions of dollars a year.
Despite the size and financial impact of professional baseball, its
owners have long asserted that their industry is notable for its lack
of profitability. Prior to the recent strike, for example, owners had
predicted industrywide losses of some $100 million for the 1994
season. It is impossible to verify assertions of economic losses due
to the lack of financial disclosure by the owners, as well as the
multiplicity of revenue sources which may benefit owners apart
12 Silverman v. Major League Baseball Player Relations Comm., 880 F. Supp. 246 (S.D.N.Y.)(National Labor Relations Board had reasonable cause to believe that the owners' unilateral ac-
tions constituted an unfair labor practice). aTfld, 67 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1995).
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from the team itself. Of course, profitability is not a factor in deter-
mining whether a particular enterprise is engaged in interstate
commerce or should be subject to the antitrust laws.
2. Effect on the minor leagues
Owners argue for continuation of professional baseball's antitrust
exemption on the basis that it is necessary to preserve the minor
league system. At the Antitrust Subcommittee hearing, Mr. Selig
asserted that:
* * * the exemption preserves and enhances our Minor
League system throughout the United States, allowing
millions of fans the opportunity to watch professional base-
ball who would otherwise be deprived of that privilege.
Currently, most of the various minor league teams are bound to
major league affiliates. This relationship is governed by the Profes-
sional Baseball Agreement, under which the major league teams
substantially contribute to the payment of minor league player
costs. The owners of the major league and minor league baseball
clubs assert that if the antitrust laws applied to baseball, the major
leagues would reduce or eliminate this "subsidy" payment. The
owners further argue that certain aspects of the operation of minor
league baseball, such as its reserve clause (by which players are
bound to teams for up to 61/2 years), would be susceptible to legal
attack under the antitrust laws. Mr. Rill stated at the Antitrust
Subcommittee hearing that:
If the antitrust exemption is repealed, the continued use
of the minor league contract would very likely result in
challenges similar to those that wheeled around the ma-
jors' reserve clause. * * * Without the protection of the
minor league contract, [major league] clubs would not in-
vest the hundreds of millions of dollars necessary to oper-
ate the minor league system.
In addition to the usual skepticism with which claims for anti-
trust protections are greeted, many commentators and Members of
Congress have questioned the owners' sincerity in asserting a need
for special treatment to protect the minor leagues, in light of the
owners' own threats to the minor leagues. For example, in the
midst of contract negotiations in 1990, the owners threatened to do
away with the minors altogether.13 As the current agreement with
the minor leagues comes up for renegotiation, there is no certainty
that the relationship will continue as it has in the past regardless
of what happens to baseball's antitrust exemption.
More importantly, the Committee has elected to leave the law as
it currently exists with regard to the minor leagues. The legislation
expressly states in section 2 that it shall not be construed to affect
"the applicability or nonapplicability of the antitrust laws to profes-
sional baseball's amateur draft, the minor league reserve clause,
13 The Associated Press reported that the "chief negotiator for the major leagues said the com-
missioner's office would begin discussions to start new minor leagues and clubs outside the
* * * current minor league governing body." Ronald Blum, AP Sports News, Lexis, AP File(Nov. 18, 1990); "Majors, Minors Can't Agree," Sporting News, Nov. 26, 1990, at 37 (major
league baseball sending out new franchise applications and would abandon attempts to reach
agreement with minor leagues).
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the Professional Baseball Agreement, or any other matter relating
to the minor leagues." At the Antitrust Subcommittee hearing, Sen-
ator Thurmond explained the importance of maintaining the status
quo for the minor leagues:
Protecting the current relations with the minor leagues
is important to avoid disruption of the more than 170
minor league teams which are thriving throughout our Na-
tion. This is a priority which other Members and I have
clearly expressed.
Despite the unambiguous language of the bill, opponents of the
legislation have continued to maintain that it might harm the
minor leagues. The Committee has asked repeatedly for the input
of the minor leagues, to determine if the proposed statutory lan-
guage is insufficient to preserve current law. However, the minor
league owners have proposed no changes to the language of the
bill.
3. Effect on franchise relocations
Those defending the antitrust exemption also contend that it en-
ables professional baseball to protect local communities and fans
against abandonment by teams seeking more lucrative venues.
Major league baseball does enjoy a good record of franchise stabil-ity, as least compared to other leagues. The bill expressly provides
that it shall not affect "the applicability or nonapplicability of the
antitrust laws to any restraint by professional baseball on fran-
chise relocation." It is the Committee's intent that the status quo
of the law concerning franchise relocation remain in place. Thus,
S. 627 would have no impact on baseball's current ability to pre-
vent franchise relocation.
4. Effect on broadcast relationships
Another concern voiced with respect to application of the anti-
trust laws to professional baseball is that the laws might unreason-
ably intrude upon the owners' ability to negotiate jointly national
broadcast contracts. The Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961 addresses
that concern, and applies to professional baseball. 15 U.S.C. 1291
et seq. The Sports Broadcasting Act provides a limited antitrust ex-
emption to enable the member clubs of professional sports leagues
to jointly pool their separate rights in sponsored telecasting of their
games to sell to a purchaser.
To further ensure that baseball comes within the Sports Broad-
casting Act, S. 627 provides that the legislation shall not be con-
strued to affect "the application" of the Sports Broadcasting Act.
Thus, any congressional repeal of baseball's judicially created anti-
trust exemption would not prejudice professional baseball's ability
to negotiate jointly such agreements with the networks. Major
league baseball would be in the exact same position as the other
major professional sports.' 4
14 With respect to local broadcast rights, application of the antitrust laws to major league
baseball would prevent unreasonable restraints of trade from being imposed by the league on
Individual teams. Well-established precedent limits a sports league's latitude in abusing its local
broadcast market. See Chicago Professional Sports Ltd Partnership v. National Basketball
Ass'n, 961 F.2d 667 (7th Cir.). cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 409 (1992) (the Chicago Bulls-owned
Continued
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5. Role of the baseball commissioner
Some have argued that professional baseball need not be subject
to the antitrust laws, because of the existence of a strong and inde-
pendent commissioner. Even if the Committee accepted the unique
argument that private regulation could suffice to justify an anti-
trust exemption, examination of the facts clearly reveals that base-
ball's commissioner has not been characterized by "strength" and
"independence." Major league baseball has been operating without
an even nominally independent commissioner since Fay Vincent's
departure in 1992.
The owners recently weakened the powers of the vacant commis-
sioner's office through the actions of a Restructuring Committee.
Previously, the commissioner had authority to take any and all ac-
tions deemed to be in the "best interests" of the game. The rec-
ommendations recently adopted by the Restructuring Committee,
however, will prevent future commissioners from using the "best
interests" powers with respect to a list of issues, including: the ex-
pansion, sale, and relocation of teams; scheduling; interleague play;
divisional alignment; and revenue sharing among owners. The com-
missioner is also explicitly prohibited from using the "best inter-
ests" powers with regard to collective bargaining matters. After re-
viewing the changes the owners made to the commissioner's office,
former commissioner Peter Ueberroth commented:
Basically, the commissioner seems to have no portfolio,
power or job. * * * I think the changes dramatically
change the position. There will be the appearance of more
responsibility, but substantially less authority. That's the
recipe for a non job.
The commissioner would have no power, for example, to prevent or
end a play-stopping decision by the owners to stage a lockout of
players over collective bargaining issues.
VI. SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS
Section 1 states the bill's short title, the "Major League Baseball
Antitrust Reform Act of 1995."
Section 2 of the bill amends the Clayton Act to add a new section
27. Section 27(a) removes the judicially created antitrust exemption
for professional baseball and provides that the antitrust laws shall
apply to the business of professional baseball as they apply to all
other professional sports. The phrase "the antitrust laws shall
apply" is intended to incorporate the entire jurisprudence of the
antitrust laws, as it now exists and as it may develop. In so apply-
ing the antitrust laws, the various judicial doctrines which have de-
veloped over the years and now apply to other professional sports
leagues would, depending on the applicable facts, apply to profes-
sional baseball.
by Jerry Reinsdorf, coowner of the Chicago White Sox-successfully challenged an NBA rule
limiting the number of games "superstation" WGN could carry). See also National Collegiate
Athletic Ass'n, 468 U.S. 85 (NCAA rule restraining member schools in the number of games they
could contract to broadcast held unlawful). There is no reason to conclude that baseball cannot
live with the same rules that govern the other professional sports leagues. Indeed, one Federal
court has held that baseball's exemption is inapplicable to local broadcasting. Henderson Broad-
casting Corp. v. Houston Sports Ass'n, 541 F. Supp. 263 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
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S. 627 clarifies that major league baseball's owners and players
are subject to the Nation's antitrust laws. The legislation was spe-
cifically drafted so that it would not implicate issues relating to
other activities, such as franchise relocation or the operation of the
minor leagues. The bill clarifies the law at the major league level.
While it is far from clear as a public policy matter that clarification
of the antitrust laws as they apply to the minor leagues should be
omitted from this legislation, S. 627 is nonetheless specifically lim-
ited to the major leagues.
New section 27(b)(1) of the Clayton Act states that subsection (a)
does not affect the applicability or nonapplicability of the antitrust
laws to professional baseball's amateur draft, the minor league re-
serve clause, the Professional Baseball Agreement, or any other
matter relating to the minor leagues.
New section 27(b)(2) of the Clayton Act likewise states that sub-
section (a) does not affect the applicability or nonapplicability of
the antitrust laws to any restraint on franchise relocation by pro-
fessional baseball. Thus, both subsections (b) (1) and (b) (2) leave the
law as it is, and as the courts may interpret it in future cases.
New section 27(b) (3) of the Clayton Act provides that the legisla-
tion will not affect the application to professional baseball of the
Sports Broadcasting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1291 et seq., which explicitly
permits the owners in sports leagues to pool their separate rights
in sponsored telecasting of their games.
There is no language in the Committee-approved S. 627 that
would grant baseball players any rights not enjoyed by athletes in
other professional sports. The availability of antitrust remedies as
a last resort has made a positive contribution to resolving several
labor disputes experienced in other professional sports, and there
is no reason why baseball players and fans should not benefit from
these alternatives as well.
The Committee wishes to make clear that by supporting these
particular modifications of baseball's judicially created antitrust ex-
emption in S. 627, it does not intend to imply that more com-
prehensive change is not also justified-or to imply that the courts
should not act decisively themselves to limit further baseball's ex-
emption in appropriate cases. Indeed, a Federal court and the high-
est court of a State have already taken such action. Piazza, 831 F.
Supp. 420; Butterworth, 644 So. 2d 1021.
VII. COST ESTIMATE
U.S. CONGRESS,
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE,
Washington, DC, August 8, 1995.
Hon. ORRIN G. HATCH,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has re-
viewed S. 627, the Major League Baseball Antitrust Reform Act of
1995, as ordered reported by the Senate Committee on the Judici-
ary on August 3, 1995. CBO estimates that enacting S. 627 would
result in no significant costs to the federal government or to state
or local governments. Also, enacting this bill would not affect direct
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spending or receipts. Therefore, pay-as-you-go procedures would
not apply.
S. 627 would remove major league baseball's current exemption
from antitrust laws, except that it would retain the antitrust ex-
emption for minor league baseball and for decisions regarding the
relocation of major league franchises. By removing the antitrust ex-
emption under these circumstances, this bill would allow the play-
ers under certain circumstances to challenge in federal court cer-
tain decisions by the owners. Enacting S. 627 would impose addi-
tional costs on the U.S. court system to the extent that additional
antitrust cases are filed. However, CBO does not expect any result-
ing increase in caseload or court costs to be significant.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased
to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Susanne S. Mehlman.
Sincerely,
JUNE E. O'NEILL,
Director.
VIII. REGULATORY IMPACT STATEMENT
In compliance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the Standing
Rules of the Senate, the Committee concluded that no significant
additional regulatory impact or impact on personal privacy would
be incurred in carrying out the provisions of this legislation. After
due consideration, the Committee concluded that enactment of the
Act would not create any significant additional paperwork.
IX. ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR THURMOND
It has been a pleasure to work with Chairman Hatch on S. 627,
the Major League Baseball Antitrust Reform Act of 1995, during
this Congress. I join in the majority report, and wish to emphasize
a few key points on this important issue.
First, the Antitrust, Business Rights, and Competition Sub-
committee s hearing on "The Court Imposed Major League Baseball
Antitrust Exemption," which I chaired in February 1995, was vital
to provide the foundation for this legislation. While those who op-
pose the bill assert that additional analysis is needed, I believe we
achieved the goal of providing a balanced and fair hearing to both
those who favor baseball's antitrust exemption and those who op-
pose it. Moreover, both the Senate and the House of Representa-
tives have previously held numerous hearings on this issue. Al-
though the antitrust aspects of baseball's special exemption are
complex, the issue does not suffer from lack of public hearings.
Second, opponents of this legislation continue to dwell on wheth-
er the Congress should get "involved" in baseball's antitrust exemp-
tion, given that a new labor agreement has not been reached de-
spite the end of the strike. However, the Congress has played an
important role in baseball's antitrust exemption simply by its inac-
tion. The Supreme Court has long viewed as outdated the reason-
ing underlying its decision creating baseball's exemption in Federal
Baseball Club, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball
Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922), yet has steadfastly maintained that the
solution should come from Congress. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258(1972). Thus, the Congress is involved even if it fails to act, as I
stated at the Antitrust Subcommittee markup of S. 627 on April 5,
1995:
As long as the special antitrust exemption remains in
place for baseball, the Congress is involved in the sport in
a way that it should not be. The Congress has an ongoing
impact on the sport simply by permitting the special ex-
emption to remain long after the factual basis for it has
disappeared.
This bill is not a matter of choosing between owners and players-
for both groups are responsible for baseball's labor problems-but
exercising the responsibility of the Congress to legislate an end to
the judicially created exemption which the Court itself has long
held to be an anomaly.
Finally, opponents assert that S. 627 would be harmful to base-
ball's ability to control franchise relocation, despite language in the
bill expressly providing that it shall not affect "the applicability or
nonapplicability of the antitrust laws to any restraint by profes-
sional baseball on franchise relocation". In introducing S. 627, I
stated in the clearest possible terms that the legislation maintains
(17)
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the status quo for franchise relocation, although I noted "that it
may be worthwhile reviewing the franchise relocation issue as it
relates to all professional sports." Relocation is a significant issue
to all professional sports, as illustrated by the events of the last
year in the National Football League. As I indicated at my sub-
committee's February hearing, legislation may be desirable to pro-
tect objective franchise relocation rules in professional sports.
Nonetheless, S. 627 would have no impact on baseball's current
ability to control franchise movement.
STRoM THuRMoND.
X. MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATOR SPECTER
I have been involved in sports antitrust issues since coming to
the Senate. Franchise relocation, protection for smaller market
teams, revenue sharing have all been issues of concern to me, and
all implicate the antitrust laws. Like many Americans, I have been
a sports fan since I was a child. I was especially a baseball fan.
My current perspective, however, is not just a fan's. As a legislator,
I must look at the numerous issues affecting sports and public pol-
icy, from intangible ones that interest fans to the very tangible eco-
nomic issues that drive professional sports today. After carefully
weighing all the relevant issues, I must oppose S. 627 at this time.
Despite the successful completion of the 1995 baseball season,
there is still no agreement between the players' union and the
major league owners. The underlying issues, which have caused
several strikes and lockouts over the past several years, most noto-
riously the strike that began during the 1994 season, causing the
cancellation of the World Series, have not been resolved. The play-
ers are free to strike again, and the owners retain the option of
locking the players out. Even as free agents are signed and the
"hot stove" league is in full swing, the 1996 season is threatened
by this failure of the parties to reach a collective-bargaining agree-
ment.
Whatever the merits of eliminating major league baseball's
broad, judicially created exemption from the antitrust laws, Con-
gress should not act while the labor situation remains uncertain.
Any action we take is certain to be viewed as favoring one side to
the dispute or the other. In such instances, Congress acts best
when it does not act at all. The complex labor problems that have
characterized baseball for the past years ought to be resolved by
the parties without congressional interference.
I am particularly concerned with this legislation because it will
not achieve one of its primary purposes, that of resolving baseball's
labor strife. This is a complex time for labor relations in profes-
sional sports. The professional football players' union was decerti-
fied in 1989. In the spring of 1995, the professional basketball play-
ers' union faced a serious internal struggle over whether to be de-
certified, and the National Basketball Association locked out the
players. These matters were finally resolved with the adoption of
a new collective-bargaining agreement. Even after the agreement
was struck, however, some union members took the union to court.
In hockey, last season began with a players' strike against the Na-
tional Hockey League.
Football, basketball, and hockey do not enjoy an exemption from
the antitrust laws. Given the labor relations records of these other
professional sports, there is no reason to believe that the existence
of major league baseball's antitrust exemption is the reason for
baseball's labor relations problems. Thus, Congress should not in-
(19)
20
tervene to no purpose while there is no contract between the play-
ers' union and the owners.
The problems faced by baseball and these other sports reflect a
variety of factors. Experts cannot agree on solutions to the prob-
lems that confront sports. Some argue that baseball's problems are
especially acute because of the exemption from the antitrust laws,
which makes baseball less susceptible to market forces. Others
argue that the antitrust exemption is irrelevant to baseball's prob-
lems. I am not able to say which side has the better of the argu-
ment, but the labor problems encountered by other professional
sports leagues makes me skeptical that eliminating baseball's anti-
trust exemption would have a salutary effect on its labor relations.
I do generally agree with the supporters of this bill that exemp-
tions from the antitrust laws are bad public policy. Baseball, how-
ever, has such an exemption. Expectations and reliance interests
are based on that exemption. Whether or not that exemption ought
to be retained, I believe strongly that given the current state of
play, it would be a mistake for Congress to enact this bill. This bill
would only upset the current situation, making it less likely that
the parties to baseball's labor strife will be able to resolve their dis-
pute between themselves. We should not lose sight of the fact that
voluntary collective bargaining is the basis of labor relations in this
country. The parties should be left to settle their current impasse
themselves without interference from Congress.
I must also raise a parochial reason for opposing the bill: the fu-
ture of the Pittsburgh Pirates. While the bill purports to preserve
the antitrust exemption that allows major league baseball to block
franchise relocations, the uncertainty that the bill would engender
is likely to result in severe dislocations to the sport. In such an at-
mosphere, it is impossible to be certain that the Pirates would be
retained in Pittsburgh.
S. 627 does nothing to solve the roiling labor issues in baseball.
It will only serve to upset the current situation even further and
can only make a labor agreement less likely, as all sides learn to
deal with a new set of rules. Whatever the possible merits of this
bill as antitrust policy, this is the wrong time for the Senate to
adopt this bill.
ARLEN SPECTER.
XI. MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATOR SIMON
In approving a repeal of major league baseball's longstanding
antitrust exemption, this Committee has decided to alter the bal-
ance of power in an ongoing labor dispute between millionaires
while the truly pressing problems facing our Nation remain unre-
solved. Congress should be devoting its time and resources to other
matters rather than inserting itself into a controversy for which
both sides deserve blame. Indeed, of the many labor disputes ongo-
ing in America today, I can think of few, if any, that are less de-
serving of our attention than this one. The American people, who
have consistently opposed government's interference in this area,
agree.
Not only does S. 627 reflect Congress' misplaced priorities, it is
also unlikely to solve the problem it purports to address. Under two
recent Federal appellate decisions interpreting the antitrust laws'
so-called "non-statutory labor exception," 1 it appears that the anti-
trust laws are not applicable to the dispute between the players
and the owners. Given that the baseball strike of 1994-95 ended
not because of any expected change in major league baseball's sta-
tus under the antitrust laws, but because of the courts' application
of our labor laws, S. 627 also appears unnecessary. In short, it is
doubtful that S. 627 will do anything other than give the players
an additional weapon in their broader, ongoing conflict with the
owners.
Finally, while I agree that baseball's antitrust exemption raises
certain questions, we should also remember that in some ways,
Congress may have more to learn from professional baseball than
professional baseball has to learn from Congress. Of the four major
professional sports in America, baseball has enjoyed by far the
most franchise stability. While NFL fans from Cleveland and Hous-
ton-and perhaps other cities-are faced with the prospect of losing
their beloved teams to other communities, and while this very
Committee is studying antitrust legislation to prevent these moves,
no baseball franchise has changed cities in over a quarter-century.
Even assuming that baseball's work stoppages are a direct result
of baseball's antitrust exemption-and we should remember that
those major sports which do not enjoy an antitrust exemption have
also experienced often-extended work stoppages in their own
right-the problems created by the application of the antitrust laws
to franchise relocation may be, in the minds of many loyal fans,
even greater.
S. 627 seeks to address this prospect by excepting franchise relo-
cation issues from its coverage. Similarly, it attempts to deal with
concerns about the effect of the bill on the minor leagues by except-
' Brown v. National Football League, Inc., 50 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1995): National Basketball
Association v. Williams, 45 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 1995).
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ing the minor leagues from its scope. Disputes regarding the scope
and nature of these exceptions, however, will undoubtedly result in
additional litigation-the outcome of which simply cannot be pre-
dicted. Indeed, the minor leagues oppose S. 627 despite the minor-
league exception, and it can safely be said that this legislation, at
the very least, should make those concerned about sports franchise
relocation very uncomfortable.
The variety of problems facing our professional sports leagues
demonstrates that even if professional baseball is a deserving sub-ject of Congress's attention, such consideration should not take
place on an ad hoc basis, in response to one "crisis" or another, but
should be part of an overall and careful reexamination of profes-
sional sports under the law. Only by studying the issue raised by
S. 627 in this broader context can Congress avoid the justifiable
criticism that it is simply playing favorites in a rancorous dispute
that, but for the parties stubbornness and lack of reason, should
have been resolved long ago.
PAUL SIMON.
XII. MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATORS BROWN AND
FEINSTEIN
In 1922, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes determined that the
game of baseball is not commerce to be regulated by the antitrust
laws. Since that time, Congress and the courts have had ample op-
portunity, during good times and bad, to revoke that antitrust ex-
emption. Proponents of this legislation argue that the baseball
antitrust exemption, which has remained in place for 75 years, to
the benefit of franchise stability and minor league support, despite
repeated judicial and congressional inquiries, should now be lifted
in the middle of an ongoing labor dispute.
That argument is unconvincing for a couple of reasons. First, we
need to acknowledge, just as the National Football League (NFL)
has after suffering through a stunning number of franchise reloca-
tions, that there are times when, in the interest of the fans, profes-
sional sports teams must act as business partners instead of busi-
ness competitors. For example, the Colorado Rockies and the San
Francisco Giants need to agree on the size of the field and the rules
of the game before they can successfully compete. Second, and more
importantly, Congress should not, as a matter of principle, inter-
vene in an ongoing labor dispute.
BASEBALL AND THE INTERESTS OF THE FANS
Before we jump to any conclusions about whether Baseball has
abused its exemption from application of the antitrust laws, we
should consider some of the facts:
Baseball has a history of franchise stability that must be the
envy of the other major sports. In the past year, the NFL had
two franchises abandon the second largest market in the Unit-
ed States: the successful Los Angeles Raider franchise relo-
cated from Los Angeles to Oakland, and the Los Angeles Ramsjumped to St. Louis. The NFL also will apparently now lose the
historic Cleveland Browns franchise to Baltimore and the
Houston Oilers to Memphis. The Chicago Bears are threaten-
ing to move to Gary, IN, while the Phoenix team (itself a re-
cent transplant from St. Louis) has talked of moving again. In
hockey, franchises continue to move regularly. Even the NBA,
which has gone through the most popular era in its history
after a decade of problems, had the San Diego Clippers relocate
to Los Angeles. Baseball has not had a single relocation in the
past 25 years. On the contrary, the recent effort of the San
Francisco Giants to move was rejected by Baseball and the Gi-
ants remained in San Francisco. Contrary to the Oilers, at the
urging of Baseball, the Houston Astros decided not to pursue
relocation but instead redoubled their effects to be successful
in Houston. All of that was made possible by the exemption,
without which Baseball would be in the same vulnerable posi-
(23)
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tion as the other sports. Given that Baseball, more than any
other sport, is steeped in tradition and stability, unchecked
franchise relocation would be disastrous to the national pas-
time.
Regarding the number of franchises, Baseball has kept pace
with the other major sports. In addition, Baseball has already
announced the addition of its 29th and 30th franchises to begin
play in Tampa Bay and Phoenix in 1998 and has under consid-
eration the possibility of adding two additional franchises be-
fore the year 2000.
Despite the exemption, Baseball supports the minor league
system at a level of over $200 million per year. Minor league
baseball benefits hundreds of communities, large and small,
across the country. Relations between the major and minor
leagues are at an all- time high. The relationship is so inex-
tricably intertwined that any attempt to eliminate the exemp-
tion, upon which 75 years of cooperative dealings have been
based, even with an attempted carve out, will no doubt create
numerous points of contention. For instance, the majority is
clear that it is eliminating the exemption with regard to labor
relations. But more than 37 percent of the players on each
team's major league roster are actually playing in the minor
leagues. Despite this bill's attempt to except the minor leagues,
the potential for conflict is inherent and obvious.
CIvic INVOLVEMENT WITH HOME TEAMS
Professional baseball and football are not like other businesses.
They are not commodities like Coca-Cola or Post Toasties. Around
baseball teams and football teams, perhaps more than anything
else, there is a civic spirit and a civic commitment. Communities
show this spirit in building stadiums and fixing up stadiums,
which are very costly; in chamber of commerce support; civic
lunches and receptions; and parades and other community celebra-
tions.
There is no business that has the kind of civic dimension that
professional baseball and football have. The players are role models
for children, spending time at recreation centers and schools, help-
ing underprivileged youngsters. Employees of other companies do
not do this to the same extent. Indeed, most teams have founda-
tions which perform charitable and community activities, such as
engaging in canned food drives, toys for tots campaigns, and rais-
ing money for causes such as children's hospitals, Special Olympics,
and the March of Dimes. There are no companies which are so in-
volved in the civic dimension of the community.
INTERVENING IN AN ONGOING LABOR DISPUTE
The current bill intervenes in a continuing labor dispute. The
majority report justifies this legislation on the basis that it "would
help resolve baseball's labor problems." This conclusion is dubious
at best.
The middle of an ongoing labor dispute is not the right time to
change the rules of the game. Both President Clinton and his cho-
sen mediator, William Usery, repeatedly stated that the problems
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of baseball should be decided at the negotiating table. But, every
time this issue comes before Congress, the parties drop what they
are doing, leave the negotiating table, and focus their efforts on
legislation.
Despite baseball's antitrust exemption, the Major League Base-
ball Players Association has been among the most successful
unions in any industry in the history of this country. The average
player's salary has grown to over $1 million per year, despite sev-
eral teams have severe financial problems, according to Major
League Baseball. Through negotiations, the Players Association has
also gained from the owners, in addition to the exorbitant salaries,
the elimination of the reserve system, and treble damages for any
collusion among owners regarding free agents.
Contrary to the proponents' suggestions, the courts are not al-
ways hostile to the baseball exemption. The two Federal courts
which have addressed the exemption since the Piazza opinion cited
by the majority expressly rejected Piazza and held that the exemp-
tion was both valid and expansive. New Orleans Pelicans Baseball,
Inc. v. National Ass'n of Professional Baseball Leagues, Inc., No.
93-0253, 1994 U.S. Dist. WL 631144 (E.D. La. Mar. 1, 1994);
McCoy v. Major League Baseball, No. C95-383D, 1995 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 19858 .D. Wash. Nov. 2, 1995). The Butterworth case cited
by the majority is a State court decision which contained no inde-
pendent analysis and relied entirely on the reasoning of Piazza.
Baseball is not the only enterprise with this regulatory status.
Other industries have operated under regulatory schemes inde-
pendent of the antitrust laws. Many will disagree with the sugges-
tion by the majority that baseball is the only industry to claim an
exemption without being subject to alternative regulatory super-
vision. Here are some illustrations:
Fewer than 3 years ago, in the National Cooperative Produc-
tion Amendments Act of 1993, Congress conferred broad pro-
tection from antitrust treble damages liability on productionjoint ventures in any industry, so long as they file notification
with the Justice Department. This legislation extended to pro-
duction joint ventures the same longstanding antitrust protec-
tion previously accorded to research joint ventures by the Na-
tional Cooperative Research Act of 1984.
The Soft Drink Interbrand Competition Act of 1980 confers
broad antitrust protection on the distribution systems of soft
drink producers, with no regulatory supervision, so long as soft
drinks face "substantial and effective competition." That act
has been invoked repeatedly and successfully to forestall anti-
trust liability.
The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 protects
doctors and other health care providers from all damages li-
ability under the antitrust laws for peer review activities so
long as those activities offer a minimum of procedural due
process.
It is obvious that Baseball, like these other businesses, will not
come crashing down if antitrust laws do not apply in the near fu-
ture. Whereas, if we were to act now, it would be to take a position
in an ongoing dispute. That should not be the role of Congress.
Elimination of the antitrust exemption would not ensure labor
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peace-to the contrary, it would guarantee protracted, uncertain,
and expensive litigation and would complicate matters further.
THE EXEMPTION IS UNRELATED TO THE 1994-95 BASEBALL STRIKE
Proponents of the legislation suggest that all of the labor discord
in Baseball can somehow be attributed to the existence of the ex-
emption and that its elimination would be a labor panacea. Noth-
ing could be further from the truth. In fact, all that its elimination
would cause is unbridled litigation. In addition, the nonstatutory
labor exemption would preclude an antitrust suit absent decerti-
fication in any event, so eliminating the exemption in the fashion
contemplated would merely shift the fight from the current judicial
exemption to the nonstatutory labor exemption.
Despite the applicability of the antitrust laws to the other major
sports, they too have had their own significant labor problems. The
NFL went through 5 years of litigation and even played a portion
of one season with replacement players. The National Hockey
League (NHL) lost a significant part of last season and almost lost
the entire season while the owners engaged in a lockout of the
players. Although the National Basketball Association (NBA) has
not lost any portion of a season as a result of a work stoppage, it
did play the first 55 days of this season with replacement referees.
Following the proponents' logic that the antitrust exemption
somehow created the labor controversy, we would have to assume
there are other examples, aside from the strike, of labor disadvan-
tage. Take a look at salaries: the NBA, the NFL and the NHL,
which do not have an exemption, do have a form of salary re-
straint. Baseball, which has the exemption, does not have a salary
restraint.
By suggesting that the 1994 strike could have been averted if
only the union had the ability to file an antitrust suit against the
owners, supporters of the proposed legislation greatly overstate
both the speed and effectiveness of antitrust legislation. Whatever
else they may be, antitrust cases are uncertain, expensive, and
above all, very time-consuming.
As the majority concedes, before an antitrust suit could be filed,
the union will still confront-as do the players in every other pro-
fessional sport-the nonstatutory labor exemption from the anti-
trust laws, which derives from several Supreme Court decisions,
most notably Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local
Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975). In order to bring an antitrust
action against the owners, the players would first have to decertify
their union to sever the collective bargaining relationship with the
club owners. The players could then have to file suit and proceed
through the typical morass that comprises current antitrust litiga-
tion. Only the NFL has proceeded down such a path, and that liti-
gation took in excess of 5 years to resolve, with the final resolution
not determinative.
Although the majority report only discusses the repeal of base-
ball's antitrust exemption as affecting labor issues, it likely will
have ramifications in other areas as well.
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DISCIPLINARY ACTION
Dating all the way back to the Black Sox scandal of 1919, base-
ball has been able to effectively discipline its own personnel. How-
ever, the exercise of this power has been challenged on antitrust
grounds. For example:
When the Executive Council of Major League Baseball sus-
pended Cincinnati Reds owner Marge Schott for racially and
ethnically insensitive remarks, Ms. Schott argued that without
the antitrust exemption her suspension would be considered an
illegal group boycott violative of antitrust laws. Schott made it
clear that without an antitrust exemption, every league sus-
pension could be challenged in court.
When baseball Commissioner Bowie Kuhn disapproved the
assignments of three player contracts after their sale by Oak-
land Athletics owner Charles Finley, the Athletics commenced
an action in federal court claiming violations of antitrust laws.
Other sports have also been subjected to antitrust challenges for
protecting the integrity of their games:
When professional golfer Jane Blalock was suspended by the
Ladies Professional Golf Association for allegedly cheating, she
retaliated against the league by commencing an antitrust chal-
lenge.
When professional bowler Ralph Manok was suspended for
cheating by his bowling association, he too responded by insti-
tuting antitrust litigation.
When NBA star Jack Molinas was indefinitely suspended for
gambling, he sued the league on antitrust grounds.
Removing baseball's exemption could well open the floodgates to
further challenges to Baseball's important ability to protect the in-
tegrity of the game.
EQUIPMENT DEALS
Eliminating the antitrust exemption could also subject Major
League Baseball to challenges of exclusive contracts that it has es-
tablished with equipment manufacturers. Although the exclusive
equipment deals help to maintain the uniformity of the game,
every new contract would carry the risk of an antitrust challenge.
Antitrust challenges against other sports leagues illustrate just
some of the types of costly and counterproductive court battles
baseball could face if the exemption is lifted:
When the PGA banned the use of golf clubs with certain U-
shaped grooves on the professional tour, a golf club manufac-
turer sued, alleging that the ban was an unlawful boycott and
restraint on competition in violation of antitrust laws.
The United States Tennis Association, which banned double-
strung racquets from the professional tour, was subjected to a
lengthy antitrust challenge by a tennis racquet manufacturer
before the court ruled in the USTA's favor.
In another golf case, a golf shoe manufacturer sued the
USGA on antitrust grounds, alleging that a USGA determina-
tion that a certain golf shoe did not conform to a USGA rule
violated antitrust laws.
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It is clear from past examples of lawsuits-both within and out-
side of Major League Baseball-that Major League Clubs could face
a storm of new antitrust challenges if the exemption is lifted. While
it is impossible to say for certain whether any or all of these chal-
lenges would succeed, it is important not to underestimate the
chilling effect of potentially costly and time-consuming antitrust
litigation, which will only be encouraged by this legislation.
CONCLUSION
The important consideration here is the fans. Our first priority
ought to be to protect them. Ending a baseball season is unaccept-
able; so too is franchise relocation; so too is terminating support of
the minor leagues. To accommodate these interests, our sports
teams are going to have to act as business partners at times. As
even the proponents concede, the exemption serves a useful func-
tion in some areas: franchise stability, the relationship with the
minor leagues, certain broadcast matters. To act now in the middle
of an ongoing labor dispute would be counterproductive. As a mat-
ter of principle, Congress ought to stay out of this continuing labor
dispute.
HANK BROWN.
DIANNE FEINSTEIN.
XIII. MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATOR FEINSTEIN
In addition to the joint views I have filed with Senators Brown
and Heflin, I write separately to add some personal views. As the
former mayor of a city with two professional sports franchises,
baseball's Giants and football's 49ers, I had to fight to keep base-
ball in San Francisco, and I know firsthand that the only reason
the Giants didn't leave San Francisco was baseball's antitrust ex-
emption. The need to maintain franchise stability, which baseball's
antitrust exemption clearly does-no Major League Baseball team
has abandoned its city for another since the Washington Senators
left the Nation's Capital for Texas almost 25 years ago-is the
overriding reason that I have consistently opposed repeal of the ex-
emption, and will do everything in my power to see that this bill
does not pass.
Moreover, I believe that baseball's antitrust exemption, far from
being repealed, should be extended to other major professional
sports. As we state in the joint views, these teams, too, are integral
parts of their communities, and their fans and hometowns deserve
the same protections which baseball fans enjoy. Thus, I intend to
introduce legislation which will extend the exemption to other
sports.
DIANNE FEINSTEIN.
(29)
XIV. CHANGES IN ExIsTING LAW
In compliance with paragraph 12 of Rule XXVI of the Standing
Rules of the Senate, changes in existing law made by S. 627, as re-
ported, are shown as follows (existing law which would be omitted
is enclosed in bold brackets, new matter is printed in italics, and
existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman
type):
UNITED STATES CODE
TITLE 15-COMMERCE AND TRADE
CHAPTER 1-MONOPOLIES AND COMBINATIONS IN
RESTRAINT OF TRADE
§ 12. Words defined; short title
(a) "Antitrust laws," as used herein, includes the Act entitled "An
Act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and
monopolies," approved July second, eighteen hundred and ninety;
sections seventy-three to seventy-seven, inclusive, of an Act enti-
tled "An Act to reduce taxation, to provide revenue for the Govern-
ment, and for other purposes," of August twenty-seventh, eighteen
hundred and ninety-four; an Act entitled "An Act to amend sections
seventy-three and seventy-six of the Act of August twenty-seventh,
eighteen hundred and ninety-four, entitled 'An Act to reduce tax-
ation, to provide revenue for the Government, and for other pur-
poses,"' approved February twelfth, nineteen hundred and thirteen;
and also this Act.
SEc. 27. (a) Subject to subsection (b), the antitrust laws shall
apply to the business of professional major league baseball.
(b) Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect-
(1) the applicability or nonapplicability of the antitrust laws
to professional baseball's amateur draft, the minor league re-
serve clause, the Professional Baseball Agreement, or any other
matter relating to the minor leagues;
(2) the applicability or nonapplicability of the antitrust laws
to any restraint by professional baseball on franchise relocation;
or
(30)
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(3) the application of Public Law 87-331 (15 US.C. 1291 et
seq.) (commonly known as the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961).
0
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BASEBALL'S ANTITRUST IMMUNITY
THURSDAY, DECEMBER 10, 1992
U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ANTITRusT, MONOPOLIES
AND BusINESs RIGHTS,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:05 a.m., in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Howard Metzenbaum
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Also present: Senators Simon; Kohl; Thurmond; Specter; Brown;
Leahy, ex officio; Simpson, ex officio; Graham, ex officio; Feinstein,
ex officio; and Mack, ex officio.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR METZENBAUM
Senator METZENBAUM. The subcommittee will come to order. Mr.
Vincent, please be seated.
This morning, the Antitrust Subcommittee holds an oversight
hearing on the validity of major league baseball's exemption from
the antitrust laws. All of us recognize that today's hearing does not
involve one of the critical problems facing the new President and
the new Congress, but there is, nevertheless, intense interest in
this subject among the public, the press, and my colleagues.
The reason for this interest is simple. Baseball has been a special
part of American life for over a century. It provides millions of fans
with a well-deserved break from the rigors of everyday life. Ameri-
cans from all walks of life and from all parts of the country have
grown up with this game. It has been a bridge of tradition and nos-
talgia that connects the past with the present and parents with
their children.
But while the game of baseball remains a simple pleasure, the
business of baseball has become complicated and, at times, cut-
throat. As a consequence, there has been a certain element of dis-
enchantment as to the fans. Major league baseball is not just a
sport. It is also a billion-dollar big business, and it is a big business
which enjoys unique treatment under the law.
Unlike any other big business in America, major league baseball
is a legally sanctioned, unregulated cartel. The Supreme Court con-
ferred that extraordinary privilege upon baseball 70 years ago
when it granted major league baseball a complete exemption from
the antitrust laws. Justice Holmes reasoned that the antitrust laws
did not apply because baseball could not be considered interstate
commerce. Although the soundness of this ruling has often been
questioned even by the Court itself, it has never been overturned.
(1)
2Instead, the Court has tossed the ball to Congress, which is why
we are here today.
While Congress did not create baseball's blanket antitrust immu-
nity, we do have the authority to remove it. Many in this body now
believe that it is time to repeal the exemption. The burden is on
major league baseball to demonstrate that the exemption is in the
public interest.
Baseball's antitrust exemption is a privilege that the baseball
owners may be abusing. I am particularly concerned that their
ouster of Fay Vincent, who is with us this morning, and their plans
to weaken the commissioner's powers invites more abuse of that
privilege. Fay Vincent understood that the antitrust exemption
placed a special obligation on the commissioner to govern the sport
in a manner that protected the public interest. Vincent had inde-
pendent authority to put the interests of the fans and the interests
of the sport of baseball ahead of the business interests of the team
owners. That is no longer the case.
Jerry Reinsdorf, the owner of the Chicago White Sox, and one of
the key participants in Vincent's ouster, has stated that the job of
the next baseball commissioner will be to "run the business for the
owners, not the players or the umpires or the fans."
Many observers believe the owners removed Vinuent because
they feared he might use his authority as commissioner to prevent
a labor dispute from interfering with the upcoming 1993 season.
Vincent helped facilitate a quick end to the 1990 lockout, and the
hard-line owners did not want a repeat of that episode. So far, the
hard-liners have carried the day.
Three months ago, they forced out Vincent. Three days ago, they
succeeded in reopening the labor agreement with the players,
which many people view as a prelude to a possible lockout. The im-
plications for fans are ominous. Every time there has been a labor
negotiation in baseball, there has been either a strike or a lockout.
It appears that the owners don't want a strong and independent
commissioner who can act in the best interests of the sport or act
as a potential check against abuse of their monopoly power. In-
stead, they want a commissioner who will function as the cruise di-
rector for their cartel. If decisions about the direction and future
of major league baseball are going to be dictated by the business
interests of team owners, then the owners should be required to
play by the same antitrust rules that apply to any other business.
Even if the owners give the next commissioner a fig leaf of au-
thority, Vincent's ouster sends a clear signal that he or she should
not cross them. It also raises questions about whether baseball can
respond credibly and effectively to allegations of misconduct by an
owner or league official.
The owners' response to the Marge Schott controversy will offer
some insight on that score, but I believe that the public would have
more confidence in the outcome if the matter was being handled by
an independent commissioner rather than by a group of owners sit-
ting in judgment of one of their own.
There are other issues that need to be explored aside from the
question of the commissioner's authority. The other three major
professional sports-football, basketball, and hockey-function
3quite well without the blanket exemption from the antitrust laws
enjoyed by baseball. Why should baseball be treated differently?
A number of commentators assert that baseball uses its privi-
leged status to maintain an artificial scarcity of franchises. The re-
cent tug of war between Tampa Bay and San Francisco is a perfect
illustration. It is clear that the number of cities which can support
baseball franchises greatly exceeds the number of franchises estab-
lished by the owners.
A scarcity of franchises inflates the resale value of existing teams
and increases each owner's share of baseball's national broadcast-
ing revenue, the total of which is about $380 million annually. It
also enables owners to squeeze concessions and subsidies from
their home cities by threatening relocation to another city. Many
cities badly in need of revenues for schools, hospitals, their police
and fire forces, and other vital projects have been forced to obtain
public funding of elaborate new stadiums or risk having their team
move to another city. This blackmail game is unseemly and a dis-
service to the fans.
The baseball owners trumpet their commitment to franchise sta-
bility even though they routinely threaten to abandon their home
city whenever it suits them financially, and the owners reportedly
have refused to permit municipal ownership of teams, which is
probably the most effective way to protect fans from franchise relo-
cations. When Joan Kroc tried to give the Padres to the city of San
Diego, baseball's barons said no.
For decades, the owners also used their antitrust exemption to
suppress players' salaries and stifle player mobility through the
use of the reserve clause. As it now stands, the reserve clause can
bind a player to a single team for 6 years. Players have gained a
limited amount of movement through the collective bargaining
process, but the reopening of the labor agreement means that the
players will once again have to bargain for some semblance of a
free market. Moreover, minor league players who constitute the
vast majority of professional ballplayers still labor under conditions
reminiscent of indentured servitude.
Baseball's special treatment under the antitrust laws also has
helped to inflate the value of its TV contracts. The baseball owners
have agreed among themselves to impose territorial restrictions on
the broadcasting of games by local TV stations. These restrictions
can facilitate the movement of games to pay TV and hurt fans who
can't afford or don't have access to cable.
The sport of baseball is a national treasure, and both Congress
and the team owners must be careful not to take actions that
would hurt the game and alienate fans. But if the antitrust exemp-
tion does provide some benefit to the fans and the game, the own-
ers are going to have to prove it. If the public does not benefit, then
the exemption should be restricted or repealed. I look forward to
hearing from today's witnesses.
I want to say to my colleagues who are sitting with me this
morning, good morning, Senator Feinstein, good morning, Senator
Graham, and good morning, Senator Leahy. We are happy to see
all of you here this morning. And Senators Simpson, Specter,
Mack, we are happy to see each of you. I am going to ask you, if
you don't mind, to withhold your opening statements so that we
4may hear from Mr. Vincent, who has a time commitment. I looked
right over my good friend, Paul Simon. I didn't say good morning
to Paul. Excuse me. I apologize.
We will hear from Mr. Vincent, and at the conclusion of Mr. Vin-
cent's comments and questions we will then ask for opening state-
ments from the members of the committee, and I hope my col-
leagues will indulge me in that respect. Mr. Vincent has to get
away and I think his testimony is particularly important to this
committee.
Mr. Vincent, we are very happy to welcome you here this morn-
ing. I know that there is a group of distinguished members of base-
ball who are also here and we will welcome them at a later point.
Please proceed.
STATEMENT OF FAY VINCENT, FORMER COMMISSIONER OF
BASEBALL
Mr. VINCENT. Senator, I prepared a short statement which I gave
to you. Let me just say at the outset that I appreciate your cour-
tesies in helping me with the arrangements here today and ac-
knowledging that I have a commitment in New York at 1:30.
I would stand or sit by the statement I prepared. I think at the
outset I would only remind you that I am at present an unem-
ployed former bureaucrat without formal standing in baseball and
if I find questions that, in my humble opinion, are really more rel-
evant to those with authority, I hope you will indulge me in
finessing those questions. I say so openly and without apology.
I think the people who have responsibility in baseball are really
better suited to deal with some of the problems that are you are
addressing, but I am at your service and I am prepared to be useful
to you, in large measure because I think your role in baseball, the
role of oversight and supervision, is critically important.
Senator METZENBAUM. Mr. Vincent, your statement that you sub-
mitted is very direct; it is short. And because I don't think it is a
privileged matter between the former commissioner and the Mem-
bers of the Senate, I am going to ask you if you would be kind
enough to read it. Would you be willing to do that, please? Do you
have a copy of it?
Mr. VINCENT. I would if you would provide a copy to me, yes, sir.
Senator METZENBAUM. Would staff please provide Mr. Vincent
with a copy of his statement, please?
Mr. VINCENT [reading]:
Senator Metzenbaum, distinguished members of the Senate, I am grateful to have
this opportunity to share my views on the continued viability of the existing anti-
trust exemption enjoyed by major league baseball. It is my opinion that the current
exemption should be retained so long as major league baseball, by which I mean
the owners, can justify the privilege of the special status the exemption affords. In
light of recent developments, I believe baseball must be pressed to persuade Con-
gress that the antitrust immunity is warranted, and whether baseball presently de-
serves this special treatment is surely open to question.
In my view, the antitrust immunity baseball enjoys is not essential either to the
economic health or the legal integrity of the game. For years, Congress has consid-
ered the threat to remove the exemption as the principal weapon with which to
pressure baseball, but the threat to remove the exemption reminds one of the cry
of wolf. As my predecessor, Bart Giamatti, once remmded the Senate, if you take
away the exemption, what do you threaten to do next?
And yet the exemption has important significance. The immunity rmits baseball
or the commissioner to prevent the migration or transfer of a franense if the move
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is not in the best interests of baseball. Eliminating the immunity would have some
unattractive consequences, and there is no evidence that the immunity has been
abused by baseball. Thus, the immunity issue tends to be overblown when, in fact,
the significance of the antitrust status of baseball may be more symbolic than vital.
Again, the question is whether baseball deserves or requires this special status.
One of the major issues in baseball is whether baseball is or should view itself
as anything other than a business like any other business. When I was being at-
tacked by various owners, I was told that they wanted the commissioner to be their
commissioner. They did not agree that the commissioner should have any obligation
to the public or to represent any other interest than the interests of the owners.
One owner said the players had their union leader, as did the umpires, but no one
represented the owners' interests.
Another view widely held by owners is that baseball should be run like any other
major corporation. The CEO or commissioner should report to the owners, who
would be able to fire the commissioner as the CEO in the corporate world can be
fired.
The corporate analo has eat appeal to owners who have difficulty accepting
or understanding why baseball is such a difficult enterprise. Thus, there is within
baseball a major debate taking place over how baseball is to see itself and what obli-
gations, if any, baseball has to the public. My confidence in the wisdom of the reso-
lution of this debate is well under control.
In my view, one, the existing antitrust exemption for major league baseball should
be retained only so long as baseball can persuade you that it is a unique institution
with special public interest obligations and not merely another business.
Two, to the extent major league baseball acknowledges the exemption is only jus-
tified by continuing recognition that baseball is a national trust with obligations to
this Congress and to the public that are not carried by ordinary businesses, the ex-
emption should be continued and the performance of baseball closely monitored.
Three, if the owners of baseball continue on their stated course of making baseball
into their business, and at the same time insist that the commissioner is their CEO
to be fired at will, I would no longer support the preservation of the exemption. If
the exemption is to be surrendered, let it be by action of the owners. Only a strong
commissioner acting in the interests of baseball, and therefore the public, can pro-
tect the institution from the selfish and myopic attitudes of owners.
Baseball is not seriously dependent on the continuation of the antitrust exemp-
tion. This Congress has other alternatives available to it that seriously threaten
baseball. If you wish to get the attention of owners and to recapture their commit-
ment to larger public interests, you may wish to consider expanding the range of
legislative options. The exemption has become, as I said, more of a symbol than a
vital baseball interest. It does symbolize that baseball is different. The question for
you and for baseball is whether major league baseball is willing to continue to carry
the burden of being different in order to preserve the exemption.
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much, Mr. Vincent. As I
understand it, you must leave in how much time, Mr. Vincent?
Mr. VINCENT. Well, I am at your service, sir. I mean, I will leave
when I can. If we are doing useful work, I won't leave.
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much. We appreciate that
and the imposition upon your own personal commitments.
We will have 10-minute rounds for members of this panel.
Mr. Vincent, why, in your own words, were you forced out of thejob as commissioner of baseball?
Mr. VINCENT. I don't know, sir. I think you would have to ask
the people who made that judgment.
Senator METZENBAUM. In your letter of resignation, you stated
that "Ownership of a baseball team is more than ownership of an
ordinary business. Owners have a duty to take into consideration
that they own a part of America's national pastime in trust. This
trust sometimes requires putting self-interest second."
Do you believe that, on their own, and without a strong and inde-
pendent commissioner, baseball fans can be confident that the own-
ers will put aside their own self-interest when it conflicts with the
best interests of the sport?
6Mr. VINCENT. Senator, I live as an optimist. I believe that base-
ball owners, when they consider the restructuring of the commis-
sioner's office, will come to the conclusion that the commissioner's
office has served baseball well over 70 years. I would hope they
would not make major changes in the governance and the constitu-
tion of baseball, and I would hope they would hire somebody who
is going to be independent, who represents the public interest, rec-
ognizes that baseball is unique.
And, by the way, baseball is unique quite apart from its legal
status. It is unique because it is what it is, because it is so well-
grounded in our history, because it is part of our culture. Baseball
is unique, and I think if you are, as I am, an optimist, I believe
that baseball will do the right thing.
Senator METZENBAUM. You often have testified, and you have
done so again today, that the antitrust exemption obliges the lead-
ership of baseball to govern the sport in a manner that protects the
public interest. But today you have noted that some of the owners
who opposed you "did not agree that the commissioner should have
any obligation to the public or to representing any interests other
than the interests of the owners." How widespread would you say
that view is among the 28 owners?
Mr. VINCENT. Well, I don't know and I don't believe that it is ter-
ribly widespread. I would think that one of the benefits of a hear-
ing like this, frankly, is to remind people in baseball of what you
represent and of this special calling that all of us had in baseball.
I believe that there are 28 owners. It is very difficult to character-
ize a group of 28 to speak generally. Their views differ, as you will
hear, and my own sense is that while some owners may speak out,
they don't necessarily represent baseball, and the views that you
are addressing may, in fact, not be the views of the majority of
owners in baseball.
Senator METZENBAUM. As I noted in my opening statement,
Jerry Reinsdorf, the owner of the Chicago White Sox, was recently
quoted as saying that the job of the next baseball commissioner
will be to "run the business for the owners, not the players or the
umpires or the fans." If the next commissioner is simply going to
be a CEO for the owners, don't you believe there is no longer jus-
tification for retaining the antitrust exemption?
Mr. VINCENT. Yes.
Senator METzENBAuM. Let us say the owners, contrary to all in-
dications which we have received up to this point, decide to invest
the next commissioner with the same degree of authority which
you had. Wouldn't the fact of your ouster send a strong signal to
your successor that he or she had better not do anything that goes
against the wishes of the owners even if it is in the best interests
of the game and the fans?
Mr. VINCENT. Well, you are right. That is a problem, and I think
that is one of the issues that baseball has to address. In order to
give a commissioner the kind of authority that he or she requires,
there has to be assurance that the person can act independently in
a fixed term. It is not unlike a judgeship or any other calling where
you are obviously going to make judgments that will disappoint
people, and as you make those judgments the number of dis-
appointed people increases and it is a very difficult calling.
7I am disappointed that I wasn't able to persuade more owners
that I was doing the right thing, but I am not surprised. My prede-
cessors had somewhat the same problem. It is a very difficult prob-
lem for baseball, and my advice to the owners is to give the com-
missioner the widest grant of authority with the most comfort and
security, but my example and the precedent of my circumstances
is certainly a difficult one.
Senator METZENBAUM. You have also testified that "Baseball is
not seriously dependent on the continuation of the antitrust exemp-
tion," and that the exemption is not "essential to the economic
health or the legal integrity of the game." If that is the case, why
do you think the owners continue to believe that the exemption is
critical to baseball?
Mr. VINCENT. Well, I am not sure they do, sir. I think that it is
helpful, and like most things in baseball there is a reluctance to
change-I think reluctance in this body, among other things. And
I am not in favor of taking the exemption away, as I testified, un-
less it is clear that baseball wishes the exemption to go, and the
only way baseball can speak on that subject is by the way they es-
tablish the governance mechanism.
My view is that it is really up to baseball to show you, to prove
to the Congress and to the Senate, whether it believes the exemp-
tion is important. My point is I think that economically the threat
to baseball of removal of the exemption is overstated. One of the
reasons is that anybody wise has to be very careful. We are never
sure how far the exemption goes. So operating baseball, as I did,
I never relied on it to any great extent because I was never sure
of the breadth and extent of its viability. It is very important to
baseball in terms of migration of franchises, but apart from that I
can't recall that I ever thought I was using it.
Senator METZENBAUM. Now, in your testimony you suggested
that Congress consider "expanding the range of legislative options."
Can you give us some examples of possible legislative options that
you-
Mr. VINCENT. Well, with all due respect, sir, I would leave that
to you. I am suggesting that if Congress wishes to address baseball,
it ought not always to think in terms exclusively of the antitrust
option. I think there are other ways in which Congress can look at
baseball.
Senator METZENBAUM. Mr. Vincent, the Marge Schott matter has
disturbed many people, and there is no question about it; it has
been an embarrassment to baseball. The owners have set up a com-
mittee to look into the situation and suggest possible actions in re-
sponse to it. Do you think that the owners can handle this matter
themselves, or wouldn't it be better to have a strong and independ-
ent commissioner dealing with a matter of this kind?
Mr. VINCENT. Well, in my judgment, those aren't exclusive. I
think the owners may be able to handle the problem properly. We
will have to see. I think obviously it would be better, and I think
probably the owners would agree it would be better to have this
sort of thing dealt with by a sitting commissioner.
I think the original authority of the commissioner arose from a
belief among owners that there were some things owners could not
do, and the existence of the office was originally and historically
8grounded in that conviction. Owners need a commissioner from
time to time because there are some issues that are very difficult
for owners to deal with. This happens to be one. There is an inter-
regnum and a hiatus in governance in baseball, and I think that
is unfortunate, but I don't think one should come to the conclusion
necessarily that the owners can't deal with this problem. My own
view is we ought to wait to see what they do.
Senator METZENBAUM. Now, you have been credited with spur-
ring more minority hiring in team front offices. A baseball writer
for the New York Times suggested that some owners may have
been rankled by the pressure that you applied on that issue. Do
you have an opinion as to why some teams have been slow to open
up front offices to minorities?
Mr. VINCENT. I don't, sir. I come from the corporate world, as you
know, and I recognize it is a problem throughout our society. Why
are some corporations slower than others? Leadership makes a dif-
ference. I think one of the things I tried to persuade owners of is
that there are dimensions of this that go beyond equity and fair-
ness and the law.
Part of the concern I have for the long-term viability of baseball
is that Afro-Americans do not go to baseball games. The percentage
attendance represented by that fast-growing part of our society is
very small. So just cast in economic terms, which is, of course, not
the way to do it, but just cast in those terms I would think baseball
would be wise to move more swiftly. The pace is not attractive; it
is not what it ought to be, though some progress has been made.
Senator METZENBAUM. Three days ago, the owners voted to re-
open the labor agreement. Many observers believe that that action,
coupled with other moves made by the owners in recent months,
might interfere with the start of the 1993 season. You know the
two sides in this matter better than anyone else. Do you believe
there will be a lockout or a strike during the 1993 season?
Mr. VINCENT. Senator, this is one of those questions to which I
will now invoke my original statement.
Senator METZENBAum. Take the fifth?
Mr. VINCENT. There are people following me to whom I heartily
recommend that question. [Laughter.]
Senator METZENBAUM. Even though baseball remains our na-
tional pastime, one gets a sense that fans are disenchanted with
the way in which greed and monetary matters are interfering with
the sport. Instead of being a relief from the stresses of daily life,
baseball today is often simply a reminder of those pressures. Do
you think there is some way to reverse the trend, or are we past
the point of no return? What can we do to make baseball the na-
tional pastime that it was in yesteryear?
Mr. VINCENT. Well, again, with respect, Senator, I don't think it
ever was what we think it was. My own recollection is that the
business of baseball has always been an annoyance. I said one time
the business of baseball is like the Sun; you can't look at it for very
long without turning away. But I have read enough of the history
of baseball to recognize that there are distinguished historians who
believe that was the case in the 19th century.
The business of baseball has always involved questions of com-
pensation, economic realities. Fans do not like that part of baseball,
9and I think baseball is wise to try to sublimate that part to the ex-
tent it can. But I don't think we ought to be romantic about the
history of baseball or the realities of the future of baseball. It is a
big business. There is no real hope that it is going to change. I
think what we have to do is protect the wonderful game and keep
the business from being unduly intrusive.
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much. My time has ex-
pired, and I would say to my colleagues that I have taken 10 min-
utes. I would hope that they might confine themselves to 5, but not
wanting to be unfair, if they need something more than that,
please go forward, but certainly not in excess of 10.
We will recognize members of the committee based upon senior-
ity on the committee. Senator Thurmond.
Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator METZENBAUM. Senator, I had indicated that at this point
we would use questions of Mr. Vincent and hold our opening state-
ments to a later point, if you would, please.
Senator THURMOND. All right. Mr. Vincent, what is your view of
the appropriate role of the baseball commissioner, given the anti-
trust exemption, and would your answer be different if the exemp-
tion were eliminated?
Mr. VINCENT. I think my view of the role and authority of the
commissioner is that it is one of the American institutions which
by and large, with some exceptions, has worked. I don't see a par-
ticular reason to tinker with it or to change it radically, and I don't
think its viability is affected one way or the other by the existence
of the antitrust immunity.
Senator THURMOND. Mr. Vincent, you also state that the anti-
trust exemption should be retained only if it can be justified by
baseball owners. Can the owners justify the exemption, and if so
how?
Mr. VINCENT. Well, I think they can, sir, and I think the way
they can do it is by acknowledging that baseball does have an obli-
gation that goes beyond their own economic interest, that there is
something special about baseball. After all, the antitrust immunity
is a privilege; it can be removed by you. To the extent there is a
privilege, privileges ought to be justified. The privilege can be justi-
fied in baseball, in my judgment, but whether it will be justified,
at least to satisfy you gentlemen and ladies, is another matter.
Senator THURMOND. Mr. Chairman, in order to save time and
give the other Senators a chance, I won't ask any more questions
right now.
Senator METZENBAUM. Senator Simon.
Senator SIMON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, I think there
is a sentiment here and a sentiment in the American public that
the next commissioner has to be both independent and strong, and
I think that is one clear message that is here today.
My concern is the commitment to communities, and if I can use
an example from football, the movement of the St. Louis Cardinals
to Phoenix, I think, did a great disservice to the St. Louis commu-
nity and to that area. I understand that football, like baseball, is
a business, but it is more than a business, as you know, Commis-
sioner. I have to tell you I don't shed any tears when I see Phoenix
down at the bottom of their division now in the NFL.
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Tell me what the difference is because of the antitrust exemption
in how the NFL operates and how baseball operates.
Mr. VINCENT. Well, I am not an expert on the NFL. Let me just
tell you that from my own personal experience, the existence of the
authority within baseball to prevent migration of franchises-the
existence of that authority in the commissioner's office was used by
me, and I think should be taken into account very carefully by you
as you think about this immunity.
The ultimate ability of the commissioner to say to a franchise
owner, you may not move that franchise until additional steps have
been taken or additional efforts have been undertaken in the com-
munity, is a very forceful and, I think, helpful asset to the commis-
sioner.
If you look at the history of baseball, when teams have moved,
including from this great city, the immediate effort is to replace the
team. If you look at the move from Kansas City to Oakland, Kan-
sas City went out and replaced the team. From Seattle to Milwau-
kee, Seattle replaced the team. From Milwaukee to Atlanta, Mil-
waukee replaced the team; here, twice, and we are still trying to
replace the team in Washington.
I think the history of baseball shows that the migration of fran-
chises has not been baseball's most distinguished moment, and
therefore migration should be looked at very skeptically. After all,
if an owner runs a team poorly and is having difficulty in the com-
munity, it is tempting to say I want to move to x, I will do better
there, or they will make me an offer which is economically very sig-
nificant. That ignores the reality of the fans and the community.
It doesn't take into account that part of the problem may be that
particular owner and the way he is managing the team. Those are
things which I think a commissioner, in the proper course, ought
to be able to take into account.
So I would urge you to look very carefully at the migration issue
in terms of whose ox is being gored. When you leave, as you say,
the fans left behind immediately coalesce around an effort to get
a new franchise. Is that the way an institution should properly be
functioning?
Senator SIMON. And as far as the differences with football, can
you just roughly outline that?
Mr. VINCENT. The principal difference is that it is clear that the
commissioner of baseball and baseball have the ability to prevent
migration, to prevent transfers. The other leagues may, in fact, pre-
vent transfers. The courts have not said that is illegal, but there
are procedural standards imposed by the courts which don't apply
in baseball's case. At least that was our view.
So I think it is easier, put it this way, for baseball to interfere
in the migration of franchises than it is for football or basketball,
though, in fact, those sports may also interfere. But the Al Davis
case in Oakland is another clear case where a franchise was moved
over the opposition of the league. There was litigation and the
transfer was valid.
Senator SIMON. Just a comment or two, Mr. Chairman, and then
I will yield to my colleagues. First, the Jerry Reinsdorf quote that
you have there, I assume, was not put together by a public rela-
tions firm. Let me say, in fairness to Jerry Reinsdorf, he is one who
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has stuck with the city of Chicago when, financially, I think it
would have been beneficial for him to move to the Tampa-St. Pe-
tersburg area.
Let me note also, Mr. Chairman, that I believe this is the first
committee meeting that our new colleague from California has at-
tended, and we welcome you here, Senator Feinstein. And let me
also note, Mr. Chairman-I think it is not inappropriate-that Sat-
urday our colleague, Strom Thurmond, celebrated his 90th birth-
day, and we wish you the very best.
Senator METZENBAUM. Hear, hear.
Senator THURMOND. I feel like I am 45. [Laughter.]
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much, Senator Simon.
Senator SIMON. And I thank you, Commissioner.
Senator METZENBAUM. This subcommittee hearing is a little bit
unusual, and I think maybe one of the few that I have participated
in in the many years I have been in the Senate, because we have
with us this morning not only members of the subcommittee, but
we have members of the full committee and we have others who
are members of the Senate who are not members of the committee.
Normally, it is not the practice to extend the opportunity for
questioning to those who are not members of the subcommittee,
and sometimes permitting it if they are members of the full com-
mittee; very seldom, Members who are not members of either com-
mittee. I feel that there is such tremendous interest in this subject
and that the time pressures are not of such a nature, other than
Mr. Vincent's time pressures, that it would be inappropriate for me
to deny those who are not members of the committee an oppor-
tunity to question. So I will permit them to do so. I would again
emphasize the need for brevity.
Let me now turn to a longtime member of this committee and
one who has indicated his interest in the whole subject of the anti-
trust exemption over a period of many years, and who is recently
reelected, for which we congratulate him, Senator Specter.
Senator SPECTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I believe that these
hearings are very important as they relate to sports and also to
very major financial interests. In my own State, Pennsylvania,
baseball, football, hockey, and basketball have an enormous impact
on the emotions and on the finances of the State, and I think that
applies to the Nation as a whole.
I believe that baseball has never recovered since the move of the
Dodgers from Brooklyn to Los Angeles in 1958. I say that as a
longtime baseball fan who became excited at the age of 8 and grew
up in the State of Kansas, where the most important morning ac-
tivity was reviewing the box scores from the previous day.
I have to say to you, Mr. Vincent, that I don't quite agree with
you that we shouldn't be romantic about the history of baseball. I
am romantic about the history of baseball. I think it is an over-
whelming passion of the American people. America is in love with
baseball. In addition, baseball has a unique business status with
an exemption from the antitrust laws while seeking, like every
other business, to exact the maximum profits. You have that tri-
angle and it is a very serious issue.
As Senator Metzenbaum has alluded to, I have been involved
with this issue for many years. In 1982, this committee took up the
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move of the Oakland Raiders to Los Angeles, and in that year Sen-
ator Thurmond convened very prompt hearings to take up the sub-
ject. At that time my studies led me to conclude that sports are af-
fected with a public interest; that is the way I articulate it. Foot-
ball is; baseball is. In your opening statement, you comment about
baseball as a national trust, which is another way of stating the
same thing.
We are now seeing the flight of players-Bonilla, and now Barry
Bonds leaving Pittsburgh for example, which will decimate Pitts-
burgh as a city. While the franchise remains there, when the key
players are taken away, a significant part of that franchise departs.
Let me pick up on a first question, Mr. Vincent: the subject of
baseball as a national trust or being affected with the public inter-
est. Permit me to state a proposition to you and ask you if you
agree with it. My own view is that a team ought not to be able to
move because of the fans' interests and because baseball is unique,
not simply another business. Thus I believe that the Oakland Raid-
ers should not have been permitted to move from Oakland to Los
Angeles, where the team was making money and had keen fan sup-
port, simply to gain a bigger market in order to make more money.
But the Philadelphia Athletics, which moved to my hometown,
should have been permitted to move from Philadelphia to Kansas
City when they were not being supported.
I would ask if, as you define "national trust" or "affected with the
public interest," you would agree that a team ought to be limited
in moving simply to make more money, when it is a solid financial
operation in its current home city.
Mr. VINCENT. I would agree with that. I made a suggestion in
baseball which was as follows. I said if you are in a smaller market
and you try to move to a larger market, why should you, the owner
in the smaller market, be entitled to the benefits of the larger mar-
ket? After all, the larger market theoretically is an expansion op-
portunity for baseball, and I thought that any premium which was
built into a transfer from a smaller to a larger market should ac-
crue to the institution generally.
That is another way of saying that I think if you make more dif-
ficult and less financially attractive the transfer of franchises from
smaller to larger markets and you spread throughout baseball gen-
erally any benefit of Philadelphia moving to a larger market, let us
say, you make the issue one with much broader considerations.
But I would agree with you. I think that my conclusion is that
there has to be the possibility of transfer. There are times, I sup-
pose, when it becomes absolutely essential, but I think the hurdle
rate-that is, the degree of difficulty that should be put to the own-
ers before they can transfer a franchise-ought to be fairly high.
Senator SPECTER. Well, we considered an antitrust exemption for
the NFL, the National Football League, to enable the owners to
limit franchise moves to overrule, in effect, the court decision based
on that proposition; and we have a good bit of tension here between
baseball and Congress. Nobody knows what Congress is going to
do, including Congress, but the possibility of a revocation of the
antitrust laws does have an effect on baseball.
When legislation is proposed and it comes close, that may be
some signal to sports, that sports should follow the rule that you
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don't maximize profits to the extreme, that when a team is making
money in a city like Oakland, where the fans have an interest, you
simply can't pick up and move to a bigger city with bigger profits;
that you can't move away from Brooklyn; but let me move to an-
other subject because of the limitation of time.
There is talk of a lockout, and I respect your situation in not
wanting to speculate about that. There has been talk of revenue
sharing among the baseball teams, as there is revenue sharing in
other sports for the limited antitrust exemption on television reve-
nues. There has also been talk of a baseball cap which would turn
on a percentage of profits.
Before asking you about that as a possibility to head off what
looks like potential problems in 1993 or 1994, let me ask you about
the subject of having sports teams pay for their own stadiums.
When you talk about profits and a division between players and
owners, one cost is the operation of the stadium. In an era when
tickets cost as much as they do, some players are making as much
as they do, and some teams are making as much as they do, why
should the arrangements be made resulting in the blackmail Sen-
ator Metzenbaum articulated which I don't think is far off, al-
though maybe a little strong. But why should the arrangements in
sports be such that the burden is placed on cities to finance these
expensive stadiums instead of financing coming out of profits,
which can be divided between the players and the owners?
Mr. VINCENT. Well, Senator, I don't mean to be disrespectful, but
what I have tried to do since I left the position is be careful about
expressing my views on issues that are current. I think you have
witnesses who really are better qualified than I. I have views on
those subjects. I think I have spoken to them in the past, but I
would ask your indulgence on that question because it does seem
to me that is a current issue for baseball and I wonder whether I
am really in a position to address that.
Senator SPECTER. Well, Mr. Vincent, with all due respect, I
would not grant any indulgence on that subject. I think that you
have experience in this field. You have been the commissioner. You
know about the subject. Perhaps none is more knowledgeable in
the country, certainly in the room, on the subject. If you don't want
to express a view, I won't press you on it, but I don't think-
Mr. VINCENT. Well, I think what I have said in the past I would
repeat to you, and that is that the issue of municipal support for
a franchise is, it seems to me, a marketplace issue. There are fran-
chises where the stadia are owned by the owner of the team. Los
Angeles is a clear example. When the team moved to Los Angeles,
obviously the Los Angeles community gave the Dodgers consider-
able benefits.
I don't know that I think that it is necessarily totally inappropri-
ate for a community, for a variety of reasons, to consider a sports
facility as it considers other entertainment facilities or other things
in the public interest. It seems to me that is a legislative rather
than a legal or sports issue.
I think sports people ask franchise cities to support facilities. The
cities are in a position to say yes or no. Some say yes and some
say no. I mean, the San Francisco votes in the past are clear exam-
ples of cities saying, no, we don't choose to do that. I don't have
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strong feelings about that issue from a legal or legislative point of
view. I think it really to a very large extent depends on the com-
munity.
Senator SPECTER. Well, Mr. Vincent, I do not agree that it is a
marketplace issue in a context where baseball has an antitrust ex-
emption. If baseball did not have that unique status, then perhaps
you could argue a marketplace issue.
Let me move to one other subject.
Mr. VINCENT. Could I make one rejoinder?
Senator SPECTER. Well, let me move ahead because we are-well,
go ahead, go ahead.
Mr. VINCENT. No.
Senator SPECTER. Television. In light of the antitrust exemption
which baseball enjoys, and the limited exemption which football,
basketball, and hockey enjoy, I am very much concerned, and have
expressed it many times in the past, with movement to pay tele-
vision. The commissioner of football, Commissioner Rozelle, and
afterward Commissioner Tagliabue, made a commitment that they
would not put the Super Bowl on pay TV, but now a number of
games are moving to cable, which is pay.
All away games of the Philadelphia Phillies used to be available
to the public; something that I have discussed with the Philadel-
phia ownership. I am concerned about the public being forced to
pay for television. Maybe "forced" is too strong a word, but when
the Super Bowl is on or the World Series is on, we find very heavy
payments there. I would be interested in your view as to whether
you think baseball and football-in light of their special treatment
with the antitrust exemption, ought to have some special consider-
ation for the fans and not move to pay television. -
Mr. VINCENT. Well, I don't think it is an issue that necessarily
prescients from the antitrust immunity because, as you point out,
the issue exists in football.
Senator SPECTER. Well, now, wait. Football has the antitrust im-
munity for revenue sharing.
Mr. VINCENT. And television, yes, as baseball would by statute,
I take it. From my point of view, it seems to me the World Series
and the Super Bowl and certain postseason events are unique, and
I think the sports people have made very serious commitments to
you that those events have to be, at least in the foreseeable future,
available generally, which means on network television.
The thing that makes this issue so difficult is not the political
point, sir, but the business point, which is the network business.
Television is changing so rapidly. The proliferation of channel
availability is changing. The availability of over-the-air television
signals is greater than it was.
So I think one of the difficulties we have, perhaps, is drawing a
distinction for all time between free television and pay television.
I think ultimately we will find that that distinction blurs, and in
time my guess is this issue will become diffused. I think for the
short term baseball-and I committed to you-has no interest in
putting post-season games on anything other than over-the-air tele-
vision, for the reason you suggest. But I wouldn't be straight if I
didn't tell you that I think over the long term, as the television dis-
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tribution business changes, so will the way in which sports address
the problem.
Senator SPECTER. Thank you, Mr. Vincent. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you, Senator Specter.
Senator Leahy.
Senator LEAHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I am pleased
that you are holding these hearings. Mr. Vincent, I come from the
small State of Vermont, so at least I am one of the people here who
will be asking questions who does not have a baseball team in his
State, and will never have a baseball team in his State, and I am
here simply as somebody representing a lot of baseball fans who
are really very, very concerned about what is happening to the
game.
You have touched on many of the problems and many of the is-
sues here today. Certainly, we see attendance going down. The ref-
erence you made to the small attendance of African-Americans, the
concerns being expressed by people all over the country about base-
ball-anybody who cares anything about baseball has to pay atten-
tion.
We have a case where there are strong antidrug rules on the
books, but then the league reinstates a player who has flunked his
drug test, I believe, seven times. I mean, what kind of a double-
standard image does that give? Or when you have the owner of a
team make racist remarks that never had a place, or shouldn't
have had a place in this country at any time, but especially not
today, you see the baseball community sort of sitting around
dithering about, saying gee, what should we do about this, at a
time when, if they asked their fans, they would find the vast ma-jority of them are shocked and wouldn't have much problem in de-
ciding what should be done and are wondering what kind of an-
other world do some of the owners live in that they are still trying
to figure out what to do.
Or the player who complains that he is only making $6 million
and therefore, of course, he has got to charge kids if they want his
autograph-well, if you are one of these kids out playing little
league and you are worried about baseball, you can imagine what
kind of an impression you have.
Do you feel, as I do, that the best way to address these prob-
lems-maybe never to fully solve them-but at least the best way
to address these problems is to have a very strong and very inde-
pendent commissioner of baseball?
Mr. VINCENT. I do.
Senator LEAHY. Do you think that the way the baseball restruc-
turing committee that is now reviewing the role of the commis-
sioner-do you think that that has a real chance of establishing a
commissioner's office that is going to look out for the true interests
of the fans in the future?
Mr. VINCENT. Well, I hope so, Senator. As I said earlier, I really
believe that when the baseball owners look carefully at baseball
governance, they will conclude as you have concluded. I am an opti-
mist. I think that some of the recent developments in baseball have
been very unattractive, but I am optimistic that people learn and
that the experience is relevant to the future. I hope that out of the
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restructuring will come not major change, but reaffirmation of
what you believe and I believe to be in the best interests of base-
ball.
Let me just say for the record on the drug issue with the person
who has been reinstated, baseball did not reinstate that person,
nor did anybody in authority in baseball. He was reinstated by an
arbitrator who was acting pursuant to a collective bargaining
agreement. Mr. Howe was thrown out of baseball by me for life. He
challenged that judgment in front of an arbitrator, a system set up
by collective bargaining. The arbitrator has the right to overturn
the judgment of the commissioner of baseball, and in this case he
did.
Senator LEAHY. I might say that in that case he certainly did not
send a signal that, in my estimation, is the kind of signal we
should be sending either to baseball fans, or especially to young
people, at a time when we have drug problems running rampant
through our schools and when we are trying to change as much by
example and education as we ever could by law enforcement.
Mr. VINCENT. Yes, I agree with that, and I must say I have said
publicly that commissioners make mistakes, but so do arbitrators.
Senator LEAHY. Now, you mentioned many times about the best
interests of baseball, a term that brings out, obviously, differing
views in different people's mind. But as commissioner, that was
your No. 1 charge. If you had to talk about the single most impor-
tant issue facing the game today in the best interests of baseball,
what would it be?
Mr. VINCENT. Well, I think the single most challenging issue af-
fecting baseball is to structure the game so that there is a partner-
ship between the ownership and the players with continuing viabil-
ity so that the disruption that occurs every 4 years with the con-
frontation is eliminated. That, from a business point of view, is
clearly the most significant challenge.
From the social point of view, the nonbusiness point of view,
though they blur, I think the issue of dealing effectively with the
minority issue is vital. It is vital both in terms of equity and fair-
ness, but as I said earlier, it is also vital in terms of business. I
think that baseball is faced with some terrifically difficult prob-
lems, not unlike the rest of a number of major institutions, and
perhaps the country. Baseball is not unique, but I think I do have
confidence that the owners and new leadership will address those
issues.
Senator LEAHY. One of the problems is we have a lot of cities
that don't have a major league baseball team and they would like
to have one. If you remove the antitrust exemption, would that
have any effect on expansion?
Mr. VINCENT. I don't think so. You know, again, coming back to
an issue I touched on earlier, one of the difficulties with expansion
is that expansion, despite what has been thought of generally, in
my view, was not in baseball's economic interest. It was very sound
policy to bring baseball to new areas. It was sound in terms of the
future of baseball. It may have been sound politically, but there
were substantial economic reasons not to expand.
When baseball is having its-
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Senator LEAHY. If you could elaborate on that, I am just curious
how much expansion you could undergo-and you were probably
going to say this in your answer anyway, but I am curious how
much expansion you could undergo without diluting the quality of
the product.
Mr. VINCENT. Well, there is clearly a question of the quality of
the product and the number of players, but I was really addressing
a much more simple issue, which is dilution of the equity of base-
ball, dilution of the ownership.
Senator LEAHY. I see.
Mr. VINCENT. I think that this body and the Senate task force
had an enormous role in promoting expansion of baseball, and I
have said publicly I think Senator Wirth played a significant role
historically in having that happen. But from a pure economic point
of view in baseball, further e ansion is not attractive, and I think
it is unlikely that baseball will expand again in the foreseeable fu-
ture, not because there aren't cities qualified, not because people
aren't interested in baseball in other parts of the country, but be-
cause baseball simply has to deal with its economic problems and
come to grips with those first before additional expansion, in myjudgment, will be approved. I don't believe the owners in baseball
will vote to expand again in the near term.
Senator LEAHY. When you talk about those economic problems,
I look at the projections of CBS and others who carry baseball
games. I think one of the groups is estimating losses of $150 to
$200 million. Those contracts come up again when?
Mr. VINCENT. Right now.
Senator LEAHY. Obviously, they are going to offer a lot less
money.
Mr. VINCENT. That is right.
Senator LEAHY. Or are we going to go to pay-to-view TV for base-
ball and sort of hit the fans one more time?
Mr. VINCENT. I don't think so. I think network television is still
going to be the carrier of essential baseball games, certainly the
postseason, for the foreseeable future. But I think you are right.
The amount paid for baseball games by the networks, and for that
matter by ESPN or by cable, is going to be substantially less,
which puts economic pressure on the ownership. There is going to
have to be major adjustment because revenues will decrease in
baseball without any question.
Senator LEAHY. A friend of mine said to me that the lesson of
the free agency era is that smart, frugal teams can win and make
money and dumb teams can overspend and still lose. Any truth in
that? I thought I would give you something fun to answer here.
Mr. VINCENT. Was it Chesterton who said about Wagner's music
it sounds better than it really is? I have that comment with respect
to that remark.
Senator LEAHY. Why does a major media market such as Flor-
ida-and I don't want to step in on Bob Graham's concerns here,but that is a major media market. They couldn't get a major league
team until 1993. Is that part of the same thing you are saying
about expansion or is there more to it?
Mr. VINCENT. I think so, Senator. I think that the pressure to ex-
pand, frankly, was very largely political. I think it was appropriate,
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certainly, and it had its consequence; that is, it produced expan-
sion. But I think that one of the lessons of expansion, and I think
baseball owners have seen it, is that expansion carries a substan-
tial burden, economic and certainly in terms of the game itself.
So as I said to you earlier, I don't believe expansion is in base-
ball's short-term future.
Senator LEAHY. Certainly a lot of my constituents, and I think
others, are hearing the same thing. They are just hearing this gen-
eral frustration with baseball, and it seems the frustration level is
the highest with those who love baseball the most. There is a lot
of fear that there might not be baseball for our children or their
children, certainly not the way we grew up. I think I saw my first
baseball game when I was 7 years old in Fenway Park. I think that
is also driving a lot of feeling, people saying, well, just get rid of
the antitrust exemption, and that may happen, that may well hap-
pen.
Do you feel, as I do, that baseball is reaching a critical point that
could actually determine whether there is a future for baseball?
Mr. VINCENT. Well, I don't. Let me state it a little differently. I
think that baseball will be played in the major cities in this coun-
try a hundred years from today.
Senator LEAHY. I hope so.
Mr. VINCENT. Well, I believe it will. I said major cities. I think
the question for baseball is, can baseball be preserved as a national
sport in a number of cities of medium to smaller size, baseball pre-
served as we know it. In my judgment, baseball will surely survive
in some form, but the question really is what form. I think it is
simply overstating the case to say baseball is threatened, its viabil-
ity or its continued existence as a major sport. I don't believe that
to be the case, but there are threats to baseball that are very seri-
ous.
Senator LEAHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Vin-
cent.
Senator 1IETZENBAUM. Thank you, Senator Leahy. Our next Sen-
ator is Senator Simpson, and I am getting some indications from
some members of the committee that it would be helpful if every-
body didn't use their full 10 minutes, but I won't deprive you of
doing so. I would just urge you pleasantly, if you can, to cut it a
bit.
Senator SIMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have seen you do
it the other way. [Laughter.]
I will take it this way. That is all right with me.
Senator METZENBAUM. You certainly would be the last that ought
to be cut back because you were one of those who raised the ques-
tion at the Judiciary Committee hearing as to whether or not we
were going to go forward on this subject, and so please proceed. If
you can cut it, we would appreciate it, but if you can't, you will
have the full 10 minutes.
Senator SIMPSON. Mr. Chairman, I do appreciate that. Howard,
you have been very quick to establish this hearing. It arose from
a question in my mind before we left the last session as to Mr. Vin-
cent's dismissal from baseball. That rankles me. I thought I don't
understand why that has taken place. I had come to know Bart
Giamatti, a wonderful, wonderful, splendid man, and then had
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come to know Fay Vincent and saw him as a strong, independent
commissioner and then saw him sacked.
I asked the question, well, if the owners are now running the
business-and it is a business, but it is also a game-what is the
situation? Do they still require the exemption in order to exist? I
think you have said very clearly you think that they could get
along without that if that were the case.
Because Howard has a passion for the game and a sense of fair-
ness about these things, this hearing is taking place, and Connie
Mack has his own serious issues with regard to expansion, as does
Senator-elect Feinstein. These are not the things that I am focus-
ing on. I am focusing on the fact that a commissioner was set up
because of the Black Sox scandal which nearly destroyed baseball.
I seem to recall that when Kennesaw Mountain Landis came to
the game, he came and demanded almost dictatorial authority to
do what he had to do, and he had it and he did it and baseball
prospered. It is certainly simple enough for us in Congress to take
the step to eliminate the exemption. I can't imagine a more simple
legislative step. All we have to do is have a congressional finding
that baseball, professional sports, does affect interstate commerce.
That is all we have to do, and existing antitrust laws should then
be sufficient to regulate the sport because it affects interstate com-
merce, period. Nothing really too fancy need be done here. So
maybe that is what we will have to do or will do.
I had a view that I see nothing wrong, in the abstract, with base-
ball occupying a higher ground and being treated that way under
the law, but the business of baseball depends upon the game of
baseball.
So let me just ask you a couple of questions. Isn't it fair to say
that the Black Sox scandal involving the throwing of the Series by
the White Sox in 1919 was the prominent reason for the creation
of the office?
Mr. VINCENT. That is correct, and you should know that Judge
Landis came from a Federal judgeship and one of the things he did
was he drafted what is known as the major league agreement, one
of the clauses of which says the commissioner during his term may
not have his authority diminished or his compensation decreased.
Now, would Judge Landis have written that clause if he weren't
convinced that he couldn't be fired and he didn't want to be fired
by indirection? He didn't want people to say, Your new office in
some small community. In this body, one is very careful about pick-
ing out such a community, so I think I will leave it just at that.[Laughter.]
And that his compensation is reduced-he put that clause in be-
cause he knew he couldn't be fired. After all, if you could fire a
commissioner, why would you worry about his place of business or
his authority or his compensation? I believe strongly that, as a
matter of law, had I challenged the owners and litigated this case
I would have been successful, and I feel strongly that a commis-
sioner should not be subject to being fired, short, I think, of cause.
I mean, I certainly think there are things subject to impeachment
that we could all agree are appropriate.
But I think if you put a commissioner in for a fixed term, you
ought to agree that he has the authority to act in the interests of
20
the game. And if you think about the corporate analogy-I am
prescienting on this question, Senator Simpson, but I have an in-
terest-the analogy is that a commissioner should be like a cor-
porate CEO with a board of directors who can fire him. That, with
all due respect, is really absurd thinking.
What chief executive is in business to discipline his board? After
all, owners in baseball are subject to sanction by the commissioner.
If the owners in baseball were colluding-let us suppose three-
quarters plus one were colluding and the commissioner were sub-ject to dismissal by a three-quarter vote. What do you suppose the
poor commissioner could do? If he proceeds to deal with collusion,
which is wrong, he will, by definition, offend three-quarters plus
one. If three-quarters plus one can dismiss him, I submit to you he
won't do anything.
The only way a commissioner can function is with the security,
as with a Federal judge, of his appointment, subject to impeach-
ment for felonies, and short of that a fixed term. I can understand
why people might say, well, you are not subject to reelection.
Maybe the term should be fixed. You are dealing with that kind of
issue in this body. I think that is an issue for baseball.
But a commissioner who is subject to being in a position I was
put in simply is not going to do what I did. The lesson, I think,
of my circumstance is that if you do a number of things, by defini-
tion, you are going to insult people and they will be annoyed with
you.
Senator SIMPsON. Well, I think that that is the act of grace and
forbearance that attracted us to what you did. Rather than litigate,
you said that you would not do that because you didn't want to
drag baseball as a national institution, or the national pastime, as
Howard refers to it, through that litigation to prove you are right,
and I think you would have had one extraordinarily tight case on
that one.
Let me just ask a final question so that my colleagues can enter
in here, too. In that creation of the commissioner's office, there was
a phrase called "the best interests of the game." That was the cre-
ation of the "best interests of the game," powers which were given
to the commissioner relating to the broad authority that Kennesaw
Mountain Landis had. Tell us about that and how you felt about
that particular phrase.
Mr. VINCENT. Well, in some respects it is very difficult phrase.
If the phrase weren't there, I suppose the job would be easier, but
it is there and it was put there by Judge Landis because he wanted
to be free to act in the best interests of baseball quite apart from
owners' interests. I think it is a power which, like a number of
powers in this country, ought to be respected and not heavily used.
I said it was like having a major cannon in my office. I ought to
polish it regularly, I ought to show people that it existed, but it
ought not to be used.
On the other hand, there are occasions when I think it simply
has to be used, and unfortunately perhaps as a matter of bad luck,
I saw or was confronted with more of those issues than I guess oth-
ers had been. I think it is a power which is important, but it is sub-ject to being overused, and I think some of the criticism of me prob-
ably was that I did overuse it.
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Senator SIMPSON. Well, I will be listening for the issue of the
CEO relationship, the corporate board relationship. I like those
analogies, and there is one ancillary matter I tend to hang in and
listen to about what happened to you when you suggested realign-
ment, a simple act of moving the Cubs to where they ought to be
in geographical areas and the basis of the opposition. The basis of
the opposition was who owns the Cubs, and that is the most curi-
ous business relationship to begin with because it is a baseball
team contracting for air time on a station owned by the same peo-
ple. That is the kind of pro-business, anti-fan state of affairs that
will continue to be upheld in the absence of a commissioner, and
it will only harm the game.
These are some of the things. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. The
yellow light has not even shown.
Senator METZENBAUM. You did well and you get two brownie
points.
Senator SIMPSON. Thank you. I deserve that.
Senator METZENBAUM. Senator Graham? Senator Brown, I want
to apologize to you. You are a member of the committee, I know,
and therefore have some priority, but in the effort go back and
forth-
Senator BRowN. No, no, Mr. Chairman. You did exactly right.
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you. Senator Graham.
Senator GRAHAM. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I also
express my appreciation to you for holding these hearings, and to
the very distinguished witnesses who are going to illuminate us on
the economics and policy of baseball.
I have a particular interest that I would like to use as a focus
of trying to get some greater clarity on baseball's policy, particu-
larly as it relates to what Mr. Selig in his testimony and you have
indicated is the principal use of the antitrust exemption, and that
is relative to the migration of franchises.
You have both in your testimony used phrases that talk about
the franchises that were having substantial degrees of local com-
munity support should not be subject to relocation. Do you apply
that policy, or do you think it should be applied similarly to a city
which has a single franchise as distinct from a community that has
two or more franchises?
Mr. VINCENT. Well, I think it certainly is more likely that the
problem would come up in the situation where there is one fran-
chise because, by definition, there are very few communities with
two-Los Angeles, San Francisco, New York, Chicago-not many.
I, early on in my tenure, developed some criteria for migration
that were very severe because I thought the test should be severe,
and they were four. One was that the franchise was losing substan-
tial money and had been losing money over a reasonably long pe-
riod of time. Second, there was a continuing decline in attendance
which was persistent and not obviously correctable. Third, there
was a substantial defect with the facility. The stadium was inad-
equate and not likely to be corrected in the near term; and, fourth,that the situation, the community, if you will, had made it clear
that it was unwilling to address or deal with the problems.
Now, those criteria are very difficult to satisfy. Cleveland, if you
will, met the criteria early on at the time when Cleveland was con-
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sidering a new stadium. I went to Cleveland, made the point. We
got the vote and the stadium is being built. But the fact of the mat-
ter is that, in my judgment, the characteristics that justify migra-
tion ought to be characteristics that basically are last resort. The
community has voted, the stadium is uninhabitable, the attendance
is subpar, and there is no likelihood of corrective measures. Those
criteria, if they persist, will not be met in most cases.
Senator GRAHAM. How would you apply those four criteria to the
situation in San Francisco as you saw it in that two-team metro-
politan area in the summer of 1992?
Mr. VINCENT. San Francisco met the criteria at the time the vote
in San Jose was negative. I think the criteria I spelled out were
satisfied, and at that stage I told Mr. Lurie that he could look
around.
Senator GRAHAM. Could you expand on what your statement was
to Mr. Lurie and to potential suitors of the Giants in the summer
of 1992?
Mr. VINCENT. Well, you understand that my ability as commis-
sioner to approve or authorize a transfer was different from my
ability to authorize an owner to consider a transfer. Up until that
point, I had not permitted owners to investigate transfers. I was
difficult on the Seattle ownership investigating transfers because I
didn't think the criteria were met in Seattle.
I told Mr. Lurie he could look around. I must say I distin-
guished-at least I thought I was clear to distinguish that from the
ultimate authority to move, which was not mine to give. That has
to come from the ownership generally. But in my view, it was ap-
propriate at that time for Mr. Lurie to look around. Among other
things, at the same time I was talking to Mayor Jordan, who was
being energetic about keeping the team, and I think one of the re-
alities of tis is that the process of considering options certainly
has some effect on a community like San Francisco responding as
it did to the problem.
Senator GRAHAM. As the commissioner, when you gave Mr. Lurie
the indication that he was at liberty to look for ownership and pur-
chasers outside of the San Francisco Bay area, did you have any
expectation that the National League owners would concur in that?
Mr. VINCENT. I wouldn't have known, and I would have been
more doubtful about whether the American League owners would
concur. On the question of whether Mr. Lurie was going to find a
home away, whether San Francisco would ultimately solve its prob-
lems, those were for the future and I really had no idea what was
going to happen.
The only thing I was in a position to do was to say to Mr. Lurie,
the vote has been negative, what options do you have. Candlestick
is a major problem, and I think in fairness and equity, it is not un-
reasonable for me to say it is appropriate for you to look around.
Senator GRAHAM. You indicated that one of the aspects of that
opening to look around was the impact on the San Francisco Bay
community, and the mayor is going to be making some comments
and we have a former mayor who has now joined us. There has
been concern that one of the uses of the no-migration policy has
been somewhat of a bait-and-switch process. First, it is indicated
that the franchise can leave, such as the White Sox were given
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some indication that they might be able to leave Chicago, and then
the local community is dragooned into making commitments to
keep them there, such as the building of the new Comiskey Park
in Chicago and other benefits, and then the franchise is denied the
right to leave.
Mr. VINCENT. Well, I wonder whether it matters. As I said to you
earlier, Senator, suppose the franchise moved, as the franchise
moved from here twice, as it has moved from a variety of other
communities. What happens is the community left behind from
which baseball departs does, in fact, respond, and history tells you
the response is to generate a new team.
So I think what happens is that the threat of the departure does
have an effect. In some cases, as in San Francisco, it may have had
an effect before the departure. Certainly, that has been true in
other communities. But even if the franchise had moved, my sense
is there would have been, and there has been in other instances,
a galvanizing effort to immediately replace our beloved team, which
only calls into question the policy of migration generally.
Senator GRAHAM. Well, that statement has been less true where
you are dealing with a community that had multiple franchises. My
history tells me that there used to be two franchises in Boston and
when the Braves left, at least there was no successful effort to re-
place the Braves. When the Athletics left Philadelphia, there was
no successful effort to replace them. When the Browns left St.
Louis, there was no successful effort to replace them. When the
Dodgers and the Giants left New York, there was a successful ef-
fort to replace them with one expansion franchise.
So it seems to me that the history of how well expansion has
served to replace a city that lost a franchise is significantly a func-
tion of whether there was another team still in place in that com-
munity at the time that one left.
Mr. VINCENT. Well, but think about Washington. I mean, is this
a community in which there are two teams? I mean, do you con-
sider Baltimore to be part of this megalopolis or not? I think you
make a point. I am not sure that I agree that that is the discerning
point. I think from a baseball point of view, from a management
of baseball point of view, it is better, I think, to put new baseball
teams via expansion in communities than to move-somebody men-
tioned the Dodgers' migration to California. While it was eminently
successful, there are lots of fans in New York-I see them regu-
larly-who are still bitter. Now, they are getting older, but they are
still bitter.
So I think migration is not necessarily the answer to the yearn-
ing of people for new teams. We did expand. There are two commu-
nities that didn't previously have baseball and we have dis-
appointed people behind. After all, some 2 million people saw base-
ball in Seattle and one of the questions I dealt with was should we
permit Seattle to move, and I think we were right to resist that.
The solution occurred and those 2 million fans have got to be
happier.
Senator GRAHAM. I want to pursue the implications of that, but
before that, you talked about making it more difficult to relocate
possibly by charging some relocation fee, and I know that was an
issue that came up in the question of the Giants. Has there ever
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been any formal decisionmaking process within major league base-
ball that would lead to the development of a relocation fee being
charged?
Mr. VINCENT. I suggested it. I think there are people in baseball
who agreed that it was a good idea. You would have to ask other
gentlemen who follow me. I don't know that anything has occurred
on that subject. You understand the premise for the suggestion is
the difference in value of baseball in a small market and a large
market.
Let us suppose you are an owner doing poorly in a small market
and you have an offer to move to a large market. The difference
in value of your franchise will be considerable. The question I
raised is why should you be permitted to race to the door and, be-
cause you get there first, capture that premium when, in fact, it
is a baseball asset. Since baseball has the right to approve the
transfer, baseball should have the right to recapture the difference
between what your team is worth in your community and what it
is worth in the Meadowlands, for example. I mean, there is no
question that if you moved a team to one of the major
megalopolises, you would get a substantial increase over the value
for most smaller market teams.
Senator GRAHAM. What concerns me is that there seems be a
pattern, a bait-and-switch pattern, in which baseball at least
stands passive, or in the case of the Giants more than passive-
actually indicates through the commissioner's office that it is ac-
ceptable to consider relocation, creates a flurry of activity, and then
in some cases, as in Chicago, pounds the local community for sub-
stantial benefits beyond those that had earlier been available from
that community, but in the final hour draws in issues such as the
relocation fee which had never been formalized or suggested at the
beginning of this process, and ultimately denies-
Senator METZENBAUM. Senator, can you wind up, please?
Senator GRAHAM [continuing]. The right of the franchise to relo-
cate. It seems to me that that raises very serious questions as to
whether the migration policy is being used to serve some broader
interest or is being used just to gain economic advantage.
Mr. VINCENT. Well, I see your question. I understand your point.
I don't think bait-and-switch is an appropriate characterization to
the extent I participated, and I would cite to you the fact that there
have been a number of franchises that have, in fact, moved.
Senator GRAHAM. When was the last relocation?
Mr. VINCENT. Well, not recently; that is correct.
Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much. Senator Brown.
Senator BRowN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Vincent, we ap-
preciate your joining us today and I think you bring a unique per-
spective that will be very helpful to the committee.
You had mentioned that perhaps the decision on whether or not
baseball loses the antitrust exemption might ultimately be up to
the baseball owners. In hearing that, it wasn't clear to me if you
are suggesting that the baseball owners should change the original
Landis agreement or should abide by the original Landis agree-
ment.
Mr. VINCENT. I apologize.
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Senator BROwN. Were you suggesting changes or are you sug-
gesting adherence to the original agreement?
Mr. VINCENT. I regret the ambiguity. What I was suggesting to
you was that if the owners can demonstrate to you satisfactorily
their concern and sensitivity to the kind of considerations that you
think are vital, then I would think continuance of the antitrust im-
munity and exemption and continuance of the status quo is appro-
priate.
To the extent that the owners are unwilling to acknowledge the
burden of the privilege, if you will, then I thmk= the owners are
making the judgment that they don't care that seriously about the
immunity because they are making judgments which, in effect, say
we are heading elsewhere, we want to be treated differently, or we
are willing to be treated differently as a result of these decisions.
I suggested that it is up to the owners only because I think it
is early to know how they are going to respond; it is premature.
I think depending on how the ownership functions, this committee
and others may address the issue.
Senator BRoWN. As you know, putting your fate in the hands of
a particular committee is a somewhat chancy enterprise. For some,
it might depend on whether or not you provide a new franchise for
Florida or Colorado. What actions do you have in mind when you
suggest that? Are you saying it is simply a matter of the attitude
that they go forward with? Is there something specific the owners
ought to do or ought not to do?
Mr. VINCENT. I think governance is very important. I happen to
think that the immunity is relevant to the role of the commis-
sioner. I think a commissioner gives this organization and the pub-
lic interest some comfort in terms of the independence of that
incumbent. So I would watch very carefully the way in which base-
ball restructures and alters its basic constitution. After all, the im-
munity attached 70 years ago. Things have changed, but the
central governance of baseball remarkably hasn't.
Now, there is talk about major changes in the way baseball is to
be governed. If those changes in governance come out in a way that
I suggest you should pay attention to, then I think the response of
the Congress might be to confront the antitrust immunity directly.
Senator BROWN. If I am hearing you correctly, you are saying the
commissioner, as it is now structured, has a great deal of independ-
ence and has a responsibility to the public or a responsibility that
is broader than just his responsibility or her responsibility to the
owners, and that if baseball changes that basic agreement to where
you lose that responsiveness or independence to the public, you
would trigger it on that.
Mr. VINCENT. One of the things you have to bear in mind is I
take the view that the commissioner can't be fired, but anybody
who thinks I wasn't fired is naive. So there has to be some con-
scious addressing of what do you expect from the next commis-
sioner. If you leave things precisely as they are, there is consider-
able ambiguity in this person's mind as to whether he may suffer
the same fate. So I think there is more work to be done by baseball
before-at least this is my own view-before you can really, or I
submit, before you might want to really think seriously about base-
ball.
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Senator BRowN. The key being to ensure the independence of a
commissioner, I take it.
Mr. VINCENT. Well, I think that is absolutely right. I think, after
all, Congress is saying baseball is unique, it has a unique cachet.
But what makes baseball unique? One of the things that makes it
unique is the commissionership, somebody who has to come here
who responds to your importuning or suggesting and who is re-
sponsible for that special standing.
So I think baseball governance has worked. I think commis-
sioners have been sensitive to the Congress and to public interest
issues, even if owners have not universally been sensitive, and I
don't see any reason to make a major change. And put it another
way; if there are major changes, then I think it is appropriate for
you to consider what those mean.
Senator BRowN. I don't mean to put you in an uncomfortable sit-
uation and if you would prefer not to respond, I would certainly un-
derstand, but I think part of the point of this whole discussion
comes down to whether or not you were fired or resigned. Obvi-
ously, in a formal nomenclature, my understanding is you resigned,
but you have referred to it and others have suggested that you
were, in effect, forced out. Were you forced out?
Mr. VINCENT. Yes, Senator, I was forced out.
Senator BRowN. Let me ask you specifically, were you paid to
leave? Did you receive compensation in addition to your normal sal-
ary to leave?
Mr. VINCENT. No, no, and that factor fortuitously in my cir-
cumstance is not relevant. But from my point of view, the owner-
ship made it clear that they were unhappy with me as commis-
sioner. They were going to vote to fire me, which would have re-
sulted in litigation challenging their right to do so, and I decided
not to precipitate that litigation in view of the fact that it was very
clear that litigation was going to result.
After all, you know very well one can't govern without the con-
sent of the governed. Here was a case where people were no longer
willing to accept my leadership, and I was perfectly willing to move
aside once I recognized that it was not in my interest or baseball's
interest, particularly, to litigate.
Coming back to a point Senator Simpson made, the one thing
that I think is going to be true about baseball in the future is it
is going to be replete with litigation. Like all of American life, I
think litigation is going to become absolutely dominant in baseball
because every decision of substance will be challenged.
The Cubs' decision to challenge the realignment points the way.
If the Tribune Co., certainly a respectable, distinguished company,
thought it appropriate to challenge, then a number of decisions will
be challenged. So I predict to you that litigation is going to be a
way of life.
Yes, I was forced out. The ownership would have voted to fire
me, I was told some time soon after I resigned, and I made thejudgment that if I won the litigation, I would lose. I mean, what
would have been proven? I think what would have been proven is
important, but it wasn't important enough to pursue.
Senator BRowN. Is the Landis agreement, the basic framework
of baseball-does it permit the owners to fire you?
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Mr. VINCENT. Well, that, of course, is the legal question we would
have tested. In my judgment, no. Other people disagree.
Senator BROWN. And you chose to leave rather than embroil
baseball in that controversy. You did not request nor receive spe-
cial compensation for doing that?
Mr. VINCENT. No.
Senator BROWN. What would happen to minor league baseball if
the baseball antitrust exemption were changed or eliminated?
Mr. VINCENT. Matters would become somewhat more com-
plicated, and I have to tell you, Senator, I think that is a ques-
tion-this is one I am not finessing. I really am not totally satisfied
that I could give you a complete answer. Minor league baseball, in
my judgment, is threatened, and I think the immunity helps base-
ball deal in a collective way with the minor league institutions and
it is probably marginally helpful from that point of view.
But there is a problem with minor league baseball; namely, the
major league clubs are going to have to cut back on the subsidies
to minor league baseball and there is going to be in the future a
contraction of minor league franchises.
Senator BROWN. You have been faced-I say you-I mean in your
previous role, and baseball in general, has been faced with some
very tough problems in disciplining players-Pete Rose. Baseball is
embroiled right now in a very painful process of perhaps disciplin-
ing an owner or a major shareholder of one of the clubs. How would
the elimination of the antitrust exemption impact baseball's ability
to deal with those problems?
Mr. VINCENT. I don't think it would at all, Senator.
Senator BROWN. It would not change it?
Mr. VINCENT. Not in my judgment.
Senator BROWN. So baseball would still have the same ability, or
could have the same ability to deal with owners, for example, that
embarrass the game?
Mr. VINCENT. Yes. As I said, the reason the corporate analogy
falls apart is just that point. No chief executive is authorized or in
business to supervise the conduct of his directors and discipline
them if they misbehave. Moreover, they all are faithful to his enter-
prise. Baseball has all those conflicts at the ownership level, con-
fhicts with the institution. The corporate analogy just won't hold up,
but it is a very popular one among owners.
Senator BROWN. You know, one of the things that I, and I sus-
pect others on this committee and perhaps the public in general,
have had trouble understanding is the reluctance to expand. The
Colorado Rockies feel very fortunate to have a franchise. My under-
standing is the Colorado Rockies now have sold more season tickets
than any team in baseball, with the exception of one, and we ex-
pect to pass them.
Why was it so difficult to get a franchise in a town that wants
baseball, and why is it so difficult to get a franchise in a lot of
other communities in America that want and will support baseball?
Mr. VINCENT. Because you are basically diluting the equity of
ownership at a time when baseball is having its financial problems.
It is not financially attractive to expand, despite the substantial
franchise fees that are paid by expansion clubs. You are diluting
the revenue of the other clubs permanently. It is a little bit like
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selling stock in a company when the stock is very low; people do
not do that. I think you have got a time in baseball when the eq-
uity is not as solid as it may be at other times, and therefore this
is not, in the short term, a time to expand.
As I said to you earlier, I think the decision may have been a
sound baseball decision, political decision, a variety of other things.
From a pure financial point of view, it was always my view expan-
sion was not financially or economically sound.
Senator BROWN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator METZENBAUM. Senator Feinstein.
Senator FEiNSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
Vincent, I would just like to indicate to you my admiration and re-
spect, and thank you very much for your service to baseball.
Mr. VINCENT. Thank you.
Senator FEINSTEIN. I would like to ask you this question. You
pointed out the public interest that is served by a strong and inde-
pendent commissioner, and I must say I would tend to agree with
that. My question to you is-and you also find that there is an in-
terest to be served, to which I agree, in maintaining the exemption
of baseball. Would it be advisable, in your opinion, for this Con-
gress to pass legislation which might, in fact, condition the exemp-
tion based upon a strong and independent commissioner who could
then respond to the public interest without fear of dismissal?
Mr. VINCENT. Well, it is a thought I hadn't really considered. It
does seem to me that that is a possibility. I don't necessarily have
any opposition to that. I wonder whether it is necessary. I would
wonder whether you might not be satisfied by other assurances or
other kinds of indicia as to the way baseball is going to be gov-
erned. But, again, with the regret that I hadn't thought about it,
I wouldn't have any personal difficulty with that.
Senator FEiNSTEIN. Could you point out what those assurances
might be or how they could be obtained?
Mr. VINCENT. Well, I think when the new commissioner is elect-
ed, it will be important to know what his or her authorities are,
what the governance conditions are, what the commissioner's per-
ception of his independence and power-I can imagine a cir-
cumstance in which the next commissioner could appear before you
and give you sufficient assurances that would satisfy you about
what he considers or she considers the authority that the commis-
sioner is going to pursue. I can imagine that. I am not sure that
I could predict that, but I certainly can imagine it.
Senator FEINSTEIN. If a commissioner were to appear before a
Senate committee or any other committee and give those assur-
ances, what capability would the commissioner have of carrying out
the assurances if it ran counter to a majority of the owners?
Mr. VINCENT. Well, as I say, I think a lot would depend upon the
governance arrangements that the commissioner is operating
under. If the next commissioner has the kind of authority that sat-
isfies you, then, by definition, he has very considerable authority.
If the commissioner is in a position where, in your judgment, it is
unlikely that the commissioner is going to be independent or effec-
tive or viable or aggressive, then I think you might come out with
a different conclusion.
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I guess what I am saying is it is just premature, in my judgment,
because all the talk about restructuring baseball has not resulted
in any restructuring taking place in terms of essential governance,
and I think that from an optimist's point of view I would hope that
baseball would realize-and these hearings may make the realiza-
tion more likely-that the kinds of commissionerships that histori-
cally have been in place ought to be preserved.
Senator FEINSTEIN. But I take it you do agree that the public in-
terest is best served with a strong and independent commissioner.
Mr. VINCENT. Yes. You know, I think it is clear that the baseball
owners established the commissionership because they couldn't
deal with problems themselves. I mean, that is the history of it,
and I think those problems occur. You see them in the disciplinary
area; there are lots of others. It is very difficult for owners to do
some things within baseball, and therefore it seems to me wise, to
say nothing of politically prudent, to continue a system which by
and large has worked.
I am not suggesting that commissioners are any better than any
other group. We did dumb things, we made mistakes, and we have
our faults. But by and large, I thmk' there have been eight commis-
sioners and I think the record is a decent one in terms of the kinds
of interests that baseball requires.
Let me remind you that baseball integrated not because owners
voted, but because a commissioner ordered the integration. That oc-
curred in 1947, and anybody who thinks that that kind of change
in baseball would have occurred by owners' vote is wrong. There
are times in baseball history when the commissioner has madejudgments which you and I now, with the benefit of hindsight,
would agree were magnificent.
Happy Chandler ordered Jackie Robinson into baseball, on the
sponsorship of Branch Rickey and the Dodgers, to be sure, but
without that order, there would be no wonderful event preceding
all of the other things like Brown v. Board of Education. So I think
much can be said for my colleagues, my predecessors.
Senator FEINSTEIN. One last question along the lines of Senator
Leahy's in pointing out the incident that I think has precipitated
a major loss of public confidence in major league baseball. If there
were a strong commissioner and that commissioner were to take
that action, as you see baseball today, would the owners support
the action?
Mr. VINCENT. Well, I don't know how to answer that. I think my
own experience is that, by and large, a vast majority of the owners
will support intervention in that kind of situation and some will be
critical. I mean, there are 28 owners. It is, it seems to me, almost
inconceivable that a commissioner can do something to universal
applause.
Senator FEINSTEIN. It will be very interesting to see the result.
Thank you very much, Mr. Vincent.
Mr. VINCENT. Thank you very much. I appreciate it.
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much, Senator Feinstein.
Senator Mack is the last Senator to have an opportunity to inquire,but he has been one of those Senators who has been most promi-
nent and most concerned about this issue. At one point, he actually
was moving forward to conduct some hearings in another commit-
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tee and I indicated that I thought this committee had jurisdiction.
I appreciate his cooperation and we are very happy to have him sit
with us this morning. Senator Mack.
Senator MACK. Well, thank you, Senator Metzenbaum, and I
want to express my appreciation to you for holding this hearing.
Second, I want to express my sadness and sympathy to the family
of Carl Barger, who died yesterday during the baseball meetings.
I want to express my sympathy not only to his family, but to his
colleagues with the Marlins, and also to major league baseball. He
was someone respected in the game and spent his life at it, so I
want to express those concerns at this point.
Fay, let me first say thank you for the time, also, that you have
spent with us over the last several years in trying to work through
the issues about expansion and where teams go, and so forth. I
want to start my questions really kind of clarifying, if I could,
where you stand on the issue about the antitrust exemption.
In your statement, you noted that the antitrust immunity base-
ball enjoys is not essential either to the economic health or to the
legal integrity of the game. Several sentences later, you argued
that the exemption has important significance, as it prevents the
migration or transfer of a franchise, and then later said that the
significance of the antitrust status of baseball may be more sym-
bolic than vital, and I really want to try to just pin you down a
little bit more.
It sounds to me what you are saying is that the most significant
area of impact with the exemption has to do with the movement
of franchises.
Mr. VINCENT. That is correct.
Senator MACK. And would you confine it to that?
Mr. VINCENT. Well, as I said to you earlier, I think the lawyers
in baseball and people like me are cautious, and where we are not
sure how broadly the exemption really applies, one has to be care-
ful about invoking it. So I think from my own experience the major
area in which the antitrust immunity has a special relevance is in
the area of franchise migration.
Senator MACK. And obviously that is the reason I have such in-
terest in it.
Mr. VINCENT. I understand.
Senator MACK. And, again, I can understand-in fact, in almost
any legal issue there is always a question about how broad it is
and what it really does impact. I wonder if, in your opinion, the
process that major league baseball went through with respect to
the transfer of the San Francisco Giants after an offer was made-
that is, in essence, developing an offer within San Francisco-
would have been covered by the exemption. In other words, if there
had not been the exemption, do you think major league baseball
would have been able to do what they did after an offer had been
made to Bob Lurie, and an offer accepted, I might add?
Mr. VINCENT. I am not being coy here. I simply don't know
enough about really what happened after I left. I would say this
to you, that I think it is likely that baseball in the area of franchise
migration could construct approval conditions and terms and condi-
tions under which baseball could prevent migration that would be
legally valid. Football and basketball have had some experience in
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this area. I don't think the immunity is coextensive with baseball's
inability to prevent migration. I think it helps.
Senator MAcK. But there are those of us who believe that since
there are not specific criteria-and I will go back to that in a mo-
ment, but the reality that there is not a clear framework sets up
situations which Tampa and St. Pete have now experienced for the
last 8 years. And I can't help but believe that the comments that
were made by you-and I think that you pretty much stayed that
course while you were commissioner-were really a statement that
said to Bob Lurie-and, again, I think you made the specific state-
ment about all options are open to you, and that was clearly a
statement to the people in Tampa-St. Petersburg that things were
a little bit different this time; that while you weren't excited-and
in my discussions with you, you have been very clear about your
lack of excitement about moving franchises, but you did open up
that opportunity and the people of Tampa-St. Pete took that very
seriously.
When the offer was made and accepted by Bob Lurie, then to
have major league baseball come back in and say, wait a minute,
we would like to see if we can't work out some other arrangement,
would go to what Senator Graham referred to, the bait and switch.
"Blackmail" was used. Let me tell you, there are other terms used
in the State of Florida that are much, much tougher than that.
So what can a person like me who is representing all of those
folks in Florida-I can't any longer sit back and say, well, let us
just let the exemption take place because everything remains the
same and Tampa-St. Pete doesn't get a team.
Mr. VINCENT. Well, Senator, there were some things done that
were untidy, and from my point of view the difference between say-
ing to someone you may go consider options and saying it would
be all right for you to sign a binding agreement to transfer the
franchise is obvious. I don't believe that Mr. Lurie had my approval
to sign an agreement with Tampa-St. Pete. I know he didn't. So,
therefore, that particular step was out of line with the ordinay
processes of baseball. I
Before an owner can make an agreement to sell, much less to
move his franchise, there are all sorts of procedural steps within
baseball that must be met. Those were not met. I take it it was
a mistake, a misunderstanding, but that untidiness causes you and
others difficulty, and I understand that, but that is different from
the kinds of orderly procedures that really should be followed.
So I think it is probably appropriate to apologize for that untidi-
ness, though I had nothing to do with it, and yet it seems to me
it is unfair to take the untidiness as indicia of a really serious bait-
and-switch attempt. I don't, from my personal knowledge, believe
anybody in baseball intended a bait-and-switch proposition with re-
spect to franchises.
Senator MACK. Let me just say again, Fay, depending on your
perspective and where one sits, it is very, very hard for me to be-
lieve, it is very, very hard for the people of Tampa-St. Petersburg
to believe that there was not some inside maneuvering that went
on, using Tampa-St. Pete once again to craft an outcome that major
league baseball wanted to see take place.
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Mr. VINCENT. Well, yes, I can understand that. I am just telling
you as a matter of fact just one gentleman to another, I don't know
of it, and while I was around, it did not occur.
Senator MACK. Yes, I understand that. Let me go back now again
to the criteria because you were pretty clear, I think, in kind of lay-
ing out the framework in which you were looking at the possible
move. The criteria I establish, the Giants fit squarely. The first was
a franchise that has to be losing money. The second is a franchise
where attendance is a problem. The third is a franchise where the
facility is inadequate without prospect of being improved, and the
last is a community which has by vote or otherwise indicated that
baseball is no longer important.
And I would say that there were four votes in this particular cir-
cumstance, and as I view what has happened since then, it is very
hard for me to understand how anyone can come to the conclusion
that any one of those four criteria have, in fact, been addressed. In
other words, we are going to have a team that is going to remain
in San Francisco with a new ownership group that is going to pay
$95 million and nothing else has changed.
Mr. VINCENT. But, Senator, I think there is a difference between
saying these are criteria which would permit a move and saying
these are criteria which require a move. What happened in San
Francisco, to be sure, took place after I left, but obviously the San
Francisco mayor and the business community made a determined
effort to retain the franchise.
Senator MACK. Let me ask you this. Do you believe that there
would have been a San Francisco group that would have come for-
ward if there had not been the $115 million offer from the Tampa
Bay group?
Mr. VINCENT. I don't know how to answer that. I would think
your question is appropriate. I can certainly understand why that
offer made the departure look very imminent.
Senator MACK. Yes. I think most people would agree that the
offer would not have been made if it hadn't been for the Tampa
Bay group. Let me ask some questions that are broader in nature,
and again it really kind of develops from an unfortunate, cynical
position that I have developed over the last several years in watch-
ing this thing unfold.
Mr. VINCENT. I have noticed, Senator. [Laughter.]
Senator MACK. I was trying to figure out how you explain this
very complicated thing of antitrust to the average person on the
street, and what I came up with was the idea that if 28 of us sit-
ting around this table all were owners of major league baseball
teams and you as an owner were going to sell to-
Mr. VINCENT. Heaven forbid.
Senator MACK. Yes, heaven forbid-would sell that team to a
group down in the Tampa Bay market, and the 28 of us would sit
around and say, you know, that $115 million is going to go to Bob
Lurie, it is not going to go to us. If we don't allow this sale to go
through, that market is still there and some time in the future the
28 of us can sell that market for $115 million and we get to share
it.
Maybe that didn't take place, but I see that as somewhat of a
driving incentive, and it raises this question which I think is fun-
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damental. Whose market is Tampa-St. Pete? Is it the people of
Tampa and St. Petersburg, or does it, in fact, belong to the 28 own-
ers of major league baseball?
Mr. VINCENT. Well, I think to the extent franchises can be grant-
ed in the future and expansion can take place, a community which
is a prime candidate for future expansion represents, if you will,
a baseball asset because baseball could put a new franchise, not
San Francisco, in Tampa-St. Pete and obviously get from that com-
munity a substantial amount of money.
So the extent there is the possibility of using that city as an ex-
pansion site, and to the extent that baseballs vote or approval is
required for a move, which I take it does prescient to some extent
from the immunity, then baseball has a particular role to play and,
in my judgment, the asset should be a baseball, if you will, asset,
so that the price-if Tampa-St. Pete were willing to pay a substan-
tial premium to get the team from, let us say, Boston or Milwaukee
or Minnesota, that premium, it seems to me, because of baseball's
involvement, should not go to the transferor owner, but rather to
baseball generally, which makes the point you are trying to make.
This asset, the expansion possibility of Tampa-St. Pete, is a valu-
able asset. To let an owner who is in a particularly grave cir-
cumstance get to Tampa-St. Pete first, capture whatever economic
emoluments are available for his or her benefit without regard to
the interests of baseball generally, it seems to me at least raises
a policy question, at least.
Senator MACK. It also seems to me that-
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much, Senator Mack.
Senator MACK. Thank you, Senator Metzenbaum.
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you. Senator Specter has twisted
my arm to get 2 additional minutes, and then we will not have a
second round with respect to Mr. Vincent because we have other
witnesses who are waiting and I don't think this hearing ought to
go beyond 8 tonight.
Senator Specter, for 2 minutes only.
Senator SPECTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think your last
answer, Mr. Vincent, is very revealing when you say that Tampa-
St. Petersburg is a baseball asset. I think the fact is that baseball
is an American asset. If baseball is going to regard an area as a
way to maximize its profits, and if it is going to function just like
any other business, I then believe that baseball is going to really
face rejection of its antitrust exemption.
Senator Feinstein makes an interesting observation when she
suggests conditioning an antitrust exemption on a strong commis-
sioner, but then we would condition it on no pay TV and condition
it on letting other markets go. I do not think that is going to hap-
pen. I think that if it gets to the floor that it is very likely the ex-
emption is going to go.
Mr. VINCENT. But, Senator, let me make a point to you that-
Senator SPECTER. Let me ask my two questions. Then you can
respond to that.
Mr. VINCENT. Yes.
Senator SPECTER. The two questions I have for you that we
didn't get to finish before turn on the very substantial talk of a
lockout in 1993 or 1994, and I would appreciate it if you would ad-
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dress question No. 1. Why shouldn't there be revenue sharing in
baseball like there is on the antitrust exemption for football on tel-
evision receipts, and a salary cap like there is in basketball?
The second question relates to the issue of Marge Schott, which
we can't go into here, but the second question is this: I would like
to know what you did during your tenure as commissioner of base-
ball to bring in minorities-African-Americans, Hispanics,
women-because baseball does not have a very good record at this
moment on that important subject.
Mr. VINCENT. Well, on the first question with respect to labor,
revenue sharing occurs in baseball to a very substantial extent. It
is not, I think, as you suggest a case where baseball does not share
substantial revenues. It does. All national contracts, all national
television contracts in baseball are shared just the way they are in
football. The issue in baseball is largely a matter of local revenue,
and basketball and baseball generate some local revenue. Football
basically does not, so baseball is in a different circumstance.
Revenue sharing is an important subject. It is not an all-or-noth-
ing proposition. There is a lot of revenue sharing going on. The
question is should there be more, and the answer is probably yes.
I think, in time, there will be more, but that is a complicated sub-ject relating to labor negotiations which is frankly bey ad my ken
at the moment.
On the issue of minorities, Senator, with all due respect, I think
my record was-and I am being immodest here-pretty good. In
the commissioner's office where I was in charge of employment, 24
percent of the people I hired or had the ability to hire were minori-
ties. That number would match any well-run, distinguished oper-
ation from that regard. Two of the nine senior people in baseball-
the third highest ranking person in my office was black.
I think the problem in baseball is basically on the field. Base-
ball's numbers with respect to front office personnel-lawyers, mar-
keting people, business people-are pretty good. The numbers are
up substantially. The deficiency in baseball is in the most visible
areas, on the field and general manager.
The fact that we are going to have more minorities managing
next year should not be misunderstood as a sign that the problem
is coming under control. We need much more progress in the minor
leagues. There were no AAA managers who were minorities the
year before last. Lots of people have to be employed in the system
to be sure that the chain will produce the kinds of people we want.
I think there has been progress in the areas that frankly I could
make progress in. I think the numbers that I generated are num-
bers that I am proud of. Look, we established a winter league in
Arizona. I said three of the six managers of that league should be
black. We hired three black managers. One of them didn't take the
job; he decided not to travel. But the other two, Jerry Royster and
Dusty Baker, have called me and said, thank you, that has given
us a chance to be in the major leagues this year in positions of
prominence. That is progress. There is progress being made, but
you and others ought to keep an eye on that. There should be con-
siderable vigilance on baseball, and the ownership has to continue
to believe that it is an issue both of fairness and equity and of
sound business practice.
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Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much, Mr. Vincent. I
want to say on behalf of the committee and on behalf of the Amer-
ican people, thank you for your testimony, thank you for your pa-
tience with this committee. We may be back to you for further con-
sultation and advice. I know you discomforted yourself somewhat
for other appointments in New York to be here with us today and
we are very grateful to you.
Mr. VINCENT. Thank you. I wish you well. Thank you for your
courtesy.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Vincent follows:]
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STATEMENT BY
FORMER COEMISSIONER OF BASEBALL
FAY VINCENT
BEFORE THE
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ANTITRUST, MONOPOLIES AND BUSINESS RIGHTS
DECEMBER 10, 1992
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
I am grateful to have this opportunity to share my
views on the continued viability of the existing antitrust
exemption enjoyed by Major League Baseball. It is my opinion
that the current exemption should be retained so long as Major
League Baseball -- by which I mean the owners -- can justify the
privilege of the special status the exemption affords. In light
of recent developments, I believe baseball must be pressed to
persuade to Congress that the antitrust immunity is warranted.
And whether baseball prehently deserves this special treatment is
surely open to question.
I. Significance of the Exemption
In my view the antitrust immunity baseball enjoys is
not essential either to the economic health or the legai
integrity of the game. For years, Congress has considered the
threat to remove the exemption as the principal weapon with which
to pressure baseball. But the threat to remove the exemption
reminds one of the cry of wolf. As my predecessor Bart Giamatti
once reminded the Senate, if you take away the exemption, what do
you threaten to do next.
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And yet the exemption has important-significance. The
immunity permits baseball (or the Commissioner) to prevent the
migration or transfer of a franchise if the move is not in the
best interest of baseball. Eliminating the immunity would have
some unattractive consequences. And there is no evidence that
the immunity has been abused by baseball. Thus, the immunity
issue tends to be over-blown when in fact the significance of the
antitrust status of baseball may be more symbolic than vital.
Again, the question is whether baseball deserves or requires this
specialstatus.
II. Baseball as ordinary Business
Qne of the major issues in baseball is whether baseball
is or should view itself as anything other than a business like
any other business.
When I was being attacked by certain owners, I was told
that they wanted the Commissioner to be their Commissioner. They
did not agree that the Commissioner should have any obligation to
the public or to represent any other interests than the Interests
of the owners. One owner said the players had their union leader
as did the umpires but no one represented the owners' interests.
Another view widely held by owners is that baseball
should be run like any major corporation. The CEO or
Commissioner should report to the owners who would be able to
fire the Commissioner as the CEO in the corporate world can be
fireo.
The corporate analogy has great appeal to owners who have
diffic4ty accepting or understanding why baseball is such a
qiff cult enterpriqe. Thuq, th*RF 4g Within Paseball a mpjor
ebate tajing place ovgyp PW bpseball tq to see itself, apd what
Obligations, if any, baseball has to the public. My confidence
38
in the wisdom of the resolution of this debate is well under
control.
Conclusion:
It is my view that:
1. The existing antitrust exemption for Major
League Baseball should be retained only so long as
baseball can persuade you that it is a unique
institution with special public interest obligations
and not merely another business.
2. To the extent Major League Baseball
acknowledges that the exemption is only justified by
continuing recognition that baseball is a national
trust -- with obligations to this Congress and to the
public that are not carried by ordinary businesses --
the exception should be continued and the performance
of baseball closely monitored.
3. If the owners of baseball continue on their
stated course of making baseball into their business
and at the same time insist that the Commissioner is
their CEO to be fired at will, I would no longer
support the preservation of the exemption. If the
exemption is to be surrendered let it be by the action
of the owners. Only a strong Commissioner acting in
the interests of baseball, and therefore the public,
can protect the institution from the selfish and myopic
attitudes of owners.
4. Baseball is not seriously dependent on the
continuation of the anti-trust exemption. This
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Congress has other alternates available to it that
seriously threatens baseball. If you wish to get the
attention of the owners and to recapture their
commitment to larger public interests, you may wish to
consider expanding the range of legislative options.
The exemption has become more of a symbol than a vital
baseball interest. It symbolizes that baseball is
different. The question for you and for baseball is
whether Major League Baseball is willing to continue to
carry the burdens of being different in order to
preserve the exemption.
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Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you.
The Chair will now announce the procedure that we will follow.
We will take a 5-minute recess, at which time we will return for
opening statements. Many of the members have already indicated
their view with respect to this subject. I will therefore ask the
members of the committee to confine themselves to opening state-
ments not in excess of 2 minutes each, and if they don't have to
make them at all, it would be appreciated. Following that, we will
hear from Mr. Selig, representing baseball ownership.
We stand in recess for 5 minutes.
[Recess.]
Senator METZENBAUM. The subcommittee will come to order. At
this time, we will hear opening statements from the members of
the committee. I would ask them to limit their statements to a
maximum of 3 minutes, and I think many of them have probably
already covered the subject and indicated their concerns. If they
can waive the opening statement, so much the better, but certainly
I don't wish deny anyone the opportunity to make such an opening
statement.
Senator Thurmond, I had indicated that we were going to limit
opening statements to 3 minutes, but hoped that some would waive
opening statements and other would speak for a shorter period of
time.
Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman,
I will speak only about 22 minutes. Mr. Chairman, the hearing
this morning addresses an issue that is unique to baseball. No
other professional sport enjoys the privilege of a complete exemp-
tion from the antitrust laws as baseball does. This exemption dates
back to the 1922 Supreme Court decision in Federal Baseball Club
of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball
Clubs.
In that case, the Court reasoned that professional baseball was
local in nature and did not involve interstate commerce within the
meaning of the Sherman Act. Subsequent decisions, although ques-
tioning the wisdom of the blanket immunity and the reasoning be-
hind it, have afrmed the Federal Baseball decision because of his-
torical precedents and Congressional silence and inaction.
Mr. Chairman, in my view, the privilege of having an antitrust
exemption carries with it certain responsibilities, especially to con-
sumers. This responsibility is particularly important when address-
ing issues concerning franchise relocation, such as the proposed
move of the San Francisco Giants to Tampa Bay-St. Petersburg,
player salaries, and league expansion.
Each of my colleagues is no doubt aware of the controversy sur-
rounding the resignation of Mr. Fay Vincent, the former commis-
sioner of baseball. Given the historic view that the baseball com-
missioner is to act in the best interests of baseball, I am concerned
that any attempts to undermine the independence and effective-
ness of this office will have a detrimental effect on consumers.
Mr. Chairman, in addition to the role of the baseball commis-
sioner, I am particularly interested in hearing from the witnesses
why baseball should enjoy an antitrust exemption when other
sports do not. I want to assure each of the witnesses that I have
an open mind on these issues and that I appreciate their willing-
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ness to appear and debate these issues at the hearing this morn-
m . Chairman, I have a statement from Senator Hatch that I
would like to put in the record.
Senator METZENBAUM. It will be so included.
[The prepared statement of Senator Hatch follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR ORRIN HATCH
Like millions of Americans, I enjoy our national pastime of baseball. Like many
other Utahns, I am pleased that minor league professional baseball has found a
home in Utah.
In 1922, the United States Supreme Court ruled that professional baseball was
not subject to the antitrust laws. The Supreme Court reaffirmed that ruling in 1953
and again in 1972. In the 70 years since the Court's 1922 ruling, professional base-
ball has well served the interests of hundreds of millions of baseball fans, and Con-
gress has therefore seen fit not to repeal baseball's antitrust immunity.
In my view, this history places a very heavy burden on those who would now ad-
vocate a blanket repeal of baseball's antitrust immunity. This is not to say that pro-
fessional baseball has been error-free. But whether a repeal of the antitrust immu-
nity would, in the grand scheme, help rather than hurt the consumer-the baseball
fan-is speculative at best.
I am committed to ensuring that professional baseball continues to serve the in-
terests of the fans. But to the extent that any problems currently exist, it is by no
means clear that repealing basebal's antitrust immunity would be an effective rem-
edy.
Senator METZENBAUM. Senator Simon.
Senator SIMON. I have no opening statement. I would observe
there is one modest member of the U.S. Senate who has declined
to come up and join us, our colleague, Senator Herb Kohl.
Senator METZENBAUM. We are very happy to have him. I as-
sumed that he preferred not to. He is a member of this committee
and we certainly would be very-
Senator SIMoN. He is going to join us. I apologize for saying he
is modest. [Laughter.]
Senator METZENBAUM. Senator Specter.
Senator SPECTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I
will be brief and will submit, instead, for the record an extensive
statement that I made when I introduced a resolution on August
2, 1991, to have the Senate consider a rescission or modification of
the antitrust exemption for baseball, football, basketball, and hock-
ey.
I believe that these are important hearings and that the issue of
availability of franchises is one which baseball, as well as the other
sports, will have to take up very seriously if baseball is to retain
its antitrust exemption. When you compare the size of the country
and the baseball industry in 1901, when there were little more
than 76 million Americans with 16 major league teams, to today,
when there are 28 teams and a population in excess of 250 million
Americans, it is obvious that there ought to be many, many more
franchises.
The issue of pay television-a subject, I think, of great sensitivity
to the American people-is another which baseball will have to
take up very seriously if it is to receive its antitrust exemption.
While there has been a commitment from professional football not
to televise the Super Bowl, professional football is moving into pay
TV in a number of ways on the cable channels, and as I noted ear-
lier, so is baseball, including the team in my own home city.
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Revenue sharing in professional football, at least with the TV on
professional football, is also something which I think has to be ex-
amined very closely by baseball, including the salary caps.
There is nothing that the Congress would rather do than do
nothing and not become involved in this tremendously complicated
subject, but that really requires self-regulation by the sports them-
selves. I think these hearings are very useful in highlighting some
of the issues which we look to baseball and other major league
sports to solve without any action on our part.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Senator Specter submitted the following excerpt from the Con-
gressional Record:]
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Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much, Senator Specter.
Senator Leahy.
Senator LEAHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, it is inter-
esting, Mr. Chairman. When we have these hearings, we are really
talking about a very conservative game in the best sense of the
word. In baseball, the traditions get passed down from generation
to generation in a way that we don't see in many other customs
in our country. They don't change much and I don't think they
should.
I remember listening to Red Sox games on the radio when I was
growing up in Vermont, and I mentioned earlier the thrill of being
7 years old in 1947 and being in Fenway Park and watching
games. These are great memories and they are memories that in-
clude going to games with my own children, which I still do. They
are not really children anymore, but I still go to baseball games
with them, and some day if I have grandchildren, I hope to do that
with them, too, because we know it is the same game.
You don't countenance experiments in baseball lightly. You don't
have the equivalent of a three-point shot or instant replay. That
doesn't work with baseball. A run is a run; you get three strikes,
you are out. It is pretty simple and straightforward. But I do won-
der whether baseball's longstanding antitrust exemption is one of
those traditions that is worth preserving. Let me be clear. I don't
stand on the side of the owners, nor on the side of the players. I
am standing on the side of the fan.
Our interests in Vermont are different than most of the other
States seen represented around this table. We don't have a profes-
sional sports team. We are not wooing a team. We weathered the
relocation of the AA Burlington Reds. We are not being jilted or
suffering because we are not being wooed by any major league. But
Vermonters care deeply about the good of the game.
Now, Mr. Vincent, who incidentally gave some of the best testi-
mony I have heard before the Judiciary Committee, hit the nail on
the head in his resignation letter when he said, "Baseball is more
than ownership of an ordinary business. Owners have a duty to
take into consideration that they own a part of America's national
pastime in trust, and this trust sometimes requires not putting
self-interest first." I agree. The owners have a broader responsibil-
ity than treating baseball like an exclusive rotisserie league. Base-
ball belongs to all of us, not just to the owners.
Baseball is going through some tough times now. Marge Schott's
comments were disgraceful, absolutely disgraceful, inexcusable.
They damaged the integrity of the game. A respected commissioner
was ousted. The money chase continues, and a lockout may be on
the horizon. Nobody in this room can tell me with a straight face
that the lockout is going to help the fans. It is going to help some
financial interests, that is all.
So the question I ask to be answered from this hearing is essen-
tially this: Does antitrust immunity protect the quality of the game
for the benefit of the fans or does it merely protect a cartel of own-
ers? And if it is the latter, then we have no need to continue this
immunity and we ought to just get rid of it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much, Senator Leahy. At
this point, I will put into the record a statement from Senator
Brown.
[The prepared statement of Senator Brown follows:]
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Mr. Chairman, thank you for allowing me to join your
subcommittee today. While, I do not serve on the Antitrust
Subcommittee, we have had the pleasure of working on a number of
antitrust issues together -- resale price maintenance,
modification to international antitrust laws and antitrust relief
for production joint ventures, to name a few.
Mr. Chairman, the people of Colorado are anxiously awaiting
the 1993 Baseball season and the beginning of a long and
satisfying relationship with one of Baseball's two 1993 expansion
franchises, the Colorado Rockies. The remarkable enthusiasm of
the people of Colorado for Major League Baseball is reflected by
the fact that the Rockies have already sold 30,000 season
tickets, the second highest total in the Major Leagues. The
removal of baseball's antitrust exemption would dramatically
change the ground rules before-the game starts for the Colorado
Rockies.
For the last several years, Coloradans have worked hard to
assemble a potential Baseball ownership group, build a stadium
and position Colorado as one of the two best expansion
candidates. After going through a long and exhausting
application procedure, Colorado was chosen as a 1993 expansion
site. The investors in the Colorado franchise paid $95 million
just to cover the franchise fees. Start-up costs in Colorado
could make the totalinvestment over $125 million. A new stadium
is being built in Denver and the people of Colorado are picking
up part of the costs related that new stadium.
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Bill Brubaker's recent article in the Washington Post,
entitled, "Income Disparity Tugs at Baseball's Seams," describes
the economics of professional baseball today and is very
informative in this regard. I would ask that a copy of his
article be made a part of the hearing record.
This enormous capital investment, and the time and effort
expended in the application process were based on a number of
critical assumptions. Not the least of those assumptions was the
fact that Major League Baseball had a time-tested system of self-
governance that is exempt from endless court challenges under the
antitrust laws.
It was of utmost importance to Coloradans that franchises,
and in particular the Rockies' National League opponents, were
stable and were not likely to relocate unless Baseball's
procedures were followed. The fact that the Rockies' National
League opponents include three natural rivals on the West Coast
and only one time zone away has caused great anticipation and
excitement for the team and its fans.
To change the rules'that have been relied on for 70 years
without considering .he needs of the fans and new potential
franchises would be unfair.
In sports it's generally agreed that the rules should not be
changed after the game has started. Colorado played by the rules
and it has become part of the great sport of Major League
Baseball. To change the very nature of that sport without
insuring that we move to something better would be a mistake.
I would hope that this subcommittee will exercise caution
when considering changes in Baseball's antitrust exemption.
50
Senator METZENBAUM. Since Senator Brown isn't here, I am
going to turn to a member of this committee who just joined us and
I think does have a statement he cares to make. We are very happy
to have you with us, Senator Kohl, for as long as you care to re-
main, and I assume you have a statement.
Senator KOHL. Well, thank you, Senator Metzenbaum. I have no
opening statement. I am here to introduce Bud Selig when he be-
comes your witness.
Senator METZENBAUM. Very good, thank you. Senator Graham,
do you have an opening statement?
Senator GRAHAM. Yes, Mr. Chairman, a very brief statement. I
think the fundamental question that we have before us today is
whether the behavior of major league baseball has been so support-
ive of the national pastime as to justify a continuation of an exemp-
tion from basic laws which in other areas of commerce prevent col-
lusive and anticompetitive practices.
There are a number of issues which raise this question. Many of
those have already been discussed by this committee and by our
first witness. Since the issue of franchise migration has been cited
as the principal utility of the antitrust exemption, I think it is ap-
propriate, therefore, that it be a primary focus of the question of
whether there is a justification for a continuation of this
exemption.
The statements that have been made by Mr. Vincent seem to
draw a distinctly different economic standard for expansion and re-
location. Mr. Vincent stated that he believed that it was unlikely
that there would be expansion of major league baseball in the near
term because it was not in the economic interest of baseball to ex-
pand; that the dilution of ownership was adverse to the current
ownership of baseball. Therefore, free market principles are being
applied to negate expansion.
On the other hand, as it relates to relocation, we seem to have
a socialized set of standards, a set of criteria that essentially says
that if a city, whether it has one or more current franchises, is able
to meet minimal standards, it will be protected to keep that fran-
chise, whereas other communities that may be expansive in terms
of their demographics and economics and their indication of their
ability to support major league baseball will be frozen out.
My State of Florida, which, when the major leagues were estab-
lished, was a State of under 500,000 people and today has a popu-
lation of in excess of 13 million people, has had to wait almost-
well, has had to wait over 100 years from the beginning of the es-
tablishment of major league baseball to have its first franchise. We
feel as if our interests in this socialization of relocation-and Adam
Smith economics as applied to expansion has resulted in millions
of fans who would like to be able to see a baseball game close to
their hometown being denied the right to do so.
Mr. Chairman, I am going to be pursuing the kinds of questions
that I asked of Mr. Vincent relative to what are the criteria that
major league baseball uses-are they being used in both the inter-
ests of a mobile fan base which is increasingly moving to States
like Florida and to the economic best interests of baseball itself-
and whether the antitrust exemption is advantaging or retarding
the ability of baseball to serve those national interests.
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Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much, Senator Graham.
Senator Simpson, I think I goofed a bit in not calling upon you.
Senator SIMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and 2 minutes and
I thank you for that. I do think it is very important what we are
about here today. I have given you my view of why I am here, why
I think we either say to baseball, if you want to have a good,
strong, independent commissioner, that is what I would prefer to
see, and if you do, then you keep the exemption; if you don't want
to have an independent commissioner and want to draft up a pile
of language that doesn't give him any authority and makes him re-
movable at will for any whim, well, then I don't think you need the
exemption. It is kind of that simple for me. So I look forward to
it.
I was interested in the passage while preparing for this from the
case of Flood v. Kuhn. That was the 1972 case in which the great
outfielder, Curt Flood, challenged baseball's reserve clause, and
Judge Irving "Ben" Cooper said this. He said,
It would be unfortunate indeed if a fine sport and profession which brings circes
from daily travail and an escape from the ordinary to most inhabitants of this land
were to suffer in the least because of undue concentration by anyone or any group
on commercial or profit considerations. The game is on higher ground. It behooves
everyone to keep it there. That is as good as any politician could do, that statement,
and so let us see if it is on higher ground. If it is, we won't cut the ground out.
If it is not on higher ground, there is certainly no reason for it.
The lifeblood of baseball is the fan. There is no real other thing.
In my mind, it depends on how much fascination this game will
have for the American fan, and that is the lifeblood of baseball. The
business of baseball depends on the game of baseball.
So thank you for bringing this to our attention, and the yellow
light has still not expired and I think I should receive another fine
grade.
Senator METZENBAUM. You get two kudos and-
Senator SIMPSON. Two kudos and one hurrah.
Senator METZENBAUM. You may have the next week off. You do
not have to attend any Senate sessions next week.
Senator SIMPSON. Yes, thank you, Howard.
Senator METZENBAUM. Senator Feinstein.
Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will
try and go fast. I would like to, by unanimous consent, submit a
statement by my colleague, Senator-elect Barbara Boxer, and indi-
cate that she wishes to concur in the statement I am about to
make.
Senator METZENBAUM. We are happy to have it and, without ob-jection, it will be included in the record.
[The prepared statement of Senator Boxer follows:]
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Thank you for the opportunity to submit testimony in support of
San Francisco's efforts to retain the Giants baseball franchise in the
San Francisco Bay Area. I do this not only because the financial
impact on the economy of the San Francisco area would be severe in
terms of lost taxes, jobs, and local economic development if the Giants
move, but also because communities across the nation need to feel
secure that their baseball teams will not be ripped away from them.
That is why franchise stability is so important and should be
maintained. Baseball should hardly be criticized for its consistent
policy in favor of keeping franchises in communities that have
supported them for decades. In fact, baseball should be applauded for
its strong preference for franchise stability, which is in everyone's
interest.
Stripping baseball of its antitrust exemption would undermine the
foundation of franchise stability. It is not in the interest of major
league baseball nor of the communities which support it to have teams
constantly on the bidding block, stolen from one community after
another.
Baseball's decision this fall in support of retaining the Giants
in San Francisco is evidence that it continues to act in the public
interest and that there is no need for the antitrust laws to be
amended. Indeed, judicial interpretations of the antitrust laws have
caused franchise instability in the other major sports.
I trust that the United States Senate will act on behalf of
communities who have invested years of financial and emotional support
in baseball teams which are so important to their quality of life.
I urge you not to take any action which would disrupt long
established traditions and expectations of hundreds of thousands of
people in Northern California and millions more baseball fans across
the country.
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Senator FEINSTEiN. Thank you very much.
I would like to begin by introducing a number of leaders who
have come from California for this hearing; specifically, San Fran-
cisco Mayor Frank Jordan, who has led the effort to retain the Gi-
ants in San Francisco and will testify later this afternoon to those
efforts; second, Supervisor Jim Gonzalez, who is chairman of the fi-
nance committee of the board of supervisors, which is giving con-
sideration to reducing a $750,000 a year lease fee to $1 for the Gi-
ants; and, third, City Attorney Louise Rennie, whose office has
taken a forceful legal stand to defend what San Francisco believes
is a legal lease.
I would like, if I can, to respond very respectfully to Senator
Mack's comment that San Franciscans have said that baseball is
not important. In fact, that is not correct. San Franciscans believe
that baseball is very important, and an unprecedented effort is un-
derway-legal effort, financial effort, fan effort to retain the San
Francisco Giants in San Francisco. The vote in 1989, it should be
pointed out, came within 700 votes of passage directly following a
major earthquake, which incidentally took place when Candlestick
Park had 60,000 people in it in the first game of the World Series.
There are those that would say that baseball is a business and,
as such, should enjoy the freedom of the marketplace as any other
business. I would submit to you, Mr. Chairman and members, that
baseball is not a box of Tide on a supermarket shelf. Baseball is
unlike any business or corporation that can be sold willy-nilly to
the highest bidder.
Baseball is part of the fabric and unity of the American city.
Baseball draws its support from decades of developing a loyal fan
base, a fan base that celebrates by the millions when its team wins
and inundates the pubs to bemoan the fate of major losses. Com-
munities, chambers of commerce, fan clubs all work to see that
baseball survives. I believe that baseball is not a business. I believe
it should maintain its exemption. I am here to say that this morn-
ing, and I thank you very much for the time. I will submit a writ-
ten statement.
Senator METZENBAUM. The balance of your statement will be in-
cluded in the record.
[The prepared statement of Senator Feinstein and an excerpt
from the Congressional Record follow:]
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Mr. Chairman, before I begin my statement, I would like to ask
for unanimous consent to submit for the record the testimony of
my colleague, Senator-elect Barbara Boxer, who has indicated that
she wishes to associate herself with the comments I am about to
make.
Now, I would like to introduce a number of leaders from
California: San Francisco Mayor Frank Jordan, who has led the
effort to keep the Giants in San Francisco; Jim Gonzalez, chair
of the Finance Committee of the Board of Supervisors; and City
Attorney Louise Renne, whose office has taken a forceful legal
stand to see that San Francisco's legal rights are protected.
In testimony later this morning, Mayor Jordan will detail the
integral relationship between the Giants and San Francisco and
the steps that have been taken to keep this key 35-year resident
of our city at home.
As a former Mayor and a new Senator from California, my objective
here today is quite clear: without baseball's exemption from the
antitrust laws, San Francisco could have lost the Giants. So, my
choice is clear. I support the exemption.
Some will say the exemption should go and that baseball is a
private business that should be freely subject to the
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marketplace. But in California we have seen what can happen in
the free marketplace. Oakland, California, lost the Raiders in a
devastating blow to thousands of diehard fans in a major American
city.
Major League Baseball is more than just another business. It is
deeply linked to the psyche and fabric of the American city.
Baseball requires stability to build fan support. Fans identify
with their teams. This loyalty stretches over years, through
changes in roster and management, and over the ups and downs of
the win-loss column. Families have an opportunity to enjoy
wholesome, relatively inexpensive entertainment. Young boys and
girls play in little league games every afternoon, using the
professional players as their role models.
For 35 years, the Giants have been part of the rich mosaic of San
Francisco. The Giants have given us one of the greatest
rivalries in baseball with the Los Angeles Dodgers, and this team
has produced many of the greatest players of all time --
including Willie Mays, Willie McCovey, Juan Marichal, Will Clark,
and now -- hopefully -- Barry Bonds.
Fan clubs, communities, governments, and Chambers of Commerce all
become deeply involved in supporting a team.
For example, in San Francisco, the Giants are exempted from an
admissions tax. While I was Mayor, the city remodeled
Candlestick Park building 110 luxury suites, improving
concessions and restrooms, and expanding Candlestick's capacity
by 10,000 seats. The city initially built the stadium with bond
funds, and the Candlestick Park Fund contributed $30 million to
its remodeling. The stadium is under the jurisdiction of the
City and County's Recreation and Park Department. The field and
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stadium are maintained by the city. The city has a real interest
in retaining the team.
Some are calling for the removal of baseball's anti-trust
exemption saying that the sport is a private business engaged in
interstate commerce and should be treated like any other
business. However, no other private business is really
comparable to a major sports franchise. In my view, major league
sport franchises are a good deal different than any other
corporate asset that can sold willy nilly to any highest bidder.
A major league sports franchise is not a product like a box of
Tide that can be sold in a supermarket.
It is absolutely proper for the League to consider a number of
factors when determining whether or not to approve the sale of a
franchise.
Baseball should not be stripped of its ability to ensure that the
owners are of good reputation, will keep teams in America, and
keep a good geographical spread to the organization.
The League has taken these steps to protect the city and fans of
San Francisco when it rejected the proposal to sell the Giants to
St. Petersburg after considering scheduling difficulties, media
markets, divisional realignment issues, and fan support.
It makes no sense to me for this Congress to be involved in
legislation that would permit the type of devastation that
occurred in Oakland when the Raiders moved to Los Angeles and in
Baltimore when the Colts were stolen in the darkness of the night
from their fans.
In the end, Major League Baseball made a baseball decision and
not simply a business decision. In my opinion, baseball cannot
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be faulted for making decisions in the best interests of the
sport and in the best interests of the fans in Major League
cities.
In conclusion, stability is not a new issue. In 1985, I joined
more than 20 Mayors in supporting a resolution by the United
States Conference of Mayors which supported S. 259 -- a measure
that would have protected team stability. A copy of that
resolution is attached.
I appear today to support baseball's anti-trust exemption.
Again, Mr. Chairman and men of the comittee, thank you for this
opportunity.
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Senator METZENBAUM. Senator Mack.
Senator MACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also have a more de-
tailed statement that I would like to have included in the record.
Senator METZENBAUM. Without objection, the entire statement
will be included in the record.
Senator MACK. As Rick Dodge from St. Petersburg will attest,
and as every good citizen of Florida knows, the barons of baseball
have treated the people of Tampa Bay with disdain, utterly dis-
regarding their hopes and their dreams for a future with a baseball
team.
The owners claim baseball acted to protect fans by upholding its
policy of locking teams into their present homes when it refused
the legitimate sale and movement of the Giants to the Tampa Bay
area, while there are at least 1.2 million households in the Tampa-
St. Petersburg metropolitan area filled with broken-hearted fans
whose interests major league baseball didn't protect. In fact, major
league baseball showed no respect for them at all. I deeply regret
that baseball has turned its back on these deserving people. Mil-
lions of fans deserve to be a part of our national pastime. Instead,
they have been unfairly left out.
The antitrust exemption represents an artificial legal framework
which the courts have set up around major league baseball to pro-
tect it. This has made the owners' pursuit of their self-interest in-
consistent with the basic interests of baseball fans. This is the op-
posite of what happens when a free market competition is allowed
to work. Why won't the owners accept a system which has brought
so much good to every other industry in America?
Instead, their system is a fraud, an emotionally wrenching fraud.
The people of Tampa-St. Petersburg were used, demeaned, and in-
sulted. Owners should be ashamed of what they did, but they
aren't. Tampa-St. Petersburg has on seven occasions in the last 8
years tried unsuccessfully to secure a team through expansion or
by purchase. We always played by the rules. We made bona fide
offers. We had commitments and promises from owners and com-
missioners. The taxpayers built a stadium, 30,000 season tickets
were sold, and in the end nothing.
Major league baseball has used us as a pawn. Owners hold the
Tampa Bay area as if it were their market, not ours. Then they use
it for leverage on current host cities and fans to extract new stadi-
ums, tax benefits, and the like. This is a game in which only base-
ball owners win while everyone else loses. Enough is enough. Since
the courts refuse to act and major league baseball is committed to
its present course, the exemption from the antitrust laws must be
removed. The Congress must act.
A common question asked about antitrust exemption is will re-
moving it really solve the problems of major league baseball. Only
time will tell, but I believe it will solve many of the problems, and
in the end more cities will have teams, more of our kids will have
an opportunity to play, and more fans will enjoy the game first-
hand.
Mr. Chairman, I have a long family tradition in the game of
baseball. I love the game. I hope this hearing is only the first defin-
itive and positive action toward bringing the public interest back
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into the decisionmaking process of major league baseball. I thank
you.
[The prepared statement of Senator Mack follows:]
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PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR CONNIE MACK
Mr. Chairman thank you for holding this hearing and for allowing me to
participate; to speak for the millions of baseball fans around this country
who deserve and badly want a team they can call their own. I believe recent
events show the importance of this hearing to the future of baseball.
Now is a very uncertain time for Major League Baseball. As Rick Dodge from
St.Petersburg will attest and as every good citizen of Florida knows, the
Barons of Baseball have treated the people of the Tampa Bay area with disdain
and without regard to their hopes and dreams for a future with a baseball
team. We had the highest offer. It's unAmerican not to accept the highest
offer.
The owners said baseball acted to protect fans by upholding its policy of
keeping teams in their home ports when it refused the move of the Giants to
Tampa Bay area. Well, there are at least 1.2 million households in the
Tampa/St. Petersburg metropolitan area filled with broken-hearted, would-be
baseball fans in the Tampa/ St. Petersburg metropolitan area whose interest
Major League Baseball didn't protect. Major League Baseball had no respect
for them. Most assuredly, the people of San Francisco feel the same way.
For thoy, too, have been used by the very same baseball barons whom we have
charged with the privilege of custodianship over our national pastime.
Tampa deserves baseball. Orlando deserves baseball. Jacksonville deserves
baseball. San Francisco deserves baseball. Cities from Phoenix all the way
to Buffalo deserve baseball -- teams they can call home teams -- but the
owners lock those cities out because they want to maintain the artificially
high value of the few teams in existence today. What other business would
leave so many hungry fans, customers, in the lurch?
Personally, I deeply regret baseball has turned its back on so many deserving
people. Millions of fans deserve to be a part of our national pastime, and
they aren't. They want to catch a foul ball, get an autograph, holler at the
ump for a call which we all know we can make better from the stands than he
can make by being right on top of the play, but they can't. I can't help
thinking this occurred because Baseball alone has an antitrust exemption and
that exemption must have some bearing on this curious behavior.
I can tell you as Florida's United States Senator the brides' maid towns are
tired of their insults. They're tired of dashed hopes and of being left at
the altar. Perhaps they're most tired of not knowing or understanding why
they can't have a team. They know darn well the free-market would allow them
the opportunity to have a team and keep a team. But no free-market principles
exist in baseball. And that is ironic because it is the free market which
allowed the owners to make so much money in their other endeavors and the free
market would solve so many of Baseball's problems. Why won't the owners
accept the system which has brought so much good to every other industry in
this country?
I'm here today to stand up for the people of my state who have no recourse
against Baseball. I'm here to say the leveraging of city over city must stop.
It's mean and it's unfair. I'm here to say nobody ever again should be
treated by baseball the way my constituents have been treated for nearly a
decade.
I am particulary hurt and angry because I know first-hand the people of Tampa
Bay acted in earnest and in good faith. They went above and beyond the
League's "criteria" to bring baseball to the area. Over 31,000 people have
already purchased season tickets. They envisioned the Suncoast dome bustling
with activity and alive with the sounds of cheering fans.
They are proud there is a team in Miami and happy for their fellow Floridians
to the South. That franchise will one day become one of the most successful
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franchises in sports history. I'm sure of it. When I'm in Miami I can see
the fire in peoples' eyes when they speak of the Marlins. It's the same way
in Tampa Bay when they speak of their soon-to-be team and, oh my, what a
rivalry could develop between the two teams. Folks in Florida are pretty
competitive, you know. They look forward, whether it be in the National
League Championship Series or the World Series to slugging it out with their
cross-state rivals.
But it appears their interest, the public interest, carries little or no
weight in the decision-making process of the league's owners and currently
there is no commissioner to reverse that trend. I'm not sure a strong
commissioner could do it in any event. What Major League Baseball needs
immediately is the discipline to serve its customers, the fans, which only a
strong dose of free-market principles can provide.
You see, its anybody's guess why the Giants didn't move to Florida: whether
it's because the owners wanted the franchise fees as opposed to Mr. Lurie
getting them or if the American League blocked the deal because they didn't
want to be shut out of Florida. We can be sure Baseball did not base its
decision on free-market principles or sound economic reasoning for the long-
term viability of the game. If that were the case, Florida would have three
or four teams.
So, the question is: What will get Major League Baseball owners to focus on
fan interest? How do we right the wrongs which Major League Baseball has
perpetrated on the people of Tampa and on cities around the country who
deserve baseball but can't get it. Better yet, what is it that will make
owners consider something other than their own short-term, financial gain when
reaching decisions on things such as player relations, expansion, the new
commissioner, realignment and the ugly specter of bigotry and anti-semitism.
To answer that question thoroughly, to compensate the people of Florida and to
act in a prudent fashion we need to gather some information through this
hearing and in subsequent efforts and then, the Congress must act. We must
review audited, financial data of the teams. If a subpoena is necessary, then
so be it. Congress also needs to investigate what actions Major League
Baseball is taking which violate the Sherman Antitrust Act. Finally, it would
also be beneficial for the Congress to study what special tax advantages we
have given to owners over the years.
A common question asked about the exemption is: will removing it really solve
the problems of Major League Baseball? Only time will tell, Mr. Chairman, but
at the very least it seems to be a necessary first step. It would sure make
real the possibility of a competing league with access to minor league talent.
If Tampa and Orlando and other cities have to go outside Major League Baseball
to get a big-league team, we're willing, but that new league must have access
to minor league talent. Removing the antitrust exemption will speed up the
process.
I'm putting Major League Baseball on notice as of today. We will have more,
big-league baseball in Florida and it will be sooner rather than later. Those
markets belong to the fans and to the investors who want to quench fan desire
for a big-league team. Baseball must not belong solely to 28 Major League
Baseball owners. Removing the antitrust exemption will help make expansion or
a new, competing league a reality. If we need to go further, then we will go
further.
I do not want other cities, teams and avid fans to go through the nightmare
Tampa/St. Petersburg has gone through over the last decade. It is simply
wrong to have the commissioner of baseball promise thousands of fans one
thing, when the other owners never had any intention of letting a baseball
team move to Tampa/ St. Petersburg. It was a fraud, an emotionally-wrenching
fraud. The people of Tampa/St. Petersburg were used, demeaned and insulted.
Baseball should be ashamed of what they did, but I believe they are not.
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Tampa/St. Petersburg has on seven occasions in the last eight years tried
unsuccessfully to secure a team through expansion or by purchasing another
team. We always played by the rules. We made bona fide offers. We had
comitments and promises from owners and commissioners. The taxpayers built a
stadium. 30,000 season tickets were sold. In the end, nothing. Our only
utility to Major League Baseball has been as a pawn. Owners hold St. Pete as
a bargaining chip over the heads of their current, host cities and fans to get
new stadiums, tax benefits, and etc. That game is a game in which baseball
owners win and everybody else loses. Enough is enough.
I have a long family tradition in the game of baseball. I love the game. My
interests are far greater than parochial. But I am disturbed about the
future of the game. I hope this hearing is just the first step in definitive
action to bring the public interest back into the decision-making process of
Major League Baseball. I hope legislation is not necessary, but believe that
thinking is wishful at best. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much, Senator Mack.
We have with us this morning three Members of the House who
would like to be heard-Congressman Schumer of New York, Mi-
chael Bilirakis of Florida, and Bill Young of Florida. Would you
please come to the table. I think you know the understanding to
limit your statements to 3 minutes, if you would, please.
Congressman Schumer, we are always happy to welcome you.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES E. SCHUMER, A REPRESENTA-
TIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Mr. SCHUMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and it is always a
pleasure to come before this august committee and before your sub-
committee. I speak as a member of your sister committee in the
House, and I first want to thank all of you for the opportunity to
speak before you briefly today.
Mr. Chairman, major league baseball is striking out. It is not the
quality of the play on the field. Our players today, it seems to me,
are as good or perhaps better than they have ever been, although
some nostalgists might debate me on that. Many in my district
think there was no better team than the 1955 Brooklyn Dodgers.
It is not the fans who are the problem either. Baseball's loyal
fans are enthusiastically packing the stadiums each summer and
soaking up every play on television and radio in numbers that bog-
gle the mind. It is not even the ballpark food that is the problem,
although I will say their hot dogs set me back more than they did
a few years ago.
What ails baseball in America, Mr. Chairman, is irresponsible
team ownership, ownership that with each passing year increas-
ingly acts as if baseball is its personal fiefdom to be operated for
one purpose: profit for the owners. They are truly out of control.
Let us look at the record. For years, they have tried to take more
and more of the games away from the fans by moving the broad-
casts off the free airwaves and onto pay cable channels, many of
which are not available to my constituents. When Commissioner
Fay Vincent, the supposedly independent official charged with
managing the game in the best interests of baseball, took action
that the owners didn't like, they beheaded him.
Their record on the treatment of minorities is the worst of all the
major league sports. Their labor relations record and treatment of
the players in recent times has been a disaster, with simple con-
tract negotiations resulting in owner lockouts in 1973, 1976, and
1990, and we learned earlier this week that the owners have voted
once again to reopen labor negotiations next month.
As if this were all not enough, allegations have recently appeared
about pejorative racial and anti-Semitic slurs attributed to Marge
Schott, owner of the Cincinnati Reds, allegations that have been
greeted with a suspicious silence by the owner fraternity at their
annual meeting in Louisville.
But we don't have to sit idly by and allow these disgraces to our
national pastime. We have the power to demand change. The own-
ers have been able to get away with their outrageous behavior
largely because baseball is the only professional team sport to enjoy
complete immunity from the antitrust laws. It has been that way
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since 1922, but as Senator Simpson noted, we are not bound to pre-
serve this exemption.
In large part, Congress has not subjected major league baseball
to the antitrust laws in exchange for an understood agreement that
the owners of baseball would operate the game for the public good.
The owners are dropping their end of the bargain.
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much, Mr. Schumer.
Mr. SCHUMER. I appreciate it, and if I might, with the permission
of my colleagues, I must excuse myself.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Schumer follows:]
68
STATEMENT OF CHARLES E. SCIUMER
MEMBER OF CONGRESS (D-NY)
BEFORE THE
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ANTITRUST, MONOPOLIES AND BUSINESS RIGHTS
DECEMBER 10, 1992
THE TROUBLE WITH MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL
MR. SCHUMER. I WOULD LIKE TO THANK CHAIRMAN MEIZENBAUM AND
TBE OTHER MEMBERS OF THIS SUBCOMMITTEE FOR TEE OPPORTUNITY TO
SPEAK BEFORE YOU TODAY ABOUT A SITUATION THAT IS BOTH TROUBLING
AND SAD TO ALL OF US.
MATOR LEAGUE BASEBALL IS STRIKING OUT. NO, IT'S NOT THE QUALITY OF
PLAY ON THE FIELDS. OUR PLAYERS TODAY ARE AS GOOD OR PERHAPS
BETTER THAN THEY HAVE EVER BEEN (ALTHOUGH SOME NOSTALGISTS
MIGHT DEBATE ME ON THAI). IT'S NOT THE PANS. BASEBALL'S LOYAL FANS
ARE ENTHUSIASTICALLY PACKING THE STADIUMS EACH SUMMER AND
SOAKING UP EVERY PLAY ON TELEVISION AND RADIO IN NUMBERS THAT
BOGGLE THE MIND. IT'S NOT EVEN THE BALLPARK FOOD, ALTHOUGH A HOT
DOG WILL SET YOU BACK MORE THAN IT DID A FEW YEARS AGO.
WHAT ILLS BASEBALL IN AMERICA IS IRRESPONSIBLE TEAM OWNERSHIP.
OWNERSHIP THAT, WITH EACK PASSING YEAR, INCREASINGLY ACTS AS IF
BASEBALL IS ITS PERSONAL FIEFDOM TO BE OPERATED FOR ONE PURPOSE:
PROFITS FOR THE OWNERS.
THEY ARE TRULY OUT OF CONTROL. LOOK AT THE RECORD. FOR YEARS
THEY HAVE TRIED TO TAKE MORE AND MORE OF THE GAMES AWAY FROM
THE FANS BY MOVING THE BROADCASTS OFF THE FREE AIRWAVES AND ON
TO PAY CABLE CHANNELS. WHEN COMMISSIONER FAY VINCENT, THE
SUPPOSEDLY INDEPENDENT OFFICIAL CHARGED WITH MANAGING THE GAMB
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IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF BASEBALL, TOOK ACTION THAT TEE OWNERS
DIDN'T LIKE, THEY BEEADED HIM. THEIR RECORD ON THE TREATMENT OF
MINORITIES IS THE WORST OF ALL MAJOR LEAGUE SPORTS. THEIR LABOR
RELATIONS RECORD AND TREATMENT OF THE PLAYERS IN RECENT TIMES
MAS BEEN A DISASTER, WITH SIMPLE CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS RESULTING
IN OWNER LOCK-OUTS IN 1973, 1976 AND 1990. AND WE LEARNED EARLIER
THIS WEEK THAT THE OWNERS HAVE AQ] VOTED TO REOPEN LABOR
DISCUSSIONS NEKT MONTH.
AS IF THIS WERE NOT ENOUGH, ALLEGATIONS HAVE RECENTLY APPEARED
ABOUT PEJORATIVE RACIAL AND ANTI-SEMITIC SLURS ATTRIBUTED TO
MARGE SCHOTT, OWNER OF THE CINCINNATI REDS. ALLEGATIONS THAT
HAVE BEEN GREETED WITH A SUSPICIOUS SILENCE BY THE OWNER
FRATERNITY AT THEiR ANNUAL MEETING IN LOUISVILLE.
BUT WE DON'T HAVE TO SIT IDLY BY AND ALLOW THE OWNERS TO FLEECE
AND DISGRACE OUR NATIONAL PASTIME. WE HAVE THE POWER TO DEMAND
A CHANGE. TE OWNERS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO GET AWAY WITH THEIR
OUTRAGEOUS BEHAVIOR LARGELY BECAUSE BASEBALL IS THEE NLY
PROFESSIONAL TEAM SPORT TO ENJOY COMPLETE IMMUNITY FROM THE
ANTITRUST LAWS. IT'S BEEN THAT WAY SINCE 1922. BUT WE ARE NOT
BOUND TO PRESERVE THIS EXEMPTION.
IN LARGE PART, CONGRESS HAS NOT SUBJECTED MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL
TO THE ANTITRUST LAWS IN EXCHANGE FOR AN UNDERSTOOD AGREEMENT
THAT TIB OWNERS OF BASEBALL WOULD OPERATE THE GAME FOR 'E
PUBLIC GOOD. THE OWNERS ARE DROPPING THEIR END OF THE BARGAIN.
THE TIMB HAS COME FOR CONGRESS TO STAND UP TO THE OWNERS AND
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GIVE A STERN WARN G THAT, UNLESS TBEY CLEAN-UP THEIR ACT,
ESPECIALLY BY APPOINTING A STRONG, INDEPENDENT COMMISSIONIL, WE
CAN PASS LEGISLATION TO FULLY SUBJECT TEEM TO THE SAME ANISTRUST
LAWS APPLICABLE TO OTHER PROFESSIONAL SPORTS, SUCH AS FOOTBALL.
THE OWNERS KEEP THROWING TBE FANS A CURVE AND HAVE GROWN RICH
OFF OF AN ANACHRONISTIC ANTITRUST EXEMPTION. IT IS TIME TO GIVE THE
NATION'S PASTIME BACK TO Tim PEOPLE TO WHOM rr BELONGS - THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE. TE COUNT IS FULL, THREE BALLS, TWO STRIKES. WE
ARE WAITING FOR THE OWNERS TO STEP BACK UP TO THE PLATP.
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Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you.
Mr. Bilirakis, we are happy to have you with us.
Mr. BILRAKIs. Mr. Chairman, thank you. With your indulgence,
may I yield to my other colleague from Florida, Mr. Young, at this
point, who has business over in the House committee?
Senator METZENBAUM. Congressman Young.
STATEMENT OF HON. BILL YOUNG, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA
Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much to you and the
members of the committee for giving us an opportunity finally to
vent some frustration on this entire issue of how certain parts of
America are being treated by baseball. I associate myself with the
remarks of my Senator, Bob Graham, and my Senator, Connie
Mack, and I would like permission to submit a written statement
because much of it would repeat what Senator Mack has already
said.
Senator METENBAUM. Without objection, we will include the
statement in the record.
Mr. YOUNG. I hope that the members of the committee will know
that the brevity of my statement is no indication of a lack of inten-
sity in my feelings about this because I think we in St. Peters-
burg-and I am the Representative from St. Petersburg in the
House of Representatives-I think we have been had by baseball.
I think they have used us to try to develop situations that were
beneficial to baseball owners and not to baseball as a game.
We have been thrown four balls pitched right to us by baseball,
but when they came to the plate they were considered strikes and
we were out, and that is not right. They shouldn't lead us on as
they have. I stayed out of this, and the city of St. Petersburg stayed
out of this argument on the antitrust discussion, but I am here
today to say that I am no longer out of it and I am here as part
of any effort to make the owners of baseball be responsible to the
fans and to the players and to the game which belongs to America
and not to the owners.
I thank you very much for this opportunity to make these brief
remarks.
Senator METZENBAUM. Does your statement indicate or imply
that you support the concept of repealing the antitrust exemption,
or do you think it ought to remain as is?
Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, my statement will indicate that I
think we should seriously consider removing that antitrust exemp-
tion, and I give specific reasons why I think that should happen.
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much.
Mr. YOUNG. If I had the time, I would have presented them to
you orally, but I understand the time constraints.
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you.
Mr. YOUNG. In the House, we are busy making committee assign-
ments and I want to make sure that the five freshman from Flor-
ida don't lose out on good committee assignments.
Senator METZENBAUM. I understand your point.
Mr. YOUNG. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Young follows:]
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Testimony of U.S. Rep. C. W..Bil Young
Before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on
Antitrust, Monopolies and Business Rights
December 10, 1992
Mr. Chairman, I want to commend you and the members of the Committee for
holding this very in depth hearing today on the issue of Major.League Baseball's
antitrust exemption and to thank you for allowing me this time to share my thoughts.
As the Representative of St. Petersburg, Florida, a city which has a long and
proud baseball history and up until recently has had a very good relationship with
league officials, I share with you the frustration and bewilderment of the thousands of
residents of our community and the millions of people of the Tampa Bay area. Over
the course of the past 15 years, the prospect of a major league team playing in St.
Petersburg has been dangled in front of our community on no less than seven
occasions. The last four cases have perhaps been the most publicized and frustrating
for our community.
The Chicago White Sox, in 1988, nearly came to terms with the city to
relocate to the Suncoast Dome, but with the leverage provided by St. Petersburg's
offer, the state of Illinois, literally at the final hour, approved a legislative package to
fund the building of a brand new stadium to keep the White Sox in Chicago.
Last year there was the hotly contested effort to win one of two National
League expansion franchises. St. Petersburg was one of the finalists but just missed
out, once again disappointing Tampa Bay area baseball fans.
Earlier this year there was the highly controversial bid to move the Seattle
Mariners to St. Petersburg, which was blocked by major league owners who voted to
support an offer by a group of Japanese investors that kept the team in Seattle.
Then there was the August 6th agreement between a group of Tampa Bay area
investors and Bob Lurie, the owner of the San Francisco Giants, to buy the Giants
and move the team to St. Petersburg. The city saw this as perhaps its best chance to
bring a team to the Suncoast Dome.
Over the next three months, however, we watched as Major League Baseball
took full advantage of its antitrust exemption to block the sale of the Giants to the
Tampa Bay group. The league also worked directly with another prospective
ownership group to restructure a counterproposal which the league owners
subsequently approved to keep the Giants in San Francisco. This was three weeks
after National League President Bill White said the league would allow no further
changes to the competing proposals. When the Tampa Bay ownership group asked
for permission to alter their proposal in light of the league's last minute changes to
the competing proposal, they were turned down by league officials.
In the end, the owners forced Bob Lurie, the owner of the Giants, to accept a
package that paid him $15 million less for his team than the package offered by the
Tampa Bay group.
The Sherman Antitrust Act would not allow any other U.S. business or
industry to prohibit an owner from selling a business to another person or group. It
would not allow a business or industry to block the movement of a franchise to
another area. It even covers other major league sports leagues,-suck- as the- National
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Football League, the National Basketball Association, and the National Hockey
League, which are all prohibited from allowing a committee of owners to block the
free enterprise rights of on an individual team's owner to sell or relocate a franchise.
The federal courts have considered this issue and have upheld the rights of individual
team owners in these other professional sports leagues.
Mr. Chairman, it has been 70 years since the Supreme Court ruling gave
major league baseball the antitrust exemption it has wielded to frustrate and
disappoint the people of St. Petersburg. Our city, however, is not alone. Other
communities have shared similar disappointing experiences at the hands of a small
committee of major league owners, or will share such an experience in the future.
The time is now for the Judiciary Committees of the House and Senate to take
a hard Iook at the history of this antitrust exemption to determine if it has outlived its
useful life and if it should be repealed entirely or significantly modified through
legislation.
The strength of our nation's economy rests upon our fervent protection of a
free enterprise system which ensures fair access to markets and competition for all,
not just a few businesses and entrepreneurs. The owners of the teams which make up
'America's Game" should abide by these same rules.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to working with you and the members of the
Committee to provide whatever information I can about St. Petersburg's experience
with Major League Baseball and its antitrust exemption so that you might have a
thorough case history to review and evaluate.
Thank you again for this time today to discuss this important matter which
threatens to undermine the integrity and support for our great national pastime.
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Senator METZENBAUM. Mr. Bilirakis.
STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL BLIRAKIS, A REPRESENTA-
TIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA
Mr. BILIRAmIs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
subcommittee. I, too, appreciate this opportunity to appear before
you today as a member of the House Energy and Commerce Com-
mittee and also a sponsor of the legislation in the previous Con-
gress to eliminate the antitrust exemption for major league base-
ball, and I fully intend to reintroduce this legislation in the 103d
Congress because I feel strongly that competition and fairness is as
important in the boardrooms of professional baseball as it is on its
diamonds.
Currently, Federal antitrust law prohibits businesses from tak-
ing actions that unreasonably constrain interstate commerce. How-
ever, as we know, in a 1922 decision that I can only term capri-
cious, the U.S. Supreme Court exempted professional baseball from
these Federal antitrust laws as an amusement and not a business.
I am a great fan of the game, Mr. Chairman. My wife rightly
calls me a baseball nut. Life starts for me when spring training
starts, but I must tell you frankly that I do not find many of the
actions of the major league baseball owners amusing these days.
Their treatment of the fans, the players, host cities, and cities seek-
ing that opportunity, even of their own commissioner, whom we
heard from here earlier today, militates against them, I think.
No other professional sport enjoys this kind of blanket exemp-
tion, something that this committee cannot overlook. What possible
standard, we must ask ourselves, can be advanced to support such
a circumstance in this day of multimillion-dollar player salaries
and telecommunications contracts? What possible difference sets
major league baseball's owners apart from their peers in other pro-
fessional sports? I maintain that there is none.
This monopoly is unhealthy and needs to be modified. In fact, as
we all know, 50 years after its initial ruling the Supreme Court
went so far as to call baseball's exemption an anomaly and an aber-
ration. More significantly, and this was referred to earlier by Sen-
ator Simpson, the Court stated that this was a problem that could
best be solved by the Congress. In Flood v. Kuhn, it was noted that
the inconsistency or illogic of the situation would have to be rem-
edied by Congress and not by the Court.
In fact, baseball's antitrust exemption has been the subject of de-
tailed study by the Congress, as we know. In the 82d Congress
back in the early 1950's, several bills were introduced in the House
to grant a blanket antitrust exemption to all professional sports.
They were studied by the House Judiciary Committee's Subcommit-
tee on the Study of Monopoly Power which recommended against
their passage. In 1976, a report by the House Select Committee on
Professional Sports also concluded that there was no justification
for baseball's special exemption.
We have as a body, Mr. Chairman, studied this issue repeatedly
and in detail. Today, the time has come for action. We can deliver
a great big Christmas present all tied up with a bow for the Na-
tion's many fans of major league baseball. The time has run out on
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the House of Lords that presently controls major league baseball,
Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much again for this opportunity.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bilirakis and a letter to Senator
Metzenbaum follow:]
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TESTIMONY OF
CONGRESSMAN MICHAEL BILIRAKIS
ANTITRUST, MONOPOLIES AND BUSINESS RIGHTS SUBCOMMITTEE
U.S. SENATE
PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL ANTITRUST EXEMPHON
DECEMBER 10, 1992
MR. CHAIRMAN, MEMBERS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE, I DEEPLY
APPRECIATE THE OPPORTUNITY TO APPEAR BEFORE YOU TODAY AS A
MEMBER OF THE HOUSE ENERGY & COMMERCE COMMITTEE, AND
SPONSOR OF LEGISLATION IN THE PREVIOUS CONGRESS TO ELIMINATE
THE ANTITRUST EXEMPTION FOR MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL.
I FULLY INTEND TO RE-INTRODUCE THIS LEGISLATION IN THE 103RD
CONGRESS BECAUSE I FEEL STRONGLY THAT COMPETITION AND
FAIRNESS IS AS IMPORTANT IN THE BOARDROOMS OF PROFESSIONAL
BASEBALL AS IT IS ON ITS DIAMONDS.
CURRENTLY, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW PROHIBITS BUSINESSES FROM
TAKING ACTIONS THAT 'UNREASONABLY' CONSTRAIN INTERSTATE
COMMERCE. HOWEVER, IN A 1922 DECISION THAT I CAN ONLY TERM
"CAPRICIOUS," THE U.S. SUPREME COURT EXEMPTED PROFESSIONAL
BASEBALL FROM THESE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AS AN
"AMUShMENT" AND NOT A BUSINESS.
I AM A GREAT FAN OF THE GAME, MR. CHAIRMAN, BUT I MUST TELL
YOU FRANKLY THAT I DO NOT FIND MANY OF THE ACTIONS OF THE
MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL OWNERS AMUSING THESE DAYS.
THEIR TREATMENT OF THE FANS, THE PLAYERS, HOST CITIES AND
CITIES SEEKING THAT OPPORTUNITY - EVEN OF THEIR OWN
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COMMISSIONER, WHOM WE HAVE HEARD TESTIFY HERE TODAY -
MILITATES AGAINST THEM.
NO OTHER PROFESSIONAL SPORT ENJOYS THIS KIND OF BLANKET
EXEMPTION. WHAT POSSIBLE STANDARD CAN BE ADVANCED TO
SUPPORT SUCH A CIRCUMSTANCE IN THIS DAY OF MULTI-MILLION-
DOLLAR PLAYER SALARIES AND TELE-COMMUNICATIONS CONTRACTS?
WHAT POSSIBLE DIFFERENCE SETS MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL'S
OWNERS APART FROM THEIR PEERS IN OTHER PROFESSIONAL SPORTS?
I MAINTAIN THAT THERE IS NONE.
THIS MONOPOLY IS UNHEALTHY AND NEEDS TO BE MODIFIED.
IN FACT, AS WE ALL KNOW, 50 YEARS AFTER ITS INITIAL RULING, THE
SUPREME COURT WENT SO FAR AS TO CALL BASEBALL'S EXEMPTION
AN "ANOMALY" AND AN "ABERRATION."
MORE SIGNIFICANTLY, THE COURT STATED THAT THIS WAS A
PROBLEM THAT COULD BEST BE SOLVED BY THE CONGRESS. IN EO
Y.UB, IT WAS NOTED THAT THE "INCONSISTENCY OR ILLOGIC" OF
THE SITUATION WOULD HAVE TO BE "REMEDIED BY CONGRESS AND
NOT BY TH[E] COURT."
IN FACT, BASEBALL'S ANTITRUST EXEMPTION HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT
OF DETAILED STUDY BY THE CONGRESS. IN THE 82ND CONGRESS,
SEVERAL BILLS WERE INTRODUCED IN THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES TO GRANT A BLANKET ANTITRUST EXEMPTION TO
ALL PROFESSIONAL SPORTS. THESE WERE STUDIED BY THE HOUSE
JUDICIARY COMMrTEE'S SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE STUDY OF
MONOPOLY POWER, WHICH RECOMMENDED AGAINST THEIR PASSAGE.
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IN 1976, A REPORT BY THE HOUSE SELECT COMMIrEE ON
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS ALSO CONCLUDED THAT THERE WAS NO
JUSTIFICATION FOR BASEBALL'S SPECIAL EXEMPTION.
WE HAVE, AS A BODY, STUDIED THIS ISSUE REPEATEDLY AND IN
DETAIL. TODAY, THE TIME HAS COME FOR ACTION. WE CAN DELIVER
A GREAT, BIG CHRISTMAS PRESENT ALL TIED UP WITH A BOW FOR THE
NATION'S MANY FANS OF MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL.
TIME HAS RUN OUT ON THE 'HOUSE OF LORDS" THAT PRESENTLY
CONTROLS MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL. TIME HAS RUN OUT ON THE
IMPERIAL FORCES THAT HAVE LIFE AND DEATH CONTROL OVER THE
DECISIONS OF TEAM EXPANSION OR RELOCATION. THE TIME HAS
COME TO GIVE AMERICA'S GAME BACK TO THE PEOPLE.
IN THE NEXT CONGRESS, WE CAN REMOVE THE SPECIAL STATUS THAT
PROTECTS THE GRINCHES THAT STOLE BASEBALL.
I HAVE HEARD IT SAID THAT THIS WILL NOT BE EASY. MR.
CHAIRMAN, I HAVE SPENT ENOUGH TIME ON CAPITOL HELL TO KNOW
THAT THINGS INSIDE THESE WALLS RARELY ARE. I ALSO RARELY
HEAR THIS GIVEN AS A REASON NOT TO ACT.
I AM CERTAIN THAT MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL WILL PULL OUT ALL
THE STOPS TO PREVENT MY LEGISLATION OR ANY OTHER EFFORT
FROM RECEIVING A FAIR HEARING. HOWEVER, I BELIEVE OUR
EFFORTS CAN AND WILL BEAR FRUIT. WE CAN ACT ON THIS MATTER
FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND IN THE NAME OF
JUST TREATMENT UNDER OUR LAWS JE WE HAVE THE WILL TO DO SO.
I INTEND TO CONTINUE WORKING WITH ALL INTERESTED
REPRESENTATIVES TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE, HOWEVER LONG IT TAKES.
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THE HIGH COURT HAS ABANDONED ITS INITIAL NARROW DEFINITION
OF COMMERCE IN THIS REGARD AND HAS OPENED THE DOOR FOR THE
CONGRESS TO RECTIFY THIS INSUPPORTABLE ERROR. WE MUST SEE
OUR WAY CLEAR TO DO THAT, NO MATTER THE OBSTACLES. IT IS
RIGHT, IT IS FAIR, AND THE FANS OF THE GREAT GAME OF BASEBALL
DESERVE NOTHING LESS.
THANK YOU.
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December 3, 1992
Senator Howard M. Metzenbaum
Chairman, Subcommittee On Antitrust, Monopolies and Business Rights
308 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510-6278
Dear Senator Metzenbaum:
It is my understanding that you will be chairing a December 10 hearing
regarding professional baseball's exemption from federal antitrust laws.
This is an issue of special importance to me.
As you may already know, during the 102nd Congress I was the House
sponsor of legislation to eliminate professional baseball's exemption
from antitrust laws. The bill number was H.R. 5489 and I have included
a copy of its text.
As a representative from the Tampa Bay area in Florida, I proposed this
legislation in order to remove the artificial barriers to league
expansion and allow qualified areas such as Tampa and St. Petersburg to
obtain a baseball franchise. Baseball has been singled out for a .
complete exemption from the antitrust laws that no other professional
sport enjoys. This monopoly is unhealthy and needs to be rectified.
The United States Supreme Court in 1972 called the situation an
"anomaly, and an aberration' but said it was a problem best solved by
the Congress.
While my legislation did not come up for consideration in the 102nd
Congress, I plan to reintroduce it in the 103rd Congress when we convene
next month. I feel strongly that we need to bring competition and
fairness to baseball, and, therefore, I respectfully request the
opportunity to testify at your important hearing on this matter.
Warmest regards.
Memb r of Congress
MB:ddl
Enclosure
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Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you, Mr. Bilirakis.
Now, our next witness will be Mr. Bud Selig, and I ask him to
come to the witness table. At the same time, I would like to intro-
duce some who have accompanied him just for introduction pur-
poses only. I think they are in the audience. I would like to ask
them to stand as I mention their names: Mr. George Bush of the
Texas Rangers, Mr. Bill Bartholomew of the Atlanta Braves, Mr.
Fred Kuhlman of the St. Louis Cardinals, Mr. Jerry McMorns of
the Colorado Rockies, and Mr. Heywood Sullivan of the Boston Red
Sox. Thank you. We are happy to have each of you with us.
Senator Kohl, all of us are aware of the fact that you not only
have a major constituent of yours with us today, but a very close
personal friend, and I wonder if you wouldn't like to say a few
words of introduction.
Senator Koim. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chair-
man, baseball is an important part of the American way of life. It
reflects the character, the history, and the competitiveness of our
society. From Babe Ruth to Hammerin' Hank Aaron to the heroes
of today, as much as any other single activity baseball is America,
and our love for the game has united us for generations. So when
baseball hurts, America hurts, and that is why all of us are con-
cerned about the problems that the game faces today.
Smaller cities like Milwaukee, Seattle, and Pittsburgh struggle to
generate enough revenue to stay profitable. They know that if they
o not make enough money, if they cannot pay their players
enough, then their hometown heroes will be lost to cities with more
money. For example, just this past Monday Paul Molitor signed
with Toronto after spending all of his 15-year career in Milwaukee
where he was indeed a real hero. For the money he got, you can't
blame him, but fans in Milwaukee have lost one of their stars.
None of the key participants in this struggle-the owners, the
players, and the cities-is without blame for baseball's problems,
and none, not the cities, not the players, not the owners, is exclu-
sively to blame for the difficulties threatening the game.
As you may know, Mr. Chairman, I am fortunate enough to have
enjoyed a long association with professional sports-primarily bas-
ketball, but also major league baseball. Because of these past and
p resent ties, I will recuse myself from taking a role in this matter
efore the U.S. Senate, but I cannot and I do not want to recuse
myself today from the opportunity to say a few words about my
good friend, Bud Selig.
Bud Selig and I grew up on the same block in Milwaukee. Our
families were close friends. Bud and I played baseball together
when we were kids. He could not then, nor can he today, hit my
curve ball. [Laughter.]
Bud and I went to high school and college together and we
roomed for a year at the University of Wisconsin. We were then
and we remain today best friends.
Like many of us, Bud Selig has worked very hard to improve the
city that he calls home. In 1965, when the then Milwaukee Braves
left Milwaukee, Bud devoted himself to bringing major league base-
ball back to our community. In 1970, he was successful in getting
the Seattle Pilots to move to Milwaukee. But to view Bud's actions
as only those of an owner would be wrong. In fact, he is first and
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foremost a fan with a great love for the game of baseball and he
knows what it means to the people of a community to have pride
in their team, to win or lose with their team, and potentially to be
the equals of New York and Los Angeles because of their team.
Since 1970, in perhaps the smallest of the franchise cities, Bud
Selig and the Milwaukee Brewers have not only survived, but they
have been winners. Earlier this fall in a time of some turmoil, his
fellow owners selected Bud Selig to chair the executive council of
baseball. Never one to duck responsibility, he agreed to accept that
assignment and he is now, in essence, the commissioner of base-
ball. As recent events in Louisville show, he is faced with a difficult
task. I am certain he will discharge his responsibilities with skill,
intelligence, and sensitivity just as he has done since he was a
young man.
As I have said, I will recuse myself from this hearing and from
any debate or vote on this issue, but I do want to express the hope
that my colleagues will be fair with Bud Selig. Bud Selig did not
cause the problems the game faces today, but he is trying to help
resolve them and if we all work together, I am sure that can be
done.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much.
With that introduction, Mr. Selig, we are very happy to hear
from you.
STATEMENT OF ALLAN IL SELIG, OWNER, MILWAUKEE
BREWERS BASEBALL CLUB
Mr. SELIG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Senator Kohl.
Mr. Chairman, before I start today-and I appreciate Senator
Mack acknowledging baseball suffered a terrible loss yesterday.
Carl Barger, the president of the Florida Marlins and the former
president of the Pittsburgh Pirates, died during our annual winter
meetings. On behalf of major league baseball, we offer our sincere
sympathy to his family, to his friends, to the Marlins, and to the
community.
Senator METZENBAUM. I think the members of this committeejoin in expressing the same sentiments that you have just ex-
pressed, Mr. Selig.
Mr. SELIG. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, my name is Bud Selig and
I am pleased to appear before the subcommittee today on behalf of
major league baseball. For the last 23 years, I have been the presi-
dent of the Milwaukee Brewers. I currently serve in the position
of chairman of baseball's executive council.
I understand that this hearing is the result of concern over the
National League's decision not to approve the relocation of the Gi-
ants from San Francisco to Tampa-St. Petersburg and over the cir-
cumstances surrounding the departure of former Commissioner
Vincent. I will address both issues.
Let me say first to the many loyal baseball fans of Tampa-St.
Pete that I genuinely understand the disappointment that you feel.
I was in your shoes in the 1960's when it took me 6V2 years to
bring baseball back to Milwaukee, but the National League's deci-
sion to keep the Giants in San Francisco was simply a reaffirma-
tion of baseball's long-established policy against the relocation of
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franchises that have not been abandoned by their local commu-
nities.
My vivid memory of the devastation caused when the Braves left
Milwaukee convinces me that baseball's preference for franchise
stability is plainly in the public interest. The Boston Braves moved
to my home town of Milwaukee in 1953. Their stay in Milwaukee
was one of the great success stories in baseball. Milwaukee sup-
ported the team spectacularly. Despite their success in Milwaukee,
the Braves moved to Atlanta at the end of the 1965 season, and
I was personally heartbroken and the entire State of Wisconsin
was traumatized.
The void in the community drove me to devote the next 62 years
of my life to bring baseball back to Milwaukee. Several deals with
existing teams fell through and we were passed over when baseball
expanded in 1969. Our break finally came when one of those ex-
pansion franchises failed after just 1 year. Baseball, acting respon-
sibly and properly, in my view, went to great lengths to keep the
failing Pilots in Seattle, but the Pilot owners put the team into
bankruptcy and a bankruptcy judge ordered the sale of the club to
my group.
My experience in Milwaukee has convinced me that the appro-
priate policy for sports leagues is to prohibit franchise relocations
except in the most dire of circumstances when the local community
has over a sustained period demonstrated that it cannot support
the team. This, I am happy to report, is baseball's policy.
But if baseball were not exempt from the antitrust laws, a deci-
sion protecting franchise stability such as the one made in San
Francisco would subject baseball to costly and unpredictable treble
damage litigation. Without its exemption, baseball might not even
have attempted to save the Giants for the people of San Francisco.
Ever since a court concluded that the NFL was powerless to stop
Al Davis from abandoning Oakland, no sports league other than
baseball has been able to stop a franchise from relocating.
I am very proud of baseball's record on franchise stability. Be-
cause of baseball's exemption, it has by far the best record of pro-
fessional sports in this area. No baseball club has been permitted
to relocate since the Washington Senators moved to Texas in 1972.
In contrast, football and basketball have each had three franchise
relocations since 1980 and hockey has had two.
As the record demonstrates, baseball has not abused its antitrust
exemption. While we have not prohibited all franchise moves, we
do not allow a club to relocate simply so that the owner can earn
greater profits. Indeed, the National League rejected the move to
Tampa-St. Pete despite the fact that it would have netted Bob
Lurie an additional $15 million. This shows that profit is not the
driving force in baseball's decisionmaking process.
Let me now address the circumstances of Fay Vincent's depar-
ture and what that departure means for the future of baseball. The
owners did not, as some have suggested, summarily dismiss Mr.
Vincent for protecting the best interests of the game. When Mr.
Vincent took office, he acknowledged that if he had ever lost the
confidence of a majority of owners, he would resign.
While Mr. Vincent had the full support of owners when he took
office in September 1989, by September 1992, 18 teams requested
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his resignation. The vote made it apparent to Mr. Vincent that he
had lost the confidence of a majority of the teams and he honored
his initial pledge and resigned. I cannot speak for all of the teams.
The clubs lost confidence in Mr. Vincent for many reasons. How-
ever, the concern heard most often was his inability to develop a
consensus on the vital issues that faced the game. Rather than
pulling together under his leadership, the teams were drawing fur-
ther apart.
In the opinion of the clubs, Mr. Vincent was simply not the per-
son to lead baseball during this very challenging period. Since his
departure, we have appointed a restructuring committee which is
hard at work. Although the restructuring committee has not yet
completed its work, I can say to you today that there will be a com-
missioner who will continue to have strong powers-the same
strong powers, I may add, to protect the integrity of the game.
In my personal view, Mr. Chairman, baseball has continued to
uphold its unique covenant with its fans, and it deserves to retain
its status under the antitrust laws. I sincerely thank the sub-
committee for the opportunity to appear before you today. I under-
stand that my full written statement will be placed in the record.
Thank you.
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much, Mr. Selig. Your en-
tire statement will be placed in the record. At this point, the com-
mittee will go into a question-and-answer period. The Chair will
allot 10 minutes to himself and to the ranking member, and 5 min-
utes each to other members of the committee. If necessary, we will
have a second round.
Mr. Selig, in his prepared testimony Fay Vincent stated that he
would no longer support the antitrust exemption if the owners of
baseball continue on their course of making baseball into their
business and at the same time insist that the commissioner is their
CEO, to be fired at will. Press statements by your fellow owner,
Mr. Reinsdorf, and others suggest that you intend to do just that
and turn the commissioner into a CEO answerable solely to the
owners.
If that happens, my concern is that there won't be anyone with
independent authority to protect the fans. If you are going to weak-
en the power of the commissioner, and it is apparent that you al-
ready have, then who will be there to protect the fans when the
business interests of the owners conflict with the public interest
and the interests of the sport?
Mr. SELIG. Mr. Chairman, let me try to answer that in the con-
text, sir, of my almost now 22 decades in this game. One needs
to understand the history of baseball. All of us who have been
raised in the business-and let me say this to you, sir, right from
the beginning-understand the need for a strong commissioner.
There is no question about that.
Whatever the reports have been-and this very sensitive issue
that the restructuring committee that has gone to work on Septem-
ber 9 in St. Louis, MO, has been composed of clubs, big markets,
small markets, pro-Fay Vincent people, people not for Fay Vincent
who have worked together-all of us in the game understand the
need for centralized authority. We also understand that on the in-
tegrity issues there will be no change, there will be no change.
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But let us understand that on other parts of the document, Sen-
ator Metzenbaum, the document is 71 years old. We live in a new
era, we live in a new society, and why shouldn't this document at
least be looked at to make baseball and bring baseball, the rest of
its functions and the structure of the office, into an era that it now
exists in? That doesn't mean the office is being weakened. On the
contrary-
Senator METZENBAUM. Mr. Selig, how do you explain this? You
say you want a strong commissioner. Eighteen members join to-
gether and fire Fay Vincent and indicate they no longer have con-
fidence in him. A strong commissioner is either independent and,
when you are not happy with him, stays there regardless of that
fact-we give Federal judges lifetime appointments so that they
may be totally independent and not subject to the will of the peo-
ple.
Here is a situation where Fay Vincent, apparently based upon
his comments here and what we have read about him previously,
was a balanced individual. He was concerned about the future of
baseball and the presence of baseball. Reinsdorf is out there talk-
* about we want a commissioner who will be the CEO for base-
How can you convince the American people and how can you con-
vince this committee that you really mean what you say? What in-
dication is there that you really want a strong commissioner? You
have fired several of them in the past many years.
Mr. SELIG. Many years, Senator. Let me suggest to you, sir, that
if you go back through the Happy Chandler episode in the late
1940's, there was a situation with Commissioner Eckert in the
1960's. There was even a situation with Commissioner Kuhn in the
early 1980's, but somehow, for whatever the reasons, the office
stayed intact, those powers intact.
Senator METZENBAum. But the commissioners lost their jobs.
Mr. SELIG. Well, OK. Let me answer that, but the fact of the
matter remains that what is a commissioner's job. The integrity
issue, there is no question about, but the ability to lead, the ability
to develop a consensus-after all, Senator Specter and others asked
very, very penetrating questions today about a lot of the economic
issues that confront this industry today.
Mr. Chairman, it was the view of the 18 clubs that there was not
a consensus, and instead of joining together to begin to solve those
problems which are clearly in the interests of clubs not only in
markets like Milwaukee, but in the big markets, we were breaking
down further. Now, Senator, that is in no one's best interest, and
so whether the 18 clubs were right or wrong, the fact of the matter
is that the best interests of the game, they believed, because of the
lack of consensus, were being served by asking Commissioner Vin-
cent to resign.
Senator METZENBAum. Well, baseball's antitrust exemption is
truly an extraordinary privilege. It insulates baseball from the nor-
mal rules that govern our free market system. To the best of my
knowledge, it is maybe the only industry in America that has an
exemption. This Senator and I worked out some exemption for in-
dustry with respect to research and development some years ago,but that was a limited kind of exemption under prescribed rules.
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Whenever Congress examines this subject, the leaders of major
league baseball come before us and say that the sport of baseball
is unique and deserves special treatment under the law. You tell
us, well, 18 members didn't agree to it. When Happy Chandler
made a decision, if my recollection is right, having to do with inte-
grating baseball, that didn't sit very well at that time with the
baseball owners, as I understand.
But baseball also acts not very much like a business; it is a busi-
ness, it is very big business. Fay Vincent was forced out because
he believed that the business interests of the owners should be sub-
ordinate to the best interests of the sport. He was concerned about
the fans. Some owners have threatened to leave their home cities
unless the public subsidized the cost of new stadiums, and that, to
me, is counterproductive to really what this whole Nation needs. I
mean, with the communities striving so hard to keep their schools
open, to pay their police and fire forces, to provide for an infra-
structure, there is this extraction; either you do this or you don't
get the team to stay.
Players, especially the minor league players, are forced to accept
restrictions on their mobility as a condition of employment. How
can anybody sit before us and justify the reserve clause, which has
some limitation by reason of the contract that you have with the
Baseball Players Association, but would have none if you didn't
have that restriction, and would therefore make baseball subject to
the antitrust laws if there were no exemption?
And the whole concept of the reserve clause with respect to
minor league baseball players who are held by a team-when I
learned what baseball does to the minor league players, I abso-
lutely couldn't believe my ears. I am not an authority on how base-
ball conducts itself, but the inability for a minor league player to
move from team to team or to be sold to a major league team be-
cause he is being held by one minor league team-baseball seems
to play the kind of hardball you see in most other businesses.
Under those circumstances, what conceivable reason is there for us
to continue to give baseball this unique privilege that no other
sport, no other business in America has?
Mr. SELIG. Well, Senator, I think there are a lot of reasons. I
think that baseball has, as I said in my statement-and you have
made a lot of points and I would like to cover as many of them as
is possible. The San Francisco situation is illustrative of a point,
and with all due respect to Senator Mack-and I know how he
feels, and Senator Graham. I can understand it because I have
been there. I lived, as I said, 62 years of my life trying to find a
team, being passed over four or five times.
But here we are with the best record on franchises, Senator. We
believe in stability. A lot of us who came into the business, and as
this policy really came into being in the 1970's, we believe in doing
the right thing.
Senator METZENBAUm. If you believe in stability, why did you
refuse San Diego the opportunity to get the team for free from Ms.
Kroc?
Mr. SELIG. Because a public entity, Senator Metzenbaum, is not
in the community's best interest. For interest-
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Senator METZENBAUM. They own a football team in Green Bay,
don't they?
Mr. SELIG. No, they don't, sir. I am on the board of the Green
Bay Packers and the community does not own the Green Bay Pack-
ers. The shareholders own the Green Bay Packers. The sharehold-
ers have nonvoting stock, sir, and I happen to be a shareholder. It
doesn't pay any dividends, but it is not owned by the community.
There is no entity in sports that is owned by that, and the city of
San Diego which now has a viable ownership group, Senator, a
local group-one of the great guidelines that we have, a local group
who-after all, if a public entity owns the team, No. 1, the team
starts losing money, as many baseball teams do today, and the San
Diego Padres are losing money.
Senator METZENBAUM. Didn't Ms. Kroe also offer San Diego $100
million in order to provide for continuing expenses and funds?
Mr. SELIG. It never got to that fact, Senator, because there would
be no stability in that situation. After all, you would understand
this better than I. Elections come and go, administrations change.
We have people trying to run a ball clubs. You have clubs that
begin to lose money and become a burden to the taxpayer. There
is no professional league, Senator, no professional league-by the
way, the other leagues don't have antitrust exemptions and they
don't allow that type of ownership. I don't believe, sir, that is re-
flective of any deficiency in baseball.
Senator METZENBAUM. Mr. Selig, I have many more questions,
but frankly as we sit here today, I think the public would have
much more confidence in the ultimate outcome of the issue that is
now hanging over the head of baseball, the Marge Schott con-
troversy, if the matter was being handled by a strong and inde-
pendent commissioner.
A story in Tuesday's USA Today reported that 1 week after the
owners had appointed a committee to look into the matter, five peo-
ple who said they heard Ms. Schott make racial slurs still had not
een contacted. The question is, what is going on? Why all the
delay, and wouldn't it be better if the Schott matter were being
handled by a strong and independent commissioner?
Al Campanis was banned from baseball for making racially in-
sensitive remarks similar to those made by Ms. Schott. If Ms.
Schott is somehow treated more leniently than Mr. Campanis,
won't it appear that the owners are coddling one of their own, and
isn't it an issue that calls for urgent action rather than this long,
drawn-out delay?
Mr. SELIG. Let me suggest, No. 1, that the Al Campanis remarks
in 1987 on "Nightline" were done in public and Peter O'Malley, the
owner of the Dodgers, took appropriate action. I would say to you
that I don't think that any of you would have handled it any dif-
ferently, Mr. Chairman, than I have.
Bill White, the president of the National League, and I were in
constant communication from day one when these allegations sur-
faced. We appointed a committee of two of our owners, plus the two
league presidents and the National League attorney. After all,
there is a spirit of fairness, there is a spirit of due process, there
is a spirit of thoughtfulness, there is a spirit of thoroughness. And,
sir, that is the period we are engaged in, and I must tell you that
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I do-I would suggest to all of you that knowing the facts as I
know them, I have every confidence that all of you would have re-
acted the same way that I did.
Senator METZENBAUM. My time has expired. Senator Thurmond.
Senator THUBMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Selig, we are
glad to have you with us.
Mr. SELIG. Thank you, Senator Thurmond.
Senator THIBMOND. Mr. Selig, given your emphasis on franchise
stability, what would be your reaction to a legislative proposal to
limit the antitrust immunity only to franchise relocations?
Mr. SELIG. Senator Thurmond, I think that would not be in the
best interests of the public. That certainly is one issue, but there
are other issues relative to the minor leagues, relative to television,
that I think are very, very important, and I do believe that if one
studies our history-and I have lived a lot of it and studied it for
a long time-that they would believe and understand that the
public's interest is really being served by that exemption.
Senator THmmOND. Mr. Selig, do you believe there are reasons
other than franchise stability that justify the antitrust immunity,
and if so what are they?
Mr. SELIG. Well, television, labor, discipline matters. I think
there are a host of functions, Senator Thurmond, that are best
served by the antitrust exemption.
Senator THuRMOND. Mr. Selig, how do you defend the antitrust
immunity for baseball when other sports appear to operate success-
fully without such an immunity?
Mr. SELIG. I think there is a uniqueness to baseball that there
isn't to the other sports. Just, if you will, sir, consider the minor
league operations, the fact that baseball subsidizes its minor league
operations to the extent of well over $100 million. There is a dif-
ference in television policy. There are other things that I think that
baseball has done, and I think, frankly, the antitrust exemption,
again going back to franchise shifts, but it can get into television
and other things, has protected the public good.
Senator THuRmOND. Mr. Selig, several commentators and one of
the witnesses this morning cite minor league player rules as par-
ticularly onerous. They claim these rules would not exist if there
were no antitrust exemption. Can you explain the leading rationale
for these rules?
Mr. SELIG. Well, let me cover, Senator Thurmond, if I may, sir,
the minor league situation. We are unique in this area, as I said.
You know, hockey has a small farm system, and obviously football
and basketball have built-in farm systems. We subsidize the minor
league clubs well over $100 million a year. There are 17 leagues,
173 clubs, 4,300 minor league players. The minor league clubs are
subsidized.
I would remind you, and it will sure come up in other questions,
the major leagues in this year, in 1992, are a virtual break-even
industry just on operations alone, pre-interest and pre-tax and pre-
depreciation. So the fact of the matter is this is an industry strain-
ing now to meet its commitments and there are many clubs, espe-
cially in the small and medium-sized markets, who are having an
extremely difficult time. So the minor league subsidization is al-
ready at the limit.
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Senator THURMOND. Mr. Selig, what is your view of the role of
the baseball commissioner, especially as to his relationship with
the owners? Mr. Vincent has stated that some of the owners believe
the commissioner should represent the owners, similar to a CEO
who could be hired and fired at will.
Mr. SELIG. As I said earlier, and I really believe this, there is no
doubt in my mind, Senator Thurmond, that baseball needs a strong
commissioner. The integrity issues should not be touched at all;
they will not. I have every confidence they won't be. The restruc-
turing committee is sensitively looking at all parts of that oper-
ation, and I can assure you all of us who have been raised in base-
ball and who love it and participate in it on a daily basis under-
stand the need for a very strong commissioner.
Senator THUMOND. Mr. Selig, I note that you cite an article
written by Mr. Gary Roberts concerning professional sports and
antitrust laws. As you know, Mr. Roberts will be one of the wit-
nesses this morning on another panel. Do you agree with his analy-
sis that the underlying structural problems with baseball-lack of
adequate revenue sharing, fewer than justified number of fran-
chises, and the shifting of telecasting practices-require solutions
other than repeal of the antitrust laws?
Mr. SELIG. I do, sir; I do.
Senator THURMOND. For example, he proposes breaking the
league into four separate leagues that could not generally engage
in joint activities.
Mr. SELIG. Well, we all have different views on things. We have
a committee today that is looking at different schedules and dif-
ferent things, and that is all part of the process that quite frankly
has begun. There are a lot of ideas that we need to look at and are
in the process, sir, of looking at.
Senator THURMOND. Thank you very much. I have no more ques-
tions.
Mr. SELIG. Thank you.
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you. Senator Simon.
Senator SIMoN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, one minor cor-
rection. There was a farm hockey team owned by the city of Peoria,
IL, a farm team of the St. Louis Blues.
Mr. SELIG. Well, I meant major league clubs. There are some
minor league baseball clubs, too.
Senator METZENBAUM. That are owned by the public?
Mr. SELIG. Yes. There are no major league clubs in any of the
sports is what I said.
Senator SIMoN. I guess this is just a word of admonition to your
restructuring committee and, frankly, you make a good impression,
you come on strong. I hope you get a commissioner that has the
same kind of approach. Gary Roberts-and I regret I won't be able
to stay here to hear him, but he has indicated in his writings that
over the last two decades the NFL has had over 60 suits filed on
the basis of the antitrust laws. Baseball doesn't need that, but
baseball may be headed for significant change if that restructuring
committee and the owners don't make very clear the strength and
the independence of the commissioner.
You have problems in baseball, as you have pointed out, but
those problems will be compounded if baseball is run by the Fed-
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eral courts or, with all due respect to my colleagues, by the U.S.
Senate. What I would like to see is that baseball's commissioner be
strong and independent. That is kind of the basic message that I
hope will come out of this hearing.
Mr. SELIG. And I share that view and we share that view, Sen-
ator Simon.
Senator SIMON. Thank you. I have no other questions.
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you, Senator Simon. Senator
Mack.
Senator MACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome. We have
had a chance to chat a couple of times.
Mr. SELIG. Thank you, Senator.
Senator MACK. I appreciate your point of view, but let me kind
of take issue with it, if I could.
Mr. SELIG. Well, I knew that you would, sir. I am not surprised.
Senator MACK. In your statements with respect to your commit-
ment to maintaining stability as opposed to abandoning one side or
another, originally Milwaukee had a baseball team because it
moved a franchise from Boston. Milwaukee has a baseball team
today because of your efforts to move a team from Seattle. In short,
you acted contrary to the very message that you are giving us. Mil-
waukee would not have a team today if it had not been for your
doing exactly the kinds of things that the people in Tampa and St.
Pete want to get done.
So I guess my question to you is, it seems like stability is impor-
tant, but by the same token there are other things that come up
from time to time that indicate that a franchise ought to be moved,
and the question is do you agree or disagree with the criteria that
basically were outlined by the former commissioner.
Mr. SELIG. I agree. I would also like to, if I may, comment on
the Milwaukee characterization, which obviously I have lived now
for almost 40 years through the Braves and, of course, my own in-
volvement with the Brewers. The Braves moved from Boston be-
cause at that time there was a very strong feeling back in the
1950's that Boston couldn't support two baseball teams-a different
era.
When the Braves left for Atlanta, you know how I felt about
that; everybody in the world does. You know, it is gone and it is
done, but it was a very traumatic and, I thought, regrettable and
unfair thing. That doesn't mean we have to keep repeating regret-
table and unfair things, not that Atlanta shouldn't have a baseball
team because it should have had. When we got a team back-
Senator MACK. Let me just ask-
Mr. SELIG. I am just going to finish my thought.
Senator MACK. OK
Mr. SELIG. When we got a team back, Senator Mack, we had
been turned down five times. We brought a team on October 10,
1969-I can still remember it-in Baltimore. Both leagues and
then-Commissioner Bowie Kuhn kept going back to that commu-
nity and giving it a chance, and they gave it one chance after an-
other to come up with a local group.
Now, I had met Bowie Kuhn 4 years earlier in a baseball trial
in Milwaukee. Yet, in 1969 I never resented him giving Seattle
every chance in the world to buy that team, and I submit what I
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and we did for San Francisco was clearly consistent with that be-
cause I do believe-and then I will keep quiet-I do believe, sir, we
really do have a moral obligation.
As I think I told you one day, when the change came and I took
over, I was inundated with letters from kids in northern California
who had grown up with Willie Mays and Willie McCovey. It may
be naive and it may be trite, but I take that very seriously, and
I also take that seriously as part of our social responsibility. I un-
derstand the heartbreak in Tampa, but we are in a situation where
we can't please everybody at one time. So our policy has been the
same in Montreal, San Diego, Seattle. I mean, this wasn't anything
new.
Senator MACK. Well, are you suggesting, then, that the commis-
sioner was misleading the people of Tampa-St. Pete? I understand
your concern about the interests of young fans being able to go to
the game and see their stars play. You know, we all understand
that. So, obviously, there has to be some criteria around which you
make decisions about when a team can leave, and the commis-
sioner laid out, I thought, some fairly specific things.
I want to ask you this question. Do you believe that the group
that has now indicated its willingness to purchase Bob Lurie's
team for $95 million has changed any of the four criteria that were
outlined as a result of the commissioner's statement?
Mr. SELIG. I believe they have; I do believe they have. I think
if Peter McGowan were here today, he could answer that a little
more directly than I can, but the fact that they are willing, sir, to
spend, I think it was $100 million to buy the team which they now
have-they certainly have plans for a new stadium and will work
at that. It is not something that is going to come overnight, but
they have faith.
After all, one of the criteria that should always exist is when via-
ble local ownership doesn't exist, and with all due respect, if that
wasn't the case in Cleveland, OH, there wouldn't be a baseball
team. I am merely saying if the people of San Francisco and that
ownership group, all of whom are very prominent citizens, very re-
spected businessmen, have the faith and judgment that they be-
lieve they can make it work, why should I tell them that they are
wrong?
Senator MACK. Yes, but that would never have come about if it
hadn't been for the offer that was made by the people in Tampa-
St. Petersburg. There was no one willing to step forward until
there was a commitment made from some place else to move the
team to Tampa-St. Pete, and that gets me into my next question
to you. Will you pledge to the people of Tampa and St. Pete that
they won't be used again? We have gone through this 8 years.
Mr. SELIG. Well, let me-and believe me, I am very sensitive to
that. That is a perfectly valid point and I do understand that. I
could have said the same thing when we tried to buy the White
Sox. We were turned down by the National League expansion, we
were turned down by American League expansion. We bought the
Seattle club. Then we were turned away for another 6 months.
Believe me, I can understand the sensitivity and the heartbreak
and frustration in Tampa-St. Pete, but in that particular situation,
Senator Mack, we have to deal with where the club was. Tampa-
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St. Pete is clearly a major league area and should get a major
league baseball team.
Senator MACK. We have heard that for 8 years now. We have
gone through expansion. We have attempted to purchase, I think,
seven different teams and it just doesn't happen. And saying to the
people, you know, just be patient once again is not good enough.
The other message that you all are sending is, No. 1, keeping the
franchises where they are is, in fact, No. 1, which is a message of
saying you are going to have to wait to expand. We just got
through hearing what the former commissioner thought with re-
spect to expansion. Are you then saying to me that the people of
Tampa-St. Pete may, in fact, get an expansion team in the next
year or two?
Mr. SELIG. No, no, I wouldn't-I couldn't say that to you because
I think that expansion, especially what I like to term undigested
expansion, is the worst thing for all parties. Certainly, Commis-
sioner Vincent this morning, I think, enunciated the reasons as to
why. Even if one is quarrelsome about the talent level-and people
can argue about that and say, well, you know, they haven t had
pitching for 80 years and they haven't done this and that. Well,
there is no question, though, that significant dilution is not helpful
to anybody.
But keep something in mind, also, Senator. You have an indus-
try-everybody has talked this morning and a lot this week-I
have heard in Louisville all week about the problems that beset
baseball, and they are there. You have a far longer tradition and
history in baseball than I do, but we have an industry today that
is a virtual break-even industry. Further expansion, weakening the
teams, especially teams in markets like Pittsburgh or Milwaukee
or Cleveland or San Diego or Seattle, is not helpful to anyone.
Expansion is always looked at as the panacea to solve all the ills.
The fact of the matter is that here we are with an antitrust exemp-
tion, but you have the NBA and the National Hockey League and
the National Football League without it, and yet we have as many
teams as they do.
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much, Mr. Selig. Senator
Leahy.
Senator LEAHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Selig, you were
reading from your submitted testimony in which you speak on the
future role of the commissioner. In the written testimony it says,
"The commissioner will continue to have strong powers to protect
the integrity of the game."
I think to underscore that, you emphasized that he will have the
same strong powers, and you were very emphatic about it. Are you
saying that the restructuring committee is not going to make any
changes in the authority of the commissioner?
Mr. SELIG. Certainly, on the integrity issues, from my under-
standing in talking to two cochairmen and other members of the
committee, yes, Senator Leahy, I am absolutely saying that.
Senator LEAHY. Well, what are the areas of authority that will
be changed by the restructuring committee?
Mr. SELIG. I don't know if "change" is the right word, but may
I cite an example for you which, unfortunately, last year during the
summer, I think was quite misunderstood. If I give you the exam-
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ple, I think you will understand why. In 1921, this agreement was
written. There were many things that didn't exist. In 1967, the
major league clubs started what is called the player relations com-
mittee. Unfortunately, I am also chairman of that, and that was to
handle labor.
Now, what you created because of the 46-year difference between
the two documents was an enormous ambiguity. It has never been
dealt with, Senator Leahy. That is why this restructuring commit-
tee is meeting. It is meeting really to clear up ambiguities. After
all, there was no television in 1921. There weren't a lot of things
in 1921.
Senator LEAHY. Well, let us go to more recently. You are talking
about the player relations committee. Some could argue that the
owners effectively gutted the commissioner's office before Mr. Vin-
cent's resignation by transferring the responsibility for labor talks,
which is one of the commissioner's most important functions, to the
head of the player relations committee; having done that, the own-
ers then voted no confidence in Mr. Vincent, 18 to 9, and demanded
his resignation.
He pointed out rightly that you couldn't fire him until his term
expired in, I believe, it was March 1994, and he threatened to liti-
gate the issue. And I believe to his credit-I realize there were a
lot of other things going on-but to his credit he said he would re-
sign and avoid a protracted legal battle that wouldn't be good for
baseball. With all the other things that baseball seems to be doing
to shoot itself in the foot at the moment, I tend to agree with that
decision.
I think you will hear as you listen to us on this committee that
we want a commissioner who can stand up to the owners on an
issue that is important to the fan. I think that that sort of follows
through almost all the questions and statements I have heard here.
Can you tell us as a result of this Restructuring committee that
what happened to Fay Vincent is not going to happen to the next
commissioner?
Mr. SELIG. I can, but let me go back to something, if I may, Sen-
ator Leahy.
Senator LEAHY. Sure.
Mr. SELIG. You said that, as a result of labor, we had effectively
gutted the office. Sir, the player relations committee has had the
same function since 1967, so you have it through Commissioner
Eckert. There was no change made.
Senator LEAHY. Did they have the commissioner's responsibility
for labor talks?
Mr. SELIG. No.
Senator LEAHY. That was a change?
Mr. SELIG. Once the PRO was formed, the commissioner at that
point, sir, did not have a direct role in labor. That was the ambigu-
ity that I spoke about before. That is one of the things that the re-
structuring committee is properly dealing with right now.
Senator LEAHY. Won't it go back to the commissioner?
Mr. SELIG. That is something that they are debating. You know,
that certainly-
Senator LEAHY. But it is on the table?
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Mr. SELIG. Oh, absolutely. It certainly is on the table and is a
matter that they are very clearly discussing because life has
changed and a whole different era has changed. So you asked what
restructuring is doing. That is the type of thing that the restructur-
ing committee is looking at with great specificity. That, in my judg-
ment, Senator Leahy, strengthens that office because there are
clear lines of authority, and because of history, and there have
been so many changes, what you really have now, you really have
a document that needs just what it says, some restructuring.
But I have every confidence that, as I said earlier, the integrity
issues will not be changed, and I think when the restructuring
committee is done, some day, and hopefully in the very near future,
the new commissioner will be sitting here, and I hope much sooner
than later, quite frankly. I think that you will understand what I
have said here today that there is no question.
Senator LEAHY. But it is not just the integrity issue, which, of
course, undergirds everything else, but it is whether he has got the
independence to stand up for the fans' interest, at least in my
mind. Senator Metzenbaum, I believe, already quoted what Jerry
Reinsdorf was quoted as saying, that the commissioner should be
a CEO of the owners, not the players or the umpires or the fans.
He would handle issues involving integrity or discipline. In issues
involving business, he would answer to the board of directors, the
owners.
I understand the analogy to a typical business. But there is one
whopping difference from a typical business-they don't get this
antitrust exemption. If we are going to use this as an analogy that
this is a business and you respond to the board of directors-you
are a CEO, you respond to them, and so on-then why not just go
all the way and make it a real analogy to business and get rid of
the antitrust exemption and make baseball just like any other busi-
ness?
Mr. SELIG. Because, Senator, I must tell you I will go back into
all the reasons for that, but I would like to say to you that there
is no question, as somebody who has been raised in this industry
and this business, the sport of baseball, that I agree with you, and
all of us agree with you, on the need for a strong commissioner. I
don't think there is really any disagreement on that.
Senator LEAHY. But when you consider the possible lockout com-
ing up next, I am wondering how anybody is going to stand and
say, well, you know, this is really good for baseball, this is good for
the fans. All I am thinking about over and over again here is we
give this antitrust exemption; it is supposed to be something that
is going to be good for baseball, good for the fans. Certainly, what
we have seen in the last few months doesn't strike me as being
good for the fans. If we go to a lockout next, I don't see where that
benefits the fans.
I realize my time is up. Thank you for your testimony. Mr.
Chairman, I want to commend you for having these hearings.
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much, Senator Leahy.
Mr. SELIG. Thank you, and I wish I had time to respond.
Senator METZENBAUM. I am not going to deny you an opportunity
to respond.
Senator LEAHY. Yes. Please respond.
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Senator METZENBAUM. Try to be reasonably brief.
Mr. SELIG. As far as the labor situation, Senator Leahy, I merely
would like to say to you that the clubs, after what I have kept say-
ing over and over-have had a spirited 2- or 3-month debate in the
most democratic of processes-did two things the other day. The
first vote they took was in the event we reopen and wanted a work
stoppage that it had to be a three-quarters vote, as opposed to a
simple majority, to do that. That vote passed unanimously, 28 to
nothing.
Then after a very spirited debate-and I want to say to you
again, in an industry with significant economic problems-we could
get into the whole situation with television, whatever, and we could
be here for a hundred hours discussing it. The vote was 15 to 13
to reopen. Nobody talked about lockout. Hopefully, Don Fehr, who
is here today, and Dick Ravage, the president of the player rela-
tions committee, will sit down and, in my judgment, begin to con-
struct a system that is responsive, and that is where we are today.
I don't think there is anything threatening about that, in myjudgment. On the contrary, I think if you look at these actions and
you understand the statements of people, I think that, frankly, we
have acted very responsibly and very sensitively.
Senator METZENBAUM. Mr. Selig, Senator Specter is up next.
Senator THURMOND. Mr. Chairman, I have a longstanding en-
gagement in South Carolina. I am going to have to leave now to
catch a plane to meet that engagement. I ask unanimous consent
that Mr. Fehr be allowed to answer for the record two questions
I have.
Senator METZENBAUM. Without objection, so ordered.
Senator THURMOND. I also ask unanimous consent that the mem-
bers of panel four be allowed to answer four questions I have pre-
pared.
Senator METZENBAUM. Without objection, so ordered. Would it be
all right with you if they answer them in writing subsequent to the
hearing?
Senator THURMOND. Yes, sir.
Senator METZENBAUM. All right.
Senator THURMOND. I also ask unanimous consent that the mem-
bers of panel five be allowed to answer three questions I have pre-
pared for the record.
Senator METZENBAUM. Without objection, so ordered.
Senator THURMOND. Mr. Chairman, since I have to go and I am
the ranking member, I ask unanimous consent that Senator Spec-
ter be allowed to act as acting ranking member in my absence and
have the privileges that I would have as ranking member.
Senator METZENBAUM. Without objection, so ordered.
Senator Specter.
Senator SPECTER. Mr. Selig, I have had to step out, so that I
have not heard all of your testimony, but I will try not to be repeti-
tious. In reading your prepared statement, I was very much im-
pressed and congratulate you on your efforts to bring back the
baseball team to Milwaukee after the Braves moved away even
though, as you articulated it, the Braves were making money and
had enormous attendance.
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I understand that you testified that there will be no immediate
plans in the future for expansion, and I would urge you to recon-
sider that. In taking a look at the statistics which I mentioned
briefly in my opening statement, in 1901 there were a little over
76 million Americans and 16 baseball teams; now, there are more
than 250 million Americans and 28 baseball teams. On a pro rata
basis, there ought to be about twice that many teams. I commend
the league for not allowing the Giants to be moved from San Fran-
cisco, although as I said earlier, I think that they shouldn't have
been moved from New York to San Francisco in the first place. But
I do believe that the forcefulness of your antitrust exemption, pre-
cluding moves from other cities, really underscores the necessity to
open new markets.
I know you were here when I disagreed with what former Com-
missioner Vincent had to say about Tampa-St. Pete being an asset
of baseball. Baseball is an asset of America. So my question to you
is why shouldn't you consider right away opening new markets like
Tampa-St. Pete?
Mr. SELIG. Well, Senator Specter, let me try to answer it again
in the context-Tampa-St. Pete is a marvelous market and there
is no question that it can support a major league baseball team,
but I go back to something I did say earlier. I call it undigested
expansion. Let me try to explain it in this regard.
You have an industry today, as I said earlier, that is struggling.
It is struggling as an industry mightily. If you expand, there is fur-
ther dilution. Forget the playing talent thing. We can debate that
all day long, and there are those in this room who will disagree
with that and there are those in this room who will agree, and
most baseball people will agree that we can't stand the dilution.
After all, Senator Specter, we are just in the process of creating
two teams now. In fact, we are trying to figure out how we replace
a relief pitcher that we just lost and we don't have anybody, and
every club goes through that. But that, I understand, can go on for-
ever.
But what I am saying to you, as an economic matter, Commis-
sioner Vincent said this morning that it didn't make sense economi-
cally. Now, we have expanded by two teams. The further dilution
of that and the strain it puts on the Cleveland Indians and the Mil-
waukee Brewers and the Pittsburgh Pirates and the San Francisco
Giants is something that would create, Senator Specter, more hard-
ships than problems it would solve.
Senator SPECTER. Why is that true, Mr. Selig? Take a look at
some of the players in the past: Cy Young won 511 games, Walter
Johnson won 416 games, Christie Matthewson won 373 games, and
Ty Cobb played for, as I recall, 24 years. Why not take a look at
Pittsburgh, whichlost Bonilla last year and which is about to lose
Barry Bonds?
Mr. SELIG. You are making my point here, though. That is ex-
actly the point,
Senator SPECTER. Well, OK, but there are other ways to deal
with that. Why not go to revenue sharing? I have talked with the
owners and executives of the Pirates and the Phillies, and have
tried to talk to other people to get a practical grounding beyond
just a reading of the cases.
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Doug Danforth says there ought to be revenue sharing. Bill Giles
would like to see revenue sharing if it is in conjunction with a cap.
I don't mean to speak for these men, but I am accurately quoting
them on recent conversations. The National Football League enjoys
that wonderful antitrust exemption on pooling of television re-
ceipts. You pool national receipts for baseball, but you don't for
local receipts, and there is an enormous imbalance where the Yan-
kees get, I have heard, in excess of $50 million and the Pirates get
a tiny fraction of that. Why not go to revenue sharing and some
form of a salary cap to try to deal fairly with teams like the Pi-
rates?
Mr. SELIG. Well, I will try and answer that. First of all, let me
state, coming from the smallest market in baseball, you may know
how I feel, Senator Specter, about revenue sharing. I said earlier
that baseball itself is an industry that in 1992 is virtually a break-
even industry just on operations. So revenue sharing, per se-and
I am not being quarrelsome about it because it is a very legitimate
and a very sensitive issue that needs to be and will be discussed.
But revenue sharing, per se, without a player compensation sys-
tem, cap-call it whatever you want-will not solve the problems.
If what you are suggesting is that you need to establish a player
compensation with different forms of revenue sharing, they must
be interlocked. We have no disagreement, sir.
Senator SPECTER. Are the leagues going to move to consider reve-
nue sharing and a cap?
Mr. SELIG. Well, there has been a lot of conversation about it,
Senator Specter, and I feel quite a bit better about it. I think there
has been in the last 3 or 4 months a lot of discussion on both of
these issues, understanding, sir, that they need to be interfaced
and interlocked.
Senator SPECTER. How soon do you think you will come to grips
with that?
Mr. SELIG. Well, I am not a good prognosticator because I said
I would only be in this job 2 to 3 months and it is almost 4, so I
am not sure. But I think the issues of the day are forcing us to
confront them immediately.
Senator SPECTER. I want to get into a couple of other subjects.
Will there be a second round, Mr. Chairman?
Senator METZENBAUM. I think not.
Senator MACK. Mr. Chairman-
Senator METZENBAUM. Well, no, no; I want to change that. There
will be a second round of 5 minutes.
Senator SPECTER. Well, let me broach-my time is still run-
ning-the issue of television. Former Commissioner Rozelle and his
successor, Commissioner Tagliabue, have made a commitment that
the Super Bowl will not go to pay TV until the year 2000. Would
you be in a position to say that baseball will not go to pay TV for
the World Series or the league championship series until the year
2000?
Mr. SELIG. I guess one should never say never to anything, but
I can't foresee any circumstances today, Senator Specter, that we
would put any of our postseason games on pay television.
Senator SPECTER. I will resume this on my next round. I thank
you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Selig.
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Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you. Senator Graham.
Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Selig, I am con-
cerned about the word "we" that has appeared several times in
your responses to questions, and there seems to be a "we" that is
left out of that and that is the "we" of the millions of Americans
in growth areas like Florida who have been denied access to major
league baseball.
Do I interpret what you say that major league baseball at this
time does not have any timetable for expansion of franchises?
Mr. SELIG. That is right, Senator Graham. We are just expand-
ing now, as you know. I mean, the Marlins are going to play next
year for the first time, and so are the Colorado Rockies.
Senator GRAHAM. Peter Uebberoth, when he was commissioner,
had a vision that there would be two 16-team leagues-
Mr. SELIG. I know that.
Senator GRAHAM [continuing]. Many rationales for that-and in-
dicated that had he continued as commissioner there would have
been some schedule to achieve that goal. Is there any schedule like-
ly to provide for the additional four teams that would be necessary
in order to have two 16-team leagues?
Mr. SELIG. There is not, but if I could just briefly elaborate on
that, Senator Graham, I said in my discussions with Senator Mack
that, in my view, having gotten an expansion team and lived
through a lot of expansions now, -the worst thing that can happen
to an industry is what I call so-called undigested expansion.
I submit to you that for us to rush into further expansion, with
as many clubs having financial difficulty as they are having today,
and the industry itself in a position that is far different from when
Peter Uebberoth talked about his-is not only unreasonable and
could have some devastating consequences for us; it is not fair to
the people coming in with new teams.
Senator GRAHAM. What concerns me is that you seem to be ap-
plying marketplace principles to the issue of expansion; that is,
that expansion would not be economically in the interests of major
league baseball. Mr. Vincent said that and gave reasons that were
both somewhat self-serving in terms of dilution of television reve-
nue to the current ownership as well as the reasons that you give
of digestion.
Then you seem to apply Socialist principles to the issue of reloca-
tion. If you are not going to expand into markets that clearly have
the capacity to support major league baseball and you are not going
to consider the relocation of teams that are in weaker markets,
particularly multiple-team markets, isn't the effect of that to say
that I have got to go back and Senator Mack has to go back to our
citizens in growth areas, as well as communities such as this one,
such as Phoenix, such as Buffalo, and say, you know, forget it,
major league baseball has decided that it is not in its economic in-
terests to expand and it is not going to apply marketplace prin-
ciples to relocation?
Mr. SELIG. No, Senator, I really don't think so, and I will tell you
why. I mean, I understand what you are saying and, believe me-
I said to Senator Mack and I want to say the same thing to you.
I understand the frustration because I remember the heartbreak
that I went through, and it was hard for people to keep telling me
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to hang in there when it looked like there was no end to the jour-
ney.
But I say to you, with the clubs in many places now struggling
under this type of economic environment to be able to survive, I am
not sure that creating more franchises that will have the same
trouble in surviving will do anybody a great favor. I am not saying
that there will not be expansion some day in an orderly way, but
this thing that they could create 10 or 15 more franchises, or 4 or
6 or 8-I mean, I have read that, I have heard it. Look, the only
thing that isn't honed with, frankly, is any pragmatism. It is in
neither party's, in my judgment, sir, best interests.
Senator GRAHAM. Frankly, Mr. Selig, your economic arguments
aren't very compelling when major league baseball continues to
make decisions that are adverse to its economic interests and then
looks to somebody else to pick up the costs, like you want local
communities to pick up the costs. San Francisco is being asked now
to, I think, get $1 a year for the use of the stadium, as opposed
to $750,000. You are going to ask the players to take a cap on sala-
ries rather than do those things that are within your own ability.
In your testimony, it is interesting to note that you say that in
the first era of the Milwaukee major league experience, the Braves
era, that the two most economically successful teams in the Na-
tional League, the two with the highest attendance, were the Mil-
waukee Braves, the former Boston Braves, and the Los Angeles
Dodgers, the former Brooklyn Dodgers.
I think it is instructive that major league baseball in the 1950's
was making decisions based on what was in its best economic inter-
est to take teams out of multiple-team cities and put them into
fresh markets, and got the benefit of that, but today you are saying
that major league baseball is not going to take that position.
It is interesting. In 1990, the combined attendance of the San
Francisco Giants and the Oakland Athletics was 4.9 million. Last
year, 1992, the current season, the combined attendance was 4.1
million. There has been a dramatic decline in the attendance in
that two-city baseball franchise. The commissioner said that every
criteria that he had set-declining attendance, losses by the fran-
chise, an inadequate facility, and an indication of community sup-
port to provide adequate facilities-had been met, and therefore in-
dicated to Mr. Lurie and to the public at large that the Giants were
going to be available to relocate, leaving the Oakland Athletics, just
as the Philadelphia Phillies, the Boston Red Sox, and the St. Louis
Cardinals had previously been left.
Senator SPECTER. The Philadelphia Athletics, please.
Senator GRAHAM. No, no. The Philadelphia Phillies were left, as
were the Boston Red Sox, as were the St. Louis Cardinals, to have
the benefit now of a single franchise in a metropolitan area. What
economic tears-
Senator METZENBAUM. I am going to have to cut you off, Senator
Graham.
Senator GRAHAM. I just want to ask-and maybe my question
doesn't need an answer, but what economic tears of sympathy are
required for baseball when baseball has acted so adversely to its
interests in the 1990's, as compared to an enlightened period in the
1950's and 1960's?
100
Mr. SELIG. Well, let me suggest to you, Senator Graham, that
that does surprise me a little bit, and I will tell you why. Here we
are, we are discussing social responsibility. All the people who have
talked about the people who are still mad in New York because the
Dodgers left-I have read and heard for years how irresponsible
baseball was in the 1950's and in the 1960's because they allowed
teams to move. I don't pass judgment. That was obviously long be-
fore my time.
We have desperately tried to keep teams, whether they are in
Cleveland or Pittsburgh or somewhere else, and now you are going
to say to me that they were more enlightened in the 1950's when
a cab driver who drove me in New York last week told me that he
never went to the baseball game because the Dodgers moved, be-
cause we had no conscience.
Senator GRAHAM. I mean, do you think major league baseball
would be better off today if we returned to the era where the west-
ernmost team was St. Louis and-
Mr. SELIG. No, no, I didn't say that. No, no, I didn't say that, but
I also want-
Senator METZENBAUM. I am going to have to cut this off. This
hearing is going to go on until tonight at midnight if the Chair
doesn't take some strenuous action.
Mr. SELIG. I apologize.
Senator METZENBAuM. This hearing is going to have to conclude
by 3, and I am actually going to change the rule that I previously
made saying to Senator Specter that we would have a second
round. I have many questions. We are going to have to submit
some questions because I have, I think, eight or nine more wit-
nesses and I can't be unfair to them, some of whom came from as
far as San Francisco.
Senator Feinstein.
Senator FEINSTEIN. May I just quickly, Mr. Chairman-
Senator METZENBAum. Excuse me, Senator Feinstein. Senator
Simpson is here and I am going back and forth. I apologize.
Senator SIMPSON. Mr. Chairman, does the record reflect properly
that on each occasion when you have admonished me I have strin-
gently kept within the time constraints?
Senator METZENBAUM. Senator Simpson, on this one occasion
particularly with this hearing, your conduct has been exemplary.
Senator SIMPSON. Just a damn jewel, right?
Senator METZENBAUM. Yes, a damn jewel.
Senator SIMPSON. Just a jewel. I knew you would say that.
Well, I have myriad questions, and I missed the first round and
I thank Senator Feinstein, and I apologize sincerely. I think I re-
ferred to her earlier as Senator-elect, and yet I was right there the
moment she was sworn in. So it shows you that I do need a good
Christmas vacation. I think I was out on the road too long in the
last endeavor.
I understand, though, that you took-and it is good to see you
here. I know you through reputation. Many have contacted me and
said, you know, listen to this man, he is trying his best. I think
you come with the good will of many, as you all do. We are just
concerned about how it is going to be with a commissioner in the
future. Will this be an independent, free commissioner or, if not,
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as Fay described it, a CEO-type thing, which certainly those of us
who know business and reality know that when you have high-
powered business people who have accumulated capital and bought
a ball team, that is the way they think. They think of it like run-
ning their business.
I understand you took issue with the characterization of the
Green Bay Packers as publicly owned, and you described it as a
shareholder-type arrangement. How are they controlled? Is that
kind of a public trading of stock? Would that be something in base-
ball? If not, why not?
Mr. SELIG. No, it is not publicly traded stock. In fact, it is stock
that people bought in the 1950's, and occasionally there are people
in their family who may give a share of stock away, Senator. It has
obviously been grandfathered by the NFL. There is no other owner-
ship like it. It is run by an executive committee and then a board,
which I happen to be a member of, and it has been a remarkable
entity that I think the NFL deserves a great deal of credit for pre-
serving.
Senator SIMPSON. Well, I guess my problem is in hearing and
trying to learn, and your issue of franchise relocation-and, boy,
that is a hot one, obviously, right here with my colleagues-
Mr. SELIG. Yes, sir.
Senator SIMPsoN [continuing]. And your review of matters with
Senator Metzenbaum. Just a final question, then. What about this
rule of providing a right of first refusal for cities? What we see, we
who are from the Wild West who will never see a baseball team-
that is why everybody in Wyoming will go to Denver and see the
Rockies, and they will love that like they do with the Broncos in
the NFL. But where are we when we see the attempt to, we are
going to leave and if you will build us this we will stay?
This, to me, seems like an eternal conflict, and I am simply going
to say what about a right of first refusal and you say, OK, you said
you were going to leave and now the community is going to buy you
up or people are going to gather together and buy you up?
Mr. SELIG. OK. Let me, if I can, Senator-we are going to build
a new stadium in Milwaukee that, frankly, the Brewers are very
hopeful to build. We have worked out a relationship with the public
sector where they have committed to take care of the infrastructure
costs and the Brewers are going to build a stadium. That is unique,
in a sense, but I think this. I know that people say that sports
teams will hold cities hostage.
However, I would also say to you that if you go to Baltimore Sta-
dium, which I know you have been to many times, and you see the
renaissance of that area and you see what that stadium has done
for Baltimore-you go even to the new Comiskey Park, and even
though there are those who say the White Sox held the city hos-
tage, and I don't believe that was so, I think that is a great part-
nership. I think a city believes it is a major league city because it
has it. It brings in millions.
Senator for instance, there is not a weekend of the 13 weekends
that the Milwaukee Brewers are home you can get a hotel room in
that area in that entire weekend. It brings, according to a study
we did, well over $200 million into our area. Economists can debate
all that. I merely submit to you that each city has to make its own
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judgment, and I think the people in Baltimore are very proud of
what they have done. I thmk the people in Chicago are very proud
of what they have done. We are working out a different arrange-
ment, Senator. We have held a gun to nobody's head because I
wouldn't threaten.
Senator SIMPsoN. Well, thank you. It is the issue of conflict and
the issue of the power of the commissioner that attracts me to see
whether we have something we should do. Thank you, Mr. Chair-
man.
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much, Senator Simpson.
Senator Feinstein.
Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
Selig, it seems to me as I listen and also try to learn that these
hearings come down essentially to three things. One is the role of
the commissioner in the sport and the public interest and the ele-
ment of social responsibility which you yourself referred to. The
second is the issue of the Giants and Tampa Bay-St. Pete, and the
third is the issue of an expansion policy. If this is, in fact, the
American tradition, the American game, why can't we see more of
it in America?
I would like to ask you a question on each of those. It is very
difficult for me to understand, if you take the Ms. Schott incident
and you take what baseball is supposed to be in this country, that
there can be any delay in taking an action. You have got to ascer-
tain the facts. It is difficult for me to see how owners are going to
pass judgment one on the other; that the role of a strong, independ-
ent commissioner is really part of an antitrust exemption because
if you don't have the strong, independent commissioner able to
move rapidly and forcefully to protect social responsibility and the
public interest, you are just a mere business. Would you respond
to that, please?
Mr. SELIG. I certainly will, Senator Feinstein, and I agree with
you. I have said several times today-I want to say it again-hav-
ing been raised in this business by people who really understood
back in the late 1960's and early 1970's when I came in, who really
sublimated their own interests to the best interests of baseball, all
of us understand the need for a strong commissioner.
I have expressed my feelings on our investigation of Ms. Schott.
I will still submit that all of you would be doing it the way I am
doing it and the executive council is doing it, given the cir-
cumstances.
Senator FEINSTEIN. So you would have no objection if that were
attached to an antitrust exemption?
Mr. SELIG. Well, the integrity issues of the commissioner are cer-
tainly not going to be touched by restructuring, and I agree with
you that they should be there and that baseball is best served by
having a strong commissioner in those areas. There is no question.
Senator FEINSTEIN. The second point on the Giants, would you
describe the procedure that you undertook to decide the Giants con-
troversy?
Mr. SELIG. Well, after September 9 and 10 when the change took
place, that was really the-you know, that is when I got involved
in the issue, and I must say in all candor that Bob Lurie is a very
close friend of mine. I do have this historical view of franchise
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shifts which I guess I have to apologize to Senator Mack and Sen-
ator Graham for, but I do really believe-when talking to Bill
White, the president of the National League at that time, and all
the parties involved, I really felt we had a great responsibility to
San Francisco.
So there was at that point in time an effort undertaken in which
we really tried to see if there was a viable option. You know, when
you go back and study baseball's relocation policy, Senator Fein-
stein, you will see that we always insist on local ownership and we
always say when viable and available to us, and that was true, as
I said, if you go back to Montreal, you go back to San Diego. This
isn't the first time that has happened. Everybody is acting like, you
know, this was some foreshadowing event, that our policy changed.
Wrong, wrong, it did not change. It has been consistent.
While I can understand the heartbreak-and I understand it
very well, having lived through some of it myself-I say to you that
baseball acted in the socially responsible way and the McGowan
group came forward and they have kept the team in San Francisco,
and it is consistent with everything else that we have done. So that
was the objective in the month of September and October, and as
you know, fortunately, it had, for one group, a happy ending.
Senator FEINSTEIN. Yes, yes. Obviously, I am very happy about
that, and I think Mayor Jordan will explain at what point the Gi-
ants decided that there might be outside ownership or be on the
market for sale because I think that is part of the time line here.
But I would like to go to the third point.
Mr. SELIG. Well, that is right. Excuse me. You know, after all,
Commissioner Vincent had some discussions with Mr. Lurie and,
frankly, there is a divergence of opinion on what took place. But
I wasn't there, so there is no sense in me commenting on those.
Senator FEINSTEIN. Right. On the point of expansion, you have
Tampa-St. Pete; they have built a stadium. They want a team, they
have got a market for a team. It is hard for me to understand in
this vast Nation, with all of the enthusiasm about baseball, why an
expansion team couldn't be granted in this case. You made some
comment earlier, well, we even have trouble getting a relief pitcher.
Are you saying that there isn't talent available?
Mr. SELIG. Well, I don't want to get into the talent thing, but I
would like to remind you of something. Everybody keeps saying
why can't you do this and why can't you do that. Now, here is the
NBA and the NFL, and I am not being the least bit critical, but
they have a farm system that is quite sophisticated in terms of the
colleges. I mean, players leave the colleges, have had great train-
ing, and come right to the big leagues. Yet, the NFL has the same
number of teams, and the NBA has one less than we do.
So this matter of talent, this matter of economics-of course, we
are concerned. Of course, we ought to be sensitive to Tampa-St.
Pete and, of course, we are and it is up to us to try to work some-
thing out in the future. But I can't sit here today, with candor, and
say to you that we have a plan and the plan is going to be x and
y because there are many difficulties and you must understand all
the internal difficulties, especially where you have an expansionjust starting right now and you start to think of another expansion
and what that does to them, and it sets off myriad problems. But
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it wouldn't be in the two or four new cities' best interest if we
willy-nilly expand without having thought it through.
Senator FEINSTEIN. But are you saying you are willing to take
a look at it?
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much. I am going to have
to cut this off. I have just got too many witnesses, one of which,
I know, wants to get back to San Francisco.
Thank you very much, Mr. Selig. Each of us, including myself
and Senator Specter-
Senator GRAHAM. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman, but some of us who
had anticipated there being a second round-now that there is not
going to be, can we submit further questions, and also requests for
documents and other information which will be necessary to an-
swer the questions?
Senator METZENBAUM. Absolutely. I am sure Mr. Selig will co-
operate. I myself have a number of questions; I know that Senator
Specter does, and Senator Mack.
Mr. Selig, you have been very, very helpful. It is understandable
why the major league owners have chosen you to be their spokes-
person and their leader. We still have some questions, notwith-
standing the very able answers that you provided us with. Thanks
a lot.
Mr. SELIG. Thank you very much.
[Mr. Selig submitted the following material:]
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STATEMENT OF ALLAN H. SELIG, PRESIDENT
OF THE MILWAUKEE BREWERS BASEBALL CLUB
Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to appear before the
Subcommittee today on behalf of Major League Baseball. For the
last 23 years I have been the President and Chief Executive
Officer of the Milwaukee Brewers Baseball Club. I currently
serve in the position of Chairman of Baseball's Executive
Council. The Executive Council consists of myself, eight other
Club owners (four from each League) and the two League
Presidents. Baseball's governing documents provide that during a
vacancy in the Office of the Commissioner all of the powers and
duties of the Commissioner shall be exercised by the Executive
Council. Those powers and duties include, of course, the
Commissioner's authority to act "in the best interests" of
Baseball.
Although I am confident that you requested that I
appear today because of my interim position as Chairman of the
Executive Council, I must candidly tell you that I necessarily
bring with me all that I have learned and experienced during my
23 years of operating a baseball franchise in Milwaukee. My own
views with respect to the unique role that our National Pastime
plays in American society and the covenant that Baseball has with
the millions of Americans who support our great game are all
shaped by my personal experiences in Baseball, which began even
before the Brewers were born in 1970. As I will explain in some
detail, I was deeply and personally affected by what I consider
to be a flagrant breach of that special covenant that Baseball
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has with its fans when the Braves were allowed to move from
Milwaukee to Atlanta in 1966. This is the type of breach of the
public trust that Baseball might not be able to prevent if those
upset with the decision to save baseball in San Francisco
succeeded in stripping Baseball of its 70-year antitrust
exemption. My personal experiences in Baseball leave no doubt in
my mind that the public interest was served in San Francisco by
Baseball's strong preference for franchises staying where they
are. I am confident that you will agree that no legitimate
public policy would be served by legislation that would force
Baseball to constantly defend before antitrust juries the
reasonableness of its efforts to promote franchise stability.
I understand that this hearing was called today for two
reasons. The first is the concern of some over the National
League's decision not to approve the relocation of the Giants
from San Francisco to Tampa Bay/St. Petersburg that I have just
touched on. The second is some concern over the circumstances
surrounding the departure this Fall of former Commissioner
Vincent and what Baseball's governing structure will look like in
the future. I will address both issues. After you have heard
from all of the witnesses scheduled to appear today, I am
confident that you will conclude that in neither area did
Baseball abuse its status under the antitrust laws or the special
trust that exists between the Game and the American people.
- 2 -
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BASEBALL'S STRONG PREFERENCE FOR FRANCHISE STABILITY
Let me first say to the many, many loyal baseball fans
in the Tampa Bay/St. Petersburg area that I genuinely understand
and appreciate the disappointment and the anger that you feel as
a result of the National League's decision not to approve the
relocation of the Giants to your fine city. As I will explain, I
was in your shoes on several occasions in the 1960's when it took
me 6h years to bring a baseball team back to Milwaukee. But the
National League's decision to keep the Giants in San Francisco,
where they have successfully operated with loyal support from
millions of fans for the past 35 years, was simply a
reaffirmation of Baseball's long established policy against the
relocation of franchises that have not been abandoned by their
local communities. So although I understand the disappointment
of the people of Tampa Bay/St. Petersburg, my vivid memory of the
devastation caused in Milwaukee when the Braves went to Atlanta
leaves me firmly convinced that Baseball's preference for
franchise stability is not only an appropriate policy, but the
only policy that is in the public interest.
The Boston Braves moved to my hometown of Milwaukee in
1953. Ironically, this was the first franchise relocation
permitted in Baseball since the 1903 Agreement between the
National and American Leagues. The Braves' stay in Milwaukee
was, until their abrupt departure 12 years later, one of the
great success stories in Baseball. Though a small town compared
to most other Major League cities, the Milwaukee community
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immediately embraced the Braves and supported them spectacularly.
Immediately, the Braves became a part of the basic fibre of the
Milwaukee community. The Braves drew 1.83 million fans in their
inaugural season in Milwaukee, which was an all-time National
League record. With increased seating the following year, the
Braves became the first National League Club to attract more than
2 million fans, and then duplicated this feat in 1955, 1956 and
1957. Although these attendance figures are certainly high by
today's standards for a market like Milwaukee, they were
phenomenal back in the 1950's, when there were fewer home dates
and when Milwaukee's county Stadium was smaller than it is today.
In fact, the Braves led the League in attendance in 6 out of
their 12 years in Milwaukee, and only the Dodgers drew more
people over this 12-year period. As a result of this tremendous
support, the Braves were also profitable in Milwaukee.
As a young man growing up in Milwaukee, I was one of
the many ardent fans of the Braves. When the Braves put some
shares of the Club on the public market, I bought 2,000 shares
and was actually the largest public shareholder of the Club
(although I owned only a very small percentage of the team). But
in 1963 we started to hear rumors that, despite the success of
the franchise in Milwaukee, future Hall-of-Famers Hank Aaron,
Eddie Mathews and the rest of the Braves would be moving to
Atlanta. The people of Milwaukee were outraged and they set
about to do everything they could to keep their beloved team in
town. I was the co-chairman of a local campaign formed to save
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the Braves. The owners of the Club tried to move the Club after
the 1964 season, but their stadium lease forced them to stay one
more year. While the team played in Milwaukee during the 1965
season, the Club's management essentially abandoned them. I
became a vice president of a Milwaukee civic group that actually
ran the Braves during that season.
But despite our best efforts, the Braves did move to
Atlanta at the end of the 1965 season. I was personally
heartbroken and I can tell the Subcommittee that the city of
Milwaukee and the state of Wisconsin were traumatized by the loss
of that franchise. The people in my town felt hostility,
bitterness and a deep sense of betrayal towards Major League
Baseball for allowing the Braves to abandon us. Our loyal
financial and emotional support of Baseball was rewarded with a
slap in the face. The years of drawing more than 2 million fans
per season were forgotten. The Club simply got up and moved to
what it considered to be an even greener pasture and no one from
Major League Baseball stopped them.
The void left in the community by the Braves' departure
drove me to devote the next 6h years of my life to trying to
bring Major League Baseball back to Milwaukee. As I mentioned, I
understand the disappointment and frustration felt by the people
of Tampa Bay because I was there. On several occasions during
those 6h years I was certain that I had reached an agreement to
purchase an existing franchise. Each time the deal eventually
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fell through and the franchise stayed put. We also lost out when
four expansion franchises were awarded to begin play in 1969.
Our break finally came when one of those expansion
franchises failed after just one year of operation. By the end
of that 1969 season, the ownership group of the Seattle Pilots
concluded that it could not successfully operate a franchise in
Seattle and so they began looking to sell the team. I led a
group that signed a contract to buy the Pilots in October of
1969. But for the next six months, Baseball, acting responsibly
and properly in my view, did everything it could to keep the
Pilots in Seattle. It was not until the Pilots' owners put the
team into bankruptcy and the bankruptcy judge ordered the sale of
the Club to my group that Baseball reluctantly allowed the Club
to move to Milwaukee. We actually purchased the Club on March
31, 1970, just days before the opening of the 1970 season. After
6h years of heartbreak, the people of Milwaukee finally got back
something that should never have been taken from them.in the
first place.
And that is the abridged version of how I became
involved in Major League Baseball. The moral of my experience in
Milwaukee is, to my mind, that the professional sports leagues in
general and Baseball in particular should vigilantly enforce
strong policies prohibiting Clubs from abandoning local
communities which have supported them. The Milwaukee experience
confirms for me that the appropriate policy of every professional
sports league is to prohibit franchise relocations except in the
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most dire circumstances where the local community has, over a
sustained period, demonstrated that it cannot or will not support
the franchise. This, I an happy to report to you, is precisely
Baseball's policy. It is also the reason why the loyal
supporters of the San Francisco Giants will continue to enjoy the
performances of Will Clark and his teammates next year and for
(we hope) many years after that.
But if Baseball were not exempt from the antitrust
laws, a decision protecting franchise stability such as the one
made in San Francisco would have certainly subjected Baseball to
a costly and unpredictable treble damage lawsuit. Indeed,
without its exemption, Baseball might not have even attempted to
save the Giants for the people of San Francisco. Ever since a
court concluded that the antitrust laws left the NFL powerless to
stop Al Davis from abandoning the remarkably supportive (and
profitable) Oakland market for greener pastures in Los
Angeles,1L no professional sports league other than Baseball has
been able to stop a franchise from abandoning its local community
for what the owner perceives to be greater riches elsewhere.
This misguided application of the antitrust rules is
why Oakland is today without its famed Raiders, although it does
still have the publicly financed stadium it built for the team
with its annual debt service of $1.5 million through the year
2006. It is also why Baltimore no longer has its beloved Colts,
11 AA Los Aneles Mem. Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football
Lag, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984), cet denied, 469
U.S. 990 (1986).
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the football Cardinals now play in Phoenix rather than St. Louis,
the basketball Clippers are in Los Angeles rather than San Diego
and the basketball Kings play in Sacramento rather than Kansas
City. From a purely personal standpoint, I feel for all the
loyal fans in those cities who lost such important parts of their
communities because of the Davis decision. I think it is a sad
commentary that the NFL and the NBA could not prevent the hurt
that these communities have had to endure.
In a thoughtful article recently published in a
compilation of articles on the business of professional sports,
Professor Gary Roberts, who I understand will also testify today,
explained that the rash of NFL franchise moves following the Al
Davis case after decades of franchise stability in the NFL is a
"dramatic example" of the type of inevitable "chaos and
inefficiency" caused by allowing juries and judges to second
guess the "reasonableness" of a sports league's governance
decisions under antitrust conspiracy doctrine.?L I heartily
agree with Professor Roberts' conclusion that "[s]uch cases
essentially have created a prescription for turning the business
of running leagues over to hundreds of federal judges with vastly
U The Business of Professional Sports 146 (P. Staudohar & J.
Mangan ed. 1992). I have attached a copy of Professor
Roberts' article to this statement for the Subcommittee's
benefit. I believe that it persuasively and conclusively
debunks the arguments of those who assert that the antitrust
laws would solve all of Baseball's problems.
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different philosophies and interests. In the long run nobody
gains from such an unpredictable and irrational system."M
Those who suggest that Baseball's problems would
be solved by subjecting the Game's decisionmaking to the
antitrust principles developed in the other professional sports
simply ignore the undeniable fact that the application of
antitrust laws has been the cause of the many problems, including
franchise instability, that exist in the other professional
sports today. Even Professor Zimbalist has recognized that
"la]pplying antitrust has hardly been a godsend to the erstwhile
NFL cities of Oakland and Baltimore. . . . From the metropolitan
perspective, antitrust is not the preferred remedy."M
In fact, Congress was so appalled by the Raiders'
abandonment of Oakland and the Colts' subsequent midnight move
out of Baltimore that several members introduced a number of
bills in 1984 and 1985 designed to promote franchise stability.
These bills would have given the professional sports leagues the
authority that only Baseball now has to stop franchises from
leaving communities that have supported them. (ERA, Se., S.
172, S. 259, S. 298). Although differences in proper approach to
the problem prevented the passage of any of these bills, all
sides of the legislative debate recognized the vital public
interest in franchise stability. The only bill that was reported
IL d, at 148.
1 A. Zimbalist, Baseball And Billions: A Probing Look Inside
The Bia Business Of our National Pastime 166 (1992).
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out of Committee was S. 259, the Professional Sports Community
Protection Act of 1985. The preamble to S. 259 reflects this
public interest:
[This bill is intended] to protect the public
interest in stable relationships among
communities, professional sports teams and
leagues and in the successful operation of
such teams in communities throughout the
Nation, and for other purposes.
While S. 259 was not ultimately voted on by the full Senate, the
debate made clear that a vast majority of the legislators agreed
with the bill's finding that "it is in the public interest to
preserve stability in the relationship between professional
sports teams and the communities in which such teams may
successfully operate. . . ." It is that same public interest
that Baseball took into account when it kept the Giants in San
Francisco and it is the same public interest that Baseball has
succqssfully preserved for the last 20 years.
I am extremely proud of Baseball's record on franchise
stability. Because Baseball's internal governance decisions have
not been subjected to the antitrust laws, Baseball has by far the
best record of the professional sports in the area of franchise
stability. No baseball franchise was permitted to relocate
between 1903 and 1952. While several franchises moved between
1953 and 1972) (including the Braves' move to Atlanta in 1966 and
the two relocations out of Washington, first to Minnesota in 1961
and then to Texas in 1972) no Club has been permitted to relocate
since the Senators' last move in 1972. The recent attempted
relocations.of the Seattle Mariners and the San Francisco Giants
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are just the latest of a long list of potential relocations over
the last 20 years that were prevented by Baseball's strong policy
in favor of stability and against abandonment. In contrast to
Baseball's unblemished record over the last 20 years, football
and basketball have each had three franchise relocations since
1980 and hockey has had two.
As Baseball's franchise relocation record amply
demonstrates, Baseball has in no way "abused" its antitrust
exemption. While we have not flatly prohibited all franchise
relocations, we do not allow a franchise to relocate simply so
that the owner can earn greater profits. Indeed, the fact that
the National League rejected the relocation to Tampa Bay/St.
Petersburg despite the fact that it would have netted Bob Lurie a
reported $15 million more than he was able to get in San
Francisco shows that profit has not been the driving force in
Baseball's decisionmaking. The San Francisco decision certainly
cannot be said to be evidence that Baseball has abused its
antitrust exemption. Accordingly, there is obviously nothing
about Baseball's most recent decision in favor of franchise
stability in San Francisco that provides a legitimate basis for
altering Baseball's antitrust status.
Although the effects of eliminating Baseball's
exemption cannot be thoroughly anticipated by anyone, it seems
inevitable to me that the most immediate consequence would be
that a number of teams in small markets would attempt to abandon
some of Baseball's existing cities for what they think are better
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economic conditions elsewhere. This is particularly likely today
because Baseball has moved into an extremely difficult economic
time. As more and more small market Clubs continue to lose money
year after year, the temptation to move to a city that appears to
offer a "quick fix" is likely to become overwhelming. Indeed,
Baseball could be faced with Clubs jumping from town to town to
take advantage of the "honeymoon" period that relocated teams
enjoy in their first few years. It would obviously not be in the
public interest to render Baseball impotent to stop such conduct.
THE RESIGNATION OF FAY VINCENT
AND THE FUTURE GOVERNANCE OF BASEBALL
Some members of the Subcommittee have expressed concern
over Fay Vincent's departure and what that departure means for
the future of Baseball's Office of the Commissioner. Let me
first say that the owners did not summarily dismiss Mr. Vincent
for protecting the best interests of the Game and the public.
When Mr. Vincent took office, he acknowledged that if he ever
lost the confidence of a majority of the owners, he would resign.
While Mr. Vincent had the full support of the owners when he took
office under very difficult circumstances after the death of Bart
Gianatti, he gradually lost that support. By September, 1992, 18
teams requested his resignation. Since he needed a majority of
the Clubs to be re-elected to a second term, and since the
decision on a second term could have been made as early as
- 12 -
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January 1993, Mr. Vincent recognized that he had become a lame
duck Commissioner and that he had lost the confidence of two-
thirds of the teams. As a result, he honored his initial pledge
and resigned.
I cannot speak for all of the teams which lost
confidence in Fay Vincent. Many Clubs had many reasons.
However, perhaps the most commonly articulated concern was his
inability to develop a consensus among the owners on the vital
issues that face the Game today. Rather than pulling together
under his leadership, the teams were drawing further and further
apart, and were advancing their parochial interests. In the
opinion of an overwhelming majority of the Clubs, Mr. Vincent was
simply not the person to lead Baseball during what they all
realized would be a very difficult and challenging period. Since
his departure, we have appointed a restructuring committee which
is hard at work and we are attempting to face the difficult
issues and build consensus. It does not help the Game to have
numerous teams for sale and to have teams on the verge of
bankruptcy. Nor will it help if eventually only a few teams can
afford all of the top players; fans will soon lose interest.
The Executive Council is now exercising the powers of
the Commissioner's Office, including its "best interests" powers.
Moreover, although the restructuring committee has not yet
completed its work, I can say that there will still be a
Commissioner who will continue to have strong powers to protect
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the integrity of the Game. There is in my view no reason to
change the current laws to do something more.
In the meantime, Baseball's responses to the two most
recent relocation attempts demonstrate that Baseball remains
committed to upholding the public's trust in the Game. As the
Subcommittee is aware, there was an effort to move the Seattle
Mariners to Tampa Bay prior to the time Commissioner Vincent
resigned. That effort was stopped and a new owner was found who
made a commitment to keep the Mariners in Seattle. The proposed
move by the San Francisco Giants took place after Mr. Vincent's
resignation. It also was stopped by Baseball and a new ownership
group was found that made a commitment to keep the Giants in San
Francisco. And I can assure you today that this consistent
policy of favoring stability over abandonment will continue
regardless of the ultimate conclusion of the current
restructuring deliberations.
CONCLUSION
When the Supreme Court reaffirmed Baseball's antitrust
exemption in the Efl:g case in 1972, it noted that over 50 bills
had been introduced with respect to Baseball over the previous 20
years. The Court found it significant that the only bills that
passed either the House or the Senate would have acted to expand
the antitrust exemption to the other professional league sports.
Those bills stripping Baseball of its exemption never made it out
of Committee. Since 1972, Congress has considered scores of
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additional bills regarding Baseball and the antitrust status of
professional sports. Again, the only bill to make it out of
Committee would have expanded the antitrust exemption for all
professional sports leagues. In short, Congress has often looked
at Baseball's position with respect to the antitrust laws and it
has always reaffirmed Baseball's status because Baseball's
conduct has always been consistent with the public interest.
Club owners and the governments and communities in
which Baseball currently operates have all relied on Baseball's
antitrust immunity which has now existed for 70 years. As
explained above, nothing has happened recently to suggest that
Baseball has abused its exemption so that Congress should reverse
its long-held position on this issue. If anything, recent events
such as Baseball's decision to preserve the National Pastime in
Seattle and San Francisco make it all the more clear that
Baseball's status should remain as it has for the last 70 years.
Baseball's critics who have advocated for the removal of
Baseball's exemption have consistently failed to describe the
ways in which the performance of Baseball would better serve the
public interest if it operated under the antitrust rules which
the courts have unfortunately applied to the other professional
sports leagues. The same is true today. The fact of the matter
is that the threat of antitrust liability has caused nothing but
confusion and instability in the other professional sports for
both the franchises' investors and the communities in which they
operate. Baseball has continued to uphold its unique covenant
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with its fans and it deserves to retain its current status under
the antitrust laws.
I sincerely thank the Subcommittee for the opportunity
to speak before you today on these extremely important issues.
- 16 -
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Professional Sports
and the Antitrust Laws
Gary R. Roberts
Perhaps no area of law has impacted professional sports more over these
past twenty years than antitrust. Since 1966 the National Football League
alone has had to defend over sixty antitrust suits. The National Basketball
Association, and the National Hockey League, and even upstart leagues
like the now-defunct World Hockey Association (WHA), American Basket-
ball League. and the United States Football League (USFL). have also been
frequently hit by such suits. Only major league baseball. which enjoys a
broad antitrust immunity as a result of three U.S. Supreme Court decisions.
has been able to operate without the substantial risk and expense of anti-
trust litigation.'
Although antitrust law seems mysterious and complex. its source is sur-
prisingly simple. Except for the statute governing mergers of two firms, the
overwhelming bulk of antitrust law derives from the first two sections of
the 1890 Sherman Act. Section 1 prohibits "every contract, combina-
tion. . . . or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce." while section 2
makes it illegal to "monopolize, or attempt to monopolize. or combine or
conspire . . . to monopolize" trade or commerce. Virtually all sports anti-
trust cases involve one or both of these vague statutory proscriptions-con-
spiracies to restrain trade and monopolization. 2
Antitrust cases against professional leagues or their member clubs gener-
ally are of two types. The first involves disputes between two different
leagues or between member clubs of different leagues. The second, and
more significant, category includes all cases brought by anyone having a
dispute with a league and alleging that a league rule or decision constitutes
an unlawful section I conspiracy among the individual member clubs of the
league. It is the second type of cases-those involving so-called intraleague
conspiracies-that has been the most frequent and problematic. and it has
had the greatest impact on professional sports.
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The Interleague Dispute Cases
The interleague type of case is typically brought by a young struggling
league claiming that an older and more established league monopolized or
attempted to monopolize some part of the sports entertainment market in
violation of Sherman Act section 2. To win such a claim the plaintiff must
prove two things: (1) that the defendant has, or is close to having, monop-
oly market power in some relevant market or line of commerce. and (2) that
the defendant has acted improperly in acquiring or maintaining that monop-
oly power. Because these issues are economically complex and often very
difficult to prove, plaintiffs also often allege that the defendant league's
conduct involved a section I conspiracy in restraint of trade. But regardless
of the legal theory, the essential claim is always that a well-established
league or its teams acted to cripple or destroy a rival league or teams in
order to maintain a monopoly position.
As suggested above, antitrust cases between leagues have been few and
have had relatively little impact on the structure or operation of professional
sports. The most recent example is the highly publicized case the USFL
brought against the NFL, which primarily claimed that the NFL's contracts
with the three major television networks unlawfully monopolized profes-
sional football. After a lengthy trial in 1986, a Manhattan jury found that
the NFL had monopolized professional football; however, apparently be-
cause the jury believed that the USFL went bankrupt primarily because of
its own mismanagement, it awarded the USFL damages of only one dollar
(which by law were automatically trebled to three). When the verdict was
affirmed on appeal, the demise of the USFL became permanent (USFL v.
NFL, 842 F.2d 1335 [2d Cir. 19881). In a similar case in 1962. the old
American Football League claimed that the NFL monopolized professional
football by putting teams in Dallas and Minnesota and threatening to ex-
pand in other cities in order to disrupt the AFL's initial operations. The
case resulted in a verdict for the NFL (AFL v. NFL, 205 F. Supp. 60 [D.
Md. 1962], aff'd, 323 F.2d 124 [4th Cir. 1963]).
The WHA was more successful in its suit against the NHL in the early
1970s. The essence of this claim was that the NHL monopolized profes-
sional hockey by including a clause in all of its clubs' player contracts giv-
ing the club a permanent renewable option on the player when the contract
term ended, which prevented a player from playing for any other hockey
club until his NHL club no longer wanted him. Thus the WHA was unable
to employ good hockey players if they had ever played in the NHL and, as
a result, could never seriously compete with the NHL. In 1972 shortly after
the case was filed. the district judge issued a preliminary injunction against
the NHL's enforcement of these "lifetime reserve clauses" based on his
finding that at trial they would probably be found to constitute unlawful
123
Professional Sports and the Antitrust Laws / 137
monopolization (Philadelphia World Hockey Club v. Philadelphia Hockey
Club. 351 F. Supp. 462 [E.D. Pa. 1972]).
Unfortunately, the injunction was of little help to the WHA; by 1979 all
of its clubs were insolvent and had disbanded except for the teams in Hart-
ford. Winnipeg, Edmonton. and Vancouver, all of which joined the NHL.
The case did, however. lead to a settlement between, the two leagues and
their player unions under which the NHL's lifetime reserve clause was re-
placed with a much less onerous "free agent compensation system" that
allowed a player to sign with any hockey team when his contract expired.
subject only to the new club giving some arbitrated compensation to the old
club, but only if both clubs were NHL members.
Another group of interleague cases has involved stadium lease or arena
lease provisions that give the leasing club an exclusive right to use the fa-
cility for its sport. If a facility is realistically the only one in the area capa-
ble of housing a professional team, the exercise of the exclusive rights
clause forecloses other leagues from putting a competing team in the city.
Several cases have involved plaintiffs who were trying to obtain franchises
in upstart leagues who alleged that such lease provisions allowed the estab-
lished local team to monopolize the local market in its sport. These plain-
tiffs have generally been unsuccessful, either because alternative facilities
were available or because the team could not show that they would have
obtained a franchise in the new league even if the stadium had been avail-
able. The only such case to result in a published opinion was eventually
settled for $200,000 after thirteen years of litigation. The ruling in this case
makes it reasonably clear that the Sherman Act is violated if a new league
is excluded from a city because of such a lease provision, at least unless
very strong business justifications exist for restricting the newcomer's ac-
cess to the facility (Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982 [D.C. Cir.
19771, cert. denied. 436 U.S. 956 [19781).
Another interleague case involved a challenge by the North American
Soccer League (NASL) to the NFl's proposed by-law that would have pro-
hibited majority owners or chief executive officers of NFL teams from own-
ing an interest in franchises of other sports leagues. Specifically at issue
was the NFL's efforts to force Lamar Hunt. who owns the NFL's Kansas
City Chiefs. and Joe Robbie, who owns the Miami Dolphins. to divest their
interests (or in Robbie's case, his ife's interest) in NASL franchises. Be-
cause of the shaky financial position of the NASL, the divestment. com-
bined with the paucity of non-NFL owners willing to invest in the NASL,
might have pushed the NASL over the financial edge (over which it even-
tually went anyway). Curiously, the primary claim in the case was not that
the NFL monopolized any relevant market, such as the league iports au-
tumn entertainment market, but that the NFL clubs unlaw tullh conspired
among themselves under section I to restrain trade. After the Jitrict court
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in New York granted a summary judgment for the NFL. the court of ap-
peals reversed and entered a judgment for the NASL on the grounds that the
NFL clubs had conspired to restrain the previously unheard-of sports capital
investment market (NASL v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249 [2d Cir.), cert. denied.
459 U.S. 1074 [19821).
The NASL decision has been severely criticized, not only because of its
result but because of its doctrinal justification. Justifying the decision on
conspiracy grounds rather than monopolization grounds seems totally at
odds with standard section 1 principles. which encourage vigorous indepen-
dent competition between separate entities, such as two different leagues
Thus, although the decision clearly invalidated the NFL's cross-ownership
ban when applied against the struggling NASL. it is probably limited to its
specific facts-that is. the ban probably does not violate the law when ap.
plied by the NFL against cross-ownership in established sports leagues like
the NHL, NBA. or major league baseball, or rival leagues in the same
sport, like the WFL or USFL.
Generally, with the possible exception of the anomalous NASL case. the
decisions in these interleague cases have been unsurprising and unremark.
able, and they have had little impact on either the law or the structure Ir
professional sports. Most doctrinal principles relating to monopolization are
reasonably clear and have not changed, and in each of the cases the out.
come primarily turned not on the interpretation or application of the law
but on what the juries believed were the real facts of the case. While jur.
findings of fact usually are significant for a particular case, they generall%
have little or no impact on future cases or the general state of the law.
The one legal issue in these sports monopolization cases that is problem
atic, and will probably remain so, is how to define the relevant market thur
the plaintiff claims has been monopolized. The market definition must in
clude both a product and a geographic dimension-for example. prote,
sional football entertainment in the United States; ticket sales for footh
entertainment (high school, college. and professional) in the New York met
ropolitan area; network television rights for all kinds of entertainment in the
United States: television rights for all sports entertainment in New England
and so on. The possibilities are almost endless. The general rule for makmp,
this determination is that the proper market includes all the different bran,:
and products sold within the appropriate geographical area that are econom
ically competitive with one another-that is, those that serve approximate -
the same purpose for the average consumer so that consumers can swit,
from one to the other if price or quality materially changes.
Defining the proper relevant market is extraordinarily difficult. For eurm
pie, how can one identify everything that meaningfully competes with NF
football in a single market description? What percentage of people w h.
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now buy tickets to New York Giants football games would, if the Giants'
ticket prices increased by a certain amount, spend their entertainment dol-
lars attending college football games? Would they attend Yankee baseball
games or Broadway shows or watch cartoons on television? Adding in the
geographic dimension, how far would disgruntled Giants fans be willing to
travel to find a substitute activity? How many would choose gambling in
Atlantic City or skiing in Vermont? Then again, what effect would the
amount of the ticket price increase have on all these factors? No one can
possibly know. Nonetheless, based on whatever information is available, a
plaintiff must establish that some group of actual or potential product alter-
natives exists that is generally substitutable to a sufficient number of con-
sumers within an identified geographic area so that they comprise a
relevant market that the defendant has monopolized.
The market definition problem is not unique to sports cases. Defining a
relevant market is a nightmare in almost all monopolization cases. Because
of the complexity and conceptual difficulty (if not impossibility) of doing
the necessary economic analysis, courts generally either have reached a
knee-jerk conclusion (camouflaged by confusing rhetoric), or have ducked
the issue by leaving the question to juries to do what they instinctively feel
is just. But the fact that a defined relevant market is an essential element of
a monopolization case always injects a great deal of unpredictability into
these interleague cases.
This problem could be greatly reduced in cases between two leagues in
the same sport, like the USFL and the NFL, simply by identifying the rel-
evant market as the labor market in which the leagues employ their players
instead of focusing on some market in which the leagues sell their enter-
tainment products against one another. The labor market is undoubtedly the
proper market for relevant concern. If the NFL wanted to drive the USFL
out of business, by whatever method, it was not because it was seriously
concerned about NFL ticket buyers or television networks switching over to
the USFL. It wanted to stop the rapid escalation in player salaries caused
by the USFL's competition in the market for hiring football players. If the
NFL was trying to monopolize anything, it was this labor market. This
market is easy to define, and a plaintiff could probably prove that an estab-
lished league like the NFL or NBA has enormous market power in it.4 By
focusing on the player market in cases between two leagues in the same
sport, plaintiffs would greatly increase their chance of success.
Ultimately, however, these types of cases will probably never be very
significant in altering the shape of professional sports because of the great
likelihood that in each sport no more than one established league will ever
exist for more than a brief period. Since World War II, one hockey, two
basketball, and four football leagues have sprung up to compete against the
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NHL, NBA. and NFL. respectively, and not one has survived more than a
few seasons. The public's demand for a single acknowledged "world cham-
pion," and the need over the long run to control player costs and competi-
tive balance among teams (which cannot be done effectively in either
league if two are competing in the same sport), make it quite likely that the
established league in each sport will never face permanent competition or
be supplanted by an upstart league. Thus no matter what legal doctrines are
developed or what the outcome of any interleague monopolization cases
may be. it is unlikely that these cases will ever be of long-term or structural
significance.
The Intraleague Conspiracy Cases
The second type of sports antitrust case involves challenges to any league
rule, decision, or action ("league conduct") by some dissatisfied person
claiming that the conduct constituted a section I conspiracy of the league's
member clubs to restrain competition among themselves. These cases are by
far more frequent, more unpredictable, and doctrinally more problematic
than the interleague monopolization cases.
Cases in this category have involved virtually every type of league con-
duct. For example, league rules barring players from the league for a vari-
ety of reasons5 and rules assigning each player to a specific league member
(like the player drafts and reserve rules) 6 have been attacked by individual
players, player unions, and rival leagues. Persons disappointed with not be-
ing able to own a team have brought cases challenging league decisions not
to expand the league membership7 and not to approve the sale of a
franchise.8 Stadiums seeking league tenants and even league members have
challenged league decisions not to allow teams to relocate their home
games to a new city.9 The Justice Department, fans, and television stations
have sued over league broadcasting contracts and practices.' 0 Equipment
manufacturers and players have even challenged playing-field rules." In
each case, the allegation was that the league's action had involved a con-
spiracy of the individual league members to restrain competition among
themselves in some commercial market.
Although the defendant leagues have won the overwhelming majority of
these cases, a few widely publicized cases in which leagues lost have had
an enormous impact on the structure and operation of professional sports.
The most notable are the John Mackey and Yazoo Smith cases from the mid-
1970s, which invalidated respectively the NFL's reserve system and college
player draft as they were then structured, completely altering the shape of
labor relations in professional sports. In the infamous Los Angeles Memo-
rial Coliseum case the court found the NFIs efforts to require the then
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Oakland Raiders to play its home games in Oakland (as it had contractually
Seed to do) instead of in Los Angeles to be an unlawful conspiracy of the
oher NFL clubs What was so significant about these decisions was not
only the way they dramatically and directly changed the face of the game
but how they were based on legal principles that were confusing, aberra-
tional, and inconsisient both with other antitrust decisions and with anti-
trust doctrine generally. The legacy of these cases is that today there is
virtually no conduct of any sports league (other than baseball) involving any
satter that -ciot gceivably be challenged successfully in the right court.
In order to underitand why these conspiracy cases are so doctrinally con-
foun and troublesome for league operations, it is necessary first to un-
seciin I's condemnation of conspiracies is all about. The
bisic theory Wt free enterprise is that the products consumers want will be
Produced in the gaest quantity, at the highest quality, and at the cheapest
P=cif r tion decisions conform to the dictates of supply and demand
W . eis:quiibrium will be achieved when independent producers of
eahame or functionally interchangeable products compete with each other
to attract customers. It is through competition and each firm's desire to
Stact the greatest sumber of customers that prices are kept to a minimum
an quality maintained. It is for this reason that antitrust law seeks to max-
imize compptition by outlawing both (a) one firm driving all competitors
out qqu(iness (monopolization) and (b) groups of competitors getting to-
Sehei 1 age on the price or quality of their otherwise competing prod-
But sectial's condemnation of "every conspiracy in restraint of trade"
is notas sige as it might seem. Obviously, totally independent companies
li e fMz_ Morbrs, Ford, and Chrysler cannot agree on the price or design
ofmpcift Ab without illegally conspiring, but what about the Chevro-
let, and Cadic divisions of GM agreeing on the price of their cars?
Becmftes are merely different divisions of the same company. it is un-
disputed tffutthey.Eititute a single legal person whose internal actions are
not 'conspiracies'-7his distinction underscores a critical aspect of anti-
trust doctrine ths ~y courts have failed to appreciate in sports league
cases--namely tAery type and form of cooperative action between sep-
1rat persots coeot possibly be illegal.
It thus becogae5 crucial for section I cases that the law define in some
Imaat 35 or.e esja aL to.be nsiered independeJof
Vah 6tfr-m put hi w& ihic5 pi4ons; enties the law~ivM
~A t Bi itbrifotead ot Wber-sufs dependent persons or
Mis who so-o* t bs coqetitorf of each otberTeach agreements on
how to coedact their busincis. Lll their prodiits,.ihey may unlawfu
n"coBptuition. But when prsons or entities that
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anerely employfs, partners, or divlsions of a single business firm make
agreem ens orjoint decisionfs in an effort to operate the firm profitably.
- their an are clearly ordinary lawful cooperation.
In most factual contexts, making this distinction has not ttel a signifi.
gcnt problem for courts. Clearly, the different employees of a single corpo-
ration cannot illegally conspire with respect- to carrying on the
corporation's bustness. The partners in a recognized partnership (whether
individual people, corporations, or other partnerships) never illegally con-
spire when making decisions about the partnership's business--Different di-
visions, and even different subsidiary corporations that are wholly owned
by the same parent corporation (since the Supreme Court's Copperweld v.
Independence Tube decision in 1984), can never illegally conspire.'12 here
is only one type of business entity that continues to give the courts fits-
the joint venture. Unfortunately, this category includes sports leagues.
It is curious that for virtually every other legal purpose, joint ventures
and partnerships are treated identically. In fact, under standard business or-
ganization law principles, joint ventures are merely a kind of partnership
different from more typical partnerships only in that joint ventures are cre-
ated by their partners for a narrow specific purpose or for a limited period
of time. Thus the special fiduciary obligations of partners to the business,
the liability of partners for the business's debts, and the authority of part.
ners to bind the business and the other partners are all exactly the same
whether the business is a joint venture or a more typical partaership. For
seemingly arbitrary reasons, federal antitrust courts have singled out joint
ventures and generally treated the internal business agreements of: beir
partners as conspiracies subject to condemnation if found tobtW"u eson-
able," whereas agreements among traditional partners have never been held
to be unlawful conspiracies.'.
From the standpoint of antitrust policy (namely, the advancement of con-
sumer welfare), the distinction between joint ventures (like ports leagues)
and traditional partnerships and corporations is not justified. It is simply
nonsense to allow judges or juries unfamiliar with the indtistry to second-
guess the wisdom of business decisions made by persons whose business is
affected. When the members of General Motors' corporate board of direc-
tors collectively decide where GM's factories will be located, o* when the
partners in a law, medical, or accounting firm collectively decid, where to
locate their offices, nobody in his right mind thinks the decisihouldobe
considered a conspiracy and tested for reasonableness by softio4A* olay
jury. But when the governing board of the NFL collectiveTy-ccides that
eight league games every year will be produced in Oakland instead of Los
Angeles, the decision is treated as a conspiracy, which a Los Angeles judge
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and jury can render illegal if they believe it to be unreasonable (as hap-
pened in the Los Angeles Coliseum/Raiders case).
This distinction also has been made with respect to the hiring standards
and employment practices of corporations, partnerships, and sports leagues.
If IBM (corporation) or a major national accounting firm (partnership) de-
cided not to hire anyone who had not completed college or insisted that
employee John Doe would have to agree to work at the company's Kansas
City Office if he wanted to be hired, nobody would question the policy as a
potentially unlawful conspiracy. But when a sports league declines to em-
ploy players who have not completed their years of college training or re-
quires quarterback John Doe to play for the team in Kansas City, courts
condemn these decisions as unreasonable conspiracies (as in the Denver
Rockets. Mackey. and Smith cases)."
The reason generally given by courts and plaintiffs for this distinction is
that. unlike corporations and partnerships. sports leagues are not really
single business firms; they are a group of separately owned teams with dis-
tinct legal identities that maintain their own separate books and have dif-
ferent profits and losses. While these points are superficially true, they are
wholly irrelevant to antitrust policy because they overlook the fundamental
nature of the business of a sports league and the relationship among a
league's member teams. In fact, the antitrust policy of maximizing con-
sumer welfare can be furthered only by treating league conduct in exactly
the same way as the law treats corporate and partnership conduct. To un-
derstand why this is so. one must first recognize that the unique product a
sports league produces is athletic (not economic) "competition," which re-
quires separate teams as a necessary camouflage for the inherent partner-
ship nature of a league.
Sports leagues produce a unique type of entertainment product-team
athletic competition. At a bare minimum two different teams are always
necessary to produce this product. Every game is the product of at least a
two-team joint venture. Although game tickets and television broadcasts
are often marketed as, for example, "Washington Redskins football," this
single reference is quite misleading. The Redskins team alone is incapable
of producing any football entertainment; the proper designation is "NFL
football."
Furthermore, although a single NFL game may be a discrete entertain-
Inent event for some marketing purposes, it is not a separate product for
any meaningful economic or antitrust purpose. The product is actually the
league's annual series of 224 regular season games leading to a post-season
tournament and a Super Bowl champion. It is only because each game is
ultimately connected to the championship that it has substantial value. An
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isolated scrimmage game between two teams that did not count in any
league standings or statistical rankings would be far less attractive to con-
sumers, and it certainly could not command millions of dollars in television
fees or twenty or more dollars a ticket from tens of thousands of fans.
A league's product is thus jointly produced, and no team produces any-
thing by itself. Furthermore, no individual game is solely the product of
even the two participating teams; the value of every game is largely gener-
ited by the trademark and imprimatur of the league and the cooperation
and participation of all league members. each of which must recognize and
accept the results of every game. Each individual team's fortunes, no mat-
ter how the league elects to divide total league revenues and expenses. are
to a greater or lesser extent inherently affected by the success or failure of
every single league game. Thus decisions affecting the structure of the
league or the production or marketing of any league game affect the entire
league, and every member has a stake and an inherent right to participate in
those decisions, just as a partner in a law firm has a stake a- * a right to
vote in his firm's business decisions. For example, although the location of
the Raiders' home games will most greatly affect the Raiders (but only be-
cause of the league's pragmatic decision to give the majority of locally gen-
erated revenues to the home team), it also affects every other NFL
member.' 5 Without the acceptance. recognition, and occasional participa-
tion on the field of the other NFL members, those Raiders home games
would be of very little economic value.
Accordingly, no individual sports team is capable of any production with-
out the full cooperation of the other league members, and each team's eco-
nomic existence, as well as its profits, depends entirely on its being an
integral part of the league. It logically follows that these members are all
inherent partners in the business of producing the league's wholly inte-
grated entertainment product, and thus the teams are not and cannot be
independent economic competitors of one another unless they voluntarily
allow themselves to be for practical business reasons.16 In short, it is the
league, not the individual club, that is the relevant business firm for proper
economic and legal analysis. and cooperation or agreements among the
members should be indistinguishable from those among the members of an%
partnership or the directors of any corporation.
From this perspective, a Minnesota Vikings home game is not a Vikings
product that the team is entitled unilaterally to produce and market any way
it chooses; it is always the product of at least one other team, and, as part
of the integrated NFL season, it is also the joint product of every member
club. If one league member has a right to determine when, where, against
whom, or under what rules it will play home games. logically the same set
of rights should exist for each team regarding road games. But obviously
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under such a disorganized regime no league product could be produced.
Only when all the teams agree to some method for deciding these produc-
tion issues can there be a league schedule and a valuable entertainment
product. Clearly, there is no economic justification for legally requiring any
of these decisions to be made by individual teams unilaterally.
Because every NFL game is necessarily the product of the entire league,
the structural, production, and marketing decisions about every game are
by definition league decisions. The league may elect for pragmatic reasons
to have some of these decisions made by the individual teams (e.g.. setting
home game ticket prices or player salaries); by the hired commissioner
ie.g.. hiring game officials. drawing up the schedule of games. or negoti-
ating network television contracts); or by some percentage vote of the mem-
ber prtners (Mg.. determining the location of teams, setting the size of
team rosters, or agreeing to collective bargaining agreements). But regard-
less of what decision-making methodology the league elects to use for any
given matter, it is undeniable that the inherently joint nature of the league
and its product makes every decision, expressly or tacitly. a decision of the
collective league membership. For example. when the Raiders decided to
play its home games in Los Angeles. it necessarily imposed a leaguewide
decision on every NFL team to play extra road games there and to recog-
nize and accept the results of the relocated games.
Despite the inherently joint or partnership nature of a sports league,
many are skeptical. The reason is, as noted earlier, that in some ways
leagues do not look like typical partnerships because each club has its own
owner(s), maintains separate books, and earns its own profit or loss. In
short. the teams look like independent and vigorous competitors. It is dif-
ficult for many to believe that the owners and employees of the various
, ue teams, who often publicly insult and deride each other and threaten
11ommit mayhem on one another, are really business partners. But the
economic reality is that they are and that these appearances are merely de-
ceptive reflections of the unusual nature of the league product-athletic
competition.
Because the league's product is athletic competition. it must ensure at
least the appearance of honest and vigorous athletic rivalry among league
members. Thus member teams are allowed to operate with a great deal of
autonomy. It would look very suspicious to many fans and greatly diminish
their enthusiasm if the clubs were largely controlled from league headquar-
ters and seemed to lack financial incentive to perform well on the field and
efficiently in the front office. But the fact that the league must create both
the appgance and reality of intense athletic competition does not lead to
the conclusion that the teams should be treated under the law like unrelated
business competitors. which they clearly are not.
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The economic competition that many mistakenly think exists between the
teams because of their separate identities and limited operational autonomy
is not unlike the internal rivalries within any company operating through
semiautonomous profit centers. The only real difference is that leagues
openly advertise and promote this internal rivalry because they want to
heighten the appearance of vigorous athletic competition. whereas more
typical businesses have no incentive to create a public appearance of "in-
fighting." But the law should recognize that deliberately created athletic
competition and internal rivalry in the league does not mean that the league
members must treat each other like independent business competitors who
are engaging in a conspiracy every time the league acts.
Furthermore, the fact that the individual teams make different profits or
losses is not material to the antitrust issue: if all league revenues were put
in a single common pot and all league expenses paid out of that pot. with
the remainder being distributed evenly among the clubs, nobody would
doubt that the league was a true partnership. The reason leagues do not
operate in that fashion is that it would destroy any incentive for the clubs to
field a top-quality team or keep costs down. To run the day-to-day opera-
tions of every team from central headquarters would be foolish from a man-
agement standpoint because it would destroy the necessary appearance (and
perhaps the reality) of honest athletic competition. 17 It is clearly good busi-
ness for each club to be responsible for its own expenses and the quality of
its team.
The practice of having many decisions made and profits determined at a
decentralized level certainly should not distinguish leagues from partner-
ships or corporations. many of which have the same profit-center type of
management structure. In a law firm, an unequal profit-sharing arrange.
ment or one that allows the lawyer members great latitude to develop their
own practices is not grounds for treating every decision of the firm as an
internal "conspiracy" subject to review by a jury for reasonableness. The
decentralized sports league structure should be treated no differently.
It should be clear that treating every league rule, decision, or act as a
conspiracy of the member teams is pure folly. It is. of course, true that a
league may make bad business decisions from time to time, just as any
business might. A league may even act irrationally or with improper mo-
tives. In short, league conduct may occasionally injure consumers or be
unreasonable. But the business decisions of every corporation and partner-
ship are sometimes foolish or injurious to consumers, yet that does not
mean that antitrust policy is furthered by treating their every decision as a
conspiracy. If every time a business acts it is an antitrust conspiracy of the
people making the decision, then every rule, decision. or act can be chal-
lenged by any disgruntled person. Business entities that are truly single pro-
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ductive firms simply could not survive the cost and uncertainty of a system
in which they had to defend the economic reasonableness of every company
decision to a jury whenever an employee, customer, supplier or competitor
did not like that decision.
This is the very reason why there is no question that the decision of a
corporation or a partnership to locate a branch office in Oakland instead of
Los Angeles, to require employees to have a college degree, or to require
employee John Doe to work in the company's Kansas City office does not
constitute an illegal conspiracy of the company's partners or board mem-
bers. It is also the reason why a sports league decision to have its franchises
located in specific cities, to require players to have exhausted college eligi-
bility requirements, or to force its players to play for designated teams
should not be considered an illegal conspiracy of the teams. It is simply
preposterous to presume that juries can generally make such league busi-
ness decisions more wisely than can the very partners whose profits depend
on acting wisely. It is for this reason that the legal doctrine allowing every
league action to be reviewed by a court as a Sherman Act section I con-
spiracy of the league partners is irrational and contrary to antitrust policy
and should be permanently scrapped.
Nevertheless, a few remaining policy concerns cause some to insist that
courts should continue to use anticonspiracy law to review the business de-
cisions of sports leagues. These concerns flow from the fact that in each
sport there has always been, except for brief intermittent periods, only one
league. For many purposes, this situation allows the league virtually to dic-
tate terms to many with whom it deals. For example, a player excluded
from the league, assigned to a team he strongly desires not to play for, or
paid a salary he believes is unfair may have no alternative except not to
play at all. A stadium, city, or equipment supplier with whom a league
decides not to do business is often simply out of luck. Few corporations or
traditional partnerships have that kind of power to impact the lives of its
employees, customers, or suppliers so severely. Thus the notion persists
that courts should exercise authority to review the decisions of leagues un-
der section I in order to ensure that league power is exercised fairly.
This concern is certainly not frivolous. The problem, however, is that the
underlying cause of the ability of leagues to wield such power is that for
some purposes. leagues usually possess monopoly power-for example, in
the labor market for players. Monopoly power in any industry is problem-
atic from the standpoint of social and economic policy. which is precisely
Why Sherman Act section 2 proscribes monopolization and attempts to mo-
nOpolize. But the law does not, and should never, make it unlawful for a
business firm that has lawfully acquired monopoly power to operate. and it
should never subject that firm's every business decision to a rev sew on
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vague reasonableness grounds by a judge or jury. What is illegal is conduct
designed to achieve or maintain monopoly power. not conduct that merely
exercises it.
If a league has acted unlawfully to become or stay the only major league
in its sport, it can and should be found in violation of section 2. That is
what the interleague cases have all been about. However, if a league has not
improperly become a monopoly or improperly remained one (perhaps be-
cause it is a natural monopoly). the antitrust laws should leave it alone. To
try to correct a problem of monopoly power by allowing courts to review
every league business rule or decision under irrelevant section I conspiracy
doctrine, and to strike down on an ad hoc basis any decision with which the
court disagrees or which it believes to be unfair inevitably engenders chaos
and inefficiency. The rash of NFL franchise moves and the frequent threats
of moving by individual NFL owners that have followed the Los Angeles
Coliseum case, after decades of total franchise stability in the NFL. is a
dramatic example. Such cases essentially have created a prescription for
turning the business of running leagues over to hundreds of federal judges
with vastly different philosophies and abilities. In the long run nobod.
gains from such an unpredictable and irrational system.
If leagues do exercise their market power in ways that are unfair or
otherwise contrary to public policy, perhaps Congress should consider
legislative solutions. For example. if unreasonable player practices cannot
be corrected through collective bargaining or under existing labor law
they could be corrected in the same manner that various types of untair
discrimination in employment have been dealt with in civil rights legisla
tion. But such a decision to regulate league conduct must come from Con
gress if the regulation is to achieve established policy goals and still be talr
and consistent. The courts should apply existing law vigorously and cre
atively to correct evils that Congress has declared should be corrected. the,
should not manipulate a law condemning conspiracies to set themselve% .-
as the arbitrator of every dispute between a league and its actual or poren
tial employees, customers, or suppliers, based on wholly unpredictable id
hoc standards. No other business firm in the United States. monopoly
not, is so saddled with such constant judicial interference (unless Congre-
has specifically given the regulators the power to further specific polit.e-.
and to follow specific standards and procedures). Neither should spor*.
leagues be.
NOTES
1. These three decisions were Flood v. Kuhn. 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Tools,-
New York Yankees. 346 U.S. 356 (1953): and Federal Baseball Club v. Nil. Leae
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,it Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). The scope of the "baseball exemption" is
mimewhat unclear. See Henderson Broadcasting Corp. v. Houston Sports Ass'n, 541
- Supp. 263 (S.D. Tex. 1982); Twin City Sportservice. Inc. v. Charles 0. Finley &
(fo 365 F Supp. 235 (N.D. Cal. 1972). rev'd on other grounds. 512 F.2d 1264
19th Cir. 1975) (both cases limiting the exemption to league structure and operations
And player rules). Generally the scope of the exemption is thought to be quite broad,
and it clearly covers all cases involving alleged conspiracies between the member
Jubs in a league.
2. One exception is a group of cases brought against the NFL teams that in-
LJuded both regular season and preseason game tickets in their season ticket pack-
Age Season ticket buyers in several cities alleged that this practice violated section
1 of the 1914 Clayton Act, which prohibits selling one product conditioned on the
buyer's purchase of a second product. Although the courts have not been uniform in
their reasoning, these cases have all been won by the defendant teams. See Driskill
t Dallas Cowboys Football Club. 498 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1974); Coniglio v. High-
%ood Services. Inc.. 495 F.2d 1286 (2d Cir. 1974); Laing v. Minnesota Vikings Foot-
ball Club. 492 F.2d 1381 (8th Cir. 1974); Pfeiffer v. New England Patriots. 1973-1
Trade Cases 174,267 (D. Mass. 1972).
3. The NHL reserve system that emerged from this settlement is described in
detail in a 1979 antitrust case brought by a player who was awarded to the Los
Angeles Kings as "compensation" by an arbitrator after his old team, the Detroit
Red Wings, signed the Kings' star goaltender. The NHL eventually won the case on
the ground that the reserve system had been agreed to by the union in a collective
bargaining agreement and was therefore exempt from antitrust attack. McCourt v.
California Sports. Inc.. 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979).
4. When a defendant has enormous economic power in a market in which it
purchases inputs used to produce its product, as opposed to one in which it sells its
output, it is said to have a "monopsony." Although a monopsony is,conceptually
somewhat different than a monopoly and is relatively rare in antitrust cases, the
economic evil of misallocated resources in either case is essentially the same. and
section 2 of the Sherman Act probably applies equally to both.
5. Examples include Neeld v. NHL, 594 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1979) (ban on one-
eyed players found legal); Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc.. 325 F.
Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971); Linseman v. WHA, 439 F. Supp, 1315 (D. Conn.
1977) and Boris v. USFL, 1984-1 CCH Trade Cases 166.012 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (min-
imum age or college eligibility requirements found unlawful); Molinas v. NBA. 190
F Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (suspension of player connected with gambling found
lawful); Bowman v. NFL, 402 F. Supp. 754 (D. Minn. 1975) (ban on WFL players
coming into the NFL past mid-season found unlawful).
6. For example, see Mackey v. NFL, 453 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dis-
missed. 434 U.S. 801 (1977) (commissioner-determined compensation for free
agents found unlawful); Smith v. Pro-Football Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir 1979)(NFL draft found unlawful); Kapp v. NFL. 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (draft
and reserve rules were found unlawful, but the NFL eventually won a jury verdict
on the grounds of no injury); Robertson v. NBA, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(NBA reserve system found probably unlawful).
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7. In Mid-South Grizzlies v. NFL. 720 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied.
467 U.S. 1215 (1984), the court found the NFI's decision not to give a former
Memphis team in the WFL an NFL franchise lawful.
8. In Levin v. NBA. 385 F. Supp. 149 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). the court found the
NBA's decision not to allow a sale of the Boston Celtics to plaintiffs lawful.
9. See Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. NFL. 726 F.2d 1381 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied. 469 U.S. 990 (1984) (NFL refusal to schedule Raiders game in
Los Angeles found unlawful); San Francisco Seals v. NHL. 379 F. Supp. 966 (C.D.
Cal. 1974) (NHL's refusal to schedule Seals game in Vancouver lawful). Also see
NBA v. SDC Basketball Club. 815 F.2d 562 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed. 108 S Ct
362 (1987) (NBA has a right to consider and vote on whether Clippers could move
from San Diego to Los Angeles).
10. In United States v. NFL. 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953). the court found
NFL blackouts of one team's games in another team's city lawful when the other
team is playing at home but unlawful when not playing at home. In both WTWV
Inc. v. NFL. 678 F.2d 142 (1lth Cir. 1982) and Blaich v. NFL. 212 F. Supp. 319
(S.D.N.Y. 1962). the courts ruled that NFL blackouts of television signals within a
75-mile radius of a game is lawful.
11. For example, the court in Carlock v. NFL. an unpublished decision in case
SA-79-CA-133 (S.D. Tex., Aug. 13, 1982). found the NFL decision not to use the
plaintiffs laser gun to spot the ball after each play to be lawful. In Smith v. Pro-
Football Inc.. an unpublished decision in case no. 1643-70 (D.D.C.. June 27.
1973). aff'd without opinion. case no. 74-1958 (D.C. Cir., September 25. 19751.
the court found the NFL rule requiring the team of an injured player to take a
time-out if there is over a one-minute delay to be lawful.
12. Although no one disputes that the internal cooperation of corporations and
partnerships is not illegal, the doctrinal basis for this conclusion is not necessarilv
the same in both cases. Corporate behavior is lawful clearly because a corporation
is a single firm incapable of conspiring with itself. and its employees and director%
are considered merely parts of the same legal person. See Copperweld. 467 U S
752 (1984). Partnership conduct, on the other hand, is more probably immunized b.
a different legal explanation-that although partners may be legally separate per
sons, their cooperation in running the partnership is always per se lawful. This po
sition is referred to as the doctrine of ancillary restraints. See Rothery Storage &
Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines. Inc.. 792 F.2d 210 (D.D.C. 1986).
13. Although Sherman Act section I expressly prohibits "every" conspiracy in
restraint of trade, since the Supreme Court's Standard Oil decision in 1911 the
courts have read this language to proscribe only unreasonable restraints. Thus. it .in
agreement between two persons or entities is considered to be a conspiracy. it i
then subject to the so-called Rule of Reason and condemned only if it is found to be
unreasonable. Although for decades courts believed this rule allowed them to make
subjective assessments about what they intuitively felt was fair and unfair. the L S
Supreme Court has made it clear since the late 1970s that antitrust reasonablenev. n
a term of art defined as being whatever is beneficial for consumer welfare Thus
conspiracies that benefit consumers are not illegal; conspiracies that injure con'.um
ers are.
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14. In many of the cases involving restrictions on players. frequently an overrid-
ing issue has been present that obscured the underlying antitrust issues. Courts have
held that when the players' union agrees to a league rule in collective bargaining,
the rule is then immune from antitrust attack because of the so-called nonstatutory
labor exemption. See Powell v. NFL. 888 F.2d 559 (8th Cir. 1989); Wood v. NBA,
809 F2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987); McCourt v. California Sports. Inc.. 600 F.2d 1193 (6th
Cir 1979); Zimmerman v. NFL. 632 F Supp. 398 (D.D.C. 1986). While the precise
scope and application of the labor exemption is far from clear and is a fascinating
issue of great importance to sports leagues today, it is well beyond the scope of the
present discussion.
15. All sports leagues allow their member clubs to keep a majority or all of the
revenues collected from the sale of tickets to home games. although most leagues
also require that some of this revenue be shared with other league members. Giving
the home team most of the locally generated revenue is done solely in order to
create an incentive for each club to promote its home games vigorously and to de-
velop an exciting winning team. But because each game requires the complete co-
operation of the other league members, the league always has the inherent power to
require that all gate revenues be divided equally (or any other way) among the mem-
bers. just as the NFL divides the network television revenues from all NFL games
equally. If any team refused, the other teams could simply refuse to play it or in-
clude it in the league standings. And if a league did require equal sharing of gate
revenues, each member club would be indifferent as to which NFL game any fan
attended since its share of the revenue would be the same either way. Any incentive
the Raiders or any other team has to "compete" with other clubs or to move to a
more lucrative market exists largely because the league allows home teams to keep
most of their locally generated revenue.
16. This voluntary competition is not the type of competition required by the
antitrust laws, and an entity's controlling such voluntary internal competition is not
a "conspiracy" for section I purposes. This phenomenon is nothing more than in-
ternal firm rivalry similar to that encouraged by all companies between employees
or divisions as an incentive for them to perform as efficiently as possible-for ex-
ample, competition engendered by performance bonuses, sales awards. promises of
Promotion, and so on. But when internal rivalry between a company's employees or
divisions becomes so cutthroat that it threatens to injure the company's profits, the
company's efforts to control or eliminate the counterproductive behavior would
never amount to illegal conspiracy.
17. Many decisions in any business are always better made at the local level,
where people are best able to judge what is involved. For example. league ex-
ecutives in New York would be far less able than local executives to judge what an
Individual player is worth to a club, what rent is appropriate for each stadium, how
best to market the local team, or how to cultivate good relationships with local
political and business leaders.
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Bud Selig
c/o Tom Korologos
Timmons & Company
1850 K Street, N.W.
Suite 850
Washington, D.C. 20036
Dear Bud:
Thank you for testifying at the December 10, 1992
Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopolies and Business Rights hearing
on baseball's antitrust immdity. Your testimony is greatly
appreciated.
Unfortunately, due to the time constraints on the day of the
hearing, there are a few questions that were not answered.
Please respond, in writing, to the following questions by no
later than Monday, January 25, 1993:
Chairman Metzenbaum's questions:
1) Mr. Selig, the primary argument you make in support of the
- exemption is that Baseball needs antitrust immunity in order3 to prevent franchises from routinely relocating from one
city to another.
In your testimony, you pointed to the NFL's failure to stop
the Oakland Raiders from moving to Los Angeles, as proof of
the importance of the antitrust exemption. But the court
which ruled in favor of the Raiders did not hold that any
effort by a sports league to limit franchise relocations
would violate the antitrust laws. The court simply did not
like the particular manner in which the NFL tried to stop
the Raiders. In fact, the court in the Raiders case
indicated that reasonable rules governing franchise
.relocations could withstand antitrust scrutiny. Los Angeles
Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National Football League,
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726 f.2d 1381, 1396-97 (9th Cir. 1984)[hereinafter "Raiders
1].
Three years after the 9th Circuit's decision in the Raiders
case, the court reiterated its view that the antitrust laws
do permit a sports league to impose restrictions on
franchise relocations. National Basketball Association v.
SDC basketball club, 815 f.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1987). In that
case, the court specifically rejected the argument that
Raiders I stood for the proposition that the antitrust laws
prevent a sports league from devising rules which limit
franchise relocations. The court stated that "neither thejury's verdict in the Raiders case, nor the court's
affirmance of that verdict, held that a franchise movement
rule, in and of itself, was invalid under the antitrust
laws." Id. at 567. The court went on to say that "a
careful analysis of the Raiders case makes it clear that
franchise movement restrictions are not invalid as a matter
of law." Id. at 568.
Given these statements by the 9th Circuit, please explain
why you continue to take the position that the Raiders case
stands for the proposition that the operation of the
antitrust laws would prevent Baseball from imposing
reasonable restrictions on franchise relocation.
2) For years, the Baseball owners have agreed among themselves
to divide and allocatesterritories for local television
broadcasting. In some instances, these territorial
allocations are exclusive. For example, the Red Sox have
the exclusive right to show their games on local television
stations in four New England states. In other instances,
these territorial agreements limit the number of teams who
can sell games to local stations in a particular state. For
example, only the Houston Astros and the Texas Rangers can
sell games to local TV channels in Texas and Louisiana.
In essence, the baseball owners are agreeing among
themselves to divide markets and limit output in an apparent
effort to maximize their revenues from broadcasting. It is
certainly a tremendous advantage for the owners to be able
to engage in these kinds of agreements without fear of
antitrust exposure.
There may be some pro-consumer benefits to these
restrictions. If so, the Supreme Court has made it clear in
the NCAA case that if the pro-consumer effect of a sports
league's TV agreements outweighed their harm to consumers
and competition, then they would pass muster under the
antitrust laws. NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University
of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984). That seems to be a
reasonable test. Wouldn't the public be better off if the
- owners' territorial restrictions and local TV contracts were
subject to antitrust scrutiny under the NCAA test?
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Senator Bob Graham's questions:
1) The Basic Agreement between the American League and the
National League and the Major League Baseball Players
Association, effective January 1, 1990, makes reference in
Article XXIV to the work of the Baseball Economic Study
Committee (Pages 62-64). Please provide the Subcommittee
with information developed by this group.
2) In testimony to the Subcommittee on December 10, 1992, Mr.
Allan H. Selig (representing Major League Baseball owners)
stated that when Mr. Pay Vincent took office as commissioner
he did so with the understanding that he would resign if he
lost the confidence of a majority of owners.
Was such an understanding a pre-condition of Mr. Vincent's
employment as commissioner? If so, was such an
understanding also a pre-condition in the employment of
previous commissioners?
Please forward your answers to the attention of Erin
O'Connor, of my Subcommittee staff, at 308 Hart Senate Office
Building, Washington, D.C. 20510. If you have any questions,
please contact Ms. O'Connor at (202)224-5701, FAXI (202)224-5474.
- Again, thank you for y9ur contribution.
Very sincerely your
Howard M. Metzenbaum
Chairman,
Subcommittee on Antitrust,
Monopolies and Business Rights
EMM/eao
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The Honorable Howard M. Metzenbaum, Chairman
Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopolies & Business Rights
c/o Erin O'Connor
308 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20510
Dear Senator Metzenbaum:
I would like to thank you again for the opportunity to appear on behalf of Major
League Baseball before the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopolies & Business
Rights on December 10, 1992. As I hope I made clear during my testimony, Major
League Baseball Takes extremely seriously its obligation to uphold the public's trust
in our great national game. We, therefore, take to heart the concerns raised by the
Subcommittee members at the December 10 hearing. Because I strongly believe
that the public interest would be poorly served by the repeal of Baseball's antitrust
exemption, I appreciate this opportunity to answer the Subcommittee's additional
questions.
I will first respond to the Chairman's two questions.
1. I certainly agree with the chairman's observation that Baseball's ability to
protect the interests of its loyal fans by maintaining stability and continuity in its
franchises is the area in which the exemption has the greatest significance. I must
respectfully disagree, however, with the suggestion that the few legal decisions
applying the antitrust laws to franchise relocations in professional sports (all of
which were decided by the Ninth Circuit) would allow Baseball confidently and
successfully to impose reasonable restrictions on franchise relocations absent its
exemption.
As I indicated on several occasions during my testimony, I am neither a lawyer nor
an expert on the complexities of the antitrust laws. But, as I understand it, the
Chairman is absolutely correct that, as a purely Legal matter, there is no absolute
rule that says that every decision by a professional sports league to block a
franchise relocation is unlawful under the antitrust laws. What I said in my
testimony, and what I sincerely believe to be the case, is that the confusion and
inherent unpredictability caused by the decisions mentioned in your letter mean
that, as a practical matter, a sports league subject to the antitrust laws simply
cannot stop a franchise from relocating.
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The fundamental problem under the current law, from the leagues' perspective, is
that there are no clear cut rules, or "safe Harbors", that can be followed when faced
with a proposed franchise relocation. As the Chairman noted, the Ninth Circuit in
the Raiders cases, and in the Clippers case, did not tell the NFL and NBA that
their franchise relocation rules were invalid in all cases. Instead, I understand that
the court left it to a jury to decide, after considering a myriad of different factors,
whether a league's application of its rules to the specific facts and circumstances of
each particular relocation is an "unreasonable" restraint of trade. I also understand
that the party complaining of the league's decision can prove the league's action
was "unreasonable" if it can merely convince the jury that there was a "less
restrictive" way for the league to address its legitimate concerns. I know there are
many clever economists and lawyers who, for a hefty fee, can think up a less
restrictive alternative to virtually every league rule.
All of this analysis of the "reasonableness" of the league's decision, of course,
necessarily takes place after the fact. When faced with a proposed move, a league
has no way of knowing which factors a jury (which will almost always be a local
jury) will ultimately find persuasive. Nor does it know whether a jury will find that
an alternative proposed by some "expert" which the league, has never even
considered, is a less restrictive one. As a result, the league is in an untenable
position at the time when it must make its decision. Even if it is firmly convinced
that rejection of the proposed move is reasonable in light of the unique facts and
circumstances, the risks of a jury reaching the opposite conclusion in a treble
damage antitrust action are so high that it cannot afford to block the move.
Our recent experience with the San Francisco/St. Petersburg situation provides a
compelling illustration of the realities that would confront Baseball if its exemption
were revoked. As the Subcommittee heard from the many energized advocates
from California and Florida, Baseball was presented with powerful arguments on
both sides of the San Francisco/St. Petersburg debate. But, despite the many
compelling reasons in favor of keeping the Giants where they have played for the
last 35 years, Baseball certainly could not have had absolute (or even reasonable)
confidence that an antitrust jury (probably sitting in Florida) would agree with the
reasonableness of a decision to keep the Giants in San Francisco.
And if, after years of costly litigation, we found out that our decision was not
"reasonable" in the eyes of the Florida jury, the very existence of our league could
be in jeopardy. That the risks of losing an antitrust action on a relocation decision
are this grave is shown by the lawsuits filed in the aftermath of the National
League's Giants decision. Notwithstanding our exemption, Baseball has been sued
by several different groups in several courts under a variety of theories. The
plaintiffs in one of those lawsuits, filed in Florida, have said that the National
League's decision caused them $3 billion in damages. In light of the enormity of
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claims such as these and the wholly unpredictable nature of litigation before juries
under the Ninth Circuit standard, it is easy to understand why Baseball almost
certainly would not have attempted to stop the Giants move if it did not have its
antitrust exemption. It is also easy to understand why Baseball would be virtually
powerless to stop any proposed franchise move - regardless of the merits of the
move.
I think that history subsequent to the Raiders case proves that the antitrust
decisions mentioned in the Chairman's letter have, as a practical matter, made the
other leagues unwilling to try to prevent relocations. Despite overwhelming
opposition within the league, the NFL did not even attempt to take actions against
Robert Irsay when he moved the Colts form Baltimore to Indianapolis under the
cover of the night. Likewise the NBA did not even attempt to stop the Clippers
from moving to Los Angeles because it was threatened with an antitrust lawsuit that
it could not afford to lose. Instead, it filed a declaratory judgment action after the
fact and sought money damages from the Club. The Clippers, of course, still play
in Los Angeles. Indeed, as I indicated in my testimony, no sports league other than
Baseball has successfully prohibited a franchise from moving since the Raiders case.
In sum, although I agree with the Chairman that there is no bright line rule of law
that sports leagues cannot stop franchise relocations, I strongly disagree that, absent
its exemption, Baseball could continue to apply the pro-stability policies that have
served the game and the public so well over the past twenty years. The lack of any
safe harbors and the enormous cost of being wrong have combined to make the
leagues that are subject to the antitrust laws impotent to protect the interests of
their fans. I strongly believe that it would not be in the public's interest to render
Baseball equally helpless to protect its fans.
2. Before responding to the Chairman's question regarding Baseball's broadcasting
rules, I want to clear up any confusion that might have resulted from my response
to Senator Specter's question on pay television. Senator Specter asked if Baseball
could commit that it would not put World Series or League Championship Series
games on pay television through the year 2000. I indicated that I could not foresee
the circumstances under which we would put any of our post-season games on pay
television during that time frame. In responding in this matter, I understood
Senator Specter to be referring to pay-per-view television and not cable television.
After reading the transcript of the entire hearing, however, I am not sure how
Senator Specter was defining "pay". I, therefore, want to address the cable issue.
Although Baseball has no current plans to move post-season games to cable
television, it is at least possible that some post-season games could be sold to a
cable broadcaster before the year 2000 if our play-offs are expanded or if the over-
the-air networks show no interest in certain play-off games. Having said that, I
cannot foresee the circumstances under which World Series games would be on
cable television before the year 2000.
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With respect to the substance of the Chairman's second question, I must first
respectfully take issue with the statement that Baseball has placed territorial
restrictions on the Clubs' broadcasting rights in an effort to maximize broadcasting
revenues. Our territorial restrictions are not intended to, nor in fact do they,
maximize broadcasting revenues. Rather, the restrictions are a necessary result of
the interdependence of our teams. Because all of our teams depend on the success
of the other teams in the league for their own success (quite unlike "competitors"
in the normal industry setting), Baseball must adopt policies that ensure that all of
its Clubs, even those in small markets, have the economic wherewithal to compete
on the field. As explained below, the territorial restrictions play a critical role in
this effort.
First the territorial restrictions allow Baseball to sell television packages to national
broadcasters who will show the games of al of our clubs in all parts of the country.
We have been criticized by some for having too few games on "free" national
television. But, without our territorial restrictions, we would be unable to sell any
national games - on free or cable television. If the individual Clubs were able to
sell the rights to broadcast their games wherever they desired, we could not give
national broadcasters the exclusivity they demand. Although our national
broadcasting contracts have benefitted all of our member Clubs, they have been
critical in keeping our small market Clubs afloat. Without the revenues from these
packages, several small market Clubs would be unable to survive.
Moreover, the "home market" protections provided by the territorial restrictions
enable our smaller market Clubs to sell not only their local broadcasting rights, but
also tickets to their games. If all of the other Clubs could sell their television rights
in the Cleveland metropolitan market, for instance, the Cleveland broadcasters
might find that there is more consumer interest in teams other than the Indians.
Those broadcasters could find it more lucrative to buy rights from the Yankees and
the Dodgers, and the Indians could find themselves unable to sell their television
rights in their own home market. Not only would this leave the Indians without a
major revenue source, it would greatly hamper their ability to foster the type of
local following that is necessary for successful home attendance. Following the
home team on television develops an allegiance in fans who will then go out and
watch the team play in person. Without the protection of the territorial restrictions,
the special relationship that develops between baseball fans and "their" hometown
team would be at risk.
My own situation in Milwaukee is instructive. Despite the territorial restrictions,
we have been unable to secure a cable contract for the Brewers 'games. Without
the restrictions, we might not be able to secure any local television package. If that
happened, we obviously could not survive in Milwaukee. We could not generate
the type of revenues necessary to put a competitive team on the field. Clubs in
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other small market cities would be in the same predicament. Further expansion in
Baseball has been suggested by this Subcommittee. But if Baseball were unable to
provide Clubs with the home market protections afforded by the restricted
broadcasting territories, Baseball could not survive in many of its existing cities, let
alone expand into additional markets. Such a result, I submit, is not in the public
interest
The Problem with the NCAA test mentioned in the Chairman's question is that
Baseball's concern for the survival of franchises in cities that have supported teams
for as long as 100 years is not a concern of the antitrust laws. As the Chairman
indicated in his question, the NCAA decision made clear that "consumer welfare"
is the only concern of the antitrust laws. Consumer welfare in this context means
only the welfare of the consumers of televised baseball games. The Court in the
NCAA case said that broader interests such as those Baseball seeks to protect with
its territorial restrictions are irrelevant to the antitrust inquiry. In fact, professional
sports leagues' legitimate need to protect interests other than those of the broadcast
consumers was one of the reasons why Congress passed the limited antitrust
exemption in the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961.
While "consumer welfare' might be enhanced, I do not believe that the public
would be better off if they could watch as many as ten different baseball games on
television on any given night if it meant that baseball was actually played in only
the five or six largest cities in our country. The many baseball fans in cities like
Cleveland, Pittsburgh and San Diego would certainly not agree that their interests
were served by a decision that threatened the continued viability of the franchise
in their city, no matter how many choices they had with respect to televised
baseball. So I strongly disagree with the suggestion that the public would be better
off if Baseball's television rules were subject to the NCAA test.
I now turn to Senator Graham's two questions.
1. At my insistence, Baseball has made the entire Report of the Baseball
Economic Study Committee available to the public. I have attached a copy of the
Report to this letter for Senator Graham. Please let me know if the Subcommittee
needs any additional copies.
2. The answer to this question is no. Fay Vincent was elected to serve out the
remainder of Bart Giamatti's term under the most difficult circumstances. Most
owners knew very little about Fay at the time of Bart's death. In recognition of the
unique circumstances the led to his election, Fay stated that he would need to gain
the owner's confidence in his leadership to successfully complete Bart's term. At
the suggestion of the owners, Fay told the Clubs at the time of his election that he
would step down if he lost their confidence.
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I hope that I have been fully responsive to your questions. If you or Senator
Graham need any further information with respect to any of these issues, or if any
Subcommittee member has any additional questions, please let me know. As I
indicated at the outset, I appreciate the Subcommittee's concern and I want to
provide all of the information that you deem relevant to your inquiry. I am
confident that once the Subcommittee reviews all of the material it has gathered,
it will conclude that the continuation of Baseballs antitrust exemption is truly in
the public's interest.
Sincerely,
Allan H. Sehg
AHS:1sk
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Senator METZENBAUM. Our next witness is Donald M. Fehr, exec-
utive director of the Major League Baseball Players Association.
Mr. Fehr, we are happy to have you with us. Please proceed.
STATEMENT OF DONALD M. FEHR, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, NEW
YORK, NY
Mr. FEHR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have been privileged to
be, first, the general counsel and then the executive director of the
Major League Baseball Players Association for 15 years, and I
think it is fair to say that the players have considerably more expe-
rience in a more direct way over a longer period of time with base-
ball and its owners and how the antitrust exemption operates than
anyone else does.
With all due respect to the witnesses that we have had, I want
to suggest at the outset that I don't think these issues are all that
involved or all that complicated or all that difficult to understand,
and what I would like to do is just take a couple of minutes to out-
line what I believe are the overriding structural causes of the dis-
cussions that we have heard here today.
The first thing is that, as has been noted, baseball is an unregu-
lated, antitrust-exempt-if it is not a cartel, it is cartel enough like
that it might as well be one. States may not regulate it because of
the peculiar way the Supreme Court acted in the Flood case. So to
the extent that public policy is being made, it is being made in
owners meetings.
Second, I suggest the issue is not at all whether there is a strong
commissioner or weak commissioner, something to which I will re-
turn in a few moments, but simply whether or not, regardless of
what the commissioner thinks, the law should permit what could
be considered unreasonably anticompetitive behavior.
I suggest that if any other industry came before you and said
don't apply this statute to us, whatever it is, which applies to ev-
eryone else because we will hire and pay someone that we will se-
lect because we like his or her views and he will take care of it all,
it would not be given a serious response.
I would also point out that David Stern of the NBA is generally
considered to be the strongest commissioner of any sport in the
modern era-a view that I share. That has been accomplished quite
apart from any necessity to have protection from the antitrust
laws.
The question that I would ask is one that I posed in my written
statement, which is, is there any explanation at all why a market
the size of Florida is not filled by an industry catering to consum-
ers unless there was an interest on behalf of those controlling the
industry in not filling it and they were unafraid that anyone else
would do so? There is no alternative source of supply, so the indi-
viduals responsible for marketing baseball need not fill the mar-
kets. No one else will get a toe-hold.
We have a circumstance in baseball in which the public policy
must be, it seems to me, on the expansion issue-more teams rath-
er than less, more opportunities for more fans to watch games up
close and personal than less. At the moment, that matter is decided
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entirely in owners meetings, as it always has been, and is not
reviewable by anyone on any basis.
Just a moment on the structure of baseball. In case there are any
members of this subcommittee or other Senators in attendance who
don't know, this is not an industry in which you can come into the
industry, you can open up a business and, if you sell a good prod-
uct, you can do well; you can satisfy the consumer.
The facts are that the number of teams, where they play, what
the area of territorial and broadcast exclusivity will be, and indeed
who the owners will be, are all determined by the existing mem-
bers of organized baseball. It is an extraordinary proposition.
There are problems in some small markets because the existing
revenue sharing agreements, if you will, are out of date. The reve-
nue streams have changed. The revenue sharing agreements
haven't been maintained, and so some markets now generate vastly
more revenue than others, and that has effects like it would in any
other business. But the problem, I suggest, is not with anything ex-
cept the structure that the owners created themselves, and they
can change that structure if they have the will to do that or it
could be examined by someone to determine if it was unreasonably
anticompetitive.
I must say that on the situation in San Francisco/Oakland, it
was a rather perplexing circumstance for the players. The owners
have been taking hard positions with the players in bargaining for
years, and in every negotiation beginning with 1981 through and
including 1990, one of the reasons has been that the San Francisco
Bay area is too small to support two teams; we won't revenue-
share. Therefore, the players must make concessions to support
that. This is an extraordinary proposition, I think.
On the expansion and market issues, again, I believe that mat-
ters are much more simple than they have been described. In read-
ing some of my prior testimony in 1985 on one of the relocation
bills, I noticed that I predicted that expansion would be long in
coming, even though it had been recently promised, and that even-
tually baseball would whittle it down to two markets at high prices
a long time from 1985. Regrettably, I was right. I suggest that
Commissioner Uebberoth, who was a very strong commissioner
during his tenure, did substantially nothing about expansion that
could be considered significant.
You get an idea of the attitude created by this special privilege
in connection with a couple of the statements that are made. One
has been talked about a lot here today. Is Tampa Bay baseball's
market? Well, it obviously shouldn't be, but it is equally obvious
the owners believe it to be, to be served when and as they choose.
It is not something that we would ordinarily in this country expect
to happen.
The second is Commissioner Vincent's comments about diluting
equity as a reason not to do that. Well, of course, you dilute equity
is a reason not to do that. If you have 28 owners that own all of
the country for baseball purposes and you add more, each one owns
less, so the equity is diluted.
Senator Biden in 1982, in one of these hearings, I think, summed
up the situation very well, better than I certainly have ever been
able to. He asked a witness if it weren't true that franchise reloca-
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tion was a zero sum game, the suggestion being, of course, that as
long as you have a limited number of teams, someone must lose,
and that is obviously the case.
I was struck listening to the comments of Senator Feinstein and
remembering a call I had from Mayor Jordan when the matter first
arose, which reflect both the anguish that they felt as public offi-
cials at the suggestion the team would be lost and then the joy and
the relief that was felt by themselves and their constituents when
that didn't happen. But wherever there is the joy and the relief,
there must necessarily be the anguish. That is what the zero sum
game is.
Senator METZENBAUM. Can you wind up?
Mr. FEHR. I just have one other comment, if I could, on commis-
sioners. I would point out that the longest commissioner in recent
baseball history in terms of tenure was Bowie Kuhn. The current
football commissioner is Paul Tagliabue. The current basketball
commissioner is David Stern. What they all have in common is
very simple. They were all the owners' lawyers and chief nego-
tiators before they became commissioner. There is no suggestion
these were independent people or people they were not otherwise
familiar with, or that they indeed did not develop the very posi-
tions which guide the owners' positions in things.
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much, Mr. Fehr. We will
have 5-minute rounds and only one round.
Mr. Fehr, even though baseball has an antitrust exemption,
major league players have prospered during the last 16 years
under your union. This year, average salaries for baseball players
will be $1 million. Some baseball owners attribute their financial
problems to these high player salaries.
My concern is that ultimately it is the fans who get stuck with
the bill for high player salaries. Mr. Fehr, why should the fans be-
lieve that they would be better off if baseball's antitrust exemption
were lifted and the players could negotiate directly with the owners
in a free market?
Mr. FEHR. First of all, what the players do now under the terms
the union has been able to negotiate for most of the higher priced
players, certainly, is that they do negotiate in a free market, and
that, after all, is what anyone else does in this country. You have
the freedom to look for a job. That is not something we take as spe-
cial or unusual, and the market determines what value is.
The situation that you have now, though, means that there
aren't very many teams compared to the potential markets. Fans
can't watch games compared to what they might otherwise be able
to do, and they are disadvantaged because the product they want
to buy is not as readily available as it might otherwise be.
The last comment I would make is on ticket prices, and that is
that I have never seen a study which demonstrates a positive cor-
relation between player salaries and ticket prices or anything else.
There is a reason for that. The reason is that the territorial exclu-
sivity provides each team with what amounts to a local monopoly.
There isn't any baseball competition for that team, and so prices
tend to be set simply upon marginal revenue product determina-
tions.
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Senator METZENBAUM. When the owners voted to reopen the col-
lective bargaining agreement in the past, there has been a lockout
or a strike every time you have had to meet at the bargaining
table. Speaking as a fan, I would hope that it won't happen this
time. However, in light of the reopening, I am particularly con-
cerned about your testimony that the antitrust exemption has "con-
tributed to the continued labor strife between the owners and the
players." Can you give us some specific examples of how it has con-
tributed to labor strife?
Mr. FEHR. I will give you two specific ones-three. In 1976, ad-
mittedly at a time when the development of the law and the labor
exemption was different than it is now, the players became free
agents through an arbitration decision. The owners responded with
a lockout which lasted most of spring training. Eventually, there
was an agreement reached that summer.
It strikes me that it would have been vastly less likely that the
issue of whether a player can look for another job at appropriate
points in his career if his contract is over would have to be resolved
in a labor confrontation had the antitrust laws applied. It is not
perfect. They still have fights in football. But in basketball, every
collective bargaining agreement in recent years has been wrapped
up in a consent decree in an antitrust case. They have had no
strikes and they have had no lockouts.
The last thing is the worst problem the players have had in the
last several years was massive collusion, or simply boycotting of
free agents and then price fixing by the owners in the late 1980's.
It strikes me as immensely less likely that the owners would have
engaged in that process had they been subject to a risk of treble
damages. That has contributed more than anything else in recent
times to extremely bad labor relations.
Senator METZENBAUM. I understand that baseball's antitrust ex-
emption gives the owners a unique advantage during collective bar-
gaining. Incidentally, I think I agree with you that this idea that
owners can collectively agree not to do business with a baseball
player strikes me as rather shocking and contrary to what I think
the free enterprise system is about.
In other professional sports, if the two sides reach an impasse
and the owners try to impose rules on the players unilaterally,
players have the option of suing them under the antitrust laws.
You describe that as a safety valve. If the owners and players were
to reach an impasse during the upcoming negotiations, could the
owners impose terms on the players unilaterally at any point, and
if so wouldn't that put the players in the position of either having
to work under terms dictated by the owners or to strike because
they don't have the safety valve of the antitrust laws?
Mr. FEHR. It removes that option, certainly, Senator. As you
know, under the labor law, if a bona fide impasse is reached in col-
lective bargaining, at some point management can choose, if it
wants to, to implement conditions equivalent to its last offer in bar-
gaining. The employees may strike at that point or later on if they
want to.
What happened in football after the 1987 strike, quite bluntly,
was that for all practical purposes the union was broken. But as
recent events have shown, there was a safety valve for the players
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which has provided a way for them to not suffer the continuation
of the anticompetitive practices. In baseball, if the owners were
ever able to break the union, they could rest, unless the law was
changed, on the notion that their problems were over.
Senator METZENBAUM. Under the circumstances that you have
just described, can you give the committee any assurance that the
players won't strike during the 1993 season?
Mr. FEHR. I can give the committee the assurances that the play-
ers don't want to. It is for any union or anyone that has ever rep-
resented them the last alternative you come to when others are ex-
hausted. Nobody wants to do that; people want to go to work. The
problem is that we did not reopen the agreement. The owners did,
and once that process starts and you are in bargaining, what has
to happen is dictated by the course of the bargaining. All I can say
is it is not something the players will do unless they believe it is
absolutely necessary. It would not and could not have happened ab-
sent the reopener.
Senator METZENBAUM. Mr. Selig testified that the owners have
used their antitrust immunity to prevent franchise relocations.
However, the owners have also used their antitrust immunity to
approve franchise relocations. My point is that the owners can use
their antitrust immunity as they see fit to either block or approve
a franchise relocation. The decision seems to depend on what is in
their best interest at the time.
Wouldn't the cities, the players, and the fans be better off if the
owners didn't have unfettered discretion on franchise relocations,
but instead were forced by the antitrust laws to develop reasonable
rules and procedures to govern those decisions?
Mr. FEHR. I certainly would agree with that general sentiment,
Senator, yes, and if there would be a way, in addition, to have
some vehicle for there to be more than one entity so there could
be competition for vacant markets, I suggest most of these discus-
sions would have been long since academic.
Senator METZENBAUM. Senator Mack.
Senator MACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome, Mr.
Fehr.
Mr. FEHR. Thank you.
Senator MACK. It is good to see you again. I appreciate the con-
versations that we have had over the last several years. In listen-
ing to the responses that Mr. Selig gave to my questions about
Tampa-St. Pete getting a team, it kind of went something like this.
Expansion, no; voluntary movement, no; bankruptcy, yes. Really,
the message was just wait until a team is bankrupt and then you
folks down in Tampa-St. Pete probably will get a team. I would
suggest that there should be some alternative to that, and both you
and I, I think, share the same perspective.
In my opening comments, I referred to free markets. I am con-
vinced that, while it won't solve every problem facing major league
baseball, if the owners would accept the concept of free markets,
I think we would see more teams, more players, more fans, and,
I would make the argument, more profits. I mean, I heard Mr.
Selig over and over and over again talk about this terrible condi-
tion that major league baseball finds itself in.
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As my colleague, Senator Graham, pointed out, I think one of the
reasons for that is because they have refused to go to the markets
on a timely basis, so I guess really kind of several things in there.
Do you agree with that basic approach? Second, if the exemption
were lifted, would that, in fact, open up the player market so that
the possibility of another league could come forward and expansion
could take place that way?
Mr. FEHR. There are lots of questions there. Let me try and take
them in some sort of a logical order. First, the artificial scarcity of
franchises does create the current problem, and if I may be so bold,
I think that San Francisco and Tampa have the same problem.
They know that one of them will lose. There are desperate at-
tempts not to be the one that loses, and so, to say the least, you
have civic decisions made in circumstances more extreme than they
might otherwise be. You both would have been better off, both
areas, were there more teams.
Second, one of the effects of eliminating the exemption, I think,
would be to put pressure on the minor league system and the lock-
ing up of all the players. That would give rise to the possibility
that there could be additional leagues in a way that is not realistic
now. I assume that it is at least possible that someone would exam-
ine whether or not there is a section 2 issue as to whether there
should be the existing league and it be the only one that could
come up and be discussed.
The third benefit, I think, that the minor league issue would
have is that I am one of those people that believes we don't have
college baseball simply because the minor leagues exist. The major
league clubs draft 18-year-old kids, tell them that this is their one
and only chance to sign with major league baseball with this one
and only club and, in effect, pressure them not to go to college,
which strikes me as peculiarly not in the public interest, but that
is the way the system works.
I don't know that I got all your questions, but if I missed one-
Senator MACK. I think you did.
Mr. FEHR. OK, thank you.
Senator MACK. Let us just explore that minor league thing forjust a moment. Again, when we have been in discussions about ex-
pansion, one of the things we were told-you know, I heard some-
body say there are not enough left-handed pitchers. The impression
that we get is that we are a country that really just barely has
enough ball players to take care of the 28 teams that we now have.
Is there another approach that we ought to take a look at with re-
spect to what is going on with the minor leagues that, in fact, will
strengthen major league baseball?
Mr. FEHR. One of the things that the interlocking major league-
minor league system with a limited number of franchises produces
is limited opportunities. People understand that. Everybody would
understand there are more major league jobs if there were 10 or
15 or 25 percent more teams than there are now.
I have been of two views with respect to the player availability
issue. The first one is that I just don't believe it is true that we
can have a population vastly larger, that blacks can play now, as
they did not before 1947, that significant numbers of players can
come from Latin America and more recently from Canada, and nev-
153
ertheless the proportion of teams to the population has fallen dra-
matically. That strikes me as implausible.
Second, however, I think there is a pragmatic approach which
makes sense, and that is that if that is true, test it out by a series
of additions of teams, and when and if that problem occurs and the
product is no longer commercially viable, that will become appar-
ent. I would not want to assume that before the process begins.
Senator MACK. Just one last question because I see my time is
about up. What happens to player salaries, though, as a result of
lifting the exemption, increasing the number of teams, increasing
the number of players that are available? What happens in that
kind of a market?
Mr. FEHR. I don't think there is any way to tell what happens
there. I think that it will depend a lot more on the overall economy
and how the game is marketed and what happens with what I in
shorthand call the telecommunications revolution than anything
else.
Having said that, I do want to make one point clear. We have
not-the players have never taken the position that the union's
goal should be to march in and determine what all the salaries
should be, although the clubs have asked us to from time to time.
What we have said is that the market ought to determine that both
in the individual case and in the aggregate case.
If you assume you will have a market level of salaries, whatever
that turns out to be, it can't be something, I suggest, by definition,
which causes major economic problems unless the industry is struc-
tured in such a way that you have people that just can't compete
with others.
Senator MACK. I probably should know this, but have you all
taken a position on the exemption? Do you favor the lifting of the
exemption?
Mr. FEHR. Yes. We have had that position for a very long time
both for some pragmatic, safety-valve reasons and for what we be-
lieve are sound public policy reasons.
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you, Mr. Fehr.
Senator MACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator METZENBAUM. Senator Graham.
Senator GRAHAM. Don, I am curious as to what has motivated
baseball's activities in the last 20 years. In the period from the
mid-1950's, which was about when the first relocation and then
subsequently expansion-until the mid-1970's, attendance at major
league baseball almost doubled. Actually, attendance had dropped
from 1950 to 1955 from 17.5 million to 16.6 million, then surged
over the next 20 years up to 31.3 million. So that period could be
characterized as one of instability, using the standards of our first
two speakers. It was actually a period of significant fan growth and
general prosperity.
Then beginning in the mid-1970's, the period of opposition to re-
location-and but for the last two expansions into Colorado and
Florida, no expansion has occurred. What happened in the early to
mid-1970's that caused such a radical shift in baseball's assessment
of what its best interests would be?
Mr. FEHR. I think a couple of reasons. I am doing some speculat-
ing here, but I think a couple of things are reasonably obvious. The
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first one is that something happened at the same tixe, we believe,
caused by the coming of free agency in 1976, which is that overall
revenues and franchise values and attendance and television reve-
nues began to skyrocket, and that had its effect on player salaries,
in addition to catching back up to the free market.
As that began to happen, I think it is natural that owners would
say if there are more of us and that doesn't increase the revenue
proportionately, then my proportional share might not be as great.
At the same time, you had the relocation of the Raiders to Los An-
geles. That produced a result, which was that the NFL wanted to
come to the Congress and say we need antitrust freedom at this
point, too, having left Los Angeles without a market.
I think that, as Senator Feinstein would agree, most people in
Los Angeles would not consider Anaheim and Los Angeles the
same place. Why shouldn't there be two? Why shouldn't there be
three, including Oakland? And the reason was the league wasn't
ready to yet. I have always viewed the Raiders case as who gets
to sell the Los Angeles market, Al Davis or the league, and not
really about much of anything else. That slowed down, I believe,
all of the efforts toward expansion toward additional markets, and
the franchise values began to grow even more, the potential bene-
fits of restricting the number of franchises grew proportionately.
Simply put, a threat to relocate the White Sox, for example, to
St. Petersburg is not credible unless there is a St. Petersburg to
threaten to relocate to. I know Senator Simon isn't here now, but
I was struck by his comment earlier. I seem to recall the Illinois
Legislature literally stopping the clock so they would have extra
time in the session so that they could provide the necessary fund-
ing so the team wouldn't leave. Whatever they were under, it was
not a lack of pressure.
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much, Mr. Fehr.
Senator GRAHAM. Don, one final question which really draws
from that Illinois experience-and, Mr. Chairman, I would like to
put into the record a page from a book.
Senator MACK. I thought you were going to submit the whole
book.
Senator GRAHAM. Its author is going to be with us later.
Senator METZENBAUM. If we ever get to him.
[An excerpt from the above-mentioned book follows:]
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other team should not be allowed to relocate just the same way that a
Coca-Cola plant can relocate at will. Testifying next, broadcaster Howard
Cosell was asked what he thought of Turner's comment. Cosell re-
sponded without subtlety: "I find that argument really could not appeal
to anybody over the age of six . .. they talk out of both sides of their
mouths. They have developed an everspinning spiral of hypocrisy and
deceit that ascends up to the heavens." 2 Less poetically, Bill Veeck made
a similar appraisal of the Braves' move, calling it baseball's "latest-testi-
monial to the power of pure greed."2
Although no MLB team has packed its bags since 1972, a number of
teams threatened to do so in 1990 and 1991, including the Montreal
Expos, the Houston Astros, the Detroit Tigers, the Chicago White Sox,
the Milwaukee Brewers, the Cleveland Indians, the San Francisco
Giants, and the Seattle Mariners. The White Sox talked about moving to
St. Petersburg, Florida, which was offering a generous package of finan-
cial incentives as well as a new domed stadium. Chicago rewarded the
White Sox for their loyalty with a new stadium, equipped with mod-
em luxury boxes projected to yield additional revenues over $5 million
annually.
Under the original agreement for a new White Sox stadium, the Illi-
nois State Legislature created the Illinois Sports Facilities Authority
(ISFA) and authorized the expenditure of up to $120 million to build the
new ballpark. After St. Petersburg sweetened its offer, Chicago was com-
pelled to reciprocate. The final plan called for $150 million for stadium
construction, financed by revenue bonds and a 2 percent hotel tax. Strong
neighborhood opposition from the low-income residents who would be
forced from their homes was eventually quieted by offering homeowners
market price for their homes plus a $25,000 cash bonus toward moving
expenses. Renters got moving expenses plus a $4,500 bonus plus $250
per month as a rent differential for one year.2 The city, of course, bore
these extra expenses. Chicago and the State of Illinois agreed to split any
operating losses on the stadium of up to $10 million per year. From 1991
to 2001 the ISFA will pay the Sox $2 million as a maintenance subsidy,
to be increased in later years; if attendance falls below 1.5 million per
year in the second decade of operations, the ISFA is obligated to buy
300,000 tickets per year.27 Asked if the White Sox painted the state
legislature into a corner, Representative Jim Stange replied: "Absolutely,
they held us up." 2n
The Tigers are involved in politically charged negotiations with De-
troit for a new stadium. Domino's Pizza entrepreneur Thomas Monag-
han owns the Tigers and is using ex-Michigan Wolverine coach Bo
Schembechler as his point man with the city. Despite Detroit's $34-
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Senator GRAHAM. And that is the extraordinary lengths that the
Illinois Legislature and the city of Chicago went to in order to keep
the White Sox there. If this policy of no relocation and the sanctity
of stability were the case, what credible threat did the White Sox
have to wield over the head of the State and the city? Why didn't
they just dismiss this as an idle menace and seek their protection
from the stability of major league owners against relocation?
Senator METZENBAUM. Very briefly, Mr. Fehr.
Mr. FEHR. I believe that your presumption is right that the policy
didn't really work, and its purpose, in my judgment, was not to
work in this fashion. You will notice that major league baseball's
officials did not complain about the potential relocation of the
White Sox unless and until it got to the point of an actual reloca-
tion. That is for a reason, because you can't have a bidding process
if you are suggesting that there is not going to be any sale.
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you, Mr. Febr.
Senator Specter.
Senator SPECTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Febr, there is a limited amount of time, so let me go the
heart of the question relating to a possible lockout, and caps and
revenue sharing. There have been suggestions about revenue shar-
ing for baseball like there is revenue sharing for the National Foot-
ball League on television, and there has been talk that revenue
sharing alone will not work without a salary cap.
I understand that this goes right into the heart of your concern
representing players, but what can be done realistically, if any-
thing, on a franchise like the Pittsburgh Pirates, where Bonilla has
already left and Barry Bonds is on his way out? There is not much
left of the franchise if, one by one, you strip away all the best play-
ers. And there is not much prospect for the future of the Pirates
if that is to be the habit, players bought by wealthy owners or by
teams in big markets with a lot of money. What can be done to stop
that kind of an exodus from Pittsburgh?
Mr. FEHR. Two or three things come up. First of all, I must sug-
gest it is Bonilla. Bobby would be upset with me if I didn't make
that correction. In the overall situation, you have always had base-
ball teams that stripped themselves because they thought it was in
their short-term economic advantage to do that. The Oakland A's
stripped a championship team in 1975 and 1976. There was no free
agency. There was nothing yet at that point that would have sug-
gested any need to do that.
Senator SPECTER. But they did it themselves.
Mr. FEHR. Yes. Second, what Barry Bonds or Bobby Bonilla or
any other player finds himself in is the following situation. He is
drafted out of high school or college, signs with an organization,
and until he gets to 6 years in the major leagues, by which point
you have eliminated 99-plus percent of all players who ever play
professional baseball, he has never once had the opportunity to go
and look for a job somewhere. That is all free agency is, this mirac-
ulous term; it is "I would like to go and look for a job like anyone
else does."
The question then becomes is baseball structured in such a way
so that, given the revenue streams in the 1990's, is it not very like-
ly that Pittsburgh is going to be able to have the assets and the
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income that some of the other markets will. The answer to that
may well be yes. The question that we see is then the revenue
sharing agreements need to be revisited.
The other point I would say on the question of caps is really a
very simple one. Here is the question when it is put to the players:
We would like you to agree to a salary cap. Why? Well, Pittsburgh
doesn't have a lot of money. Why won't the big markets give them
any money? Well, they don't want to give them any money, and
that then leads to the following question. Would the players be
paid more or less if you had a salary cap, and the answer is they
would be paid more if you didn't have a salary cap. That makes
bargaining extremely difficult.
Senator SPECTER. With the yellow light still on and about to turn
to red, you have players like Barry Bonds with a very high salary
and you have a lot of players with a lower salary. I am not suggest-
ing a conflict of interest because you represent them all, but don't
you have very substantially competing interests between the play-
ers at the lower end of the salary scale and those at the upper end
of the salary scale in representing the association as a whole?
Mr. FEHR. Yes, we do, as any union does. The job of the union
and the responsibility it has under Federal law is, in a democratic
fashion, to meld those interests and to come up with a position.
When and if the players feel that the current position is not the
one that they any longer want to adopt, it will change. It is their
decision.
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much.
Senator FEINSTEIN. I have no questions.
Senator METZENBAUM. Senator Feinstein has no questions. I
want to thank you, Mr. Febr. I think some of us do have additional
questions. I am sorry we don't have more time, but we are sort of
starting to run out of it. Thank you. Your testimony has been ex-
tremely helpful.
Mr. FEHR. I understand. I appreciate the opportunity to be here.
[Mr. Fehr submitted the following material:]
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UNITED STATES SENATE
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10 December 1992
Oversight Hearine on Baseball's Antitrust Exemotion
Mr. chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
My name is Donald M. Fehr. I became the General Counsel of
the Major League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA) on August
1, 1977, and its Executive Director in December, 1983. The MLBPA
is the exclusive collective bargaining representative of all
Major League Players, on whose behalf I appear here today. I
welcome the opportunity to appear before this Subcommittee and
present the Players' views with respect to baseball's antitrust
exemption. For the reasons set forth below, baseball's unique
and privileged status should be eliminated.
Over the last decade, various Congressional committees and
subcommittees have looked into antitrust issues in the context of
professional sports, particularly with respect to the location
and relocation of franchises. However, in my fifteen year tenure
with the MLBPA, this is the first oversight hearing directly
concerned with baseball's exemption. While recent events, such
as the proposed relocation of the San Francisco Giants to St.
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Petersburg and the owners' firing of Commissioner Vincent, no
doubt sparked the interest which led to this hearing, its focus
should be more comprehensive than an inquiry, no matter how
detailed, into those events. Rather, I respectfully suggest that
the focus of your attention should be and remain on one
fundamental question: What is the public uolicv basis upon which
an antitrust exemption for baseball's owners should be continued?
If an appropriate public policy basis cannot be found - and it is
my strong belief that no such justification exists - then the
special privilege enjoyed by baseball's owners should fall.
I. The Historical Basis for the Exemption
The starting point is the Supreme Court's decision in
Federal Baseball Club v. National LeaSMe, 259 US 200 (1922). In
short, the Court determined that baseball, although a business,
neither operated interstate nor was the subject of commerce, and
that as a result, the federal antitrust laws did not apply to
baseball. Thus was the exemption born. That such a sweeping
holding also threw into question whether at that time the
Congress could regulate baseball at all seems not to have been
noticed. That is, however, of considerable interest in light of
the Court's subsequent ruling exempting baseball from the ambit
of state antitrust laws.
In essence, Federal Baseball gave to baseball's owners the
right to operate their business in cartel-like fashion. Long
ago, the Supreme Court recognized its mistake. In subsequent
cases, the Court refused to extend baseball's exemption to any
other professional sport or business, and specifically noted that
baseball would be held subject to the antitrust laws if the Court
were to consider baseball's status for the first time. &&j,
SAg., Radovich v. National Football League, 352 US 445 (1956).
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But while the Court has confessed its error it has refused
to remedy it by overruling Federal Baseball. In Flood v. Kuhn,
407 US 258 (1972), the most recent baseball case to come before
it, the Supreme Court flatly held, as it had nearly twenty years
earlier in Toolson 346 US 356 (1953), that the business of
baseball was interstate commerce, and that the rationale of
Federal Baseball was simply wrong. In his majority opinion,
Justice Blackmun wrote that baseball's exemption was "in a ve
distinct sense, an exception and an anomaly. Federal Baseball
. . Thasl become an aberration. . . ." [Emphasis added.]
Notwithstanding these strong words, the Court nevertheless
permitted the exemption to stand, on stare decisis grounds.
Justice Blackmun cited Congressional "inaction" as the reason
that the Court should decline to remedy the effects of erRal
Baseball. The "illogic" of the Court's decision, he wrote, could
only be remedied by the Congress. Concurring, Chief Justice
Burger wrote that the time had come for "the Congress [to act] to
solve this problem." (See also the dissenting opinions of
Justices Douglas and Marshall.)
By rejecting the rationale of Federal Baseball, but then
holding that the need for uniformity and the potential for
burdening interstate commerce precluded the application of state
antitrust laws, the Court compounded its mistake. ederal
Baseball, which originally had stood for the proposition that the
Congress lacked the power to legislate with respect to baseball,
had become instead an expression that Congress alone had the
power to regulate baseball. It is difficult to imagine a more
convoluted course to an illogical result. But for the owners it
was the perfect result: they were subject to the legislation of
neither the federal nor any state government.
Accordingly, twenty years ago the Court made clear that
there was no legal basis upon which the exemption should have
been granted or should be permitted to continue, except that the
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Congress had preserved the Court's error through its inaction.
In this way the Court avoided coming to terms with its prior
decision, and cast the blame for baseball's exemption upon the
Congress, as well as the responsibility to do something about it.
But the Congress has done nothing about it. Baseball's exemption
was last examined in 1976 by the House Select Committee on
Professional Sports (Sisk Committee). The Clubs, predictably,
urged the Select Committee to conclude that the exemption was
justified and should be retained. However, in its final report,
the Committee's judgment was otherwise:
Based on the information available to it, the Committee has
concluded that adequate lustification does not exist for
baseball's special exemption from the antitrust laws and
that its exemption should be removed in the context of
overall sports antitrust reform. [Emphasis added.]
Similarly, the Department of Justice has consistently
expressed the view that baseball's exemption should be
eliminated. For example, Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Lipsky testified before the House Judiciary Committee on July 14,
1981, that the exemption "is an anachronism and should be
eliminated." Yet today, more than seventy years after Fedral
Baseball, baseball's owners continue to enjoy the freedom to
operate their business as a shared monopoly, without antitrust
scrutiny or governmental regulation.
The Congress has not acted. The exemption has not been
legislatively eliminated. No up or down vote on the exemption
has been taken. Baseball remains the only unregulated cartel
around. The aberration, the anomaly, the anachronism remains.
And through it all, no public policy basis has been articulated
for the existence of the clubs' antitrust exemption, much less
for its continuation. The continuation of the exemption simply
cannot be justified in the absence of the Congress articulating
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and adopting a public policy rationale sufficiently compelling to
justify this unique treatment.'
II. Baseball's Internal Structure
How do baseball's owners organize the industry? The answer
to this question is important; it illuminates the circumstances
in which baseball operates in the last decade of the 20th
century. In considering this question, it is important to keep
in mind the behavior of the now twenty-eight owners with respect
to one another, as compared to their behavior with respect to the
rest of the world.
Baseball's structure can be easily described. The main
factors at work are relatively few, and easily understood. In
essence, baseball is a shared monopoly, of which all major league
and all minor league teams are a part. The major league teams
are bound to one another through the Major League Agreement, and
the rules and regulations that the owners choose to enact under
the Major League Agreement (the Major League Rules) in their
internal meetings. Every minor league club is bound up with the
major league clubs through the Professional Baseball Agreement
and the rules and regulations enacted under it and the National
Association Agreement, and is subject to the Major League
Agreement. Each minor league club is also bound to the other
minor league clubs through these same agreements. These
agreements, together with certain others (e.g., the American and
National League Constitutions and Rules) determine the boundaries
1 In F1ood, the Court asserted that the baseball antitrust
exemption "rests on a recognition and an acceptance of baseball's
unique characteristics and needs." What are those "unique
characteristics and needs?" Baseball's only unique
characteristic is that it benefits from an antitrust exemption
granted by a case that was, concededly, wrongly decided. Its
only "unique need" is to unreasonably restrain trade. Any other
alleged "need" is of a kind which can be and is routinely
addressed by Congress through enactment of legislation that isprospective only.
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within which each club will be permitted to operate. Taken
together these agreements and understandings provide the
framework within which the cartel-like behavior occurs. The club
owners act as one would expect the members of a shared monopoly
to jointly act: they strive to artificially control to t~heir
advantage the market prices both of what they sell, and of what
they buy. The operating premises of this arrangement are simply
that, to the greatest extent possible, no club will economically
compete against another, and that consumers will have no
alternative source of supply.
The owners first agree among themselves on the number and
location of baseball franchises. Thus, the club-owners divide
geographical markets, effectively giving each club territorial
exclusivity, and thereby making each club, as a practical matter,
a local monopoly. Similar arrangements divide up local
broadcasting rights. National over-the-air broadcast rights are
negotiated centrally by and on behalf of all clubs. Accordingly,
for all practical purposes, competition, whether at the local,
regional, or national level is eliminated. Moreover, a Major
League Club cannot be sold on the open market. As we have
recently seen in the San Francisco situation, the sale of a club
is subject to the approval of all of the other owners, in all
material respects, including the sale price and the identity of
the new owner(s). Teams may not be relocated absent the consent
of the other clubs. As a condition of ownership, each new owner
is required to agree to all of the agreements by which major
league baseball operates, including the territorial exclusivity,
local broadcasting rights division, and revenue sharing
agreements. A sale and/or relocation can be disapproved for a
good reason, for a bad reason, or for no reason at all.
Membership in the club of Major League baseball owners is
membership in a very exclusive club indeed. In an antitrust
sense, the barriers to unwanted entry are effectively absolute.
164
Similarly, the owners' agreements with one another determine
how the revenue from baseball is divided up. Certain receipts
are shared by the clubs, but others are not. To briefly
summarize, gate receipts are shared between the home and visiting
club to a limited degree. Local broadcast revenue is not shared
to any meaningful degree. National broadcast revenue is shared
equally, as is certain licensing revenue. Plainly, revenue
disparities between the clubs (which can be significant) can be
traced directly to and, in effect, are the necessary consequence
of the revenue sharing agreements which govern the relationships
by which the clubs have elected to operate. And it is the club-
owners themselves, by there agreements, who determine whether,
and to what extent, revenue is shared.
The foregoing summarizes the manner in which baseball's
rules eliminate competition with respect to the selling of its
product. In establishing and implementing these operating
agreements, regulations and procedures, baseball's owners are
accountable to no one but themselves, and their actions are not
limited by any obligation to refrain from engaging in
unreasonably anticompetitive behavior.
III. The Size of the Industry
At the time that Federal Baseball was decided, it is fair to
say that baseball was not a large industry. Although baseball in
1972 was a much larger business than it had been in 1922, twenty
years ago baseball was a small fraction of its current size.
Indeed, in the period beginning with 1975, baseball's total
revenues have grown tenfold (unadjusted for inflation), to more
than $1.5 Billion.
For ease of comparison, one can look at the total industry
revenue numbers compiled by baseball for the years 1975-1992. In
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1975, total revenue was approximately $162.5 Million (24 teams).
By 1980, that figure more than doubled, to more than $350 Million
(for 26 teams). By 1985, only five seasons later, total revenue
exceeded $715 Million, more than doubling the figure of 1980.
Revenue was slightly more than $1 Billion in 1988, only three
years later, and then reached nearly $1.25 Billion in 1989.
During negotiations with the MLBPA in the winter of 1989-90, the
clubs projected 1990 revenue at $1.315 Billion, 1991 at $1.412
Billion, 1992 at $1.52 Billion, and 1993 at $1.64 Billion. 1990
actual revenue exceeded the projection, and 1991 revenue was
nearly 1.54 Billion, or more than $100 Million ahead of the
projection. 1992 revenue should comfortably exceed $1.6 Billion.
In short, baseball has become a large business in the last
several years. Moreover, many baseball clubs are now owned by or
otherwise affiliated with large corporations including Turner
Communications (Atlanta Braves), the Chicago Tribune (Chicago
Cubs), which also holds broadcasting rights to seven teams
beginning 1993, Anheuser-Busch (St. Louis Cardinals) and LaBatt's
(Toronto Blue Jays). Other clubs are owned by the principal
owners of other corporations, such as Levi-Strauss (Oakland A's),
Nintendo, and others. It is an industry of this magnitude that
the club-owners operate free from antitrust scrutiny.
IV. Effects on the Players
If baseball games are what the owners sell, then the
services of players are what the owners buy. In this respect,
too, the club-owners have traditionally organized their
relationships in order to artificially control (lower) the market
price they would have to pay. Their vehicle to do so was the so-
called "Reserve System". The central purpose of the reserve
system was to make it impossible for one club to compete with
another club for a player.
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Under this arrangement, each club exclusively "reserved" the
right to contract with and employ certain players, and the other
clubs agreed to honor that exclusive reservation, provided only
that they exacted the same promise in return. Every club agreed
to keep "hands off" any player except those on its own reserve
list. In other words, the clubs simply divided up the players
among themselves, agreed that they would not compete for players,
and gave the players a single choice: play for what you are
offered, or find some other line of work. In baseball, a player
was not permitted to look-for a job, and weigh the benefits and
detriments of more than one potential offer of employment (if he
was good enough to be able to secure more than one offer), as
would an employee in virtually any other industry. When signed
to his first professional contract, a player was stuck in that
single organization for the balance of his career. He could only
move to another organization if he were unconditionally released
(baseball's euphemism for being fired), or if he were traded.
(Only in professional sports - following the lead of baseball -
are employers permitted to involuntarily assign a contract of
employment to a different employer in another location.) In such
circumstances, it is not surprising that salaries were held down
to well below the levels that a free market for player services
would have otherwise produced. And that, after all, was the
purpose of the reserve system.
The MLBPA was reconstituted as a functioning labor union in
1966, when Marvin Miller was selected by the players to be
Executive Director. 2 The task facing the newly formed union was
to secure, through collective bargaining, the agreement of the
major league clubs to do that which they most desperately did not
want to do; compete with one another for players in a free
2 All-Star pitcher Jim Bunning, now a Member of Congress
from Kentucky, was one of the four players most instrumental in
re-forming the MLBPA and hiring Marvin Miller.
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market. In other words, the Players Association had to
collectively bargain the existence of a free market for players'
services, and then be able to enforce and maintain that free
market. And it had to do this without recourse to the
fundamental laws which prohibit unreasonable restraints on
competition, the anti-trust laws. 3
Given the foregoing, it was not a surprise that the clubs'
resisted the players' efforts to bargain for free agency.
Rather, free agency came to baseball in December, 1975, by virtue
of a grievance arbitration decision, the Nessersmith-McNally
case. The arbitrator ruled that the language of the uniform
player's contract and certain Major League rules did not after
all give the club a perpetual right to the player. The clubs
tried first to enjoin the arbitration hearing from going forward,
and then attempted to overturn the arbitrator's award, but
failed. See Professional Baseball Clubs, 66 LA 101 (1975), affId
asub n=. K.C. Royals vs. MLBPA, 532 F2d 615 (8th Cir. 1976).
The clubs then promptly locked out the players in the Spring of
1976, the first shot of what has proven to be endless conflict
over this issue. The subsequent bargaining between the players
and clubs (in 1976, 1980, 1981, 1986 and 1990) can be seen merely
as a continuation of the owners' desire to drive down player
salaries by eliminating or restricting free agency.
In the years following the 1976 settlement, by which free
agency (albeit with length of service and many other
restrictions) became a part of the Basic Agreement between the
MLBPA and the clubs, players' salaries began to rise toward
market levels. The clubs responded by unilaterally imposing
costly "compensation" on a club that signed a free agent. This
compensation (which was designed to and would have virtually
3 The idea that a player should be able to seek work with
another club(s) when his contract is over was such an extreme
notion that baseball adopted a special term for it: "free
agency".
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ended the free market for players)' provoked the fifty day strike
which almost ended the 1981 season. In the next bargaining
round, in 1985, the clubs were not so subtle. They insisted on a
so-called "salary cap", which would have lowered player salaries
in the face of exploding revenues.s The players struck in
August, and a settlement was quickly reached which preserved free
agency, at least on paper.
Immediately following the 1985 World Series, in flagrant
violation of the new Basic Agreement that they had just
negotiated with the MLBPA, the Major League clubs organized and
implemented a virtually complete and total boycott of free
agents. For all practical purposes, the market for players
ceased to exist. The clubs acted uniformly and in lockstep.
This was the beginning of what came to be known as free agency
"collusion". The collusion was to last a very long time, and its
bad effects even longer.
The MLBPA filed a grievance alleging a violation of the
collective bargaining agreement, but as that matter progressed
the conspiracy just continued. In breach of their agreement with
the players, the clubs in effect had reinstituted the old, pre-
free agency reserve system. Management officials scoffed at the
players' claims, confidently asserting that "fiscal
responsibility" had at last returned to baseball. When the clubs
4 "Compensation" for a free agent is another baseball term
with a hidden meaning. It does not refer to how much a player is
paid. On the contrary, a payment of compensation (here, a player
and a draft choice) is made from the team signing the free agent
to his former employer, to "compensate" the other club for the
"loss" of the free agent. In other words, part of the value of
the free agent is paid to his former team, not to him. This
reduces the value of his new contract by the amount of the
compensation. If the compensation is high, as in the clubs' 1981
proposal, free agency becomes just a memory, so the players
struck.
s A "salary cap" is a device by which the players are to
agree to "cap" their own salaries at a lower level than the clubs
would pay players absent the cap. It is simply another mechanism
to constrain competition for players' services.
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found the arbitration hearing not to their liking, they tried to
fire the arbitrator in the middle of the case, hoping to derail
the process. A separate grievance was filed and heard, resulting
in the arbitrator being reinstated.
Following the 1986 season, the boycott continued with even
more strength. A second grievance was filed, this time before a
new arbitrator. Finally, near the end of the 1987 season, the
players prevailed in the liability phase of the first collusion
case. This did not, however, stop the conspiracy. The clubs
simply shifted from a boycott of free agents to price fixing the
free agent market. Yet a third grievance was filed.
Late in the 1988 season, the MLBPA prevailed in the second
collusion case. Subsequently, the players also won the third
case. In later opinions the arbitrators awarded damages for the
first three seasons at more than $100 Million dollars.
Eventually, in December, 1990, the cases settled. The Clubs paid
the players $280 Million (in an industry that only employs about
700 players) plus provided much other very valuable, although not
specifically quantifiable relief.
This staggering amount -- it may be the largest settlement
in the history of American labor arbitration -- demonstrates how
pervasive and successful the collusion was. Most significant,
however, were the arbitrators, findings that the clubs violations
of the Basic Agreement had been intentional and deliberate. And
the players were forced to contend with this massive premeditated
invasion of their rights without the fundamental protections of
the antitrust laws. There can be little doubt that the clubs
would have refrained from this behavior had they been subject to
treble damages. But, without question, the collusion cases
demonstrate the behavior of which the clubs are quite capable.
(Copies of the three decisions by the arbitrators finding the
collusion have been provided to the Subcommittee staff.)
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It is quite clear that the owners' antitrust exemption has
contributed to the continual strife between owners and players in
baseball. The media often talk about the positive labor
relations between the National Basketball Association and the
Basketball Players Association. But while there have been no
work stoppages in the NBA, the basketball players have been able
to do what the baseball players have not: they have instituted
antitrust litigation, the settlement of which was wrapped up in
their collective bargaining agreements. In short, there was a
safety valve in the system. It is at least possible that, if
baseball players had the same protection as the basketball
players, one or more of the several strikes and lockouts (one or
the other of which has taken place in every bargaining round
beginning with 1972) could have been avoided.
Moreover, it is fundamentally unfair to deny to baseball
players the protection of the antitrust laws that is afforded to
virtually all other individuals. It is sometimes suggested that
baseball players do not need the protection of the antitrust laws
because their union has to date been successful. But are not
baseball players entitled to the protection of the law as are all
others? As was noted in Justice Marshall's dissent in Flood, at
407 US 292:
The importance of the antitrust laws to every
citizen must not be minimized. They are as
important to baseball players as they are to
football players, lawyers, doctors or members
of any other class of workers.
The current circumstances of the minor leagues make this
clear. Minor league baseball players, clearly the majority of
all professional players, for all practical purposes remain
subject to the traditional, pre-free agency reserve system.
Essentially, such players have no recourse. Consider just one
facet of the reserve system, the amateur player draft, by which
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the clubs tell each potential player the one, single baseball
organization with whom he can negotiate or contract. The Major
League Clubs direct, organize and conduct the draft, and enforce
the exclusive negotiating rights of the clubs as against the
players. What if that draft restrains the market unreasonably,
to the injury and damage of the players? They have no recourse
but to submit, or to give up a baseball career. .Is that fair?
The most recent example of the clubs' behavior in this area
is illuminating. Last year, the clubs simply changed the rules
relating to the amateur draft, to make it virtually impossible
for a high school graduate to have any leverage in negotiations
with the clubs. Not wanting the world to know that was the
reason for the rule change, the Clubs concocted the ridiculous
suggestion that they really were doing this to encourage young
poeple to go to college! Because it violated a provision of the
Basic Agreement relating to compensation for free agents, the
MLBPA challenged the rule change and in his subsequent decision,
the arbitrator had no difficulty concluding that the rule change
was designed to and did shift greatly the leverage in favor of
the club in its negotiations with drafted amateur players and was
designed to save the Clubs money. It was about money, nothing
more or less. But the kids themselves have no effective remedy.
We do not and cannot represent them and cannot seek a monetary
remedy on their behalf. As the arbitrator found, the kids would
have to pursue such remedies on their own in court. Is that
fair? Young people pressured into signing contracts, in
consequence of an improperly enacted rule, losing their
collegiate eligibility, which would restor their leverage, and
yet having no remedy other than to sue Major League Baseball?
Finally, players are also adversely affected by the
artificial scarcity of franchises maintained by the owners, an
issue with which this Committee should be vitally concerned.
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V. Number and Location of Franchises
Over the last ten years or so, the Congress has been
repeatedly concerned with issues relating to the number and
location of professional sports franchises. Numerous bills have
been introduced and considered (at least in committee) on
various aspects of this problem, and an Ad h= "Task Force" was
formed on baseball expansion. I have previously testified at
some length on such issues.6
Yet the problem remains, as events over the last several
years relating to the efforts to secure a team to play in St.
Petersburg so poignantly demonstrate. Baseball's owners control
absolutely the number of franchises and where each franchise
will play. The difficulty is that because the absolute number
of franchises is artificially scarce, some deserving cities will
always have to do without teams, and the owners will decide
which ones. The number of teams (the supply) is limited because
that has the effect of pushing up the value of the existing
teams as well as the price which is paid to the owners of the
existing teams for an expansion club. A threat to relocate an
existing club, which is not a believable threat unless there is
a qualified city without a team to threaten to move to, provides
great leverage to the owners against both cities. Thus, all
6 See Statement of Donald M. Fehr, before the Energy and
Commerce Committee, Subcommittee on Commerce, Transportation and
Energy, April 4, 1985, On Professional Sports Team Relocation
Legislation; Hearings before the Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation United States Senate, April 27 and May 12,
1984; Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary United
States Senate, August 16, September 16, 20 and 29. And Ee
Professional Sports Franchise Relocation: Introductory Views
from the Hill, 9 Seton Hall Legislative Journal (1985), by
Senator Slade Gorton, in which he recounts his experiences in
this regard as the Attorney General of Washington State, and as
a Senator.
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efforts to secure a team by expansion or relocation in the end
will benefit the owners of the existing teams.
Consider: What economic forces were at work that
resulted in an entire industry - major league baseball -
electing not to market its product in Florida, one of the most
quickly growing, attractive areas in North America, until next
year? What kind of consumer business could be expected to
ignore for the nearly fifty years after World War II the
burgeoning Florida population? To ask such questions is to
answer them. Only an enterprise interested in restricting the
supply of its product and absolutely unafraid that a competitor
will establish itself in such a market would so behave.
Moreover, it is important to remember that it is the
entire industry - all of the owners - who effectively act
together with respect to decisions regarding the number and
location of franchises. Each have-not city seeking a team must
satisfy the owners as a group before it can succeed. And, while
it is certainly not uncommon for one locale to compete with
another for a particular factory or company headquarters, cities
are not required, as they are in baseball, to petition an entire
industry. Budweiser, LaBatts and Coors do not get together and
jointly agree to limit the production of beer and the number of
facilities, each one protecting the others by refusing to locate
a plant except when and as the other two agree. But that is how
it works in baseball.
The current situation works to the advantage of team
owners and to the disadvantage of cities in two different ways.
In the first, a club that considers relocating is in a position
to secure concessions from its local area, desperate to keep the
team where it is, as well as from the "have-not" city trying to
entice the team to move. In the second, have-nots effectively
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bid against one another to acquire a scarce expansion franchise.
Moreover, in nearly every situation, the owners permit, if not
encourage the courtship to play out, so that the best possible
terms can be secured.
The most basic point is this: the markets alvays compete
for the teams; the owners do not compete for the markets. And
it is the absence of the antitrust laws' proscription against
unreasonably restraints and the exercise of monopoly power which
allows the owners to proceed as they see fit. In the case of
St. Petersburg, this situation has played itself out many times
in the last several years (e.g., the proposed relocation of the
White Sox and then of the Giants, as well as expansion).
Clearly, this situation continues because the clubs have agreel
not to compete with one another for territorial markets. Can it
be seriously questioned that Florida would have had one or more
teams long ago if the National and American Leagues were
competing with each other for new markets? What is the public
policy basis upon which such a situation is permitted to
continue?
In addition to cities and fans, players are also hurt
when the number of franchises is artificially held down.
Players lose jobs. Careers are shortened. There is less
competition for players than there should be. In short, to the
extent that the number of franchises is artificially limited,
players careers are limited. A player's opportunity to engage
in his profession is thus constrained. 7
Owners often say that there cannot be additional clubsbecause there are not enough players for more teams. The ownershave always said that, no matter how many teams there were, howlarge the population grew, or whether blacks were permitted to
Play. The players have always believed that there are more than
enough players for a significant number of additional teams.
However, that judgment need not be made. Rather than assuming
that there are not enough players, let the number of teamsincrease until it can be determined that such is the case. Andlet the market determine whether the players are good enough.
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VI. Conclusion
No one can be certain what would happen in the event
that baseball's antitrust exemption were to be eliminated. But
this much is certain: whatever the result, baseball's owners
would be faced with the same the state of affairs every other
American business is compelled, in the interests of pro-consumer
competition, to confront every day. All (save those which are
regulated) must abide the antitrust laws and refrain from
anticompetitive and monopolisitic behavior. Why not the owners
of the 28 baseball teams?
That final question returns to the first. Minimally, if
baseball's literally unique exemption from the antitrust laws,
which themselves are at the foundation of our free economic
society, is to be continued, the Congress must identify,
articulate and endorse the public policy principles upon which
baseball's owners should receive such special, preferred
treatment. In baseball's case, what is that public policy
justification? No one has ever been able to find one -- not the
Supreme Court, not predecessor Congressional Committees, no
disinterested economists, no one except the Clubs themselves.
But the inability to articulate a public policy basis for an
exemption of this magnitude itself undermines the clubs' views,
and demonstrates why the exemption should be repealed. It does
not serve anyone's interest -- except of course those upon whom
it was improvidently, and mistakenly bestowed.
Donald M. Fehr
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COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6275
January 11, 1993
Donald H. Fehr
Executive Director
Najor League Baseball
Players Association
805 3rd Avenue
New York, New York 10022
Dear Mr. Fehr:
Thank you for testifying at the December 10, 1992
Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopolies and Business Rights hearing
on baseball's antitrust immunity. Your views on this issue are
greatly appreciated and very helpful.
Unfortunately, due to he time constraints on the day of the
hearing, there are a few questions that were not answered.
Please respond, in writing, to the following questions no later
,than Monday, January 25, 1993:
Chairman Metzenbaum's questions:
1) Mr. Fehr, how wppld the application of the antitrust laws to
Major League Baseball affect labor relations and contract
negotiations between the players and the owners?
2) In your testimoni, you stated that "the issue is not at all
whether there is a strong Commissioner or weak
. Commissioner." Do you believe the owners can restructure
the Commissioner's office so that Fay Vincent's successor
can freely exercise independent judgment or address critical
issues such as expansion in a manner that promotes the long-
term interests of the sport and the fans?
Senator Thurmond's questions:
1) How do you answer Mr. Selig's point that the antitrust
exemption is important to protect franchise stability, and
thus the "covenant" that baseball has with its fans?
2) - How would you react to an antitrust exemption that was
limited to franchise relocation only?
I look forward to working with you in the future as the
Subcommittee continues its work in this area.
Again, thank you for your contribution.
Very sincerely yours,
Howard M. Metzenbaum
Chairman,
Subcommittee on Antitrust,
Monopolies and Business Rights
BMM/eao
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Hon. Howard K. Metzenbaum
Chairman, subcommittee on Antitrust,
onopolies and Business Rights
Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate
Washington, D. C., 20510-6275
Dear Senator Metzenbaum:
This will reply to your letter of 11 January posing
questions by Senator Thurmond and you relative to baseball's
antitrust immunity. Before turning to the four questions asked,
however, I would like to make one preliminary observation, which I
believe should be kept in mind.
Baseball's current antitrust immunity does not run to some
abstract, amorphous institution, or to a "game", or to the
"national pastime." Rather, it is to baseball's 26 (now 28) owners
that the exemption runs. The exemption means that the owners may
operate as a cartel; nothing more, but nothing less. Thus, those
institutions charged with the making of public policy have no role
in baseball. The right to make public policy has been effectively
shifted from elected officials (federal, state and/or local) to the
owners themselves. Public policy is made in the confines of
owners' meetings. Accordingly, the exemption should be removed,
and baseball's owners subjected to the law of the land, unless the
Congress can identify, articulate and endorse a public policy basis
upon which the owners special, preferred treatment should be
permitted to continue. I strongly believe that no such basis can
be found.
803THIRD AVENUENE% 1Ri.,1110022
TEL (212) 826008 Flk (212) 752-3619
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Chairman Metzenbaum's Ouestions
Question 1: Mr. Fehr, how would the application of the
antitrust laws to Major League Baseball affect labor relations and
contract negotiations between the players and the owners?
Answer: Application of the antitrust laws to baseball
would improve collective bargaining in this industry. The reason
is straightforward. In baseball, as in the other professional team
sports, the team owners' goal is, and since the advent of free
agency has always been, to restrict or eliminate competition among
clubs for players. This is classic monopoly behavior. Because the
antitrust laws do not apply, baseball's owners have a built-in
incentive to try to break the union, because if they were to suceed
in doing so, they would once again be able to totally eliminate
competition for players.
There has been a work stoppage (lockout or strike) in
baseball in every negotiation for more than 20 years (1972, 1973,
1976, 1980, 1981, 1985, 1990). Contrast this record with that of
professional basketball, which has not had a stoppage, but in which
every agreement since the 1970's has been wrapped up in an
antitrust case consent decree. Or consider pro football, where the
NFL owners have recently learned that they may not unreasonably
restrain competition for players even if there is no union. Simply
put, the manner in which the parties negotiate would be different
if the antitrust laws applied. The owners would be much less
likely to force a confrontation with players over free agency
issues (the heart of every dispute beginning with 1976) if the
players had recourse to the antitrust laws to ensure competition.
Accordingly, the likelihood of a work stoppage over this issue
would be reduced.
Question 2: In your testimony, you stated that "the issue
is not at all whether there is a strong Commissioner or weak
Commissioner." Do you believe the owners can restructure the
Commissioner's office so that Fay Vincent's successor can freely
exercise independent judgment or address critical issues such as
expansion in a manner that promotes the long-term interests of the
sport and the fans?
Answer: I do not believe that the office of the
commissioner can be so restructured. To suggest that it can
ignores certain realities of the situation:
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-- The Office of the Commissioner is established by the
Major League Agreement, an agreement entered into and
amended by the owners alone. The very raison detre of
the Office of the Commissioner is to serve the ownersjoint ends. The powers and limits of the Office of the
Commissioner are established entirely by the owners.
-- The owners hire, re-hire and pay the Commissioner.
And, as we have seen, they can fire the Commissioner.
-- The owners determine the pay of the Commissioner,
and set the budget for his office.
Given these facts, it is extremely unlikely that any Commissioner
can or would be independent of the owners. The owners will surely
select someone who will act on their collective behalf, and who
will know and remember who has employed him. One simply cannot
reasonably expect the owners to do otherwise, or a Commissioner, so
selected and paid, to act in a manner inconsistent with the
interests of the owners as a group, who are, after all, his
employers and constituents. Moreover, a Commissioner is
"independent" only to the extent and so long as there is no working
majority of owners in opposition. A Commissioner may be able to
mediate and/or arbitrate disputes between owners, or to act if the
owners as a group are unwilling or unable to do so. Of such
things, and only of such things consists the Commissioners vaunted
independence, as Fay Vincent discovered.
As is evident from Bud Selig's oral testimony, the public's
interests, which is in more rather than fewer major league teams
and in reducing the owners' power to exact public support for
facilities, etc., are not those of the owners, whose interests are
in artificially restricting the number of teams, thereby increasing
the value of each club by making it an artificially scarce
commodity, and to secure public subsidies by implicit or overt
threats to relocate. For example, Mr. selig testified why it is
emphatically not in the owners' interests to expand (e.g., to the
Tampa Bay area). A Commissioner selected and paid by the owners
will come down on the owners' side; it would be astonishing were he
to act otherwise. And he would be ignored (or fired, or both) if
he did so.
A Commissioner can be expected to act independently of the
owners and in the interests of the fans only if he were not
selected and paid by, and did not receive his authority from the
owners. In short, a Commissioner cannot be independent of the
owners unless he does not owe his job, his salary or his authority
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to them. In all probability, it would take regulation to achieve
such a result. Removing the exemption, and thereby requiring the
owners to refrain from anti-competitive behavior is a much easier,
more certain way to go.
Senator Thurmond's Questions
Ouestion 1: How do you answer Mr. Selig's point that the
antitrust exemption is important to protect franchise stability,
and thus the "covenant" that baseball has with its fans?
Answer: Mr. Selig is simply wrong. To begin with, the
pressure on franchise stability stems primarily, if not
exclusively, from baseball's owners maintaining an artificial
scarcity of franchises. This produces "have-not" cities, such as
Tampa - St. Petersburg, that seek to entice an owner to move by
offering more lucrative stadium leases and other concessions.
(This is, of course, the only way such a city can reasonably expect
to secure a franchise.) It is the shortage of teams that allows
existing owners to play one market against another to secure ever
more concessions. Baseball permits - if not overtly encourages -
threats to relocate in order to secure concessions from the
existing city. Thus, the "franchise stability" question is created
by the exemption, which permits the artificial scarcity of teams.
Indeed, this entire situation is one which the owners have created
and maintained for their own benefit. Many an owner has reaped the
reward which followed public consideration of relocating his team.
Do baseball's owners object when an owner threatens to relocate his
team in order to maximize bargaining leverage with the city where
the team now plays? Did baseball tell the White Sox they could not
relocate to Tampa? Of course not: the owners want the ability to
threaten to move. That is what the artificial scarcity is all
about.
Second, the notion that if the exemption were removed teams
would move about willy-nilly is simply nonsense. Case law clearly
permits a league to have reasonable rules regarding franchise
location and relocation issues. The suggestion that under the
antitrust laws there can be no effective bar to relocation is a
simple scare tactic unworthy of serious consideration. * See also
my answer to the next question.
* During and after the Raiders litigation the NFL raised such
fears. But it did so both to avoid pressure to expand and to try
to pressure the Congress into giving it broader antitrust immunity.
Under the NFL's rules, of course, the result would have been that
the Rams would have left Los Angeles, and the Raiders would have
stayed in Oakland, leaving Los Angeles without a team.
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Onestion 2: How would you react to an antitrust exemption
that was limited to franchise relocation only?
Answe: While, for the reasons previously set forth,
eliminating the exemption with respect to everything except
franchise location issues would be helpful in terms of labor
relations, it would clearly do nothing to address the concerns of
the have not cities. (If this question has not been put to the
owners, I hope that it will be. The owners claim only that the
exemption is needed with respect to franchise location issues.
Hence, they should not oppose this concept.) Moreover, a bill of
this type would serve as the endorsement of the Congress to
baseball's owners' current practices with respect to the number and
location of teams. Such a bill would perpetuate the pressures on
localities that currently exist. From the point of view of the
fan, this would only continue the current situation of too many
cities and too few teams. By endorsing this concept, without more,
the Congress would, implicitly, be approving the artificial
scarcity of franchises the owners have maintained.
There is, however, a solution to franchise scarcity. If
baseball were split into two or more competing leagues, such
leagues would no doubt compete for vacant and attractive markets,
rather than the reverse, as now occurs. Such competition would
likely increase the number of teams, and decrease the number of
"have-not" cities, thereby reducing the pressure to relocate, and
increasing franchise stability. There is no way around it:
pressure on teams to relocate will abate only as and to the extent
that the number of teams increases. Alternatively, legislation
could provide a measure of antitrust protection for the owners in
this area, provided that the owners first were able to establish
that the number of teams was not artificially restricted. While
difficult to write, such a bill could provide a measure of relief
for fans in the "have-not" cities. On balance, however, I submit
that legislation forthrightly placing baseball under the antitrust
laws remains the best, most simple and most direct course.SI
sin erely,
~hld M. Aehr
182
MAJOR LEAGUE
BASEBALL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION
Dnu.sn M~t. FEllR
29 January 1993
Hon. Howard M. Metzenbaua
C/o Chris Harvie
Subcommittee on Antitrust,
Monopolies and Business Rights
Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510-6275
Dear Senator Metzenbaumx
Enclosed please find my reply to your letter of 11 January.
In addition, I know that certain members of the Committee have
been interested in the report of Baseball's Economic Study
Committee. For the record I will forward a copy of that report,
including the separate report by member Henry Aaron, under
separate cover.
Your /very truly,
DMF/ac
805THIRD AVENUE. NEW YORK, NY 10022
TEL. (212) 826080 FAX. (212) 752.36%9
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December 3, 1992
Mr. Donald Febr
Executive Director and General Counsel
Major League Baseball Players Association
805 Third Avenue
New York, NY 10022
Mr. Allan "Bud" Selig
Chairman
Major League Baseball Players Relations Committee
350 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10022
Dear Don and Bud:
With the transmittal of the enclosed report to you the independent members of the Baseball
Economic Study Committee conclude their work. We wish to thank you both for the
opportunity to participate in baseball's effort to think through its approach to the challenges
ahead and to share with you a few of the broader observations we have reached in the process
of our work together over the past year and a balf.
This document reports many facts and trends; the interpretation of this information is
controversial. On some matters the independent members were divided. The report language
reflects our efforts to bridge these divisions. No one of us, had be been writing alone, would
have worded the report exactly this way. But we found enough common ground in the
conclusions found herein to join in signing the report.
Henry Aaron
David Feller
Peter Goldmark
Paul Volcker
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PREFACE
The world of baseball provides our country with some of its most wonderful moments of
athletic competition. Baseball is part of our history, part of our character - a never exhausted
outlet for hope, and a continuing drama of grace, timing and achievement on the field of our
dreams
It is also filled today with money, conflict, and distrust.
The history of relations between owners of Professional Baseball Qubs and the Major
League Baseball Players Association has been characterized by repeated and acrimonious disputes.
Six rounds of collective bargaining have been marked by three strikes and three lockouts.
We believe that prolongation of the past pattern of strikes and lockouts in baseball would
inevitably damage the short and long term interests of both the clubs and the players. Unseemly
contests between club owners and players would only sour public attitudes toward the game as a
whole, with a consequent long-term reduction in both profits and salaries.
While public attention will shortly focus on the preliminary skirmishing surrounding
collective bargaining between the clubs and the players, we believe that baseball faces a challenge
far broader and more critical than simply reaching a labor agreement. That challenge is to arrest
the decline and embitterment of baseball in American life, and to forge a framework in which
owners and players can go beyond their individual financial interests to pursue constructively,
fruitfully and together their shared interests.
Baseball must be reconceived by its participants, the owners and the players, as a genuine
partnership which pursues competitive excellence, leads by moral and athletic example, resolves
labor disputes through negotiation rather than by insulting the public with lockouts and strikes, and
tempers financial greed with a sense of mutual cooperation and accountability to the public.
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The independent members of the Committee believe that a confluence of developments
makes such a partnership both more urgent and more possible than at any time in the recent past
These developments include:
- an imminent end to the heady increases in financial returns for both owners and players
that marked the 1980's;
- the likelihood of wrenching readjustments in the terms of national broadcasting contracts
with baseball;
- the particular threat posed to the financially weaker clubs by these and associated trends;
- the recognition by owners and players alike that something is amiss, as reflected by the
very appointment of an independent committee such as this for the first time in baseball's history.
Baseball has existed for more than a century in America. In the process it has brought
pleasure and pride to generations. But it is now being tested, perhaps as strongly as ever before,
as to whether it can muster the trust and the vision to build a true partnership for the future. We
think now is a good time to start.
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L Introduction
Assessment of the economic performance of baseball and of the forces bearing on its future
outlook are at the heart of our assignment While some issues are clear, the overall task is
difficult and potentially confusing for the following reasons:
Forecasting of revenues, expenses, profits and asset values in any industry is subject to many
uncertainties. It is complicated in baseball by important structural changes in recent years
in revenue and cost trends.
- Owners, players, and others differ as to the relative importance of operating income, net
profits, cash flow, and franchise values. In particular, owners are interested in return on
their past investment and maintaining franchise values. From other points of view emphasis
on current and prospective operating income or cash flow is more usefuL
- Because baseball is a business and a sport at the same time, and has important community
values and interests, the condition of this industry, more than that of other industries,
involves intangible and indirect returns and satisfactions in addition to the direct monetary
returns of owners.
Our primary concerns are whether, and to what extent, the health of baseball is threatened
by economic pressures, and the possible implications of these pressures for owner-player relations.
We do not believe that health can be determined simply by analyzing whether the returns available
to baseball owners are comparable to thbse in other industries, or even whether the returns justify
the prices paid for particular franchises in the past. What does matter is whether there is a
continued interest by existing owners in building their franchises and maintaining their
competitiveness and whether owners who wish to sell can find responsible and willing buyers.
In other words what is critical for baseball over time is not maintaining particular franchise
values, but that there be reasonably stable ownership able and willing to maintain the continuity
of their clubs and franchise location, to pay enough to attract exceptional athletes to baseball and
to their team, to justify the large capital expenditures for stadiums (whoever directly bears that
cost), and to maintain fan interest and healthy competition.
As the history of baseball suggests, this does not require every club to be profitable every
year. As in the past, the overall profitability of baseball may vary over cycles. But to have any
reasonable assurance that owners, eisting and new, will be willing to operate and acquire baseball
clubs, and be able to make the requisite investment, there should be some reasonable prospect of
achieving revenues in excess of expenditures most of the time.
For civic or avocational interests owners or ownership groups may sometimes be willing to
support a particular club through even extended periods of losses. However, we believe that a
healthy outlook for baseball does require the prospect that with effective management the industry
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as a whole be able to cover operating expenses, with a reasonable margin to cover necessary
investments and to maintain continuity during inevitable difficult years. Tat situation would usually
be reflected in significant franchise values. The absence of such franchise value for a significant
number of clubs, reflecting an inability to "carn their way' over the long hau, would be disruptive
not just for those clubs, but for the stability of baseball as a whole and thus to its appeal to the
public.
A wide range of motives impels people to own and operate baseball teams. Running a club
has a romantic appeal for many Americans. Others derive immeasurable benefits, such as prestige
and public approbation, from owning a baseball team, or capitalize on synergy with other
enterprises they own. Community leaders and civic bodies often come forward to finance the
acquisition of franchises because of the benefits major league baseball brings to a city. It is not
possible to determine what mix of financial, altruistic, civic, competitive or avocational interests
impels club owners to do what they do. What is important for the game and for the public interest
is that they continue to do so, i.e. that there be clubs, that games and seasons be competitive, and
that the continuation and the viability of the sport be supported by the existence of a market which
can assure the transfer of a club to new and responsible investors. There is every reason to believe
that this is the condition of baseball today. What is at issue is whether this situation can be
expected to continue in the future.
This test does not require that franchise values rise continuously or that higher values need
cover past losses. In that light, the information available to this Committee indicates that there
have been to this point buyers and communities willing to acquire and support clubs whose present
owners decide they cannot continue to operate them.
Information submitted to the staff indicates that sales prices of clubs rose sharply in the
1970's and '80's, and may have stabilized in real terms since the late 1980's. Whether prices will
be maintained in the future will depend upon trends in revenues and costs of individual clubs, of
baseball as a whole, and upon whether and how rules governing both the distribution of revenues
among clubs, in large markets and small, and player compensation may be changed in the future.
Because the reasons for investing in a major league baseball team include more than financial gain
the fact that profit rates are below those of other U.S. industries does not mean in itself that
baseball as a whole has a problem or that the condition we have described as necessary for its
continued health will not continue.
While the Committee makes some recommendations on changes that should be considered,
we are aware that the parties through collective bargaining are in the best position to decide the
specific contract terms that will govern their relationship. Baseball's economic system is intricate
and interdependent. As a result, any changes must be carefully analyzed. For the benefit of the
fans, the players, and the clubs, it is imperative that the parties address the issues facing the game
on a timely basis.
The atmosphere between the parties has been marked in the past by hostility and distrust.
It is the strong conviction of the Committee that if the clubs and players cooperate to deal with
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the problem they confront - if they approach these challenges in a spirit of genuine partnership
- they can cope with any trend or event in sight and operate baseball profitably for both owners
and players and enjoyably for the public. Overall, baseball panrates more than enough revenue
to thrive only peed, rashness, or a lack of reasonable cooperation can preclude economic viability
for both owners and players.
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IL The Economic Condition of Baseball
The Committee is charged to study and report on the 'overall economic condition of the
industry' but also current and impending problems, if any. In approaching this task, the Committee
examined revenues and expenses, operating income, and franchise values.
The Committee believes that more information about the financial operations of baseball
can and should be made public. Accordingly, this report includes as Attachment B a summary
report of financial operations for 1991 prepared for the clubs by the accounting firm of Ernst &
Young. This report is known as The 8-10-8 Report" because it presents information reported by
the clubs in three groupings of the eight largest, ten middle-size, and eight smallest clubs
respectively in terms of contribution to overall operating income.
Revenues
Gross real revenues rose at an average annual rate of 9 percent from 1985 through 1991.1
Several factors strongly suggest that revenues will not grow as fast in the first half of the 1990's
as they did in the late 1980's and may even decline.
Average game receipts per club have grown from $14 million in 1985 to $20 million in 1991,
or nearly 6 percent per year in real terms, as attendance reached new records and ticket prices
increased significantly. Some additional growth in attendance is possible in the years ahead as new
stadiums replace old ones but the rate of growth seems bound to slow. (1992 attendance was
approximately 2 percent below 1991 attendance.)
Much greater uncertainty surrounds future growth of revenues from national television
contracts which now account for 23 percent of total revenues. Current contracts with CBS and
ESPN will expire at the end of the 1993 season. Both CBS and ESPN have reported sizable losses
on their contracts. ESPN now has exercised its option, at a cost of $13 million, not to extend its
contract beyond 1993. Some of these losses may be attributable to the current recession, some to
the perceived attractiveness of baseball, some to secular declines in advertising expenditures, some
to competing programming, and some, perhaps, to business misjudgments. The concern of the clubs
that national television revenues will decline is understandable in the light of current circumstances.
Iocal television and radio revenues constitute nearly the same proportion of gross receipts
a network television. This source of revenue, which varies a great deal by individual club and size
of market, increased greatly between 1984 and 1991. Changes are not likely to be so abrupt as
in national television. Given the pressures on advertising generally over the past few years, growth
'Unsku oderwise specified all dara on rewoues and cenditures contained in this report ad in the accomaning
saff report are capres in constat 1991 dollars adjusted for chsanes in the Consmer price ider.
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at the pest rate is unlikely to continue and it appears unwise to assume future growth in local
media revenues that is faster than the growth in gate receipts.
No projected slackening in revenue growth will affect the financial viability of baseball if
the clubs cut expense growth, including player compensation, correspondingly. The clubs project
that expenditures other than player salaries will grow more slowly, but that player salaries will grow
more rapidly, than revenues. The players challenge the contention that salaries will grow if
revenues do not In projecting costs, the critical question is whether player compensation, which
grew at an average real annual rate of 10 percent from 1985 through 1991, will continue rising
even if growth of revenues slows or if revenues actually fall.2 We deal with this important issue
below.
Industry Operatine Income
As the annexed staff report indicates, the baseball industry as a whole consistently produced
net operating income before ta, averaging slightly more than 6 percent of revenue, from 1985
through 1991.
While acknowledging that other measures may be important, the Committee has chosen to
focus primarily on net operating income before tax in its analysis of baseball financial performance.
For one thing, this measure facilitates comparison among clubs that have quite different capital
structures. Moreover, it focusses on the elemental relationship of any operating business - whether
operating revenues cover expenses. In reaching its conclusions, however, the Committee did, where
appropriate, take into account other measures, especially return on investment (see Staff Analysis,
Section U). However, our analysis of trends in operating revenues and costs encompasses the
significant factors bearing on the financial outlook for the industry as a whole.
It should be emphasized that while standard accounting uses the terms profit and
profitability, we refer to net operating income before taxes. We exclude interest expense and
revenue, income tax liabilities and benefits, and the depreciation of the portion of the club
purchase price attributable to intangible assets. Major league baseball as a whole or an individual
club would have positive net operating income, under our definition, if its revenues from baseball
operations exceeded the expenses of those operations, even though net operating income might
not be enough to cover non-operating expenses, including, for example, interest on working capital
or tangible assets, interest on the money borrowed to purchase the club, much less any repayment
of loans or return on equity.
Me players hold that the 10 percct gwth rate is miseading fr two reaons. rst, they aim, salarics at the start
of the period are depreued ty the cary saes of llusion. Semnd, some players negotated multiyear cmus that
shihd salary for 1990, hen a work stoppSe was considered possible, to later ycars, thus inflating salaries in tb efalyear
of the period.
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The period since 1985 has been one of remarkable growth - in attendance, in television
revenues, and in other revenue sources. As the annexed staff report shows, industry operating
income as of the end of the 1991 season, the last year for which final audited figures are available,
averaged $3.5 million per club. But this income was concentrated in a minority of clubs. Complete
data for 1992 will not be available before this Committee submits its report; but attendance fell
slightly and player salaries rose significantly, suggesting that the net operating income line will be
lower in 1992 than in 1991, which itself was well below earlier years.
The Committee is charged to consider not only the current economic condition of the
industry but also its future course. The industry as a whole, by its own standards, enjoyed several
years of healthy net operating income in the late 1980's; this does not necessarily mean that it will
continue to do so. Whether most clubs most of the time can comfortably cover operating expenses,
with some margin for necessary investments, is obviously economically important.
The clubs have presented "best" and 'worst' case projections of revenues and costs through
1994? Those projections indicate that the industry will suffer substantial losses in 1993 and 1994.
The projected decline in operating income hinges on the assumption that player salaries will grow
more rapidly than revenues, which in turn will be damped by a sharp drop in national television
revenue. The clubs assume that player salaries will grow an average of 7 percent (best case from
the standpoint of profitability) to 10 percent (worst case) in 1993 and 1994. Other costs are
assag to increase 3 to 6 percent, well below the assumed increase in revenues other than
national television.
Recognizing that all forecasting is inherently unreliable, and that the history of baseball
specifically is replete with predictions that have proven inaccurate, the information made available
to this Committee drives it to several broad conclusions:
- The rapid rise in gross revenues which characterized the late eighties and early nineties
is probably over for the time being. A major factor is the anticipated decline in revenues from
national television broadcasting under contracts which expire in 1993.
- The critical variable on the cost side is player salaries, which have risen sharply throughout
the eighties, and which - because they rose in 1991 and apparently in 1992 more rapidly than
revenues - are the principal cost element which has eaten into the operating margins which baseball
as a whole has enjoyed over the past 5-6 years.
Union representatives have suggested that, while they would not wish to endorse the
owners' projections of lower revenue growth, they would expect aggregate salary costs to be
responsive to aggregate revenue declines, just as they were to the rapid revenue increases of the
past. If player costs do not respond to changes in revenue, then there will be a serious economic
squeeze on baseball as a whole and a more imminent threat to the weaker clubs, raising doubts
"M Ob projectios are as i curc= t dogrs, at adjusted for kfbtiao.
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aot simply about franchise value but about the continuity of established franchises and their ability
to compete for players and eventually public support. Then the case for new mechanisms to
provide for timely and orderly adjustment would, in the interests of owners and players alike,
become more compelling.
Franchise Valties
Despite the fall-off in operating income, the prices at which franchises have sold have
remained high. During the past four years, seven clubs have been sold for prices (expressed in
constant 1991 dollars) ranging from $80 million to $131 million. The average price has been $94
million. Investors in Tampa-St. Petersburg are reported to have offered approximately $110 million
for the San Francisco team, but the owners disapproved the transfer of this franchise.
No recent upward or downward trend in franchise values is discernable. This is a matter
of some controversy. The clubs hold that the sale of the Detroit Tigers in 1992 for a price below
that of the expansion franchises is evidence of softness in asset values. The players assert that the
willingness of San Francisco investors to offer $100 million for the San Francisco franchise
contradicts this claim. Should the present pattern of franchise values hold in the future, there
would appear to be little reason for apprehension about future economic pressure on baseball as
a whole.
'Flamacially Troubled' Clubs
Whatever the economic condition of baseball as a whole, not all clubs fare equally well.
Some franchises are highly successful financially, others are not As we note in the following
section, wide disparities in income have not at this point created troublesome differences in on-
field performance. But some clubs are currently losing money, some have lost money persistently
in recent years, and the next few years may aggravate the situation. The clubs claim that eleven
team are 'financially troubled.' The clubs and players dispute whether the number of teams that
merit the designation of 'financially troubled' is eleven or some smaller number. They also dispute
exactly how much money has been lost. Whatever the merits in this dispute - and we stipulate
that at least some clubs have been unprofitable in the sense of a persistent inability to achieve
revenues equal to operating costs - any squeeze on industry profits would mean that clubs that
have lost money in the past are at risk of losing more in the future.
The "bottom eight' group of clubs in the appended 8-10-8 report (See Attachment B) is
in the main typical of clubs alleged by the owners to be 'financially troubled," and it is such clubs
which run the greatest risk of being adversely affected in the years ahead.
The staff report contains an analysis of financial performance and of the recent history of
franchise values. It confirms that several clubs have lost money year after year based on the
operating income measure the staff finds most defensible; we have noted elsewhere that it seems
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likely that a number of these clubs will face an even more difficult period in the years immediately
ahead.
Nevertheless, the Committee was told by the clubs that there is no evidence that current
franchises will go out of existence. As noted, substantial prices continue to be paid, even for
franchises considered troubled. The owners claim that the number of potential bidders for old or
new franchises at established prices is diminishing. The recent sale of the Seattle club and the
competition for the San Francisco franchise - all involving clubs claimed to be troubled - make
it evident that, for whatever reason, baseball franchises are still considered valuable property.
The committee has seen no evidence that baseball cannot support the prospective 28 franchises.
Whether the difficulties of the troubled clubs reach the point of undermining the stability
and competitive positions of major league baseball, vis-a-vis other sports or the balance within
baseball itself, turns in part on the relationship between player compensation and revenue, as we
have discussed earlier, as well as on the revenue trend itselL
Revease ShariE
Revenues of some clubs (mostly large market clubs) persistently exceed revenues of other
clubs. Because these discrepancies could lead to competitive imbalance and do contribute to
financial difficulties of small market clubs, this Committee was directed to consider the extent and
nature of revenue sharing.
Major league baseball is a joint enterprise, a shared monopoly exempt from the antitrust
laws by virtue of judicial decisions that Congress has not revoked. This exemption permits the
clubs to establish a system of governance that regulates the number and location of franchises,
which in turn influence the economic futures of particular clubs.
An important example of the way in which the economic impact of baseball's established
regulatory and financial framework has evolved can be found in the rules and processes that govern
how and to what extent various sources of revenue are allocated to individual clubs or the joint
enterprise. In general, the arrangements assume that each club is entitled to the revenues
generated by its local market. The rules adopted significantly affect the profitability or
unprofitability of individual clubs. Specifically, revenues can be "shared" to reduce disparities among
clubs -or divided in ways that increase disparities or leave them unaffected.
A principal finding of this Committee is that the owners now face a set of conditions and
economic prospects which requires a basic restructuring of the rules and processes that determine
how and to what extent various sources of revenue are allocated to individual dubs or the joint
enterprise.
Some current financial arrangements reduce and some increase revenue disparities.
Disparity-reducing arrangements include those governing the distribution of revenues from national
broadcasting (about $350 million in 1991) and licensing ($55 million in 1991). Together, these two
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sources accounted for about 26 percent of revenues. Revenues from the Copyright Royalty
Tribunal, the All-star game, and fees paid by superstations are also fully shared. A small portion
of game receipts is shared with visiting teams.' In the American League a portion of local cable
revenue sharing is also shared.'
In recent years, local broadcasting has generated a growing portion of the industry's revenue
and the disparity in the revenues generated by individual clubs has skyrocketed. While the
American League has recently increased the sharing of local cable (as opposed to over-the-air
broadcast and radio) revenue, the general rule remains that each club is exclusively entitled to the
local broadcasting revenue generated in its own market.
The rules that govern the distribution of revenues among the clubs need review. As far
as the Committee can tell, revenue sharing arrangements have not been updated to reflect
enormous recent changes in revenue sources. The fixed nominal payment to visiting clubs in the
National League represents a steadily declining share of steadily rising ticket prices. Such practices
may have made sense a century ago. They are now inadequate to bridge current disparities in
revenue among the clubs. In short, baseball's revenue sharing rules produce a much different result
in the early 1990's from that of a generation ago.
One aspect of current revenue allocation may actually widen financial disparities in the years
immediately ahead. By far the most important component of revenue sharing in baseball today is
the arrangement governing national broadcasting, which distributes revenue among the twenty-six
major league clubs on an equal basis. The amount of that revenue has grown significantly over
the past decade, and reached about $350 million in 1991. Should national broadcasting revenues
decline, the cushioning effect of the existing revenue sharing arrangements will actually be reduced
precisely when the financially weaker clubs may need it most. We have stated earlier that some
clubs may face difficult circumstances, including operating deficits, in the immediate future. We
believe that increased revenue sharing is warranted, and that under no circumstances should a
possible decline in television revenues be permitted to reduce total revenue sharing.
While, as reported below, no overall problem of competitive balance in major league
baseball has cisted or cists now, the committee judges it important to make sure that financial
imbalances do not create such a problem. In particular, the financially weakest clubs must not be
led by low revenues to slash payrolls dramatically by selling off their star players in an effort to
reduce costs and become profitable. Such practices would produce what is essentially minor league
baseball in which some teams make no meaningful attempt to produce winning teams, would break
'Shad pte receipts equal 20 percent of revenue from ticket ales la the Ameran league and S0.47 to S0.72 per
asedec in the National Lague.
itle cent ao sare cdruabn esponse, iacudiag the cots of t Oft ce of the Cxromiincr, the Phyr Itelations
Cminees centrathed scouting, umpre development and cowtributis for piaygr pemons. These shared capones e
ID aboA 15 percent aoaverage team operating capcoac and do nt -ay signilcandy by team. By for the most important
and epease la recent years has beca damage payments asing &o cammio oer plar salaries.
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faith with the public in the affected cities and harm baseball as a whole.' Increased revenue
sharing, we believe, would reduce the likelihood of such unfortunate behavior.
Revenue sharing is an established feature of baseball's financial arrangements. It has played
an important role in moderating financial disparities among the clubs over the past decade. The
troubled financial times baseball may encounter in the immediate future make it more appropriate
than ever before to fashion a mechanism that will support the financially weaker teams. A number
of existing and potential revenue sources could be dedicated in whole or in part to an extended
revenue sharing arrangement
Whatever sources are selected, we recommend that the current level of twenty-five percent
shared revenues should be considered as a Goor, and that significant increments in this percentage
should be achieved promptly.
The specifics of increased revenue sharing will be complicated to design and implement.
The Committee does not believe its mandate requires it to make detailed recommendations on the
structural and procedural modifications to the present rules in baseball that might be necessary.
The clubs link revenue sharing to the establishment of limits on player salaries to a percentage
of overall revenue. The players reject such limits, but claim a voice in the determination of
revenue sharing arrangements. On this disagreement we take no position. We do note, however,
that we see an important relationship between our recommendation for additional revenue sharing
and our recommendation concerning salary arbitration, which is set forth in the next section.
Our analysis and the discussion between the players and owners persuade us that
both parties, players as well as clubs, have an enormous interest in the additional financial stability
that extended revenue sharing would bring to baseball. The fans and the communities served by
major league baseball have an even larger stake.
Franchise location
Franchise relocation is another possible but limited solution when a team finds itself in a
market where sufficient revenues are difficult or impossible to generate. It is obviously not in the
best interests of baseball as a whole if franchises are moved frequently. On the other hand no
franchise in major league baseball has been moved for twenty years. The recent controversy
surrounding the proposed move of the San Francisco Giants to Tampa-St. Petersburg is illustrative.
Both the Oakland Athletics and the San Francisco Giants are on a list of clubs the owners
designate as 'financially troubled. The Giants' owner proposed to sell the team to a group of
'Tbere i soe evidence that thi occurred in the 1950's, after the Philadelphia AthiLtics rnchie wa said to Kawm
City, which became in the view of sone a fam dub for the New York Yankees. See Hank Greeberg. e Stm Of y
ge (1989), p. 215. Many believe that this wu the strateg employed by the Houston dub bAfre ks recnt ae. It
reduced its player salary am, which had been about average in 1991, by aMost Mfy percent In 199Z at the ame sne that
average salary for al clubs increaed thirty percent. It wa reported that this wa the strategy proposed by the fairst, and
enmuccesful, syndicate seeking to keep the San Francisco Giants in San rancisco.
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fevstors found by an owners' committee to be financially responsible which would have relocated
the team to St. Petersburg. Moving the Giants to Plorida, it at least appears, would have
strengthened both the Giants and Oakland (which would have remained as the sole team in the
Bay area); it also seems likely that the move would have benefitted the players, who had no voice
in the decision. On the other hand, there may well have been other factors which caused the clubs
to reject the proposed move. We recognize baseballs legitimate interest in preserving the
traditions of the game in a community that has supported a club for over thirty years.
The Committee heard no testimony on this isue and makes no judgment about the
proposed sale and relocation of San Francisco to St. Petersburg. What the controversy does
illustrate is that income disparities among the clubs, at least in part, result from and are
perpetuated by the system of rules now in effect.
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III. Implication for Methods of Setting Player Salaries
As we have indicated earlier, the future financial health of baseball as a whole depends on
whether player salaries will adjust to any slowing of revenue growth. The players assert that just
as salaries responded to the growth in revenues they will respond to decline or slowing in growth.
The clubs contend that salaries will not respond because of long-term contracts that promise
salaries based on more bullish revenue expectations and because arbitration tends to pass on to
'poorer' clubs the salary costs paid by "richer' clubs.
The Committee is not persuaded that any relief is required from long-term contracts. A
club may have erred in its own expectations as to revenues. A club may have deliberately engaged
in deficit spending in order to increase its chance of succeeding on the field or because of pride,
civic virtue or other considerations. We see no reason in such cases to suggest a change in the
compensation system to account for past decisions voluntarily and deliberately entered into by the
clubs.
Putting aside, therefore, the existence of long term contracts, the issue before the
Committee is whether anything in the existing arrangement for determining player salaries will
prevent salaries from responding to changes in revenues. History provides no clear guide, since
baseball has not had to confront a situation of declining revenues since the present arrangement
for determining salaries was put in place. As staff analysis shows, in the 1978-81 period when the
reserve clause was breaking apart salaries as a share of revenues rose sharply, from 30 to 48
percent. Since then, including collusion payments, the share has remained close to 46 percent,
though it did rise to nearly 51 percent in 1991. (See Staff Analysis, Figure 2.)
Players fall into three broad categories, based on seniority. players with fewer than three
years of major league service;" players with six or more years of such service; and players falling
between those two categories.
layer ivth Fewr than Three Years of Savice The bargaining agreement provides that
clubs may pay players with fewer than three years of service any salary the team wishes, so long
as the salary is a) at least $100,000 per year plus an adjustment for cost of living increases between
1991 and 1992 b) no more than 20 percent below the salary in the previous year; and c) no more
than 30 percent below the salary two years past. If the player does not accept the team offer, he
We refer to payer whth less than three years of major league aervice fo covCenico. b dividg line is not
precisely at three years. Under the 1990 agreement the salaries of a few of the most sor players in the upothree-
years bracket are grouped with thoe who have completed three years. There were 17 suh players in 1991. For
convrec, tvmer, the te "three me of service will be usd througbout s abo iWding tO plaWycrs wih fewer
than three years of srvie who are thus treated.
It should alo be dear that length of major league serve is not calulated contiuously from tbe due of a
piayer's first major league servic. A year of srve is credited coly for 172 days mn a major league's active i c, the
25 man rser during the saon until September 1, the 40 man rater thereafter.
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cannot play major league baseball. For a variety of reasons, clubs typically pay such players more
than the required minimum. In 1991, 45 percent of all major league players were in this category.
'beir salaries, however, constituted slightly less than 9 percent of total salaries.
Compensation for such players, therefore, imposes little burden on the clubs. In any event,
such salaries are under control of the clubs. If operating revenues decline, the clubs could reduce
the salaries paid to these players, subject only to the minimum salary and the maximum reduction
percentage (which is larger than even the most pessimistic forecast of decline in club revenues).
tyrs vith Sir Ar Mor Yes ofSmc At the other end of the spectrum, players who
have completed six years of major league service and who are not playing under a multi-year
contract extending beyond six years are eligible to become "free agents.' Free agents may negotiate
with any team and sign a contract of any mutually agreed duration for any mutually agreed
compensation. In 1991, 30 percent of the players had six years or more of service. Their salaries,
however, constituted almost 61 percent of the total salary bill.
These players include a large proportion of the prominent 'franchise" players with a
substantial public following, but only a small portion of these players is eligible to exercise free-
agency rights in any given year. Some are playing under multi-year contracts signed before or after
they became eligible to be free agents. After a player who ranks statistically among the top 50
percent in performance of all major league players at his position has exercised his right to free
agency, he may not do so again for a period of five years. Clubs are obligated to pay free agent
players only the salaries they voluntarily agree to as a result of negotiations with the player and/or
his agent
Unless it can be clearly demonstrated to be inimical to baseball as a whole we see no
reason why outsiders should interfere with freely negotiated contracts between clubs and individual
players. While the salaries of selected players are quite high, similar or higher salaries are paid in
other sports and in the long run baseball needs to be attractive to talented young athletes.
In short, with respect to players with fewer than three years of service and those with six
or more years of service, constituting 75 percent of the players and nearly 70 percent of the total
salary bill, the clubs are paying salaries to which they have agreed. The arrangements set forth by
the collective bargaining agreement in themselves create no structural impediment to salaries
responding to changes in the revenue.
Players wih Thrar To Sir Years of Smice Players with at least three but fewer than six
years of major league service are subject to the reserve system and are bound to the clubs that
signed them, but are normally eligible for final offer salary arbitration, unless they have signed
multi-year contracts. In 1991, 25 percent of major league players fell in this service category.
They received slightly less than 31 percent of total player salaries.
The clubs argue that the 'pernicious" system of final offer salary arbitration is the second
of the two reasons for their prediction that player salaries will not be responsive to the projected
decline in national television revenues. Under final offer arbitration, the player and the club to
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which the player is reserved each present the arbitrator with a proposed salary for a one-year
contract, together with arguments on why the proposed salary each party advocates is the more
reasonable. Arbitrators must pick one proposed salary or the other. In making their decisions,
arbitrators are barred from considering the financial condition of the club.
Probably the most important factor considered by the arbitrator is the salaries paid to
"comparable" players, including free agents. Relevant free agent contracts include not only those
signed in the current year, but all contracts still in effect that were signed in the previous years.
The emphasis on *comparable salaries" was intended to and had the effect of eliminating geographic
differentials in salaries. Iength of service is also an important part of the salary arbitration criteria.
This has resulted in arbitrators' decisions which show a pattern of average salaries, in the group
of players eligible for arbitration, graduated by length of service with the higher salaries on average
being paid to those players with longer major league service.
The Committee has heard three arguments on why arbitration produces undesirable effects.
First, both the players and the clubs allege that arbitration systematically produces salaries different
from those that would be generated by unfettered contracting between players and clubs.
Second, the clubs hold that arbitration reduces the effective control of the clubs over their
payrolls. The lack of control arises, it is argued, because the clubs are forced either to release
arbitration-eligible players as unrestricted free agents or to tender contracts to the players, which
automatically precipitates arbitration under current rules if the player does not accept what the club
has offered. Under final-offer arbitration, the arbitrator may choose the player's bid, which may
considerably exceed what the club had been planning to spend. The statistical analysis conducted
by staff on the lag between arbitration awards and free agency salaries was not considered
conclusive enough by the Committee to provide much clarification on this point.
The players argue that arbitration does not deprive owners of effective control over their
salary budgets because the club may refuse to tender a contract to a player and may enter the free-
agent market to acquire a player who can provide comparable services. If the club tenders a
contract, the players argue, it is because it thinks it can get 'more player for the money through
arbitration than it can through the free agent market. Since no one denies that clubs can control
what they spend in the free agent market, the players maintain that the clubs can do at least as
well, on the average, under arbitration as they can under free agency.
The third argument against arbitration is that it deprives players who wish to play for a
team other than their current one of the opportunity to act on that preference.
As a general matter, the Committee believes that in the absence of other compelling
arguments restrictions on contracting between the parties should be minimized. The burden of
proof is on those who would restrict the ability of individual players and owners to contract freely
with each other. The Committee finds no such justification for arbitration as currently applied to
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three-to-six year players. Accordingly, we recommend that the service level at which players
become free agents be reduced from six to three years.s
The enlargement of the number of players entitled to free agency may have a number of
side effects. One may be an increase in the number of long-term guaranteed contracts to ensure
clubs that they will be able to keep promising players. Another may be an increase in the number
of players moving from club to club. That, however, may or may not be balanced by a decrease
in the number of trades of players in the three to six year category. It is impossible to predict with
certainty the ctent of such side effects. However, if the enlargement of free agency produces such
significantly larger movement of players as to decrease fan loyalty to teams, it would be in the
interest of the parties to negotiate subsequently some small deterrent to movement by players in
the three to six year service group.
Taking all these considerations into account, the Committee recommends that the parties
move to extend free agency to players in the three-to-six year category. We have not agreed to
recommend any changes in the rules governing player compensation other than the reduction in
the service requirement for free agency from six to three years.
'Artitration, under the rommendetm, would remin a akernative to free agency woe botb the dub and the
pi st asuese Under the esig ctractual rrngemeat for pars clagb i frc agency.
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IV. Competitive Balance
A reasonable degree of competitive balance is essential to the excitement of baseball. One
of the great attractions of baseball is that on any given day any team may beat any other team.
Tight pennant races, Cinderella teams, underdogs, and David-and-Goliath contests are all part of
the lore and attraction of the national pastime, perhaps more so than in other spors. The
practical question, therefore, is whether financial imbalances among teams have undermined
competitive balance sufficiently to be "a problem."
Clubs situated in large communities usually have access to more local television revenues
and game receipts than do clubs in small communities. Common sense suggests that clubs with
larger revenues should be able to field stronger teams, on the average, than small market clubs can.
This advantage should arise from the greater capacity of large-market clubs to support extensive
farm systems to develop future players and to offer higher salaries to attract star players. Clubs
that can remain financially viable only by keeping payrolls low might be expected to win relatively
fewer games. Such a strategy might (or might not) keep these teams profitable, but it could
destroy competitive balance.'
The Committee found no evidence that such a problem has existed in the past two
decades." The 1991 World Series involved two clubs that were last in their division's standings in
1990. Six of eleven teams alleged by the clubs to be in chronic financial difficulty (see section II
above) finished in the top third of their respective division races in 1992; two won division titles.
As the staff report shows, clubs in large markets enjoyed an advantage on the field of 2.5 games
during the period from 1984 through 1990. Staff estimates indicate that a club in a market four
times as large as that of another club would win from 2.5 to 5.2 more games than the smaller
market team. (See Staff Analysis, Section II.) Staff analysis finds no evidence that competitive
balance has decreased and some that it has increased since the advent of free agency.
'Economic tbcory also sugests that larg market teca should be stronger than small market team. If transaction
csts were small, it would be in the interest of both owners and pisyers for players to be employed In bsebal markets
where they coold contribute most to team revenues. If a player were in another market than the oe where be could
generate highest revnues, it would pay the team that owns his contract to negotiate a mutually advantageous sale with
the team where the players addition to revenue wa highest. Ibe rules under which players are compensated would not
afnct this coclusion if transaction costs were small. In fact, transaction cots are sipilficant. As the ten indicates, the
teadency indicated by conomic theory s observed in practice. Economic tory does not, howver, indicate how Iwa
the dicapancy in co-feMl performance wil be.
Competitive balance" ba no obvious simple denition. It could reft to the frequccy with whi team win the
World Series, the league chatnpioship, or their division or it couMl refer to the frequency with which teams are In the
race' at some date in the season, which itacif could be dened in maious ways. Competitive balace could also refer to
the difference in the averae number of pme won between first and last place team or to the standard deviation in the
number of wi. It could be bued o a compariso at singie-ason records or on averages over several seasons. [bc
number of oIb definition competitive blance is infnite. The staff tried several defnits. None indicated a
decarse in competitive balance and one indicated large imtlances.
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From one standpoint, it is puzzling why the great differences in baseball market size-the
largest market is effectively four times the size of the smallest-have not resulted in larger
differences in won-lost records than those actually observed. Part of the answer to this puzzle
seems to be that such factors as skill in player development, managerial ability, the equalizing effect
of injuries, teamwork and synergy among the players, and just plain luck play a larger part in
performance on the field than many suppose. Part may be that the greater revenue potential of
the large-market teams is absorbed by (i.e. 'capitalized into) higher purchase value so that a higher
operating margin is needed to service debt or provide a return on equity. In any event, under
the existing compensation arrangements, economic differences as represented by market size are
weakly associated with differences in won-lost records. We have found no sign, moreover, that the
association between economic differences and competitive imbalance has grown stronger over time."
The data contained in the staff analysis do strongly suggest that there is a statistical
association between payroll size and on-the-field performance. (See Staff Analysis, Figure 13.)
They do not, however, establish which is the cause and which is the effect. It is arguable that
there is a "winner's curse', i.e. that superiox: on-the-field performance capped by a league or world
series championship causes payrolls to rise. The reverse may also be true, i.e. that payroll increases
lead to superior on-the-field performance. The evidence before the Committee is too inconclusive
to support a definitive judgment on this question. We do conclude that at least to this date there
has been no problem of competitive balance.
We are not asserting that competition between the clubs is in perfect balance. Some teams
have done poorly in recent years, including Cleveland, Seattle, and Houston, three of the eleven
clubs alleged to be financially troubled. Whether these clubs will continue to perform poorly is
not certain. As the result of its recent sale, ownership of the Seattle franchise moves to owners
with larger financial resources; and Cleveland will have a new and more attractive stadium. As the
experience of Baltimore dramatically illustrates, new and attractive stadiums can sharply increase
fan interest and attendance, although in Baltimore's case the effect of the new stadium is difficult
to disentangle from the team's greatly improved on-field performance.
The evidence we have found on the effect of market size on competitive balance suggests
that increased revenue sharing would probably add slightly to competitive balance, but that the
addition would be small in the context of a generally profitable industry. However, as indicated
earlier, revenue sharing could help protect against cost pressure on weaker franchises if a serious
cost-revenue squeeze were to develop for the industry generally.
nnbc optisum deree at competitive balance is hard to define. Fas would probably be happics if every club
appeared to be a Conender every year. Total baembal revenues would probably be nimabd, however, if large market
tms won a bit more often than small market team do, but not by wide margins. Pennant races would continue to be
and the sight dominance of large teas would mmie the rester drawing power and ideviion potential of the
ager murkets. Ibe rather modest current advantage of large market teans seems to be roughly consistent with this
scoone ideal.
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V. Other Issues
This section treats three other issues the Committee chose to address.
Related Part, Transactions
Many teams are part of business groups that engage in activities other than baseball. These
groupings may involve partnerships or corporations. The common element is that separate
businesses, each of which is wholly or partly owned in common, sometimes engage in business
transactions with one another. The prices paid by one such business to another may or may not
be the same as would result if the businesses were independently owned. In such caes, the
revenues, expenses, and profits of each entity may differ from those that would have been
generated by arm's length transactions.
The players have long alleged that such transactions cause baseball profits to be
systematically understated. The dubs acknowledge that some minor distortions may occur, but hold
that they do not much color the overall picture of basebal's economic condition.
The Committee finds no evidence to suggest that local variations in media contracts, stadium
arrangements and other related party transactions invalidate the general picture of club profitability
that cmerges from the combined operating statements furnished by the owners.
The staff analysis concludes that, with the exception of a handful of cases, the discrepancies
reported are small, not suspect, or come down in the end to reasonable questions of judgment
And with one ciception, where the club has not furnished enough data to allow a conclusive
judgment, none of the cases concern financially troubled clubs.
The Committee concludes that the profits of a smal number of teams, most of which ae
profitable, are somewhat understated became of related party transactions. Tbe financial condition
of some other teams may be affected to a relatively sinor csent. In the aggregate, baseball is
probably slightly more profitable than the statistics submitted to the Commissione suggest. ot
this Committee does not think that its comments about the future or its recomendatio would
have been changed if eams transacted al business completely at an-s length.
Eleuer CeMMastie Ias*@ em Cambhpp 118Me
During the bargaining leading, up so the current labor-management agreement, the dubs
advanced a proposal that would have established mainmum and maximum gram salaries for each
club based an a percentage of certain defined revenues for the dubs as a whole. Under thi
proposal the salaries of al players with fewer than si years of seavice would be deterained by
statistical acasure of perfosmance and would be paid from a common pool. Tbe rules would have
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provided numerous exceptions to the maximum, most notably an exclusion of salaries paid to
players on any club's roster in the previous year. A broadly similar minimum-maximum rule, with
the same exception, is in operation in professional basketball. The players did not accept this
proposal and the clubs withdrew it.
The Committee does not express an opinion on any floor-cciling proposal. It did identify
various advantages and disadvantages to the idea. Some of the prominent ones are as follows:
Advantages:
* Allows clubs collectively and individually to negotiate their total labor costs within
broad limits clearly related to revenue growth. Combined with revenue-sharing,
contributes to stabilizing the weaker clubs.
* Gives both players and owners a common stake in the overall commercial success
of baseball, since they would share explicitly in the same revenue stream.
* May increase management-labor harmony by focusing contract negotiations on
exactly how much of the pie labor will get, and then fixing that for the duration of
the contract.
* During a period of severe financial adjustment could be designed to protect players
against rapidly falling salaries.
Disadvantages:
The Committee recommendations with respect to players with three to six years of service
would in fact allow the clubs to negotiate all of their player costs clearly and specifically. Any
minmum-maximum proposal would add nothing except to limit the ability of players to negotiate
with individual dubs and to artificially restrict dubs from paying what they think players are worth.
If as basketball has found to be necessary, and as the clubs proposed in 1990, an exception to the
maximum permits clubs to resign their own players without regard to the maximum, free agency
would be essentially eliminated, since bidding clubs would be subject to the maximum while the
players' current clubs would not. The result would be to reduce total player compensation and,
as in basketball, might be to seriously affect competitive balance. If no such exception were made,
dubs with payrolls now in excess of the maximum would be required to reduce the salaries of their
present players and would be powerless to bid for any players at all.
If total player salaries are contractually tied to revenues, the players would insist on the
right to have an equal voice in the negotiations and decisions which the clubs now make
unilaterally that directly affect revenues, such as franchise sales and moves, new franchises,
television and cable contracts, ticket prices, revenue sharing, etc. Fnally, any direct tie to gross
dub revenues would require a relationship of trust in the accuracy of club statements as to
revenues; it is dear that, at present, the union does not have the requisite level of trust.
208
Reportt of Ecomom Study Commtes as BasauI
December 3. 199 Pase 22
MarketlaE and Promotion of Baseball
During the course of its work, members of the Committee frequently encountered
observations on baseball from people knowledgeable about the marketing of professional sports.
They have noted that effective and determined efforts by local clubs to boost attendance and
promote their teams have produced marked results in recent years both at the gate and on the
bottom line. At the same time, many expressed the view that baseball is marketed and promoted
less well on a national level than are other major sports. In particular, observers in the world of
sports and the media expressed the view that both basketball and football do a superior job at the
national level of communicating the excitement and attraction of their sport to the public, and of
finding ways to manage scheduling, competition and promotion of stars that build audiences and
hence advertising revenue.
Although fan support of baseball is near all-time highs, the Committee judges that
aggressive promotion of baseball can produce even better results. To realize this potential will
involve looking at a wide range of matters, including how to make playoff and championship
competition more attractive; exploring the possibility of more international baseball competition;
additional ways to market local television rights; and possible restructuring of league structure and
season length. These issues can be addressed only through disciplined and effective cooperation
between players and clubs. Indeed, the very challenge of more effective national marketing for
baseball underscores the need for a broad and durable partnership between players and owners.
Marketing in baseball means marketing the players, particularly the stars; and the only way that can
work is for players and owners to share a vital sense of their very real common interest and to
develop a pattern of cooperation which allows them to build on that common interest.
Another opportunity is the management and marketing of television rights to cable
distributors and other outlets for baseball programming other than national over-the-air
broadcasters. Some of the dubs do a remarkably sophisticated job of selling local media rights to
their games. But most TV markets now have 300-400 games per season available to the viewer;
these games are available helter-skelter and often are not effectively promoted or scheduled so as
to maximize audience and advertising potentiaL It is ironic that of the major sports, the only one
with a judicially sanctioned anti-trust exemption is the one which makes available its entertainment
product on the least controlled, least effectively marketed basis. The present price of most regular
season games sold to local cable systems can range anywhere from $15,000 per game on the low
end to $100,000 and higher per game on the upper end. Local TV may replace national
broadcasting as the fastest growing source of revenue for baseball. While this revenue picture will
certainly be affected by the general slowdown in TV revenue growth we have described elsewhere,
baseball as a whole has a tremendous stake in maximizing the growth of local TV audience and
revenue in the future. Many clubs presently do a professional job of selling and marketing their
games on a local ADIn basis. But the increasing availability of multi-channel TV in markets all
over the country, increasingly refined market segmentation programming strategies, and the
profusion of other sports events available to distributors and local systems, are beginning to give
ADL Area at Dominant InOccm, a televison marketing term raerring to the populado at a geographic are In
which a panicular am of VHF statn are the principal om reccived.
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an enormous advantage to any sport or entertainment which does an aggressive, nationally
coordinated job of packaging. scheduling selling and promotion. The Committe feels this
opportunity should be a major focus of baseball's efforts in the future.
The Committee makes no recommendation on how the players and clubs should organize
to improve the marketing and promotion of baseball. We note simply that increases in overall
baseball revenues create the potential for both parties to gain, and that "growing the overall pie
is a vital objective that the owners and players share in common. We think that cooperative efforts
to increase revenues may be more important in the 1990's than they would have been in the 1980's.
Some parts of the game must and will forever remain the same. The bases will always be
ninety feet apart, and there will always be three outs per half inning. But by examining
imaginatively other aspects of the sport that do evolve over time in response to changing
conditions, baseball may develop avenues of promotion which can rekindle public interest, attract
new fans, and intensify the loyalty of existing ones.
Henry Aaron
David Feller
Peter Goldmark
Paul Volcker
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Except from Article XXIV
Collective Bargaining Agreement Between Parties
Establishing Economic Study Committee
A. Study Committee
A Study Committee shall be established no later than September 1, 1990, to
study and report to the Commissioner and to the Parties to this Agreement on
the overall economic condition of the industry, including a description of current
or impending problems, if any; the cause of such problems; and possible
solutions. The Committee shall be composed of six (6) individuals, four (4) of
whom shall not be or have been an employee, member o or consultant to, any
club, the Player Relations Committee, the Association or Major League BasebalL
The Chairman of the Player Relations Committee and the Executive Director of
the Association, or their designees, shall serve as co-chairs of the Committee and
shall each recommend two (2) additional members who shall be appointed by the
Commissioner to serve on the Committee. The Committee shall consider the
following issues as part of its study;
1. The relationship, if any, between club revenues and on-field
competition;
2. The extent and nature of revenue sharing among the clubs;
3. The advantages (and/or disadvantages) of compensating players
based on a percentage of combined industry revenues;
4. Past and future trends in national and local media markets;
5. The extent, nature, and value of club related party
transactions;
6. Franchise values;
7. The number and location of geographical markets (including
franchise relocation); and
8. Such other matters as the Committee (or either of the co-
chairs thereof) deems appropriate.
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Report of Independent Accountants
Major League Baseball Clubs
We have compiled the accompanying combined summary of operations (before income
taxes) (the "Summary') of the twenty-six Major League Baseball Clubs (the "Clubs') and
the.Major Leagues Central Fund for the 1991 playing season. The Summary combines
the revenues and expenses of each of the Clubs and the Major Leagues Central Fund for
the respective fiscal year end which included the 1991 playing season. For presentation
purposes, the Clubs have been grouped based on their respective contributions to income
(loss) from baseball operations.
We audited the statements of revenues and expenses of six of the twenty-six Clubs and
that of the Major Leagues Central Fund. Our audits were made in accordance with gen-
erally accepted auditing standards and, accordingly, included such tests of the accounting
records and such other auditing procedures as we considered necessary in the circum-
stances. The statements of revenues and expenses of the twenty other Clubs together with
the reports of other auditors thereon have been furnished to us through respective League
Counsel. Each Club has also furnished to us, through the respective League Counsel, a
completed questionnaire (the "Questionnaire") containing detailed financial information
for the respective fiscal year end which included the 1991 playing season. The income
(loss) before income taxes reported on these Questionnaires have been agreed by us to the
respective Clubs' audited statements of revenues and expenses. These Questionnaires
have been used to effect the above-mentioned compilation.
Management has elected to omit substantially all of the disclosures required by generally
accepted accounting principles. If the omitted disclosures were included with the
Summary, they might influence the user's conclusions about the operatipns of the twenty-
six Major League Baseball Clubs and the Major Leagues Central Fund for the 1991
playing season. Accordingly, the Summary is not designed for those who are not in-
formed about such matters.
In our opinion, based on our audits, the reports of other auditors, and the reconciliation of
the income (loss) before income taxes reported on the Questionnaires to the respective
Clubs' audited statements of revenues and expenses referred to above, the Summary for
the 1991 playing season has been properly compiled from the Qdestionnaires and the
statement of revenues and expenses of the Major Leagues Central Fund.
I
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The accompanying combined schedules of operating revenues, major league player costs,
team operating expenses and major league player acquisition costs, scouting and player
development expenses, stadium operations expenses, marketing, publicity and ticket
operations expenses, general and administrative expenses, and amortization of franchise
acquisition costs for the 1991 playing season have been compiled from the information
included in the Questionnaires and the statement of revenues and expenses of the Major
14agues Central Fund. Such schedules are presented for purposes of additional analysis
and are not a required part of the Summary. In our opinion, based on our audits, the
reports of other auditors, and the reconciliation of the income (loss) before income taxes
reported on the Questionnaires to the respective Clubs' audited statements of revenues
and expenses referred to above, the combined schedules have been properly compiled
from the Questionnaires and the statement of revenues and expenses of the Major
Leagues Central Fund.
July 31, 1992
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26 Major League Baseball Clubs
1991 Season
Combined Operating Revenues
Schedule I
(In Thousands)
Top Middle Bottom
Elght Ten Eight
A. Regular Season Game Receipts
Home game receipts-ner
Total home game receipts
Less visiting club share
Less League share
Less admission/sales tax
Total home game receipts-net
Away game receipts
Unredeemed tickets, rain checks
Total Regular Season Came Receipts
B. Spring Training Game Receipts (net of
rent and stadium operations expenses)
C. National Broadcasting
Regular season
World series
League Championship Series
All-Star Game
Foreign rights
Total National Broadcasting
D. Local Television and Radio
Television:
Gross revenues
Less direct expenses
Television-net
Radio:
Gross revenues
Less direct expenses
Local radio-nct
Cable:
Gross revenues (including advertising)
Less direct expenses. including local taxes
Less television scrambling
Local cable-net
Total Local Television and Radio
S 218.792 S 195.906 S 143309 S 558.007
28.913 19,877 19.246 68,036
5.645 5,266 3.911 14,822
8,951 10,980 3,950 23,881
175,283 159,783 116,202 451,268
22.963 21.794 23351 68.108
1,300 1,210 1,135 3,645
199546 182.787 140.688 523.021
4.422 4.401 4.225 13,048
30,123 37,654 30,123 97.900
45.981 57.476 45981 149.438
25.888 32.361 25,888 84.137
5,200 6,500 5,200 16,900
805 1,006 805 2,616
107,997 134,997 107,997 350,991
59.650 58361 32398 150.409
2 5,099 3,488 8,589
59648 53.262 28.910 141,820
23.430 28.214 23,642
469 3,326 4,501
22961 24-888 19.141
75,286
8,96
66.990
43.119 32.112 25,877 101.108
- 500 1,607 2.107
118 148 118 384
43,001 31,464 24,152 98,617
125.610 109.614 72.203 307427
4
Tetal
217
26 Major League Baseball Clubs
1991 Season
Combined Operating Revenues (continued)
Schedule I (continued)
(In Thousands)
IL n.Park Cocessios, Net (including
restauraat/stadlum dub revenues
and novelties, but excluding sales of
publications)
F. Advertising and Publications (including
sales and cost of publications)
Stadium signs and scoreboard, act of direct
saes expenses (including commissions)
Serecards-aetolexpenses
Yearbooks-nect of expenses
Othe-netofexpenses
Total Advenising and Publications
G. Parkng, Net
H. Stadium Suite Rentals
Gross revenues (excluding ticket revenues)
Lnss direct expenses (including labor and
supplies. but excluding depreciation)
Total Stadium Suite Rentals
L Copyright Royally Tribunal
J. Amortization of amounts received in 1989
relating to network telecasting
agreements
L League Championship Series and
World Series
Shareofsamereceipts-net
Conicessions-net
Otherrevenues
less expenses
Total League Championship Series and
World Series
Top Middle Bottom
Eivht Ten Eight Total
S 58,970 S 42,349 S 29,653 S 130,972
11.818 7,797 5.253 24.68
1,538 2.196 1.181 4,915
830 137 139 1,106
5,189 504 612 6,305
19,375 10,634 7,185 37,194
6458 5370 5,637 17,465
13.093 7.350 3,680 24.123
4,272 828 416 5,516
8.821 6.522 3,264 18607
4,099 5,124 4,099 13322
2,846 3,865 3,086 9,797
2013 8.837 3.111 13.961
372 3.193 374 3.939
549 751 725 2025
(899) (4,485) (1,328) (6,712)
2,035 8.296 2.882 13.213
5
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26 Major League Baseball Clubs
1991 Season
Combined Operating Revenues (continued)
Schedule I (continued)
(In Thousands)
LNational liceasing
M. Other Baseball.Related Revenues
National marketing
Local marketing and licensing
All-Star Game receipts
Receipts from exhibition games
Other-net
Total Other Baseball-Relatcd Revenues
Total Operating Revenues
Top Middle Bottom
Eight Ten Eight Total
S 17,249 S 21337 S 16849 S 55,435
1.582 2,429 2,404 6,415
1,659 6.632 289 8,580
621 777 621 2,019
1390 290 678 2,358
16,910 7,071 3.550 27,531
22,162 17,199 7.542 46,903
S579.590 S552A95 S405.310 SI.537.395
6
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26 Major League Baseball Clubs
1991 Season
Combined Team Operating Expenses
and Major League Player Acquisition Costs
Schedule m
(In Thousands)
Top Middle Bottom
'iht Ten Rht
Team Operating Expenses
Salaries-nanager. coaches and trainers S 7,493
Spring taining 3,835
Transportation and road trip expenses 7.172
Hotelsand meals 3.196
Players moving allowances and expenses 218
Disability, life. accident and travel insurance 2,356
Workers' compensation insurance 4.815
Uniforms and playing equipment 354
Baseballs 749
Bats 352
Clubhouse expenses 849
Medical expenses 700
Other expenses 1,631
33,720
Major League Player Acquisition Costs
Amortization of cost of contracts
purchased-active players 694
-players released or retired 9
(Gain) loss on sale of player contracts 163
866
TotatTeam Operating Expenses and Major
League Player Acquisition Costs S34.586
S 10.251
7.346
7,881
4.524
404
2.259
6,012
455
821
446
1,169
1,419
10Q71
S 6.771
4,511
7,098
3.745
263
2,607
7,015
225
666
311
890
705
1 072
S 24.515
15.692
22.151
11,465
885
7,222
17.542
1.034
2.236
1,109
2,908
2,824
774
44,058 35,879 113,657
327 617 1,638
214 1,646 1.869
(32) (756) (625)
509 1,507 2,882
S 44.567 S 37.386 S 116.539
8
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26 Major League Baseball Clubs
1991 Season
Combined Scouting and Player Development Expenses
Schedule IV
(In Thousands)
Scening Expeases
Travel expenses
Other expenses
Tatal Scouting Expenses
Amateur Player Acquisition Costs
Minor League signing bonuses and other
player acquisition costs
Con of released players
Sak ofcontracts-net (gain)
Other
Totsl Amateur Player Acquisition Costs
Player Development Expenses
Salaries-front office (farm director. director
ofplayer development, assistances. etc.)
Salaries-managers, coaches. trainers and
instructors
Class AAA Clubs
Cha AA Clubs
Class A Clubs
Rookie Clubs
Spring training (March camps only)
Extended spring training (including
June camps)
Insructional league
Latin American and other foreign
National Association. net
Oiler expenses
Total Player Development Expenses
Toral Scouting and Player Development
Expenses
TOp Middle Bottom
Eight Ten Eight Total
S 8,035 511.261 S 7.428 S 26.724
5.481 7.250 5.655 18386
614 1,200 523 2,337
14,130 19,711 13,606 47,447
9.937 10.036 5.577 25.550
725 1.090 110 1,925
(500) (575) (146) (1,221)
105 301 292 698
10,267 10,852 5,833 26,952
2.350 2.164 1.670 6.184
5.707 7.903 5.751 19.361
6.401 7.636 7.042 21.079
2.996 3.244 3.326 9,566
5.900 6.806 5.543 18.249
2.596 2,075 1,274 5,945
3,336 3.565 2,826 9.727
1.469 1.071 941 3.481
1.558 1,677 974 4.209
2,176 1.503 1,306 4.985
134 164 134 432
3,661 2.997 2,956 9,614
38,284 40,805 33,743 112.832
S 62.681 S 71.368 S 53.182 S 187.231
9
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26 Major League Baseball Clubs
1991 Season
Combined Stadium Operations Expenses
Schedule V
(In Thousands)
Top Middle Bottom
Eiaht Ten Eiht
Salaries (or contracted cost) for day of
game and season personnel
Salaries-year-round personnel
Signs and scoreboard operations, including
salaries
Rent (including olncelstadium rent, use taxes.
Cable TV, super suites. etc.)
Depreciation o stadium (including super
suites and scoreboard) and equipment
Real estate and property taxes
Utilities
Maintenance and repairs
Other expenses
Total Stadium Operations Expenses
S 19.321 S 12,957 S 13.880 S 46.158
2297 3.077 1.590 6964
2,087 957 2,228 5,272
15,254 7.571 9.104 31.929
12,468 9.339 2,601 24408
1,781 1.628 184 3,593
3.978 3.812 1.946 9.736
2,211 3,516 1,190 6.917
2.629 2222 1,068 5-919
S 62.026 S 45,079 S 33.791 S 140.896
10
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26 Major League Baseball Clubs
1991 Season
Combined Marketing, Publicity and Ticket Operations Expenses
Schedule VI
(In Thousands)
Top Middle Bottom
Fleht Te Fieht
Salaries, including bonuses and commissions:
Marketing/promodons
Publicity/community relations
Sales office
Ticket office
Total Salaries
Game promotions--net (revenue) expense
Advertising
Club newslcter
Ticket printing and schedules
Agency and credit card commissions
Press room expenses (salanes and
food supplies)
Other (including Media Guide)
All-Star Game expense
Total Marketng. Publicity and Tickc
Operations Expenses
S 1.746 S 3.693 S 1,885 S 7.324
1.931 2.701 1.836 6.468
1.683 2,480 1.930 6.093
4,263 4,632 4,247 13,142
9,623 13506 9,898 33,027
(1.456) 342 (923) (2.037)
3.192 5,499 3922 12,613
33 574 28 635
632 1.293 842 2.767
1.367 1,233 929 3.529
809 950 1,001 2.760
3.988 3.910 3,722 11.620
179 224 179 582
8,744 14,025 9,700 32,469
S 18.367 S 27.531 S 19.598 S 65.496
11
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26 Major League Baseball Clubs
1991 Season
Combined General and Administrative Expenses
Schedule VII
(In Thousands)
Top Middle Bottom
Eight Ten Eight Total
Salaries-tasetall administration S 4,672
Salae -business administration 9.760
Payroll taxes 7,401
Travel and entertainment 4.113
Employee benefits-
Group life. health and other 4.482
Retirement. profit sharing, 401(k) plans, etc. 3.454
Insurance.
General liability-primary and excess 3,585
Other 2,389
Legal fees 4,045
Accounting fees 1.009
Other professional fees 4,289
Business taxes 978
Computer operations. including ticket office 1,270
Telephone 1.989
Postage 1,302
Stationery and supplies 1.434
Drug program 82
Charitable contributions 1,677
Other expenses
Total General and Administrative Expcnses S 64.470
S 5,692
11,916
9.256
8.018
S 4.115
8.116
6379
3.512
S 14.479
29.792
23.036
15.643
6.108 4.851 15.441
4,866 3.245 11.565
3.768
911
3.488
1.396
2,525
855
1.107
2.355
1.485
1.149
103
1,552
22
1,729
295
1.883
643
3,029
941
396
1.496
1.006
920
82
600
2,AS591
9.0=2
3.595
9416
3.048
9.843
2774
2.773
5.840
3.793
3.503
267
3.829
11S44
12
S 6,82 S56 96
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MAJOR LEAGUE
BASEBALL PLAYERs ASSOCIATION
Dotra ML Fein
2 February 1993
Hon. Howard M. Netzenbau
c/o Chris Harvie
Subcommittee on Antitrust,
Honopolies and Business Rights
Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510-6275
Re: Baseball's Antitrust Exemption
Dear Senator Metzenbaum:
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The 19W93 Basic Agreement between the American and National ague Baseball
Clubs and the Major League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA) established an Economic
Study Committee (ESC). The ESC is to report on "the overall economic condition of the
ladustry, including a description of current or impending problems, ... the cause of such
problems, and possible solutions."
The ESC hired a staff to do the factual and statistical work necessary for this
examination. This is the staff analysis. It focuses heavily on two questions the ESC felt to
be of paramount importance - the overall economic condition of baseball clubs, and the state
of competitive balance between clubs with large and small revenue bases. Section I deals
with the overall economic condition of the industry and impending problems. Section II looks
for evidence of these problems on the financial side - how profitable are baseball clubs, how
much are clubs worth, how large are rates of return from owning clubs? Section El looks for
evidence on the competitive side - how competitive are the clubs on the field, how large are
disparities in win-loss records, how great are the competitive advantages of clubs with
greater revenue potentials? Since this is just an analytical report, it contains no
recommendations of changes that might be made in the structure of major league baseball.
Recommendations can be found in the report of the ESC itself.
L The Overall Condition of Major League Baseball
To appraise the economic condition of major league baseball, we were able to examine
cwfidential club data submitted to the Commissioner, covering the years 1978 to 1991. We
converted all figures in this report to 1991 US dollars by deflating by the Consumer Price
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Inde. Since the data are confidential, we generally just give either club ar group averages,
not the data for particular clubs.
On the surface major league baseball looks reasonably healthy. As can be seen in Figure
1, overall real revenue for the 26 major league baseball clubs grew fairly slowly, at an
annual average real growth rate of 3 percent, from 1978 to 1982 (the year following
baseball's worst strike). Since that time revenues have increased sharply, at an annual
average real growth rate of 10 percent from 1982 to 1991. Over this span major league
baseball has more doubled its share of US real gross domestic product. Over the 1985-91
period, the focus of much of the ESC's report, the annual average real growth rate was 9
percent
There has been much attention to the explosion in players' salaries. For most of this
century these salaries were held down by the old reserve clause system, which bound players
to clubs and did not let players sell their services on the free market. The reserve clause
system began to break apart in the mid-1970s, and player salaries began a rapid ascent, at
the annual average real growth rate of 12 percent a year from 1978 to 1991; 10 percent a
year from 1985 to 1991.
But after an initial change, baseball revenues grew rapidly enough that even this rapid
growth of players salaries did not absorb an unusually high fraction of revenues. Figure 2
shows player costs, including pension payments and collusion payments (to be explained
later), as a share of club revenues. In the 1978-81 period, when the reserve clause system
was breaking apart, this share rose sharply, from 30 percent to 48 percent. Since then.
including the collusion payments, the share has remained pretty close to 46 percent, though
it did rise to 51 percent in 1991.
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The results for the overall operating income (to be defined below) of baseball clubs are
sawn in Figure S. Average club operating income was low or negative up to 1I65 but then
began a rally through 1990, reaching a peak of $5 million per club. It dipped back to $3.5
million per club in 1991.
These numbers illustrate the high points. Each comes with a variety of qualifications and
complications, to be discussed further below. And, even if these overall figures give the
superficial appearance of health - revenues are rising rapidly, operating income Used to be
negative and is now positive - there could be potential trouble spots. Two of the main ones
are:
a The vast disparity in revenues between clubs.
a The adjustment of the compensation system to slowdowns in revenue growth.
Revenue disparities
There is a widespread variation in the size of club markets, and in potential revenues.
City population sizes vary from the two New York teams, splitting up a metropolitan
population of 19 million, to Kansas City, Milwaukee, and Cincinnati, each with metropolitan
populations of less than 2 million.
Similar population disparities exist in the other major professional sports - football,
basketball, and hockey. But because of its more decentralized revenue sources, the revenue
disparities are much greater in baseball. Average club revenue was $56 million in 1991, of
which only $12 million came from a flat distribution from the major league central fund
(MLCF). The balance, over three-fourths of total revenue, was raised by the clubs on their
own, in markets as widely disparate in size as those cited above. This led to a great variation
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in total revenues warss clubs - from $98 million for the top revenue club to $89 million for
the lowest revenue club. The lower number is lew than the entire player payroll for some
clubs.
Since clubs are bought and sold in free capital markets, franchise prices would be expected
to capitalize these disparities. This means that clubs in large markets with high revenue
potentials will tend to sell for more than clubs in small markets. It also means that star
players will generally be worth more in large markets, where their contribution to winning
games will produce more gate receipts and local television revenue. Would-be baseball
owners then have a choice - they can buy large market clubs for a high price, knowing that if
they do they will have the revenue potential to buy more star players and win more, or they
can buy small market clubs without these advantages, but for a smaller price.
This description is more or less the way all free markets work in a capitalist system -
whether for consumers or investors, one gets more if one pays more. But since baseball is not
a pure business, these free market attributes can lead to difficulties. All clubs, from
whatever size market, must bid for the same players and compete on the same playing fields.
Large market clubs could bid player salaries to such a level that small market clubs could
not afford to field competitive clubs and still remain profitable. If the small market clubs try
to remain competitive, the impact of revenue disparities will be felt in the financial
statements. If the small market clubs try to remain profitable, the impact of revenue
disparities will be felt in win-loss records. For this reason, it is necessary to examine both
financial records and on-field performance to see how serious these problems are.
A4justment
4
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The former reserve clause system has now been supplanted by a system with three
categories for setting player salaries. In this system:
o Most players with fewer than three years of major league service mut accept what the
clubs ofer them, provided that this offer exceeds the minimum salary of $100,O0 per year.
In 1991 45 percent of all major league players were in this category, but these players
received only 9 percent of total compensation.
o Players with more than six years of major league service are eligible to become free
agents and to sign contracts with aty club for any agreed on duration. In 199130 percent of
major league players had at least six years of major league service and these players received
61 percent of total compensation.
o Players in the middle with more than three but fewer than six years of major league
service are sulect to the reserve system and bound to the club that signed them, but are
normally eligible for final offer salary arbitration, unless they have signed multi-year
contracts. In 1991 25 percent of major league players were in this category, receiving 31
percent of total compensation.
Since the rules of collective bargaining create no impediment to clubs regarding player
costs in the first two categories, those worried about the adjustment of costs to revenues focus
on the third category - arbitration. There is a possibility that if the growth of revenues is
suddenly altered, say it slows dramatically, arbitration salaries will be set relative to free
agent salaries negotiated when revenue prospects were more optimistic, will not adjust to
revenues quickly, and will not be entirely under the control of baseball clubs. In this sense a
sudden slowdown in revenue growth could at least temporarily worsen baseball club incomes.
0 0 0
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These seem to be the main potential problems with the structure of major league baseball
To see how serious they are we must look more carefully at the economic and competitive
prospects for baseball clubs with different revenue base, as well as at the aiustment
warhanm
I. Evidence of Financial Health - Operating Income, Franchise Values, and Rates
of Return
We turn first to the financial aide. How "profitable" are baseball clubs, both in general
and for small market clubs in particular? Since it is difficult to define or appraise the
general profitability of clubs, we look at things in three different ways - we examine the
operating income of the clubs, we examine the franchise values of the clubs, and we combine
these two pieces of information to compute realized real rates of return from owning baseball
clubs.
Income statements
Since 1978 all clubs have submitted common audited financial forms on their baseball
operations to the Commissioner. With the advice of Ernst and Young, these forms have
become increasingly standardized over the years. We used these forms to compute a time
series of the real operating income of each baseball club, on a common accrual basis over
time and across clubs. The resultant data are probably more consistent and accurate than
data for most other American industries.
There are seven accounting issues worth special mention:
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e INormally when groups buy baseball clubs they incur
varying amounts of debt. To the new owners, the interest on this debt looks like a fixed
expense just like any other fixed expense. But to accountants, the interest is a function of
the capital structure. What is paid out in interest by dubs with debt would appear as profits
to clubswithout debt. Hence unless interest payments and receipts are excluded, cub
epense statements simply are not comparable, given that different clubs purchased for
different amounts at different times would have different interest expenses. We have thus
followed accepted accounting practice by removing all interest payments and receipts from
operating expenses and revenues (putting them "below the line," in accounting vernacular),
and computing the net operating income of baseball clubs as if all dubs were financed
entirely by equity (Sorter. Journal ofAcCzauntncy. 1986).
o Amnisition costs. Initial owner acquisition costs - costs of the initial player roster, lease
arrangements, the stadium, and "good will" - are considered as capital transactions and also
eliminated from expenses and revenues (put below the line). But when a tangible asset such
as the stadium depreciates in the course of operating the club, this depreciation is considered
a depreciable expense (above the line), even if the club does not actually pay out any cash.
When the initial roster depreciates and the club is forced to acquire new players, these
subsequent new player acquisition costs are also considered as expenses (above the line). But
no further depreciation for initial rosters is allowed in our definition of operating income.
o ML. This is a shell entity that receives revenues from national and superstation
television arrangements, licensing, and the All-Star game, and uses the revenue to finance
the Commissioner's Office, centralized scouting and umpiring expenses, and payments to the
player pension fund. The balance of the revenue is returned to the clubs, a flat amount per
club. We treat this MLCF as a 27th club. When the total revenues of baseball are measured,
we add the revenues of the 26 real clubs (net of the MLCF distribution) to the revenues of the
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ALCF. When club averages are calculated, we compute this average across the 26 real cubs,
including as revenues the amounts received by the clubs from the MLCF.
o Collusion payments. In the late 1980s the clubs were found to be guilty of collusive
bidding for free agents. The dubs and players reached an out-of-court settlement that had
the dubs pay $280 million to the MLBPA, which then redistributed the funds to individual
players. We allocated the non-interest component of this amount, $242 million, to club
salaries over the relevant years, 1986-92, using an annual distribution worked out by the
MLBPA (as was seen earlier in Figure 2, this allocation roughly preserves the ratio of player
costs to club revenues over the collusion period). For each year the adjustment to player
salaries was a flat amount per club, regardless of how much the club may or may not have
benefitted from collusion. While there seems to be no feasible alternative to this treatment,
it should be noted that some dubs could have benefitted more from collusion than this flat
addition to expenses, and had their operating income over this period artificially inflated,
while other clubs could have benefitted less and had their operating income artificially
depressed.
o Bonuses and deferred comoensation. Very often baseball player or television contracts
involve signing bonuses. Where we could identify these, we spread the bonuses according to
the language of the contract or evenly across the years of the contract, to prevent otherwise
erratic movements in revenues and expenses. Because the clubs themselves differ widely in
how they treat these bonuses, it was not always possible to make these spreads.
On the other side, sometimes player contracts involve deferred compensation. Where
possible, we put the appropriate present value amount into expenses in the year the deferred
compensation liability was first incurred. Again, because of accounting procedure
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variability, often it was not possible to do this and we simply had to ue unagusted club
figures.
* ld n ons ( s. RP are transactions between the club and a business
in which the club or its owners have a financial interest, or which has a financial interest in
the club. With one party either controlling or able to influence the other, or both parties
controlled by a third party, the terms of an RPT may be slanted to favor one party at the
expense of the other.
There are about fifty RPrs involving revenues or expenses in a typical year. We reviewed
each of these RPTs and identified a small number that seemed clearly disadvantageous to the
club over the 1988-91 period (more information is needed on another few RPTs). We have
shown operating income figures without any adjustment for RPTs, but have also indicated
how different treatment of these few RPTs could change our overall conclusions regarding
operating income.
The RPTs are of several different kinds. Four clubs are units in consolidated enterprises
that file consolidated tax returns covering both the club and the television station or beer
company with which the club does business. The terms of transactions between units of these
consolidated enterprises have no effect on either their tax liabilities or their operating
income. While there is no tax motive for contrivance, nor is there an incentive to make sure
all transactions are correctly priced. Two of the transactions we found disadvantageous to
the clubs were between units of consolidated businesses.
When the club and the related party are both controlled by the same owners but not
consolidated for tax purposes, the owners may sometimes be able to profit from manipulating
transaction terms. We found two of the transactions in this category to be disadvantageous
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to the club. Again, we indicated where alternative treatment would change our conclusions
about overall club operating income.
There were a number of transactions where neither party had a controlling interest in the
other. Here terms slanted to favor the related party would ordinarily be disadvantageous to
club owners since they would incur all of the cost of the slanted terms but get only a small
share of the benefits. We found no evidence that any RPTs of this kind were biased to favor
the related party.
o Taxes- Since baseball clubs are in a so-called talent industry, their tax treatment is
somewhat unusual. When a club is purchased, one of the "assets' involves the economic
value of player contracts conferring rights to obtain player services at a below-free-market
price. That value depreciates over time as player contracts expire or as players progress to
free agency.
Like other talent enterprises, for tax purposes clubs are permitted straight line
depreciation of intangibles such as the value of these initial player contracts. Then, when
either the player or the club is sold, there is a recapture provision that assesses capital gains
taxes on the difference between the sale price and the post-depreciation basis of the relevant
contracts. Hence if a club has taken tax depreciation on player contracts and then sells these
contracts at a higher price, it has to pay capital gains taxes on the difference. This general
tax treatment is common to firms in talent industries and seems to confer no special tax
advantages to baseball clubs, provided that the depreciable initial roster costs are set at
reasonable values.
The key question then boils down to whether the limitation on depreciable roster costs is
reasonable. That limit is 50 percent of the franchise value, with the average club now
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claiming 43 percent (Finandal World, 1992). While it is of course unclear how much a new
clubowner is paying for what aspect of a club, the following crude calculation suggests that
the limit may not be unreasonable.
We will me below that an average club now sells for $94 million. Applying the 43 percent
ratio means that this average club would claim about $40 million as the present value of
depreciable initial player roster costs. These costs are normally depreciated over a five-year
period, reducing the typical club's taxable profits by $8 million per year. Is $8 million a good
estimate of the true depreciation costs of the initial player contracts?
Probably not too bad. On the other side, several economists have tried to measure the
value of existing player contracts to clubs by comparing market values and wages for players
bound to the clubs, such as those in their first six years of major league service. Perhaps the
best estimate from this literature is that individual clubs realize in benefits nearly $6 million
per year from these contracts with their major league players. There are an average of 13
pre-arbitration players per club and these players are paid about $.3 million apiece less than
their estimated market value; an average of 7 arbitration players per club and they are paid
about S.2 million apiece less than their estimated market value (The market value estimates
come from Zimbalist, Baseball and Billions: The Economic Dilemmas of Our National
Pastime, Basic Books, 1992, pg. 92). There would be further value from contracts of minor
league players owned by the club. The sum of all these contract rights could well be close to
$8 million, though of course all estimates in this process are highly speculative. If this
indirect test can be believed, there do not seem to be undue tax advantages to owning a
baseball club. Whether there are or not, we have not adjusted our operating income figures
for any tax advantages in the empirical examination below.
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Operating income
Figure 3, described earlier, gives the real operating income of baseball clubs under these
accounting conventions. The solid line representing the 26 club average was slightly positive
up to 1979, negative from 1980 to 1984, and then positive again. The sharp drop in 1981 was
due to the strike in that year.
But given the large disparities in potential revenue between the clubs, the most important
indicator of the economic health of major league baseball may not be the overall average,
but rather the operating income of clubs in small markets or otherwise difficult
circumstances. One measure of these is given by the bottom line in the Figure, showing the
income path for less profitable clubs. These less profitable clubs are defined statistically by a
measure called the standard deviation, which has the property that a band from one standard
deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean includes about two-
thirds of the clubs. Hence in the figure the area between the two dotted lines contains about
18 clubs, with an average of 4 clubs making operating income less than the lower band and
an average of 4 clubs making operating income more than the upper band. By this statistical
measure, several clubs - the 4 below the lower band and more just above it - could have had
negative operating income even when baseball as a whole had positive operating income.
The standard deviation is a statistical measure computed separately for each year, so it
does not indicate which clubs had negative operating income. Nor does it say whether these
negative income clubs are the same ones year after year. One can only determine the
situation for particular clubs by examining their particular income statements.
Results of such an examination are summarized in Table 4, which categorizes the average
annual real operating income of all 26 clubs either for the period when baseball as a whole
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had positive operating facome (1985-91) or for a longer period (1979-81). It is commonly felt
that winning affects income, so we have also estimated the sensitivity of income to winning.
For each period we regressed average club operating income on average winning percentage
and meesures of market size. The Table then uses the winning percentage coefficient to
categorize hypothetical adjusted" income as ifeach club had a .500 winning percentage over
the relevant period. Since by this construction winning just shifts income from club to club,
average operating income across all clubs is the same in both the "income" and adjusted"
columns.
In the recent positive income period 2 clubs lost fairly large amounts (more than $4
million per year) with or without the adjustment for wins. Then 8 clubs lost more modest
amounts with no winning adjustment, 6 with a winning adustment. By this standard
between 8 and 10 clubs have had negative operating income in recent years. An adjustment
for consolidated enterprise RPTs described above for one of these clubs might eliminate the
negative operating income, leaving between 7 and 9 clubs with true negative operating
income in the recent profitable period of baseball.
Over the longer period when baseball was first unprofitable and then became profitable, 3
clubs lost more than $4 million per year with no adjustment for winning, 2 with an
adjustment. Then 7 clubs lost more moderate amounts with no adjustment, 8 with an
adjustment. By this standard 10 clubs had negative operating income over the longer period
which includes a spell when baseball as a whole was not profitable. Making the adjustment
for consolidated enterprise RPTs in this case does not eliminate the negative operating
income.
Hence our examination of the operating income of baseball clubs indicates that up to 10
clubs normally do not earn operating income. The number is cut slightly if we confine
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attention to the recent seven-year period when baseball as a whole was profitable, it is
sometimes cut by lffwe make an ac'ustment for RPs, and it can be changed slightly if we
a4ust for how much these clubs have won. But even with all a4'ustments there still seem to
be about 7 clubs that do not earn operating income on average.
Asset values
A second way to look at the underlying profitability of baseball clubs is by their asset
values, which should reflect the market valuation of clubs' future earning streams. We have
these asset sale values from separate data also submitted by the clubs to the Commissioner,
though these data are not confidential and particular club values can be presented.
Asset values for 7 clubs that were sold in the 1989-91 period, all in 1991 US dollars, are
shown in Table 5. We only include the most recent Seattle sale, and we do not include the
Texas sale (because a stadium was included) and the Kansas City transaction (which was not
a true market sale). The average value for these 7 clubs is $94 million, implying a perhaps
not unreasonable 4 percent real rate of return if the $4 million of average profits noted
earlier were continued indefinitely. But the numbers in the Table do present some puzles.
Those clubs on the list that have on average had negative operating income have sold for just
over $90 million, which seems a high price to pay for the privilege of losing money. And not
much less than the sale price for those clubs on the list that have made money, which is just
under $100 million.
It is puzzling that this variance in sale prices is so smaUl, with so little premium paid for
having positive operating income. Why will prospective owners pay $90 million to buy a club
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that is likely to lose money on average, and only an extra $10 million for a dub that is likely
to make money on average?'
There are several possible explanations:
o Masurement. Given the difficulties in measuring true baseball profits recounted earlier,
one possible explanation for the discrepancy between income and asset values is that
operating income is still not measured well, despite our best efforts. In this case one would
place credence mainly in the asset values.
o Speclative bubhles. On the other side, economic history is full of examples of speculative
bubbles, where asset values are bid much higher than the true worth of the property.
Everything is fine until the market suddenly crashes. If it is true that sset values are being
bid up by a speculative fever, one would place less credence in the asset values and more
credence in the underlying operating income numbers.
o Civic altruism. Some of the sales of less profithle clubs could be influenced by civic pride -
- that is, by the fact that local owners will bid what it takes to keep a club in the home city,
even if these owners know they cannot earn positive operating income. In this case the asset
value could reflect what a baseball club is worth in some other city, not in the present
location. In this case, it is not even clear what question should be asked - about the worth of
the club in the present location, or the worth of the club in any imaginable location.
o The attractiveness of baseball. A related explanation is that potential owners simply
want to own a baseball club - because they are fans, because it helps their business, or for
some other reason. This explanation does not fit the observed pattern of franchise values in
all respects, because it implies high values for all franchises, not just those losing money.
But it could still explain why baseball asset values in general give better reports of the
financial health of baseball clubs than do the income statements of the clubs.
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o Opimim A final argument that does fit the facts well is that it takes a certain amount
of optimism to operate a baseball club. Potential buyers of successful clubs will se full
stadiums and/or winning records, realize they cannot do much better, and bid more or less a
normal price for the earnings streams of successful clubs. On the other hand, potential
buyers of clubs that are losing money will see empty stadiums andlor losing records, think
they can do much better, and bid the price well beyond the level implied by the clubs'
financial history.
Each of these hypotheses has different implications for the economic state of money-losing
baseball clubs, and there are few enough sales that each hypothesis is virtually impossible to
prove or disprove with actual data. This is one reason, possibly the main reason, why
observers can look at the same facts and derive such different interpretations about the
economic condition of major league baseball.
Rate of return
A third way to look at the profitability of baseball clubs involves the combination of
disparate information from the income and asset value statements. One uses both the
operating income figures and the asset figures to compute the internal rate of return from
owning a baseball club. One views owners as buying a club at some date, earning or losing
money over the holding period, and then selling a club at some later date. All dollar
amounts are put in common terms, 1991 US dollars, and one then computes the internal rate
of return that makes the present value of the entire transaction zero. One can then compare
this internal rate of return with an internal rate of return calculated from bond or stock
markets in the same way for the same time horizon to see which investment performed
better. All rates of return in this calculation are pre-tax, which is acceptable if the tax
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treatment is approximately the sme. We argued earlier that there was not obviously more
generous tax treatment of baseball clubs than for other types of invetments.
The results of these calculations are given in Table 6. The ten clubs listed in the table
have been bought and mold over the period for which we have the data necessary to compute
internal rates of return. Four of theme clubs showed losses in Table 4, six did not. Five were
lat sold after 1987, five were last sold before 1987. In all obvious ways, this seems a
reasonable sample of clubs for computing internal rates of return.
The column listed "rate" shows our calculation of real internal rates of return. Income
data were taken from the records described above, still with no adjustment for RPTs or taxes.
The average annual pre-tax real rate of return from holding a club over the period was 5.6
percent, but the spread around this average was wide, with four clubs earning zero or
negative returns, three clubs earning moderate returns, and three clubs earning very
handsome returns. This wide variance in return is reflected in the standard deviation of 7.1
percent, which indicates that a random owner had a two-thirds chance of making an annual
return between -1.5 percent and 12.7 percent.
Theme rate-of-return calculations permit a comparison of the returns from owning baseball
clubs to the returns on other investments, most of which also did well in the 1980s. The
column listed "bond" gives the annual pre-tax real rate of return on holding long term
taxable government bonds (interest and capital gains) over the exact same holding period as
for the baseball club. The asterisks show that 4 clubs outperformed the bond market, the
other 6 clubs did not. The column listed "stock" gives the same annual pre-tax real rate of
return information for randomly chosen common stocks (dividends and capital gains) over the
exact same holding period as for the baseball club. The double asterisks show that 3 clubs
outperformed the stock market, the other 7 did not.
17
244
These comparisons are for what are known as ex post returns over the exact holding
period. An alternative way to display relative profitability is to assume that potential
owners of baseball clubs knew the general expected real profitability of government bonds
and stocks over the period when they bought their clubs. Under this assumption one would
compare the return on baseball clubs to the long term average expected real return in the
bond and stock market, given in the table as 4.1 percent per year for taxable government
bonds and 8.2 percent per year for common stocks. By this standard, 5 clubs outperformed
the bond market and 3 clubs outperformed the stock market.
Hence a few clubs seem to be doing very well, outperforming the stock market, and most
not as well. For these calculations the time at which the club was bought and sold does
matter, with those sold in the revenue surge of recent years earning somewhat higher real
returns. The average operating income of the clubs also matters, with those earning more
generally having higher rates of return.
Concerning overall profitability, is a real rate of return of 5.6 percent adequate
compensation for owning a baseball club? One can argue the issue either way. Financial
analysts might say that because of the greater risks in owning a baseball club, the real rate
of return should be higher than for bonds, perhaps comparable to the real return on holding
stocks. Sports fans might retort that since it is more fun or rewarding to own a baseball club
than to clip coupons from randomly chosen bonds and stocks, the rate of return need not be
very high. It is impossible to resolve this issue conclusively. The only factual statement that
can be made is that the average real rate of return from owning baseball clubs has been
moderate, with some chance of very large returns and some chance of negative or very low
returns.
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he future
The data examined so far, whether from income statements, asset values, or rates of
return, are from the past decade, an era when baseball revenues were rising at a very rapid
rate. An important question facing baseball is whether these past trends will continue,
particularly if revenue growth slows. It is notoriously difficult to forecast anything about
major league baseball, but it still makes sense to examine recent trends to see what can be
found.
There are indications that revenue growth will slow. Although complete figures for 1992
are not yet available, game attendance did dip slightly. The CBS national television contract
does not expire until the end of the 1993 season, but CBS is reporting large losses on its
baseball contract. ESPN has already informed baseball that it is not exercising its option to
extend its agreement past 1993. These contracts now provide about 23 percent of the revenue
for the average club, and the likely drop in real revenue from the contracts could imply a
decline in total club revenues, unless offset by rises in the real value of local television
revenue (now also 20 percent of revenues for the average club).
The question is what happens then. If salary growth adjusts to revenue growth, operating
income need not decline. But there are two reasons why salary growth may not adjust, one
within the long run control of clubs and one at least partly not within the control of clubs.
The factor that could in principle be controlled by the clubs is long term contracts for free
agents. In the short run these long term contracts place a fixed liability on clubs, but over
time the clubs can recontract and refuse to sign some of their low-value players. The factor
partially outside the control of clubs is salary arbitration, and it has been suggested that
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replacing arbitration with earlier free agency would insulate operating income from revenue
fluctuations.
To determine how sensitively arbitration salaries follow free agent salaries, we have
regreseed these arbitration salaries on current and lagged free agent salaries over the 1983-
91 period, the only span for which we have the requisite data. This is a very low power
statistical test - using one period to measure the impact of the lag, there are only eight time
series observations with real free agent salaries rising every year. We do not have any
observations on the lag in periods when free agent salaries underwent sustained declines.
Moreover, it is unclear exactly how to adjust for changes in the arbitration system (the
system was changed to exclude two-year players in 1987, and again in 1991 to include a
handful of two-year players), for new contracts, for deferred compensation, and for player
contracts that moved money across years in anticipation of a possible work stoppage. But the
results generally suggest that arbitration salaries respond to free agent salaries with very
little lag - sometimes there is no lag at all, sometimes the lag is about a half-year. Our
tentative conclusion is that eliminating arbitration, whatever its other virtues or costs, will
not insulate operating income from revenue swings to a very great degree.
0 0 0
Hence the various financial records give some hint of trouble for the first of the problems
listed above. Revenue disparities among the clubs imply that some number of clubs do have
trouble earning operating income - we find that this number could be as high as 10. All the
clubs that were sold in the 1989-92 period sold at good prices, but even then average internal
rates of return were not exceptional, although some clubs were extremely good investments
and some clubs were poor investments. As for sensitivity, there is no evidence that
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alteratices in the arbitration system will insulate operating income from declines in
revenues to an important degree.
I. Evidence of Competitive Health. Wins and Losses on the Field
The other way problems with the structure of major league baseball can become evident
involves on-field competitive performance. These competitive balance questions are much
easier to deal with than the financial questions because win-loss records are public
information, are not subject to the same ambiguities, and are available for a much longer
period of time.
Competitive balance in general
For years the maintenance of competitive balance - to prevent large market clubs from
bidding talent away from small market clubs - was the main justification given for the
reserve clause. This justification was never convincing to academic economists studying
baseball (Rottenberg. Journal of Political Economy. 1956). The economists' argument is that
good players are worth more to large market clubs whatever the compensation system. If the
compensation system is a reserve clause, large market clubs will pay more to small market
clubs for star players. If the compensation system is free agency, large market clubs will pay
more than small market clubs in bidding for star players. Either way the best talent will
flow to the large market clubs, and either way the large market clubs should win more.
But these arguments involve theory. How has competitive balance fared in fact in this
era when the compensation system was changing so rapidly? To answer this question, we
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first looked at measures of tightness of pennant races. We focused on the 37 year period
beginning in 1954 and ending in 1990. The AL began 1954 with its eight original clubs,
added California and the club that is now Texas in 1961, added Kansas City and the club
that is now Milwaukee in 1969, and added Seattle and Toronto in 1977. The NL began 1954
with its eight original clubs, added Houston and New York in 1962, and added Montreal and
San Diego in 1969. We analyzed the leagues separately, breaking the 37 year period into 5
seven-year segments for each league. The segments are intended to be long enough to
average out year-to-year variation in on-field performance, and are chosen so that expansion
teams enter at the beginning of a seven-year segment. Hence the seven-year periods are
1954-60, 1961-67, 1969-75, 1977-83, and 1984-90 for the AL and the same except that the
second segment is replaced by 1962-68 for the NL.
The results are shown in Table 7. One way to answer the question of how tight are
pennant races is to compute the variation in performance of all clubs in all of the seven
years, by league, again using standard deviations. To read the table, in the 1984-90 period in
the NL, on average 8 of the 12 dubs had winning percentages between 435 and .565, 2 dubs
(on average the last place club in each division) had winning percentages below .435 and 2
(on average the first place clubs) had winning percentages above .565. The middle columns
translate these winning percentages into games won and lost - on average 8 NL clubs won
between 70 and 92 games (in a 162 game season), 2 won less than 70 games, and 2 won more
than 92 games.
The results of this test seem clear enough. As anticipated by the economic theorists, in
neither league has there been a worsening of competitive balance since the start of free
agency in about 1977. In the AL competitive balance has actually improved over time, with
the lower tail teams winning an average of about 5 more games a year (from 66 to 71). It is
well-known that this early disparity in the AL was in part a Yankee effect - the New York
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Yankees won five pennants in these seven years - but it turns out that Chicago and
Cleveland also did quite well through this whole period, and Baltimore, the team that is now
Minnesota, and the team that is now Oakland did quite badly. This early period in the AL
tura out to be the heyday of competitive imbalance.
Apart from this period effect, competition stays imbalanoed when the AL adds expansion
teams, as it did in the next three seven-year segments. Finally, in the recent 1984-90 period
competition is the most balanced - the Yankee effect has long since disappeared, as has the
expansion effect.
It may be more meaningful to look at the NL, which did not have a Yankee effect in the
1954-60 period, and which added only two sets of expansion teams. Here there has been
remarkably little change in competitive balance over the whole period, with the lower tail
teams winning 69 games in the early period and 70 games in the recent period.
Another way to answer questions involving tightness of pennant races is just to see who
won. By this measure there is a lear increase in competitive balance over time. In the AL 3
teams won pennants in the first seven-year period and 5 teams in the latest period. In the
NL 4 teams won pennants in the first seven-year period and 6 in the latest seven-year period.
In both leagues the excitement or World Series is now available to fans in more cities.
Similarly, the table shows that there has been an upward drift in numbers of clubs winning
division championships since the divisional championships began in 1969. And also in
numbers of clubs within 10 games of the division winner at the close of the season, indicating
that the excitement of pennant races is being spread around more widely.
These figures describe how competitive clubs are within a year. But it is also meaningful
to focus on the performance of the clubs over a longer period, averaging out year-to-year
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variation in their own performance. These measures of good and bad clubs are shown in
Table 8, which presents the range statistics as if the clubs were engaged in one giant seven-
year pennant race. Now in the recent NL period, 8 of the 12 clubs had seven-year average
numbers of wins between 75 and 87 games, with the 2 worst teams over the seven-year span
averaging less than 75 wins and the 2 best teams averaging more than 87 wins. Compared to
Table 7, all of the ranges are compacted because year-to-year variation in club performance is
averaged out.
But the range results can be interpreted roughly the same as before. In the AL
competitive balance has improved slightly; in the NL there has been very little change.
Nowadays in both leagues the lower tail clubs average about 75 wins per year over a seven-
year period and the upper tail clubs average about 87 wins. Again we more or less confirm
the economists' predictions that whatever free agency does to the clubs' income statements, it
seems to have made remarkably little change in on-field performance. Indeed, for all the
changes in professional baseball since 1954 - in numbers of franchises, player compensation
arrangements, the increased importance of shared national television revenues, the amateur
player draft, and who knows what else - the distribution of wins and losses has changed very
little. The only thing that does seem to have changed is the number of clubs who are
participating in pennant races and winning pennants and division championships in a seven-
year period. By these measures, on-field competition has increased.
Market size
The nezt question involves the impact of market size. With either the reserve clause or
the free agency compensation system, dubs in large markets are likely to win more than
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clubs in small markets. But how much more? Is a large market worth a few or a lot of
games in the win-loss column? Has this difference changed with free agency?
Tb answer this question, for each of the seven-year segments, now with both leagues
pooled together to increase numbers of observations, we regressed clubs' seven-year win-loss
percentage on metropolitan population from the Census, number of clubs in that area, and
whether the club was a recent expansion club. The number-of-clubs variable permits us to
determine empirically whether the New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, and San Francisco
populations should be divided by two or some other number. There is no dear pattern, but
we have used two for illustrative purposes below.
The results in Table 9 give the estimated impact on games won of a quadrupled market
size from these regressions, holding constant other variables. As the accompanying scatter
plot shows (Figure 10 for 1984-90), a number of the small market clubs (St. Louis, Montreal,
San Diego, Minnesota, Pittsburgh, Seattle, Cleveland, Atlanta, and the San Francisco
population divided by two clubs) have metropolitan populations between 2.5 and 3 million. If
the population of these metropolitan areas were quadrupled, the clubs would have roughly
the population of the two New York clubs (19 million divided by two), making each of these
small market clubs into large market dubs.
Even though the large market clubs would be expected to win more than small market
clubs, these population impacts seem reasonably small. In the 1954-60 period the large
market clubs, particularly the Yankees and Dodgers, did very well, with the population
quadrupling effectively amounting to an added 13.5 wins a year. We also tested the same
model with games behind the first place team, arriving at almost identical results (games
behind were reduced by 13.2). After 1960, market size effects become much more modest. In
the first three pre-free-agency periods the quadrupling adds 3.2 wins; in the last two free
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agency periods the quadrupling adds 5.2 wins; in the most recent seven year period the
quadrupling adds 2.5 wins.
How big a spread is 2.5 to 5.2 wins? The range can be shown in various lights. Over the
recent seven year period Table 8 reported that the average distance from second to second-to-
last place in a division has been 12 games. In this range 2.5 to 5.2 games has been worth
about one place in the division standings. On the other hand, there has been a greater
spread in the tails of the distribution - the average distance between first and second place
has been 6 games and the average distance from second-to-last to last place has been 8
games. In this range 2.5 to 5.2 games has been worth less than one place in the division
standings - 5.2 games would not have gotten a second place club into first place on average,
nor would it have gotten a club out of last place. And the 2.5 to 5.2 game spread is for an
enormous change in market size, taking a very small market club all the way to a club with a
New York-sized market.
However large the spread, it should be remembered that changes in the method by which
players are compensated is not likely to be causing the disparities. From a theoretical
standpoint, the large market clubs would be expected to win more whether players are
compensated under the reserve clause or free agency. Historically, the large market clubs
did better in the old reserve clause system than under free agency. And in the National
Basketball Association, where there has been a real attempt to protect the income of small
market clubs through a salary cap, the large market clubs win championships far more
regularly than they do in baseball.
On a technical level, one reason for the apparently small impact of market size on wins
and losses could be the intrinsic difficulty of defining market size. We tried a number of
alternative definitions - looking at television's Area of Dominant Influence figures,
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combining or splitting agacent areas such as Baltimore and Washington, agusting for clubs
with large populations just outside the metropolitan areas or for clubs with more resources
than the metropolitan population alone would predict. Indeed, one can make one's own
agnetments by sliding clubs left or right the desired amounts in Figure 10. These types of
adstments never seem to change the basic story much.
Another possibility is that we should go behind the overall relationship between market
size and on-field performance and look at the component relationships. A schematic diagram
is given in Figure 11. Larger market size can lead simultaneously to larger player salaries
(the top loop) and to larger player development expenditures (the bottom loop). These then
could generate more wins. Since we need data on club player salaries and development
expenditures to estimate such a model, we can only do the analysis for the last two periods,
from 1977-90 (we extrapolated 1978 figures back one year to fill in 1977 values). There is
also a new statistical uncertainty: to the effect that winning leads to higher salaries, the
cause and effect relationship in the top loop is not entirely blear.
But even with these uncertainties, the results agree closely with those of the overall
approach. In the overall approach a quadrupled market size raises the average club's
winning percentage by .032 for the 1977-90 period, 5.2 games. In the disaggregated approach
the quadrupling adds .029 (4.7 games), with the breakdown as shown. The relevant scatter
plots are shown as Figures 12 and 13. Most of the impact, .025 (4 games), comes from the
player salary loop, with.only a slight amount from the player development loop. It might be
felt that player development expenditures would work better if they were lagged, so that
earlier years' development spending leads to current wins and losses. We tried this approach
too, but lagged player development expenditures had no more explanatory power than did
current player development expenditures. However the melon is sliced, one finds that the
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quadrupling of city size adds 2.5 to 5.2 games to the win column, moving small market clubs
up about one rung in the division standings, even less in the tails.
In non-quantitative terms, there could be several reasons why we might not expect much
relationship between market size and winning:
o Difficulties in fning market size Some supposedly small market clubs have access to
populated hinterland areas, lucrative television possibilities, or owners willing and able to
spend to put competitive teams on the field. Some supposedly large market clubs may not
have some of these advantages. For these purposes it is difficult to come up with precise
measures of market size.
o Iniuries and other random elements. Large market or rich clubs can buy players, but it is
much harder to keep them healthy and to guarantee good performance. Today fans in every
city can easily cite a list of highly-paid but less worthy free agents; in the old days these fans'
parents were citing lists of expensive player trades and bonus babies that did not work out.
o Relative numbers of plavers and clubs. There may be more quality players at a position
than the large market clubs can buy or want to pay to sit on the bench, with the consequence
that even small market clubs will often have quality players at many positions.
o The price of winnin. It has been argued that teams that win pennants find the price of
winning is high - that is, their successful players drive hard bargains the next year. To the
degree that this is so, free agency has introduced an automatic mechanism to even out wins
and losses across clubs.
o Conflicting gouls. Just as better players have a higher value in large market areas, aging
players with high media profiles who can fill seats do too. These expensive free agents may
be worthwhile from a revenue standpoint to large market clubs, but not a winning and losing
standpoint. If so, large market clubs will have higher payrolls, but not necessarily win that
much more than small market clubs.
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o Artatin. Perhaps the ability to use less experienced and lem ezpensive players
through the arbitration system gives the small market clubs a strategy they can uee to
maintain their winning record. We tested for this effect by seeing if informatio en shares of
arbitration players and free agents added explanatory power to the equations explaining
wins and losses. These shares had essentially zero impact. If this is an alleged benefit of
retaining the arbitration system, it seems to be of slight importance.
As a final matter, one still might wonder whether the differential winning advantage of
large market clubs is growing over time. There is no evidence of such trends in the data
analyzed, which go up to 1990. We do not include 1991 and 1992 in the formal data analysis,
but by this time we do know who won in those years. In both 1991 and 1992 three of the four
division-winning clubs - Atlanta, Pittsburgh, and Minnesota in 1991 and Atlanta,
Pittsburgh, and Oakland in 1992 - were small market clubs. Even Toronto, the other winner
in both years, has a population size slightly below average.
0 0 0
The bottom line here is that, predictions to the contrary notwithstanding, competitive
balance in major league baseball seems to have improved over time. The range between
winning and losing clubs has declined over time in the AL, remained stable in the NL. In
both league more teams have won pennants and divisions, and pennant races have involved
more clubs.
Beyond that, there is no indication that the advantage to locating in a large market is
terribly great on-the-field. However they manage to do it, small market clubs are hanging in
there, winning 2.5 to 5.2 games less a year on average than the large market clubs. Possibly
this margin is as small as it is because with fewer financial resources the small market clubs
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Just have to manage better to stay alive, possibly it is because with all the uncertainties o
baseball, it is just very difficult to buy winning clubs. Whatever the case, on-field disparities
due to market or resource size have been small ever since 1961, never smaller than in 1991-
92, and smaller than in profesional sports with em clubwide variance in their revenues.
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Figure 1
Average Operating Revenue
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Figure 2
Player Costs as a Share of
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Figure 3
Average Income from Baseball Operations
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Table 4
Operating Income of Baseball Clubs
Number of clubs making operating income in the designated bracket
Bracket amounts in millions of 1991 US dollars per year
Adjusted and not adjusted for winning percentage
Bracket Income
Losses exceed $4 million 2
Losses less than $4 million 8
Income less than $4 million 6
Income from $4 to $8 million 5
Income exceeds $8 million 5
Average operating income ($ million) 2.7
1985-91
Adiusted*
2
6
9
4
5
2.7
1977-91
Income Adinsted*
3 2
7 8
10 10
5
1
0.9
5
1
0.9
*Assuming the club had a .500 winning percentage.
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Table 5
Asset Values for Clubs Sold in 1989.92
Millions of 1991 US Dollars
Rale dant
Detroit
Montreal
Baltimore
San Diego
Texas
Seattle
Toronto
Average
Standard Deviation
1992
1991
1989
1990
1989
1992
1991
Valme
so
84
84
85
94
103
131
94
17
cinhb
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Table 6
Internal Real Rates of Return
Percent
Club Period Rate Bonds stocks
Cincinnati 1981-85 -3.7 15.2 14.6
Houston 1979-84 -2.5 3.0 7.4
Philadelphia 1981-87 -1.3 12.4 12.5
Cleveland 1977-86 0.1 4.0 8.8
San Diego* 1974-90 3.6 3.2 8.3
Detroit 1983-92 7.1 9.9 11.4
Seattle 1981-92 7.6 10.6 12.3
NY Mets** 1980-86 13.7 12.5 10.1
Baltimore* 1979-89 15.2 6.9 11.2
Toronto** 1976-91 15.8 3.5 7.6
Average 5.6
Standard Deviation 7.1
Long term average 1975-91 4.1 8.2
Baseball club outperformed bonds but not stocks over the exact holding period.
* Baseball club outperformed bonds and stocks over the exact holding period.
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Table 7
Measures of ight Pennant Races
Range unwop...ir 2/8 of clubs, number of pennant and division winners, and number of
clubs within 10 games offirst place
By seven year period
American League
Prod LP HP LW HW PW DW TC
1954-60 .408 .592 66 96 3 -
1961-67* .425 .575 69 93 4 -
1969-750 .427 .573 69 93 3 5 5
1977-830 .420 .580 68 94 4 7 7
1984-90 .438 .562 71 91 5 7 7
National League
Period LP HP LW HW PW DW TC
1954-60
1962-68*
1969-75*
1977-83
1984-90
.428 .572 69 93
.419 .581 68 94
.428 .572 69 93
.435 .565 70 92
.435 .565 70 92
4
3
4
4
6
7
8
9
5
7
7
LP is the lower bound winning percentage.
HP is the higher bound winning percentage.
LW is the lower bound number of wins, 162 game basis.
HW is the higher bound number of wins, 162 game basis.
PW is number of pennant winners in the seven-year period.
DW is number of division winners in the seven-year period.
TC is the number of teams within 10 games of first place at the end of the season (the same
for both leagues).
*xpanion clubs added.
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Table 8
WMss Wmd IASn a.e.
Range encompassing 2/3 of club seven-year winning percentage
American League
Period LP HP LW HW
1954-60 .423 .577 69 93
1961-67* .443 .557 72 90
1969-75* .446 .554 72 90
1977-83* .441 .559 71 91
1984-90 .466 .534 75 87
National League
Period LP HP LW HW
1954-60
1962-68*
1969-75*
1977-83
1984-90
.451
.433
.443
.454
.461
.549
.567
.557
.546
.539
73
70
72
74
75
89
92
90
88
87
LP is the lower bound winning percentage.
HP is the higher bound winning percentage.
LW is the lower bound number of wins, 162 game basis.
HW is the higher bound number of wins, 162 game basis.
* Expansion clubs added.
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Table 9
Effects of Quadrupled Market Size
Peiod Win-Ln Pct. Games Won Game Back
1954-60
1961267168
199-75
1977-83
1984-90
First 3 Periods
Last 2 Periods
.083
.015
-.033
.048
.016
.020
.032
13.5
2.4
-5.3
7.8
2.5
3.2
5.2
-13.2
-2.8
3.0
-5.1
-0.9
-3.0
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Figure 11
Causal Unks Between Market Size and Win-Loss Record
Salaries 
Win-loss
Scouting and 
record
development
33% higher salaries 4.025 higher
win-loss
percentage
Quadrupled market
25% higher scouting & y .004 higher
development expenditures win-loss
percentage
sum = .029 higher
win-loss
percentage
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THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
1775 A wsAcwausV mN.W. WAsunwraw. D.C. 20036-2188
TVWaoN* 2020976000 FAr: 202097.6181
Economic Studies Program
3 December 1992
Mr. Donald Pehr, Executive Director
Major League Baseball Players' Association
805 Third Avenue PA
New York, New York 10022 D 0 71992
Mr Allan Selig, President
The Milwaukee Brewers Baseball Club RECEIVL-oMilwaukee County Stadium
201 South 46th St.
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53214
Dear Don and Bud:
Along with the other public members I have signed the majority report of the Baseball
Study Committee. I did so because I concur in the major recommendations on free agency and
revenue sharing and the major finding on competitive balance.
In contrast, I find the discussion of the economic condition of baseball to be garbled,
inconsistent, and unbalanced. Accordingly, I have written this supplemental statement that
should also be regarded as part of the output of the committee.
This supplemental statement should be regarded as part of the report of the Committee.
I have requested that wherever my name appears, on the transmittal letter covering the
majority report or on the majority report itself, mention should be made that I am submitting
a supplemental statement that should be regarded as part of the report. My understanding Is
that Peter sent out the report and covering letter before I transmitted this request to him. But
I have asked that corrected pages be distributed; I presume that he will do so.
I also request that this supplemental report will be included as part of any distribution
of the Committee's work to the various clubs, to the players' executive committee, or to others.
Se
Henry J. Aaron
Director
+ FOMED 1916 +
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Supplementary Statement
Report of Baseball Study Committee
by
Henry J. Aaron
3 December 1992
Six labor negotiations between major league clubs and the players union have
ended in three strikes and three lockouts. The relationship between players and clubs
is best described as immature, a situation in which the two parties fail to take advantage
of opportunities that could help both, but instead perpetuate distrust and rancor.
The Baseball Study Committee makes two major recommendations with which
I concur. First, players should become eligible for free agency not after six years of
service as under current rules, but after three years. Second, the proportion of baseball
revenues distributed equally among the dubs should be increased. These are
constructive recommendations, and I support them. The staff report also includes
factual analysis clearly indicating that competitive balance in major league baseball good,
that it is probably better than it has been in the past, and shows no signs of deteriorat-
mg.
Because I agree with these two central recommendations and the finding on
competitiveness, I am signing the majority report. Nevertheless, I am impelled to submit
this supplementary report because the majority report fails to clarify the nature of the
disputes between players and owners and fails to explain the structure underlying this
unfortunate relationship. This failure betrays the parties who appointed the committee,
elected officials and the courts who may be called upon to settle disputes between the
parties or change the special exemption of baseball from the anti-trust laws, and the
272
Henry J. Aaron 3 December 1992
Supplemental Statement Page 2
public who, as fans, are puzzled by the hostile and destructive relationship sullying a
sport that brings pleasure, diversion, and surcease to millions. The report skirts central
issues. In substitutes hortatory and saccharine rhetoric appropriate to childrens' novels
or sentimental movies for clear analysis. And in an effort to fashion language all
members could accept, it becomes obscure and contradictory. Confusing what should
have been the educational objectives of its report-which require clarity-with mediation
and negotiation-which require compromise of conflicting interests, the majority blurs
disagreements in the pursuit of consensus.
Some Key Facts
The politics and economics of baseball are inextricably related. Baseball is a cartel
managed by twenty eight clubs each of whose owners agreed when he or she purchased
a franchise to abide by rules established by previous generations of owners. These rules
govern league structure, the size of baseball markets, the distribution of revenues among
the clubs, the scheduling of play, the management of the minor leagues, and many other
matters. The Basic Agreement between the clubs and the players union governs labor
relations, including the period during which players are under reserve and the tenure
they must achieve to be eligible for arbitration and free agency.
The common perception among the public is that two major parties are involved
in labor negotiations-players and owners. In a certain sense this view is obviously
.
1These critical comments do not apply to the report of the staff, prepared under the direction
of Edward M. Gramlich. This report is largely factual. It is careful in drawing inferences and
highly informative.
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correct. A deeper insight into the current situation emerges if one recognizes that for
practical purposes, three parties are involved in negotiations-large-market clubs, small-
market dubs, and the players. I shall return to this point presently.
Qperating Income versus Asset Values
Unlike investors who primarily seek profits, baseball owners have twin
objectives-profits and on-field success. They want both to make money and to win
games. Furthermore, owning a baseball team brings a variety of noneconomic
satisfactions. These dual objectives and diverse satisfactions mean that the economic
health of baseball cannot be judged by the same standards-net operating revenues,
ordinary accounting profits, or cash flow-that are applied, for example, to such activities
as automobile dealerships, breweries, or ship lines, businesses that happen to be the
former or current activities of owners of three baseball clubs.
Because owners are interested in winning games, they may rationally sacrifice net
revenue for on-field success. They may spend more money on players, on scouting, or
other outlays deemed likely to produce winners than is consistent with maximizing
current net income. Because running baseball clubs is probably more fun for most
people than selling cars, beer, or shipping services, owners may be prepared to sacrifice
profits, or even pay for the pleasure by bearing losses.
To the extent that owners engage in such behavior, they rationally accept lower
profits than they might eam in other businesses. In fact, it could be quite rational,
although admittedly costly, for club owners out of a desire to win or in pursuit of the
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pleasures of baseball to adopt policies that result in persistent losses. There is simply
no way the Baseball Study Committee or anyone else can determine by looking at net
income the weight that owners attach to making profits, fielding winning teams, or
having fun.
This line of argument reveals that the lengthy passages in the majority report on
revenues, costs, and net operating margins-interesting and informative as they may be-
reveal precisely nothing about the economic health of baseball. To illustrate the point,
owners of race horses are reported to lose money persistently; but this fact is not
regarded as persuasive evidence that horse racing is in economic jeopardy. Race horse
owners have fun and enjoy social cachet. They want to win, stand in the winners' circle,
and collect occasional purses; and they are willing to pay for the pleasure. It is at least
conceivable that owners of baseball clubs do the same thing. The way to tell is to
look at franchise values. Are clubs valuable investments that club owners wish to retain
or to acquire? To answer this question, one need only observe sales prices of franchises.
The staff report makes clear that several clubs have sold in the past four years. The
average price was $94 million. This group includes some clubs that have lost more than
$1 million annually for several years running.
The staff report considers several possible explanations for why high and well-
maintained asset values can coexist with persistent losses. It is conceivable, but hardly
plausible, that baseball is riding on a speculative bubble. To accept this explanation, one
would have to believe that high prices for baseball teams have persisted through a
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protracted recession that seriously eroded the value of many other assets. Successive
buyer-groups, all of whom can read the published warnings of current owners about the
dire economic future of baseball, must be regarded as in the grip of something akin to
the Dutch tulip bulb frenzy? The assertion that each successive buyer of a baseball club
is a 'greater fool,' oblivious to realities of the sport, requires that one believe hard-heads
of investors, who understand enough to make millions in other businesses, turn mushy
when buying a baseball team? Again, such an explanation is conceivable, but hardly
plausible.
The other explanations for high asset values in the face of indifferent operating
income seem far more reasonable. Operating income or cash flow may in fact be greater
than is apparent. Civic altruism may cause club owners to bear losses for the good of
the communities in which they reside. And the sheer fun and community prestige from
owning a baseball club may cause owners to accept returns that would be insufficient
to induce them to hold more pedestrian investments.
In short, nothing whatsoever can be inferred about the economic health of
baseball by looking at net operating income. Much can be inferred by examining the
prices old investors demand when they sell franchises and that new investors are willing
to pay when they buy franchises. The majority points out this fact. But it devotes six
2Dning the tulip bulb frenzy, the prices of tulip bulbs soared to hundreds or thousands of
dollars each. When the frenzy ended, prices collapsed.
3Since the Baseball Study Committee did not look into the representations made to potential
buyers by former owners and other clubs, none of us is able to pass on the accuracy of
information provided to potential investors.
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times more space to a meandering examination of revenues, expenses, and operating
income than it vouchsafes a brief examination of franchise values.
The majority asserts that positive operating income is essential over the long haul
for the economic health of baseball. This assertion is economic nonsense, as demon-
strated by the fact that teams sell for high and rising prices despite negative operating
income. Owners who purchase clubs for high prices, field clubs that compete effectively,
and sell clubs periodically for sizeable prices preside over an industry that evidences no
economic illness. While club owners no doubt would prefer operating income to exceed
operating expenses, in addition to enjoying the other benefits from owning a baseball
club, positive net operating income is necessary for the economic health of the sport
neither in the short nor in the long run. The majority report correctly observes that the
only condition required for the long term health of baseball is that investors be prepared
to own clubs and hire top-notch athletes, but it fails to recognize that this observation
undermines its misplaced emphasis on net operating revenue.
The Three Parties to the Negotiation
Large market teams can pay free agents large salaries, pay salaries determined in
arbitration and still have positive net operating income. They can do so because large-
market teams on the average have larger revenues from attendance and vastly larger
revenues from local television than do small market clubs. The arbitration system
assures that small- and large-market teams must pay essentially the same salaries to
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three-to-six year players.' To avoid excessive losses, small market teams can hold down
salary costs by dipping sparingly into the free-agency market or by releasing arbitration-
eligible players expected to win large salaries.
If picking talented players and assembling winning clubs were more of a science
and less of an art than it is, these financial constraints might put small market clubs at
a significant competitive disadvantage. As the staff report and the majority report make
clear, this unfortunate circumstance has not occurred. No one is good enough at
predicting which players will play well next year or what combination of players will
jell into a winning team to permit those with deep pockets consistently to buy on-field
success. Small market clubs have remained competitive. But, on the average they earn
smaller operating income or incur losses, while large market clubs are disproportionately
represented among those with positive net operating income.
While winning is important it isn't everything (pace Vince Lombardi). The
owners of small market clubs quite naturally would prefer positive operating income to
operating losses. The golitical problem owners of small market clubs face is how to
achieve this end. They have two major options.
First, they can petition large-market clubs to agree to arrangements under which
a larger proportion of revenues is shared equally among the clubs or is distributed to
offset revenue differentials. For example, local television could be distributed equally
among the clubs, much as national television revenues currently are shared, or the small
'This group also includes the most senior 17 percent of players with more than two, but
fewer than three, years of tenure.
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share of gate receipts shared with visiting dubs could be increased. Either of these two
measures would significantly reduce the current large imbalance in gross revenues
among the clubs.
These solutions to revenue imbalances have a major shortcoming. Owners of
large-market clubs prefer keeping revenue to giving it away; and owners of the small
market clubs cannot force them to do so. If driven to extremes, the large-market clubs
could probably leave the current leagues, reconstitute themselves as a separate league,
and survive quite well. The small market clubs probably do not have this option. They
therefore must try to persuade the large market clubs to make concessions on revenue
sharing. The large market clubs are prepared to grant such concessions only if they
receive something in return.s
The second way owners of small-market clubs can try to improve operating
income is to join owners of large-market dubs in seeking concessions from the players.
If total player salaries can be capped, the domain of competition among the cubs is
changed and the chances of making profits is increased. lf the cap is set below the level
that would arise from free negotiation among dubs and players, small-market clubs may
be able to make positive operating income. Note that smoothing out the ratio of salaries
to revenues is also worth something to owners, as fluctuations can be troublesome. But
s1t is important to note that even if revenues were completely shared so that revenues of
every club were the same, there is no reason to suppose that any club would necessarily make
positive operating income. Some or all owners might well decide that it was worth losing some
money in the pursuit of winning. In this situation, baseball as a whole and each team might lose
money each year, but each club could be a highly valuable asset coveted by investors.
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the larger benefit to clubs comes from a salary cap that reduces the fraction of revenues
paid out as salaries. If owners were to succeed in reducing the salary fraction, net
operating revenues of all clubs, large and small, would be increased. Asset values
would climb. The increase in asset values would approximate the capitalized value of
the reduction in player salaries.
The effects on club values from a salary cap could be quite dramatic. Economists
differ on the appropriate capitalization rate to use in value income streams. The correct
choice depends on the certainty of the income stream. Purely for purposes of
illustration, suppose that the correct capitalization rate is 10 percent and that a salary cap
would reduce total player compensation by 15 percent. In 1991 player compensation
was $670 million. Fifteen percent of $670 million is $100.5 million. Capitalized at 10
percent, this shift of income to owners would have increased aggregate team values by
$1 billion, or approximately $38 million per club.
With such interests at stake, one can understand why the clubs find a salary cap
so appealing. One can also understand why small-market clubs, whose owners
understand that large-market clubs are not likely to agree to share a larger portion of
revenues, would join forces with large market clubs to impose a salary cap. And one
can understand the reasons why the players resist any salazy cap that might appeal to
the clubs.
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Summary
The report of the majority, which I signed, makes two important recommenda-
tions-awarding free agency after three years of tenure rather than at six years and
greatly increased revenue sharing among the clubs. It also reports one crucially
important finding-that competitive balance in baseball is good and probably better than
ever before.
Through roughly 9,000 words of text, however, the majority report leads readers
up one blind alley and down another, suggesting that an industry whose companies are
valued in the market at prices as high as, or higher than, ever before is on the brink of
some vague sort of economic trouble.
The industry of baseball isin political chaos, bereft of any governing mechanism
by which clubs can agree to share revenues among themselves in a fashion that will
permit all clubs both to compete equally on the field and to have an equal chance to
make positive operating revenues. No such concerns arise in most other industries,
where increased market share goes to the strongest companies. In baseball, however,
more "companies in more cities make a stronger industry able to bring the pleasures of
baseball to more fans. Thus, a governance structure of professional baseball clubs that
is incapable of enforcing greater revenue sharing is the problem. Unless that problem
is addressed and solved, labor management peace will never come to baseball.
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Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you.
In order to see to it that no witness be precluded from an oppor-
tunity to appear, I am going to call to the witness table Mr. Zimba-
list, who is the author of "Baseball and Billions," and also the Rob-
ert A. Woods professor of economics at Smith College; Gary Rob-
erts, professor of law from Tulane Law School in New Orleans;
Roger Noll, professor of economics at Stanford University; and also
bring to the table at the same time the Honorable Frank Jordan,
mayor of San Francisco; Rick Dodge, assistant city manager of St.
Petersburg; Roric Harrison, former major and minor league player;
and Gene Kummelman, Consumer Federation of America.
Why don't you just please proceed, Mr. Zimbalist?
STATEMENTS OF A PANEL CONSISTING OF ANDREW ZIMBA-
LIST, ROBERT A. WOODS PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS,
SMITH COLLEGE, NORTHAMPTON, MA; GARY R. ROBERTS,
VICE DEAN AND PROFESSOR OF LAW, TULANE LAW SCHOOL,
NEW ORLEANS, LA; ROGER G. NOLL, PROFESSOR OF ECO-
NOMICS, STANFORD UNIVERSITY, STANFORD, CA; HON.
FRANK M. JORDAN, MAYOR, CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN
FRANCISCO, CA; RICHARD B. DODGE, ASSISTANT CITY MAN-
AGER, ST. PETERSBURG, FL; RORIC HARRISON, FORMER
MAJOR AND MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYER, MISSION
VIEJO, CA; AND GENE KIMMELMAN, LEGISLATIVE DIREC-
TOR, CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA, WASHINGTON,
DC
STATEMENT OF ANDREW ZIMBALIST
Mr. ZIMBALIST. Thank you for inviting me to testify before your
subcommittee today, and I hope that Senator Metzenbaum's efforts
in conducting this hearing will not be in vain and that after scores
of inquiries, Congress will be persuaded at last to take positive
public policy action vis-a-vis the baseball industry.
The overriding economic characteristic of the industry is that
there is an artificial scarcity of franchises which is underwritten in
part by baseball's blanket exemption from the country's antitrust
laws. This scarcity of franchises and protected monopoly status, in
turn, can be held responsible for many of the industry's problems.
Over the years, baseball's owners have offered various rationales
for the exemption. First, until 1976, the argued that the exemption
was necessary to preserve the reserve clause in players' contracts.
They said that without such a clause, competitive balance in the
game would be undermined. Yet, the game has experienced unprec-
edented competitive balance since the introduction of free agency
in 1977.
Second, the owners perennially have claimed that their industry
is not profitable, that it is not a typical business, and hence they
do not take advantage of their monopoly position. Without stock-
holders to whom they have to show profits and open their books,
owners have several legal means to juggle their accounts and to
hide the true return on their investments. I will be happy to elabo-
rate on baseball's accounting trickery during discussion. For now,
let me only cite the revealing case of the Cincinnati Reds.
282
We gained an unusually candid and detailed look at the Reds'
books as a result, inter alia, of the litigation brought by Marge
Schott's minority partners against her. Cincinnati is baseball's
smallest media market, the 30th largest in the country. Despite
this, the Reds have been a consistently very profitable franchise.
Between 1985 and 1992, the club averaged over $10 million a
year in profits and were profitable every year. If owners did not re-
ceive a healthy economic return on their investment, including the
consumption value of ownership, then the explosion of franchise
values, more than tenfold since the late 1970's, would be impossible
to understand.
What is true, however, about baseball's financial situation is that
the industry is coming out of a 15-year boom period, during which
revenue growth exceeded 14 percent per year. In all likelihood, if
baseball does not move to an expanded playoff format, then begin-
ning in 1994 baseball's national media contract will diminish by up
to $3 million per team. The national media contract accounts for
slightly under one-fourth of baseball's revenues, and this shortfall
will be more than made up for by strong growth in licensing in-
come and local revenue sources. The net effect, though, will be that
the industry will experience low to moderate growth for the re-
mainder of this decade.
Third, owners have claimed that baseball needs the exemption so
that the commissioner can exercise the best interests of baseball
clause. With the forced resignation of Fay Vincent and prospective
restructuring of the office, however, this rationale, always dubious,
is now clearly obsolete.
Fourth, the rationale heard from the owners more frequently
over the past several months is that the exemption permits base-
ball to prevent franchise relocations. To the extent that baseball's
relocation has thwarted some team movement in recent years, the
purposes and processes underlying this outcome must be examined
more closely. Is baseball ready to foreswear all future team move-
ments, and hence render obsolete the practically ubiquitous prac-
tice of threatening cities with imminent departure in order to se-
cure more favorable stadium deals?
To the extent that Congress is concerned with franchise move-
ment and the blackmail of cities, there is a more direct and pre-
ferred remedy; namely, to give cities the right of first refusal to
allow municipal ownership and to set a baseball expansion time-
table.
Fifth, the owners have also claimed that the exemption prevents
proliferation of frivolous litigation. This rationale would perhaps
also serve to argue for granting the exemption to all U.S. indus-
tries. It is no longer clear, however, that the rationale applies to
baseball. 'Baseball's longstanding protected and unregulated mo-
nopoly status has occasioned such arrogance, laxity, and arbitrari-
ness that at least five lawsuits are presently pending, one for over
$3 billion. The same uncompetitive and unregulated environment
has engendered gross inefficiency and waste in the industry, which
ultimately is paid for by the consumer.
What effect does the exemption have? Most importantly, the ex-
emption allows for the preservation of baseball's amateur draft and
minor league reserve system. These have constituted a formidable
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barrier to entry, helping to thwart the emergence of the Continen-
tal League in 1960, as well as more recent efforts in 1987 and
1990. Baseball is the only major team sport since World War II
which has not had a rival league and it has experienced slower ex-
pansion than football, basketball, or hockey. Thus, the exemption
has reinforced the game's artificial scarcity.
Second, the exemption helps to preserve certain restrictive prac-
tices in broadcasting that are not protected by the 1961 Sports
Broadcasting Act, which I trust Mr. Kimmelman will discuss.
Third, despite new provisions to forestall collusion in the 1990
basic agreement, the exemption takes the potential weapons of in-
junction and discovery out of the players' hands. Without these de-
terrents, players are less willing to consider doing away with salary
arbitration, which is a major sticking point in the present discus-
sions.
In sum, the exemption cannot be justified on efficiency grounds.
If it could, lifting it would not matter because the owners would
win in court. The exemption allows for an income redistribution in
favor of the owners and against the consumers. It should be lifted,
but by itself it is an incomplete remedy. In my view, it should be
accompanied either by two pieces of legislation granting the cities
the right of first refusal and an expansion timetable or by legisla-
tion breaking up baseball's four divisions into separate competing
business entities.
Thank you.
[Mr. Zimbalist submitted the following material:]
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Major League Baseball (MLB) is the only industry in the
United States that has a blanket exemption from the country's
anti-trust laws and is subject to no trade regulation. The
exemption's origin lies in in the breakup of the Federal League
(FL), which challenged MLB's monopoly during 1914-15. After two
years of exploding player salaries, which resulted from
competition for players between MLB and the FL, the leagues made
peace. FL owners were either allowed to buy into MLB teams or
they were paid off.
MLB's owners, however, treated the owners of the Baltimore
Terrapins with scorn, offering them only $50,000 in settlement and
saying they should be pleased with this paltry sum because,
according to Charles Comiskey of the White Sox, Baltimore was not
a major league city and, in fact, it was even a bad minor league
city. Charles Ebbets of the Dodgers elaborated that the city had
too large a population of colored people.
The Terrapins' owners, not surprisingly, sued MLB in 1916
claiming violation of antitrust laws. In April 1919 they won
their suit before the Indiana Supreme Court for triple damages of
$240,000. But MLB appealed and the decision was reversed in April
1921 before the Washington, D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. The
case was again appealed and came before the U.S. Supreme Court in
May 1922. This court was headed by former President William
Howard Taft, who also happened to be an erstwhile third baseman
for Yale University and the first President to throw out a ball at
opening day, and the court's decision was written by Oliver
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Wendell Holmes, himself a former amateur baseball player.
The Supreme Court argued principally that baseball did not
engage in interstate commerce and, hence, was not subject to the
country's antitrust laws. A curious finding: did not the players
cross state lines, were not the bats, balls and uniforms
manufactured in different states, was not the first World Series
broadcast over radio in 1921, using a relay between New York City
and Newark, New Jersey? Even more curious, the decision was
reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in 1953 and again in 1972.
Congress from time to time has threatened to legislate away the
exemption, but has never come close to acting.
So MLB is the only legally-sanctioned, self-regulating
monopoly in the country. Decisions about how the game is played
and how the business is conducted are made by the 28 groups of men
and one woman who happened to be the fortunate owners of
baseball's big league franchises. Prior to the forced resignation
of Commissioner Fay Vincent in September 1992, the owners were
subject to at least one constraint, however minimal. Now their
decisions about the fate of our national pastime go completely
unchecked.
Owners' Justification for the Exemption
Over the years, the owners of major league baseball's
franchises have proferred three basic rationales for their
exemption.
- . ONE. Without the exemption the reserve clause could be
challenged and, without the reserve clause, baseball's competitive
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balance would be undermined. This argument was put forward by
virtually the entire baseball establishment and all the players
testifying before Subcommittee on Monopoly Power of the House
Judiciary Committee in 1951,1 at a time when the Yankee dynasty
was in full swing and the game had no competitive balance
whatsoever.
What exactly is the threat of free agency that the baseball
owners railed against, and now the football owners decry? It is
nothing more than the right for players to receive competitive
bids for their services, i.e., it is the same free labor market
idea that functions in the rest of the U.S. economy.
The free labor market rights conferred by free agency, in
fact, apply to only a small minority of professional ballplayers.
The 3400 minor leaguers have no free agency rights. With few
exceptions, minor leaguers are paid between $850 and $2000 a month
for between 2.5 and 5.5 months per year. They have no job
security and few benefits. One in ten minor leaguers makes it to
the major leagues. Of those who make it, only one in eight stays
for more than six years. And it is only those in this very select
group of players with more than six years of experience ih the
major leagues who gain free agency rights.2
1. Although Congress considered removing the exemption at the time
of these hearings, it seems confusion over the status of the
ruling in the Gardella case at the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
was a major factor behind Congress' inaction in 1951. See, inter
.lia, Chapter One of my book Baseball and Billions: A Probing Look
Inside the Big Business of Our National Pastime. New York: Basic
Books, 1992.
2. To be sure, there are even restrictions on the free labor
market rights of free agents. See Chapter 4 in Baseball and
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When an owner signs a free agent, he or, in the case of Marge
Schott, she is making a business decision. Nobody is pointing a
gun at the owner's head, compelling them to sign and pay
exhorbitant sums to individual free agents. A rational owner will
estimate the expected value or additional revenue that the player
will bring to the team and then offer the player any sum up to
this amount. Since player performance is not perfectly
predictable, sometimes the owner will overestimate and sometimes
the owner will underestimate; over time player salaries under
free agency should approach their value.3 It makes no sense for
the owners to sign a player for $6 million one day and the next
day to call a press conference and announce that the team is
losing money because player salaries are too high.
Those fans who express outrage at players' multi-million
dollar salaries should ask themselves why baseball franchise
owners should have different rules of the game than other U.S.
businesses. They should also consider that if player salaries
were somehow to be lowered that the money would be pocketed by the
owners. They should further consider that multi-million dollar
salaries are not so uncommon in the entertainment world. Bill
Billions for more details on the operation of baseball's labor
markets, including the functioning of salary arbitration primarily
for players with between three and six years of major league
experience.
3. There is a subsidiary issue here. Small city franchises that
are only marginally profitable may find that they are caught on
the short end of the bargain before the scales balance.
Unpredictability and risk are more serious threats and deterrents
to small city teams. This is another reason to increase revenue
sharing among teams in MLB.
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Cosby's annual income exceeds $100 million, Madonna's exceeds $60
million, Michael Jackson's exceeds $50 million and Prince's latest
contract brings him $10 million per record ... and an
entertainer's professional lifetime is generally significantly
longer than a ballplayer's. Finally, they should consider the
hundreds of corporate executives whose salary and stock options
yield over $5 million annually. Perhaps there is something
inequitable about the market-engendered salary structure in the
United States and perhaps it would be desirable to reintroduce a
truly progressive income tax, but there is no persuasive rationale
for singling out baseball's free agents for ridicule.
What about the traditional owner claim that free agency
disrupts competitive balance, a claim that was repeated
unsuccessfully in court t~his past summer with regard to football
by the NFL owners. The basis for the claim is that rich clubs or
big city clubs will be able to buy up disproportionately the best
talent and dominate opponents on the field.. If measured by the
number of different teams winning their division, pennant or World
Series, there has actually been more competitive balance in MLB
than at any time since 1903. If other measures are used, such as
the standard deviation or the spread in win percentages or excess
tail frequencies the conclusion is similar. Further, big city
teams have actually had a lower than average finish in the
standings since 1977.
How can these unexpected results be explained? First, and
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this is an explanation that was first suggested by University of
Massachusetts professor Sy Rottenberg,4 since it always has been
possible to sell or trade players, the introduction of free agency
did not initiate the movement of players from poor teams to rich
teams, it only changed who captured the economic rent or extra
value generated by the players. That is, prior to the advent of
free agency, top players were sold or traded from poor to rich
teams and the owners received payment for the player. With free
agency, the top player may still move from a poor to a rich team
but now the player receives the payment in the form of higher
salary. Thus, free agency per se does not change the pattern of
player movement across teams, it only changes the distr..ution of
izicome between owners and players. If one adds to this insight,
the fact that today teams losing free agents are compensated with
amateur draft picks then it follows, other things being equal,
that free agency would lead to a somewhat greater competitive
balance.
The problem with this explanation is that it does not tell us
why big city teams have not outperformed small city teams on
average since 1977. For this we must turn tb the second factor.
Because of greater unpredictability in player performance, it is
no longer possible to buy a winning team. Studies on the
correlation of average team salaries and team win percentage
revealed a positive and strong correlation prior to 1960 but no
4. Simon Rottenberg, "The Baseball Players' Labor Market," Journal
of Political Economy 64 (June 1956).
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significant correlation over the last twenty years. 5
Why has performance become more unpredictable? Some will say
it has to do with increased pressure on the players from their
high salaries and media attention. By this reasoning, some
players are better equipped psychologically to cope with the
pressure than others, but this ability is not always evident
during the players' early years. I believe a stronger and more
tractable phenomenon is at work and that is talent compression.
5. Performance predictability becomes even more problematic as
players enter the second half of their careers and are
increasingly plagued by injury. Most free agents are in their
late twenties or their thirties.
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Table 1
Baseball Players and Population
Year Major League Players U.S. Population Pop/Player
1890 480* 63 mn. 131,250:1
1903 320* 80 an. 250,000:1
1990 650 250 in. 385,000:1
* based on assumption of an average of 20 roster players
per team.
In 1990, the population-to-player ratio was 54% higher than
it was in 1903, the beginning of the modern era of professional
baseball. That is, a smaller and smaller share of the population
is playing professional baseball. Further, new groups have
entered the -game. Before 1947 no blacks played in the major
leagues and there were few latins. Today these two groups
comprise almost 35 percent of major league ballplayers. Moreover,
the population is healthier, more physically-fit and better
trained in baseball-specific skills through the expansion of youth
league baseball. Because major league ballplayers are a smaller
fraction of an increasingly prepared population, the difference
between today's best, average and worst players is much smaller
than it was twenty or forty years ago. Unlike track and field
records which are based strictly on individual prowess and improve
gradually over time, baseball performance statistics are the
result of the balance of competing forces. Baseball's annual
hitting and pitching records not only have not improved over time
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but with one exception they have not even been approached in
recent times. Moreover, the one exception dates back to 1961 and
is tainted by an asterisk in the minds of most fans.6 There is no
more compelling evidence of talent compression than a review of
batting and pitching records and their dates of accomplishment.7
6. I refer here, of course, to Roger Maris' 61 home runs in 162
games, compared to Babe Ruth's 60 home runs in 154 games.
7. To be sure, the lively ball was not introduced until 1920 and
this contributed to pitchers' low ERAs during the 1910s, but it
also contributed to lower batting averages. Batting averages rose
13 points in 1920 and ERAs rose 0.39 points. Even adding 0.39
points to the ERAs listed in Table 2 would leave them considerably
below the best performances in recent times. Eventually pitchers
adjusted to the lively ball and both batting and slugging averages
gave back some of the gained ground. Other rules' changes that
have affected performance records since 1903 include: narrowing
the strike zone in 1950, widening the strike zone in 1963,
narrowing the strike zone and lowering the pitchers' mound in 1969
and the introductiQn of the designated hitter in the American
League in 1973. Controlling for the different effects of these
changes does not alter the argument regarding the impact of talent
compression in the text.
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Table 2
Performance Records
Player Year
Batting Avg.:
.424
.420
.420
RBIs:
190
184
183
Home Runs:
61
60
59
58
58
Doubles:
67
64
64
Runs:
177
167
163
163
Earned Run Average:
1.01
1.04
1.09
Rogers Hornsby
George Sisler
Ty Cobb
Hack Wilson
Lou Gehrig
Hank Greenberg
Roger Maris
Babe Ruth
Babe Ruth
Hank Greenberg
Jimmie Foxx
Earl Webb
george Burns
Joe Medwick
Babe Ruth
Lou Gehrig
Babe Ruth
Lou Gehrig
Dutch Leonard
T.F. Brown
Walter Johnson
category
1924
1922
1911
1930
1931
1937
1961
1927
1921
1938
1932
1931
1926
1936
1921
1936
1928
1931
1914
1906
1913
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Similar to today's batters, the great batters of yesteryear
faced many strong pitchers, but they also faced a steady diet of
weak pitchers not enjoyed by today's players. Likewise, the great
pitchers of yesteryear faced many strong batters but they also
faced large numbers of weak batters. Because the inequality among
the players was greater during baseball's earlier years, the
strong players were better able to take advantage of their weaker
opponents and set baseball's longstanding records. With rare
exceptions, the only yearly record that is challenged consistently
by today's players is stolen bases, and, interestingly, this
activity has much more to do with individual prowess than it does
an outcome of competing forces. In any event, it is this
compression of baseball talent that today results in greater
difficulty in selecting dominating players and leads to greater
competitive balance among the teams. It is also clear evidence
that talent is sufficient for a significant increase in the number
of major league teams.
Other factors may have played a smaller role in the
preservation of competitive balance since 1977 and warrant a brief
mention: the introduction of the amateur draft in 1965; the
relative equalization of team revenues with the more rapid growth
of the national television revenues which are fully shared across
the teams; poor management by big city owners, and neglect of
their farm systems; possible perverse incentive effects of long-
term contracts on older players; greater difficulty in keeping a
winning team together; and, lastly, greater ease for bottom teams
to improve quickly.
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TWO. The owners of major league baseball franchises
perenially have claimed that their industry is not profitable,
that it is not a typical business. If the owners are not making a
profit, after all, then how can it be argued that they are abusing
the monopoly power conferred by the exemption?
To properly assess this claim, it is necessary to understand
the structural circumstance of franchise ownership which assumes
one of three legal forms: business partnership; subchapter S
corporation or, in a few instances, a submerged division within a
large corporation. In practice,'what this means is that there are
no stockholders for whom you have to show profits to convince that
you are doing a good job or to please through increases in stock
prices, and there are no stockholders to whom you have to open the
books. This leaves baseball's owners free to cook their books
practically at will and either to show greatly diminished profits
or to show losses. Reality is different.
Consider the opportunities for accounting legerdemain.
First, corporate tie-ins from cross ownership permit owners to
easily transfer millions of dollars of profit from one business to
another. The Tribune Company, for instance, owns both the Chicago
Cubs and the superstation WGN which broadcasts Cubs and White Sox
games. Chicago is the third largest media market in the country,
and baseball broadcast rights to this city alone are worth in
excess of $15 million a year. But as a superstation that reaches
over 40 million homes nationally, WGN's contract with the Cubs is
worth well over $25 million. Evidence from the late 1980s
suggests that WGN was paying the Cubs around $7 million for
297
-13-
broadcast rights. These figures imply that the Tribune company
chose to transfer roughly $20 million from its Cubs pocket to its
WGN pocket.
Why would they do that? Baseball believes it derives public
relations value from making franchises seem less profitable than
they are or by making them appear to earn losses. The clubs then
use this as ammunition in their negotiations with the Players'
Association, with the cities and the minor leagues.
Seventeen of MLB's 28 teams have had cross-ownership ties
with broadcasters since 1986 and have been able to utilize the
same transfer pricing scheme as the Tribune Company. Corporate
tie-ins also take other forms. Anheuser-Busch, for instance, owns
the St. Louis Cardinals as well as Busch Stadium as two separate
divisions. While the Cardinals pay a standard rent for the
stadium, the ball team receives none of the parking, concessions
or general stadium revenue which could amount to $10 to $15
million or more annually.
Anheuser-Busch also derives significant.promotional value for
its beer products from its ownership of the Cardinals and Busch
Stadium. To be sure, promotional synergy between products of
other businesses and baseball franchises benefits most owners.
(It may also be a matter of legislative concern that MLB's
franchise owners use baseball's protected monopoly and subsidized
status as a means to secure competitive advantage for their
businesses in other industries. This occurs not only through
transfer pricing schemes and promotional synergy, but also through
easier access to loans (often using the franchise or some of its
298
-14-
contracts as collateral) and to politicians.)
Second, owners in a franchise partnership often make loans as
individuals of tens of millions of dollars to the partnership to
which they belong. This means that the partnership that owns the
ball club may make interest payments of millions of dollars
annually to one of the partners. In essence, the partner is
choosing to receive his return on investment in the form of
interest income instead of profit distribution. The end result is
that the team's profits are artificially diminished.
Third, owners can pay themselves handsome salaries, even
though they retain a full complement of front office personnel.
We do not have details on the practices in MLB in this regard, but
the NFL players' antitrust suit this past summer produced some
fascinating revelations. NFL teams, like in baseball, are
closely-held partnerships and subchapter S corporations. At least
eleven NFL owners paid themselves over a million dollars salary in
1990, including the owner of the Buffalo Bills who paid himself
$3.5 million and Norm Braman, who owns the Philadelphia Eagles and
lives most of the year in France, paid himself the modest salary
of $7.5 million. In other words, the Eagles might have had a $7
million profit turned into a $0.5 million loss from this sleight
of hand. Although we do not have specific salary information for
executives of baseball teams, we do know that some teams have
front office expenses from $10 to $20 million above those of other
teams.8 Naturally, extensive ownership and front office
8. More generally, as long as baseball's employees are paid above
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perquisites can also hide profits.
Fourth, each of these three accounting practices is perfectly
legitimate, but owners also can dishonestly manipulate or falsify
their books by underreporting revenue or overstating costs. We
caught an unusually candid glimpse of the books of the Cincinnati
Reds as a result of the suit brought by Marge Schott's minority
partners against her. Among other things, it was shown that
Schott was giving her car companies free advertising in Reds'
media outlets and double charging several major investment
expenditures, such as their new $5 million electronic scoreboard
and their artificial turf field.
Fifth, unlike other industries which cannot depreciate their
employees, sports teams are allowed to depreciate their players.
Player costs, of course, &re also expensed. The general practice
is for the owners to assign 50 percent of the team's purchase
price to players and then depreciate this sum over five years.
Thus, a team purchased for $100 million would claim depreciation
of $10 million a year over five years, diminishing book profits by
$10 million per year. Eventually, the depreciation is partially
recaptured in higher-capital gains taxes and the actual gain to
ownership is equivalent to an interest free loan over the holding
period.9 The value of this tax shelter has fallen over time with
their reservation wage (the best wage they could earn outside of
baseball) then the industry's true monopoly profits will be
hidden, even if no accounting gimmickry is employed.
9. The actual value of the loan would be the appropriate average
rate of interest plus the average rate of inflation multiplied
times the accumulated amount of depreciation summed over the
ownership period (adjusted for the early years).
300
-16-
a lower proportion of the franchise purchase price assignable to
players, decreasing tax rates and the diminishing spread between
income and capital gains tax rates. Nonetheless, during the early
years of ownership player depreciation privileges result in
sharply lower book profits.
Lastly, it-must be pointed out in response to the owners'
cries of poverty that there is also an investment return in the
consumption value of ownership. Most owners admit to great
pleasure from the power and public exposure that team ownership
confers. Even the most outlandish and irresponsible owners seem
to become community icons. Certainly, the tens of thousands of
baseball fanatics participating in rotisserie and other fantasy
leagues will recognize this consumption value immediately.
If baseball teams were not yielding a positive economic
return, it would defy all the laws of economics for franchise
values to be over $100 million and to have risen so rapidly over
the past two decades. Consider, for instance, the Seattle
Mariners, one of baseball's weakest teams financially and on the
field: the Mariners sold for $6.5 million in 1977, $13 million in
1981, $77 million in 1988,'and $106 million in 1992. Six teams
currently are appraised above $175 million.
Baseball's smallest media market is Cincinnati. We know from
our privileged access to the Reds' books that the Reds have been
eminently profitable, earning an average annual profit of $9.4
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million during 1985-89, then $19 million in 1990 alone, $12
million in 1991, and around $5 million in 1992.
So, properly interpreted, virtually all MLB teams are
profitable and to not be so seems to require a combination of a
small city, poor team performance and wasteful management.
Besides, who ever said capitalism guarantees profits?10
Two caveats are appropriate here. First, the protracted
boom period since the mid-1970s of almost 15 percent annual
revenue growth has come to an end. The national media contract,
which had grown 16-fold between 1976 and 1990, will likely
diminish between 10 and 20 percent beginning with the 1994 season,
unless baseball moves to an expanded playoff format. But the
national media contract with CBS and ESPN represents less than
one-quarter of MLB's revenues and the shortfall here will be more
than offset by growth in local television and radio contracts,
licensing, luxury box, concessions and other income. Overall, we
can expect slow revenue growth rates through the remainder of this
decade. Mismanagement is a lot easier to conceal during periods
of rapid revenue growth.
Second, there is a potential distribution problem. With the
expected reduction in the national media contract which is shared
equally among all teams and the consequent increased dependence on
10. Further, if the owners truly feel that the finances of certain
small city franchises are too fragile, they always have the option
of increasing revenue sharing among the teams. Presently,
approximately one-third of an average baseball team's revenue
comes from shared sources; in the NFL this figure is over three-
fourths. See discussion below in the text.
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non-shared income sources, many small city franchises which are
only marginally profitable and are more limited in their resources
likely will experience greater financial pressure in the years
ahead.
Herein lies a key dynamic behind baseball's economic
instability. The big city owners (Steinbrenner, Reinsdorf,
Tribune Co., O'Malley, Autry, Wilpon, Giles, et. al.) adamantly do
not want to increase revenue sharing. Their strategy has been to
say to the small city owners: "We know you don't want our charity;
instead, what we'll do is help you make your operation more
profitable." So, in lieu of more revenue sharing, they go after
baseball's various constituencies. They go after the Players'
Association and this is why there has been a work stoppage every
time the collective bargaining agreement has come up since 1970,
yielding the preposterous outcome that an industry with 15 percent
yearly revenue growth, 20 percent yearly salary growth, average
salaries over $1 million, no foreign competition and growing
employment does not experience labor peace, and this is why we
might have a lockout before the 1993 season begins. They go after
the cities, which are confronted with threats of teams moving if
they do not build new stadiums. They go after the minor leagues,
which two years ago were forced to share more of their revenue
with their parent franchises or to face extinction. And they go
after the fans, who are faced each year with more expensive cable
packages, tickets, concessions and parking costs. It should
serve as a stern warning to baseball's barons, for instance, that
the neighborhoods surrounding Baltimore's new stadium are 70
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percent black but only 2 percent of attendees at Camden Yards in
1992 was African-American.
%EREE. Various baseball team owners and commissioners have
maintained that the sport's antitrust exemption was needed to
allow the commissioner to exercise effectively the "best interests
of baseball" clause. Without the exemption, the exercise of this
power might abridge free commerce or property rights and be
vulnerable to a successful challenge. In practice, the
commissioner rarely invoked this power and did not serve as a
sufficient checkon the owners, who, after all, hire and fire the
commissioner. Nevertheless, to the extent that this power ever
had enduring significance, it has now been negated by the forced
resignation of ray Vincent and the owners' clear intention to
restructure the office, further circumscribing the commissioner's
independence. Plainly, this argument is now obsolete.
TOUR. A rationale heard from the owners more frequently over
the past several months is that the exemption permits baseball to
prevent franchise relocations. First, the premise of this claim
is not fully correct. It is based on a facile interpretation of
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in the NFL Raiders'
case. The decision did not say that any league rules restraining
franchise movements were in violation of the antitrust laws, only
that the NFL's rule 4.3 and its application in this case were in
violation. One salient fact, for instance, was that if the
Raiders' move to Los Angeles were restrained by the NFL it would
have preserved the Rams' monopoly in the Los Angeles area, as
defined by rule 4.1 to cover a radius of 75 miles.
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Second, to the extent that MLB's exemption has thwarted some
team movement in recent years, the purposes and processes
underlying this outcome must be examined more closely. Is MLB
ready to foreswear all future team movements and, hence, render
obsolete the practically ubiquitous practice of threatening cities
with imminent departure in order to secure more favorable stadium
deals? To the extent that Congress is concerned with franchise
movement there is a more direct and preferred remedy; namely, to
give cities the right of first refusal and to allow municipal
ownership (elaborated below).
FIVE. The owners have also claimed that the exemption
prevents a proliferation of frivolous litigation. This rationale
would perhaps also serve to argue for granting the exemption to
all U.S. industries. It is no longer clear, however, that the
rationale applies to baseball. MLB's longstanding protected and
unregulated monopoly status has occasioned such ownership laxity
and arbitrariness that at least five lawsuits are presently
pending, one for over $3 billion.
Independent Perspectives on the Exemption
Outside the industry, views on the importance of baseball's
antitrust exemption have varied widely. In their 1981 book
Baseball Economics and Public Policy, economists Jesse Markham and
Paul Teplitz argued that prior to the introduction of free agency
there was cause to remove baseball's antitrust exemption but with
free agency the exemption has little economic meaning. Their
study was commissioned by MLB. Economist Gerry Scully resonates
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that not only do the players have free agency now but they have a
powerful union to protect their interests, so lifting antitrust
exemption would accomplish little.1 1
On the other end of the spectrum is law professor Stephen
Ross who could scarcely paint a rosier picture of the benefits
from applying antitrust statutes to baseball. "Competing leagues
would vie against each other for the right to play in public
stadiums, driving rents up and tax subsidies down. Leagues would
be more eager to add new expansion markets, lest those markets
fall into the hands of a rival league. Because the competing
leagues would bid on players, salaries would reflect more
accurately the players' fair market value, and no one league would
unduly restrict intraleague mobility of players. Teams thus could
obtain more readily the right player for the right position.
Leagues would hesitate to move prime games to cable for fear of
losing their audience, as well as the loyalty of their fans, to a
league whose games remained available on free television. The
pressure of competition would force each league to maintain
intelligent and efficient management."1 2
Reality lies somewhere in between these polar contentions
that antitrust action would do away with all problems in MLB and
that it would do nothing. Where does it lie? The first question
to answer is what areas of MLB are still affected by its
11. Scully, The Business of Major Leaaue Baseball. University of
Chicago Press, 1989, pp. 192-193.
12. Ross, "Monopoly Sports Leagues," Minnesota Law Review 71, 3,
1989, p. 646.
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exemption.
Impact of the Exemption
Consider the players. Damages in the recent collusion cases
against the owners were settled at $280 million. If antitrust
principles were applied to these cases, the Players' Association
would have been entitled to triple damages or $840 million.
Realizing this, the Players' Association added a clause to the
1990 Basic Agreement stating that in the future owners' collusion
over free agent salaries will be subject to triple damages. The
owners accepted the change, so the only remaining advantage seems
to be indirect. If the exemption is lifted, the Players'
Association will have recourse to injunctions and pre-trial
discovery procedures. The implicit threat that either injunction
or discovery rights might be invoked may further deter collusive
behavior among the owners.
What about the players with less than six years experience
who do not have free agency rights? Since the Players'
Association operates essentially as a union shop, including all
major league players, the collective bargaining agreement legally
binds all major leaguers to its provisions. Players without free
agency cannot bring an antitrust suit against MLB because of the
non-statutory labor exemption that allows labor unions involved in
bona fide, arms'-length bargaining to surrender possible
protections under antitrust statutes. Removing the antitrust
exemption, then, would have no direct effect on MLB's relation
with the major league players.
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Minor leaguers are in a different category. They do not
belong to the Players' Association, nor any other union, and MLB
restrains them from entertaining competitive bids for their labor
services. This is restraint of trade and no labor exemption
applie*. Theoretically, a minor leaguer could sue MLB. Of
course, such a suit would be time consuming and costly, and most
minor leaguers have neither the money nor the interest to
challenge their employers. Moreover, any lawyer would advise them
that their chances in such a suit would be slim since the courts
have repeatedly upheld MLB's exemption. Were the exemption
lifted, this is an area that could well be affected. 13
The existence of the reserve system in baseball's minor
leagues is also a factor that makes it more difficult for
competing leagues to establish themselves in baseball; in
economists' jargon, the minor league reserve system is a barrier
to entry. When the Continental League was forming in the late
13. The absence of a blanket antitrust exemption in the NFL and
the NBA has not mattered in this regard because they do not have
professional minor leagues; colleges serve in this capacity.
Interestingly, however, both the NFL and the NBA have been
challenged in court on a related issue where MLB is also
vulnerable -- the amateur draft. In all three sports, amateur
players, either out of high school or college, are drafted by
professional teams and prevented from seeking competitive bids for
their services. The NBA and NFL have won their cases, basically
on union shop grounds. That is, an amateur being signed in the
basketball or football drafts is about to enter the "majors" and
its players' union, so they are bound by the rules of the union's
collective bargaining agreements. These rules accept the draft
and, hence, by the labor exemption, the drafts are legal. Players
drafted in baseball, however, are headed for the minor, not the
major, leagues where there is no union. Thus, a challenge of
baseball's June amateur draft would be quite compelling in the
absence of baseball's exemption.
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1950s, Branch Rickey appealed to MLB to allow the new league to
draft and pay for players from its minors. MLB never responded to
the request. The Continental League had the option of sueing MLB
for exploitative'adhesion, but here again MLB was protected by the
antitrust exemption. Not anxious to test its exemption over this
issue and to otherwise alienate scores of politicians, MLB
compromised on an expansion program that incorporated some of the
prospective team owners from the Continental League. Another
effort to form a third league was close to fruition in 1987 when
the stock market crashed in October, financially decimating some
of the monied individuals involved in the effort. The effort was
revived with some new investors in 1990; precisely one of the
chief concerns was access to minor league talent. Without such
access, the quality of play would be too low and the riskiness and
expense of drafting players out of high school too great to make
the new league viable. A third league in baseball does not have
the option that the AFL or USFL had in football to offer sweeter
deals to college players. Unlike in college football and
basketball, the overwhelming majority of college players in
baseball are not ready for major league competition.
The exemption, then, deters the formation of competitive
leagues. This deterrence helps to explain the failure of rival
major leagues to emerge in baseball since 1914-15 as well as the
slower pace of expansion since the 1960s of MLB relative to the
other professional team sport leagues. The NHL, NFL and NBA have
all experienced rival leagues over the last thirty years and they
have all expanded more rapidly than major league baseball.14
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Among other things, a rival league would serve to pressure
MLB to deal with its notoriously inefficient and wasteful
management practices. It would also temper some of the
troublesome arrogance that characterizes the baseball
establishment.1 5 In the end, management waste and abuse are paid
for by the fans, the cities, the players, the umpires and many
other employee groups.
Consider the media. Here antitrust has a straightforward
role to play. MLB restrains trade when it imposes territorial
restrictions on the broadcasting of its games. Although somewhat
vitiated by compulsory license with the carriage of local Cubs,
Braves, Yankee and Mets off-air games on superstations, baseball's
territorial restrictions still apply to all local cable deals as
well as to the broadcast deals of other teams. Thus, a Yankee fan
living in Massachusetts cannot see the Yankees on cable (MSG) at
any price because the Red Sox have been awarded exclusive rights
to the area by MLB. The explosion in cable channel capacity from
14. In 1967 there were ten teams in the NBA and six teams in the
NHL; in 1991 there were twenty-seven and twenty-two teams
respectively. That is, the NBA expanded by a factor of 2.7 and
the NHL by 3.7 over the period, while MLB expanded from twenty to
twenty-six teams, by a factor of 1.3. The NFL has also expanded
more rapidly, but the existence of so many quasi-major football
leagues (for example, the World League of American Football, the
World Football League, the United States Football League, the
Canadian Football League, and arena football) over the years makes
a direct calculation more problematic. Of course, the precise
rates of expansion will depend on the base year chosen.
15. See Chapter 2 in Baseball and Billions for a discussion of
baseball ownership and management.
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the advent of fiber optics and digital compression will soon make
it technologically feasible as well as cost effective to offer
fans throughout the country the choice of watching any major
league game on any given day. As long as MLB awards teams
exclusive territorial rights, however, this technological
potential is thwarted.
Further complicating the implementation of unrestricted game
viewing is MLB's system of revenue sharing. In particular, local
broadcast revenues, with the exception of a small share of cable
income, are retained by the team. Some teams earn over $40
million from their local media contracts while others earn under
$10 million. To the extent that local rights lose exclusivity as
viewership to local games becomes available nationally the
pressure for additional revenue sharing among teams will mount.
Baseball's big city franchises, then, are likely to resist the
move toward a policy that would maximize consumer choice and
welfare. If, however, in the spirit of political compromise with
the small city teams, the big city owners surrender exclusivity to
some share of local broadcasts, it is likely that MLB itself will
centrally program and market on pay-per-view the menu of
nationally available games. The existence of territorial rights
and MLB's monopoly marketing of the pay-per-view games, in turn,
will increase the purchase price for viewership and further limit
the access of low and middle-income Americans to enjoying the
national pastime.
311
-27-
The right to negotiate a network package for over-the-air
broadcasting conferred by the 1961 SBA should be qualified to
guarantee a certain level of fan access to free telecasting. The
175-game ESPN package strictly speaking is a violation of
antitrust law since it is pay TV and not protected by the SBA. If
MLB's blanket exemption were lifted, the ESPN package would be
subject to challenge. In exchange for the right to make such a
package deal, MLB might be required to lift its local blackout
provisions on Tuesday, Thursday and Friday nights. By allowing
ESPN games into certain local markets on these nights, this would
raise somewhat the value of the ESPN package and lower somewhat
the value of local contracts, but on balance the gross revenues
should not be affected. It would simply redistribute revenues
from local sources (only a small share of which is shared) to
national sources (all of which is shared.)
In 1987 MLB's television committee recommended a rule that
team owners not be allowed to own television stations. Over
Commissioner Ueberoth's objections, the rule was accepted and has
been honored only in the breach. Cross ownership ties now affect
more than fifteen teams and in the one case the Tribune Company
owns the Chicago Cubs, the superstation WGN that broadcasts the
Cubs and the White Sox as well as local stations that will
broadcast the games of five other major league teams in 1993. The
Tribune Company, then, has enormous power within the baseball
establishment and they are using it to promote their interests.
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For instance, the immediate provocation for former Commissioner
Vincent's ouster was his decision to realign the divisions in the
National League so that they would correspond to their member
teams' geographic locations. This would have promoted more local
rivalries in the long run, reduced team travel expenditures and
allowed the fans in Cincinnati and Atlanta to see more night games
at normal hours. The Tribune Company disliked the move, however,
because, given the divisional scheduling formula in the National
League, it would have put a larger number of WGN's games on after
prime time for most of the nation. Once again, the short-term
profit interests of the most powerful owners conspired with
baseball's exemption to limit fan access to the national pastime.
Consider the cities. MLB behaves like a standard monopoly in
restricting supply (the nimber of teams) below the demand for
teams from economically viable cities; that is, it creates an
artificial scarcity.16 There were, for instance, 18 ownership
groups from around the country in 1990 who paid $100,000 simply to
apply to be one of the National League's two expansion teams.
This excess demand forces cities to compete with each other to
16. Over the past year owners have been quick to point out that
there were several franchises on the block that had not been sold.
They claimed this was evidence of no excess demand. To this claim
it must be pointed out that: (a) demand was artificially
restricted by imposed conditions from MLB; (b) the asking price
was unrealistic in some cases; and, most importantly, (c) other
things equal investors always shy away from uncertainty and risk
and MLB in 1992 was confronted by the prospects of labor unrest,
legal turmoil, political backlash and a smaller national
television contract. Despite this, the franchises in Houston,
Detroit, San Francisco and Seattle all sold at around the $100
million mark.
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attract new teams or retain existing ones. MLB can blackmail the
cities into bankrolling new stadiums replete with luxury boxes,
advertising-friendly electronic scoreboards, adjacent and abundant
parking, and an extensive network of in-stadium restaurants and
concessions outlets. All this can be worth tens of millions of
dollars in additional annual revenue to a team and bring the city
no more in rental payments. The cities are being mugged.
The standard ploy for a MLB franchise is to threaten to move
the team. Such threats have consistently brought owners either
more favorable rental contracts for their teams, as with the
Minnesota Twins who have paid zero rent since 1989, or stadium
retrofits such as the $105 million investment by New York City in
adding luxury boxes, new scoreboards, concessions outlets, and
parking to Yankee Stadiun during 1974-75,17 or entire new stadiums
with a wide array of revenue-generating accoutrements, such as the
new and beautiful Camden Yards ballpark in Baltimore which brought
the Orioles' owner Eli Jacobs some $40 million in profits this
past year.
If the affected city dares to demur and ask for a better
deal, matters can get ugly very quickly. There were two notorious
cases in 1992. The first was in Seattle where a local group
trying to buy the team was told by the Commissioner that MLB had
one rule that required local ownership and another rule that
proscribed foreign ownership. Seattle's group included Nintendo
17. New York City received zero rent from the Yankees in 1976.
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of America, originally as a majority owner. Despite the facts
that the Mariners' owner at the time lived in Indianapolis, that
the previous owner lived in Los Angeles and that the CEO of
Nintendo of America had lived in Seattle for fifteen years, raised
his children there and would become the first Seattle Mariners'
owner to possess a Washington state driver's license, the
prospective Seattle group was told by the commissioner to expect a
cold shoulder from MLB. This was the status quo until Speaker of
the House, Representative Thomas Foley from the state of
Washington, told MLB that if the Seattle group was turned down
that it could expect to see legislation removing baseball's
antitrust exemption in Congress within 24 hours. MLB relented and
allowed Nintendo to hold 49 percent of the partnership's shares.
The second case was partially resolved last month and
involved the San Francisco Giants. Back in 1958 when the plans
for cold and windy Candlestick Park were being hatched, Mayor
Christopher of San Francisco and his city council were either
hoodwinked or paid off by Charles Harney, owner of the prospective
stadium site on the bay and construction contractor. Giants'
owner Horace Stoneham was guilty of benign neglect. There have
been four referenda since 1987 to raise funds for a new stadium in
the Bay Area and all four.were voted down. Only Harold Stassen
and Gus Hall have lost more elections. Of the four referenda
defeats, however, only two were in San Francisco proper. The last
one in the city was in November 1989, one month after the massive
earthquake. The mayor, who had been actively supporting the new
stadium, stopped campaigning for it and an ownership group from
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Sacramento which controlled the NBA franchise there, hoping to
lure the Giants 90 miles east, began a propaganda effort against
the stadium on the grounds that a new stadium was needed but now
was not the time to spend public funds on it while earthquake
relief efforts were so crucial. This referendum lost by 50.5 -
percent to 49.5 percent, or by less than two thousand votes! The
most recent vote in June 1992 in San Jose was in the context of a
gargantuan fiscal crisis, and it is well to recall, as it was
repeatedly recalled for the voters in San Jose, that Bob Lurie,
the Giants' owner, inherited a multimillion real estate fortune
from his father, that he bought the Giants in 1976 for $8 million
and the sale price will be around $100 million. Besides, if a
failed referendum was a sufficient condition to vindicate
franchise relocation, then the Detroit Tigers also would be
justifiable carpetbaggers because on May 17, 1992 a stadium
initiative in Detroit failed decisively.
San Franciscans have been accused of being unworthy baseball
fans. Many have pointed to the Giants' attendance which fell from
2.06 million in 1989, to 1.98 million in 1990 and to 1.74 million
in 1991. Yet in 1991 the team record was 75 wins and 87 losses
with a fourth place finish. It is possible to estimate
econometrically what the Giants' attendance would have been had
San Francisco fans behaved like average baseball fans.
Controlling for city population and team win percentage, the
expected attendance at Candlestick would have been only 1.69
million in 1991 or 50,000 below the actual.
In the meantime, the city of Tampa, Florida, the 13th largest
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media market in the country, has been promised a major league team
since 1984. In 1988 the city financed the construction of a $138
million domed-stadium, intended originally as the new home of the
White Sox. Jerry Reinsdorf, owner of the White Sox, then used
Tampa's beckoning dome to induce Chicago and Illinois to build his
team a new Comiskey Park. When Bob Lurie signed a sale agreement
with a Tampa group on August 6 of this year, the city began an
additional $30 million investment to prepare the ballpark for
major league play. Now the dome will remain empty and Tampa once
again finds itself without a team. MLB will have several major
litigations brought against it, the costs of which in large
measure will ultimately be borne by the fans and will likely bring
further instability to the game.
The obvious answer to MLB's ability to blackmail the cities
and to extract annual subsidies totalling over $200 million from
them is to rebalance the supply and demand equation through an
expansion of franchises. There are enough economically-viable
cities to support a gradual expansion to 40 teams by the year
2004. The Cincinnati Reds operate profitably in baseball's
smallest media market, the 30th largest in the country. Without
incorporating any smaller media markets, since four metropolitan
areas have two teams each and two teams are in Canada, it would be
possible for MLB to expand to 36 teams. Another six media markets
were at least 86 percent the size of Cincinnati in 1990; at a
market growth rate of 1.4 percent a year, by the year 2000 they
would all be larger than Cincinnati was in 1990. Thus, there are
more than enough economically viable cities to support such an
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expansion.
Although the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
in the NFL Raiders' case is often misinterpreted as discussed
above, applying antitrust law has hardly been a godsend to the
erstwhile NFL cities of Oakland, Baltimore and St. Louis. When Al
Davis moved his Raiders to Los Angeles in 1982, the NFL was so
embarassed by Davis' naked greed that it tried to stop him. Davis
went to court and won on the grounds that the NFL was restraining
trade and interfering with his prqperty right. 1 8 Baltimore Colts'
owner Robert Irsay, encouraged by the Davis precedent, packed up
his bags in 1984 and was in Indianapolis in less time than it took
Johnny Unitas to run out of the pocket. The NFL's St. Louis
Cardinals followed suit in 1988 when they moved to Phoenix. The
NFL was not willing to risk the expense and effort to challenge
these moves even though there was no existing team in Indianapolis
or Phoenix whose monopoly was being challenged.
The case can be made, then, that if baseball's exemption is
lifted it should be accompanied by additional legislation.1 9 One
piece of legislation would give cities the right of first refusal.
That is, before an owner was allowed to move a team or to sell it
to owners in another city, the team should be offered for sale to
18. Oakland was unsuccessful in the California courts when it
tried to invoke eminent domain to prevent the Raiders' relocation.
19. It is also true that removing the exemption alone may provoke
private antitrust suits yielding damages but no structural relief.
For structural relief the antitrust division of Department of
Justice or the Federal Trade Commission would have to get
involved. The outcome in this case would be uncertain and the
process would be expensive and drawn out.
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its host city. The host city, in turn, could either buy it and
operate it as a quasi-public company or it could arrange for a
widely-dispersed ownership among its citizens -- as in Green Bay,
Wisconsin with the football Packers. The fair market value could
be set by an independent arbitration body.
Presently, MLB has a policy proscribing municipal ownership.
Thus, when Joan Kroc attempted to give the Padres to the city of
San Diego two years ago, the baseball establishment informed her
that this was impossible. Publicly, the owners state that
municipal ownership would be too cumbersome and inefficient. Many
minor league franchises, however, are municipally-owned,
management is separated from local politics and the teams are run
efficiently. The real concern of baseball's barons is that public
ownership means public actountability which, inter alia, may lead
to opha books. Open books means loss of control and that is where
the real threat lies. Right of first refusal legislation would
overturn MLB's prohibition on municipal ownership.
A second piece of legislation would set down an expansion
timetable for baseball. Again, here I would argue for 40 teams by
the year 2-004. Congress may prefer a decision rule for expansion
to a specific timetable; if so, an adjudicatory agency would have
to interpret and oversee the implementation of the rule.
Another public policy option would be the creation of a
federal sports commission. Such a commission, originally proposed
in 1972 by Senator Marlow Cook, a Republican from Kentucky, would
set guidelines for expansion in each league, control franchise
movements, regulate the relationship between professional and
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amateur sports and curb the reckless commercialization of
organized sports. The checkered history of regulatory bodies in
the United States and the primacy of special interests in
Washington politics argue for great caution before pursuing public
policy along these lines.2 0 An oversight commission would have an
advantage over a piecemeal legislative approach in being able to
respond more flexibly, promptly and, possibly, more intelligently
to new problems. It would, of course, be desirable to build in
safeguards to minimize the opportunities for the industry to
capture its regulators.2 1 As perilous as this option may appear,
the existing alternative may well be worse: that is, professional
sports leagues run by self-interested owners unfettered by the
forces of competition or regulation, and intir-collegiate
athletics run by the NCAA, in turn, controlled by the non-
academically-minded athletic directors from the big-time
universities.
Each of the above public policy options entails some direct
government interference in the industry. An alternative approach
to undoing baseball's contrived scarcity of franchises would be
20. One might also wonder whether the status quo wherein Congress
periodically threatens to revoke the exemption if baseball does
not behave in certain ways avoids the penetration of special
interests. Besides, even without the threat of removing the
exemption, there exists another threat -- the removal of the
nonsensical right to depreciate players.
21. One such safeguard might be a requirement that no regulator
could come from or go to a sports industry within a five-year
period. Another might stipulate that the regulators be chosen
from lists provided by particular constituencies, such as the
United States Conference of Mayors, the Consumer Federation of
America, sportswriters, players and the owners.
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for Congress to legislate that the four divisions in MLB be broken
into separate business entities.22 'The new leagues would be
allowed to collaborate in setting common playing rules and
arranging post-season contests, but their business dealings would
be separate from each other. They would compete for fan loyalty,
for television contracts, for worthy cities, and so on. Owning a
team in more than one league and vertical interlocks would be
prohibited.23
In 1947 former MLB Commissioner Happy Chandler broke
baseball's longstanding tradition by decreeing that blacks be
allowed into the game. Before leaving office in 1951, Chandler
made a public statement with another democratic sentiment: "I
always regarded baseball as our National Game that belongs to 150
,million men, women and children, not to sixteen special people who
happen to own big league teams." Our long-dormant public policy
needs to be awakened if we are to rescue Commissioner Chandler's
vision.
22. A version of which was first suggested by Roger Noll in 1974;
see his concluding chapter in Noll (ed.) Government and the Sports
Business. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1974.
23. Such a hands' off approach has a certain appeal but the move
from contrived scarcity to contrived competition might also
disfigure the national pastime beyond the tolerance level of the
average fan. For instance, in addition to or instead of competing
by offering lower ticket prices or-cheaper broadcasting, the
competition might take the form of greater commercialization or
excessive experimentation with new rules to excite fan interest.
Were true price competition also to break out, the threats of
financial fragility and geographical instability of franchises may
reappear. Under such conditions, the industry would still survive
but are such outcomes the most desirable for the fans and the
cities?
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In April 1976 the U.S. House of Representatives passed a
resolution establishing a Select Committee on Professional Sports
(a.k.a., the Sisk Committee) to investigate the stability of the
country's major sports industries. The Sisk Committee issued its
report on January 3, 1977, concluding: "Based upon the information
available to it, the Committee has concluded that adequate
justification does not exist for baseball's special exemption from
the antitrust laws and that its exemption should be removed in the
context of an overall sports antitrust reform." 24 To accomplish
such a reform, the Sisk Committee recommended the establishment of
a successor committee to undertake a broad study and then propose
a specific legislative course of action. The successor committee
was never created.
No bill to lift baseball's exemption has ever made it out of
committee in either the House or the Senate. Thus, Congress
heretofore has shown itself to be content with baseball's legal
monopoly. In other cases where the government has deemed it
desirable to sanction a monopoly, such as with public utilities,
the government has also sought to assure through regulatory
controls that the monopoly did not abuse its privileges. Not so
with baseball; it is a self-governing, unregulated monopoly.
There is no justification for treating the baseball industry
differently from others in this regard. It is unaesthetic,
unseemly, inefficient and unjust to perpetuate the historical
24. Cited in Markham and Teplitz, p. 1.
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mistake of baseball's exemption any longer. Congress cannot
sensibly exercise its duties and represent the best interests of
the U.S. electorate by periodically threatening to revoke the
exemption. The anomoly should be ended forthwith and accompanying
legislative protections should be enacted.
I did not vote for Ross Perot, but I found his rallying cry
to the electorate most appealing: "Take back your government." I
think it is also time to take back our national pastime.
323
JOSE-H . 5010 H 0ELWA 04060
1650EN M xt NOv. RSACHSM S STROM flH40NO SOOT" aAROA
HOS M Mmf. Wo OMN0G HATCH UTAN
OHI NO NCO ARQ060 056. KA Sam-SON O 00I
ARUN SPECTER NSYLVANtR
Pmx5&*K KNAoNK BADWK LOAD
0ET xON WfSCOSg Enited *tatts Ainatt
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6275
January 11, 1993
Professor Andrew Zimbalist
Robert A. Woods Professor of Economics
School of Economics
Smith College
Northhampton, NA 01063
Dear Professor Zimbalist:
Thank you for testifying at the December 10, 1992
Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopolies and Business Rights hearing
on baseball's antitrust immunity. Your views on this issue are
greatly appreciated and very helpful.
Unfortunately, due to the time constraints on the day of the
-hearing,"there are a few questions that were not answered.
' '%Pease respond, in writing,. to the following questions no later
x -than Monday, January 25, 1993:
iairman Metzenbaum's questions:
1) Professor simbalist, in your testimony, you state that
"Major League Baseball behaves like a standard monopoly in
restricting supply [in order to] create an artificial
scarcity." The owners dispute that characterization. The
owners suggest that due to the economics of baseball and the
limited supply of player talent, the game is simply not
capable of supporting more than 28 teams at this time. What
evidence do you have that baseball is deliberately
maintaining an artificial scarcity of teams?
2) At the hearing, we heard from city officials from both San
Francisco and Tampa Bay who testified about the dispute over
the threatened relocation of the Giants. I believe the
public is ill-served when teams threaten to move in order to
gain concessions and subsidies from their hometowns. In
your view, would elimination of the antitrust exemption
promote or reduce stability with respect to the relocation
of franchises?
3) In your book, Baseball and Billions, you state that Major
League Baseball has refused to allow municipal ownership of
teams. In which instances has baseball blocked cities from
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owning teams? Also, isn't it the case that community
ownership of teams has worked in the minor leagues and in
the National Football League?
4) Professor Zimbalist, you have testified that a number of
teams employ accounting gimmicks and transfer-pricing
schemes with corporate affiliates that have the effect of
understating team profits. What enables the owners to
engage in these kinds of practices and what impact do they
have on the fans and the public?
5) Professor Zimbalist, some observers have suggested that
baseball in particular -- and professional sports in general
-- are being priced out of the reach of poor people and
working families. The costs of attending a game --
including ticket prices, and especially parking and
concession costs -- are increasing steadily, and many fans
need to subscribe to cable television in order to follow
their teams on a regular basis. Has this problem become
apparent to you in your research, and is there anything that
we here in Congress can do about it?
Senator Thurmond's questions:
1) Please comment on what you consider the appropriate role of
the Baseball Commissioner to be, especially in the context
of an antitrust exemption?
2) Please address the legal argument, which Mr. Roberts and
others propound, that a sports league should be viewed as
one legal entity incapable of conspiring with itself under
Section I of the Sherman Act.
3) Please state, as succinctly as possible, who will benefit
from repeal of the antitrust exemption and how?
4) As I understand it, you believe that repealing the antitrust
exemption is either not necessary and/or not sufficient to
cure the structural problem inherent in the business of
baseball. You propose additional action that would have to
be undertaken either legislatively or in the form of
regulation. At a time when de-regulation is thought to be
the better approach for all but the most urgent problems,
how do we justify federal government regulation of an
entertainment industry such as baseball? Are we not better
off repealing the antitrust exemption and leaving the
outcome to market forces?
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I look forward to working with you in the future as the
Subcommittee continues its work in this area.
Again, thank you for your contribution.
Very sincerely yours,
Chairman,
Subcommittee on Antitrust,
Monopolies and Business Rights
BM/eao
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Andrew Zimbalist's
Responses to Inquiries
pertaining to
oversight Hearings
on
Major League Baseball's Antitrust Exemption
Antitrust Subcommittee
Committee on the Judiciary
U.S. Senate
10 December 1992
Chairman Metzenbaum's Questions
1. I might begin by noting theoretically that if, in the
presence of their protected monopoly status, the owners did
not contrive a franchise scarcity then they would not be
behaving as efficient profit maximizers. There are many
pieces of empirical evidence to support the contention of an
artificial scarcity of baseball teams. First, when the
National League conducted a bidding during 1990-91 for two
expansion teams to enter the League in 1993 there were several
dozen ownership groups interested in applying. After weeding
out the less attractive applicants, the final list of
applicants included 18 ownership groups from 10 different
cities across the country. Each of these groups paid $100,000
just to apply and for the privilege of being considered by
baseball's expansion committee.
Second, the smallest media market in Major League Baseball is
Cincinnati. According to the Reds' own books, the franchise
has been profitable every year at least since 1985, averaging
almost $10 million a year in profits. Without incorporating
any smaller media markets, since four metropolitan areas have
two teams each and two teams are in Canada, it would be
possible for MLB to expand to 36 teams. Another six media
markets were at least 86 percent the size of Cincinnati in
1990; at a market growth rate of 1.4 percent a year, by the
year 2000 they would all be larger than Cincinnati was in
1990. Thus, there are more than enough economically viable
cities to support an expansion to 40 teams or more by the
beginning of the next century.
Third, many argue that the effective constraint on expansion
is not the economic viability-of cities but the scarcity of
playing talent. As I argue at length in my written testimony
and in Baseball and Billions, there is no empirical basis for
this contention. Indeed, there is every reason to believe
that the absolute level of talent today in baseball is greater
than ever before. Today there is a smaller share of an
increasingly fit and trained population playing major league
baseball and, in recent decades, there has been an influx of
black and latins into the game. Furthermore, if more
lucrative job opportunities opened up, it would induce more
youth to attempt a professional baseball career. If anything,
the problem is the reverse. There is an excess of top talent,
leading to skills' compression and the failure for today's
ballplayers to challenge longstanding individual season
performance records.
Fourth, although we do not have access to complete details, I
am confident from the information we do have that front office
and executive salaries in baseball are considerably above
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reservation levels (what these individuals would earn in their
best alternative employment). This too constitutes a return
to monopoly power.
Fifth, even using the owners' manicured figures, baseball has
experienced a higher rate of return on sales in recent years
than U.S. business on the whole. For instance, in 1990
baseball's return on sales was 10.6 percent, while the average
in U.S. manufacturing was 6.3 percent.
In my view, the game would unquestionably benefit from
expansion: more fans would get to see live professional
baseball; more minor league ballplayers would have an
opportunity to play major league ball; the blackmailing of
cities would cease, or, at least, subside; and, historical
performance records would come within closer reach of today's
players. Other things being equal, franchise values and
owners' profits would slip some, but this, after all, is the
cost of breaking up any monopoly.
2. This is an excellent and complicated question, and goes
straight to the heart of the public policy dilemma. First,
let us assume that Congress lifts the antitrust exemption and
does nothing else. Then the question becomes whether the new
circumstance will bring about the formation of a competitive
league or whether the greater potential threat of a
competitive league will cause baseball to act preemptively and
expand. To the extent that either of these outcomes comes to
pass then the excess demand for franchises will be reduced as
will baseball's ability to extort exploitative stadium
contracts from cities. But before either of these outcomes
materializes it is necessary that certain structural relief to
baseball's organization be introduced; such as, the courts
declaring that minor league contracts constitute exploitative
adhesion and are violative of antitrust statutes. Successful
civil litigation is likely to result only in damages and not
structural relief; thus, it would be desirable in this
instance to have the Justice Department bring its own suit but
this is not something the Congress can legislate. In other
words, if the exemption is lifted and Congress does nothing
else it will result in substantial uncertainty regarding the
continued monopolistic practices of baseball. In this case,
it is possible, and I underscore the word "possible," that
lifting the exemption would hurt cities' bargaining power vis
a vis baseball franchises, as was the case with the NFL's '
Raiders and the city of Oakland. Here too the situation is
ambiguous however, because the decision of the Ninth Circuit
of Appeals referred clearly to the special circumstances of
the NFL's attempted protection of the Los Angeles monopoly for
the Rams and the NFL's rule 4.3.
Furthermore, only part of the problem is actual movement of
franchises; the other part is the threat of movement and
consequent extortion of giveaway stadium deals from the cities
-- a dimarche recently employed by Bud Selig himself invoking
the beckoning city of Phoenix. On the one hand, the owners
extol the virtues of franchise stability and, on the other,
they continue to exploit their unregulated control over the
number and location of franchises to mug the cities. This
arrogant behavior derives in significant measure from the
decades of special treatment for their industry by the courts,
with implicit Congressional assent.
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Nevertheless, it is precisely the ambiguity of the precedent
in the Raiders' case and the prospect of drawn-out and
expensive legal battles that leads me to recommend Congress do
more than simply lift the exemption. One option, involving
only the laws of the free market, would be to legislate that
baseball's four divisions be broken up into separate business
entities. These entities could collaborate on setting playing
rules and terms for interleague play as well as post-season
competition, but they could not collaborate on signing
television or radio contracts, basic agreements with the
Players' Association or fixing territorial rights. This
solution is straightforward and involves a minimum of
government intervention. The only problem that it carries is
the instability of markets. It is possible that weaker teams
or leagues would be forced to move more frequently, to merge
or to go out of business. The Darwinian laws of the
marketplace may not be consistent with the desired cultural,
geographic and financial stability of our national pastime.
Another option would be to lift the exemption and pass special
legislation to restructure baseball's minor league contracts;
in particular, freeing minor leaguers to sign contracts with
other leagues, or applying a modified version of the 1960
Kefauver bill to limit the minor leagues' reserve system.
Yet another option would be to lift the exemption and
legislate an expanison timetable for baseball and/or the right
of first refusal for cities. The latter would give cities the
right to purchase their team (either with municipal or
dispersed citizen ownership) before it moved. In my view, a
proper expansion timetable would provide for the creation of
four new teams each in 1996, 2000 and 2004, bringing the total
number of teams to 40. A still more interventionist approach
would be along the lines of the legislation first.proposed in
1972 by former Republican senator from Kentucky, Marlow Cook,
envisioning the creation of a federal sports commission.
Although I favor lifting the exemption along with an expansion
timetable and right of first refusal legislation, I view any
of the other options (liftiig the exemption by itself, lifting
the exemption and breaking up the divisions, lifting the
exemption and freeing the minor leaguers, lifting the
exemption and creating a federal sports commission) as
enhancing economic efficiency and consumer welfare and, hence,
as more desirable than the status quo.
3. Yes, Major League Baseball has had a longstanding policy
of proscribing municipal ownership of major league franchises.
The details of individual cases are hard to come by, however,
as this information along with most financial information
about the teams is viewed as proprietary. This, of course, is
the case despite the fact that the average major league team
receives annual subsidies in excess of $10 million from its
host city. One instance about which I have heard
corroboration from a number of credible sources is the San
Diego Padres. In this case, Joan Kroc inherited the club from
her deceased husband, Ray Kroc, founder of MacDonalds, and did
not have an interest in owning the franchise. In 1987, I
believe, she attempted to give the team to the city of San
Diego but was informed that this was not allowed. I have also
heard from sources within the Pirates' organization that when
the Pittsburgh Pirates were sold in 1985 for approximately $44
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million to a local syndicate the city of Pittsburgh put down
roughly $20 million of equity capital. Since the city was not
allowed to own a part of the team, however, this money was
considered a grant on behalf of keeping the team in
Pittsburgh. A similar story is told about the 1990 sale of
the Montreal Expos to a syndicate headed by Charles Brochu for
around $86 million; apparently the city of Montreal and the
province of Quebec together contributed some $29.4 million.
It is also true that various forms of municipal and local
ownership schemes have been successful at all levels of minor
league baseball and that the Green Bay Packers of the NFL have
been owned in a dispersed form by members of that Wisconsin
community since 1935. Publicly, the owners state that
municipal ownership would be too cumbersome and inefficient.
Many minor league franchises, however, are municipally-owned,
management is separated from local politics and the teams are
run efficiently. I discuss some of the successful experiences
with community-owned minor league baseball teams in Baseball
and Billions. The real concern of baseball's barons is that
public ownership means public accountability which, inter
Alia, may lead to open books. Open books means loss of
control and that is where the real threat lies.
4. Baseball franchises are closely-held companies. They are
either partnerships, subchapter S corporations or submerged
subdivisions within large corporations. In no case are there
stockholders to whom the top executives and owners are
accountable, either to open their books or to show profits in
order to boost stock prices or benefit stock options. Their
accounting legerdemain is often either in the owners' interest
for reducing tax liabilities or in their perceived interest to
show smaller profits. One aspect of showing smaller profits
or book losses is to plead poverty to the Players' Association
at collective bargaining time or to the cities when stadium
construction or a new contract is being discussed. Another
aspect has been to argue before the U.S. Congress and the
courts that Major League Baseball does not take advantage of
its protected monopoly status. I detail the mechanisms of
creative accounting in my written testimony and provide
further information in Baseball and Billions.
5. There is no question but that there is a trend for ticket,
concessions and parking prices to rise. Average ticket prices
today for a major league game are close to $10. For a family
of four to attend a game, buy food and pay for parking, the
tab can easily run from $60 to $100. It is also true that
since baseball plays roughly ten times more games than
football, twice as many games as basketball and is played in a
much bigger arena than basketball, that baseball ticket prices
are not as high as in other sports. There is also a process
of cable-ization and tiering of baseball game broadcasts that
is limiting viewing access to millions of Americans. Together
these developments are making it increasingly difficult for
low and middle income fans to consume major league baseball.
Congress can do something about keeping the national pastime
accessible to all income groups. One option would be to
legislate price controls. I do not recommend this. The
preferred option would be to take action to increase
competition in professional baseball. Removing the antitrust
exemption would be one step in the right direction; as
indicated earlier, I recommend complementary steps as well.
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Senator Thurmond's Questions
1. I would like to respectfully suggest that the long
discussion with ex-Commissioner Vincent and with Bud Selig on
the question of the Commissioner's role is irrelevant to the
question of baseball's antitrust exemption. The proposition
that the Commissioner can stand above the owners and safeguard
the long-run interests of the game has always been dubious;
with the dismissal of Mr. Vincent it has been made manifestly
absurd. In the pre-August 1992 conception of the
Commissioner's office, the Commissioner was always hired by
and dismissable by the owners. In this structural
circumstance, the Commissioner could take marginal decisions,
especially on issues of the game's integrity such as the use
of drugs, without worrying about the owners' reaction, but
substantial decisions, especially those affecting the game's
economics, could never be made in a manner to undermine the
owners' interests. Commissioners Chandler and Vincent, and
perhaps Commissioner Kuhn, learned this lesson. -Commissioner
Landis, heralded as a czar of baseball, in fact, was unable to
make the only important economic change to the game he
attempted, namely, the restructuring of the relationship
between minor leaguers and the parent club.
If the CEOs of Ford, Chrysler and GM came before this
subcommittee and proposed that they be allowed to merge, but
in exchange, they offered to hire a commissioner to oversee
their behavior, I assume they would be laughed out of the Hart
Office Building. I suggest that structurally the situation in
Major League Baseball is little different that this.
To make matters worse, the owners have been pretty clear that
they do not want any further interference from future
commissioners on economic matters. It seems the commissioner
will be given relative independence on "integrity" issues but
little, if any, real power pertaining to labor relations or
the game's finances. Such an arrangement would have the
advantage over the previous state of affairs only in reducing
the dissimulation and hypocrisy of a guardian commissioner,
hired and fired by the owners.
2. I am not a lawyer and fear I cannot do justice to the
legal complexities of Mr. Roberts' argument. I can only say
that I have a high regard for Mr. Roberts' intelligence and
his experience in the sports' industries. I believe there are
aspects of professional team sports that could lead one to
infer their leagues are a single entity, but there are other
aspects (e.g., the separate ownership and unequal
profitability of the teams) which would lead to the opposite
inference. As an economist and social scientist I believe
that reality is more complex than the single entity argument
allows.
3. As I suggested in my response to Senator Metzenbaum, I
think that if Congress repeals baseball's exemption and does
nothing else it is uncertain whether or when the industry will
become more competitive. I suggested a number of
complementary measures, not requiring a heavy-handed approach,
that, if implemented, would undercut the industry's monopoly
power and end up benefitting everyone but the twenty-eight
owners. I would also like to suggest that removing baseball's
exemption would benefit the Congress which would thereby
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demonstrate to the American people that it is capable of
standing up to entrenched interests and of passing legislation
that promotes equal treatment under the law for all
professional team sports' leagues and for all U.S. industries.
4. The real challenge, it seems to me, is to find the best
public policy approach to preserve and strengthen our national
pastime. It does not matter whether the baseball industry
generates $2 billion in revenue or $50 billion.
Again, I want to emphasize that it is preferable for Congress
to remove the exemption than for Congress to do nothing. But
Congress can do still better and this is why I recommend
additional action. There is both a free market and regulatory
way to proceed, and, again, either is preferable to no action
at all.
The free market course is to compel baseball to break its four
divisions into four separate business entities. The actual
legislation might stipulate that no league can expand to
beyond eight or ten teams. These new leagues could cooperate
only on matters pertaining to playing rules, scheduling and
post-season play; they could not cooperate on media contracts,
collective bargaining and setting territorial rights. As
business competitors, each league would attempt to have a
franchise in the most viable locations. It would not take
long before a new team appeared in Washington, D.C.,
Tampa/St. Petersburg, and Phoenix, or a third team appeared in
New York. Leagues would also presumably compete for fan
interest and loyalty. This would provide a check on ticket
and concessions prices and on the expansion of pay television.
Competition would begin to provide answers to many of the
abuses and problems that currently afflict the game.
While I would welcome such legislation by Congress, I feel
there is still a more preferable option. The problem with the
market solution is that it might be too destabilizing. Teams,
cities and leagues could go under. Players could be left, at
least temporarily, without a team. Litigations may abound,
challenging rules and boundaries of the new situation. It is
one thing to have instability in goods' producing industries.
If private money builds a factory and the factory shuts down,
this raises different public policy concerns than if a
longstanding baseball team belongs to a league that goes
under. A large share of the citizens in the city identify
with the team and the city has likely invested millions of
dollars to support the franchise. Do we want the normal rules
of the marketplace to determine the evolution of the baseball
industry, a major part of the country's cultural heritage?
Some may answer in the negative to this question and then
conclude that Congress should do nothing. This would be a
mistake. Removing the exemption would provide a modicum of
competitive pressure on the baseball industry without entirely
restructuring it. Furthermore, an orderly process of
addressing baseball's abuses could be legislated directly and
simply. Cities should be given the right to buy their ball
team before it is sold and moved elsewhere, and baseball
should be required to follow a timetable of periodic
expansion. The implementing criteria for this legislation
could be worked out easily enough. I would favor an expansion
to 40 teams by the year 2004 and a franchise assessment board,
involving representatives from the interested parties and the
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American Arbitration Association or someone agreed to by the
parties, to determine a fair market price for a franchise.
One might object that if the government were to do more than
simply lift the exemption then it is meddling too deeply in
the affairs of the private sector. As an economist, I do not
instinctively favor government involvement in the economy and
I am painfully aware of the pitfalls of regulation, but I do
recognize there are areas involving externalities and public
goods that the private sector cannot handle efficiently on its
own. To ignore this reality, in my view, is to be blinded by
libertarian ideology as well as to do a disservice to the
electorate. Some parts of the economy need to be regulated.
Rather than running away from this fact, it is time that
government confront the difficulties of regulation
forthrightly. I believe the measures I propose constitute
benign, not heavy-handed, public oversight of the baseball
industry and that they will work in the best, long-term
interests of preserving and strengthening our national
pastime. Given the status quo of a protected monopoly, with
presumed oversight by an employee of the owners, there is a
compelling case for a new public policy approach.
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Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much, Mr. Zimbalist.
Mr. Gary Roberts.
STATEMENT OF GARY IL ROBERTS
Mr. ROBERTS. Like everyone else, I will thank the subcommittee
for giving me this opportunity. I must say these hearings are more
fun to watch on C-SPAN when you can go to the refrigerator once
in a while.
My written statement outlines in some detail my views on the
impact of baseball's renowned antitrust exemption, or exclusion, as
I prefer to call it, on the public interest. I will briefly summarize
these views here in my oral remarks.
I believe, unlike everybody else, apparently, which is not un-
usual, that the exclusion is largely irrelevant to the public interest,
and that if Congress is concerned, as it should be, about the mo-
nopoly market structures that characterize professional baseball,
and indeed every major league sport, then it should deal with those
specific issues rather than simply repeal this insignificant legal
anomaly and then hope that the Federal courts will uncharac-
teristically use antitrust law to remedy meaningful problems.
There are arguably four areas in which the exclusion protects
baseball from the threat of significant antitrust enforcement; one,
rules affecting players; two, rules affecting broadcasting; three,
rules affecting the number, location, and ownership of franchises;
and, four, the complicated relationships between the major and
minor leagues.
For reasons detailed in my written comments, it is only with re-
spect to the fourth, the minor leagues, that I think we could expect
significant changes in baseball's structure or behavior if the anti-
trust exclusion were repealed. In fact, without the exclusion, there
would probably be a substantial restructuring of the minor league
system as we know it in a very short period of time. In fact, I think
a lot 'of communities with single-A ball clubs today would not have
baseball teams in the future without that exclusion. But other than
that, what changes would occur and whether they would be good
or bad for the public interest, I think, is unpredictable.0
So while there is really no theoretical justification for baseball's
anomalous antitrust exclusion, there is also no practical justifica-
tion, in my mind, for wasting the time, energy, and political capital
trying to abolish it. On the other hand, I do believe that there are
many serious problems in baseball about which Congress and the
public should be very concerned, virtually all of which relate to the
fact that major league baseball, like each of the major professional
sports leagues, is an inherently wholly integrated partnership that
possesses monopoly power in most of the markets in which it oper-
ates.
This extraordinary market power allows baseball to act in two
general ways which are common to monopolies that injure the pub-
lic. First, monopoly power allows baseball executives often to act in
foolish and inefficient ways without the fear of market retribution
that would face businesses in competitive industries. And, second,
monopoly power allows major league baseball to exercise that
power in a variety of ways to maximize profits at the expense of
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those over whom it holds the power, particularly fans, commu-
nities, and taxpayers.
But it must be emphasized that neither acting stupidly nor mere-
ly exercising monopoly power is illegal under the antitrust laws.
Antitrust law condemns behavior which creates or entrenches ex-
cess market power. It was not designed and it has no rational doc-
trinal structure to control either stupidity or the exercise of monop-
oly power. Thus, abolishing the antitrust exclusion, in my judg-
ment, would simply subject baseball to the same kind of hap-
hazard, inconsistent, and doctrinally unjustified litigation that the
other major sports have been subjected to, but which has not
caused them to behave generally any more in the public interest
than baseball does.
As I see it, the major problems in baseball today that should con-
cern Congress and the public interest include grossly inadequate
revenue sharing, a woeful shortage of franchises to meet reason-
able demand, and the accelerating shift of baseball telecasts away
from free TV to cable, and eventually to pay cable and then pay-
per-view.
Rather than simply turn the Federal courts loose on baseball
with an antitrust weapon not designed or well suited for dealing
with these problems, I would suggest that Congress consider spe-
cific legislation that targets them and the market structure that
creates and perpetuates them.
I would be happy to discuss with you at greater length today or
in the future some of the alternatives that would bring about
meaningful change for the betterment of the public and baseball,
but given my time constraints here and the little yellow light up
there, perhaps it is better now simply to answer questions you
might have for me. But suffice it to say here that, in my mind, sim-
ply abolishing baseball's antitrust exclusion would be quite unlikely
to benefit the public one iota, and in some ways might even injure
it.
[Mr. Roberts submitted the following material:]
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BEFORE THE ANTITRUST SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
Statement of Gary R. Roberts, Vice Dean and Professor of Law,
Tulane Law School, New Orleans, Louisiana
December 10, 1992
On the Scope and Implications of Baseball's Antitrust Exclusion
I want to thank the Subcommittee for inviting me to share my
views on a subject of long-standing interest to me -- the extent to which
baseball's structure and operations are affected by the Supreme Court's
thrice stated view that the game of baseball is neither interstate nor
commerce and thus not subject to federal antitrust law.'
I have been involved in litigating, teaching, speaking, and writing
about sports antitrust issues for the better part of two decades. From
1976 through 1983 I worked at the Washington firm of Covington &
Burling with, among others, now NFL Commissioner Paul Tagliabue. My
primary client was the National Football League for whom I worked on
several major antitrust cases; I also did some work for the National
Hockey League and World Championship Tennis. In 1983 I joined the
faculty of Tulane Law School where I have taught sports law, antitrust,
and business enterprises for ten years. I have been the vice dean for the
past three years. Since 1986 I have also been an officer and director of
the Sports Lawyers Association, and the editor-in-chief of and regular
writer for its bimonthly journal, The Sports Lawyer. I often speak at
I See Federal Baseball Club v. National League. 259 U.S. 200 (1922); Toolson
v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953); and Flood v. Kuhn. 407 U.S. 258(1972). While the latter two decisions involved suits challenging baseball's lifetime
reserve system (i.e., restraints on the labor market for players), the former
involved alleged blatant acts of monopolization by the sole remaining team in the
defunct Federal League against the recently united National and American Leagues.
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sports law conferences, have written seven major law review articles and
two book chapters on sports antitrust matters, and along with Professor
Paul Weiler of Harvard Law School I have just completed the manuscript
for a 1,000 page sports law textbook and supplement which will be
published this Spring by West Publishing Company. I also regularly work
with and am cited by the print and broadcast media on sports legal issues
and often author columns in publications like The Sporting News and USA
Today. In short, sports law, particularly sports antitrust law, has been
my career for over sixteen years.
The value of eliminating the baseball antitrust exemption (which is
more appropriately called the "baseball antitrust exclusion") depends on
how baseball would be affected and constrained if it did not exist.
Ascertaining this requires an exploration of how antitrust law would
likely be applied to baseball. My conclusion is that while it is in theory
unjustified to treat baseball differently from other sports, and while there
are certainly problems in baseball of concern to the public and Congress,
abolishing the exclusion would be unlikely to further the public interest.
Although baseball is treated differently under antitrust law than
the major leagues in football, basketball, and hockey, the conduct of those
leagues is not discernibly more pro-public than that of Major League
Baseball. Furthermore, the application of antitrust law to these other
major sports leagues over the years by the federal courts has been
inconsistent, often unjustifiable, and generally counterproductive.
Subjecting baseball to the vagaries of this confusing enforcement process
cannot predictably result in benefits to the public interest. Instead of
focussing on this largely insignificant antitrust exclusion, Congress would
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do better to focus on the real problems in baseball today and to adopt
legislation specifically targeted against those problems.
I. The Scope and Effects of the Baseball Antitrust Exclusion
The Federal Baseball holding has not been extended to any other
sport. 2 Still, all of the often cited examples of "bad" behavior by baseball
owners which purportedly justifies abolishing the antitrust exclusion are
more or less found in all of the major sports. There is no reason to
assume that simply changing baseball's antitrust status will result in
public benefits. For example, contrary to the assertion in the November
30 issue of Business Week (p.42), it is very doubtful that without the
exclusion "it would be easier for baseball-hungry cities to lure a team" --
any more so than football-hungry cities can lure teams today.
The reason that the behavior of baseball owners is not noticeably
different than that of owners in other sports, even though they enjoy the
antitrust exclusion, is twofold: (1) the exclusion is not as far reaching as
many believe, and even as to those matters it does cover the owners' fear
of its abolition effectively deters them from engaging in the most
egregious conduct, and (2) the haphazard enforcement of antitrust law
against the other sports leagues results in very little if any meaningful
benefit to the public. The fact is that all of the major leagues engage in
conduct contrary to the public interest, not just baseball, but this conduct
generally is a lawful exercise of monopoly power, not the uIawful
acquisition or entrenchment of that power, and thus antitrust law is not
2 See United States v. International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236 (1955);
Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957); Haywood v.
National Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971)(Douglas, J.. reinstating lower
court injunction).
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an effective vehicle to deal with it. When league conduct does involve the
acquisition or entrenchment of monopoly power, the courts have been
largely ineffective in using antitrust law to combat it and to diminish
market power. Accordingly, there is no significant predictable benefit to
the public from applying antitrust law to sports leagues, and so whether
baseball has its exclusion is unimportant. The problem is structural, and
the best way to benefit the public is to strike legislatively at the heart of
that structural problem, not randomly ask courts to review the normal
profit-maximizing behavior of leagues under laws not designed to deal
with that behavior.
A. The Exclusion Does Not Cause Blatant Anticompetitive
Conduct By Major League Baseball
The lower courts have narrowed the scope of the exclusion by
holding in several cases that contracts between baseball entities (teams,
leagues, or players associations) and third parties, even those relating to
marketing baseball entertainment, will not be protected in suits against
either the third party or the baseball entity under Sherman Act section
1.3 The Ninth Circuit has held, however, that if the third party is another
baseball entity in the minor leagues, the exclusion will still apply.4 This
suggests that while the scope of the exclusion is not limitless, it would
probably be interpreted by most lower courts to give baseball entities
3 See Fleer v. Topps Chewing Gum & Major League Baseball Players
Ass'n. 658 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1981)(contract with memorabilia merchandiser):
Henderson Broadcasting Corp. v. Houston Sports Ass'n (Houston Astros),
541 F. Supp. 263 (S.D. Tex. 1982)(contract with broadcaster): Twin City Sports
Service, Inc. v. -Charles 0. Finley (Oakland Athletics), 365 F. Supp. 235 (N.D.
Cal. 1972).
4 Portland Baseball Club v. Kuhn, 491 F.2d 1101 (9th Cir. 1974).
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great latitude in structuring professional baseball and producing baseball
entertainment without fear of serious antitrust litigation.
1. Player Rules
One area in which baseball is most certainly protected is in rules
restraining only the player-labor market. This was the market
specifically involved in both the Toolson and Flood cases. Also, because
these player rules involve an exercise of monopsony power raising very
tricky conceptual antitrust questions, they are more difficult than usual to
analyze under standard antitrust principles.5 (In my view, the difficulty
of applying antitrust doctrine to internally adopted sports league rules
and policies, particularly player restraints, was a major factor influencing
seven justices in Flood to reaffirm the anomalous exclusion.) But the
impact of the exclusion in the player restraint context is virtually
nonexistent today given the extraordinarily successful use of the
protections and processes of federal labor law by the Major League
Baseball Players Association (MLBPA) in collective bargaining. It is hard
to imagine that players or consumers would be any better off today with
respect to the labor market if the antitrust exclusion were abolished.6
2. Relationships With Minor Leagues
Another area in which courts would probably find baseball
protected is in the complex relationships between the major and minor
5 See, e g , Kartell v. Blue Shield of Massachusetts, Inc., 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir.
1984)(indicatng that a program to fix the maximum price patients would be
charged for medical services presented less antitrust concern because it tended to
lower, not raise, prices to consumers).
6 It is ironic that player restraints have since 1975 been far more restrictive in the
National Football League which does not enjoy antitrust protection and has
repeatedly faced antitrust litigation over its rookie player draft and restrictions on
veteran free agents. Indeed, the relative success of the players associations in
baseball and football suggests that the availability of antitrust suits against the
league actually distracts attention away from more effective labor law remedies.
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leagues. It is not my purpose here to delve into the myriad rules and
contracts that create the structure of the major league-minor league
relationships, but it is important to note that the baseball exclusion plays
its most significant role in allowing the major leagues to maintain these
relationships without fear of serious antitrust challenge. Thus abolishing
the antitrust exclusion might lead to radical changes in the structure and
operation of the minor leagues and could potentially alter the structure
and behavior of all professional baseball, albeit in unpredictable ways. If
the baseball minor leagues as now constituted are good from a policy
standpoint, this would be good reason to continue giving baseball the
special antitrust protection not needed by the NFL and NBA who have the
colleges for minor leagues. 7 If, however, one believes that the current
system is undesirable, simply abolishing the baseball antitrust exclusion
and leaving the matter to judicial enforcement would be unlikely to bring
about desirable results. Specific legislation mandating the needed
changes would be far preferable.
3. Radio and Television
A third area in which baseball is arguably, but not necessarily,
protected is in the area of broadcasting -- television and radio restrictions
on member clubs or league television contracts with pay channel
7 I believe that the existence of the minor leagues, coupled with the tight control of
their structure and operation by the major leagues, effectively precludes the
emergence of any upstart major leagues to compete against Major League Baseball.
Barriers to entry in sports with no minor leagues are enormous enough for
newcomers like the American Football League in the 1960s, the World Football
League and American Basketball Association in the 1970s, and the United States
Football League in the 1980s, but the existence of the baseball minor leagues makes
entry so much more difficult that potential newcomers are deterred from even
trying. 'Still, even if the current structure of the minor leagues were significantly
altered, it is uncertain whether new upstart major leagues would be attempted,
whether such a league would be successful, or whether such a league would on
balance be beneficial for fans or the general public interest. *
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networks. (League television contracts for "sponsored telecasting" in all
four major sports are already exempt by the Sports Broadcasting Act of
1961.8) Currently, however, unlike the National Basketball Association,
Major League Baseball imposes no significant quantitative restrictions on
its member teams. It does prohibit individual teams from selling
television rights for individual games tor cable companies (but not to over-
the-air broadcasters) outside of a designated home viewing area.
However, whether this restriction actually prevents a team that otherwise
would do so from having any games televised somewhere, whether
someone would challenge the restriction, whether a court would find the
rule to violate antitrust law, and whether lifting this restriction would in
fact benefit the public interest are all highly questionable. Given the
complexities of television technologies and the effects of various
broadcasting schemes on public viewing, it is far from clear that
subjecting this limited restriction on team cablecasts to antitrust review
would result in a benefit to the public interest.
Major League Baseball does have a significant television contract
with ESPN, which arguably is not exempt under the Sports Broadcasting
Act. However, the evening games shown under this contract almost
certainly would not otherwise appear on a major network and thus get
far greater exposure on ESPN to the benefit of the public. Furthermore,
because of the politically volatile nature of sports broadcasting generally,
it is unlikely that baseball owners would try collectively (as opposed to
individually) to restrict teams or utilize pay channels in any ways that
would significantly diminish viewership, and if they did I am confident
8 15 U.S.C. 11 1291-94.
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that Congress would be quick to react. Thus, the impact of the exclusion
in the broadcasting area is largely theoretical.
A final point about broadcasting. It is not at all certain that the
Federal Baseball exclusion would be held by the courts to cover restraints
of trade on broadcasting. The exclusion has been held to cover the
structure and production of the game, but it has never been extended to
the marketing and sale of broadcasting rights through the obviously
interstate commercial media of radio and television. If in fact someone
wanted to challenge baseball's restriction on team cablecasts outside the
home viewing area, there is a significant chance that the courts would
hold that the antitrust exclusion did not apply. If so, abolishing the
exclusion would accomplish nothing in this area, except perhaps to
encourage potential plaintiffs (whether or not they had a valid case) to
bring suit.
4. Franchising and League Structure
The fourth and last major area in which the exclusion probably
protects baseball is in franchising decisions -- namely in deciding how
many teams there will be, where those teams will be located, and who
will own them. An example is the National League's recent decision to
reject the purchase and relocation of the San Francisco Giants by a group
in St. Petersburg, Florida. It this area, however, in which antitrust law
most clearly does not properly apply; franchising decisions are an
exerise of monopoly power, but they rarely if ever create or entrench
market power.9 Thus, it is within this sphere of decision-making that
9 One exception to this would be if a league expands in reaction to an upstart
league's efforts to put a franchise in an attractive unoccupied community. Such
targeted expansion can disrupt the operations of the upstart league, prevent it from
gaining a toehold in attractive communities, and possibly weaken its ability to
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there is the greatest chance for courts to create much mischief to the
detriment of the public by misusing antitrust law in unjustified and often
highly political ways, as happened in the infamous Oakland Raiders case a
decade ago in California.10 It is the substantial potential for misuse of
antitrust law in this type of case that causes me to oppose simply
abolishing baseball's antitrust exclusion.
It should be noted that the greatest impact of the baseball antitrust
exclusion flows from how it alters the risk assessment of baseball
executives and thereby causes them to vary their conduct. Evidence
suggests that major league owners generally believe that if they were to
engage in blatantly anticompetitive or politically unpopular conduct, the
courts and/or Congress would probably intervene and abolish the
exclusion, even if antitrust law would not likely apply to that conduct.
For example, I do not believe that the major league owners, if faced with
a competing upstart league, would employ tactics like were used against
the Federal League before the Federal Baseball case in 1922, Thus, the
risk of losing the exclusion may deter improper conduct by baseball
owners (with the possible exception of their relationships with the minor
leagues) more than if the exclusion did not exist.
All of this is not to suggest that baseball does not benefit from the
exclusion. By allowing major league owners to maintain control over the
minor leagues and to make franchising decisions without the serious risk
survive as a viable competitor. However, in the most blatant case of this happening
- the NFL's expansion into Dallas in 1960 and Minneapolis/St. Paul in 1961.
simultaneously with the start up of the American Football League, antitrust law was
unable effectively to deal with it. See American Football League v. National
Football League, 323 F.2d 124 (4th Cir. 1963).
10 See Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football
League (Raiders 1). 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 469 U.S. 990 (1984); and
Raiders II. 791 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1986). cert. denied 484 U.S. 826 (1987).
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of expensive and unpredictable litigation, the exclusion is a substantial
benefit to the owners. But whether these owner benefits injure the
public interest is questionable. One could make a case that the current
minor league structure on balance benefits the public (although the
opposite case can be made as well) and that subjecting baseball to the
vagaries of often politically motivated and/or confused courts in
franchising cases would cause more injury to the public interest than
good. Thus, I believe the exclusion's impact on the public interest is not
sufficiently clear to justify its abolition, at least not without specific
guidance to the courts on how to apply antitrust law in specific cases.
B. Applying Antitrust Law To Professional Sports Leagues
Does Not Predictably Benefit The Public Interest
The recent matter which has focussed so much attention on these
these hearings was the National League's rejection of the sale and transfer
of the San Francisco Giants to investors in St. Petersburg, Florida. But that
this incident should be linked in so many minds to the subject of these
hearings illustrates why simply abolishing the exclusion would not serve
the public interest. Had baseball been subject to the same type of
antitrust challenge in St. Petersburg that the NFL faced in the Oakland
Raiders case, it almost certainly would have faced a prolonged and
expensive legal battle in a politically biased forum that might have
resulted in a distorted application of the law, the creation of bad
precedent, and injury to the public interest This was certainly the legacy -
of the Oakland Raiders case, whose legally unjustified result and
unexplainable precedent ushered in the modem era of great uncertainty
over the ability of leagues to control franchise relocations and thereby
345
11
triggered the now frequent use of relocation threats by owners to cause
bidding wars between cities at the expense of taxpayers.
In the current Giants controversy, just as in the Oakland Raiders
case, antitrust law could not sensibly be applied to cause a result more in
the public interest than the decision of the league owners. In both cases,
the league's decision to require a franchise to remain in its current home
city led to charges that the decision was a section 1 "conspiracy . . in
restraint of trade" by the league owners. But no sensible antitrust
principle can justify such a claim that would not equally apply to the
inevitable lawsuit by interests in the other city if the league had voted
the other way. Thus, in these cases a league (other than in baseball) is
faced with a Catch-22 situation -- whether it approves or disapprovei of
the move, it will be sued in the disappointed city in an inevitably highly
charged emotional and political environment." This situation cannot
predictably lead to results that generally benefit the public interest.
The fact is that there is no sensible set of principles under current
antitrust doctrine to explain when or why a joint venture partnership like
a sports league (even if it happens to have monopoly market power)
might violate section I of the Sherman Act if it grants or rejects a
proposal to expand its membership, to allow a change in ownership of a
member franchise, or to allow the relocation of a member franchise's
home games. Basic partnership/joint venture law makes every partner
in a joint venture bound by the terms it agreed to in the founding
II Of course, in some cases a league could do what the NFL did when the Philadelphia
Eagles threatened a move to Phoenix in the mid-1980s -- that is, before it votes bring
a declaratory judgment suit in the city it will support asking the "home town" judge
to declare that it is not illegal for the league to require the team to play in that city.
But this is simply allowing procedural posturing rather than a rule of law to bring
about the appropriate outcome.
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venture contract (the league constitution), and imposes a fiduciary duty
on every partner not to compete against the venture or to seize any
venture assets (including business opportunities) for its own unilateral
benefit without the venture's approval. Thus, it is axiomatic that a lawful
joint venture has the inherent right to determine how many partners it
will have, who those partners will be, and where or how those partners
will do business under the name and trademarks of the venture. 12 To
suggest that it might violate anticonspiracy rules (that prohibit
competitors from combining to create or entrench market power) for joint
venture partners tO exercise these inherent legal rights is without merit.
Judicial rulings to the contrary, such as those in the Oakland Raiders case,
simply achieve politically desired results at the expense of creating
confusion and encouraging expensive groundless litigation in future cases,
which then leads sports leagues to operate more out of an interest to
avoid litigation than to do what is best to enhance the quantity and
quality of its entertainment product.
It is precisely because I do not believe it to be in the public interest
for sports leagues to be subject to misdirected, confusing, and politically
motivated ad hoc regulation by federal courts that I have often argued
that leagues should be treated as single firms incapable of internally
12 Of course, this would not be true if the venture were in fact a cartel - a,
collection of inherent horizontal competitors whose coming together to form the
organization is itself illegal. Such an organization is illegal in its inception, and
one need not judge the legality of its subsequent behavior. See United States v.
Timken Roller Bearing Co.. 341 U.S. 593 (1951). However, because the joining of
sports teams in a league creates an entity to produce a valuable product that could
not be produced by the teams separately, no one has ever seriously suggested that
leagues are unlawful in their inception. Thus, they should be accorded the same
lawful authority to structure and operate their joint venture business as that given
to any partnership, except to the extent their decisions create or entrench
monopoly market power. See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v.
Pacific Stationery & Printing Co.. 472 U.S. 284 (1985).
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conspiring within the meaning of section I when the governing body of
the venture's partners adopts rules or makes decisions relating solely to
the structure and operation of the league itself.13 Since abolishing the
baseball antitrust exclusion would cause baseball's operating decisions to
be subject to the same type of random, unpredictable quasi regulation by
home town judges as the NFL faced in the Oakland Raiders case, I oppose
that abolition.
II. The Real Problem
I do not argue that there is not a problem with the current market
structure of baseball, or any major league sport. I only argue that the
current manner in which antitrust law is applied to sports leagues is not
the proper way to deal with that market problem. The real problem is
that in many markets in which major sports leagues operate they have
enormous market power. Coupled with the inherently highly
decentralized structure of a sports league and the highly athletically
competitive nature of the league's entertainment product, this has led
many lower courts and legal observers to oppose granting "single entity"
status to leagues.14 "Better they be subject to arbitrary, ad hoc judicial
13 To the extent such rules or decisions create or entrench excess market power,
they could properly be challenged as acts of monopolization or attempts to
monopolize by the league under section 2 of the Sherman Act.
14 It should be noted, however, that several judges have supported finding leagues
to be single entities for section I purposes, at least in the context of a specific case.
See North American Soccer League v. National Football League, 505 F.
Supp. 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)(trial court decision reversed on appeal at 670 F.2d 1249 (2d
Cir.). cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982)(Rehnquist, J.. dissenting): Raiders 1. 726 F.2d
at 1401 (9th Cir. 1984)(Williams. J.. dissenting); San Francisco Seals v. National
Hockey League. 379 F. Supp. 966 (C.D. Cal. 1974). Furthermore, a recent Seventh
Circuit opinion strongly hinted that it might have found the NBA to be a single
entity had the league raised the issue. See Chicago Professional Sports v.
National Basketball Ass'n, 961 F.2d 667 (7th Cir.), cert. denied. _ S.Ct.
(1992).
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regulation of their use of monopoly market power than no regulation at
all" goes the argument. I don't agree with this argument's implicit view
of the proper role of law, but regardless I believe that there are better
ways to cure the evil of monopoly market power than subjecting leagues
to the arbitrary, ad hoc use of anticonspiracy principles that cannot
rationally be applied to the internal rules of an inherently totally
integrated joint venture partnership.
What the courts largely have done to date is to use section 1
randomly and unpredictably to overturn league exercises of monopoly
power, not more properly to use section 2 to attack behavior that actually
causes or entrenches that market power.I5 -Thus, rather than repeal
baseball's antitrust immunity, I would urge Congress to explore legislation
that would standardize and sensibly define the way antitrust law applies
to all professional sports leagues, and that also then either regulates some
of the operating decisions of leagues and/or forces upon them a market
structure that greatly mitigates their excessive market power.
The source of the problem creating the current disappointment and
anger in St. Petersburg is not that the National League owners "conspired"
to leave a team in its current home city. Had the owners decided to let
the Giants move there would have been just as much disappointment and
anger in Northern California, the same calls for these hearings by
California politicians, and the prospect for the same kind of politically
biased section I antitrust litigation in San Francisco. The real problem is
15 The only case in which a court utilized section 2 to bring about meaningful
reform in professional sports, through a preliminary injuction that led to a
settlement, was Philadelphia World Hockey Club v. Philadelphia Hockey
Club, 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972)(holding that the NHI's lifetime reserve system
would likely be found to allow the NHL to monopolize professional hockey and
enjoining its use).
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that there are not enough teams to satisfy the market demands of all the
major metropolitan areas in the country that can reasonably support one.
When there are two markets the size of the West San Francisco Bay and
Tampa/St. Petersburg areas and only one available team, one community
is going to be bitter and disappointed. The solution, however, is not to
subject the league's decision as to which community gets that franchise to
section I antitrust scrutiny by a judge and jury in the disappointed city --
i.e., to attack only the symptom of the underlying market power problem.
The solution is to bring about the creation of enough franchises within a
reasonable period of time to satisfy the reasonable demand for them --
i.e., to attack the source of the problem.
The shortage of franchises to meet reasonable demand reflects the
monopoly power of existing major sports leagues over the nationwide
market in which franchises in each sport are sold. If a league faced
meaningful market competition, it could not afford to let attractive
communities go without a team lest the competitor take and entrench
itself in those communities first. Further, the unique ownership structure
of a sports league compounds the problem of the league's monopoly
market power.
If major league baseball were owned by a single person or group of
stockholders, its total profitability would be enhanced by occupying every
attractive territory in which no major league baseball team is currently
operating. But because the peculiar ownership structure of a league
requires that for every additional team there be an additional partner
who will then share the league's total profits, it is not necessarily true
that even a new profitable franchise would increase profits per partner.
Thus, league owners rationally will not expand unless the profitability of
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a new team would be great enough to justify an up-front franchise fee
sufficient to compensate the existing franchise owners for a decline in
their profits. But even in cases where such franchise fees could be
charged and paid, major league owners will usually resist expansion
because the fewer the number of franchises there are, the more each
franchise is worth because of bidding wars between cities to attract or
keep them. It is a classic example of how the market value (price) of
something (a franchise) can be inflated to monopoly levels by artificially
reducing its supply well below natural market demand.
Thus, under current market constructs, there will always be far
fewer franchises in each professional sport than there are cities that could
reasonably support one. How many fewer is a difficult question to
resolve because the size a market must be to support a team in a league
with a relatively unrestrained internal labor market (which over the long
run forces every team to pay approximately the same player salaries in
order to be athletically competitive) depends to a large extent on the
degree to which the league is politically willing to share revenues. If
every dollar of revenue in a league were shared equally by every team in
the league, in theory every community in which a team would be
profitable could reasonably support one and be athletically competitive.
On the other hand, if no dollars are shared, only a few huge metropolitan
areas could probably support viable competitive teams. In fact, given the
very low amount of revenue sharing in major league baseball today, it
may be that the market does not justify more than the current number of
teams (if that many), although some of them are probably in the wrong
cities.
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In short, I see the major public policy problems in baseball today to
be the woefully inadequate degree of revenue sharing and the far too few
number of franchises, along with the accelerating shift of televised games
off of widely-viewed free or cheap channels to more expensive pay cable
or pay-per-view channels (which is another issue altogether16 ) - all
three of which conditions exist and will continue uncorrected because of
the enormous market power that Major League Baseball enjoys in many
of its operating markets. None of these problems, however, will be cured.
by simply abolishing the antitrust exclusion and subjecting baseball to the
same kind of random antitrust enforcement to which the other major
sports leagues have been exposed. They are the effects or symptoms of
market power not the causes of it which antitrust doctrines are designed
to address.
Thus, if Congress is to solve or mitigate these "real" problems, it
must attack the source. This could be done in one or some combination of
three ways: (1) legislatively mandate a minimum level of revenue sharing
(i.e., a maximum revenue disparity among clubs) for every major
professional sports league, require expansion on a reasonable timetable to
some set number of teams (probably around 36), and set a minimum
percentage of televised games that must be on over-the-air and/or "basic
package" cable channels; (2) create a regulatory body of some type
empowered to correct structural market problems; or (3) require each
major sports league to be split into two to four wholly independent
leagues with equal market power and governed by wholly independent
16 Because this shift is taking place at the individual club level, it poses even no
arguable section I conspiracy issues. However, it is another classic exercise of
monopoly power - restricting output (the number of viewers) in order to charge
much higher monopoly prices to the far fewer viewers willing to pay those prices.
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governing boards, commissioners, etc. with no lawful right to cooperate in
anything other than the staging of all-star, post-season championship, and
possibly regular interleague games. The various pros and cons of each of
these approaches are many and would need to be explored in detail
before choosing the best one or combination of them.
Conclusion
The- baseball antitrust exclusion is not a cause of any easily
identifiable injury to the public, primarily because it is impossible to
predict that the courts would apply antitrust law to baseball in a way that
would enhance that public interest. Furthermore, the fear of losing the
exclusion may effectively deter baseball owners from engaging in
egregious conduct, some of which antitrust law might not affect even if it
applied. The exclusion also has the benefit of protecting baseball from
the expensive, behavior-distorting, and often counterproductive effects of
being subjected to ad hoc, arbitrary judicial regulation under the guise of
enforcing section 1 anticonspiracy principles ill suited for reviewing the
internal decisions of an inherently integrated joint venture partnership.
I also believe that while treating baseball differently from the other
major league sports is anomalous, there is very little political interest in
changing the current exclusion. In the first place, because antitrust
enforcement by the courts is so random and unpredictable, there are no
easily identifiable benefits from abolishing the exclusion, and thus there
will be little political support for doing so. Furthermore, any incident
triggering immediate political passions against the exclusion, like the
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current St. Petersburg-San Francisco dispute, will invariably create
equally strong countervailing political interests. It would be legally and
politically counterproductive to propose abolishing the exclusion in a
context where the interests of some cities are pitted against the interests
of other cities. The chances of passing some meaningful legislation will be
much greater if the Subcommittee can propose something with more
obvious benefits that might be able to muster a political consensus.
Thus, I recommend that Congress disregard the largely insignificant
baseball antitrust exclusion and instead focus on the real problems
affecting the public interest in professional baseball today, most
specifically the lack of adequate revenue sharing, the fewer than justified
number of franchises, and the shifting telecasting practices of the tearas.
The ultimate legislative ways of doing this are varied and need careful
further study, but I am confident that focussing political attention in this
fashion would have much greater long term benefits for fans and the
public generally than wasting time and political capital on a futile effort
to abolish the exclusion, an effort that even if it succeeded would create
more legal confusion and chaos than predictable benefits.
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Gary Roberts
Talane Law School
6801 Freret Street
-New Orleans , LA 70118-5698
Dear Mr. Roberts:
Thank you for testifying at the December 10, 1992
Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopolies and Business Rights hearing
on baseball's antitrust immunity. Your views on this issue are
greatly appreciated and very helpful.
Unfortunately, due to the time constraints on the day or the
hearing, there are a few questions that were not answered.
' Please respond, in writing, to the following questions posed by
Senator Thurmond by no later than ay uary 25, 1993:
1) Please comment on what you consider the appropriate role of
."the Baseball Commissioner to be, especially in the context
of an antitrust exemption?
2)Please state, as succinctly as possible, who will benefit
Sfrom repeal of the antitrust exemption and how?
3) As I understand it, you believ the cee g 2antitrust
exemption is either not necessary and/or not sufficient to
cure the structural problems inherent in tusines Riness of
baseball. You propose additional action that would have to
grbe undertaken either legislatively or in the form of
regulation. At a time when de-regulation is thought to be
the better approach for all but the most urgent problems,
how do we justify federal government regulation of an
entertainment industry such as baseball? Are we not better
off repealing the antitrust exempation and leaving the
outcome to market forces?
I look forward to working with you in the future as the
Subcommittee continues its work in this area.
Again, thank you for your contribution.
Very sincerely A s,
Howard M. Metzenbanm
Chairman,
Subcommittee on Antitrust,
Monopolies and Business Rights
HMM/eao
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January 22, 1993
Sen. Howard M. Metzenbaum, Chair
Senate Antitrust Subcommittee
Hart Senate Office Bldg.
Washington, DC 20510-6275
Re: Hearings on Baseball Antitrust Exemption
Dear Senator Metzenbaum:
I received your letter of January 11 asking for responses to three
specific questions posed by Senator Thurmond in connection with the
hearings held last December 10 on baseball's antitrust exemption. This
letter attempts to answer those questions.
Qnestion 1: Please comment on what you consider the
appropriate role of the Baseball Commissioner to be, especially
in the context of an antitrust exemption.
The commissioner should not simply be a CEO for the owners, but
rather should be empowered to act in the best interests of the game,
which means taking into account and balancing the interests of owners,
players, communities, and (most importantly) fans. It is, however,
politically unrealistic to expect a commissioner elected only by owners to
act contrary to the best interests of those owners. For this reason, I
would support a rule, perhaps legislatively imposed, that requires the
commissioner of any major sports league to be approved by the club
owners, the players union, and a designated Senate committee, and that
removal of a commissioner before the end of his/her stated term would
also require the approval of at least two of these three groups. Only in
this way would commissioners truly be politically positioned to govern
the game instead of primarily to do the owners' bidding.
If the above suggestion were adopted, the authority of
commissioners to act in the best interests of the game would be real, not
illusory, and I would support extending the baseball antitrust exclusion to
every professional sports league governed by such an independent
commissioner. If there is not such an independent commissioner, my
view is that the role of the commissioner is not linked to the existence of
the baseball antitrust exclusion.
One could argue that since the antitrust exclusion is a benefit to
baseball owners, its continuation should be made contingent on baseball's
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creation of a strong commissioner. However, a commissioner that is hired
and can be fired by the owners alone will be "strong" or independent in
appearance only, not in fact. Thus, this would be a meaningless quid-pro-
quo. I do not believe that how Congress decides to deal with the antitrust
exclusion should be linked in any way to the role assigned by club owners
to the commissioner, unless it somehow involves a commissioner whose
appointment and removal involves the union and Congress as well as the
owners.
Question 2: Who will benefit from repeal of the antitrust
exemption and how?
There are only two groups who would be likely to benefit from
repealing baseball's antitrust exclusion: (1) lawyers who would make lots
of money litigating challenges to baseball practices, and (2) the baseball
players association which could use the threat of antitrust litigation as a
means to increase its collective bargaining leverage. More generally,
anyone dealing with baseball could conceivably use the threat of antitrust
litigation to enhance its bargaining position. Whether such a shift in
relative bargaining power would be good or bad for the public interest
would depend in each case on the specific context in which it occurred.
Otherwise, I do not know who will benefit from repealing the
antitrist exclusion, and I do not believe anyone really knows no matter
what they say. Because of the haphazard, often political, and usually
assinine way in which the courts have applied antitrust law to this
uniquely structured industry, we simply cannot predict how any
challenges to various league practices would be resolved, let alone what
practices would actually be challenged.
Onestion 3: At a time when de-regulation is thought to be the
better approach for all but the most urgent problems, how do
we justify federal government regulation of an entertainment
industry such as baseball? Are we not better off repealing the
antitrust, exemption and leaving the outcome to market forces?
We are = better off repealing the exemption and leaving the
outcome to market forces because the outcome will not be dictated by
market forces! The outcome will be dictated by the way in which the
federal courts choose to apply (or how the parties predict the courts will
likely apply) the antitrust laws to a uniquely structured business that I
believe is a natural monopoly. Historically, the courts have done a
terrible job of applying antitrust to other professional sports leagues, and
I see little reason to hope the performance will improve for baseball.
Antitrust regulation of professional sports leagues will simply not
predictably benefit the public interest.
As for the current political preference for de-regulation, I can only
say that sometimes political fads go overboard. I agree that the market is
generally a better long term regulator of an industry than government
regulation, although there hre often short-term frictional problems or
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national security interests that an unregulated market simply cannot
properly accomodate. However, in industries where market forces do not
and will not result in competitive pricing and output decisions, especially
natural monopoly industries like the major professional sports, regulation
is appropriate. To the extent the current political wisdom is to oppose all
but the most vital types of regulation, in my judgment it is wrong.
If Congress is interested in stopping the artificial restriction of
professional sports franchises, forced monopoly subsidies by communities
to sports teams, and monopoly pricing of sports contests, it will not do so
by turning baseball over to the courts for haphazard antitrust
enforcement. Other professional leagues are subject to the antitrust laws,
and their track record on these consumer and public interest issues is no
better than baseball's. What is needed to correct these practices that
injure the public is to regulate them in some fashion. If that is politically
unfashionable, so be it; but then Congress should quit complaining about
the problems and simply accept them as the inevitable result of its
refusal to regulate natural monopoly industries.
I hope this adequately responds to your inquiries. If you need any
further information or input, please don't hesitate to contact me.
Respectfully,
Gi . Ro ferts
Vice Dean & Professor
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Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much.
Mr. Noll.
STATEMENT OF ROGER G. NOLL
Mr. NoLL. Thank you, Senator. The last time I appeared before
this subcommittee was 20 years ago, a little over 20 years ago,
when the issue was an antitrust exemption for professional basket-
ball, and this committee, in its infinite wisdom, decided not to
grant it. I hope it will be consistent this time.
I do not believe that the baseball antitrust exemption is valid, al-
though I share some of Gary's concerns that it is not all that im-
portant. Let me say specifically how I think it is important. The
single most important effect is what Don Fehr testified to before
us; that is, if, in fact, the purpose behind the reopening of the col-
lective bargaining agreement in baseball is, in fact, to impose uni-
laterally a more restrictive system in the player market after, say,
a year's worth of negotiations that get nowhere, then the baseball
players do not have available to them what the basketball players
and the football players used in the last couple of years; namely,
decertify as a union, become a professional association, and use
antitrust to deal with the issue.
That is an important effect because, historically, strikes in pro-
fessional sports have not worked. They do not work because the
fact is the players have no reasonable alternatives and there is
nothing available to them to cushion them from the enormous loss
of income that derives from the strike. Unions in sports are con-
genitally weaker than unions in the rest of the economy, in part
because of the diversity of interests among the players, but also in
part because the players have very, very short time horizons. If you
strike for a year, that means something like 25 percent of the play-
ers have just lost half their career. So strikes are not as effective
a weapon in collective bargaining as they are in other industries.
I would like to devote the rest of my remarks to what I believe
is an extraordinary myth that has been perpetuated since the ap-
pointment of Judge Landis as the commissioner of baseball 70
years ago, and that is that somehow a strong commissioner solves
the public interest problems associated with professional sports.
The fact is you could easily separate out the commissioner's du-
ties into, as Mr. Selig did, those having to do with the integrity of
the game and those having to do with the business management
of the game. There is no way on God's Earth that any court is ever
going to find an antitrust violation to fine or suspend a player or
an owner for gambling or for being involved in drug trafficking.
Indeed, in other sports with antitrust exposure, exactly these
events have transpired in the past and nothing has come of it.
There has not been antitrust litigation. The integrity-of-the-game
issues have absolutely nothing to do with antitrust immunity.
The second part is the business affairs, and the fact remains if
you have an antitrust exemption, it is because the Government has
said it is OK to manage yourself as a cartel; it is OK to behave in
a way that maximizes your leverage, whether it is over cities,
whether it is over broadcast networks, whether it is over player
unions, whether it is over fans. That is OK.
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What the individual owners will see, then, is a necessity to have
a commissioner to resolve the disputes among themselves that get
in the way of collective profit maximization, and that is exactly
what commissioners have done throughout the history of sport.
Now, Judge Landis, in fact, attempted a major reform of profes-
sional baseball that the owners did not think was in their business
interest, and he was unable to carry it off; namely, the minor
league system, which Gary says is the single most important part
of the antitrust exemption-he tried to prevent the owners from es-
tablishing the current minor league rules. He said it was not in the
interests of baseball to have the kind of monopolization of the
minor league system that baseball currently enjoys. He tried to put
an end to the farm system of minor leagues and the owners would
not allow him to do it.
In other words, if a commissioner, even as strong a commissioner
as Judge Landis, attempts to go against the collective profit-maxi-
mizing interests of a sport, the owners will simply not abide by it
and there is no legal power or authority for a commissioner to pre-
vent that, and that was the case of Judge Landis. They didn't have
to fire him; they just ignored him.
Now, finally, as to what is the real public policy issue here, the
real public policy issue is both San Francisco and St. Petersburg
ought to have baseball teams, and so should a dozen other cities.
Indeed, in addition to that, several of the larger cities should have
two or three more. There is enough market demand out there to
have on the order of 40 to 50 baseball teams. Why don't we have
these teams? It is in my testimony, but Fay Vincent told you why
and Bud Selig told you why, because the way to keep up those $100
to $200 million franchise values is, in fact, to play hardball with
Mayor Jordan and hardball with St. Petersburg and hardball with
players associations.
Thank you.
[Mr. Noll submitted the following material:]
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Statement of Roger G. Noll
Before the
Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopolies and Business Rights
Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate
December 10, 1992
Once again, the baseball exemption -- the great anomaly of
antitrust -- is before Congress. I thank the committee for
inviting me to explain why I believe that the antitrust laws
ought to apply to baseball, and ought to be vigorously enforced
in all professional sports.
The message of my testimony is simply stated: all
professional sports, including baseball, ought to be subject to
the antitrust laws, but lifting the antitrust immunity from
baseball is unlikely, by itself, to solve some of the problems
that cause Congress regularly to investigate the sport.
In other professional team sports, the most significant
effect of antitrust exposure has been on the rules that govern
competition among teams for players. And in player relations,
baseball has negotiated more liberal rules than exist in hockey
or existed in football before the recent McNeil v. NFL litigation
in Minneapolis. Practices regarding expansion, potential entry
of new leagues, revenue sharing, team relocation, stadium
arrangements, and broadcasting rights are not materially
different among the sports.. Thus, on the basis of the
performance of other team sports under antitrust scrutiny, one
can not make a case that, from the standpoint of consumers
(sports fans), lifting the baseball antitrust exemption would, by
itself, solve all of the anticompetitive problems of baseball.
Nevertheless, I strongly urge Congress to eliminate the baseball
exemption. To do so is a necessary, but not sufficient, action
to ameliorate the monopolistic practices in the sport.
The initial rationale for the baseball exemption was probably
not good law in 1921, when the Supreme Court ruled that the
antitrust laws did not apply to baseball because baseball was not
engaged in interstate commerce. Today there can be no doubt that
this basis for the exemption is ludicrous. Baseball derives more
than half of its revenue from various forms of broadcasting
(radio and TV, local and national, off-air-and cable), all of
which are not only interstate in character but which are
regulated by the federal government. Eventhe program
acquisition process (including sports programming) for television
networks is regulated by the Federal Communications Commission.
Hence, it is ridiculous to contend that baseball is beyond the
reach of federal legislation.
The primary defense of antitrust exemptions in sports is the
claim that cooperation among owners benefits both players and
sports fans. Examples of this argument are the following:
* Monopsonistic practices in the player market protect
the balance of competition in a league, causing
games to be more exciting, interest in (and, hence,
revenue to) a sport to be greater, teams in smaller
markets to have a chance of winning, and therefore
both fans and players to be better off;
* Collective decisions about franchise locations enable
owners as a group to prevent a single owner from
greedily pursuing the highest possible price for a
team, even if that means transferring the team from
a city that supports it; and
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* Cooperative decisions about the number of teams in a
league prevent the number of teams from becoming
so large that the talent pool is diluted,
diminishing the quality of play, again risking
competitive imbalance, and thereby reducing fan
interest.
In addition, owners make two more arguments that pertain to their
own financial welfare:
* Baseball is a precarious business financially, and
any significant change in its institutional
structure risks causing financial failure of
some teams, aspecially in small cities; and
* Lifting the exemption would subject the sport to a
flurry of litigation that would be both costly and
wasteful.
None of these arguments is a valid defense for retaining the
antitrust exemption. Although I question the validity of each of
these claims, the most important reason that these arguments do
not amount to a defense of the exemption is that they reflect a
misconception of the true implication of antitrust liability.
The Nature of Antitrust Exposure
All of the important antitrust cases in professional sports
during the past two decades have analyzed the practices of sports
leagues according to the "Rule of Reason" test. That is, in
order for a sports league to be found to have violated the
antitrust statutes, plaintiffs have had to show that, first, the
practices of the league had a significant anticompetitive effect,
and second, that these practices did not have a reasonable
business justification in that they did not produce an offsetting
efficiency advantage. Antitrust harm (or damage) arises only if
a practice leads to an anticompetitive effect that is more
important than its beneficial effect. Consequently, all but the
last of the reasons given for the antitrust exemption, if true,
would constitute defenses against an antitrust complaint. Hence,
they constitute reasons why baseball would not be found guilty of
violating the antitrust laws, rather than reasons why it should
be exempt.
The final reason -- the wasteful costs of defending against
antitrust complaints -- has one element of truth: the litigation
costs of baseball would be very likely to increase if its
antitrust exemption were lifted and if it refused to change some
of its business practices. But that is not because these cases
would be frivolous. Indeed, federal courts have a great deal of
experience in dealing with frivolous antitrust complaints. Some
antitrust complaints in other industries have an invalid basis,
usually of one of two forms. First, an antitrust issue is often
raised inappropriately in a case that actually is about some
other issue. Second, a disappointed owner of a failed business
sometimes believes incorrectly that the failure is do to
anticompetitive actions by competitors, and so files an invalid
complaint. Courts have learned how to recognize most frivolous
complaints, and readily dismiss them or grant summary judgement.
Thus, the argument that baseball will suffer from frivolous
complaints does an injustice to the judicial system, and
constitutes no better a case for exempting baseball from
antitrust than for repealing the antitrust statutes altogether.
The real reason baseball is likely to face increased
litigation costs is that there is substance behind the complaints
that would be filed against the sport, and that baseball is more
likely to resist these complaints in court than to change its
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practices to be in conformance with antitrust requirements.
Baseball's business justifications for its anticompetitive
practices have already been litigated with respect to other
sports, and the courts have consistently held that these claims
are invalid. Sports leagues have persistently failed to make a
convincing case in court that their anticompetitive practices are
necessary for the continued provision of high quality
professional team sports. Baseball wants to avoid this
litigation not because it would be frivolous and wasteful, but
because it would be likely to lose.
The Business Justifications
When considering the business justifications for baseball's
anticompetitive practices, two important aspects of the baseball
business must be kept in mind. First, the sport is not in a
precarious financial circumstance, and second, even if some
significant number of teams were on the verge of economic
inviability, their financial circumstances are determined by the
revenue-sharing and team-location rules of the sport, not by the
basic economic health of the industry.
To understand the economics of any professional sport, one
simply has to compare the revenue stream with the underlying
economic costs. In so doing, one should keep separate the
earnings of the players and the other direct costs of operating a
team: travel, baseball equipment, ticket sales, ballpark
maintenance, etc. Owners, players, managers, and the principal
front office personnel differ from secretaries, ticket takers,
groundskeepers, and manufacturers of baseball equipment in one
very important respect. The latter group earns wages and profits
that are determined in a much broader market than just baseball,
while the earnings of the former group depend completely on the
financial status of the sport. Player salaries, manager
salaries, and owner salaries and profits are determined solely by
the willingness of fans to buy tickets, watch or listen to game
broadcasts, and buy concession products. If baseball revenues go
down, all of these groups will make less money. Thus, the
financial viability of baseball is governed by the answer to the
following question: Are baseball revenues, net of the direct
cost of staging games, sufficient to keep players and managers in
the sport with enough left over to cause business people to want
to own a team?
The answer to this question is very obvious. If a baseball
team takes in $50 million, and must spend $10 million for travel,
stadium maintenance, equipment, ticket sellers, and even a minor
league subsidy, that leaves $40 million to be divided among about
50 people (players, coaches, owners, executives). Obviously,
this is more than enough to keep everyone in the business, and to
make the sport financially viable. An average take of $800,000
each ought to be sufficient to maintain their attention.
By far the most important component of the costs in any team
sport is the cost of players. But these costs are driven by
revenues. In the 1985 negotiations with the baseball players
union, the owners argued that their financial position was
precarious on the basis of a projection of future costs and
revenues. Their projection assumed that player costs would
increase by fifteen percent per year, but that their revenues
would grow by only eight percent annually. The problem with
these projections was not just that they were wildly incorrect --
to the tune of several hundred million dollars. The key problem
is that the projections reflected a fundamental misconception --
and one that still permeates the public discussion of the sports
business. This misconception is that player costs are unrelated
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to revenues -- that somehow a baseball superstar could still
command a $5 million salary if revenues fell in half.
In reality, baseball salaries -- and player salaries in other
sports and franchise values -- are driven by revenues. Owners
pay players because players, in Bill Veeck's immortal phrase,
"put fannies in the seats." More fannies (and more eyeballs
glued to the television screen) translate to higher salaries.
Baseball will not become financially unviable because of rising
player salaries, for player salaries will simply adjust to
whatever changes occur in the revenues of the sport. As all
baseball players will readily admit, if a financial crisis hit
baseball, and so all salary offers next year were ten percent
less than last year, nearly all players would still be in the
sport, and the game would go on as before. Indeed, this
circumstance is almost precisely what happened in baseball in the
mid-1980s when the owners engaged in salary collusion. Players
were offered far less than one would have predicted, given the
trends in revenues, yet the players continued to play. Then,
when the owners lost the collusion case and a competitive market
for veteran players was restored, salaries returned to their
long-term trend. The importance of this episode is that it
confirms a fundamental fact: by far the most important cost item
to a baseball team is player salaries, and this is driven by
revenues. Hence, unlike almost any other business, where
salaries are driven by a much broader market, baseball's
financial viability is remarkably secure. Its most import cost
item simply adjusts to accommodate any change in revenues.
Although the entire sport is financially viable, all sports,
including baseball, face the possibility that some teams may not
be viable. In baseball, a persistently weak team does not do
anywhere near as well financially as the average team. But two
important facts must be kept in mind about this circumstance.
First, no teams are so weak financially that they cannot
command a positive market price. That is, given the current
financial performance of bAseball, every single team could be
sold today for at least $80 or $90 million, and perhaps more.
Just ask the folks in St. Petersburg. Obviously, as long as
investors are willing to spend such significant sums on weak
teams in small cities, the sport is not on the verge of financial
collapse.
Second, the relative financial strength of teams in a sport
is determined by the sport's policies regarding revenue sharing.
In football, for example, revenue is extensively shared. As a
result, the differences in revenues between the most successful
and least successful teams in football are far less than in
baseball. Indeed, as was revealed in the McNeil case, so
extensive is the revenue-sharing in football that the most
profitable teams have mediocre playing records. The teams that
are most successful on the playing field have average profit
performance. By contrast, in baseball the most successful teams
financially are usually the teams in the largest markets plus the
small market teams that, in a given year, win a division
championship.
Baseball and football are very similar in several respects.
Teams in both sports are about the same size (the relevant
comparison is the 40-person roster in baseball with the 57 or so
players a football team can control, counting injured reserve and
the development squad). Teams in both sports have, on average,
about the same revenues. Moreover, in both sports more than half
of the revenues come from various forms of broadcasting.
The most important difference between the sports is in how
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the broadcasting revenues are shared. In football, the league
has sold the TV rights to literally every regular-season game to
a national network (including two cable networks, ESPN and TNT),
even though most games are televised only locally in the
territories of the two teams involved. These revenues are then
shared equally. This policy guarantees that more than half the
revenue in football is shared equally. In addition, gate
receipts are shared, with 40 percent of the net receipts going to
the visiting team. In baseball, gate receipts are divided less
evenly (the visitors receive 20 percent in the American League
and about 5 percent in the National League). And, local radio,
television and cable revenues are not shared at all. As a
result, a big-city team like the Yankees can receive ten times as
much local broadcasting revenue as a small-market team. (Indeed,
the Yankees local cable revenues are about the same as the total
revenues of the weakest franchises.)
An important principle of antitrust is that in pursuing a
reasonable business justification for an anticompetitive
practice, businesses must adopt the least anticompetitive
practice available to them for achieving their business
objectives. Thus, if baseball does have, or were to develop, a
problem with the viability of small-market teams, it could share
revenue more equally. More revenue sharing is clearly less
anticompetitive than, for example, restricting competition for
players to reduce their pay, or bargaining as a league, rather
than individual teams, for broadcasting rights. The fact that
the owners refuse to adopt such a policy does not, therefore,
justify a more anticompetitive practice.
A second cause of financial disparity among teams within
baseball, as well as in other sports, is the monopoly enjoyed by
teams in the large markets. If New York had a half-dozen
baseball teams, the Yankees would be unlikely to command $40
million for their cable television rights. Indeed, because of
the territorial rules of baseball, baseball teams located
elsewhere are not permitted to sell cable rights in New York in
competition with the Yankees. Thus, the Yankees, and other teams
in the largest markets, have much greater revenue than teams in
small markets because leagues have restricted competition in the
large markets. Obviously, a procompetitive solution to the
problem of revenue imbalance is to reduce the revenues of big
city teams by letting more teams compete with them.
Franchise Locations
During the past fifteen years, much of the public attention
to the business practices of professional sports has centered on
the issue of the number and location of teams in the sport. The
recent battle between San Francisco and St. Petersburg over the
Giants is simply the most recent example; previous examples are
the recurring battle between Oakland and Los Angeles over the
Raiders, the movement of the Colts from Baltimore to
Indianapolis, the relocation of the Cardinals in Phoenix from St.
Louis, and the departure of the Washington Senators for Dallas-
Ft. Worth.
Unfortunately, most of the debate aboiit franchise movements
-- and their relationship to antitrust -- has had a very narrow
focus: the effect of a move on the community that a team
abandons. The NFL, for example, has strongly advocated that it
be given an antitrust exemption so that it could control the
movements of teams more than is possible under the antitrust
statutes. And, as a practical reality, the antitrust laws do
prevent leagues from vetoing team relocations simply as a means
of protecting exclusive territorial rights or otherwise serving
the narrow business interests of other owners.
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In this instance, the antitrust laws are being correctly
interpreted by the courts, and the resulting policy outcome is
the correct one. When a team moves from one city to another, the
effect on sports fans is always no worse than a break-even
affair. The fans in the new city gain and the fans in the old
city lose. And, usually the former exceeds the latter, because
teams typically draw better in their new home than in the old
one, at least for a while.' Thus, there is nothing inherently
wrong with team relocations, even though personally I will be
very depressed if the Giants eventually leave for Florida.
The harm from relocation arises because the city that loses a
team has no realistic expectation of getting a replacement.
Washington, D.C., is one of the nation's largest metropolitan
areas. It could easily support a baseball team. But the
Senators have been gone for two decades, the owners have vetoed
Washington as an expansion site (too much competition for
Baltimore), and no other team seems likely to relocate, whether
for lack of interest or lack of support among other owners.
Likewise, the most salient fact about the battle over the Giants,
and prior battles over other teams, is that both of the bidding
cities are perfectly good, economically viable franchise
locations. The policy problem raised by the fight over the
Giants is not that St. Petersburg lost, but that anyone had to
lose. Given the quality of the Giants in the past two years,
either city should be roughly indifferent between the Giants and
an expansion franchise. The harm made manifest in the battle is
that baseball has not expanded to the extent justified by the
market, forcing the loser in the battle for the Giants to be
without a team.
Removing baseball's antitrust immunity would limit, but not
remove, baseball's control over the number and location of
franchises. In other sports, courts have applied the Rule of
Reason to league decisions about franchise locations and
ownership changes. Owners do have a legitimate business interestin assuring that owners are reputable and financially able to
operate a team, and that a franchise location is economically
viable. The courts have refused to block or to prohibit
franchise relocations when league actions were not based on suchinterests.
Unfortunately, removal of the antitrust exemption in baseballis not likely, by itself, to solve the problem of scarcity infranchises. It is unlikely, for example, that removing the
antitrust exemption will soon put teams in Washington and St.Petersburg. In other sports, susceptibility to antitrust has notforced more rapid expansion.
In all sports, expansion occurs only if it is in thefinancial interests of most of the existing teams to expand. For
several reasons, teams are unwilling to expand a league until all
viable franchise locations are occupied. Among the factorslimiting expansion are:
* The Franchise Price Effect -- all teams benefit from
a scarcity in franchises, because scarcity drives up
the price at which either an existing team or an
expansion franchise can be sold;
* The Home-Town Holdup Effect -- the presence of other
unoccupied but viable franchise sites increases thebargaining power of existing teams in dealing with
local governments to obtain stadium subsidies and
state and local tax breaks;
* The Broadcast Revenue-Sharina Effect -- the addition of
one more city to a league will have no significant
effect on the amount of money that national
366
broadcasters will pay for rights to games, but it
will create another mouth to feed through revenue
sharing, thereby reducing the gross revenues of all
existing teams; and
* The Local Competition Effect -- now that all sports are
national in that all regions have teams, a new
franchise is likely to have some effect on the local
monopolies enjoyed by the others, either in ticket
sales or local broadcasting (an effect that
explains why leagues rarely expand into cities that
already have a team).
Normally, under the present regime, the price of an expansion
club has to be sufficient to compensate the existing owners for
all of these effects, even though each one amounts to nothing
more than the erosion of some of the monopoly profits of the
existing teams. As long as a sport can control its membership by
collaboration among the established teams, the league will not
expand to the extent warranted by the market because it is not in
the financial interest of existing owners to do so.
Antitrust has not proved to be an effective remedy to solving
the problem of insufficient numbers of teams. Prospective owners
and cities have been generally been unwilling to sue professional
sports leagues to force expansion, for a variety of reasons. One
factor is the historical unwillingness of the courts to provide
structural relief in antitrust cases unless the federal
government is the plaintiff. Thus, a city or a prospective owner
may expect to win on liability, but win only damages (which are
likely to be relatively small) and not a franchise. An
illustrative example is the USFL antitrust case against the NFL,
in which the NFL was found to have violated the antitrust laws in
forcing the league out of business, but in which the USFL failed
to win significant damages beyond its court costs and to obtain
meaningful injunctive relief. Another instructive example is
Hecht v. Pro Football, in which Mr. Hecht was victorious in his
claim that the NFL had acted anticompetitively to prevent his AFL
expansion team from locating in Washington, but which ended in a
settlement giving the plaintiff only money -- no team, and no
change in NFL practices.
Another reason that owners and cities are reluctant to use
antitrust as a means to force expansion is that they fear
retribution. Filing the suit is regarded as virtually
guaranteeing that the city or owner will never have a team. And,
among prospective owners, another inhibiting factor is that the
prospective owner of an expansion franchise has mixed incentives.
Whereas winning might bring a team, the owner must also consider
that winning would reduce the value of teams in general, so that
the victory could be Pyrrhic. A prospective owner prefers to
gain membership to an exclusive club, not to one that, as a
consequence of admitting the new owner, must also admit any other
reasonably qualified applicant.
Thus, eliminating the baseball antitrust exemption leaves
baseball positioned like the other sports with respect to its
control of franchises. Whereas it will lose some control over
the location of its existing members, history in other sports
suggests that it will still not expand to the extent warranted by
the economics of the sport.
. Player Acquisition and Control
- Elimination of the baseball antitrust exemption will provide
some benefit to players, but the effect may not be dramatic. The
benefit of antitrust exposure to players is that it gives them
the option of reliance on antitrust, rather than collective
367
bargaining, to determine the rules within a sport governing the
market for players. In other sports, leagues have lost several
highly significant antitrust cases on the issue of player market
restrictions. Hence, antitrust deserves important credit for
introducing some competition into these markets. Nevertheless,
baseball players have supcessfully used collective bargaining to
negotiate agreements with baseball owners which give veteran
players the right to become free agents, and give other players
arbitration rights after three years. Although the situation in
football is still very fluid, at the moment the baseball player
markets is less restrictive than the 1992 systems in football and
hockey, although on balance perhaps more restrictive than in
basketball. (Basketball is difficult to compare with baseball
because the former has a flexible but often binding cap on total
salary payments by a team to all of its players, but allows the
players to become free agents earlier in their careers.)
The elimination of the baseball antitrust exemption would
clearly benefit the players in that it would virtually guarantee
that the owners would never be able to reimpose a substantially
more restrictive system than the status quo. The reason is that
the introduction of free agency in 1976 has clearly had no
damaging effect on the sport. The owners' claim that free agency
would destroy competitive balance, lead to the creation of
dynasties in the largest cities, and cause fans to lose interest
has been solidly rejected by the subsequent facts. Baseball has
never been more competitively balanced than during the free-
agency era, when 23 of the 26 teams have won a division title.
No team has managed to become dominant, and the teams that would
appear to be best placed to dominate -- the Dodgers, Yankees and
Cubs -- have had many poor 'years.
The importance of these facts is that they would prevent
baseball from providing a reasonable business justification for a
more stringent set of rules. Hence, should the owners
unilaterally apply new rules when the current contract expires
after the 1993 season, the baseball players would probably be
able to block them by resort to antitrust -- if the exemption
were lifted. Of course, the players might be able to win a
substantially more liberal system than the status quo through
antitrust litigation. If the owners believe this, they ought to
be willing to negotiate a new arrangement with the players that
is less restrictive than the current system. And even if the
owners do not believe it, antitrust action might ensue, and their
beliefs could be forced into modification.
The lesson from the history of antitrust applied to player
markets is that the strength and wisdom of the players union is a
far-more important factor in determining player market rules than
is antitrust exposure. Baseball has benefitted from a strong,
intelligently-led union for 25 years, and through collective
bargaining players have won a system that holds up well in
comparison with the systems in the sports that have lost
antitrust cases -- football and hockey -- and with basketball,
where antitrust suits have been filed but settled before reaching
conclusion.
One potentially important effect of the elimination of the
antitrust exemption for baseball would be through minor league
players. The contract that baseball requires minor league
players to sign binds them exclusively to the existing
institutional structure of baseball until they are released or,
as major leaguers, qualify for free agency. This system is a
barrier to entry of a competitive major league. The normal
practice when a new league is formed in other sports is for the
entrant to sign only a relatively few players who are employed in
the established league. Most players in the new league will be
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rookies or players who have previously been cut by the
established league. In baseball, most players in both categories
are tied up in the minor leagues. Very few players play in the
major leagues during their first professional year, and most
players who are removed from a major league playing roster are
demoted to the minors, often to be recalled again and again.
If a competitive league entered and signed some major league
veterans, all teams -- including the established teams -- would
be required to promote some minor leaguers to fill out the
roster, just as they do after an expansion. But the rules of
baseball prohibit a new league from acquiring these players.
Indeed, the last time an "outlaw" league tried to enter -- the
Mexican League after World War II -- baseball banned for life
any player who signed with the new league. Some legal scholars
believe that the courts would not uphold such a Draconian policy
today, but, if baseball again resorted to such a tactic, would
overturn the antitrust exemption. Others, including baseball
owners, disagree. The issue would be resolved with certainty if
the exemption were removed. I believe that no court would rule
that preventing a minor league player from joining a competitive
major league was consistent with the antitrust statutes.
Whether minor leaguers and potential entrants would derive
significant value from removing the antitrust exemption is
unceirtain. The last remotely successful entry of a new league
was the World Hockey Association of more than twenty years ago.
Between 1960 and 1970, the WHA, the American Football League, and
the American Basketball Association all managed to enter and to
survive long enough to force a merger with the established
league. Since then, several new leagues have been attempted, a
few have actually played, but none has succeeded. The history of
the past twenty years is pretty convincing that the entry
barriers in professional sports are high, even with antitrust
exposure. Indeed, as the USFL case demonstrates, an entrant can
even be forced out of business by anticompetitive practices that
are found in violation of the antitrust statutes without the
incumbent monopolist suffering any serious consequences beyond
the legal costs.
An entrant in every sport faces a long list of serious
problems. First, the existing leagues are very large and
national in scope. To be attractive to broadcasters, and to
convince fans that the newcomer is a serious major league, the
entrant would have to be national in scope and large. Entering
against 28-team leagues is much more difficult than entering
against leagues with between nine and 16 teams. Second, a new
league would have to enter in the biggest cities. In many cases,despite the outcome of Hecht, exclusive stadium leases stand in
the way. In many cases, the established teams have contract
provisions that give them the rights to concessions at all events
in the stadium, not just their own games, so that a competitor
would be in the peculiar position of letting the incumbent team
earn the concession profits from its games. Moreover, the
established leagues have the benefit of long-term, subsidized
rental agreements for playing facilities that were signed under
the duress of a monopolized industry. These subsidies would not
go away for many years -- decades in some cases -- and so
constitute a permanent, unfair competitive advantage of the
incumbent, even if Hecht were enforced.
In the sports that are exposed to antitrust, these barriers,
plus the unwillingness of the courts to take strong action to
enforce antitrust in cases involving competitive leagues, have
proved sufficient to keep entrants out. Thus, there is no reason
for optimism that the removal of the antitrust exemption, by
itself, would induce a real threat of a competitive league.
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Nevertheless, the antitrust exemption should be removed
simply because an issue such as this should not be prejudged. If
a group of wealthy individuals and baseball-hungry cities want to
try forming a new league, the legal barriers to doing so ought to
be removed. There is no good reason for federal law to guarantee
that a third major league will never be created. Moreover, entry
is certainly more likely with the exemption removed. Hence,
removing the exemption could make baseball more willing to expand
as a preemptive move against entry, much as the first baseball
expansion was a response to the threat posed by the formation of,
the Continental League.
Beyond Removing the Exemotion
By itself, removal of baeball's antitrust exemption would be
desirable. But an important implication from recent sports
history is that this action does not go far enough. Congress
needs to do more. The other sports have structural problems like
baseball's, despite their susceptibility to antitrust. What is
needed is some additional positive action that would eliminate
the single most important structural problem in sports: lack of
competition among teams and leagues for fans, as manifested most
clearly by the gap between the number of teams and the number of
viable franchise locations.
The structural problem of sports is unlikely to be solved
without action by the federal government. Private antitrust
litigation can provide financial relief for aggrieved parties and
can force important accommodations from the leagues, but it is
not likely to lead to the right structural outcome. The ideal
industrial structure for a sport is to have multiple competing
leagues, none of which honors or is bound by the business rules
of the others. Each league would decide its own membership;
however, its decisions on whether to expand and where to locate
its teams would not be subject to the approval of others. This
arrangement would dramatically alter the incentives governing
expansion and team location decisions.
Imagine a world in which all four major league baseball
divisions make independent decisions about where to locate a
team. For starters, two would find themselves without a team in
at least one of the three largest markets. These divisions would
be disadvantaged in negotiating broadcasting contracts, and so
would welcome the possibility to expand into them, or to relocate
a weak team to a big city. Of course, none of the existing sites
would actually be abandoned, for they all are viable -- someone
will pay a high price to own a team even in small cities, as
shown most recently by the sale of the Seattle Mariners. Hence,
these cities, even if abandoned, would be immediate expansion
targets by competing leagues seeking to collect the expansion
fee. Then, three divisions would discover that they lacked a
team in America's fastest growing market, Florida. St.
Petersburg, with a ready-made stadium, would certainly be snapped
up quickly. Indeed, from the experience of the most recent
expansion, potential owners of expansion franchises have been
identified in several major cities (including Washington). Can
anyone imagine that the National League East would continue to
protect the Baltimore Orioles if the American League East ceased
to have a say about its expansion decisions?
Likewise, each league could develop its own player market
rules, its own broadcasting arrangements, and its own revenue-
sharing rules. None would have antitrust significance, because
each league would provide a competitive alternative for a player,
broadcaster, city stadium authority, or even owner who did not
like one league's rules.
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Sports as a whole would still have some legitimate need for a
cooperative organization. The antitrust laws would not stand in
the way of common playing rules, cooperation in scheduling (with
an agreement about sharing the revenues from interleague games),
a jointly-managed sport-wide championship playoff, and a common
set of behavioral rules for participants in the sport. Pairs of
leagues could also negotiate joint regular-season play and
revenue sharing of interleague games. And each sport would need
a central office -- a commissioner -- to oversee the legitimate
collaborative activities. All of these arrangements have
business justifications in that owners, players, fans,
broadcasters and others involved in sports would all benefit from
them. The antitrust laws do not stand in the way of such
agreements.
If the ultimate objective is business competition but
sporting cooperation within a sport, there are three paths to
achieving it: regulation, litigation, and legislation. All three
are better than the status quo; however, I do want to express a
preference for a simple piece of legislation that not only
removes the baseball antitrust exemption, but that states some
simple ground rules for all professional team sports.
The regulation approach was last discussed in Congress in
connection with various legislative proposals to deal with
franchise relocations. In essence, it means setting up some
broad guidelines governing the activities of sports leagues, and
then asking a government agency -- perhaps a new one, perhaps one
of the antitrust agencies -- to develop the details and enforce
them. For example, Congress might state that all sports had to
expand by a "reasonable number" of teams at a "reasonable rate,"
beginning with two shiny new baseball and football teams in, say,
1995. The vagueness in the law would derive from the difficulty
of knowing exactly how far expansion should go: how many cities
without a team could support one, how many teams could be added
without seriously eroding the quality of play, and which cities
ought to have multiple teaas -- and how many? These are the
kinds of questions that Congress must ask the bureaucracy to
decide, for it has neither the time nor the resources to make
these decisions itself, especially on a continuing basis.
The difficulty with this approach is that our system of
government requires that regulatory agencies be quite
inefficient. They face significant legal hurdles in imposing
significant economic harm on anyone, and they are easy to hang up
in long and costly legal battles. And the fight over which two
cities deserve the next two baseball teams is going to be small
potatoes compared with the battles in the past over which company
deserved the next fighter contract or the next airline route.
The political system does not seem to be a good candidate for
picking which cities ought to have baseball teams.
The litigation strategy requires a federal antitrust attack
against sports. Thus, in addition to the line removing the
baseball exemption, Congress could, through legislation, the
budget process, and oversight hearings, instruct the Federal
Trade Commission and/or the Antitrust Division to investigate
sports for the purpose of determining whether an antitrust action
seeking structural relief was warranted. If so, the Congress
could appropriate incremental funds necessary to carry out this
litigation.
The problems with this approach are easy to identify. First,
Congress cannot predetermine the outcome, nor can it even
predetermine that federal antitrust action is warranted. In the
end, the court will be the major player if this strategy is
followed, making the outcome uncertain. Second, major antitrust
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cases are very time consuming and expensive. For example, the
investigation leading to the antitrust case against AT&T
proceeded for seven years before the case was filed, and then for
ten more years through litigation, settlement and implementation,
all the while consuming scores of lawyers and not an
insignificant number of economists.
The legislation strategy is to state with precision a few
things that sports-wide associations (like Major League Baseball)
are not permitted to do. After the sentence removing the
antitrust exemption, the law would state that no league within a
sport could at present account for more than a third of the
existing teams, and that in the future mergers and switches of
teams between leagues would be permitted only if they did not
violate the concentration thresholds of the merger guidelines,
with the unit of analysis for concentration calculations being a
league. This would force baseball to break into three leagues --
or, more likely, the existing four divisions. The law would then
prohibit:
* Collaboration between leagues in the sale of rights
for broadcasting other than for interleague
post-season championship playoffs, and in honoring
exclusive territories in local broadcasting;
* Mutual recognition among leagues of restrictions on
the competition for players, such as rookie drafts,
waiver rules, minor league drafts and promotion
rules, and restrictions on free agency after the
expiration of a contract; and
* Agreements between leagues about franchise locations,
expansion, procedures for stocking expansion teams,
and compensation by one league for invasion of the
franchise territory of another; and
* Exclusive agreements for sports facilities that go
beyond securing the facility for the dates that are
necessary for a team to complete a regular-season
schedule and to secure options for playoffs.
Finally, the list would clearly state that it does not provide
antitrust immunity for practices not listed. Instead, all other
practices would be subject to antitrust scrutiny by the courts,
including rules within leagues as well as between them. And the
new act would repeal the Sports Broadcasting Act that gave
leagues an antitrust exemption for negotiating national broadcast
contracts, and the amendment to the 1967 tax bill that gave a
partial antitrust exemption to the merger of the AFL and NFL
insofar as the latter legislation went beyond the limits
described above.
By taking such action, Congress would solve the structural
problem within baseball and the other sports by making them
structurally competitive. Congress would also achieve this
result without costly litigation, without delay, and without
creating new uncertainties about the future of sports. Fans will
benefit from the ensuing competition by having more variety in
sports broadcasting, by expansion into markets not now served,
and by introducing the possibility of competition for fans in the
larger cities. Players will benefit by the expansion in jobs and
the creation of something more akin to a normal labor market in
sports. Broadcasters will benefit from the availability of
sports programming in a competitive environment in which a
network need not buy rights to the entire industry to secure a
national contract.
372
JOSE" " BEE - DELWARE CAN
E W D M KENNEDY MSACHUSEr STCM U DOND SOUH OACU
OWDM MEMMAUM OHIO OR C HA CH tTm
DENNIS DECONCI. ARIZOA ALAN C SIMPSON WYOMING
PATIC, 3 LEA.VERMWON CARS E SSG  . IOWA
HOWELL EFLN ALABAMA AALEN SPECTER PENNSYLVANtA
PAUL SIMON ILLINOIS HANK BROWN COLORADO
HUBET KOHL, WISCONSIN Sutd tasA at
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
WASHINGTON. DC 20510-6275
January 11, 1993
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I-Dear Professor Noll:
Thank you for testifying at the December 10, 1992
Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopolies and Business Rights hearing
on baseball's antitrust immunity. Your views on this issue are
greatly appreciated and very helpful.
- Unfortunately, due to the time constraints on the day of the
hearing, there are a few questions that were not answered.
Please respond, in writing, to the following questions no later
than Monday, January 25, 1993:
Chairman Metzenbaum's questions:
1) In their testimony before the Subcommittee, the baseball
owners claimed that an antitrust exemption was necessary for
them to prevent the relocation of baseball franchises. The
owners even suggested that their good record of preventing
such relocations, and thereby ensuring franchise stability,justified continuation of their antitrust exemption. How
does Baseball's record on franchise stability compare with
other sports leagues, and do the owners need an antitrust
exemption in order to block ox approve franchise
Vti relocations?
) Do the baseball owners need an antitrust exemption in order
to sanction owners, managers, players who violate a specific
league rule or whose conduct is at odds with the best
interests of baseball?
3) At the subcommittee's hearing, your colleague, Professor
Roberts, stated that lifting the antitrust exemption would
expose baseball to a flurry of antitrust litigation under
the rule-of-reason test that would have unpredictable
results. Is his concern justified based on the experience
of the other sports that are subject to the antitrust laws?
4) How would lifting baseball's antitrust exemption benefit
minor league players?
5) The owners have suggested that numerous teams are already
losing money, that tv revenues will fall after next year,
that costs are rising rapidly, and that there is a
significant and potentially destabilizing disparity of
income between large and small-market teams. If baseball is
in such a dire economic situation, wouldn't that counsel
against revoking their antitrust exemption?
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6) In your testimony you suggested that it is in the owners'
best financial interest to create an artificial scarcity of
baseball franchises. You testified that there is enough
demand for as many as 40 or 50 more teams. What evidence do
you have that the owners have created an artificial scarcity
of teams and what affect would such a scarcity have on
cities and fans?
Senator Thurmond's questions:
1) Please comment on what you consider the appropriate role of
the Baseball Commissioner to be, especially in the context
if an antitrust exemption?
2) Please address the legal argument, which Mr. Roberts and
others propound, that q sports league should be viewed as
one legal entity incapable of conspiring with itself under
Section 1 of the Sherman Act?
3) Please state, as succinctly as possible, who will benefit
from repeal of the antitrust exemption and how?
4) As I understand it, you believe that repealing the antitrust
exemption is either not necessary and/or not sufficient to
cure the structural problems inherent in the business of
baseball. You propose additional action that would have to
be undertaken either legislatively or in the form of
regulation. At a time when de-regulation is thought to be
the better approach for all but the iost urgent problems,
how do we justify federal government regulation of an
entertainment industry such as baseball? Are we not better
off repealing the antitrust exemption and leaving the
outcome to market forces?
I look forward to working with you in the future as the
Subcommittee continues its work in this area.
Again, thank you for your contribution.
Very sincerely yours,
Howard M. Metzenbaum
Chairman,
Subcommittee on Antitrust,
Monopolies and Business Rights
HMM/eao
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Senator Howard M. Metzenbaum, chairman
Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopolies
Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate
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Dear Senator Metzenbaum:
I am responding to your letter of January 11 in which you asked
me several questions about baseball's antitrust immunity and
operating methods. I am herewith providing some brief answers.
Unfortunately, because your letter did not reach me until January
20, I have been unable to take the time necessary to unearth any
facts to buttress or illustrate my answers.
I will procede to answer both your and Senator Thurmond's
questions as they were listed in your letter.
Senator Metzenbaum's Questions
1. An antitrust exemption is necessary for baseball to prevent
some but not all movements of team franchises. Although I am not
a lawyer, my understanding of the antitrust cases involving team
movements is that a league can establish rules that create
obstacles to team movements, as long as the reasons and effects
are not antitcompetitive, and as long as the movement does not
require approval by an unreasonably large majority of other
owners. For example, the antitrust laws have been interpretted
as saying that leagues may not stop a movement because one team
wants to invade the territory of another for the purpose of
competing with it. In short, a league can stop a move, or any
change of ownership, if the league has a legitimate business
reason for doing so. For example, if a city cannot support a
team because it is too small, other owners, because of revenue
sharing arrangements and the necessity for all teams in a league
to be financially stable, can veto the move.
In practice, this issue is not very important, because few teams
move in any sport, and in any case leagues usually do not attempt
to prevent moves. The recent notoriety surrounding the sale of
the San Francisco Giants notwithstanding, baseball has not
attempted to stop very many franchise moves in its history. The
current policy seems to be to try to find a local buyer who is
willing to pay close to the same price as a bidder from another
city, but to permit moves if this cannot be done -- unless the
propsective owner wants to move a team into a city occupied by
another major league team, in which case the move always will be
stopped. Baseball did not attempt to stop the movements of the
Washington Senators to Texas, the Seattle Pilots to Milwaukee,
the Kansas City Athletics to Oakland, or the Los Angeles Angels
to Anaheim. Indeed, in the past three decades, baseball has not
stopped very many moves. Most likely, some team would now be in
St. Petersburg had it not been for the baseball policy, and
Denver might have succeeded in attracting the Oakland A's a
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decade ago rather than wait for an expansion franchise in 1993.
Whereas only baseball's executives know their roles in franchise
moves, I do not know of any other times that baseball management
has stopped a team from moving.
Despite the hand-wringing about franchise moves, the issue is not
greatly significant. The vast majority of owners do not want to
move their teams, and will not do so regardless of the antitrust
status of baseball. And, when teams are offered for sale, in the
vast majority of cases the old owner finds a buyer in the same
city. The reason is that almost all existing franchise locations
are financially more attractive than all but two or three cities
that do not now have teams. Moreover, one of the attractive
locations -- Washington, D.C. -- is probably out of bounds for
either a team movement or an expansion franchise because the
owners would allow the Baltimore Orioles to veto it. Thus, the
frequency of franchise moves that might be stopped only because
of the antitrust exemption is far too low to weigh heavily in an
evaluation of the exemption.
Let me also briefly reiterate what I said in December, and have
said in previous hearings on this topic. Franchise movements are
not intrinsically bad. When they are blocked, the effect is to
disappoint fans in a city without a team but with sufficient fan
interest to be a viable franchise site. Team movements create a
public issue solely because there are too few teams. If baseball
had steadily expanded during the 1970s and 1980s in proportion to
the growth of interest in the sport, cities like St. Petersburg
would already have a team. Franchises move only if attractive
markets have no team.
2. As in the previous question, baseball owners do not need an
antitrust exemption to discipline owners, managers and players
who violate the behavioral rules of the sport as long as there is
a legitimate business interest in enforcing the rules. The NFL
and the NBA have successfully banned, fined or suspended players,
owners and managers for misconduct without any antitrust
repercussions. Colleges and universities, which are subject to
the antitrust laws, as demonstrated when they lost cases
involving NCAA broadcasting rights and common scholarship
practices for entering students, can legally discipline students
for violating the NCAA's behavioral rules. Thus, baseball does
not need antitrust immunity to impose penalties on numerous
people in the sport over gambling, drugs, and other actions that
harm baseball. Indeed, if these rules are the outcome of
collective bargaining, they are immune from antitrust in any
case. And, even with antitrust immunity, baseball sometimes
loses these cases on other grounds unrelated to antitrust, as
with the recent case involving Steve Howe. Basically, the only
benefit to baseball from the antitrust exemption regarding
discipline is that baseball can ban a player for life for playing
with a competitive league -- as it did with the players who
signed with the Mexican League in the late 1940s. This
"disciplinary" action should not be permitted, but it has been
because of the antitrust exemption.
3. Professor Roberts' view is partly correct in the following
sense. If baseball does not change its most obviously
anticompetitive practices, it will probably be sued. But, two
points should be kept in mind. First, most sports antitrust
suits are filed by players, and as long as baseball has a
collective bargaining agreement, the major league players, at
least, will not be able to sue. However, the minor league
players may be able to sue, depending on whether courts rule that
the labor exemption for collective bargaining extends to the
rules pertaining to them. Such a ruling would be bad public
policy; however, I do not know for sure whether it would be a bad
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reading of the labor exemption. Second, the precedents in other
sports are likely to carry over into baseball, so that baseball
is unlikely to face a completely different set of antitrust
constraints than the other sports. Baseball owners, by examining
these precedents, can avoid most of the litigation by simply
studying these cases and changing their practices accordingly.
Thus, if baseball experiences a "flurry of antitrust litigation"
it will be because they failed to learn from the experiences of
other leagues.
4. If baseball did not have an antitrust exemption, several
aspects of minor league operations would need to be seriously
reexamined, and I believe that many would have to change. The
National Agreement specifies the relationships among all
professional baseball leagues, and much of it is probably not
legal under the antitrust laws. The agreement covers not only
the player market, but also relations among leagues and teams
that amount to agreements not to compete. An example is the
agreement about relations among leagues of the same
classification, and about the arrangements when a team in a
league with a higher classification moves into the territory of a
team in a lower league.
Certainly the most important single issue would be the rookie
draft, which serves to bring most players into the minor league
system who have any serious chance of playing major league ball.
Similarly, the minor league draft, whereby teams of higher
classification draft players from teams of lower classification,
would also be brought into question.
One can imagine three distinct paths for minor league baseball
players, and I do not know which will emerge after the antitrust
exemption is lifted. The first would be that the present system
would be replaced by a system like the one that existed before
the draft was instituted in 1964: competition among teams
(including minor league teams as well as majors) for rookies.
Most likely, teams would sign players to multiyear contracts, and
then lower-classification teams would sell players with unexpired
contracts to teams with higher classification. Unlike the old
system, however, players with expired contracts would be free
agents, just as are veteran major leaguers. The second
possibility would be that minor league players would be
unionized, and would sign an agreement that kept more or less the
present system, in return for better terms of employment. The
third possibility is that the major league players would expand
their collective bargaining agreement to incorporate the minor
leagues. If the major league players did not make minor league
players full union members, a legal issue would arise whether the
major league players could extend the labor exemption for
antitrust to minor league arrangements. If they could not do so,
perpetuation of the present minor league system would have to be
accompanied by benefits for minor leaguers. Note that in all
three cases, minor league players would be made better off, for
they would either receive the benefits of competition or receive
some additional compensation or security for agreeing to the
present restrictions.
5. The financial conditions of baseball are not relavent to the
question of whether it should have an antitrust exemption. For
example, we should not tolerate price fixing among the nation's
airlines because the recessaion has caused nearly all of them to
lose money, and in the recent antitrust complaint against some
prestigeous universities, the current financial crisis in higher
education was not an issue in whether price-fixing in tuition isjustified. If the nation's great universities can get along
without an antitrust exemption during a period of financial
retrenchment, so can major league baseball.
377
Several points should be kept in mind when discussing baseball's
finances. First, the best indicator of the financial health of a
business is how much it is worth. And the weakest baseball
franchises are worth approximately $100 million -- ten times as
much as they were worth twenty years ago, and three times as much
as they were in the early 1980s. Second, baseball financial
statements are not very meaningful indicators of the viability of
the sport. There is no publicly determined standard for baseball
accounting that corrects for numerous common practices that
understate the profitability of teams. Examples are sales of
local broadcast, concession and luxury box rights to corporate
affiliates at prices less than the market value, and salaries of
executive/owners that vastly exceed the payments to executives in
other enterprises of the size and complexity of a sports
franchise.
Moreover, many teams are hobbies of wealthy owners, and are
purposely operated more extravagantly than a normal small
business. I was once told by the late Phil Wrigley that every
September he would inspect the books, estimate the likely profit
of the Cubs, and then enter contracts for renovating Wrigley
field or the Cubs' spring training facilities so that the team
would show no profit. In poor years, he would simply not spend
money on these items. As a result, the Cubs occaisionally showed
losses, but never showed significant profits. I personally had
great respect for Mr. Wrigley, partly because of his candor. But
during his tenure as owner, the "precarious" financial position
of the Cubs as "revealed" by the financial statements was
obviously an illusion -- and equally obviously did not justify an
antitrust exemption.
Quite possibly, baseball will not receive as large a national
broadcasting contract next time around. But, so what? The
decline of national rights is due in part to the fact that the
national broadcasters are experiencing ever greater competition
from local rights sold through superstations and regional cable
networks. Local cable revenues are increasing rapidly, and on
balance probably will more than offset the decline in national
rights. And, even if it does not, the most important cost items
to teams -- salaries to players, coaches and management -- are
detetained by revenues. They will simply decline (or, more
likely, grow less rapidly) if revenues decline (or, more likely,
grow less rapidly).
Finally, the disparity in team revenues and financial performance
is due to baseball's failure to adopt more generous revenue
sharing. Sports leagues do not need an antitrust exemption to
share revenues, for revenue-sharing has no adverse effects on
competition. Revenue sharing can make the rewards to good
management more equal across different markets. Indeed, as was
brought out in the recent antitrust case against the NFL, revenue
sharing can be so extensive that it actually eliminates the
financial incentive to field a winning team.
A core principal of antitrust is that if businesses want to
engage in a cooperative practice that has a legitimate
justification, they are required to adopt the least
anticompetitive practice that can accomplish this objective.
Baseball wants to keep its antitrust exemption because it wants
to help the financial position of weak teams by harming players,
broadcasters and fans through monopolistic practices. Of course,
these practices actually help the strong teams more than they
help the weak. Society does not need to subsidize the Yankees
and the Dodgers in order to keep Milwaukee and Seattle
financially viable. Instead, this objective can be accomplished
-- if it is needed -- through revenue sharing.
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6. In my testimony, I thought I said that baseball could expand
to as many as 40 to 50 teams, not that it could add that many.
The evidence that this is so has two main elements. The first is
the expressed willingness of propsective owners to buy expansion
franchises. When baseball announced its most recent expansion,
groups in about a dozen cities expressed their willingess to pay
the expansion fee to join the league. The price was $95 million,
plus no share of national broadcast rights in the first year
(1993). Even more propsective owners would have been found if
either league had permitted expansion into a city that already
has a team. The best indicator that baseball has many more
viable franchise sites than teams is the expressed willingess of
intelligent business executives to pay this much for a new team.
The second piece of evidence arises from study of the factors
that determine the revenues of a team, the most important of
which is the population base of a metropolitan area for ticket
sales and of a region for local broadcast sales. Many cities are
comparable in size and other relevant characteristics to the
smaller third of cities that currently have teams. Examples are
Buffalo, Indianapolis, Memphis, New Orleans, Orlando, Phoenix,
San Antonio, St. Petersburg/Tampa, and Washington, D.C.
Conceivably, Charlotte, Portland, Salt Lake City and Vancouver,
Canada, could also succeed even though these areas have a smaller
population because of their large regional broadcasting markets.
And, additional teams probably could succeed in some of the
largest markets -- most clearly New York in the Jersey
Meadowlands.
The important point about scarcity is that the price of a team
reflects almost entirely its scarcity value. When a baseball
franchise is sold, the buyer acquires almost no assets of value
other than the right to join an exclusive club. The expansion
teams, for example, had the right to "draft" players from
established teams; however, they could as easily have populated
their rosters through signing free agents and making use of the
minor league system for a few years before entering the league,
as they have in part. The latter would have been a little more
expensive -- perhaps as much as an additional ten million dollars
a year in salaries plus three million in minor league subsidies
for a couple of years. But that still makes the franchise alone
worth $70 million or more. This part of the franchise value is
the capitalized value of the baseball monopoly to a member team.
Senator Thurmond's Ouestions
1. The appropriate role for the baseball commissioner is to be
the final authority on the noneconomic aspects of the management
of baseball. The commissioner should handle the enforcement of
the behavioral rules of owners, players, managers and coaches,
and the process of overseeing, developing and modifying the
playing rules. Baseball refers to these duties as related to the
"integrity of the game." These activities must be separated from
the business activities of the sport in order to remove any
possibility that these decisions would be tainted by economic
considerations.
Specifically, I do not believe that the commissioner should be
deeply involved in such business decisions as collective
bargaining, negotiating broadcast contracts, undertaking
expansion, or overseeing franchise relocation decisions. One
reason is that the commissioner is appoiinted solely by the
owners. Obviously, an independent commissioner will on occaision
make decisions that a majority of owners oppose; however, a
commissioner will always be selected to pursue the business
interests of the owners. The disagreements that develop are
likely to be about means and strategies, rather than ends.
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The problem of the commissioner's biases and interests would not
be solved by allowing players to have a say in the selection of
the commissioner. Whereas this would allow baseball to have a
genuinely neutral referee in collective bargaining disputes, it
would not solve the problem of the unrepresentation of fans,
cities, broadcasters and other affected business interests in
baseball decision making. Owners and players share an interest
in running baseball in a way that maximizes the wealth of the
participants in the sport, even if this is at the expense of
fans, local governments, and other industries.
All cartels suffer from the problem that some clever members
occaisionally figure out ways effectively to defeat the cartel's
rules against competition. I prefer a baseball structure in
which the commissioner is not able to punish people in the
industry who find ways to introduce more competition into
baseball.
2. Professor Roberts' view about the "single entity" concept in
sports needs to be broken into two parts. First, the league
central office is most definitely a joint venture among the
teams. In selling a league's national broadcasting rights and
the league logos for promotional purposes, it does act as a
single entity. Second, the individual teams need to cooperate
(usually through league auspices) to settle on common playing
rules, revenue-sharing agreements, a schedule, and a playoff
system. In my view, the only practice in these two categories
that is contrary to the public interest is the method of sharing
national broadcasting rights. I believe that congress should
appeal the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961, which granted leagues
an antitrust exemption for selling exclusive national television
rights to their games.
Having identified some aspects of sports leagues that are truly
joint activities among teams, I do not believe that it makes
sense to think of all of the teams in a league as branches of a
single business (like branche outlets of Macy's). The reason is
that all of the legitimate collaborative functions can be
undertaken without the need for eliminating competition in both
the player market and the output markets. Indeed, the NCAA does
this all the time. The college conferences in the NCAA are
operated independently. They compete in selling broadcast rights
(having lost an antitrust case on this issue), in selling tickets
to games, and in arranging bowl games. Nearly all major
metropolitan areas have several Division I basketball teams, and
many have more than one Division I football team, all of whom
compete. And several conferences and teams independently sell
local, regional and national television rights. The NCAA, which
is not exempt from antitrust, has no trouble surviving antitrust
scrutiny when it disciplines players and coaches, when it
establishes uniform playing rules, and when it arranges for
national championships. Yet it does run into problems when it
tries to adopt uniform business practices or otherwise to
cartelize its members.
The important point is not whether professional leagues behave as
if they were single entities, rather than competing businesses.
Obviously, in many ways they do so behave. But some of these
activities are perfectly legal and legitimate. Others exist
purely because of antitrust expemptions, and are unnecessary.
Still other business activities -- such as setting ticket prices,
selling local broadcast rights, and negotiating employment
arrangements for executives, coaches and free agent players --
are done completely independently. Even in baseball with its
antitrust exemption, owners have created a structure in which
many decisions by a team are made completely independently of the
other teams -- and in competition with them. These facts
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demonstrate to me that no league is a single entity, and that no
league ought to be. I should add that no court has ever found
otherwise in adjudicating antitrust disputes.
3. Repeal of the antitrust exemption will provide the following
benefits:
A. Major league players need not fear that owners will fail to
renegotiate a collective bargaining agreement, declare an impasse
in bargaining, and reestablish the old "reserve clause" to
eliminate veteran free agency and salary arbitration. Under the
antitrust exemption, baseball players do not have the option that
players in the other sports have used: use antitrust to prevent
owners from unilaterally monopolizing the player market.
B. Minor league players will benefit in the ways described in
answer to Senator Metzenbaum's Question #4. Specifically, they
will be able to move to another minor league system if their
advance to their parent major league club is blocked, and they
will either have some freedom in their own player market or will
be able to use the propsects for freedom to gain the strength
necessary to form a union and bargain collectively.
C. Prospective competitors who might seek to form a new major
league will benefit in that the barriers to entry will be lower.
They will have access to minor league players to help populate
new major league teams, and their players (including those who
might jump from existing major league teams) will not risk a
lifetime banishment from baseball for doing so. Note that 25
percent of the old USFL players played in the NFL the year after
the USFL folded. These players did not risk a pro career by
playing for a new league. But if a third major league were to
form, the players who joined the new teams would risk such a ban
if the league did not succeed.
D. Fans and cities would benefit to the extent that the repeal
of the antitrust exemption did lower entry barriers for new
leagues by enough to threaten the existing structure. Fans and
cities might benefit from the entry of a new league, but this is
not the most likely outcome. Instead, the source of the benefit
most plausibly would be more rapid expansion of the existing
leagues in order to keep new entrants out. In any case, more
cities and more fans would have teams.
E. Broadcasters, advertisers and fans would benefit if the
repeal of the antitrust exemption included repeal of the Sports
Broadcasting Act. Professional sports on TV would come to look
more like iitercollegiate sports: more games being broadcast,
with more opportunities for advertisers, especially small, local
businesses, to buy advertising. As an illustration of the last
point, Ira Horowitz concluded from a study of sports broadcasting
that the most likely cause of the demise of smaller local and
regional breweries was the rise of national sports broadcasting.
Only very large national firms can derive full value from
nationally broadcast events, and as a result, national sports
advertising by a few large breweries drove the smaller firms out
of business.
4. I do not believe that the best cure for the structural
problems in sports is regulation in the sense of the creation of
a government agency to monitor sports and to make rules regarding
its business practices. Obviously, the nation has a deep problem
with even the sports that do not have an antitrust exemption.
The scarcity of teams has made sports franchises exteremely
valuable, and has given teams the power to extract hundreds of
millions of dollars in subsidies from financially strapped local
governments. Yet, unlike in other industries, these conditions
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have not caused new businesses to enter major league sports.
Through the structure of player reservation systems, stadium
contracts, national broadcasting contracts, and, or baseball,
minor league arrangements, competitive leagues have been forced
out or kept out for more than twenty years.
I believe that the simple solution to this problem is divestiture
within the existing sports. That is, force all of the existing
major league sports to divide into no fewer than three
independent leagues. These leagues could develop common playing
rules, behavioral rules outside the economic realm (e.g., drugs,
gambling, etc.), and championship playoffs. But they would not
be permitted to honor each others' territorial rights, to adopt
rules for acquiring players that limited interleague competition,
or to collaborate in selling their broadcasting rights. This
solution most assuredly does not require the establishment of a
regulatory agency. It could be accomplished by the Department of
Justice or the Federal Trade Commission through antitrust action,
but to do so would probably require repeal of the existing
exemptions: not only baseball's blanket exemption, but the sports
Broadcasting Act and the AFL-NFL Merger Amednment. It would also
be greatly facilitated by a special appropriation for this
purpose. Another approach would be to pass legislation removing
the baseball exemption and specifying that no sports league
having restrictions between teams regarding competition and a
common expansion policy could constitute more than forty percent
of the major league teams in a sport or eight teams, whichever is
larger. This provision should be written to bar common business
arrangements in a sport even as part of a collective bargaining
agreement.
The effect of the divestiture approach would be to enable us to
rely on market forces, rather than regulation, antitrust
exemptions and strong commissioners, to serve the interests of
fans. The most important single effect would be that leagues
would begin to compete for franchise locations, and so would race
to expand to any unoccupied attractive market. Hence, we would
not need to worry about franchise relocations, for attractive
alternative sites would be fewer, and attractive vacated sites
would soon be reoccupied.
An interesting parallel can again be made to interaollegiate
sports. Obviously, colleges do not relocate; however, leagues
are constantly forming and reforming in order to make member
teams more attractive to their fans. And, colleges frequently
move from one classification to another, depending on their
success. A wonderful example is the University of Nevada at
Reno, which moved to Division IA in football in 1992 -- and
managed to go to a bowl game during its first season. The
reformations of league arrangements, the entry of new teams, and
even the exit of unsuccessful ones, reflects the market at work.
I would like to see the professionals, who do it for the money,
subject to the same free market principles as the colleges, who,
with few exceptions, are not so motivated.
Visiting Professor, UC San Diego
Morris M. Doyle Professor,
Stanford University
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Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much, Mr. Noll.
Mayor Jordan, we are very happy to have you with us, sir, and
I think pursuant to the instructions that I have received from Sen-
ator Feinstein, you will be able to get your plane out in adequate
time. She gave me very strict instructions and I always do what
she tells me to do.
STATEMENT OF MAYOR FRANK M. JORDAN
Mayor JORDAN. Thank you, Senator Metzenbaum. I appreciate
the courtesy, and I also appreciate, as the mayor of San Francisco,
this opportunity to address you and the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee here today.
I did not travel to Washington, DC, as an attorney or as an anti-
trust expert or someone who is a professional knowing ins and outs
of professional baseball, but I do sit before you today as the mayor
of a major American city to describe to you what the people of San
Francisco did to keep their baseball team.
There is no doubt in my mind that a major league baseball team
is an important part of any city's identity. Fortunately, the current
system of baseball's governance recognizes this fact and works to
preserve baseball's relationship with our communities.
Just a few months ago, I recall arriving at city hall to discover
that the owner of the San Francisco Giants baseball franchise had
announced an agreement in principle to sell and relocate the Gi-
ants to St. Petersburg, FL. In fact, he said that he had a binding
contract that already had been signed. It was a terrible day, obvi-
ously, for the people in San Francisco, and while the citizens in
Tampa Bay at the same time were rejoicing at the prospect of lur-
ing the Giants away from my city, the residents of San Francisco
were devastated by the news.
Thirty-four years earlier when the Giants came to San Francisco,
I was a young San Francisco police officer. I remember the sense
of excitement and joy that filled the streets of our city and the
neighborhoods. It was a proud time. Even before the Giants ar-
rived, San Francisco had always been a baseball town. We gave the
Nation Joe DiMaggio and many other legendary ballplayers. In
fact, some of my best childhood memories are of watching the San
Francisco Seals at old Seals Stadium at 16th and Bryant.
But it wasn't until 1958 that the San Francisco Giants were ob-
tained as a major league team for our city. In 1958, when the Gi-
ants arrived, jubilant fans crowded Market Street to welcome their
new team and its stars, like Willie Mays, with a tickertape parade.
People of all ages and backgrounds rejoiced together in the Giants'
arrival. The children of San Francisco had new heroes and a new
reason to be excited about their lives.
I remember just like it was yesterday Willie McCovey's perfect
four-for-four day against Philadelphia's legendary Robin Roberts in
his major league debut at old Seals Stadium. I remember when our
city erupted with joy in September 1962 when the Giants won their
first pennant for San Francisco.
Since 1958, almost 50 million people have watched the Giants
play baseball in San Francisco. Millions more have followed games
on television, radio, and the local newspapers. Every year, thou-
sands of San Franciscans make their pilgrimage to Arizona for
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spring training. The Giants have become a part of the city's culture
that affects the daily lives of many of our residents.
On August 7 of this year, however, San Franciscans were forced
to collectively consider the prospect of losing their baseball team
and all that came with it. Although some local radio personalities
repeatedly told their listeners that the Giants were gone, I and
thousands of other people in my great city refused to give in.
Baseball is more than a game and baseball is more than just an-
other business. Most baseball teams play in ball parks built withpublic support, and also with public financing. Teams are granted
eases on favorable terms and they often have standard taxes
waived. All of this is done in recognition of the importance of major
league franchises and what they represent both on an emotional
and economic level.
There is no doubt the Giants are a valuable asset to San Fran-
cisco. The Giants provide entertainment for people of all ages and
all backgrounds. The Giants create economic opportunities for the
city's residents and they produce economic benefits in tens of mil-
lions of dollars for the city and the surrounding area.
In the days following August 7, San Franciscans launched an all-
out effort to save their team. Rallies were organized. Fans mailed
hundreds of thousands of letters and postcards to former Commis-
sioner Fay Vincent and to other owners. Local organizations formed
to save the Giants received thousands of calls each day from fans
eager to help in the effort to save our team. Businesses purchased
additional season tickets and business leaders joined forces to put
together an offer to buy the team so that it could continue to play
in San Francisco.
Although we never saw a copy of the agreement to move the Gi-
ants to Florida, we knew that under major league rules the sale
required the approval of the owners of both leagues. We also knew
that major league baseball had traditionally taken a stance strong-
ly discouraging franchise relocations. We knew that many of the
Nation's mayors and elected officials supported the policy of fran-
chise stability and have voiced their support before this and other
congressional committees.
We knew that baseball had just successfully encouraged the city
of Seattle to find local ownership in an effort to save the Mariners
franchise. We knew that the cities of Montreal, Pittsburgh, San
Diego, and others had successfully campaigned to save their teams
in the past.
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much, Mayor. The con-
straints of time are forcing me not to permit you to go on, but we
will include the balance of your statement in the record.
Mayor JORDAN. Thank you very much, Senator.
[The prepared statement of Mayor Jordan follows:]
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Remarks For Senate Judiciary Committee
Hearings on Major League Baseball's Antitrust ExemptiOn
My name is Frank M. Jordan. I am the Mayor of the City and County of San Francisco.
It is an honor to appear before you today.
I have not traveled to Washington as a lawyer or as an expert in antitrust law. Ihave
not come here as an expert in baseball. I sit before you today as a mayor of a major
American city to describe for you what the people of San Francisco did to keep their
team. A major league baseball team is an important part of a City's identity.
Fortunately, the current system of baseball governance recognizes this fact and works
well to preserve baseball's relationship with our communities.
Just a few months ago, I arrived at work to discover that the owner of the San Francisco
Giants baseball franchise had announced some sort of an agreement to sell and relocate
the Giants to St. Petersburg, Florida. It was a terrible day for the people of San
Francisco. While the citizens of the Tampa Bay Area were rejoicing in the prospect of
luring the Giants away from San Francisco, the residents of San Francisco were
devastated by the news.
Thirty-four years earlier, when the Giants came to San Francisco, Iwas a young San
Francisco police officer. I remember the sense of excitement and joy that filled the
streets and neighborhoods of the City. It was a proud time. San Francisco had long
been a great baseball city - it gave the nation Joe DiMaggfo and many other legendary
.ballplayers. But It did not have a major league team.
That all changed in 1958. Jubilant fans crowded Market Street to welcome their new
team and its stars, like the young Willie Mays, with a ticker tape parade. The mood was
reminiscent of the many celebrations held around the country to embrace the return of
our young soldiers from World War H. People of all ages and backgrounds rejoiced
together in the Giants' arrival. The children of the City had new heroes, a new reason to
be excited about their lives.
Since 1958, almost 50 million people have watched the Giants play baseball in San
Francisco. Millions more have followed games on television, radio and in the local
newspapers. Every year, thousands of San Franciscans make their trip to Arizona for
Spring Training. The Giants have become a part of the City's culture, and the daily lives
of many of its residents.
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On August 7th of this year, however, San Franciscans collectively considered the
prospect of losing their baseball team and all that came with it. Although some local
radio personalities repeatedly told their listeners that the Giants were gone, I and
thousands of other people in my great City refused to believe them.
Baseball is more than a game and baseball is more than just another business. Baseball
teams play in ballparks built with public support and financing. Teams are granted
leases on favorable terms and they qften have ordinary taxes waived. All this is done in
recognition of the importance a major league franchise represents, both on emotional
and economic terms. The Giants are a valuable asset to the City. The Giants provide
entertainment for people of all ages and backgrounds. The Giants create economic
opportunities for the City's residents and produce economic benefits in the tens of
million of dollars for the City and its people.
In the days following August 7th, San Franciscans launched an effort to save their team.
Rallies were organized. Fans mailed hurdred of thousands of letters and postcards to
former Baseball Commissioner Fay Vincent and to the other owners. Organizations
formed to save the Giants received thousands of calls each day from fans eager to help
In the effort. Businesses bought new season tickets and business leaders joined forces to
put together an offer to buy the team so that it could continue to play in San Francisco.
Although we never saw a copy of the agreement to move the Giants to Florida, we
knew that under Major League rules, the sale required the approval of the owners of
both leagues. We knew that baseball had taken a stance strongly discouraging franchise
relocations. We knew that many of the nation's mayors and elected officials supported
the policy of franchise stability and have voiced their support before this and other
congressional committees. We knew that baseball had just successfully encouraged
Seattle to find local ownership in an effort to save the Mariners franchise. We knew that
the citler of Montreal, Pittsburgh, San Diego and other cities had successfully
campaigned to save their teams in the past. In fact, only ten teams have moved away
from their home city since 1903, and none in the last twenty years.
In early September, I went to New York to meet with Bill White, the President of the
National League. I told Mr. White that the City had a vital economic interest in the
Giants franchise and had important contractual rights under the Stadium Lease.
Without giving us any assurance of success, Mr. White told me that the League would
consider a competing offer from San Francisco. Under the agreement to sell the Giants
to Florida interests, the Giants owner allegedly promised to refuse to deal with all other
who wanted to buy the team, even with those from San Francisco. Without the
League's intervention, we would not have been permitted to submit a competing offer
and the voices of Giants fans in San-Francisco would not have been heard or considered.
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I cannot begin to tell you the amount of time and work that my staff and other officials
of our city government devoted to this effort I can tell you, however, that it was and
continues to be worth every minute. In entering the competition to save our own team,
I vowed that we would fight hard, but we would fight fair. We never did anything to
disparage the current Giants' ownership or those who were seeking to acquire our team.
As you know, on November 10, 1992, having in hand the offer from San Franciscans
- who stepped forward to save the team, the National League voted overwhelmingly to
reject the proposed sale and transfer of the Giants to Florida. Baseball officials made
clear that the-reason for the decision was their policy of promoting stability of
franchises. As I said publicly on that day, I was both gratified that our efforts had
succeeded and sorry for the people of the Tampa Bay area.
The sad truth is that in any competition, there is only one winner. San Francisco was
the winner in this instance, and I am certainly glad for that But the key point is that
this was a competition. In fact, it was Major League Baseball's policy of franchise
stability that allowed a competition to occur. Had it not been for baseball's policy, and
the requirement that new buyers' obtain the approval of Major League Baseball, San
Francisco would never have had the opportunity to compete. The Giants might have
left in the middle of the night, the way the professional football Colts left Baltimore for
Indianapolis. Major League Baseball's policy of franchise stability prevented that from
happening and gave San Francisco a chance to put together a strong offer and one of the
strongest ownership teams in professional sports.
Ibelieve that giving franchise cities this opportunity is good for baseball and good for
the country. Obviously, it has also been good for the cities of San Francisco, Seattle,
Chicago, Oakland, Minneapolis, Montreal, San Diego, Pittsburgh, Houston and many
other cities that have found themselves in a position where an owner sought or
threatened to relocate a baseball team.
Thankfully, baseball's current system of governance allowed the voices of the fans to be
heard and gave our and many other communities an opportunity to gather the support
and funds needed to save our teams. We are glad that in baseball, an owner cannot
unilaterally decide to move a team away from its city and fans in the dark of the night.
The current system gives our communities a fair opportunity to compete to keep our
teams and as such, the current system is vital to preserving the stability of baseballas
America's national pastime.
Thank You.
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Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much.
Mr. Dodge, we are very happy to have you with us, sir. You are
assistant city manager of the city of St. Petersburg.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD B. DODGE
Mr. DODGE. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, it is good
to be with you. My name is Rick Dodge. I am the assistant city
manager of the city of St. Petersburg, FL. I am here today to rep-
resent the city and its taxpayers. I represent 4.6 million people of
Tampa Bay. I represent 31,000 fans who reserved season tickets for
baseball at St. Petersburg, FL, Suncoast Dome, and 60 corporations
that have reserved stadium luxury suites. I also represent fair-
minded individuals from cities throughout the United States that
have been leveraged by major league baseball and have witnessed
the unjust, unwise, and unfair business practices of those in charge
of America's game.
The antitrust exemptions that we are discussing today have al-
lowed major league baseball to artificially restrict the supply of
baseball franchises, and thereby artificially increase their value.
The unfortunate result of this practice is it positions one city
against another, and regardless of the outcome both cities lose.
Baseball can thank St. Petersburg for new, generous stadium
leases it signed in Oakland and the new publicly financed ball park
in Chicago and the new ownership groups in Seattle and San Fran-
cisco. In most cases, taxpayers pick up the tab for the new stadi-
ums, generous leases, and team subsidies. Fans pay a higher price
at the gate and proceeds go to the pockets of baseball's elite group
of owners.
Tampa Bay's recent efforts to purchase the San Francisco Giants
best exemplifies the various methods baseball employs to skirt the
law, operating accountable to no one with exemptions to the Sher-
man Antitrust Act.
On August 6, 1992, Bob Lurie signed a $115 million agreement
in principle to sell the Giants to a Tampa Bay ownership group led
by Vince Naimoli. This agreement, through further negotiations,
evolved into a contract for sale, conditioned subject to the approval
of major league baseball. Between the time the offer was submitted
on August 6 and rejected by baseball on November 10, Tampa Bay
fans watched in quiet desperation as officials in baseball conspired
to thwart the team's move to Florida while it extracted financial
gains from San Francisco.
Consider these points. Point: If Bob Lurie owned a troubled fi-
nancial business in any other industry than baseball, he would
have been free to sell his company to the highest bidder regardless
of the bidder's intentions to relocate the company. Even though
Tampa Bay's offer was $15 million higher than San Francisco's
offer, and originally $20 million higher, 75 percent of the National
League owners did not approve the sale. Such rules requiring ap-
proval of team location would be in violation of the Sherman Anti-
trust Act as an unreasonable restraint of trade, as ruled by the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit during a similar dis-
pute over the relocation of the Oakland Raiders football franchise.
If football, basketball, and hockey teams operate successfully with-
out the antitrust exemption, why should baseball be any different?
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Point: Bob Lurie entered into an exclusive agreement to sell his
team to the Tampa Bay ownership group, a stipulation which pro-
hibited him from accepting or negotiating any other offers until
baseball had voted on the sale. At the September baseball meet-
ings, National League President Bill White made a statement that
deserves repeating. He said, "Bob Lurie is a man of his word and
he has given the St. Petersburg group his word he will not accept
an offer. I will accept an offer. I will accept an offer from the people
in San Francisco and the league will have to decide what they will
do with that offer."
Not only do White's words constitute interference with Tampa
Bay's exclusive offer, but his subsequent actions should provide
enough evidence to this subcommittee that the administration of
the industry of baseball is inappropriate with the antitrust exemp-
tions. What Bill White was saying is Bob Lurie is a man of his
word, but baseball is not so bound.
Point: In disallowing the sale to the Tampa Bay investors, base-
ball reiterated its longstanding policy against the relocation of fran-
chises. Relocation is the longstanding policy of baseball. Since
1901, 12 franchises have relocated. Among those who benefited
from such relocation, Peter O'Malley, who led the opposition
against the Giants' move to Tampa Bay, owns a team that relo-
cated from Brooklyn to Los Angeles in the late 1950's. Today,
speaking before you, Acting Commissioner Bud Selig operates a
franchise that moved from Seattle to Milwaukee in 1970.
Point: Baseball made this decision to protect the fans in San
Francisco. This past season, San Francisco recorded the second
lowest attendance in the league. The area's fans rejected four ref-
erendums during the past 10 years to build the Giants a suitable
stadium. In an October survey of the San Francisco Examiner, only
50.7 percent of fans said they would be disappointed if the Giants
moved to Florida. Most ironically, San Francisco fans are just 6
miles away from another major league baseball franchise in Oak-
land. If the fans were the primary interest of baseball, why
wouldn't baseball reward Tampa Bay's 31,000 season ticketholders
with a franchise?
Point: The fans are the bottom line that motivates baseball. In
a letter sent to Florida Governor, Lawton Chiles, by Miami Marlins
owner Wayne Huizenga on October 23, 1992, Huizenga expressed
his concern over the Giants relocation to Florida, raising the issue
of potentially lost future expansion fees. He asks, "To whom does
that premium belong, major league baseball or Bob Lurie?" By pro-
hibiting the relocation of the Giants to Tampa Bay, baseball owners
have retained the opportunity to share a $100 million expansion
fee at an undetermined future date. Were it not for the antitrust
exemption, this might be construed by a court of law as stifling free
and open commerce and demonstrating anticompetitive behavior.
Point: Major league baseball adopted rules in recent years re-
quiring parties involved in sale and relocation to execute indemnity
agreements whereby baseball officials are insulated from any liabil-
ity or legal redress. Officials in both San Francisco and Tampa Bay
signed such letters of indemnification, leaving baseball free to oper-
ate with impunity regardless of how improper its conduct may be.
This policy, too, could be construed as an antitrust violation.
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As I push through on this, I want to summarize by a couple of
points. One, San Francisco and St. Petersburg have both lost in
this transaction. San Francisco has retained its franchise, and that
is important, but in the process they have given up $3 million in
revenue for the operation of their stadium. It also must proceed
with plans to build a new park to replace Candlestick if it hopes
to retain the team in the future. Ironically, the ownership group
that last week signed outfielder Barry Bonds to a 6-year, $43 mil-
lion contract will ask taxpayers to bear the costs of a lengthy legal
battle in court. St. Petersburg has also lost, and those economic
factors are well shown in my written presentation.
I would like to take my last minute to sort of respond to some-
thing I heard earlier and, Senator Feinstein, it comes from your
comments about trying to determine whether you were talking
about a game, a business, or an athletic contest, and I think that
is very important to this committee to understand the difference.
Baseball has three distinct faces. The first face is the sport, that
dynamic and exciting athletic contest that takes place between the
foul lines. It has rules that are precise, observable, and enforceable.
The second face is the game, that mystical and romantic embodi-
ment of our culture, our history, and our childhood richly described
by the late Commissioner Bart Giamatti as the only game where
one-
Senator METZENBAUM. Please wind up, Mr. Dodge.
Mr. DODGE. OK-starts from home and then returns there.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Dodge follows:]
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TAMPA BAY AND ITS PURSUIT OF
MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL
Testimony to be presented before the Committee on the Judiciary
Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopolies and Business Rights
Richard B. Dodge, St. Petersburg Assistant City Manager
December 10, 1992
My name is Rick B. Dodge. I am the assistant city manager for
the city of St, Petersburg, Florida. I represent the city and its
taxpayers, which negotiated a 27-year lease to house the Giants in
the city's Florida Suncoast Dome. I also represent 4.6 million
people within a 2-hour drive of the dome, and the 31,000 fans who
put down deposits to purchase season ticket reservations and the 60
corporations that reserved luxury suites. I represent the State of
Florida which became an economic partner in this venture by
committing $2 million a yepr for a thirty year period to aid the
capital construction of the facility. And, finally, I represent
fair-minded individuals from throughout the country who see the
latest actions of Baseball as unjust, unwise and unfair for both
the fans and for "America's Game," the sport of baseball. In my
left hand is a baseball, symbolic and emblematic of the game. This
baseball is now also ironically symbolic of Major League Baseball's
latest effort to avoid ethical business practices by denial of
Tampa Bay's recent relocation efforts. This baseball was signed on
August 6, 1992 in the office of Bob Lurie, the owner of the San
Francisco Giants. The signataries include Bob Lurie and his key
executive staff; Vince Naimoli, the Managing General Partner of the
Tampa Bay Investor Group; and a number of St. Petersburg City
officials who attended the meeting. The baseball is a memento of
a business agreement by the Tampa Bay Investor Group to purchase
the Giants for $115 million. The signing of that agreement in
principle, and the signing of this baseball, did not happen easily
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or quickly. It capped off a 14-year effort by Pinellas County, the
Pinellas Sports Authority and the City of St. Petersburg to bring
baseball to the biggest market in the nation's fourth largest
state.
In 1976, Bob Lurie purchased the Giants and was heralded as
the savior of baseball for the San Francisco community. At that
point in time, the ball club was in the process of being sold to an
investor group from Toronto, Canada. Mr. Lurie led a civic effort
to purchase the club with the intention of maintaining it in the
Bay area. It is important to note that Mr. Lurie is a San
Franciscan with deep roots in his community. His family included
a former Mayor of San Francisco, his business holdings are in that
city, and he is considered to be one of the first citizens of the
area. During the next 18 years, Mr. Lurie did everything in his
power and in his pocketbook to make the San Francisco Giants
successful both athletically and financially. The athletic
successes came with division championships and appearances in the
World Series. But, the financial success was never present.
A major reason for the lack of financial success was a poor
and inadequate baseball stadium affectionately known as The Stick,
where cold, gale force winds produce fans wearing parkas in August
and the highest revenue from hot coffee sales in the league. It is
a ballpark so hated by players that it is referred to as tDevil's
Island," and many players have stipulated in their contracts that
they cannot be traded to San Francisco because of the quality of
the playing conditions. If the players don't like the park, the
fans like it even less. They showed their dislike through
declining attendance. This year alone, the Giants have the second
lowest attendance in the National League.
Bob Lurie, understanding that the future financial stability
was tied to a modern baseball park with quality playing conditions
and the normal compliment of revenue producing opportunities,
attempted over a period of six years to construct a new ballpark.
On four occasions, two in the City of San Francisco, one in Santa
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Clara, and one in San Jose, the voters (more specifically the fans)
of the Bay area denied approval of the construction of a new
ballpark even though it was clear that failure to do so placed the
franchise in jeopardy of moving. Only after the failure of the
last referendum, only when Lurie was experiencing annual losses of
between $5 to $10 million, only when all efforts had been exhausted
to find any local ownership group that would pay him market value
for his team, and only after being frustrated by a number of failed
efforts to bring the community together in consensus did Bob Lurie
gain permission from Fay Vincent to enter into explorations, dis-
cussions and ultimately a contract to sell and relocate the Giants.
When the last referendum failed on June 2, 1992, Bob Lurie
wrote to San Francisco Mayor Frank Jordan on June 8 to advise him
that he was considering relocating the team. On June 11, Commis-
sioner Fay Vincent stated in New York that Mr. Lurie is free to
pursue all the ranges of options available to that ball club.
With that public announcement, with no ownership group
assembled or coming forward in San Francisco, and only after the
assurances of Giants officials that they had the permission and
authorization from the commissioner of Baseball and the President
of the National League, did representatives of Tampa Bay initiate
discussions for the sale and relocation of the Giants. Those
negotiations were finalized in an agreement in principle executed
on August 6, 1992, the same day this baseball was signed by the
principals. We then began a chronology of events that demonstrate
how Major League Baseball's exemption from the anti-trust legisla-
tion permits them to twist and bend communities on both coasts of
this country for purposes described as "the best interest" of the
game.
The original timetable, suggested by Bob Lurie and to our
knowledge with the approval of Major League Baseball, was for
approval of the Tampa Bay Investor Group and the vote on relocation
of the franchise occurring during the September 9 meeting of
baseball in St. Louis. It soon became clear, however, that some
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baseball officials would delay and filibuster the process to
develop a bid from San Francisco. The first step in the approval
process was for a group of owners, known as the Ownership Commit-
tee, to review the credentials and financial capacity of our
proposed ownership group. Trying to obtain instructions from the
Ownership Committee staff was extremely difficult. Continual
changes, revamps of partnership agreements, all done at great time
and great expense, were completed, and the Tampa Bay Investor Group
was told finally that everything was in place and ready for
approval. However, at the same time, some members of the Ownership
Committee said publicly that they had not received all the
information they needed to make a final recommendation. Finally,
Vince Naimoli, the Managing General Partner of our ownership group,
in frustration and anger, begged attorneys representing Major
League Baseball to detail specifically what was required to permit
the Ownership Committee to act. These delay tactics stalled the
vote on the ownership group and on relocation at the September
meetings of Major League Baseball.
But perhaps the biggest surprise during those September
meetings was National League President Bill White's announcement of
his intent. He indicated that Major.League Baseball would accept
a purchase offer from yet unnamed San Francisco investors. No
timetable was set, and no requirements for a competitive bid were
set. This was done despite an exclusive contractual requirement
between the Tampa Bay Investor Group and Bob Lurie requiring he
would neither accept nor negotiate other offers on his team until
Major League Baseball had acted on the Tampa Bay offer. President
White's words at that press conference deserve repeating: "Bob
Lurie is a man of his word and he has given the St. Petersburg
group his word that he will not accept an offer." White said, "I
will accept an offer. I will accept an offer from the people in
San Francisco and then the League will have to decide what they
will do with that offer." That statement in itself should provide
evidence enough to this subcommittee and to Congress that anti-
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trust exemptions are inappropriate in terms of the administration
of the industry of Baseball. What Bill White was saying is Bob
Lurie is a man of his word, but Major League Baseball is not so
bound. Bob Lurie is a man who honors contracts executed; Baseball
may alter agreements as it sees fit. Bob Lurie is an ethical
individual who has exhausted all opportunities in the San Francisco
Bay area to solve his financial problems, but Major League Baseball
as an industry has another agenda outside the normal practices and
ethics of business transactions, and it may act in such a way
because it considers itself not bound by any Antitrust laws.
After White's press conference, Major League Baseball did
everything in its power to induce an offer in San Francisco, and,
at the same time, stall action on the bona fide offer from Tampa
Bay. The Mayor of San Francisco met with President Bill White;
formal deadlines for receiving an offer were extended time and time
again.
Finally, when a San Francisco Group was assembled, investors
had serious concern that their submission of an offer would be
ruled as tortiously interfering with the contractual relationship
between Bob Lurie and the Tampa Bay investment group. Clearly,
that was a valid concern and still is. As a result, the investors
in San Francisco turned to their political leaders and said they
were unwilling to submit an offer unless the City of San Francisco
would indemnify them against lawsuits that may evolve from the
Tampa Bay investors or the City of St. Petersburg. What choices
did supervisors in the City of San Francisco have? Major League
Baseball, through that investor group, had leveraged the City of
San Francisco to take an unpopular, difficult and financially risky
position. This indemnification was considered so onerous and
dangerous that a coalition of San Francisco neighborhoods sued the
Board of Supervisors in San Francisco Superior Court attempting to
nullify the indemnification. And, an attorney in San Francisco
wrote a guest column for the San Francisco Examiner on October 21,
1992. The attorney said, "Our mayor and supervisors have sold us
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a bill of goods in promising to indemnify the local investors
trying to veto the Florida sale. They are going to bankrupt San
Francisco ..... "
Furthermore, the investors in San Francisco said it was clear
that this ball club could not be financially successful in Candle-
stick Park and, since there was no ability to construct a new
facility, the city would need to eliminate all rent paid at
Candlestick Park. The City of San Francisco had little choice but
to approve the demands of the investor group. The Mayor agreed to
relinquish all of the $3 million of revenue paid in forms of rent
and expense reimbursements by the ball club to further induce the
group from San Francisco to make an offer. This rent reduction
requirement seems particularly questionable in light of the Decem-
ber 7 announcement that the Giants have signed outfielder Bobby
Bonds to a six year $43 million dollar contract.
George Shinn, a Charlotte, North Carolina businessman and NBA
owner, joined the group in a leadership position. Major League
Baseball was then faced with the potentially embarrassing possibil-
ity of having to act on a local ownership group in San Francisco
led by a businessman from Charlotte, North Carolina. No public
objections were raised by Major League Baseball during Mr. Shinn's
flirtation with leading the group, despite Baseball's longstanding
tradition for local ownership. Suddenly at the last minute, George
Shinn withdrew, indicating he and the other investors in San
Francisco had fully analyzed the situation and concluded the team's
records were "worse than we expected. We knew they'd be bad, but
we didn't know they'd be disastrous." However, the very next day,
October 12, Peter Magowan replaced George Shinn as the Managing
General Partner and the group presented a $95 million offer to the
National League. Why would Mr. Shinn withdraw and all jointly
issue a statement that the business enterprise could not be finan-
cially successful, only to be followed the next day with the
announcement from one of the primary investors in the Shinn group
that he was proceeding to put an offer on the table?
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Furthermore, after the $95 million offer was submitted, it was
adjusted upward to $100 million. Also, the first offer that went
to Major League Baseball included the new San Francisco ownership
group retaining the Giant's $11 million share of the expansion fee.
After concerns and complaints were brought to attention by the
national media, the San Francisco Group altered its bid to permit
Bob Lurie to retain the Giant's $11 million share of the expansion
fee. These details demonstrate continual shaping of the bid offer
by officials in Major League Baseball to move it toward a position
that would be accepted.
During this entire process, National League President Bill
White said he would not conduct an auction. In reality, however,
that is specifically what he did. With one bona fide bid in hand
for $115 million from the Tampa Bay Investor Group, Major League
Baseball proceeded to leverage investors in the City of San
Francisco to push their bid upward.
On October 17, Bill White and representatives of the Ownership
Committee finally met in person with Vince Naimoli, Managing
General Partner of the Tampa Bay Investor Group, and Jack
Critchfield, a Tampa Bay civic leader. During that meeting, Jack
Critchfield asked Bill White if he would give Tampa Bay its oppor-
tunity to increase its bid since he was accepting increases to and
changes in the offer from San Francisco investors. Bill White and
the members of the ownership Committee reacted with shock and
surprise, and said that no increases by the Tampa Bay Investor
Group would be permitted, that the Tampa Bay offer was adequate and
Baseball was not conducting an auction. Clearly, it was a reverse
auction, and Major League Baseball's reluctance to accept any
increase in offer from the Tampa Bay Investor Group underscores the
strategy of closing the gap between the two bids, thus making the
San Francisco bid appear more "competitive." Also, at that
meeting, the rules for the percentage of equity investment were
changed for the Tampa Bay Investor Group. Originally the Tampa Bay
Investor Group was told it would be required to put up 60% equity
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against 40% debt. At this meeting in Atlanta, it was then
indicated that the Tampa Bay Investor Group would be required to
put up 66% equity against 34% debt. Also, for the first time, the
Tampa Bay Investor Group was told that limited investors of a
million dollar size would not be acceptable. As a result of the
Committee's new requirements, Vince Naimoli quickly replaced or
increased the size of million-dollar investors, increased the
amount of equity to the 66% level and also raised additional equity
to remove Bob Lurie's participation.
On October 28, the San Francisco group increased its offer to
$100 million. It is clear that the full content of the Tampa Bay
offer was discussed with and profiled to the competitive group in
San Francisco, and at the same time alteration and increases in the
San Francisco offer were permitted while the Tampa Bay Investor
Group was denied the opportunity to adjust its bid. On October 29,
the Commissioner's office announced a special League meeting in
Scottsdale, Arizona on November 10 and 11 to consider the Giants
situation. At no time was there an indication that there would be
a final decision at that meeting, only that considerations of the
situation will be examined. No deadlines were set because Major
League Baseball was concerned that they would not have a "competi-
tive" counter offer to put on the table at the decision point.
During the week prior to the November 10 and 11 meetings in
Scottsdale, Arizona, there were strong indications reported in the
media that the San Francisco offer had numerous conditions that
were not acceptable to Major League Baseball. During the weekend
and up until the meetings commenced on November 10, new information
and changes in conditions were permitted by Major League Baseball
in the San Francisco offer. Bill Giles, the owner of the Philadel-
phia Phillies, depicts the rapid and last minute changes that were
permitted by Major League Baseball in an article in the St.
Petersburg Times on November 12: He said, "When I left for
Santa Fe on Friday, I felt convinced it would end up in Tampa Bay,
because the deal (the San Francisco investor offer) really wasn't
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a deal. But when I got there, they changed it completely and took
out all the loop holes and that's what made the difference."
Finally, with all the maneuvering completed, the National League
voted on November 10 to reject the proposal to sell and relocate
the Giants to the Tampa Bay Investor Group.
In his remarks to the media announcing the vote of the
National League, Bud Selig, chairman of the Executive Council,
summed up the decision. He said, "I think the National League was
very sensitive today and pursued the same consistent policy both
leagues have for a long time."
I would agree with Mr. Selig's remarks that Major League
Baseball pursued consistent policy. That policy fails to comply
with the spirit or substance of the Antitrust laws that every other
sports league in the country must follow.
What are the results of this situation, Baseball having
leveraged both the communities of San Francisco and Tampa Bay?
Both cities have lost. The City of San Francisco has retained its
franchise but it has given up all revenue for the operation of its
stadium that comes from that baseball team. In times of tightening
financial budgets in San Francisco, that loss of $3 million a year
is significant. Furthermore, the City of San Francisco has been
forced to indemnify the investors who have put forward a bid to
purchase the Giants from Mr. Lurie. The City of San Francisco is
now engaged in lawsuits with the Tampa Bay Investor Group and the
City of St. Petersburg. These lawsuits will be costly to taxpayers
in bbth cities and the potential exposure to the City of San
Francisco could suffer could be in the billions of dollars.
The City of St. Petersburg has also lost. It has lost the
opportunity to bring major league baseball to Tampa Bay. It has
lost a minimum of 27 years of revenues to its stadium that team
would provide. It has lost the economic impact that team would
bring to the west coast of Florida. Furthermore, it has lost the
opportunity to receive the $2 million per year State revenue that
the State of Florida had committed for stadium capital improvements
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had the team had been allowed to come to Tampa Bay. It has also
now been leveraged into a position that, to protect its contractual
rights, it has joined with Tampa Bay Investor Group to pursue
remedies of tortious interference against the investors in the San
Francisco group and also officials in San Francisco.
Major League Baseball would tell you that it has created
stability by this process, and protected the longstanding tradition
of not allowing the relocation of a franchise. Ironically, base-
ball's spokesperson and Chairman of the Executive Council,
Milwaukee Brewers owner Bud Selig, would not own the Milwaukee
Brewers had the team not been permitted to move from Seattle in
1970. Similarly, the primary opponent to the Giants' move to Tampa
Bay, Peter O'Malley has also benefitted from relocation. The
Dodgers moved from Brooklyn to Los Angeles in the late 1950s.
Baseball has not created stability, nor has it preserved a long-
standing tradition. Baseball's longstanding tradition is reloca-
tion, and by using and playing one city against the other, they
have created serious and unnecessary legal and financial problems
in both areas.
If the motive of disallowing the relocation of the Giants to
Tampa Bay was to protect the fans, it is important to examine the
history of fan support in San Francisco. As stated earlier, the
Giants' attendance was the second lowest in the league during the
1992 season, while nearly 31,000 Tampa Bay fans waited with season
ticket reservations for baseball at the Florida Suncoast Dome.
Fans had four opportunities to build the Giants a suitable home
through failed referendum attempts. And, surveys conducted
throughout the past months showed dwindling support for keeping the
Giants in San Francisco despite the threat of a move. In an
October survey of 610 San Francisco area taxpayers, only 50.7%
responded that they would be disappointed if the Giants left for
Florida, down from 64.3% in an identical pole conducted in April,
1992. Ultimately, if the fans were the primary interest, San
Francisco fans would still be accessible to a major league
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franchise in Oakland, just six miles away. Fans in Tampa Bay,
however, are 250 miles from the nearest Major League franchise.
In a letter Miami Marlins Owner Wayne Huizenga sent to Florida
Governor Lawton Chiles on October 23, 1992, it was not the issue of
protecting the fans that stirred protest from baseball, but the
issue of a future expansion fee. Huizenga asked, "To whom does
this premium belong - Major League Baseball or Bob Lurie?." By
prohibiting relocation of the Giants to Tampa Bay, baseball has
retained a lucrative future expansion market and the $100 million
fee that will be collected and shared by all baseball owners at a
future date, yet undetermined.
The Sherman Antitrust Act is a key component of the free
enterprise system and is a foundation of our country's economic
structure. That legislation prohibits any contract, combination or
conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce and it punishes those
who monopolize or combine or conspire with others to monopolize any
part of such trade or commerce. If it were not for the blanket
antitrust exemption enjoyed by Major League Baseball, Bob Lurie
would have been free to maximize his profits by selling the Giants
to the Tampa Bay Investor Group with the Giants then being
relocated to St. Petersburg.
On the basis of the Antitrust exemption and the absence of any
form of governmental regulation, Major League Baseball is free to
operate in the clandestine, cloak and dagger fashion it does with
secret meetings, hidden agendas and collusion among the owners and
administrators of baseball, and with outsiders such as San
Francisco politicians and investors.
If Bob Lurie had owned a financially troubled business in any
industry other than baseball, he would have been free to sell his
company to the highest bidder regardless of the bidders' intention
to relocate the company. Or, Mr. Lurie would have been free to
move the company to a location where it would have been profitable
and have had a more positive economic impact while continuing to
own the company.
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However, the rules of baseball require that 75 percent of the
National League owners and a majority of the American League owners
had to approve the sale and relocation of the Giants, and even Mr.
Lurie's vote was deemed invalid.
Such rules requiring approval of team location could be a
violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act as an unreasonable restraint
of trade. The United States Court of Appeal for the 9th Circuit so
ruled in the case involving the relocation of the Oakland Raiders,
since professional football does not possess an exemption from
antitrust violations.
Bob Lurie agreed with the Tampa Bay Investor Group that its
contract would be an exclusive one, and that Mr. Lurie would not
negotiate for the sale of the Giants with any other party.
Notwithstanding that fact and against Mr. Lurie's wishes, National
League President Bill White negotiated with the San Francisco
investors regarding the sale of the Giants; accepted a bid on a
team he did not own; and worked with the San Francisco investors to
revise the bid until it was in a form acceptable to Major League
Baseball. Major League Baseball officials and individuals from San
Francisco conspired and combined forces to frustrate what otherwise
would have been a straight forward, fair market transaction and, in
essence, compel Mr. Lurie to accept $15 million less for his team.
In the absence of the Antitrust Exemption, such conduct by
Major League Baseball would be a violation of the Sherman Antitrust
Act. Furthermore, there is legal authority for the proposition
that if an exempt entity steps outside its sphere of exemption to
conspire with a non-exempt entity, it loses its exemption. There-
fore, it is possible that Major League Baseball in fact has
violated the Antitrust Laws by conspiring with the San Francisco
investors and politicians, notwithstanding the extent of the
exemption from Antitrust.
In the letter mentioned earlier sent by Wayne Huizenga, the
owner of the expansion Florida Marlins, to Florida Governor Lawton
Chiles, Mr. Huizenga's rationale would seem to be that profits from
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the sale of the Giants would go to Mr. Lurie while expansion fees
are shared by all clubs. Major League Baseball's categorization of
the Tampa Bay area as a territory for future expansion and its
resulting disapproval of the relocation of the Giants to St.
Petersburg has stifled free and open commerce; constitutes anti-
competitive behavior, and, in the absence of the Antitrust Exemp-
tion, presumably would be a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
In recent years, Major League Baseball has adopted a rule
providing it will not consider any sale and relocation of a team
unless the prospective purchasers execute indemnity agreements in
favor of Major League Baseball, whereby Major League Baseball and
its team owners and officials are insulated from any liabilities or
legal redress in connection with their consideration of such
relocation. In addition to the protection provided by the
Antitrust Exemption, Major League Baseball coerces potential
purchasers to provide contractual indemnity so that it can operate
with impunity regardless of how arbitrary, inequitable or improper
its conduct may be. This policy can have the effect of stifling a
competitive market place by driving away prospective purchasers and
to, a large extent, make the lords of baseball accountable to no
one.
Mr. Chairman, the judicially created exemption of Major League
Baseball from the Antitrust Laws is based upon what the lawyers
tell me is legal fiction. The legal fiction is that organized
baseball is not a business involved in interstate commerce. While
no court has ever held that the baseball owners are exempt from
antitrust liability for franchise relocation decisions, uncertainty
about the scope of baseball's exemption from the Antitrust Law
encourages the anti-competitive activity which has been so harmful
to Tampa Bay and other cities.
In 1922 when Justice Holmes authored the much criticized
opinion that gave baseball its Antitrust exemption, Major League
Baseball may not have been much of a business. But, in 1992 it
most assuredly is a very big business. As the book Baseball and
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Billions points out, Major League Baseball is a billion and a half
dollar annual industry. The revenues on its licensing of merchan-
dise alone rack up $100 million annually.
It was because of the Antitrust exemption that Baseball is
able to artificially restrict the supply of Major League Baseball
franchises and thereby artificially drive up the price. This
artificial restriction of supply has a number of results which are
contrary to good public policy. First, the artificially inflated
value of a franchise creates tremendous pressure upon competing
communities to subsidize the teams through rent concessions and/or
uneconomic leases. Second, the artificial restriction of supply
allows and permits competing communities such as St. Petersburg to
be used to leverage up the value of an existing franchise. Major
League Baseball can threaten to allow an existing franchise to move
solely in order to improve the bargaining position of the franchise
holder. Finally, the lack of Antitrust oversight allows "America's
Game" to conduct business in total secrecy, in a conspiratoriil
fashion and with disrespect for the public good.
Other United States sports leagues have operated successfully
without the Antitrust exemptions, including football, basketball
and hockey. Despite these successful models, the notion of an
outright repeal of the Antitrust Exemption that has existed for 70
years may be perceived as too precipitous an action. At a minimum,
we urge the Congress to provide legislative clarification of the
extent of the current Antitrust Exemption and to state clearly that
the Baseball Exemption has never extended to matters outside the
reserve clause and other player relation issues.
Mr. Chairman, St. Petersburg and the Tampa Bay Investor Group
have commenced a major legal challenge to seek redress for the
wrongs perpetrated upon us. The Florida Attorney General, Bob
Butterworth, has committed his Antitrust Division to assist us. We
strongly believe that we will ultimately prevail, and achieve
through the courts, redress for the conspiratorial activities of
Major League Baseball, the San Francisco investors and others.
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Unfortunately the continued existence of this historical anomaly of
the exemption of Baseball from the Sherman Act, much criticized by
legal scholars and economists, leaves the nation as a whole prey
for future conspiratorial acts of the nature which I have de-
scribed. The citizens of Florida urge you to adopt legislation
repealing the baseball exemption or providing legislative clarifi-
cation of the extent of the current exemption.
In regard to baseball, the sport and the country at a whole is
at a crossroads. As Yogi Berra said so well, "When you come to a
crossroads, take it."
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Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much.
Our next witness is Roric Harrison, who is a former major and
minor league player.
STATEMENT OF RORIC HARRISON
Mr. HAMSON. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of
the committee.
Senator METZENBAUM. Do you want to bring the mike a little
closer to you, please?
Mr. HARmSON. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of
the committee. My name is Roric Harrison. I was born and raised
in Los Angeles, CA, and I signed my first professional baseball con-
tract in 1965. In 14 years as a pitcher, I was fortunate to have
played with four major league teams for 4 years-the Baltimore
Orioles, Atlanta Braves, Cleveland Indians, and Minnesota Twins.
During my career, I watched a great many players who were un-
able to rise out of the minor leagues simply because the major
league owners' monopoly acts as a smothering grip on minor league
players. I wasn't a superstar, so I can say a few things on behalf
of all the players who ride buses overnight from one small town to
the next, making salaries that are laughable compared to the major
league minimum-$109,000, I believe it is now.
I left professional baseball in 1978, but have not forgotten what
it was like to climb up and stretch out in the overhead luggage
rack of a bus, uncramping my legs to maybe get some sleep before
pulling into a town just shy of daybreak.
During the same years that other men are developing career
paths in business, a minor league baseball player has no right to
interview with and move to a competing employer with a desirable
position, a better salary, or a greater opportunity for advancement.
When a minor league player finds himself bound to a big-league
team with an overabundance of talent, he has nowhere to go. He
can't move to a new team where he might have a better shot at
making the majors. Instead, he is under the complete control of one
employer for over 6 years, while sacrificing irreplaceable opportuni-
ties of youth.
Career opportunities are extremely limited on the major league
level, and matching your potential peak performance years with
available positions on a major league team can almost be impos-
sible. Restricted movement in any business creates limited opportu-
nities, but no business restricts opportunities and dreams like
baseball.
For example, as a AAA-level minor league ball player in 1970,I played winter baseball in the Mexican Pacific Winter League dur-
ing the off-season. American players often play in winter leagues
in Latin America to improve their skills, and more importantly to
generate an income. Baseball, you see, forces minor league players
to forego outside career development. A minor league player isn't
paid during the off-season. That means a player can't afford to go
to school or work on an entry-level position with the potential of
professional opportunities once he is washed up in baseball.
As I said before, minor league players are literally owned by
baseball. Houston had acquired exclusive rights to me in 1965 and,
in 1969, traded me to a team that became the Milwaukee Brewers.
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They would own me, unless they traded my contract or released
me, for the rest of my career. I was actually fortunate compared
to today's players. The summer after I negotiated my player con-
tract with Houston, new minor league players became subject to an
exclusive draft. They are now notified by whatever team has draft-
ed them that their only choice is to sign with that team or not play
at all. If they wait until the following year's draft, they are faced
with the same dilemma.
Anyway, I was enjoying tremendous success pitching in Mexico
that winter when I was approached by officials from a Japanese
team and asked if I would be interested in playing in Japan if they
could get my contract. I knew that in those days the few players
who were able to get out of their American contracts and go to
Japan had signed multiyear contracts for sizable salaries.
The Japanese league told me that if they could buy my contract
from Milwaukee, they could pay me what was equal to four times
what I was earning with that club and give me a guaranteed 2-
year contract with additional option years. They also offered to pay
my housing expenses during the contract years and provide four
trips to the United States each year. I told them if they could get
my contract from Marvin Milkes, the Milwaukee general manager
at the time, they would have a pitcher.
The Japanese gentleman later told me the Brewers turned down
their offer of up to $200,000 plus, saying that they wouldn't sell me
for any figure. So I was forced to remain with Milwaukee, and iron-
ically a few weeks later when I began to negotiate for the upcoming
year, all I heard from my GM was how bad I was and that it was
impossible to.give me a raise over the year before. A minor league
player has no leverage and almost no negotiating power.
After spring training camp in 1971, to my great joy, I made the
team and was in the Milwaukee bullpen opening day, but it was
too good to be true. After the first game, I was traded to the Balti-
more Orioles. That year, the Orioles were defending world champs.
Their pitching staff was already the best in baseball, and it was
back to the minor leagues for me. My other choice was to quit base-
ball.
There were other players on my AAA team who could have been
playing for any other major league team, and therefore at least 12
players with big-league experience and successful records who were
forced to stay in Rochester during the critical phase of their career
did not have the opportunity to go and further their major league
career. Because of a major league team that was loaded, they were
forced to stay there.
I was almost unhittable in 1971, going 15 and 5 with five shut-
outs in 1 month, and winning the Pitcher of the Year Award for
the AAA International League, but no callup from the Orioles.
Other teams, managers, and players came to me and said that par-
ent clubs were trying to trade for me, but the Orioles wouldn't
trade. I was backup insurance in case someone got hurt. My
dreams of being in the big leagues didn't matter at all.
It is fair to say that some players I knew went on to splendid
big-league careers and 1 extra year in the minor leagues probably
didn't mean that much to them. But, for me, that 1 extra year lost
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from the big leagues meant a 25-percent reduction per year in my
retirement pension, which wasn't that large in the first place.
What it meant to my career overall I will really never know, but
if Houston, Milwaukee, Baltimore, and those teams I was traded
to later had not had the special privilege of antitrust exemption,
they could not have owned me for my entire baseball career and
would not have been able to make my career choices for me. To-
day's drafted minor league players get locked up for as much as
6% years, not much better than it was when I was playing.
I am sure the major league club owners would argue that restric-
tions on movement for minor league players are necessary. They
say that they spend hundreds of thousands of dollars developing
each minor league player who makes it to the big leagues, so the
owners need to make sure that their investment is protected from
other owners who might otherwise raid the stable.
I believe it is possible to give the minor league players freedom
and still preserve the minor league system, but with license to act
as a monopoly, the major league owners have no incentive to find
alternatives. For example, they could use the entire minor league
system as a combined player development pool, dipping in and ac-
quiring someone from any team for a needed position based on abil-
ity, performance, and merit. That way, each owner wouldn't be lim-
ited to the best available player within their own system and a
minor league player wouldn't be a captive of his own organization.
The minor league teams are already supported almost entirely by
major league teams. This system would simply allow a player
blocked from the big leagues by a talent-rich team to go to another
big-league team and realize his life's ambition. A minor league
player out of college, if he goes to college, and most don't, is 22
years old and obligated to that team that drafted him until he is
28 years old or older before he gains the right to move to another
team of his own. Talent should flow where it is needed and players
who have the ability shouldn't be trapped in a dead-end organiza-
tion for the better part of their younger years. They deserve the op-
portunity to move to a team that needs them.
Players aren't the only victims of the restrictions imposed on the
minor leagues by the major league club owners. Towns and cities
that boast minor league teams are subject to the impact of business
decisions that they have no part in making. When a minor league
team is forced to change its affiliation with a major league team,
the whole operation can be uprooted and moved to a different city,
leaving the first community with an empty stadium and dis-
appointed fans. Over the years, I have watched Charleston, WV,
Louisville, KY, Evansville, IN, Winnipeg, AB, and many other com-
munities lose hometown teams, and I imagine the losses to mer-
chants and families were tremendous.
The fair play and team spirit that baseball teaches school kids
on playgrounds and Little League fields all over America shouldn't
have to be left on the field for those who grow and become profes-
sionals. When management has the advantage of being an unre-
stricted cartel for the 3,200-and I know Mr. Selig says 4,300-pro-
fessional players who are on minor league teams today and the
hope-filled kids who will be drafted next summer, baseball is no
longer a fair contest.
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I consider it a privilege and an honor to have played in the minor
leagues, and I loved it. I hoped to be speaking here today on behalf
of those minor league ballplayers because there is no one speaking
on their behalf. Mr. Febr represents the major league players.
There is no one speaking for minor league players, and I feel that
it is my part to say something on behalf of them because no one
else is.
Thank you very much.
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much, Mr. Harrison, for
very, very moving testimony on a matter that is-each time I read
about it or hear about it or talk about it, I am more and more
shocked, and I don't see how major league baseball can look their
families in the face and look the fans in the face and live with
themselves. I think the situation that prevails with respect to
minor league baseball players is an absolute abomination, and if
for no other reason, unless there is some action in connection with
it, I pledge I will lead the fight to repeal the antitrust laws. I am
not sure that that is the only answer, but maybe we need a law
that deals with this, whole question of indentured service in base-
ball and maybe we ought to do something on that subject alone re-
gardless of what we do about the antitrust laws.
Senator SPECTER. I would like to associate myself with the chair-
man's remarks about the poor treatment of the minor league play-
ers.
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you.
Mr. HARRiSON. Thank you very much.
[Mr. Harrison submitted the following material:]
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STATEMENT BY
RORIC HARRISON
FORMER MAJOR AND MINOR LEAGUE PLAYER
BEFORE THE
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ANTITRUST, MONOPOLIES AND BUSINESS RIGHTS
DECEMBER 10, 1992
Good Morning Mr. Chairman & Members of the Committee.
My name is Roric Harrison, I was born and raised in Los
Angeles, California, and signed my first professional baseball
contract for the 1965 season. In 14 years as a pitcher, I was
fortunate to have played four and one half years in the Major
Leagues with Baltimore, Atlanta, Cleveland and Minnesota. During
my career, I watched a great many players who were unable to rise
out of the minor leagues simply because the major league owners'
monopoly acts as a smothering grip on the minor league player.
I wasn't a super star, so I can say a few things on behalf
of all the players who ride buses overnight from one small town
to the next, making salaries that are laughable compared to the
Major League minimum. I left professional baseball in 1978, but
have not forgotten what it was like to climb up and stretch out
in the overhead luggage rack of a bus to uncramp my legs and
maybe get some sleep before pulling into town just shy of day
break.
I loved my years in minor league ball and am happy to have
had the experience, but I believe there must be a way for players
to have a shot at the big leagues without sacrificing
irreplaceable opportunities of youth.
During the same years that other young men are developing
career paths in business, the minor league baseball player has no
right to interview with, and move to, a competing employer with a
desirable position, a better salary, or a greater opportunity for
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advancement. When a minor league player finds himself bound to a
big league team with an over-abundance of talent, he has nowhere
to go. He can't move to a new team where he might have a better
shot at making the majors. Instead, he is under the complete
control of one employer for over six years.
Career opportunities are extremely limited on the major
league level and matching your potential peak performance years
with available positions on a major league team can be almost
impossible. Restricted movement in any business creates limited
opportunities -- but no business restricts opportunities and
dreams like baseball.
For example, as a AAA level minor league ballplayer in 1970,
I played winter baseball in the Mexican Pacific Winter League
during the off season. American players often play in the Latin
American winter leagues to "improve their skills" and, more
importantly, to generate an income. Baseball, you see, forces
minor league players to forgo outside career development. A
minor league player isn't paid during the off-season, which lasts
through the 4 1/2 months of winter. That means a player can't
afford to go to school or work an entry level position with the
potential of preparing him for professional opportunities once he
is washed-up in baseball. He has to find a way to get
compensated playing baseball 12 months a year.
AsI said before, minor league players are literally owned
by Baseball. Houston had acquired exclusive rights to me in 1965
and, in 1969, traded me to the team that became the Milwaukee
Brewers. They would own me, unless they traded my contract or
released me, for the rest of my career. I was actually fortunate
compared to today's player. The summer after I negotiated my
player's contract with Houston, new minor league players became
subject to an exclusive draft. They are now notified by
whichever team has drafted them. Their only choice is to sign
with that team or not play. If they wait until the following
year's draft they face the same dilemma.
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Anyway, I was enjoying tremendous success pitching in Mexico
when I was approached by officials for a Japanese team and asked
if I would be interested in playing in Japan if they could get my
contract. I knew that, in those days, the few players who where
able to get out of their American contracts and go to Japan had
signed multi-year contracts for sizeable salaries. The Japanese
league told me that if they could buy my contract from
Milwaukee, they could pay me four times what I was earning with
my club and give me a guaranteed two year contract with
additional option years. They also offered to pay my housing
expenses during the contract years and provide four round trips
per year back to the U.S.. I told them if they could get my
contract from Marvin Milkes, Milwaukee GM, they'd have a pitcher.
The Japanese gentlemen later told me the Brewers turned down
their $200,000+ offer, saying that they wouldn't sell me for any
figure. So, I was forced to remain with Milwaukee. Ironically,
a few weeks later I began negotiating for the upcoming year and
all I heard from my GH was how bad I was and that it was
impossible to give me a raise over the previous year. A minor
league player has no leverage and almost no negotiating power.
After spring training camp in 1971, to my great joy, I made
the team and was in the Milwaukee bullpen opening day. But it
was too good to be true, after the first game I was traded to the
Baltimore Orioles. That year, the Orioles were defending World
Champs. Their pitching staff was already the best in baseball.
It was back to the minor leagues for me. My other choice was to
quit baseball.
There were other players on my AAA team who could have been
playing for another major league team, but because of a loaded
championship team in Baltimore --At least 12 players with big
league experience and successful records were forced to stay in
Rochester during the critical phase of their career. Not to
mention a lost year on the major league pension program.,
I was almost unhittable in 1971, going 15-5 with five
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shutouts in one month, and winning the Pitcher of the Year award
for AAA International League. But, no call up came from the
Orioles. Other team's managers and players came to me and said
their parent clubs were trying to trade for me, but the Orioles
wouldn't trade. I was back up insurance in case someone got hurt
-- my dream of being in the big leagues didn't matter to them.
It's fair to say that some players I knew went on to
splendid, big league careers, and one extra year in the minors
probably doesn't seem like much to them now. But, for me, that
one extra year lost from the big leagues meant a 25% reduction
per year in my retirement pension, which wasn't large to start.
What it meant to my career overall, I'll never really know.
But if Houston, Milwaukee and Baltimore and those teams I
was traded to later had not had the special privilege of the
antitrust exemption they could not have "owned" me for my ENTIRE
baseball career and would not have been able to make my career
choices for me. Today's drafted minor league players get locked
up for as much 6 1/2 years--not much better than in my day.
I'm sure the major league club owners would argue that the
restrictions on movement for minor league players are necessary.
They say that they spend hundreds of thousands of dollars
developing each minor league player who-makes it to the big
leagues. So, the owners need to make sure their investment is
protected from other owners who might otherwise raid the stable.
I believe it is possible to give the minor league players
freedom and still preserve the farm system. But, with a license
to act as a monopoly, the major league owners have no incentive
to find alternatives. For example, they could use the entire
minor league system as a combined player development pool,
dipping in and acquiring someone from any team for a needed
position based on ability, performance and merit. That way each
owner wouldn't be limited to the best available player within his
team's minor league system, and a minor league player wouldn't be
a captive of his organization.
The minor league teams are already supported almost entirely
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by the major league teams. This system would simply allow a
player blocked from the big leagues by a talent rich team to go
to another big league team and realize his life's ambition.
A minor league player out of college -- if he goes to
college, most don't -- is 22 years old and obligated to the team
that drafts him until he is 28 years old, or older, before he
gains the right to move to another team on his own. Talent
should flow where it is needed, and players who have the ability
shouldn't be trapped in a dead end organization for the better
part of their younger years. They deserve the opportunity to
move to teams that need them while they have prime performance
years available.
Players aren't the only victims of the restrictions imposed
on the minor leagues by the major league club owners. Towns and
cities that boast minor league teams are subject to the impact of
business decisions they have no part in making. When a minor
league team is forced to change its affiliation with a major
league team the whole operation can be uprooted and moved to a
different city leaving the first community with an empty stadium
and disappointed fans. Over the years I've watched Charleston,
West Virginia; Louisville, Kentucky; Evansville, Indiana;
Winnipeg, Alberta; and many other communities lose home town
teams that way. I imagine the loss to merchants and families
economically or emotionally committed to those teams has serious
repercussions for years.
Fair play and team spirit that baseball teaches school kids
on playgrounds and little league fields all over America
shouldn't have to be left on the field for those who grow up to
play professionally. When management has the advantage of being
an unrestricted cartel, for the 3200 professional players who are
on minor league teams today--and the hope-filled kids who will be
drafted next summer, baseball is no longer a fair contest. I
consider it a privilege and honor to have played minor and major
league baseball, I hope by speaking here today I will have given
something back to the kids who make the game possible.
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WASHINGTON, DC 20510-8275
January/Z, 1993
Roric Harrison
27271 Las Ramblas
Mission Viejo, CA 92691
Dear Mr. Harrison:
Thank you for testifying at the December 10, 1992
Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopolies and Business Rights hearing
cn baseball's antitrust immunity. Your views on this issue are
greatly appreciated and very helpful.
Unfortunately, due to the time constraints on the day of the
hearing, there are a few questions that were not answered.
Please respond, in writing, to the following questions posed by
Senator Thuzmond by no later than Monday, January 25, 1993:
) Has there been any change in the rules governing minor
league players since you participated in the sport?
2) Would you address whether there has been any attempt to
unionize the minor league players in the same way as the
major league players, and if not, why not?
I look forward to working with you in the future- as the
a.bcommittee continues its work in this area.
Again, thank you for your contribution.
Very sincerely yourt
Chairman,
Subcommittee on Antitrust,
Monopolies and Business Rights
HMM/eao
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February 8, 1993
Senator Howard M. Metzenbaum
Chairman, Subcommittee On Antitrust,
Monopolies and Business Rights
Room 308 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Senator Metzenbaum:
Thank you for inviting me to testify at the hearing on
baseball's antitrust immunity. The experience of
participating in the hearings was a privilege I will never
forget.
In response to the questions posed by senator Thurmond, I am
submitting the following statement:
Question 1: No changes that I am aware of since the 1976
change which gave the club the right to reserve a minor
league player for six additional contracts after his
original agreement, or seven years.
Question 2: There have been various incipient tries to
organize minor league players but without success. The
prohibitive costs associated with such attempts have
rendered future efforts unlikely.
If I can be of help in any way, please don't hesitate to let
me know.
Again, thank you for allowing me to play a small part in
your subcommittee's important review of baseball's business
practices.
sincerely yours,
Roric Harrison
RH:ct
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Senator METZENBAUM. I think it is appropriate that this hearing
having to do with the owners and having to do with Mr. Vincent's
role and the role of others getting teams, not getting teams-that
it is appropriate that the last witness at this hearing is somebody
speaking for the consumers of America, a very able spokesperson,
in fact, one we have heard from many times previously, Gene
Kimmelman of the Consumer Federation of America. We are de-
lighted to have you with us.
STATEMENT OF GENE KIMMELMAN
Mr. KIMMELMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think the one
thing I can say for sure for all consumers in America is they wish
that even for just one inning they were unhittable as a pitcher, not
a whole season.
It is an honor to be here, Mr. Chairman, Senator Feinstein, Sen-
ator Specter, Senator Mack, on behalf of the Consumer Federation.
We certainly will support your efforts to eliminate baseball's anti-
trust exemption and subject major league baseball to the same pro-
competition rules that other businesses must live with.
I would like to take a slightly different tack at this point. You
have heard many of the reasons for eliminating the antitrust ex-
emption already today, and I certainly would say from a fan's point
of view, the notion of having more teams, having expansion, wheth-
er it be in Florida or elsewhere, is a very welcome thought. But in
the interim, until that happens, there is a sort of minor consolation
prize for the public, and that is the opportunity to watch baseball
games on television, and I want to address a concern we have with
trends that we believe are related to baseball's antitrust immunity.
And when I speak of the antitrust immunity, it is not just the com-
mon law immunity, but what we think may be an overbroad read-
ing of the 1961 Sports Broadcasting Act by the leagues.
We think the antitrust exemption hurts sports fans who want to
watch games on TV. By using territorial restrictions, traditional
horizontal restraints, we think baseball is trying to maximize its
revenues by limiting output, limiting televised games to raise
prices, prices that ultimately are paid by the public.
Some ominous trends, Mr. Chairman, we think, are developing.
Let me give you a few examples in television contracts. Everyone
remembers the old, traditional Saturday afternoon game of the
week, the only opportunity to watch national televised baseball. It
used to be on over 30 Saturdays; now, 16. In many communities
where people cannot afford cable television-and even with our
new regulated rates, it certainly is more expensive than free over-
the-air television-the opportunity to watch national games and to
watch the national pastime is severely restricted.
In the last few years, the New York Yankees have shifted a large
portion of their games from free over-the-air television to pay cable,
again raising prices for the many New York Yankees fans who
used to watch games for free over the air.
A contract between major league baseball and ESPN involves an
absolute prohibition anywhere in the country for watching over-
the-air baseball games Wednesday night, and in some instances
Sunday evenings-no over-the-air games because of this cable con-
tract. You can get a lot of games on cable if you are willing to pay,
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but the free games that were once available these evenings are no
longer available to the American people. We see a trend of more
and more pay-per-view packages, pay options, more and more
money consumers have to shell out to watch the national pastime.
Unfortunately, we think this trend is likely to continue, iron-
ically, at a time when there are greater viewing options for the
public and more competition coming to the market for multichannel
video distribution. We have a growth of cable options. We have new
satellite distribution systems coming to market, we have wireless
cable, more and more games, and yet the leagues are trying to cut
back on these games, starting with the superstations.
Major league baseball has testified before another subcommittee
of this committee that it would like to eliminate the cable compul-
sory license. This would be an effort, we believe, to wipe out super-
station telecasts. The Braves, the Cubs, the White Sox, and the
Mets carried now nationwide on cable systems would no longer be
available unless agreements could be worked out to pay major
league baseball more, and former Commissioner Vincent indicated
there was not a strong interest in having this broad national dis-
tribution of games.
Now, the greatest fear we have from a consumer perspective is
that just as we are about to get more distributional competition,
competition to cable, we could see exclusive contracts for one dis-
tribution medium, possibly cable only, signed by major league base-
ball, which would lock up the distribution of games to one way of
reaching the fans, cable television. This could be the death knell
to these technologies, these new potential competitors to cable, and
again could lead to dramatic price increases for consumers.
Now, without antitrust immunity, with free-market pressures,
we think fans would benefit, first, by having increased options for
free over-the-air television of major league baseball, and there
would be increased pressure on cable and its new competitors to
offer new, attractive packages at attractive prices for consumers.
We could virtually have baseball on demand in this country, and
if that sounds too much like pie-in-the-sky, I want to remind you
of what the situation is with radio.
As a kid growing up in Cincinnati, OH, finding out that my fam-
ily was going to move to Tennessee, my heart was broken. I was
a Reds fan; I couldn't give up the Cincinnati Reds. Lo and behold,
we have in this country clear-signal channels, and I found that I
could listen to WCKY and WLW and pick up the Reds games in
Tennessee. Then I also found I could pick up WCAU and listen to
the Phillies, and KDKA, the Pirates. I could listen to the Mets, I
could listen to the White Sox, I could listen to Yankees games.
Clear-station radio in this country, for free, has offered consum-
ers something that is just wonderful, not just for a little kid like
me at that time. Why can't we do that on television? There is no
technical reason we can't do that, but we are fearful that territorial
restrictions that major league baseball enters into to limit broad-
casts and to limit the potential for new technologies will wipe out
that potential option and new competitive options for consumers.
We urge you, Mr. Chairman, to eliminate this barrier to greater
fan access to more games and television competition for attractively
packaged and priced games, just as has been the case for college
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sports telecasts when the NCAA was subjected to antitrust andjust as other businesses in our economy have learned to live with
and prosper under. Our Nation's procompetition laws are good
enough for everyone else. Mr. Chairman, we believe they should be
good enough for major league baseball.
Thank you.
[Mr. Kimmelman submitted the following material:]
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INTRODUCTION
The Consumer Federation of America (CFA) believes that
sports fans and the general public are increasingly harmed by
professional sports league activities that are not subject to our
nation's pro-competition, antitrust laws. To promote maximum
sports viewing options at the lowest price and to infuse
competitive market pressures in the structure of Major League
Baseball, CFA urges Congress to eliminate Major League Baseball's
antitrust immunity' and to ensure that the Sports Broadcasting
Act's antitrust exception is limited to national off-air
broadcasting contracts.2
Hidden behind our national pastime's positive cultural image
is a pattern of questionable business practices, peculiar (and
possibly extortionist) expansion and franchise transfer
decisions, volatile labor relations and anti-consumer television
contracts that are shielded from antitrust scrutiny. While CFA
believes sports fans and society at large would be better served
if all these activities were subject to the pro-competition rules
that govern our economy, we wish to focus our attention in this
testimony on the importance of antitrust to dangerous trends in
professional sports video contracts.
In the increasingly competitive multichannel video
marketplace that is likely to develop under the 1992 Cable Act,'
consumers' sports viewing options should expand significantly and
1 See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Toolson v. New
York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953); Federal Baseball
Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of
Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
2 15 U.S.C. § 1291.
3 Public Law 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (Oct. 5, 1992).
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cable prices should fall to competitive market levels.' New
direct broadcast satellite and wireless competitors to cable
could offer consumers imaginative new options and packages for
sports programming otherwise available on broadcast channels,
superstations (i.e. WTBS, WGN, WWOR), cable channels or new
sports networks. Competitive forces should drive down prices and
increasingly respond to niche market demand (e.g., offer native
New Yorkers who retire to Florida a greater opportunity to watch
the Yankees or Mets). With new technologies offering consumers
dramatically larger channel capacity in an increasingly
competitive video marketplace, it is conceivable that sports fans
could watch virtually any game they desire for free (i.e., over-
the-air) or at a reasonable price.
I. The Antitrust Loophole: Horizontal Restraints that Result
in Fewer Games on TV at Higher Prices.
These potential consumer benefits may be impossible to
achieve, however, as a result of Major League Baseball's federal
antitrust exemption. Without public scrunity of horizontal
agreements that limit output in order to maximize revenue, it is
no wonder that baseball has established a set of rules
restricting the sale of television rights to particular
territories. By dividing markets among its teams, the League
ensures that teams cannot enter each other's territories to
compete on the basis of price (e.g., free-TV v. cable, basic
cable v. pay-channels), quantity of games available, or quality
of viewing options. This results in an opportunity and incentive
for the League to maximize television profits by reducing viewing
options or by making them more expensive for baseball fans.
4 Numerous economists claim cable's basic rates are
inflated 20-30 percent above competitive market prices.
See Thompson v. Higgins, "FCC Faces Thorny Questions
About Rate Re-regulation," Multichannel News, Nov. 23,
1992 at 50.
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Recent trends in professional sports television contracts,
shielded with antitrust immunity, threaten to deny consumers the
full fruits of video competition. Major League Baseball has more
than cut in half the number of games available for national over-
the-air viewing on its traditional Saturday afternoon "game of
the week." The New York Yankees have shifted a substantial
amount of local television coverage from free over-the-air
channels to an expensive cable network.' Consumers may no longer
watch free over-the-air baseball games on Wednesday or, in some
instances, Sunday evenings because the League gave ESPN exclusive
television rights during these time slots, to maximize cable
revenue.
7 Also, more and more professional sports teams are
promoting pay-per-view television packages.'
Despite significant technological advances that should
dramatically expand sports viewing options, Major League Baseball
has acted like a classic monopolist attempting to limit output
and raise prices. By dividing the country into exclusive "home
television territories"' the League ensures that clubs can shift
television rights from over-the-air stations to cable networks
without fear that a local broadcaster would compete by importing
another team's games. Similarly, the League can use its
territorial restrictions to prevent local broadcasters from
substituting new national telecasts on the Saturday afternoons
when fans can no longer view a "game of the week" telecast.
5 see Smith, "Fight Baseball's TV Fadeout," New York Times,
Oct. 1, 1989.
6 See Mc Manus, "The Perie of Pinstripes", Sports Inc.,
Feb. 20, 1989 at 42.
7 See Statement of Fay Vincent before the Senate Judiciary
Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopolies and Business
Rights, Nov. 14, 1989 at 5-6.
8 See Brown, "Slow Bat Sure, Local Sports Trying PPV,"
Broadcasting, June 8, 1992 at 21.
9 See Memorandum to Broadcasting Directors from David
Alworth, Major League Baseball, April 29, 1992.
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These territorial restrictions allow major league teams to
maximize television revenue by maintaining a monopoly on local
baseball viewing options. Through limitations on television
distribution rights (i.e., output), the League provides fewer
viewing options than fans desire, which results in above-market
prices for televising/viewing rights.
This anti-consumer behavior is most obvious in Major League
Baseball's political efforts to undermine superstation
distribution of the Atlanta Braves, Chicago cubs, Chicago White
Sox, and New York Mets." By eliminating cable operators'
automatic right to retransmit local broadcast stations (i.e., the
cable compulsory license), the League hopes to prevent WTBS, WGN
and WWOR from distributing locally televised baseball games to
cable systems and viewers throughout the country. By limiting
superstation telecasts, the League could bring in more money from
cable's "regional sports" channels and pay-per-view. Of course
this means fewer games at a higher price for baseball fans."
The public dangers associated with Baseball's efforts to
limit television distribution will grow substantially as
competitors to cable television enter the video market. If the
League continues to use exclusive television contracts to
maximize revenue, it could sell exclusive rights to one video
distribution medium -- like cable TV -- and thereby prevent
wireless cable or direct broadcast satellite systems from
obtaining the type of sports programming that would make these
distribution systems competitive with cable. Not only would
these exclusive arrangements leave fans without competitive
10 See Statement of Commissioner Fay Vincent before theSenate Judiciary Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and
Trademarks, April 29, 1992.
11 ZpA Statement of Gene Kimmelman before the Senate
Judiciary Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and
Trademarks, April 29, 1992.
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options for sports viewing, they could stymie the development of
multichannel video competition in general.
II. Benefits of Eliminating Antitrust Immunity.
These anti-consumer trends may be averted without harming
Baseball by eliminating the League's antitrust immunity. No
other professional sports league -- the NBA, NFL, or NHL -- has
had any difficulty maintaining important league functions under
full antitrust liability. Contrary to Major League Baseball's
claims, necessary measures to protect weak franchises, promote
fair distribution of quality athletes or share revenue in an
equitable fashion do not require antitrust immunity. As a matter
of fact, insulation from competitive forces may be one of the
fundamental causes for public disenchantment with Baseball's
management. If the NBA, NFL and NHL can manage and prosper
within the confines of our nation's pro-competition laws, so
should baseball.
This principal applies equally for professional sports
television contracts. Full application of the antitrust laws to
National Collegiate Athlete Association (NCAA) contracts for
televising college sporting events has led to a dramatic
expansion in sports viewing options for the American people. In
determining that an NCAA restriction on college football
telecasts violates the antitrust laws, the Court demonstrated how
a "rule of reason" analysis of professional sports television
contracts would protect appropriate league functions while
promoting greater consumer welfare:
What the NCAA and its member institutions market in
this case is competition itself -- contests between
competing institutions. Of course, this would be
completely ineffective if there were no rules on which
the competitors agreed to create and define the
competition to be marketed. A myriad or rules
affecting such matters as the size of the field, the
number of players on a team, and the extent to which
physical violence is to be encouraged or proscribed,
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all must be agreed upon, and all restrain the manner in
which institutions compete. Moreover, the NCAA seeks
to market a particular brand of football -- college
football. The identification of this "product" with an
academic tradition differentiates college football from
and makes it more popular than professional sports to
which it might otherwise be comparable, such as, for
example, minor league baseball. In order to preserve
the character and quality of the "product" athletes
must not be paid, must be required to attend classes,
and the like. And the integrity of the "product"
cannot be preserved except by mutual agreement; if an
institution adopted such restrictions unilaterally, its
effectiveness as a competitor on the playing field
might soon be destroyed. Thus, the NCAA plays a vital
role in enabling college football to preserve its
character, and as a result enables a product to be
marketed which might otherwise be unavailable. In
performing this role, its actions widen consumer choice
-- not only the choices available to sports fans but
also those available to athletes -- and hence can be
viewed as pro-competitive.
Despite the fact that this case involves restraints on
the ability of member institutions to compete in terms
of price and output, a fair evaluation of their
competitive character requires consideration of the
NCAA's justifications for the restraints.
Our analysis of this case under the Rule of Reason, of
course, does not change the ultimate focus of our
inquiry.
Because it restrains price and output, the NCAA's
television plan has a significant potential for anti-
competitive effects. The findings of the District
court indicate that this potential has been realized.
The District Court found that if member institutions
were free to sell television rights, many more games
would be shown on television, and that the NCAA's
output restriction has the effect of raising the price
the networks pay for television rights. Moreover, the
court found that by fixing price for television rights
to all games, the NCAA creates a price structure that
is unresponsive to viewer demand and unrelated to the
prices that would prevail in a competitive market.
And, of course, since as a practical matter all member
institutions need NCAA approval, members have no real
choice but to adhere to the NCAA's television controls.
The anti-competitive consequences of this arrangement
are apparent. Individual competitors lose their
freedom to compete. Price is higher and output lower
than they would otherwise be, and both are unresponsive
to consumer preference. This latter point is perhaps
the most significant, since "Congress designed the
Sherman Act as a 'consumer welfare prescription."'
Egiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979).
(Footnotes omitted)."
12 NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85,
at 101-107 (1984).
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A more recent application of this legal standard to the
National Basketball Association's (NBA) television contracts
illustrates the value of antitrust to sports fans. A federal
district court judge found that the NBA's effort to reduce the
number of superstation telecasts of pro-basketball games from 25
to 20 per season was an unreasonable restraint of trade. The
court's detailed antitrust analysis points out the danger
consumers face when professional sports leagues attempt to reduce
telecasts available to competing media outlets:
The 5-game reduction damages competition in several
areas. It constrains competition between the teams and
the league, by ousting teams from a portion of the
national television market and allocating that portion
to the league. It reduces competition between
basketball on superstations and basketball on the
networks, to the extent that they compete for viewers,
and by the same token, also reduces competition between
superstations and the networks for advertisers.
Further, by placing an artificial limit on the number
of games in the market, the reduction makes supply less
responsive to demand. Limiting the teams to 20 games
keeps the teams from judging for themselves how many
superstation games the market might bear -- and there
clearly is demand as evidenced both by the audiences,
outside Chicago and Atlanta, for superstation games and
the interest among advertisers in buying time during
those games. The number of games on television is less
responsive to the preferences of broadcasters,
advertisers and fans than it would be in a freer
market.
The 5-game reduction also keeps viewers from deciding
whether the games they want to watch will be on a
superstation or on the networks. It "curtail(s) output
and blunt(s) the ability of (the teams) to respond to
consumer preference." HCAA, 468 U.S. at 120. It
preempts market mechanisms by deciding for viewers,
broadcasters and advertisers that they do not need
games that they are currently demanding and, in doing
so, "impairs the ability of the market to advance
social welfare by ensuring the provision of desired
goods." FTC -. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476
U.S. 447, 459 (1986) ("Indiana Dentists")."
While it is unlikely that the public or professional sports
leagues would suffer any ill consequences from application of
"rule of reason" antitrust analysis to television contracts, it
may be appropriate for Congress to maintain the limited antitrust
13 Chicago Professional Sports Limited Partnership and WGN
v. NBA, 754 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
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immunity for contracts involving national over-the-air football,
baseball, basketball or hockey telecasts. So long as this narrow
exemption contained in the Sports Broadcasting Act's antitrust
exemption, which enabled the NFL to sell a package of games to
one network so that all road games would be televised in a team's
home area -- is not interpreted to apply to pay or cable
contracts, the consumer benefits of subjecting Major League
Baseball to our antitrust laws would be preserved."
CONCLUSION
Unless Congress eliminates Major League Baseball's exemption
from federal antitrust laws, consumers are unlikely to reap the
full benefits of new multichannel video technologies and viewing
options. Behind the shield of antiturst immunity, Baseball is
increasingly relying on horizontal, territory-restricting
agreements to control output, reduce free over-the-air telecasts,
and promote cable or pay-er-view television options that result
in higher prices for sports fans and advertisers. However, if
baseball is required to abide by our nation's pro-competition
laws, consumers are likely to receive greater viewing choices at
lower prices.
14 This interpretation of the Sports Broadcasting Act is
consistent with the Act's legislative history. See Ross,
"An Antitrust Analysis of Sports League Contracts with
Cable Networks," Emory Law Journal, Vol. 39, No. 2,
Spring 1990.
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WcmSEflSon cnCOMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
WASHINGTON, DC 20510Y6275
January 11; 1993
Gene Kimmelman
Consumer Federation of America
1424 16th Street, N.W.
Suite 604
Washington, D.C. 20036
Dear Mr. KimmI SOelman:
Thank you for testifying at the December 10, 1992
Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopolies and Business Rights hearing
on Baseball's antitrust immunity. Your views on this issue are
greatly appreciated and very helpful.
Unfortunately, due to the time constraints on the day of the
hearing, there are a few questions that were not answered.
Please respond, in writing, to the following questions no later
than Monday, January 25, 1993:
Chairman Metzenbaum's questions:
1. How doeBa s atitrus antitrust exemption facilitate the
movement of games from ,free TV to cable?
2. Can you give us some examples of how Baseball's territorial
restrictions hurt fans? Would fans be better off if these
restrictions were subject to antitrust review?
3. You have testified that Congress should eliminate the
blanket antitrust immunity granted to Baseball by the
Supreme Court in 1922. Do you also believe that Congress
should repeal or amend the 1961 Sports Broadcasting Act?
4. You have suggested that the insulation of Baseball's TV
deals from antitrust scrutiny also could hinder development
of competition in the cable TV business. How would that
happen?
Senator Thurmond's question:
1) Do you propose that we repeal the Sports Broadcasting Act of
1961, or is your concern only with cable?
I look forward to working with you in the future as theSubcommittee continues its work in this area.
Again, thank you for your contribution.
Very sincerely yours,
Howard M. Metzenbaum
Chairman,
Subcommittee on Antitrust,
Monopolies and Business Rights
HMM/eao
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Consumer Fedbi i6ifdAmerica
January 28, 1993
The Honorable Howard M. Metzenbaum
Chairman
Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopolies
and Business Rights
United States Senate
Russell Building, Room 140
Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Chairman Metzenbaum:
Please find enclosed our response to your questions and
Senator Thurmond's questions concerning major league baseball's
antitrust immunity.
I look forward to working with you in the future on this
issue.
S rely,
ene K1 man
Legislative Director
Consumer Federation of
America
1424 16th Street. N.W.. Suite 604 * Washington. D.C. 20036 * (202) 387-6121
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CFA'S ANSWERS TO CHAIRMAN METZENBAUM'S QUESTIONS
1. Without antitrust scrutiny, Major League Baseball is able
to negotiate television contracts with cable networks
that pay a premium for exclusive distribution rights to
narrow segments of the TV-viewing public. Under
traditional antitrust analysis, such restrictions on
output and efforts to raise price would be suspect.
However, Baseball's antitrust exemption increasingly
enables cable networks that can pay a premium, and pass
along the cost to subscribers, to outbid the free over-
the-air networks for television rights to baseball games.
2. Territorial restrictions that are insulated from
antitrust principles allow baseball teams to prevent
sports fans from watching which ever teams or games they
prefer to see on television. For example, after the
Yankees moved many of their games from free-TV to cable,
New York's broadcast stations could not replace these
Yankees games with Red Sox or other popular teams' games
because of territorial restrictions. If the antitrust
laws applied, the Yankees could not have blocked this
competition, and therefore would most likely have kept
all their games on free-TV. New Yorkers would either be
able to watch all Yankees games, or other popular games,
for free.
3. To the extent the Sports Broadcasting Act is applied only
as Congress intended -- to cover free over-the-air
national "telecasts" of professional sporting events, it
does not harm consumers. However, if the professional
sports-leagues succeed in convincing the courts to apply
the Act to local television contracts, cablecasts or
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other technologies, consumers would be harmed by the
types of anti-competitive exclusive television
distribution arrangements available to Baseball, as
described in response to Questions 1, 2, and 4. At the
appropriate time, we urge that the Congress reiterate its
original narrow intent in passing the Sports Broadcasting
Act.
4. Under the 1992 Cable Act, Congress sought to promote
competition to the cable industry by ensuring that
cable's potential competitors could purchase cable-owned
programming at market prices. In an effort to thwart
this competition, cable companies could purchase
exclusive rights to televise the most important games of
the most popular baseball teams. Shielded from antitrust
liability, Baseball might accept a premium price offer
from cable for exclusive television rights that prevents
satellite or other competitors from offering consumers
programming that is comparable to cable service. This
would impede the development of multichannel video
competition, contrary to Congress' stated goals in the
1992 Cable Act.
ANSWER TO SENATOR THURMOND'S QUESTION
1. As described above in response to Chairman Metzenbaum's
third question, CFA believes it is important for Congress
to clarify that it did not intend for the Sports
Broadcasting Act's antitrust immunity to extend beyond
national over-the-air broadcasts of professional sporting
events. At this time, we do not believe it is essential
to repeal the Act.
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Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much, Mr. Kimmelman.
We will have 5-minute rounds for those of us who are still here and
then conclude this hearing.
I want to say a prefatory statement to you, Mr. Harrison, that
I don't know how much impact your testimony is going to have
with reference to the repealing of the antitrust exemption, but I
can tell you that it has had sufficient impact that I am determined
that I will put in a piece of legislation to deal with the question
of what I consider to be involuntary service because I don't think
that is the right way to treat people, whether it is in baseball or
at General Motors or at General Dynamics, or wherever. I just
don't think that that is the way this country has operated. I am
hopeful my colleague from Pennsylvania and perhaps my colleague
from California and others will join me. I think we can move it.
Having said that, let me start by asking Professors Roberts, Noll,
and Zimbalist, and perhaps Mr. Kimmelman as well, to focus
sharply on probably what is the most important question before us.
How does the antitrust exemption affect the fans? In what ways,
if any, does the antitrust exemption cost fans money or result in
fans losing benefits or opportunities which they might otherwise
have if major league baseball was not exempt from the antitrust
laws? Mr. Zimbalist.
Mr. ZIMBALIST. Well, I think, as I tried to indicate in my oral tes-
timony, that the exemption makes it impossible for rival leagues to
go to the minor leagues. To have access to that group of players
would be the natural alternative to form a rival league. Because of
the reserve system in the minor leagues and because of the exemp-
tion and because of the unlikelihood of being able to successfully
sue on the grounds of exploitative adhesion because of the exemp-
tion, it is not possible to get a rival league using AA and AAA
minor leaguers. This, it seems to me, has forestalled the creation
of rival leagues.
Baseball is the only sport that has not had a rival league since
World War H. It has had slower expansion. So I think this is a
very, very important factor. Lilting the exemption by itself would
not guarantee that we have a rival league. It would increase the
chances that we have it, and if you had rival leagues and you had
competition, then all sorts of very salutary things would follow
from the consumer point of view.
Senator METZENBAUM. Mr. Roberts.
Mr. ROBERTS. Well, I guess my whole point is that I don't know
the answer to the question because repealing the exemption as-
sumes you know what the Federal courts are going to do with the
antitrust laws in baseball when you get done repealing it, and I
have had enough experience with the Federal courts to know that
what these guys are going to do with it-you can take Judges
Easterbrook and Posner on one side and Abner Mikva and a few
others on the other side, and you try and tell me who is going to
get these cases and what they are going to do with them. I just
don't know, and that is the problem. If we have got problems in
baseball, and we have got them, let us deal with the problems in-
stead of repealing an exemption and Lord knows what is going to
happen.
Senator METZENBAUM. Professor Noll.
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Mr. NoLL. I think specifically, beyond repealing the exemption,
you ought to repeal the Sports Broadcasting Act because that, in
fact, creates part of the problem about expansion franchises. The
reason the leagues won't expand is because they don't want one
more mouth to feed in the fixed broadcasting contracts, and that
is just pure protection of monopoly profit. There is absolutely no
economic or social justification for protecting monopoly profit, and
that is why they don't expand.
What your legislation ought to do besides repealing those two ex-
emptions is prohibit collaboration between leagues in the sale of
rights for broadcasting-Gene Kimmelman's point about local terri-.
torial rights-prohibit mutual recognition among leagues of restric-
tions on the competition for players, prohibit agreements between
leagues about franchise locations, and prohibit exclusive agree-
ments for sports facilities; that is to say, have legislative teeth be-
hind one of the antitrust cases that was lost, which is the Hecht
case, which says that these exclusive leases are illegal, but, in fact,
they still exist.
I think that you do need proactive action beyond simply repeal
because Mr. Selig is right. The situation isn't all that much better
in football and basketball than it is in baseball, and they have anti-
trust exposure.
Senator METZENBAUM. Mr. Kimmelman, do you care to comment?
Mr. KIMMELMAN. I think you should eliminate the exemption. I
think you can't really predict what the free market will bring. We
do have some experience with the other professional leagues that
should dampen expectations, but one concrete example: The Chi-
cago Bulls tried to protect the number of games they were showing
on their super station. The NBA didn't like it. They wanted to re-
duce superstation games from 25 to 20. The courts found that was
a violation of the antitrust laws. I mean, it is those kinds of con-
crete things that we know of today, efforts to reduce fan access to
sports on television, that are of concern. Elimination of antitrust
immunity protects the fans that way, and an increasingly competi-
tive environment for television rights, we think the benefits could
be much larger than that.
Senator METZENBAUM. Mr. Harrison, as I see it, the way baseball
treats its minor league players is really an abuse of monopoly
power. Most of these kids are typically out of school; most of them
are not even college graduates. I think they are high school play-
ers. They sign with a team and once they sign, the team owns
them for 6 years. They can't go to any other team, no matter how
well they are playing. If the team doesn't need them or they are
not playing well enough, whatever the case may be, they are locked
in. The team isn't under any obligation to release them regardless
of whether their major league affiliate ever uses their talents.
Can you give me any good reason why owners should be allowed
to treat minor league players as indentured servants, or was any
ever given to you when you were in that category?
Mr. HARRISON. Well, I was not in that information loop with my
owner, but I can-
Senator METZENBAUM. What was that?
Mr. HARRISON. I say I was not in that information loop with the
owner of my team when I signed. I mean, he did not give me that
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information of why he thought it should stay that way, and I cer-
tainly see no reason why it should stay that way. Mr. Selig, in rep-
resenting the owners, talked about the moral obligation he has to
the general public, but where is the moral obligation he has to his
own employees, mid-level and low-level, which are the minor
leagues, if you want to bring in the business aspect of it, as he
does? He shows no moral obligation there, let alone the good labor
practices that all other businesses must live with in business.
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much.
Senator Specter.
Senator SPECTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think today's
hearings have been very informative, and I thank all of you gentle-
men for coming. With seven witnesses, it is a little hard to do too
much on questions in 5 minutes. I would like to make an observa-
tion or two and perhaps ask a question.
One of the very revealing statements, to me, was the one about
not being romantic about the history of baseball which Mr. Vincent
commented about and which I discussed with him, as contrasted
with your testimony, Mayor Jordan, or your testimony, Mr. Har-
rison, that the essence of baseball is the romanticism. I think part
of what we need to do on a joint effort is to bring back the field
of dreams. It can't be perfect, but baseball has to be more than sim-
ply a money machine.
When Tampa Bay and St. Petersburg were referred to as a base-
ball asset, I know how that made you feel, Mr. Dodge. By those
standards, there are many other baseball assets around the coun-
try today which are really not baseball assets at all. Baseball is an
American asset and it is being run conversely, that is not being run
right.
We talk about some of the statutory changes which are pro-
posed-and I went to your statement, Mr. Roberts, to see what
your ideas were because you couldn't get to them in your testi-
mony; changes such as legislating a mandate on a minimum level
of revenue sharing-if you want to ask Congress to do that, you are
in deep water-requiring us to determine an expansion on a rea-
sonable timetable, or setting a minimum percentage of televised
games.
I think what we are going to be faced with, really, is either tak-
ing away the antitrust exemption and letting the market work or
not taking it away. You suggest splitting the sports leagues into
two or four independent leagues, and while that may be a good
idea, it will really have to be done, I think, by the courts in apply-
ing the antitrust laws if the exemption is removed.
But I do think these hearings are very important to put sports,
and not just baseball, but football, hockey, and basketball, on no-
tice that there are some really important problems out there on the
expansion to more cities. They just have to do that, and beyond St.
Petersburg and Tampa.
In discussing the business of pay television, one thing was sig-
nificant today. To get a commitment from Mr. Selig that they won't
go to pay TV on postseason games, League Championship or World
Series is significant. To the extent that such a statement has any
binding effect, I don't know, but it has some moral effect since he
is a spokesman for major league baseball. I think that is significant
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and I think that is something that those of us in the Congress can
hold them to, but they are creeping around the edges. Mr.
Kimmelman outlines it eloquently. It happens all over that they
are moving to pay TV by increments.
In addition they have to find a way to deal with teams like the
Pittsburgh Pirates, part of the major leagues, and not to take the
franchise away bit by bit-Bonilla, Bonds, et cetera.
Your testimony was very powerful, Mr. Harrison, as Senator
Metzenbaum said, and I join him. These are problems which we all
hope the leagues will address. This is a clarion bugle call putting
them on notice because if they don't, we will, and that is a bad al-
ternative.
Thank you.
Mr. ROBERTS. Senator, can I just say one thing in response?
Senator SPECTER. I should have allowed you some time, and this
generous clock has anyway because I did comment about your testi-
mony.
Mr. ROBERTS. I share your romantic view of baseball, but the
problem is, in the real world, it just ain't so. Asking people to
spend $100 million to buy a franchise and then run it in the public
interest is like asking a Senator not to worry about reelection. The
real world is out there and these are people who are in business
to make money.
If it is a national asset instead of a private asset, then the Gov-
ernment ought to buy it or regulate it, and expecting these peo-
ple-and they are not bad people; they are just businessmen who
have a lot of market power and they are going to use it, and that
is what they do.
Senator SPECTER. I think what you say has a lot of merit, and
there has to be a balance. Right now there is an imbalance and I
think, in large measure, by this antitrust exemption which we
are-
Mr. ROBERTS. That is where I disagree. I don't think the exemp-
tion gives them power at all.
Senator METZENBAum. There is a big difference between asking
Congress to regulate it, which nobody is suggesting, and question-
ing whether or not any particular business is entitled to an exemp-
tion from the laws that are applicable to everybody else. I think
you have turned it right up on its head. I don't think anybody is
suggesting that we are going to regulate baseball.
Mr. ROBERTS. Well, I am.
Senator METZENBAUM. Pardon?
Mr. ROBERTS. I am.
Mr. NOLL. He hasn't learned his lesson.
Senator METZENBAUM. Well, you liberal fellows-I wouldn't know
about that. [Laughter.]
Senator Feinstein.
Senator FEINSTEIN. I think Mr. Mack is next.
Senator METZENBAUM. Oh, I am sorry-no; we go back and forth.
Senator FEINSTEIN. Oh, you go back and forth, all right. Well,
this is my first hearing as a U.S. Senator and I must say, Mr.
Chairman and Senator Mack, it has been a very interesting one.
The more I think about it, it seems to me that the question of
the exemption comes down to whether you have got a team or you
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don't have a team. If you have got a team, you want to protect that
team. You want to see that it remains, and if the exemption is re-
moved there is the opportunity for the marketplace to move just
based on the owner's wishes alone without considering the civic
fabric, the amount invested, the fan stability, franchise stability,
all of those things. If you don't have a team, then you want to see
the exemption go because then you want those things.
Somehow, it seems to me that the exemption-I would almost
tend to agree with Mr. Roberts-isn't really what is going to solve
the problem of baseball. I don't know. If I were a baseball owner-
and I don't know how many of them are left here-I would really
be listening very carefully to what was said today because I do
think, in this day and age, there are some things that are very
compelling, and that is that you can't have your cake and eat it,
too.
Mr. Harrison's biographical remarks on his career are probably
not the kind of thing that most American people would say is right.
They would want a change. They would say, well, why couldn't he
exercise his talent? If you have a chance, go for it. I mean, that is
as American as the American pastime.
I am very deeply disturbed should the commissioner of baseball
become a CEO for owners because that, to me, would say baseball
is then a box of Tide on a supermarket shelf, and that all of the
things that we in cities go through to get a team, to keep a team,
and to support a team are really irrelevant.
So I really think right now, Mr. Chairman, because I think you
have made some very forceful remarks-you are known to have a
very forceful position-that the ball is in baseball's court, to use a
bad pun, and. it is going to be very interesting for me to watch and
see what comes out of this reorganization meeting. I just hope that
the owners and the representatives that are here today take as se-
riously as I did what I heard, and I thank you for the opportunity.
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much, and following your
line of reasoning, I hope the baseball owners don't think that they
can just volley the ball back and forth across the court, or else they
may wind up being in the courts.
Senator Mack.
Senator MACK. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and let me-
Senator METZENBAUM. It took me this many hours to get to be
cute.
Senator MACK. Mr. Chairman, let me say again how much I ap-
preciate your holding this hearing today. I do think it was timely.
I think it was, in fact, very valuable, and I want to express again
to you and to the staff that put together the witnesses today, it is
an excellent group of people and I wish that, in a sense, we had
more time. As Senator Specter indicated, it is difficult to come up
with a series of questions for seven people.
Through my mind went the thought as I saw Rick Dodge and
Mayor Jordan sitting side by side, and then listening to Mr. Har-
rison express so eloquently the problems and concerns of minor
league baseball and the players, that there are always-in almost
any process, there are winners and losers and we are moved by
those who come up at the short end. The question we have to ask
ourselves is what is the most significant or what is the most effec-
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tive, what is the most compassionate way to come up with making
those decisions about how you allocate resources, where teams go,
how consumers will have an access to watch this sport that we all
love. My conclusion really is that, in fact, it is through more reli-
ance on the free market.
As I listened to the discussion today-again, I came in here with
a preconceived idea, I must admit that, that it is time that the ex-
emption be lifted, but I was also somewhat affected by Mr. Zimba-
list's comments with maybe moving toward the splitting of the
teams into three or four leagues to really establish some competi-
tion. The idea of giving minor league baseball players a greater op-
portunity to participate in the sport is one that is really exciting
to me, and so I hope that we will be able to find some ways to be
helpful in that particular area.
I am convinced now more than I was when this hearing started
that if we will find a way for the free market to have a greater im-
pact on the decisions that major league baseball makes, there will
be more teams playing in more cities with more people playing in
the game and more fans having the opportunity to watch.
Since I do have just a bit more time, I just want to give Rick
Dodge the opportunity to just expand a little bit on whether you
thmk that you were used. I could probably come up with a more
eloquent way to say that, but what is the feeling of what happened
to you for the sixth or seventh time now through the process of try-
into et major league baseball?
mr. DODGE. The area certainly feels it has been used. The fans
feel they have been used. The city and county governments feel
they have been used. The point I was making earlier which is very
important is our quibble was never with the city of San Francisco.
They have also been used in this process, and for anyone to say
what baseball-look at the wreckage that now exists. The city of
San Francisco, not by its choice, and the city of St. Petersburg, not
by its choice, are in major litigation. Baseball is not part of that
process, but they, through their forced indemnification by the in-
vestor groups on both sides, have created the cities battling among
themselves.
There is loss of revenue to that stadium in San Francisco of
about $3 million a year. If you look at the trend of leases from the
1980's forward, they are no longer making leases that pay the debt
service to stadiums or their operating deficits. They are now subsi-
dizing those franchises. Players' revenues and salaries going up,
revenues in the game going up, revenues coming to stadiums and
communities going down to a subsidized position-yes, we feel we
were used.
Senator MAcK. Did you get any assurances from any team own-
ers or the commissioner's office about the criteria that were estab-
lished? Again, I made the point that you guys have played by the
rules that have been told to you, and it seems each time you do
that-who is it in the cartoon? Is it Lucy that holds the football
and says, I am going to hold it this time?
Mr. DODGE. This time, I am going to hold it.
Senator MACK. Yes, right.
Mr. DODGE. To be specific to that, when we were contacted by
the executives of the Giants, we asked, one, specifically, do you
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have permission to discuss the relocation and sale of this franchise?
We repeated that question three times both to the owner in San
Francisco and also to the commissioner, and each time received,
yes, you can proceed to negotiate a contract for sale, even to the
point that the announcement of that contract was approved by the
commissioner's office.
Senator MACK. You are saying that the commissioner's office spe-
cifically gave you permission to engage in an offer and acceptance
of a contract?
Mr. DODGE. Absolutely.
Senator MACK. Well, I think that is contrary to what we heard
earlier this morning.
Senator FEINSTEIN. Mr. Chairman, I think that is correct. I think
what Mr. Vincent said this morning, and we can check the record,
is that he said to the team, you now have the opportunity to exer-
cise your options, but he specifically said that did not mean we
could approve a contract.
Senator MACK. Let me get Rick Dodge again to give-
Mr. DODGE. That is right. He did announce that, but before we
went and met with the Giants in San Francisco, we specifically
asked for that to be reinforced specifically if we could enter into a
contract and whether he supported the relocation of that franchise
to Florida. We would have not proceeded to enter into that contract
without that permission and without that guarantee being offered
by the Giants.
Senator MACK. Mayor Jordan, I think you wanted to respond.
Mayor JORDAN. Thank you very much, Senator Mack. The issue
as I saw it from my point of view was that Baseball Commissioner
Fay Vincent did give Bob Lurie, the owner of the Giants, an oppor-
tunity to shop the team around the country, but at the same time
he also expected to have the offer brought to baseball before it was
signed, sealed, and delivered in principle.
The part that is confusing and frustrating to me is that I talked
to Bob Lurie; he told me he had signed the contract in principle.
At the same time, I already had organized a very prominent inves-
tor group in San Francisco who were out trying to put a package
together. In fact, one of the principal investors had already had in
his hands the financial records of the Giants, so that doesn't show
me an opportunity to keep the franchise in San Francisco. It
seemed that both of those offers could have been brought to the
baseball world, as Commissioner Fay Vincent mentioned this morn-
ing, so that a decision could be made as to which one is the best
offer, but also giving the San Francisco base an opportunity to
present their offer as well and not just shut them out, stating it
is tampering if you even bring across an offer yourself.
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much. I want to thank
each of the witnesses. Thank you, Senator Mack and Senator Fein-
stein, for being with us the entire day.
That concludes the hearing.
[Whereupon, at 2:47 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
[The following was subsequently submitted for the record:]
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